G.R. Nos.
138874-75 January 31, 2006 illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR;
ROWEN ADLAWAN alias "WESLEY;" ALBERT CAÑO alias
"ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON VALIENTE
RUSIA alias 'TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias
"WANGWANG;" and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM," Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants
(1) Francisco Juan Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto
Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy,
assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes
of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
(b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK;
ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK;
ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping and serious
PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES
ANTHONY UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in
Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral
damages, and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit
to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of
Her Excellencys pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:
A. LARRAAGA
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI)
REGIONAL DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE
TESTIFYING; DEFENSE OF APPELLANT AZNAR.

II IV

THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS; THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
DEATH PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS.
III

LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;

IV

THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF

KEY DEFENSE EVIDENCE;
C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO
V

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF I

MARIJOY; AND
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE
VI A STATE WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E),
SECTION 17 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED PROCEDURE.
WITNESS.
II

RUSIAS TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER

PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE,
B. AZNAR INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.

III
I
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
GLARINGLY DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH
TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE GREATLY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
IV
II
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING
CRIME CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
DAVID RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) REASONABLE DOUBT.
CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS
OF THE TESTIMONY OF RUSIA.
D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY
III
 I In his consolidated comment to Aznars supplemental motion for
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS
YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR
AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY
HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN
FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18,
1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS
THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;
In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004,
Larraaga submitted a separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun,
Forensic Pathologist, to show that the examination conducted by the
prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is
inadequate.
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration , Aznar submitted to
this Court the Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin,
Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas,
to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was flawed; (2) he
(Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but
because he had in his possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David
Rusia is not a credible witness.
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment
praying that the four (4) motions for reconsideration be denied with finality,
there being no new argument raised. He responded to appellants assignments
of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged Decision.
reconsideration, the Solicitor General enumerated the grounds why Atty.
Villarins Affidavit should not be given consideration. On February 15, 2005,
Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General read out of context
certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the Affidavit only exposes
the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his arrest,
there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General
filed a rejoinder stating that Aznars reply actually supports the undersigned
counsels (Solicitor Generals) position that Atty. Villarins Affidavit is utterly
inadequate to prove his innocence or at least even acquit them on reasonable
doubt, thus, it would be useless to call for new trial on the basis of such
Affidavit. On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the
Affidavit should be given due consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James
Andrews alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule
again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of
the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our
Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco, we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual invariably
involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment
or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant."
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants
Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the
points raised therein are not neoteric matters demanding new judicial
determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their
respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before
we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we
deem it necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.
The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their
motions:
This Court erred
first, in according credence to Rusias testimony;
second, in rejecting appellants alibi;
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process
when it excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of
Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the
case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general conclusions
from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal
case opens its entire records for review.
I
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusias
testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation.
However, it must be stressed that Rusias testimony was not viewed in
isolation. In giving credence to Rusias testimony, the trial court took into
consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of
other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial
courts findings.
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusias
testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with the physical
evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks
more eloquently than all witnesses put together.[10] The presence of
Marijoys ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape
on her mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusias
testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan.
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality
that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes could
furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other
witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and
Mario Minoza witnessed Jacquelines two failed attempts to escape from
appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara
recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could
find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw
Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nenes Store while the
white van, driven by Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard
voices of quarreling male and female emanating from the van. And lastly,
Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larraaga
and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and
pieces of story form part of Rusias narration. Now, with such strong
anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusias testimony? Even
assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of
belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other
evidence presented by the prosecution.
II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial courts
rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[11] Being evidence that is
negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence.[12] On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible
as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the
accused.[13]
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is
appellants alibi supported by witnesses who were either their relatives,
friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of
the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way,
related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain
that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution
shows that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the
requirements of time and place.[14] They failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear
from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and
James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the
required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that
it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there
are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses
admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning,
afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July
16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4)
witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and
Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July
16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach
Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident
reminded her of Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela
confirmed that she knows Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5)
occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July
16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to
two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2)
men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game
zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard
Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the
foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a
businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan
at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against
the hood of a white van.[15] And over and above all, Rusia categorically
identified Larraaga as one of the participes criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation
with that of Rusia, we are convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at
the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal
perpetrators thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time
that Larraaga was charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young
female students in Cebu. Months before the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie,
the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larraagas attempt
to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It
happened just near the gate of Rochelles school, thus, showing his impudence.
We quote a portion of the transcript of stenographic notes dated September 23,
1998, thus:
ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this representation
a copy of a Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs
Office, University of San Carlos,P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is
signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs.
Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls High School,
and for the record, I will read the content:
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year
high school student of your University of San Carlos-Girls High
School, are writing your good office about an untoward incident
involving our daughter and another student of your school.
xxxxxx
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other
classmates, Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while
on their way to get a ride home near the school campus, a black
Honda Civic with five young male teenagers including the
driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and simultaneously one
of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed
Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She
 resisted and got away from him. Sensing some people were
watching what they were doing, they hurriedly sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still now, she is
suffering the shock and tension that she is not supposed to
experience in her young life. It is very hard for us parents to
think about what shed been through.[16]
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not
enhance Larraagas chance of securing an acquittal.
III
Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial courts exclusion
of Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional
Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was properly excluded.
First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his
report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits
already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the
trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar submitted
via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises
nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said
Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was the one responsible
for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion. The trial
court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his intended
testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor Generals observation that such
Affidavit is neither helpful nor encouraging to Aznars cause. We quote his
keen reflection on the matter:
