Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam

Author(s): Edwin E. Moise

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Spring, 1976), pp. 70-92
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2756362
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 Land Reformand Land Reform
Errorsin NorthVietnam
Edwin E. Moise

T HE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC of Vietnam(DRV) carriedout a large

land reformcampaign between 1953 and 1956.* On the surface it
was a program to abolish landlordism and place the land in the hands
of peasant smallholders, paving the way for a later transition to
cooperative farming.Considered simply in this light,the land reform
was quite successful. In fact,however, it had been a strugglenot only
for economic, but also for political power in the countryside,and in
this respect the results were much less fortunate.The campaign was
basically completed in July 1956. Over the next few months the Lao
Dong (Workers') Party discovered that it had been committing di-
sastrous errors. By the end of October these errors were being dis-
cussed at length in the newspapers, and the General Secretary of the
Party, Truong Chinh, was forced to announce his resignation. A
campaign to undo some of the excesses of the land reformlasted for
more than a year thereafter.
Although these excesses have long been known outside Vietnam,
their nature and extent have been widely misunderstood and often
misrepresented. Serious study (by western scholars) of the land re-
form,which began only a few years ago, must rely mainly on DRV
sources, particularly the Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan. This is not only
because the anti-Communist materials on land reformwhich used to
come fromSaigon are of low quality but because the North Vietnam-
ese sources are extremelyinformative.While therewere some aspects
of the land reformon which the Hanoi press kept silent, on others it
gave a great deal of intelligentanalysis, and was sometimes extraordi-
narily candid in discussing errors and failures.
Nationally, the land reformoccurred in waves, in each of which
a number of villages underwent land reformmore or less simultane-

* This article is a revisedversionof a paper read beforethe Asian Studies Section of the
MichiganAcademyof Science,Artsand Letters,Ann Arbor,April4, 1975.

70
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
TABLE I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE LAND REFORM2
Wave Dates Villages Population
Experimental 12/53to 3/54 6 I0,8oo
I 5/54 to 9/54 53 I I0,000
2 I0/54 to 1/55 210 48i,000
3 2/55to 6/55 466 I,207,000
4 6/55 to I 2/55 859 2,564,000
5 10/55 to 7/56 I,720 6, I42,000

TOTAL 3,314 I0,514,000

ously. The one experimentalwave and fiveregularwaves covered

3,314 villages'witha totalpopulationofabout 10,500,000.
The laws governingland reformtendedto becomemoremoderate
fromone wave to the next,but theiractual implementation became
more radical, and "leftist"excesses were most widespread during
waves fourand five.3
Beforethe land reformpropermost villageshad gone througha
preliminary program,the mass mobilizationforrentreduction.This
was a moremoderatecampaign,concentrating on a fewoftheworst
landlords,thosecalled traitors,reactionariesand local despots;it did
not make an all-outattackon the landlordclass as a whole. During
themass mobilizationthelandlordshad to refundpartoftherentthey
had collectedfromthepeasantsin past years,butverylittleland was
confiscated.In all therewereeightwaves ofrentreduction,covering
1,875villageswitha population ofabout 7,800,000.
In each village, the rent reductionand the land reformwere
supervisedby teams of cadres speciallytrained and sent into the
villageforthatpurpose.The cadres would firstspreadout amongthe
people gettingto knowthe poor peasants and agriculturallaborers.
Each would movein witha particularpeasant,practicingwhatwere
knownat the "threetogethers"(living,eating,and workingtogether
withthe peasant). The cadre would tryto persuadethe peasant first
thathe or she was poorand miserablenotbecause offate,butbecause

to is thexa, sometimestranslated"commune," an administrative

1 The villagereferred rather
thana social unit.Figuresfromdifferent periodsare notcomparable,since some largevillages
were splitintosmallerones at varioustimesduringthe 1950's.
2 Tran Phuong (ed.), Cach mangruong dat o Viet-nam (The Land Revolutionin Vietnam)
(Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1968),pp. 107-io8.NhanDan, Novemberi6, 1955;
January6, July20, and October io, 1956.
3Tran Phuong,op.cit.,pp. 103-104,107-108.NhanDan, October7,October30, and November
7, 1956.

7'1
 PacificAffairs
of the oppression and exploitation of the landlords, and second that
the landlords were not all-powerful; that the poor and oppressed
could defeat them if they united and fought. Once the peasant had
accepted these ideas he or she became known as a re,or "root", and
went out to persuade other peasants of the village.4
From this point, the cadres began to withdraw into the back-
ground. In theory,they were supposed to let the peasants, especially
the "roots," make many decisions for themselves. It was important
that the land reformbe as much as possible something the people of
the village carried out, rather than something imposed from the
outside. Furthermore,the "roots" were supposed to take key roles in
the village afterthe land reformwas over and the cadres had departed.
They had to get some genuine leadership experience, and not just
serve as mouthpieces for the land reform cadres. Thereafter they
became known as cotcan,or backbone elements; beforethe end of the
land reformmany of them had become cadres and Lao Dong Party
members.
In practice, many land reformcadres did not have the patience to
wait forthe peasants to make decisions, or trustthem to decide things
correctly.Such cadres either told the cotcan what to do at everystage,
or simply did things forthem.5
Once most of the peasants in a village had been given at least some
ideological education, it was necessary to decide the class status of
every household. A simplifiedversion6of the class definitionsused is
as follows.Over half the households in most villages were labeled poor
peasants and agricultural laborers. These were the people who did not
have enough land and capital to be fullyindependent small farmers;
they often had to rent land, borrow grain, or hire themselves out to
their wealthier neighbors. Middle peasants, basically, were self-
sufficientsmallholders. Rich peasants had enough land and capital

4Tran Phuong,op. cit.,pp. 117-122.

Tran Phuong,op cit.,p. i96. NhanDan, April20, 1956.
6 The exact criteriaforclass demarcationchanged over time.The major decrees affecting

class demarcationinclude:
Decree 239/B. TLP ofMarch 1953,on class demarcationin thecountryside. The text,in an
incompleteEnglishtranslation,is in BernardFall, The VietMinhRegime:Government andAdminis-
trationIn theDemocratic Republicof Vietnam,revised edition (New York: Instituteof Pacific
Relations,1956),pp. 172-178.
RegulationsforDemarcatingClasses in the Countryside, 472(?) TTg ofMarch 1, 1955.Iext
notavailable.See Tran Phuong,op. cit.,pp. 147-159,and NhanDan, Februaryi i, March 29, and
April I I, 1957-
Decree 6oo TTg of October 9, 1955on class demarcationin suburban areas. Text not
available. See Tran Phuong,op. cit.,p. 154,and NhanDan, July ig, 1956.
Decree 1196 TTg ofDecember28, 1956on class demarcationin thecountryside. Text inNhan
Dan, March 29, 1957.