xxxxxx
Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof,
acknowledged that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of
Marijoy. This assertion immediately conflicts with accused-appellant
Aznars claim in his Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not
Marijoys. Surely, something is amiss in accused-appellant Aznars
recollection of his defense.
Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit
that accused-appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect in the subject
crimes. Evidently, this statement completely supports this Honorable
Courts findings in its Decision dated February 3, 2004.
Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarins affidavit, he stated that:
The arrest of Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the
investigation of the case because witnesses came out and identified
Juzman Aznar as one of those allegedly seen talking to the victims
on the night they disappeared. Hence, accused-appellant Aznar was
in the beginning already a first-grade suspect in the Chiong sisters
celebrated abduction and killing.
Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that:
x x x I did not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our
next move to get Juzman Aznar as we were already placing him
under surveillance because I knew [Supt. Labra] did it in his
honest desire to help solve the crime x x x. Clearly, this statement is
not an indictment of the investigation that the police undertook in the
subject crimes.
Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades
against alleged influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of
the victims, and the purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and
police officers who unearthed the evidence against accused-appellants
and successfully prosecuted the latter. In executing the affidavit, it
appears that Atty. Villarin would want to impress that he, rather
than those promoted, deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarins inability to testify in the criminal cases was
not due solely to the prosecutions action. Whether he ought to testify or
not was an argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the resulting
inability, Atty. Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers
who did everything to make a mockery of the criminal proceedings.
And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarins affidavit of the
quality of a smoking gun that would acquit accused-appellants of the
crimes they have been convicted. For he did not finish the police
investigation of the subject crimes; this is the long and short of his
miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by the substance of
his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is held on
anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his
own unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by
evidentiary rules), his self-congratulatory remarks, and his
unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion when
almost everyone else did.[17]
Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show
that the examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is
inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence
warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larraaga could have produced it
during trial had he wished to.
IV
Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia
testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found
at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We
must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such argument.
First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,[18] a fingerprint expert, testified that the
fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy.[19] Second, the packaging
tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed on
Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained.[20] Third, the body
had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted.[21] And
fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to
be that of Marijoy[22] which they eventually buried. They erected
commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which
mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still
fail to bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the said
body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other families who had lost
someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and
claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusias narration that
Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine, following Josmans
instruction "to get rid" of her.
On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only
seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the
crimes were committed, the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James
Andrews birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of the
Formal Offer of Additional Evidence,[23] with the statement that he was
eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation
of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by
alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.[24]
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage
of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be
reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus
it is extremely difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim.
However, considering that minority is a significant factor in the imposition of
penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure from
the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics
Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and
thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration
filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews
claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and
penalty, there being nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration
of our Decision.
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task
of evaluating every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial
court in response to appellants plea for the reversal of their conviction. But,
even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an
ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their
submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the
verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants clear culpability which
demands retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants
Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and
Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The Solicitor General is DIRECTED
(a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the
National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth
Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an extensive
comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James Andrew and
James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority. The motion
is likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175605
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA a.k.a. JUNIOR; JOEY
PAMPLONA a.k.a. NATO and JESSIE GARCIA Y ADORINO,
Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00765 which affirmed an earlier
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan City, Branch 25
in Criminal Case No.9440-B, finding accused-appellants Arnold
Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. Junior, Joey Pamplona, a.k.a. Nato, and
Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P16,700.00 as actual damages, P408,000.00 for loss of
earning capacity and to pay the costs of the suit.
The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an
Information dated January 22, 1996, filed with the RTC for the crime
of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 22, 1995, in the Municipality of
Binan, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, alias
Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and Jessie Garcia y Adorino,
conspiring, confederating together and mutualy helping each other,
with intent to kill, while conveniently armed with a deadly bladed
weapon, with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Mauro Biay y
Almarinez with the said weapon, thereby inflicting upon him stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, accused-appellants, duly assisted by their
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely, Dulce
Borero, elder sister of the victim Mauro Biay and eyewitness to the
killing of her brother; Dr. Rolando Poblete, who conducted an autopsy
on the body of the victim and prepared the post-mortem report; and
Amelia Biay, the victims widow. The evidence for the prosecution, as
culled from the CA Decision under review, is as follows:
In the proceedings before the trial court, witness for the
prosecution Dulce Borero testified that on September 22, 1995, at
 around 9:00 oclock in the evening, she was selling balut at Sta. Inez,
Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz, Binan, Laguna. Her brother,
Mauro Biay, also a balut vendor, was also at the area, about seven (7)
arms length away from her when she was called by accused Jessie
Garcia. Borero testified that when her brother Mauro approached
Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of her brother behind his back and
Jessies companions- accused Arnold Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona
began stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed
instrument. Joey was at the right side of the victim and was strangling
Mauro from behind. Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free
himself while being stabbed by the three (3) accused., until her brother
slumped facedown on the ground. Arnold then instructed his two co-
accused to run away. During cross-examination, Borero claims that
she wanted to shout for help but nothing came out from her mouth.
When the accused had left after the stabbing incident, witness claimed
that she went home to call her elder brother Teodoro Biay, but when
they returned to the scene, the victim was no longer there as he had
already been brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital. They learned
from the tricycle driver who brought Mauro top the hospital that their
brother was pronounced dead on arrival.
Dr. Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted an autopsy
on victim Mauro Biay and prepared the post-mortem report, testified
that the victims death was caused by hypovolemic shock secondary to
multiple stab wounds. Witness specified the eight (8) stab wounds
suffered by the victim one in the neck, two in the chest, one below the
armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the left
thigh and also a laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According to
the expert witness, the nature of stab wounds indicate that it may have
been caused by more than one bladed instrument.
The victims widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred
burial expenses amounting to P16,700.00 due to the death of her
husband. Also, her husband allegedly earned a minimum of P300.00 a
day as a balut vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a part-time
carpenter.
The accused-appellants denied the charge against them.
Specifically, accused-appellant Joey Pamplona denied that he
participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay, accused-appellant Jessie
Garcia interposed the defense of alibi, while accused-appellant Arnold
Garchitorena interposed the defense of insanity. Succinctly, the CA
Decision summed up their respective defenses:
On the other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied that he
participated in the stabbing of Mauro Biay. Joey Pamplona claims that
he was seated on a bench when co-accused Arnold came along. Then
the balut vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold stand up, pull something
from the right side of his pocket and stab the balut vendor once before
running away. Joey Pamplona testified that after the stabbing incident,
due to fear that Arnold might also stab him, he also ran away to the
store of a certain Mang Tony, a barangay official and related the
incident to Aling Bel, the wife of Mang Tony. Joey Pamplona said that
he stayed at Mang Tonys store until his father arrived and told him to
go home.
Danilo Garados testified that on Septemebr 22, 1995, he was
at the store of Mang Tony to buy cigarettes and saw Arnold and Joey
seated on the bench near the artesian well. Arnold and Joey allegedly
called Mauro Biay and he saw Arnold stabbing Mauro. Jessie Garcia
was not there and Joey allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed
Mauro.
Clavel Estropegan testified that on September 22, 1995,
around 9:00 p.m. Joey Pamplona entered her store and told her that
Junior or Arnold Garchitorena was stabbing somebody. She did not
hear any commotion outside her house which is just four houses away
from the artesian well. However, she closed her store for fear that
Arnold will enter her house.
Barangay Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he
investigated the stabbing incident and, although he had no personal
knowledge, he found out that it was Arnold Garchitorena who stabbed
Mauro Biay. Upon questioning Arnold, the latter admitted that he did
stab Mauro.
Defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo testified that on
September 22, 1995, he was in his shoe factory at his house located at
186 Sta. Teresita Street, Almeda Subdivision, Binan when he heard
Mauro Biay shouting, and so he went out of his house. He allegedly
saw two persons embracing each other near the artesian well. He
recognized these two persons as Mauro and Arnold. He saw Arnold
pulling out a knife from the body of Mauro and the latter slowly fell
down on his side. After Arnold washed his hands at the artesian well
and walked away towards the house of his aunt, this witness
approached Mauro and seeing that the victim was still breathing, went
to get a tricycle to bring Mauro to the hospital. When he got back to
the area, there were many people who helped board Mauro in the
tricycle and they brought him to the Perpetual Help Hospital in Binan.
The other co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand and claimed
that on September 22, 1995, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, he
was still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt. He arrived at his
home in Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On September 24, 1995, he was
fetched by two (2) policemen and two (2) Barangay Tanods from his
house and brought to the Binan Police Station for questioning.
Thereafter, he was put in jail and incarcerated for six (6) months
without knowing the charges against him. He was only informed that
he was one of the suspects in the killing of Mauro Biay by his mother.
With respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen,
Medical Officer III and resident physician of the National Center for
Mental Health, testified that she examined the accused Arnold and
based on the history of the patient, it was found that he had been using
prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two (2) years prior to
the stabbing incident in 1995. The patient is allegedly suffering from
schizophrenia, wherein he was hearing auditory voices, seeing strange
things and is delusional. However, Dr. Belen also testified that the
accused Garchitorena had remissions or exaservation and understands
what he was doing and was aware of his murder case in court.
On May 9, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds accused Arnold
Garchitorena y Gamboa alias Junior, Joey Pamplona alias Nato and
Jessie Garcia y Adorino GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime of
MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act 7659, (Heinous Crimes).
Accordingly, all of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH.
Furthermore, all of the accused are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally Amelia Biay, widow of the victim Mauro Biay,
the following sums:
a) 50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity
b) 50,000.00 as and for moral damages
c) 50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages
d) 16,700.00 as and for actual damages
e) 408,000.00 as and for loss of the earning capacity of
Mauro Biay; and
f) To pay the costs of suit.
Likewise, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, is hereby ordered to transfer/commit the three (3)
accused to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately
upon receipt hereof.
Considering that death penalty was meted against all of the
accused, let the entire records of the above-entitled case be forwarded
to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment pursuant to
Rule 122, Sec.10 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellants appealed to the CA. Pamplona and Garcia
reiterated their denial of the charge against them. Garchitorena who
never denied his participation in the killing, insisted, however, insisted
that he is exempt from criminal liability because he was suffering from
a mental disorder before, during and after the commission of the crime.
On May 31, 2006, the CA rendered the Decision now under
review, affirming RTCs Decision in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001
Decuision of the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 25,
in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty
 beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its
entirety.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the CA ratiocinated as
follows:
After studying the records of this case, we do not find any
reason to overturn the ruling of the trial court.
Despite the testimony of defense witnesses that it was only
accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena who stabbed the victim Mauro
Biay, we find reason to uphold the trial courts giving credence to
prosecution witness Dulce Borero who testified as an eyewitness on
the circumstances surrounding the incident and the manner by which
the crime committed.
Defense witness Garados testified that he was at the store and
saw both Arnold and Joey at the vicinity where the stabbing incident
happened, seated on a bench near the artesian well, when they called
the victim Mauro. Defense witness Gonzalgo was in his house when
he heard the commotion and went outside to see Arnold and Mauro
embracing near the artesian well and the former pulling a knife from
the body of the latter. On the other hand, prosecution witness Borero
was merely seven arms length away from the incident and could easily
see the victim Mauro overpowered and attacked by his assailants,
Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia. She witnessed
the stabbing incident in its entirely and positively identified the
accused and their criminal acts. It is a well-settled rule that the
evaluation of testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on
appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if they
are telling the truth or not. (People vs. Cardel, 336 SCRA 144)
Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the accused
conspired to assault the victim Mauro Biay. Accused Jessie Garcia was
the one who called the victim and prompted the latter to approach their
group near the artesian well. When the victim was near enough,
accused Jessie Garcia and co-accused Joey Pamplona restrained
Mauro Biay and overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw the two
accused, Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona, together with their co-
accused Arnold Garchitorena instructed his two co-accused to run.
Conspiracy is apparent in the concerted action of the three accused.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
(People vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 148). Conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or
inferred from the acts of the accused which show a joint or common
purpose and design, a concerted action and community of interest
among the accused (People vs. Sicad, et al., 391 SCRA 19).
Likewise, we affirm the trial courts appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength to qualify the
crime into murder. While it is true that superiority in number does not
per se mean superiority in strength, the appellants in this case did not
only enjoy superiority in number, but were armed with a weapon,
while the victim had no means with which to defend himself. Thus,
there was obvious physical disparity between the protagonists and
abuse of superior strength attended the killing when the offenders took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense. (People of the Phils. vs. Parreno, 433 SCRA 591). In the case
at bar, the victim was rendered helpless when he was assaulted by the
three accused. He was restrained and overpowered by the combined
strength and the weapons used by his assailants.
We do not find improbable Boreros failure to act or shout for
help upon witnessing the stabbing of her brother Mauro Biay. It is an
accepted maxim that different people react differently to a given
situation or type of situation and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling
experience. xxx There is no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted by a shocking incident. The workings of the human mind
when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable. (People of the
Philippines vs. Aspuria, 391 SCRA 404)
Accused-appellant Jessie Garcias denial of any involvement
cannot prevail over Boreros positive identification. As ruled by the
trial court, allegations that accused Jessie Garcia was somewhere else
when the crime was committed is not enough. He must likewise
demonstrate that he could not have been present at the crime scene, or
in its vicinity. He also could have sought the help of his co-worker,
employer or anyone in the area to support his defense of alibi. Indeed,
we affirm that accused Jessie Garcias allegation that he was elsewhere
when the crime was committed is not substantiated by evidence. Alibi
can easily be fabricated. Well-settled is the rule that alibi is an
inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the victim. (People of the Phils. vs.
Cadampog, 428 SCRA 336)
Finally, the defense of insanity cannot be given merit when
the expert witness herself, Dr. Belen, attested that accused Arnold
Garchitorena was experiencing remission and was even aware of his
murder case in court. The trial court had basis to conclude that during
the commission of the crime, Arnold was not totally deprived of
reason and freedom of will. In fact, after the stabbing incident, accused
Arnold Garchitorena instructed his co-accused to run away from the
scene. We agree that such action demonstrates that Arnold possessed
the intelligence to be aware of his and his co-accuseds criminal acts.
A defendant in a criminal case who interpose the defense of mental
incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact that he was insane at
the very moment when the crime was committed. There must be
complete deprivation of reason in the commission of the act, or that
the accused acted without discernment, which must be proven by clear
and positive evidence. The mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does not preclude imputability. Indeed, a man may act crazy but it does
not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. (People of
the Philippines vs. Galigao, 395 SCRA 195)
Having found the court a quos decision to be supported by the
evidence on record, and for being in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence, we find no reason to set it aside.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed March 9, 2001
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 25, in
Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its
entirely.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. The
People and the accused-appellants opted not to file any supplemental
brief. The respective assignments of errors contained in the briefs that
they filed with the CA are set forth hereunder.
For accused-appellant Pamplona:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL AND TOTAL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS DULCE BORERO
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE
EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN DULY PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
For accused-appellant Garcia:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
GIVEN BY DULCE BORERO, ELDER SISTER OF THE VICTIM
AND PROSECUTION WITNESS, IN RESPECT OF THE
PARTICIPATION OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED DESPITE
GLARING INCONSISTENCIES, INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES
AND UNRELIABLE DECLARATION ATTENDING THE SAME;
AND, ON THE OTHERHAND, IN DISREGARDING THE
COHERENT, CONSISTENT AND CREDIBLE EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE WITNESSES ALL IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES GOVERNING QUANTUM
OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENSE EXISTING IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED GARCIA;
 II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPLETELY
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT JESSIE GARCIA WHO WAS
SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THE TIME AS TO RENDER IT
PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE BEEN AT THE
SCENE OF THE CRIME AND EVEN IF THE SAME IS
SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
THAT IS, THE TESTIMONIES OF OITHER DEFENSE
WITNESSES WHO WERE ONE IN SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT
PRESENT THEREAT;
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A VERDICT OF
CONVICTION FOR JESSIE GARCIA INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL
WHEN NONE OF THE OTHER ACCUSED, AFTER HAVING
ADMITTED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIME,
IMPLICATED HIM;
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED, IN AWARDING MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE
THEREFOR.
For accused-appellant Garchitorena:
I March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 551), that the circumstance alone that the
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE OVER THE TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT
WITNESS.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED ARNOLD
GARCHITORENA TO HAVE WILLFULLY EXECUTED THE
ACTS COMPLAINED OF.
Accused-appellant Pamplona capitalized on Dulce Boreros
inaction at the time when she had supposedly witnessed the slaying of
her younger brother. He argued that if she really witnessed the crime,
she would have had readily helped her brother Mauro instead of fleeing.
Accused-appellant Garcia anchored his acquittal on his defense of alibi,
while accused-appellant Garchitorena used his alleged mental
disorder, specifically, schizophrenia, as a ground to free himself from
criminal liability.
The core issues raised by the both accused-appellants Pamplona
and Garcia are factual in nature and delve on the credibility of the
witnesses.
Since the accused-appellants raise factual issues, they must use
cogent and convincing arguments to show that the trial court erred in
appreciating the evidence. They, however, have failed to do so.
Accused-appellant Pamplona contends that the trial courts
decision was rendered by a judge other than the one who conducted trial.
Hence, the judge who decided the case failed to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses on the stand so as to gauge their credibility. This
argument does not convince the Court for the reason it has consistently
maintained, to wit:
We have ruled in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No. 87214,
judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision. After all, he had
the full record before him, including the transcript of stenographic
notes which he could study. The efficacy of a decision is not
necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a
colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached
by him.
A perusal of the trial courts decision readily shows that it was
duly based on the evidence presented during the trial. It is evident that
he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence A: Yes sir.
before him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses. This
Court finds no plausible ground to set aside the factual findings of the Q: Now, when [did] this stabbing incident [happen]?
trial court, which were sustained by the CA. A: On September 22, 1995 sir.