72
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
to be able to geta largepartoftheirincomesbyexploitingthelaborof
others,but not so much that they disdained workingin the fields
themselves.Usually theyhiredlaborersto helpthemworktheirland,
but theyalso rentedout land sometimes.Landlordswererichenough
notto need to do anylargeamountofphysicallabor.The policyofthe
land reformwas to relyfullyon thepoor peasantsand laborers,unite
withthe middlepeasants,ally withtherichpeasants,7and overthrow
the landlords.
The landlords' land and some of theirotherpropertywas con-
fiscatedand distributedto the agriculturallaborers,the poor peas-
ants,and someofthemiddlepeasants.In theory,theaveragelandlord
shouldhave been leftwithabout as much land as the former tenants
were getting,and should have been allowed to keep his house and
mostofhis othergoods.8In practicethe landlordswereleftwithless
land than anyoneelse in the village,and oftenweredeprivedoftheir
homes.
The villagebranchofthe Lao Dong Partyhad to be reorganized
duringthe land reform.People fromlandlordand richpeasant back-
groundswereexpelled,as well as people suspectedofhavingsympa-
thisedwiththe landlordsand richpeasants or ofnot havingcarried
out Partypolicies. New people, especiallythe poor peasant cotcan
trained duringthe land reform,were givenmany importantparty
positions.The same thinghappenedin theothermajororganizations
in the village: the village administrativecommittee,the peasants'
association, the militia, the police, the youth league, and the women's
association.
Most accounts published in the West have described the land re-
formas a bloodbath, though there has been a great range of estimates
of the number of people killed. The highest,by Richard Nixon, is that
500,000 were executed and another 500,000 died in slave labor camps.9
What might be called a "standard" estimate, by Bernard Fall, was
that about 50,000 were executed.'0 D. Gareth Porter demonstrated a
few years ago that these estimates were unfounded." He discovered

7 Note the contrastwith the Soviet experience.Under Stalin the rich peasants (kulaks)
were treatedas enemiesofthe state.
8 Land Reform Law ofDecember4, 1953,articles4 and 25. The textofthislaw is in Le Chau,
Le VietNamsoczalzste:
uneeconomie (Paris: Maspero, 1966),pp. 393-402.
de transition
TheNew YorkTimes,July 28, 1972.
10 BernardFall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Politicaland MilitaryAnalysis,
revisededition (New
York: Praeger,1964),p. 156.
" D. GarethPorter,TheMythoftheBloodbath: NorthVietnam's LandReform Reconsidered
(Ithaca
CornellUniversityIREA Project,1972).A shorterbut morereliableversionofthispaper was
publishedin TheBulletinofConcerned AsianScholars,
Vol. V, No. 2, September1973, pp. 2-15.

73
 PacificAffairs
that various people in Saigon had been manufacturingcounterfeit
North Vietnamese documents, and falsifiedtranslations of genuine
documents, in order to support the idea that large numbers of people
had been killed in the land reform.The documentaryevidence forthe
bloodbath theory seems to have been a fabrication almost in its
entirety.Porter's argument, though adequate, was essentially nega-
tive: the evidence forthe bloodbath theoryis demonstrablyuntrue,so
there is no reason to believe in the theory.However, it can be supple-
mented by some positive evidence. The land reformlasted roughly
fromDecember I953 to July 1956. Throughout this period, the Saigon
government was pouring out anti-Communist propaganda, yet it
contained remarkablylittleabout the land reform.In November 1956,
Saigon learned from international press agency dispatches that the
North Vietnamese were admitting that serious land reformexcesses
had occurred. It was only after this that Saigon's anti-Communist
tracts became filled with supposed eyewitness accounts of mass
slaughter.
A good example ofthis can be seen in the work of Hoang Van Chi,
whose book FromColonialism to Communism has been the most impor-
tant single source of the bloodbath theory.'2It was based largely on
his personal observations; he was in North Vietnam for the firstone
and a half years of the land reform.Chi estimated that fiveper cent of
the North Vietnamese population died in the land reform; this is
based supposedly on what happened in his home village.13 Yet texts
are available of two interviewshe gave in Saigon in mid 1955, shortly
after he came from the North. In one, while he was describing the
situation in North Vietnam, he did not mention the land reformat all;
in the other he mentioned it but did not make it sound terriblybad.'4
It was only in later years that his memories began to alter.
A superficialsurveyofthe Saigon press suggests that even as late as
October 1956, well afterthe end of the land reform,nobody in Saigon
had heard of any major land reformatrocities. When Truong Chinh
announced his resignation as General Secretary of the Lao Dong
Party at the end of October, Saigon's officialpress agency had diffi-
culty understanding the fact that this had been caused by the crisis
over land reform.15If there had in fact been a bloodbath, Saigon

12 Hoang Van Chi, From toCommunism:

Colonialism A CaseHistory ofNorthVietnam(New York:
Praeger,1964).
13 Ibid.,p. 212; The Washington
Post,September13, 1972.
14 Texts in Hoang Van Chi, The FateoftheLastViets (Saigon: Hoa Mai, 1956),pp. 30-35.
15 The Times November3, 1956,carriedan articlefromthe VietnamPressAgency,
ofVietnam,
Saigon, October 30,whichwas based on a dispatchofAFP, Hanoi, October29. The portionof

74
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
wouldhave knownabout it,forduringthefirsthalfoftheland reform,
the DRV had been allowinglarge numbersof refugeesto go to the
South.'6During the second half,the InternationalControlCommis-
sion had been circulatingquite widely in the North Vietnamese
countryside. Though it is conceivablethata wave ofexecutionscould
haveoccurredwithouttheCommissionhavingbeen able to proveit,it
is mostunlikelythatit could have occurredwithouttheanti-Commu-
nist elementson the Commissionknowingabout it and passingthe
wordto theirfriendsin Saigon.
How many people actually were killed in the land reform,is
impossibleto judge fromthe North Vietnamese press, since this
subjectwas rarelymentioned.It is notjust thatN/han Dan did notgive
overallstatisticson executions;itseldomevendiscussedspecificcases.
When landlordswereconvictedofcrimesso greatthatanythingless
thanthedeath sentencewould have been mostunlikely,such as mul-
tiple murdersor assassinationsof Communistcadres, press reports
ofthetrialsoftenendedonlywiththestatementthatthecriminalhad
been made to bow his head and admit his crimes,or had been
"appropriately"or "severely"punished."7 One possiblereasonis that
the leadershipin Hanoi may have wanted to avoid provokingtoo
manyexecutions.Most of the land reformcadres did not have ade-
quate trainingor experience;theytendedto followblindlypatterns
theythoughttheywereexpectedto follow,and to see in the villages
what theyexpectedto see. Some thoughttheywere supposed to fill
quotas oflandlords,and despots,in each village.'8The top leadership
did not understandthe full extentof this problem,but may have
understoodenoughnotto wantthe land reformcadres to go intothe
villagesexpectingto finda certainnumberoflandlordswho deserved
to be executed.
Two otherexplanationsmightseem more plausible: that there
were few executions,or that the Party kept silentbecause it was
ashamed of them. However,neithertheoryis acceptable, since the
Partywas so reticentabout executionsonlyinside Vietnam.On two
occasionsit gave data to foreignaudiences,themostextensivefigures

thisstorywrittenby AFP mentionedland reform repeatedlyin connectionwithTruongChinh's

resignation;thecommentary bytheVietnamPressAgency,amountingto sixcolumninches,did
not mentionland reformonce.
16 There is no truthin theclaimthattheland reformhad been temporarilyhaltedduringthe
periodof maximumrefugeeoutflow,as statedin Hoang Van Chi, 1964,p. 163.
7NhanDan, June 29, July 2, November4, and Novemberi8, 1955. The termtranslatedas
"punished" is trung tri.
"8Tran Phuong,op.cit.,pp. 131,195;NhanDan,September6, 1956.

75
 PacificAffairs
being in a report by Hoang Quoc Viet translated into Chinese and
published in the People'sDaily of Peking.'9 It said that in the first6oo
villages to undergo mass mobilization forrent reduction, the peasants
had exposed the crimes of 10,I47 landlords (i 7 per village), and that
I .3 per cent of the landlords were executed, or about I 32 men in those
villages. If this number of executions per village was typical, there
would have been about 4I5 executions during the whole rentreduction
campaign.
The mass mobilization forrent reduction was only a preliminary.
In the land reformproper more people were classified as landlords
and the landlords were treated more harshly. Hoang Quoc Viet said
that during the experimental wave, which took place in six villages of
Thai Nguyen province, the peasants had exposed as landlords 6o
households which had avoided being classified as landlords during the
rent reduction, an average of i0 additional landlords per village. All
the landlords had to confess their crimes before the people, and 8 per
cent of them were executed. A radio broadcast a few months before
had said that in these six villages 38 households had been classified as
landlords during the rent reduction, and that this had been increased
to 98 during the land reform.20If 8 per cent of the landlords were
executed we have 8 executions, or I.3 per village, or o.o7% of the
population. If we assume that the same percentage of the population
was executed throughout the land reform,we get a total of about
7,800.
On the other hand, ifwe assume that the number ofexecutions per
village was about the same throughout the land reform,the total
would be about 4,400.21 This is a more reasonable formof extrapola-
tion than it might seem: the main point of the executions lay in their

'9JZenMin Jh Pao, September2, 1954.

20 Voice ofVietnam,May 4, 1954,translatedintoEnglishin U.S. ForeignBroadcastInforma-
tion Service(FBIS) Daily Report:Far East, May 12, 1954,CCC 13-14.
21 Misunderstanding of Hoang Quoc Viet's articlehas led to a considerablylowerestimate
Aside frombeingpublishedin Peking,itwas broadcastoverRadio XBK (VietMinh) August25,
1954. However, the statementthat 8 per cent of the landlords were executed duringthe
experimentalwave of land reformseems to have been omitted;it was presumablytoo sensitive
forcirculationinsideVietnam.The broadcastwas monitoredand translatedintoEnglishin the
FBIS DailyReport: Far East,September8, 1954,CCC i-io. The translationgave,correctly, figures
fromwhichit can be computedthatabout 132 people wereexecutedin 6oo villagesduringthe
mass mobilizationforrentreduction.J. Price Gittingermisreadthe translationand said that
about 135people had been executedin 836villagesduring"mass mobilization"(a normaland
correctabbreviationof "mass mobilizationforrentreduction"); see his "CommunistLand
Policyin NorthVietnam",Far Eastern Survey,Vol. XXVIII, No. 8, August1959,p. ii6. D. Gareth
PortermisreadGittingerand said that 135people had been killedin 836villagesduring"mass
mobilizationforland reform,"this led to his estimatethat only800 to 2,500people had been
executedin the whole land reform(Porter,1972, pp. 29, 54-55.)

76
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
psychologicaleffect,and althoughthereis no directevidence,itseems
likelythatto have thepropereffecton thewholepopulationtheParty
would have wanted to have a fewexecutions,but not too many,in
each area. It would not have been necessaryto have an executionin
everyvillage,sinceitwas commonforpeasantsfromseveralvillagesto
gatherforan importanttrial.It is knownthatthe Partywantedeach
villageto have about the same numberoflandlordsbe denouncedfor
theircrimesat mass "strugglemeetings."Considerablevariationwas
allowed, but not nearlyenough to reflectthe real variationin the
numberoflandlordsin different villageswho had committedserious
crimesagainstthe peasants.22Additionalevidencethatthe deathtoll
was approximatelyon this order turnedup quite recently.When
David MarrvisitedThanh Hoa provinceearlyin I 975,cadreswho had
been involvedwithland reformtold him that on the averageone to
two landlordshad been executedin each villagein the province.23
Can one properlyextrapolatefromthesefiguresto theland reform
as a whole?It is notlikelythatwe are beingmisledby purelyrandom
fluctuations. Thanh Hoa provinceis extremelylarge,containingover
one tenthofall the villagesinvolvedin the land reform.And Hoang
Quoc Vietwouldhardlyhavereleasedthefiguresfromtheexperimen-
tal wave inThai Nguyenas he did, monthsafteritwas over,ifhe had
notconsideredthemrelevantto otherareas. However,thereare three
possible sourcesof systematicerror.
First,Thanh Hoa and Thai Nguyen had been under firmViet
Minh controlforyearsbeforetheland reform.In theRed RiverDelta,
muchofwhichwas ruledbytheFrenchup to I 954, farmorelandlords
mighthave been accused of collaboratingwiththe enemy.On the
otherhand, landlordsin such areas oftenfledalong withthe French
when the Viet Minh came, and the netresultmighthave been fewer
executionsthan in the areas whichthe Viet Minh had held sincethe
beginningof the war.
Second,therewas the issue oftiming.The experimental wave was
in early I954, and mostofThanh Hoa underwentland reform during
wavesthreeand fourin 1955. Most ofNorthVietnamdid notundergo
land reformuntilwave five,and by that time the land reformhad
become moreradical. There is no reliableinformation on how much
moreradical it became,or in exactlywhatways,butthetotalnumber

22Tran Phuong,op. ct., p. I 25.

23 Notes,givento me byDavid Marr,ofhis talkswithcadresin Thanh Hoa province,
January
6, 1975. Porter,who participatedin thesame discussions,remembersthemdifferently;
he thinks
the figureofone to two executionsper villagewas a maximumratherthan an average.