Q: Do you know what was [the] time when this incident

happened on September 22, 1995?
A: 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
The eyewitness Dulce Boreros testimony clearly established
Pamplona and Garcias participation and, consequently, their culpability Q: Where [did] this stabbing [happen]?
in the appalling murder of Mauro Biay: A: At Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Bian, Laguna sir.

Q: Could you tell Madam Witness, where in particular place in

Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision this stabbing incident
Fiscal Nofuente (To the witness) happened?
A: In the street near the artesian well sir.

Q: Do you know where is that street?

A: Sta Inez St., Almeda Subdivision, dela Paz, Bian, Laguna sir.
Q: Madam witness, do you know Mauro Biay?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You said a while ago that accused Arnold Gatchitorena, Jessie
xxx
Garcia, Joey Pamplona repeatedly [stabbed] Mauro Biay, do
Q: Do you know likewise the cause of his death?
you know these three accused?
A: Yes sir.
A: Yes sir.
Q: What was the cause of his death?
xxx
A: He was repeatedly stabbed sir.
Q: Will you kindly step down from your seat and tap the three
Q: You said that Mauro Biay was repeatedly stabbed, who
accused that you have pointed to us to be the persons who
stabbed Mauro Biay repeatedly?
stabbed and killed your brother Mauro Biay?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena, was stabbing repeatedly the victim
sir.
Court: Police Officer Dionisio will you kindly accompany the
witness.
Q: Was Arnold Gatchitorena alone when he stabbed Mauro
P02 Dionisio: Yes sir.
Biay?
A: They were three (3) who were stabbing Mauro Biay, sir.
Fiscal: I would like to manifest Your Honor, that the witness was
crying when she was pointing to the three accused, uttering that
Q: You said that they were three who were stabbing Mauro Biay,
who are the other two? Sila ang pumatay sa aking kapatid!.
A: Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona sir.
xxx
Q: So that when you said three, you are referring to Arnold
Q: What is the name of that person wearing that blue t-shirts?
Gatchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena sir. Q: When you said Jessie, are you referring to Jessie Garcia, one
of the accused in this case?
Q: We would like to confirm if he is really Arnold Gatchitorena A: Yes sir.
pointed to by the witness?
Q: When Mauro Biay was called by Jessie Garcia, what was
Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness wearing blue t- [M]auro Biay doing there?
shirts identified himself as Arnold Gatchitorena. A: Mauro Biay approached sir.

Fiscal: Do you know the name of second person whom you tapped Q: By the way Madam Witness, do you know why Mauro Biay
on his side wearing white t-shirts? was in that place where the incident happened?
A: Yes sir. A: Yes sir.

Q: What is his name? Atty. Pajares: Witness would be incompetent Your Honor.
A: Jessie Garcia sir.
Court: Witness may answer.
Interpreter: The person pointed to by the witness identified
himself as certain Jessie Garcia. Fiscal: Why was he there?
A: He was selling balot sir.
Fiscal: Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name of a person
in longsleeves polo shirts-checkered? xxx
A: Yes sir, Joey Pamplona sir.
Fiscal: When Mauro Biay approached Jessie Garcia, what [did] Mauro
Interpreter: The person pointed by the witness identified himself Biay do, if any?
as certain Joey Pamplona. A: Jessie Garcia twisted the hand of my brother and placed
the hand at his back sir.
xxx
Q: Who were the companions of Jessie Garcia when he called
Q: How far were you from Mauro Biay when he was being [M]auro Biay?
stabbed by the three accused Joey Pamplona, Jessie Garcia, A: Joey Pamplona and Jr. Gatchitorena sir.
and Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Seven (7) arms length sir. Q: When you said Jr. Gatchitorena are you referring to Arnold
Gatchitorena?
Q: You said that your brother was stabbed successively by the A: Yes sir.
three accused, how did it [happen] Madam Witness?
A: They called him sir. Q: So that when Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay, he was
together with Arnold Gatchitorena and Joey Pamplona?
Q: Who was called? A: Yes sir.
A: Mauro Biay sir.
Q: If you know Madam Witness, what did Joey Pamplona
Q: Who called Mauro Biay? and Arnold Gatchitorena do after Jessie Garcia twisted
A: It was Jessie who called sir. the arm of Mauro Biay on his back?
A: Arnold Gatchitorena repeatedly stabbed [M]auro Biay at A: The victim Mauro Biay was suddenly slumped face down on
his back and also Jessie Garcia also stabbed my brother the ground sir.
sir. xxx

xxx Q: What did you learn if any when you went to the hospital to see
your brother [M]auro Biay?
Q: Were you able to know the weapon used to stab Mauro A: He was already dead sir.
Biay?
A: It was like a shiny bladed instrument sir.
Even under cross-examination, Dulce Borero was unwavering,
Q: Now, what was the position of Mauro Biay when being straightforward, categorical and spontaneous in her narration of how the
stabbed by the three accused?
killing of her brother Mauro took place. [10] Notably, her testimony as
A: He was struggling to free himself sir.
to the identification of Garchitorena as the one who stabbed Mauro Biay
Q: You said that he was struggling to free himself, why did you was even corroborated by defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo, [11]
say that he was struggling to free himself? thus:
A: Because I could see sir.

Q: You see what?

A: Because that three were repeatedly stabbing Mauro Biay sir.
Q: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay, what was Joey
Pamplona doing to Mauro Biay, if you can still remember?
A: He was also repeatedly stabbing my brother sir.
Q: From the time you saw these two persons near the artesian
well, what happened after that, mr. witness?
A: Mauro Biay slumped on the floor and I saw Junior
stabbed once more the victim but I am not sure if the
victim was hit at the back, maam.

Q: Aside from that stabbing, what else if any Joey Pamplona Q: How far were you from the two when you saw the incident,
was doing to Mauro Biay? mr. witness?
A: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay Joey Pamplona was also
struggling [strangling] the neck of Mauro Biay sir. A: More or less 7 to 8 meters, maam.

Q: You said that Mauro Biay was stabbed by the three

accused successively, was Mauro Biay hit by these
stabbing? Q: Were there anything blocking your sight from the place where
A: Yes sir. you were standing to the place of incident, mr. witness?
A: None, maam.
Q: Why do you know that he was hit by stabbing of the three?
A: Because I saw the blood oozing from the part of his body
sir.
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we
Q: Now, what happened to Mauro Biay, when he was stabbed sustain the lower court in giving her testimony full faith and credence.
and hit by the successive stabbing of the three accused? Moreover, the prosecutions version is supported by the physical
evidence. [12] Boreros testimony that the victim was successively
stabbed several times conforms with the autopsy report that the latter
suffered multiple stab wounds. [13]
Accused-appellant Pamplonas argument that there were
inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses Borero is not
convincing. He specifically points out that in the direct examination of
Borero, she stated that it was Jessie Garcia who twisted the hand of
Mauro Biay backwards when the latter approached the former. [14] In
the cross-examination, she stated that it was Joey Pamplona who
strangled the victim when the latter approached Jessie Garcia.
The seeming inconsistencies between her direct testimony and
her cross-examination testimonies are not sufficient ground to disregard
them. In People v. Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel y Molet and
Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz, [15] we ruled that:
minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they
may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a
testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.
Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility
of Borero or her narration of the incident. On the contrary, they showed
that her account was the entire truth. In fact, her narration was in
harmony with the account of defense witness Gonzalgo. We note further
that both the Sworn Statement [16] of Borero and her testimony before
the lower court [17] were in complete congruence.
Undoubtedly, accused-appellants identities as the perpetrators
were established by the prosecution. The prosecution witness was able
to observe the entire incident, because she was there. Thus, we find no
reason to differ with the trial courts appreciation of her testimony.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, and not
attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses
on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial. [18]
Accused-appellant Garcias alibi has no leg to stand on. In People
v. Desalisa, [19] this Court ruled that:
for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place when the crime was committed, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing evidence.
Here, the crime was committed at Binan, Laguna. Although
Garcia testified that he was still riding a bus from his work in
Blumentritt and arrived in Binan only at 11:00 P.M. or two hours after
the killing incident, still, he failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the place of the crime or its immediate
vicinity. His alibi must fail.
Accused-appellant Garchitorenas defense of insanity has also no
merit. Unlike other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a
more stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. [20] As aptly argued by the Solicitor General, insanity is
a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance. As such, it must be
adequately proved, and accused-appellant Garchitorena utterly failed to
do so. We agree with both the CA and the trial court that he was not
totally deprived of reason and freedom of will during and after the
stabbing incident, as he even instructed his co-accused-appellants to run
away from the scene of the crime.
Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no
conspiracy, as there was no evidence whatsoever that he aided the other
two accused-appellants or that he participated in their criminal designs.
[21] We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo, [22] we stated:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the
incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or
community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by
each of the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of
all. (citations omitted, emphasis ours)
In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants
were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their
common objective. Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twisted his
arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and
straddled him on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying
to free himself from them, but they were too strong. All means through
which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to the
ground and expired. The three accused-appellants prior act of waiting
for the victim outside affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks
of a common design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among
the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of
their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. [23]
The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be
appreciated against the accused-appellants. Abuse of superior strength
is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim
and the aggressor, considering that a situation of superiority of strength
is notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. [24] This
circumstance was alleged in the Information and was proved during
the trial. In the case at bar, the victim certainly could not defend
himself in any way. The accused-appellants, armed with a deadly
weapon, immobilized the victim and stabbed him successively using
the same deadly weapon.
All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-
appellants of murder, considering the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. Since an aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime, each of the
accused-appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of death
in accordance with Article 63 [25] of the Revised Penal Code. Murder,
under Article 248 [26] of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Following Article 63 of the same code,
the higher penalty of death shall be applied.
In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, [27]
otherwise known as the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole should instead be imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants
shall be sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in
lieu of the penalty of death.
While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and
the offense is still heinous. [28] Consequently, the civil indemnity for
the victim is still P75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon, [29] we explained
that even if the penalty of death was not to be imposed on appellant
because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 was still proper. Following the ratiocination in People v.
Victor, [30] the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with the formula for
of the crime. computing the award for loss of earning capacity. [36] Thus,

Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity by the trial court Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income 50%
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and (GAI)]
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Likewise the award of P50,000.00 for moral lost earnings
damages is modified and increased to P75,000.00, consistent with recent
jurisprudence [31] on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is = 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 P12,000.00
death, it is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. 9346. The
award of moral damages does not require allegation and proof of the = (34) x (P12,000.00)
emotional suffering of the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the
= P408,000.00
vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied. [32] The trial courts
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall,
however, be reduced to P30,000.00, also pursuant to the latest
jurisprudence on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
As to the award of actual damages amounting to P16,700.00, we CR HC No. 00765, finding the three-accused appellants guilty beyond
modify the same. In People v. Villanueva, this Court declared that when reasonable doubt of murder is hereby AFFIRMED WITH the
actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on
P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages for accused-appellants is REDUCED to RECLUSION PERPETUA without
P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. In eligibility for parole pursuant to RA 9346; (2) the monetary awards to
the light of such ruling, the victims heirs in the present case should, be paid jointly and severally by the accused-appellants to the heirs of
therefore, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. the victim are as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages; (3) P408,000.00 for loss
The award of P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is
of earning capacity; and (4) interest is imposed on all the damages
justified. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid. [37]
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way
of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is No costs.
self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in SO ORDERED.
the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. [35] It cannot be disputed that
the victim, at the time of his death, was self-employed and earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws. The computation
G.R. No. 175926 July 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN
CHUA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934
dated May 10, 2006. Said Decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) convicting them and one Restituto Carandang for two
counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in Criminal Cases
No. Q-01-100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063, the Informations for
which read:
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061
That on or about the 5 day of April 2001, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior
strength and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of PO2
DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO, by then and there shooting
the latter several times with the use of a firearm of unknown
caliber hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the immediate heirs of said PO2
DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with
insult to the public authorities.
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100062
That on or about the 5 day of April, 2001, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior
strength and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, by then and there
shooting the latter several times with the use of a firearm of
unknown caliber, hitting him on the different parts of the body
and as soon as the said victim fell on the ground, by placing a
hand grenade (sic) underneath the body which directly caused
an explosion and mutilated the body which directly caused the
death of SPO2 WILFREDO RED Y PILAR, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in such amount as may
be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with
insult to the public authorities.
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063
That on or about the 5 day of April, 2001, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill with evident premeditation and
with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon the person of SPO1 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y
DALIDA, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of
a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on his neck, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries, the offender
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reasons or causes
independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said SPO1
 WILFREDO MONTECALVO Y DALIDA, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or with
insult to the public authorities.
of the house near Milans room. The door to Milans room was open,
enabling the police officers to see Carandang, Milan and Chua inside.
SPO2 Red told the group that the persons inside the room would not put
up a fight, making them confident that nothing violent would erupt.
However, when the group introduced themselves as police officers,
Milan immediately shut the door.

On May 15, 2001, accused-appellants Carandang, Milan and

Chua pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to
fall and propelling them inside the room. PO2 Alonzo shouted Walang
gagalaw! Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red
who dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the suddenness of
The prosecution evidence, culled from the testimonies of Senior
the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were not able to return fire and
Police Officer (SPO) 1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, SPO1 Rodolfo Estores,
were instantly killed by the barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who
Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Virgilio Calaro, P/Supt. Manuel
was right behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants
Roxas and Dr. Wilson Tan, yielded the following version of the facts:
when Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground.
SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, Sugurin mo na! Milan lunged
towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire his gun and hit
Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the house and pulled SPO1
In the afternoon of April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of
Montecalvo out.
the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance from the
sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take
place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy. Salvacion, Quezon City. The
station commander called SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and instructed him
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of
to talk to Milans sister, who was in their office. SPO2 Red, accompanied
P/Sr. Insp. Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La Loma Police
by Police Officer (PO) 2 Dionisio Alonzo, SPO1 Estores and SPO1
Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of Police
Montecalvo, talked to Milans sister. Thereafter, SPO2 Red formed a
Station 1 at the time of the incident. SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to
team composed of the officers who accompanied him during the
the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out of the house and was
interrogation, with him as team leader. The team received further
also brought to a hospital, but Carandang and Chua remained holed up
instructions from the station commander then proceeded to Calavite
inside the house for several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for
Street aboard two vehicles, a mobile patrol car and an unmarked car.
the surrender of Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for
the presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo.
It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when Carandang and Chua
surrendered. SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were found dead inside the
When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., they
house, their bodies slumped on the floor with broken legs and gunshot
alighted from their vehicles and surrounded Milans house. SPO1
and grenade shrapnel wounds.
Montecalvos group went to the left side of the house, while SPO2 Reds
group proceeded to the right. The two groups eventually met at the back
Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem
examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo. He found that
the gunshot wounds of Red and Alonzo were the cause of their deaths.
According to SPO1 Montecalvos account, Dr. Bu Castro of the
Chinese General Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet from the
right portion of his nape. SPO1 Montecalvos hospitalization expenses
amounted to P14,324.48. He testified that it was a nightmarish
experience for him as he feared that he might be paralyzed later on.
The defense presented the three accused as witnesses, testifying
as follows:
Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the incident, and
that it was the police officers who fired all the shots. He was in Milans
house during the incident in order to ask Milan to accompany him to
convert his cellular phones SIM card. When he arrived at Milans place,
he found Milan and Chua playing a card game. A short time later, there
was banging on the door. The door of the house was destroyed and
gunfire suddenly erupted, prompting him to take cover under a bed.
Chua cried out to him that he was hit and that he might lose blood. Milan
ran outside and sustained injuries as well. There was an explosion near
the door, causing burns on Carandangs left arm. Gunfire continued
coming from different directions for two to three minutes. Suddenly, the
place became dark as the lights went out.
Since gunshots were still heard every now and then, Carandang
stayed in the house and did not come out. Col. Tor, the new Chief of the
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated for
Carandang to come out. Carandang requested for the presence of his
wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and media man Ramon Tulfo. He went out of
the house at around midnight when the three arrived.
Milan testified that he was at home in Calavite St. at the time of
the incident. He knew Carandang for seven months. Chua was their
neighbor. While playing a card game inside his room, they heard
someone pounding at the door. He stood and approached the door to
check. The door was destroyed, and two unidentified men barged in.
Gunshots erupted. He was hit on the left side of his body. He ran out of
the room, leaving Chua and Carandang behind. As he was doing so, he
saw his mother lying down and shouting Itigil niyo ang putukan;
maraming matatanda dito! Milan was then hit on his left leg by another
gunshot.
Chua testified that he went to the house of Milan at around
noontime of April 4, 2001 to play a card game. They played inside
Milans ground floor room. Five to ten minutes later, Carandang arrived
and laid down on the bed. Chua did not pay much attention as Milan and
Carandang discussed about cellular phones. Later, they heard a loud
banging in the door as if it was being forced open. Milan stood up to see
what was happening. Chua remained seated and Carandang was still on
the bed. The door was forcibly opened. Chua heard successive gunshots
and was hit on his left big toe. He ducked on the floor near the bed to
avoid being hit further. He remained in that position for several hours
until he lost consciousness. He was already being treated at the Chinese
General Hospital when he regained consciousness. In said hospital, a
paraffin test was conducted upon him.
P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin test on Chua yielded a
negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but that performed on Carandang
produced a positive result. She was not able to conduct a paraffin test
on Milan, who just came from the operating room when she saw him.
Milan seemed to be in pain and refused to be examined.
On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision finding
Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two counts of murder and one
count of frustrated murder:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused RESTITUTO
CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN CHUA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
described and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 63 of the same Code, for the
killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo
qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each
other, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and to indemnify
the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, as follows:
To the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red:
1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P149,734.00 as actual damages; and
4. P752,580.00 as compensatory damages
To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:
1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P139,910.00 as actual damages; and
4. P522,960.00 as compensatory damages.
Likewise, finding the accused Restituto Carandang,
Henry Milan and Jackman Chua guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, described and
penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, paragraph
2, having acted in conspiracy with each other and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of six (6) years of prision mayor to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, and
to indemnify the victim Wilfredo Montecalvo as follows:
1. P14,000.00 as actual damages;
2. P20,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P20,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees; and
4. To pay the costs.
Carandang, Milan and Chua appealed to this Court. The appeals
were separately docketed as G.R. Nos. 160510-12. Pursuant, however,
to the decision of this Court in People v. Mateo, the appeals were
transferred to the Court of Appeals, where they were assigned a single
docket number, CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934.
On May 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision modifying the Decision of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061-63 finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of Murder and one (1) count of Frustrated Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1) In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-
01-100062, accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red
an indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
P2,140,980.69 and P2,269,243.62, respectively; and
2) In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, accused-
appellants are hereby instead sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew. Carandang did not
appeal, and instead presented a letter informing this Court that he is no
longer interested in pursuing an appeal. On April 9, 2008, Milan and
Chua filed a Supplemental Appellants Brief to further discuss the
Assignment of Errors they presented in their September 28, 2004
Appellants Brief:
I.
The court a quo erred in holding that there was conspiracy
among the appellants in the case at bar.
II.
Assuming arguendo that conspiracy exists, the court a quo
gravely erred in convicting them of the crime of murder and
frustrated murder instead of homicide and frustrated homicide
only, the qualifying circumstance of treachery not having
been duly proven to have attended the commission of the
crimes charged.
The trial court had ruled that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted
in conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite
the established fact that it was Carandang who fired the gun which hit
SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all three accused were
held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court explained
that Carandang, Milan and Chuas actuations showed that they acted in
concert against the police officers. The pertinent portion of the RTC
Decision reads:
Milan, Carandang and Chua were all inside the room
of Milan. Upon arrival of police officers Red, Alonzo and the
others and having identified themselves as police officers, the
door was closed and after Alonzo and Red pushed it open and
as Alonzo shouted, walang gagalaw, immediately shots rang
out from inside the room, felling Alonzo, then Red, then
Montecalvo. Chua was heard by Estores to shout to Milan:
Sugurin mo na (tsn, October 16, 2001, page 8). And as Milan
lunged at Montecalvo, the latter shot him.
That the three acted in concert can be gleaned from
their actuations. First, when they learned of the presence of
the police officers, they closed the door. Not one of them came
out to talk peacefully with the police officers. Instead,
Carandang opened fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the
chance to touch their firearms at that instant.
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded
on the acts of Milan and Chua showing that they acted in concert with
Carandang, to wit:
In the present case, when appellants were alerted of
the presence of the police officers, Milan immediately closed
the door. Thereafter, when the police officers were finally able
to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with
bullets. PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result
while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded. Then, upon
seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously
wounded, Chua ordered Milan to attack the police officers.
Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but
the latter, however, was able to shoot him.
At first glance, Milans act of closing the door may
seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the crime. On
second look, however, that act actually facilitated the
commission of the crime. The brief moment during which the
police officers were trying to open the door paved the way for
the appellants to take strategic positions which gave them a
vantage point in staging their assault. Thus, when SPO2 Red
and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to get inside, they were
instantly killed by the sudden barrage of gunfire. In fact,
because of the suddenness of the attack, said police officers
were not able to return fire.
Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in the
conspiracy consisted of lending encouragement and moral
ascendancy to his co-conspirators as evidenced by the fact that
he ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police officers
with the obvious intention to finish them off. Moreover, he did
not immediately surrender even when he had the opportunity
to do so but instead chose to stay with Carandang inside the
room until their arrest.