77
 PacificAffairs
of executions might have been significantlyhigher than we would
expecton the basis ofdata fromI954 and I955.
Third, there is the question of whether the information, from
Communist sources, was accurate in the firstplace. I tend to thinkit
was. There were some aspects of the land reformwhich Hanoi did
not discuss in public, but what it did say usually showed a fairlyhigh
level of honesty. It seems improbable that the number of people killed
could have been much higherthan the Communist sources indicated,
or there would have been more evidence of it in anti-Communist pub-
lications.
Allowing for these uncertainties, it seems reasonable to estimate
that the total number of people executed during the land reform
was probably in the vicinityof 5,000, and almost certainly between
3,0oo and I5,ooo, and that the slaughter of tens of thousands of
innocent victims, often described in anti-Communist propaganda,
never took place.
Nevertheless,the land reformdid commit serious excesses of other
types. The campaign was supposed to be directed against a small elite
of landlords who were, at least by Vietnamese standards, fairly
wealthy. In practice it attacked many peasants only moderatelybetter
off than their neighbors. Poor peasants who refused to treat such
people as enemies were likely to be attacked themselves. Perhaps
worst of all, fromthe viewpoint of the Party, was the damage done to
itself: thousands of experienced and loyal cadres were accused of
being connected with the old order, oftenon veryflimsyevidence, and
were purged.
The Party was tryingto carry out both a nationalist and a social
revolution.The goals of what is usually called a "nationalist" revolu-
tion include establishing freedomfromforeigncontrolor intervention,
abolishing autonomous satrapies within the country,promoting eco-
nomic development and mass education, and making local adminis-
tration efficient,honest, and responsive to laws and directivescoming
fromthe capital. A social revolution involves mobilizing the poor to
change the structureof society and set up a more egalitarian order.
There is no inherent contradiction between these two programs,
despite the loose talk which sometimes treats nationalism and Com-
munism as if they were opposites. The Communists argue that the
two programs are connected; that only by carrying out a social
revolution can a revolutionaryleadership mobilize the popular sup-
port necessary to accomplish a full nationalist revolution. And the
recent historyof Vietnam and China supports this assertion; by far
78
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
the mosteffective groupsworkingfornationalistgoals in thesecoun-
trieshave been the Communists.
In a countrysuch as Vietnam,thereare threemain pathswhicha
revolutioncan follow.First,thenewrulersmayfitthemselvesintothe
patternsof the old regime,carryingout neitherthe fullnationalist
programnor a social revolution.They will take over much of the
existingadministrativeframework.Most of the people who for-
merlyheldreal powerat thelocal levelwillcontinueto do so, and will
exerciseit in about the same fashionas before.Second, the new
government may carryout the nationalistprogramonly.Powerwill
be exercisedat the local levelin ways verydifferent frombefore,but
mat stillbe held by manyof the same people. The new rulingelite
may be composed largelyof membersof the old elite who have
adapted themselvesto a changedsituation,and the mass population
may have littlemorepowerthan before.Third,the new government
may carryout botha nationalistand a social revolution;thisrequires
that the pooreststrataof societybe politicallymobilized,and that
membersofthosestratariseto positionsofreal powerin local society.
There were tendenciesin the Viet Minh representingall three
types of revolution.The firstneverhad a chance of becomingthe
dominantline. But therewere areas where the Communistsallied
themselveswith existinglocal power-structures, especiallyreligious
organizations,and forseveralyearsthesestructures remainedessen-
tiallyunalteredwithinthe framework of a united frontagainst the
French. Most of the largerones had changed sides and joined the
Frenchby 1950.24 But at the villageleveltherecontinuedto be land-
lords whojoined the Viet Minh, and eventhe Lao Dong Party,and
used theirpositionsto maintaintheircontrolovertheirtenantsand
preventmajorchangesin local society.In particular,theydelayedthe
implementation ofrentreductionpolicies.25One ofthe main goals of
the land reformwas to removesuch people fromthe Partyand other
organizations.
The second tendencyrepresenteda more complexproblem.The
richerhalf of the Vietnamesepopulation,which includedthe land-
lords,the rich peasants, and the middle peasants,held most of the
leadershippositionsin the Viet Minh. This was not unnatural;they
were the people who had literacy,self-confidence,
influencein local
society,and enough moneyso that if theytook time offfromtheir
24
See Ellen Hammer, The Struggle forIndochina)
I940-I955 (Stanford:StanfordUniversity
Press, 1955),pp. 140-141,210-211, 276.
25"Nhan Dan, May 29, July 12, and October 8, 1955.

79
 PacificAffairs
regular work to do political tasks they would not have to worryabout
their families starving. In the firstvillages to undergo mass mobiliza-
tion forrent reduction the situation was especially bad; it was found
that the poor peasants (about half the rural population) formedonly
3.7 per cent of the Party membership. The landlords formed I3.5, the
rich peasants I5, and the middle peasants 6i.4 per cent.26 Many
people fromrich peasant and even landlord backgrounds were gen-
uinely committedto the revolution.When the necessitywas explained
to them they were willing to implement policies favoring the poor
peasants, either because they had genuinely been convinced this was
just, or because it was obviously unsafe to refuse.They thoughtthat
as long as they accepted the policies of the revolution they could
retain their leading positions in the revolution.
The land reformwas supposed to implement the third type of
revolution.The Party had decided in I953 that it was time to mobilize
the poor peasants ideologically and give them real power at the local
level. They could then defend their intereststhemselves, rather than
depending on members of other classes to carry out policies which
favored them. In the long run this was a goal in itself,since the Party
considered itselfthe representativeofthe poor and oppressed. In more
immediate terms, the development of cooperative agriculture could
not go the way it was supposed to unless the influence of the poor
peasants and agricultural laborers was increased substantially. The
experience of rent reduction effortsup to I953 had shown that unless
the poor were effectivelyrepresented in major village organizations,
those organizations were not likely to work with real enthusiasm on
programs to benefitthe poor.
This focus on class issues meant that once the animosities of the
war against France had had time to cool, the DRV forgavemost ofthe
people who had collaborated with the French. Landlords were the
enemy. If they had been or could be accused ofhaving been collabora-
tors, then they could be attacked as such.27But most of the Vietnam-
ese who had joined the French armed forces,and later the forcesofthe
French puppet government in Saigon, had been ordinary peasants
and were assumed to be basically good. By May I955 the Party said it
was working to reduce misunderstanding between veterans of the
resistance against France and formersoldiers of the French puppet
army. In June it was announced that 6,ooo formerpuppet personnel
26"hanDan, October 6-0o, 1953, reprintedin Cuockhangchienthanthank
cuanhandan Vzet-nam
(The Sacred ResistanceWar oftheVietnamesePeople) (Hanoi: Su That, 1960), Vol. IV, p. 124.
27 See Tran Phuong,op.cit.,p. 105

8o
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
had joined peasants' associationsin Son Tay province.ByJulyNhan
Dan was sayingthatsome formerpuppettroopshad been givenposts
in villageadministrations. By October it was consideredacceptable
forformerpuppet troopsto become chairmenofvillageadministra-
tions.28
Unfortunately, thenecessarypolicyofgivingthepoorpeasantsand
was disastrously
laborersa major role in politicsand administration
misapplied.Poor peasants were promotedtoo rapidly,withoutade-
quate training,to positionswhichtheydid nothave theexperienceto
handle.29Meanwhile,the revolutionary contributionsand rightsof
othergroupswere oftenslightedor ignored.
We emphasizedrelying on thepoorpeasantsand agricultural laborers,
whichwas correct(althoughactually,becauseoferrors. . . theranksofthe
poorpeasantsand agriculturallaborerswerealso attacked to someextent).
Buttheerrorlayinslightingcloseunitywiththemiddlepeasants,andeven
harming innotcarrying
theirinterests; outthepolicyofallying withtherich
peasants,and evenattacking
them,regarding themalmostlikelandlords.30
The land reformcadres often"thoughttherewereenemiesevery-
where."3' Investigation of one village where at least 6o people had
been wrongly accused of being reactionaries showed that the land
reformcadres "had regarded every unusual event occurring in the
village during the land reform as having been caused by enemy
sabotage."32 They were sure that anything which had the effectof
harming the revolutionmust have been intended forthat purpose, and
a remarkable varietyof things could be construed to have harmed the
revolution. If a landlord gave away land to the peasants, or even if he
committed suicide,33this might be considered a reactionary plot.
Paranoid distrust of the exploiting classes, and of anyone con-
nected with a member ofthem, had some of its worsteffectswithinthe
Lao Dong Party and local administrations. Many experienced and
loyal cadres were expelled from the Party and other organizations
because they did not meet, or were accused of not meeting, strict
criteria of class origin and class loyalty. This was later criticised as

28NhanDan, May 25, June 4,July 26, and October 20, 1955.
29 Le Van Luong, who was the memberof the Politburomost directly involvedwithParty
reorganizationin thisperiod (and was dismissedfromthe Politburoforhis errorsin September
1956)said explicitlythatitwas all rightto promotepeople to postsforwhichtheywerenotfully
qualified,iftheyhad the properspirit.Hoc Tap, Vol. I, No. 3, February1956,p. 22.
30 NhanDan, October 3 I, 1956
31 Ibid.
32 NhanDan, September8, 1956.
33Nhan Dan, June 25, 1955.

8I
 PacificAffairs
having represented the error of "classism"-"thinking that social
class decides everthing."34In theory,most ofthose who did not have a
correct attitude should simply have been given some re-education. In
practice theywere dismissed fromtheirposts and oftenimprisoned. In
later investigationsit was stated that there had been valid reasons for
expelling about 9 per cent of the rural members of the Party,35but
the number actually expelled was far higher.
In all too many places, the following pattern occurred. Land
reformcadres would come into a village already suspicious of the
existing Party branch and village administration. They had been
warned repeatedly against "relying on old organizations," and in
some areas had been taught that "our organizations are basically
organizations of the enemy."36 If they found evidence that there were
or had been landlords and rich peasants in these organizations this
strengthenedtheir prejudice not only against the landlords and rich
peasants themselves but against all the members of these organiza-
tions, even poor peasants and agricultural laborers, on the ground
that theyhad been workingalongside the landlords and rich peasants.
We underestimated our organizationsin the villages,and overestimated
thecontrolofthelandlordclass; we did notclearlyrecognisethatduringthe
resistancewar, a ratherlarge proportionofthe poor peasants and agricul-
tural laborershad had theirideologicaland politicalconsciousnessraised,
and some of the [more] advanced poor peasants and laborershad partici-
pated in villageorganizations.As a result,duringtheland reform we did not
emphasizestrengthening and relyingupon thesepoorpeasantsand laborers;
we even grewsuspiciousofthemand attackedthem. . . 37
The result in 76 villages of Bac Ninh province was that in only 26
villages were any veteran Party members at all allowed to remain on
the executive committee of the village Party branch.38
The land reformcadres chose cotcan,who were supposed to replace
the people who had been purged, mostly fromamong poor peasants
and agricultural laborers who had not been leaders in the resistance.
The cadres were workingagainst a tightschedule, and had to choose
and train the cotcanrather hastily.39The cadres and cotcantogether
3 NguyenDam, "Ban ve chu nghia thanhphan" (Report on Classism), Hoc Tap, Vol. II,
No. i, January1957,p. 49.
35TranPhuong,op. cit.,p. 214.
36NhanDan, November5, 1956.
37 Tran Phuong,op.cit.,p. 189.
38NhanDan,July6, 1956.
39At theend ofeach wave,therewerelargeconferencesat whichland reform cadreswhohad
workedin differentvillagesmettogetherto reviewtheirwork.The cadres in each villagetried
very hard to finishland reformin time to attend the meetings.For some reason, North
Vietnameseanalysesofthe causes ofthe land reformerrorshave said verylittleabout this.

82
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
thendid mostoftheworkofdecidingwho in thevillagewas a landlord
or richpeasant,and who in thePartybranchand thevillageadminis-
trationwas a "bad element." Land reformcadres in some villages
taught the cot can to see landlords,lackeysof the landlords,and
landlordconspiracieseverywhere. It was considereda great accom-
plishmentto expose as a reactionary,or as a landlord,someonewho
had notpreviouslybeen knownto be one.40The resultwas thatmany
people weredenouncedforthingstheyhad neverdone,and probably
over30,000 peasant householdswerewronglyclassifiedas landlords.
In To Hieu villageof Ha Dong province,whichhad a populationof
about io,ooo,over 20 householdswerewronglyclassifiedas landlords
and almost ioo people wronglyarrestedduringthe land reform;this
was consideredan averagevillageforthe area.4' Anyonewho triedto
defendthe victimswas likelyto be denounced in turn as being
"connected with landlords." If theyhad workedin the resistance,
theiraccomplishments were likelyto be belittled.
Whilecarrying task,we slighted-there
out the anti-feudal wereeven
places wherethe cadresdenied-theachievements of theanti-imperialist
The landreform
struggle. wasseparatedfromtheresistanceandtherevolu-
tion;therewereevenplaceswheretheyweresetinoppositiontoeachother.42
This picturewas not universal.There were manyvillageswhere
the land reformcadres and thecotcanwereable and responsible,and
refusedthe temptationto attack large numbersof innocentvictims.
There were villages where there were enough genuine reactionary
plottersand concealedlandlordsso thatthecadresand cotcandid not
need to go chasing imaginaryones. But the errorsdescribedabove
occurredat least to some extentin most villages,and were really
seriousin many.
This sounds reminiscentof the Stalinistpurges. However,there
wereseveralimportantdifferences. ofthe
First,theidea ofinfiltration
Lao Dong Partybyanti-Communist elements,whileexaggerated,was
notjust a paranoidfantasy;ithad muchmorefoundationin factthan
givenforthe purgesofthe 1930's in the So-
the paralleljustifications
viet Union. Second, in Vietnamthe greatmajorityof those unjustly
attackedlivedthroughthe experience.Third,in Vietnamthe govern-
mentand Partyrecognisedtheirmistakesquickly,admittedthemin
public, and correctedthemto the extentpossible. One of the most
extraordinary thingsabout theland reform was thefactthatitserrors
NhanDan, August 24, 1956,and April23,
40 See 1957.
41NhanDan, August 24, 1956.
42 hanDan, October 31, 1956.