Milan and Chua object to the conclusion that they were in
conspiracy with Carandang due to their acts of closing the door and not
peaceably talking to the police officers. According to them, those acts
were caused by their being frightened by the police officers who were
allegedly in full battle gear. Milan and Chua further assert that the
fortuitous and unexpected character of the encounter and the rapid turn
of events should have ruled out a finding of conspiracy. They claim that
the incident happened so fast, giving them no opportunity to stop
Carandang.
Appellants contest the factual finding that Chua directed Milan
to go after SPO1 Montecalvo, alleging that they were both unarmed and
that there was no way for Milan to attack an armed person. What really
happened, according to them, was that Milan ran out of the room for
safety and not to attack SPO1 Montecalvo. [36] Milan claims that he
was already injured in the stomach when he ran out, and it was natural
for him to seek safety.
Assuming arguendo that Chua uttered Sugurin mo na! to Milan,
appellants argue that no crime was committed due to the same as all the
victims had already been shot when said words were shouted.
Furthermore, it appears to have been uttered as a result of indiscretion
or lack of reflection and did not inherently carry with it inducement or
temptation.
In the Supplemental Brief, Milan and Chua point out that the
assault on the victims was the result of the impulsive act of Carandang
and was not a result of any agreement or a concerted action of all the
accused. They claim that when the shootout ensued, Chua immediately
dove down near the bed while Milan ran out of the room out of fear.
[40] It is allegedly hard to imagine that SPO1 Montecalvo with certainty
heard Chua utter the phrase Sugurin mo na, considering that the incident
happened so fast, there were lots of gunshots.
To summarize, Milans and Chuas arguments focus on the lack
of direct evidence showing that they conspired with Carandang during
the latters act of shooting the three victims. However, as we have held
in People v. Sumalpong, conspiracy may also be proven by other means:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual
agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived
plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of
concerted action before, during and after the crime, which
demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient.
When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all
regardless of the degree of participation of each.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired
with Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot
the victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by
inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what
made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds
of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by
direct participation.
Appellants attempt to instill doubts in our minds that Chua
shouted sugurin mo na to Milan, who then ran towards SPO1
Montecalvo, must fail. SPO1 Estoress positive testimony [44] on this
matter prevails over the plain denials of Milan and Chua. SPO1 Estores
has no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April 5, 2001. As
part of the team that was attacked on that day, it could even be expected
that he is interested in having only the real perpetrators punished.
 Furthermore, we have time and again ruled that factual findings
of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. [45]
It was the trial court that was able to observe the demeanors of the
witnesses, and is consequently in a better position to determine which
of the witnesses are telling the truth. Thus, this Court, as a general rule,
would not review the factual findings of the courts a quo, except in
certain instances such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on
which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts
is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court;
(9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the
issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions
of both parties.
Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a
finding of conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, there is no
requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of
time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection.
Instead, conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act
of closing the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing
Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police
officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and
Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers to defend
themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is
decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the
attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to
retaliate.
The trial court correctly sentenced appellants to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and
Q-01-100062. The penalty for murder under Article 248 [49] of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Article 63
of the same Code, since there was no other modifying circumstance
other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the penalty that
should be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the Court of Appeals
correctly modified the penalty for the frustrated murder of SPO1
Montecalvo. Under Article 50 in connection with Article 61, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for frustrated murder is one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion
temporal. Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20
years. Its medium period, which should be applied in this case
considering that there is no modifying circumstance other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to
17 years and 4 months the range of the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty should then be
within the range of the penalty next lower to reclusion temporal, and
thus may be any term within prision mayor, the range of which is 6 years
and 1 day to 12 years. The modified term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, is within these ranges.
The civil liabilities of appellants should, however, be modified
in accordance with current jurisprudence. Thus, in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062, the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each victim must be increased to P75,000.00. [54] In
cases of murder and homicide, civil indemnity of P75,000.00 and moral
damages of P50,000.00 are awarded automatically, without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. [55] Appellants
are furthermore solidarily liable to each victim for P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, which is awarded when the crime was committed
with an aggravating circumstance, be it generic or qualifying. [56]
However, since Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily liable
with Milan and Chua with respect to the amounts awarded by the Court
of Appeals, since the Court of Appeals Decision has become final and
executory with respect to him. The additional amounts (P25,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages) shall be borne
only by Milan and Chua, who are hereby held liable therefor solidarily.
In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, the solidary liability of
Milan and Chua for moral damages to SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo is
likewise increased to P40,000.00, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence. [57] An award of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is
also warranted. [58] The additional amounts (P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages) are likewise to be
solidarily borne only by Milan and Chua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01-100062,
appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are held
solidarily liable for the amount of P25,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the
heirs of each of the victims, PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and
SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red, in addition to the amounts to which
they are solidarily liable with Restituto Carandang as held in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to summarize the
rulings of the lower courts and this Court:
a. The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are entitled to the
following amounts:
i. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua, while P25,000.00 shall
be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;
ii. P50,000.00 as moral damages to
be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. P149,734.00 as actual damages to
be soldarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. P2,140,980.00 as indemnity for
loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua; and
v. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;
b. The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are entitled to the
following amounts:
i. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 of which shall be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua, while P25,000.00 shall
be the solidary liability of Milan and Chua only;
ii. P50,000.00 as moral damages to
be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. P139,910.00 as actual damages to
be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iv. P2,269,243.62 as indemnity for
loss of earning capacity to be solidarily borne by
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
v. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages
to be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only;
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants Henry Milan
and Jackman Chua are held solidarily liable for the amount
 of P20,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages to SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo, in
addition to the amounts to which they are solidarily liable
with Restituto Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the lower courts
and this Court, SPO1 Wilfredo Montecalvo is entitled to
the following amounts:

i. P14,000.00 as actual damages to be

solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua;

ii. P40,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00

of which shall be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan
and Chua, while P20,000.00 shall be the solidary
liability of Milan and Chua only;

iii. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to be

solidarily borne by Milan and Chua only; and

iv. P20,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees,

to be solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua.

3. Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on all damages

awarded at the legal rate of Six Percent (6%) per annum from
date of finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201860 January 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO, EDDIE
MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI,* Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a Decision dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and
Alfemio Malogsi, which affirmed with modifications the Decision
dated January 31, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, Branch 11 that convicted appellants Marcelino Dadao,
Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi for
the felony of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in Criminal Case No. 93-1272.
The genesis of this court case can be traced to the charge of murder
against the appellants in the trial court via an Information dated July
16, 1993. The accusatory portion of said indictment reads:
That on or about the 11 day of July 1993, at 7:30 in the evening more
or less at barangay Salucot, municipality of Talakag, province of
Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to kill, by means
of treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and sho[o]t PIONIO
YACAPIN, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that
cause[d] his death thereafter.
To the damage and prejudice [of] the heirs of the deceased PIONIO
YACAPIN in such sum they are entitled under the law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
On September 27, 1993, the appellants were arraigned. All four (4)
accused pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the charge leveled against them.
The factual backdrop of this case as condensed in the trial court's
assailed January 31, 2005 judgment and adopted by the Court of
Appeals in its similarly assailed May 16, 2011 Decision is reproduced
hereunder:
Evidence for the Prosecution
Prosecution's first witness, Ronie Dacion, a 14[-]year old
stepson of the victim, Pionio Yacapin, testified that on July 11,
1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino
Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and [A]lfemio
Malogsi helping each other and with the use of firearms and
bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their house at
Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon.
The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar
Dacion, a 12[-]year old stepson of the victim, corroborates the
testimony of his older brother Ronie Dacion.
Prosecution's third witness, Nenita Yacapin, the widow of the
victim, also corroborates the testimony of the prosecution's first
and second witness. The said witness further testified that she
suffered civil and moral damages [due to] the death of her
husband.
Prosecution's fourth witness, Bernandino Signawan, testified
that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of July 11, 1993, Ronie
and Edgar Dacion reached to [sic] his house and related to him
that their stepfather was killed by accused Eddie Malogsi,
[A]lfemio Malogsi, Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao.
Witness Signawan further testified that on the following
morning, he and the other people in Ticalaan including the
barangay captain, Ronie and Edgar Dacion returned to the house
of the victim and found the latter already dead and in the
surrounding [area] of the house were recovered empty shells of
firearms.
Prosecution's fifth witness, SPO2 Nestor Aznar, testified that he
was the one who prepared the sketch of the hut where the
incident happened and further testified that the four accused
were in the custody of the government and in the following
morning of the incident, he was at the scene of the crime and
found in the yard of the hut eight (8) garand empty shells caliber
30m[m].
The prosecution presented its sixth and last witness, Modesto
Libyocan, who testified that on the evening of July 11, 1993, at
Barangay Salucot, he saw in the house of the victim, Pionio
Yacapin, lights caused by flashlights and heard several gunshots
from the house of the victim, and that the family left their house
on that evening and went to Ticalaan where they learned that
Pionio Yacapin was killed in his house and that early the
following morning, July 12, 1993, he was with some
companions, barangay officials of Ticalaan in the house of the
victim where they found him dead and sustaining gunshot
wounds.
Evidence for the Defense
Defense's first witness, Police Inspector Vicente Armada,
testified that on July 30, 1993, at 11:00 in the morning, he
conducted an examination for paraffin test on all four accused
with the findings that they yielded negative result x x x.
The defense presented Eddie Malogsi, one of the accused, as its
second witness, who testified that on July 11, 1993 at 7:30 in the
evening, he was at the farm of a certain Boyle together with his
brother, [A]lfemio Malogsi, one of the accused herein, being a
worker of that farm. He further testified that on the said date and
time, he never fired a gun.
Defense's third witness, [A]lfemio Malogsi, another accused in
this case, corroborates the testimony of his brother and co-
accused, Eddie Malogsi, that on the said date and time above-
mentioned, he was at the farm of a certain Boyle with his brother
and that they heard several gunshots. He further testified that he
never owned a garand rifle.
Another accused, Antonio Sulindao, defense's fourth witness,
testified that on the date and time above-mentioned, he was at
Salucot together with his family and at 7:30 x x x in the evening,
he heard some gun shots. He further testified among others, that
he has no grudge x x x with the victim prior to the incident.
The testimony of defense's fifth witness, Fernandez Saplina,
[was to] establish the defense of denial and alibi in so far as
accused Marcelino Dadao, that on the whole evening of July 11,
1993, accused Marcelino Dadao was all the time at his house in
San Fernandez, Salucot, Talacag, Bukidnon, and there was no
occasion that said accused went outside or left his house on the
said date and time. The said witness further testified that he
visited the accused at the municipal jail of Talakag, Bukidnon,
where he was detained for having been the suspect in the killing
of Pionio Yacapin.
The defense presented its sixth witness, Camilo Dumalig, who
corroborates the testimony of Fernandez Saplina to the effect
that accused Marcelino Dadao has been residing at San
Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon at the time of the
incident on July 11, 1993 which place is about 7 kilometers from
the place of the incident.
Defense's seventh witness, Venancio Payonda, father-in-law of
accused Antonio Sulindao, testified that the latter was in his
house the whole day of July 11, 1993.
The defense presented as its last witness, accused Marcelino
Dadao, who testified that three (3) months prior to July 11, 1993,
he had been staying at the house of one Fernandez Saplina at
Sitio San Fernandez, Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon, which is
about 7 kilometers away from the house of the victim. He further
testified that on July 11, 1993, he did not leave the house of
Fernandez Saplina until the following morning.

After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial
court finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering
Pionio Yacapin. The assailed January 31, 2005 Decision disposed of the
case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused, EDDIE
MALOGSI, [A]LFEMIO MALOGSI, ANTONIO SULINDAO and
MARCELINO DADAO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, the said four accused are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and are ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim, the amount of SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) as moral damages and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages and to pay the cost of the suit.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated
January 20, 1992, the bailbonds of all four accused are hereby ordered
cancelled and the latter are ordered detained, pending resolution of any
Appeal that may be pursued in this case.
Appellants elevated their case to the Court of Appeals. During the
pendency of the appeal, the appellate court acted on a Manifestation
filed by Rogelio Tampil, bondsman for Eddie Malogsi, who sought the
cancellation of the memorandum of encumbrance that was reflected in
his land title (Original Certificate of Title No. P-13825, Entry No.
165683) for the reason that Eddie Malogsi had already died on August
25, 2003. Thus, on February 11, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution granting Tampil's request. Subsequently, after considering
the pleadings and memoranda of the parties, the Court of Appeals issued
its May 16, 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification the P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded
in addition to the moral and exemplary damages already awarded by the
lower court.
Hence, appellants, through counsel, seek final recourse with the Court
and reiterate the following assignment of errors from their Appellants'
Brief filed with the Court of Appeals:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE
OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
The foregoing arguments were later on amplified by appellants'
Supplemental Brief.
Appellants reiterate that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt because the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were
afflicted with inconsistencies and improbabilities, thus, making them of
doubtful veracity. Furthermore, appellants faulted the trial court for
disbelieving their alibis and for disregarding the fact that the paraffin
test which all of them were subjected to produce a negative result.
Appellants also underscored the fact that they did not take flight despite
the knowledge that they were made suspects in the murder of Pionio
Yacapin. Lastly, appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength should not have been appreciated as it was
not alleged in the criminal information filed against them.