83
 PacificAffairs
were not covered up, or blamed on a few scapegoats, afterit was over.
A Nhan Dan editorial admitted: "The errorswhichrecently occurred were
generalerrorsofourParty.Theseerrorsharmedthewholepeopleand thewhole
Party. Theywerenottheparticularerrorsof anyparticularcomrades. . ."43
When large numbers of people began to be released from prison
around September I956, the newspapers made it quite clear that they
were not being granted clemency, but were being released because
they had never been guilty in the firstplace.44 General Vo Nguyen
Giap discussed the correction of errors at considerable length in a
speech of October 29, 1956:
Whilemobilizingthemassesto overthrow thelandlordclass itwas correct
to emphasize decisivelyoverthrowing the landlordclass. The errorlay in
attackingtoo widely,notcarryingout the policyofdiscrimination (between
differenttypes of landlords), not havingconsiderationforthe familiesof
landlords who had worked with the revolution,and for the familiesof
landlordswhosechildrenhad servedas soldiersor cadres;nothavingconsid-
erationforresistancelandlords,or discriminating in the treatmentof the
landlords'children.
While carryingout attackson the enemywe overemphasizedattacking
decisively,and did not attach importanceto takingprecautionsagainst
deviations,did not emphasize the necessityforcaution and foravoiding
unjustxu tri45 of innocentpeople; thereforewe expandedthe area ofattack,
attackedtoo broadly,and made widespreaduse ofexcessiverepressivemeas-
ures ...
All Partymemberswho have been wronglyxu trimusthave theirParty
membershiprestored.Partymemberswho belongedto thelandlordand rich
peasant classes,and who metthe standardsforPartymembership, butwho
were wronglyxu triduringland reformand rectification of organizations,
shouldall have theirPartymembershiprestored.
Cadres and otherpeople who have been wronglyxu trishall all benefit
fromthe correction.Politically,theyshall have theircivilrights,honorand
workrestored.Those who have been wronglyimprisonedmustall be freed.
Economically,theymustbe givenappropriatecompensationand helped to
make a living.All medals, honors,and titleswhichhave been taken away
must be restored . ..
Correctthe classificationof people who have been wronglycalled land-
lords,richpeasants,and small renters.Abolishthe category"otherexploit-
ingclasses"; everyoneso classifiedmustbe reclassified.
Everyonewhoseclass
standinghas been correctedshall enjoypoliticalrightsaccordingto policy;
economicallytheyshall receiveappropriatecompensation(to help) them
make a living.

43NhanDan, November2, I956 (Emphasis in the original).

N4/hanDan, November21, 1956.Some actual criminalsweregrantedclemencylater,afterthe
innocenthad been released.
to convict,to punishor to discipline.In documentsofthisperiod
4 Xu trzmightbe translated
it usuallyreferredeitherto imprisonment or to expulsionfromthe Lao Dong Party.

84
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
The questionof givingback propertyto people who have been wrongly
classifiedas landlordsor wronglyxutrishall be discussedby thepeasantsso
and mutualaid, so
as to settleit on a basis ofunity,compromise,negotiation,
theywillhavewhattheyneedto makea living;butin generalone shouldnot
infringe thepropertyrightsdistributed to thepeasantsduringrentreduction
and land reform.
Do not treat the rich peasants like landlords.Carry out correctlythe
policyof allyingwiththe richpeasants.46
In late 1956and I957, over50 per centofthosewho had been
classifiedas landlordswere reclassified.47They weregivenback part
of the propertywhichhad been takenfromthem.There were sharp
conflictsoversome ofthisproperty, especiallyhouses. Most ofthose
who had been expelledfromthe Partyand otherorganizationswere
readmitted.
thecorrection
Politically oferrorswas verydifficult.
The goals ofthe
land reformhad been genuinelyimportant,and the Partycould not
affordeven temporarily to abandon thosegoals whilecorrecting the
errors.It had to defendthe principleof relyingon thepoor peasants
and agriculturallaborers, which had been discreditedin some
people's eyes by the way it had been misapplied.Many of the old
Partymemberswho formedthebackboneofthePartyhatedthecotcan
who had been broughtintothe Partyduringland reform. The cotcan
themselveswere confusedand demoralizedby the revelationof their
errors,and some were subjectedto physicalassaults by theirformer
victims.They could easily have been drivenout ofthe Party.But if
this had happened, then not only would the proportionof poor
peasants in the Party have become ratherlow, but the old Party
members,manyof whom had been expelledfromthe Partyduring
land reform and thenreadmitted, mighthave been prejudicedagainst
admittingtoo manypoorpeasantsin thefuture.The Partyleadership
therefore had no choice but to tryto reconciletheold memberswith
the new,and persuadethemto worktogether.This effort had consid-
erable success,but it could noteliminateall bad feeling.It maybe no
coincidencethatLe Duan, who had been away in SouthVietnamand
thuswas notcloselyidentified withany ofthepartiesin the disputes
overland reform, was chosenas thenewGeneralSecretaryofthe Lao
Dong Partynot long afterthis.
Economically,the land reform had succeeded.It had givenland to
those peasants who had lacked it. The figuresusually given for
46 NhanDan, October
31, 1956.There is a grossmis-translation
ofthisspeech in Hoang Van
Chi, 1964,p. 210, paragraphd.
47Nhan Dan, April 18,1958.

85
 PacificAffairs
TABLE 2. AVERAGE HOLDINGS BEFORE AND AFTER LAND REFORM48
(Hectares per person)
Poor Middle Rich
Laborers peasants peasants peasants Landlords

Before .02 .05 .12 .2 i.6

After .15 .14 .17 .21iIo

changes in land ownership (Table 2) exaggerate the effectsofthe land

reform.There were large amounts of land which the middle peasants,
poor peasants and laborers had controlled for years without legally
owning it. If this land is excluded, the holdings of these groups before
land reformappear smaller than they really were.
The changes in the amounts of land used by each social class
probably give a better picture of the real effectsof the land reform
(Table 3). The land reformhad not established complete equality of
landholdings, but it had given enough additional land to the poor
peasants and laborers to raise theirlevel oflivingquite substantially.
The land reformwas accomplished without disruptingthe postwar
reconstructionof the North Vietnamese economy. One need not ac-
cept the officialfigures for rice production (Table 4); the society of
North Vietnam was not well enough organized to permit the collec-
tion of accurate statistics, and figurescomparing the I956 crop with
the pre-war maximum (1939) contain glaring inconsistencies.
But regardless of the exact figures, it is clear that agricultural
production rose rapidly while the land reformwas going on. In I954
and most of I955 there was a severe food shortage in North Vietnam,

TABLE 3. LAND CONTROLLED BEFORE AND AFTER LAND REFORM49

(Hectares per person)
Landowned Landowned orused Landowned
landreform before
before landreform after
landreform

Middlepeasants .126 .i68 i

Poor peasants .049 .101 .44
Laborers .026 .o8I .14

48Fall, 1964,p. 159,citingV. Zelentsov,in Voprosy Ekonomiki, September1957,p. 62. The

"after" figuresare fromlate 1956,beforethe campaign forthe correctionof errors.
49Tran Phuong,op. clt., p. 212; data froma sample of 112 villagesand 31 hamlets.It is not
possibleto tellhowrepresentative thissamplewas; thevariationbetweendifferent samplescited
in Tran Phuongis sometimessignificant. The "after"figuresare fromafterthe campaignfor
the correctionof errors.

86
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
TABLE 4. ANNUAL RICE PRODUCTION OF NORTH VIETNAM50
(Tons)

I939 2,500,000or 3,500,

000
1954 2,600,000
1955 3,600,000
I 956 4, I 32,000

resultingin famine in some areas. By the end of I 956 the shortage was
over; problems in the grain tax systemwere being handled in a slow,
deliberate fashion that would have been utterlyimpossible ifthe total
food supply had been inadequate.51
Politically the results of the land reformwere much less satisfac-
tory.The power of the landlord class had been broken and many poor
peasants had been promoted to importantposts in their villages. But
the circumstances of their promotion had left them with less self-
confidence and less popular support than they should have had. And
the prestige and unityof the Lao Dong Party itselfhad been seriously
shaken.
The Party's evaluation of the land reform has remained about
the same ever since I956; it has emphasized that the campaign was
basically successful while admitting that there were errors. The best
history of the land reform,published in i968, analyses the nature,
causes, and effects of the errors quite convincingly, and at great
length.52The most recentofficialhistoryofthe Lao Dong Party says:
The land reform. . . completelyfreedthe peasantsfromthe feudalyoke
whichhad lasted thousandsofyearsin our country,bringingthepeasantry
in the North to the positiveof real mastersin the countryside,not only
politicallybut also economically. ..
The victoryof the land reformwas greatand fundamental. ..
In the courseof the land reformwe committeda numberofgraveerrors.
The PartyCentralCommitteefoundout thesemistakesin timeand resolved
to correctthem.53

50The lowerofthetwo figuresfor1939is theone whichmatchesFrenchstatistics,but DRV

historiansfeelthatlargelandlordshad reportedto thecolonialauthoritiesfarless ricethanthey
actuallygrew,in an effort to evade taxes. This is probablytrue;the DRV would hardlyhave
wantedto exaggeratethe productivity and thusthepropserity ofthecolonialregime.NhanDan,
January5, January14,and November29, 1957.
" This was discussedin MAhanDan at greatlengthin late 1956and early 1957;see in particular
November24, 1956.
52Tran Phuong,op. cit.,especiallypp. 188-210.
58Bon muoilam namhoatdongcua Dang Lao dongViet-nam Years' Activitiesofthe
(Forty-five
VietnamWorkers'Party) (Hanoi: Su That, 1975),pp. 83-84,

87
 PacificAffairs
After the land reform, peasant smallholdings were gradually
merged into larger units. The firststep was to formlabor exchange
teams. A group of perhaps eight familieswould help each other work
theirland, but each plot was still the propertyofone family,and when
the crop was harvested it would belong to that family.A considerable
number of labor exchange teams were created before and during the
land reform. Some later collapsed as a result of the conflicts and
confusion created by land reformerrors. Most peasant families did
notjoin (or rejoin) labor exchangeteams until I958 or I959.54
The next step was to formcooperatives, in which the land, except
for private plots not permitted to exceed 5 per cent of the cultivated
area, was managed and worked collectivelyrather than by individual
families.North Vietnam, like China, grouped the peasants into coop-
erativeswithout any significantamount ofviolence. It could not afford
the massive waste of resources which had accompanied forcedcollec-
tivization in the Soviet Union. Perhaps more to the point, the Lao
Dong Party did not need to use brute force; even in the aftermathof
the land reformerrorsit was on good enough termswith the peasants
to relyprimarilyon persuasion. The principle that membership in the
cooperatives should be voluntarywas not always scrupulouslyobeyed,
but it was taken seriously. For a while the peasants were even able to
take back their land and withdraw from the cooperatives if they
wished.5
The land reformwas a necessary prerequisite forcollectivization.
When the cooperatives were formed there was a natural tension
between poorer peasants who wanted the crops to be divided among
the members in proportion to the amount of work each familydid,
and wealthier ones who wanted those familieswhich had contributed
more land and draftanimals to the cooperative to get a larger share of
the crops. Even with the comparatively minor disparities in land-
holdings which remained after land reform this was a problem.56
Under the conditions of much greater inequality which had existed
before land reform,the problem might have been really serious.
The firstcooperatives, very small, were gradually combined into
larger ones. Thai Binh province, which was made up of 294 villages at
the time of the land reform,had at least 3,000 cooperatives in i960.

5 Le Chau, op.cit.,pp. 184-195.NhanDan, October 24, 1956.

5 Gerard Chaliand, ThePeasantsofNorthVietnam (Harmondsworth:Penguin,1969),pp. 99-
0oo, I47. Nhan Dan, August I3, 1959.
56 This was probablyone reasonwhythe richpeasantswereexcludedfrom the cooperatives
July-August1960,
at first.Vo Nhan Tri, "La politiqueagrairedu Nord-vietnam,"Tiers-Monde,
p. 367.

88
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
These had been reorganizedinto 1,070 largercooperativesby i965, 711
by 1970, and 469 by 1974.57This processhas been slow and cautious;
presentunitshave not approachedthe size whichthe people's com-
munes attained only seven years afterland reformin China. The
errorsofthe periodfromI953 to I956 have taughtthe Vietnameseto
carryout major changes deliberately,withcarefulplanningand su-
pervision.
The consolidationofsmall cooperativesintolargerones willprob-
ably continue,but in recentmonthsit has notreceivedmuchempha-
sis. The oftrepeated slogan of advancingagriculturetowardlarge-
scale socialistproductionhas referrednot to the creationof larger
units,but to an increasein thescale ofproductionwithintheexisting
cooperatives.A recentarticlein the Partyjournal Hoc Tap entitled
"Minh Sinh CooperativeProgressively AdvancestowardLarge-scale
Socialist Production"58 said verylittleabout the way the present
cooperative(not verylarge in any case) was formedthroughthe
amalgamationof severalsmallerones. It was concerned,rather,with
the way Minh Sinh has advanced fromsingle cropping through
double croppingand a simple formof triplecroppingto a rather
complexpatternoftriplecroppingwhichsupportsa largepig-raising
industryon the side.
The chiefgoal today is simplyto continuethe gradual improve-
mentof agriculturaltechniqueswhichhas been goingon foryears.
The peasantsneed morefertilizer, improvedstrainsofrice,morecarts
so theywill nothave to carrythingsto and fromthefieldson shoulder
poles,and so on. The mostimportantstructuralchangenowgoingon
is a movementtowardincreasedspecializationofcooperatives.While
the Americanbombingwas disruptingtransportation, each coopera-
tivetriedto produceas much as it could ofits own needs.Today the
regimeis encouragingcooperativesto concentrateon crops partic-
ularlysuitedto local conditionsand buy otherthingsfromneighbor-
cooperativeson
ingcooperatives.It criticizesthe idea ofself-sufficient
the groundthattheyare economicallyinefficient.59
Thereare a numberofstatefarmsin NorthVietnam.Most ofthem
are in thehighlands,and concentrateon cropssuch as rubber,coffee,
pepper, oranges,jute, etc., or on cattle-raising.The DRV has no

17David Marr,"NorthVietnam:A PersonalJournal,"Indochina No. 39,March 1975,

Chronicle,
P. 7.
5 Xuan Kieu, "Hop tac xa Minh-sinhtungbuoc di len theo huongsan xuat Ion xa hoi chu
nghia", Hoc Tap, Vol. XXI, No. 2, February1975,pp. 53-59.
59HocTap, Vol. XXI, No. 4, April 1975,pp. 50, 57.

89
 PacificAffairs
presentintention ofconverting thecooperativesofthelowlands,which
producemostofthe country'srice,intostatefarms.
An understanding of the NorthVietnameseland reformwill shed
only a limitedamount of lighton the agrarian changes occurring
today in South Vietnam.The difference does notarise onlyfromthe
fact that the policies of the I950's included errorswhich present
plannerswill be carefulto avoid. Thirtyyearsofwar and revolution
have alreadyalteredSouth Vietnamenormously.There was a time
whenSouth Vietnamhad morelandlordism,and farmoreverylarge
landholdingsowned by absentees,thanNorthVietnam.In the 1950's
therewerepeople who thoughtthatDRV land policiesmightactually
have been moreappropriatein the Souththan in theNorth.60 But by
1975 almostall the land formerly rentedout in the South had already
been distributedto the peasants by the now defunctSaigon govern-
ment,or distributed to thepeasantsbytheNationalLiberationFront,
or simplyabandoned as a resultofmilitaryaction.Traditionalsocial
institutionsin generalhave been weakened; the task of eliminating
them does not warranta reallymassivecampaign in most parts of
South Vietnam.
At the timethisarticlewas writtenthe ProvisionalRevolutionary
Government did notseem to be attackinglandlordsperse. Therehave
been a numberofmass meetingsto denounce"bullies" (ac on,prob-
ably equivalentto the "traitors,reactionaries,and despots" of the
I95o's).61 In the area around Hue the land of the "bullies" is being
confiscatedand distributedto thepeasants.62This separateassaulton
theworstenemiesofthe new regimemaybe onlya temporary policy;
in the North what were regardedas the worstlandlordswere hit
duringrentreduction,and a fewmonthslaterall the landlordswere
attackedduringthe land reformproper.On the otherhand the Lao
Dong Partyfeelsthatland reformin theNorthshouldhave discrimi-
natedmuchmorethanit did betweenthoselandlordswho obstinately
opposed the revolutionand those who submittedto it or actively
supportedit. The plannersresponsibleforcurrentpolicyin theSouth
will surelyconfiscatemostofthe landlords'remainingland, but they
may decide notto subjecttheordinarylandlordsto therigorsofmass
struggle.One recentradio broadcasteven said that "The greatna-
tional unitybloc of our Southernpeople now includesthe workers,

60Fall, 1956,p. i i8. See also NhanDan, February26, 1954.

61SaigonGzaiPhong, June 24, 26,and 27, and July4, 1975.
t2NhanDan, July22, 1975.

90
 Land Reformin NorthVietnam
peasants . . . [and] small landlords.
"63 In any case thisis notlikelyto
be a majorissue; thereare notmanylandlordsleftin SouthVietnam.
The ProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernment,since its victoryin
April I975, has been moreinterested in bringingabandonedland back
into cultivationand gettingmillionsof formerpeasants out of the
cities and "refugee" camps and back to the villages. Many such
people have been givenfreetransportation (usuallyto theiroriginal
homes),land, and some foodto helpthemsurviveuntiltheycan grow
theirfirstcrop.
Most of the land now beingdistributedto the peasants has come
fromsources other than confiscation.In a few places it has been
donatedto the peasants by its formerowners;64 some landlordsmust
have been genuinelyglad that theycould establishmoral creditby
givingaway theirland ratherthan waitingforit to be taken from
them.There is a muchlargeramountofland theownersofwhichare
missingor unknown.Some of it is being provisionallyallocated to
peasants to cultivate.65It will be difficultto establishownershipin
some cases; peasants returningto villages which have been aban-
doned for severalyears, and been overgrownby jungle, may have
troublefiguring outexactlywheretheirhomesand fieldsused to be.66
There will have to be a programsoon to settlethe ownershipof
large amountsof land to which the presentoccupantsdo not have
clear title.This includesland whichhas been provisionally allocated
to thepeasantsand also a greatdeal ofland distributed undertheold
government's land reformprogram.The new government will prob-
ably allow mostof the people to whomsuch land was distributedto
keep it, but it does not regardthe deeds theynow have as legally
valid.67
A considerableamount of new farmlandis being cleared, espe-
ciallyin whatare called the new economicareas, large-scaleprojects
in whichteamsoflaborersare sentto clearthejungle withbulldozers
and build roads and houses.Then peasantsare broughtin and given
land. The new economic areas are being used to redistributethe

63 Saigon, August 14, 1975, translatedin the FBIS Daily Report:Asia andPacific,
August 15,
1975, L 2.
64 Saigon Radio, June i8, 1975,translatedin the FBIS Daily Report:Asia andPacific,June ig,
1975, L. 8. Liberation Press Agency, June 27, 1975 (in English), reprinted in the FBIS Daily
Report:Asia andPacific,July I, 1975, L 8.
65 NhanDan,July22, 1975. Provisional allocationhas been used evenin cases wherethereis no
possibilitythe originalownerwill returnto claim the land, notablyin the case ofex-President
Thieu's land. Saigon Gzaz Phong,June 25, 1975.
66Cuu Quoc,June 27, 1975. P. 9.
67 The New rork Times, October 19, 1975.

9'
 PacificAffairs
Vietnamese population, which has traditionallybeen concentrated in
certain areas. Some peasants have been leaving overcrowded villages
near the coast and movingto new economic areas fartherinland.68But
most of those who volunteerforthe new economic areas are probably
peasants who have been living in the cities forseveral years and have
to some extent lost contact with their original home villages. Out of
239,758 people known to have returnedto the countrysidefromSaigon
up to the end of September 1975, over 50,000 went to new economic
areas. In Vurg Tau, which was full of short-termrefugees fromthe
fightingof early 1975, the 85,000 people who leftforthe countrysideup
to early October I975 included less than 5,000 going to the new
economic areas; most just returned to their formerhomes.69
South Vietnam is moving quite rapidly toward collective agricul-
ture. A collective effortis obviously necessary for the present recon-
structioneffort,and this may make it easier to introduce permanent
collective units. The basic pattern is roughlythe same as in the North:
first labor-exchange teams and then cooperatives. Some areas are
forming"production collectives" (tap doansan xuat) instead ofcoopera-
tives; the exact nature of the differenceis not clear. In the most
advanced province, Quang Tri, 73 per cent of the peasants were in
production collectives or cooperatives by May 1975, and almost all the
rest were in labor-exchange teams.70
As in the North, state farmswill probably be limited forthe most
part to the highlands. Existing rubber plantations, etc. will be con-
verted to state farms; new ones will be set up by members of ethnic
minorities formerlyengaged in shiftingcultivation,71 and probably
also some peasants fromthe coastal areas.
University
of Michzgan,November1975

" NhzanDan, July I12, I1975.

Radio Hanoi, October I3, 1975,translatedin theFBIS DailyReport:
69 AsiaandPacific,
October
16-i7,1975.
70 hanDan, July 12, 1975.
71 Hoc Tap, Vol. XXI, No. 5, May 1975, p. 68.

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