The petition is without merit.
In fine, the pivotal issue raised by appellants in questioning the validity
of their conviction for the crime of murder is whether or not the
eyewitness testimonies presented by the prosecution, specifically that of
the two stepsons (Ronie and Edgar Dacion) and the widow (Nenita
Yacapin) of the deceased victim, Pionio Yacapin, are credible enough
to be worthy of belief.
We have consistently held in jurisprudence that the resolution of such a
factual question is best left to the sound judgment of the trial court and
that, absent any misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion,
the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. In People v. De la
Rosa, we yet again expounded on this principle in this wise:
[T]he issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of
[the] witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a
better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and
observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the
sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face
of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with
reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to
believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to
materially affect the disposition of the case. x x x.
Jurisprudence also tells us that where there is no evidence that the
witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed
that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit. In the case at bar, no imputation of improper motive on the
part of the prosecution witnesses was ever made by appellants.
Furthermore, appellants contend that the prosecution witnesses made
inconsistent and improbable statements in court which supposedly
impair their credibility, such as whether or not the stepsons of the victim
left for Ticalaan together to report the incident, whether the accused
were still firing at the victim when they left or not, and whether or not
the accused went after the stepsons after shooting the victim. We have
reviewed the relevant portions of the transcripts pointed out by the
appellants and have confidently arrived at the conclusion that these are
matters involving minor inconsistencies pertaining to details of
immaterial nature that do not tend to diminish the probative value of the
testimonies at issue. We elucidated on this subject in Avelino v. People,
to wit:
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to
assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies
and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their
probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant
details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant
point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the
testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material
points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a
prosecution witness. (Emphasis omitted.)
Notwithstanding their conflicting statements on minor details, Ronie,
Edgar and Nenita positively identified appellants as the perpetrators of
the dastardly crime of murder committed on the victim which they
categorically and consistently claimed to have personally witnessed.
In order to counter the serious accusation made against them, appellants
put forward the defense of alibi which necessarily fails in the face of
positive identification. It is a time-honored principle in jurisprudence
that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily
be fabricated and is inherently unreliable. Hence, it must be supported
by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is
fatal to the accused. An examination of the record would indicate that
Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi were unable to present a corroborating
witness to support their alibi that they were working at a farm owned by
a certain Boyle on the date and time of Pionio Yacapin's murder. While
the witnesses presented by the defense to corroborate the respective
alibis of Marcelino Dadao and Antonio Sulindao consisted of friends
and relatives who are hardly the disinterested witnesses that is required
by jurisprudence.
With regard to appellants' assertion that the negative result of the
paraffin tests that were conducted on their persons should be considered
as sufficient ground for acquittal, we can only declare that such a
statement is misguided considering that it has been established in
jurisprudence that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that a person
has not fired a gun. It should also be noted that, according to the
prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held firearms which were
used in the fatal shooting of Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and
Antonio Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not come as a
surprise that the latter two tested negative for powder burns because they
were never accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the evidence
on record has established that all four accused shared a community of
criminal design. By their concerted action, it is evident that they
conspired with one another to murder Pionio Yacapin and should each
suffer the same criminal liability attached to the aforementioned
criminal act regardless of who fired the weapon which delivered the
fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.
In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the principle of criminal
conspiracy and its ramifications in this manner:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and then decide to commit it.
It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly,
to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once
established, each and every one of the conspirators is made
criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of
them. In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a
crime may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission
of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does
not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of the actors
incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of
all. (Citation and emphasis omitted.)
As to appellants' argument that their act of bravely reporting to the
police station to answer the serious charge of murder against them
instead of fleeing militates against a finding of any criminal liability on
their part especially in light of the dubious evidence presented by the
prosecution, we can only dismiss this as a hollow line of reasoning
considering that human experience as observed in jurisprudence
instructs us that non-flight does not necessarily connote innocence.
Consequently, we have held:
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true.
Culprits behave differently and even erratically in externalizing and
manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or flee a circumstance strongly
illustrative of guilt while others may remain in the same vicinity so as
to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from
other members of the community.
Contrary to appellants' claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength was used by the trial court to qualify the act of
killing committed by appellants to murder despite it not having been
alleged in the criminal information filed against them, the text of the
assailed January 31, 2005 Decision of the trial court clearly shows that,
even though abuse of superior strength was discussed as present in the
commission of the crime, it was not appreciated as either a qualifying
or generic aggravating circumstance.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court
appreciated treachery, which was alleged in the information, as an
aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to murder. This is
proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly
alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the
felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the
former is absorbed in the latter.
Time and again, we have declared that treachery is present when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. Furthermore, we have also held
that the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In the
case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all
the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. We quote with approval the
following discussion of the Court of Appeals on this matter, to wit:
Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by
the prosecution. The Court notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita
Yacapin who declared that when the victim was making a fire in the
kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on
the bamboo split walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical
chart certified by the Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel,
shows the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the
victim. The chart indicates that the victim was shot from behind.
Clearly, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate. (Citations omitted.)
After reviewing the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the trial court
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we declare that the imposition of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellants is correct and should
be upheld. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death for the felony of murder. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Anent the award of damages, it is jurisprudentially settled that when
death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5)
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper
cases.
Thus, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is
proper. Likewise, the award of temperate damages, in lieu of actual
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 is warranted considering that
the death of the victim definitely caused his heirs some expenses for his
wake and burial though they were not able to present proof.
However, we must modify the amounts of moral and exemplary
damages already awarded in order to conform to existing jurisprudence.
Therefore, the exemplary damages awarded should be increased from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. Moreover, there being no aggravating
circumstance present in this case, the award of moral damages in the
amount of P75,000.00 should be decreased to P50,000.00. Lastly, the
interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from
the date of finality of this ruling until fully paid.
Finally, we observe that the Court of Appeals did not rule on the effect
of the death of Eddie Malogsi during the pendency of this
case. Considering that no final judgment had been rendered against him
at the time of his death, whether or not he was guilty of the crime
charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that he did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally
extinguished by his death, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code and, by analogy, our ruling in People v. Bayotas. Therefore, the
present criminal case should be dismissed with respect only to the
deceased Eddie Malogsi.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 16, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The amount of exemplary damages to be paid by
appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi is
increased from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);

(2) The amount of moral damages to be paid by appellants Marcelino

Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio Malogsi is decreased from
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00);

(3) Appellants Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao and Alfemio

Malogsi are ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all
damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment; and

(4) Criminal Case No. 93-1272 is DISMISSED with respect to Eddie

Malogsi in view of his death during the pendency of this case.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195196 July 13, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ESTANLY OCTA y BAS, Accused-Appellant.
SERENO, C.J.:
Before us is a Notice of Appeal dated 30 July 2010 from the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision dated 19 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03490, affirming the Decision dated 15 May 2008 in Criminal Case
No. 04-224073 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 48,
Manila, convicting accused-appellant Estanly Octa y Bas, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
As culled from the records, the prosecution’s version is herein quoted:
In the morning of September 25, 2003, around 6:40 A.M., Johnny
Corpuz (Johnny) and Mike Adrian Batuigas (Mike Adrian) were on
board a Honda Civic Car colored silver with Plate No. UPT 697
travelling on Buenos Aires St., Sampaloc, Manila when their way was
blocked by a Mitsubishi box type Lancer car colored red-orange. The
four (4) armed occupants of the Lancer car alighted. Johnny did not
open the door of the Honda Civic car but one of the armed men fired
his pistol at the left window of the civic car, thus compelling Johnny
to open the locked door of the car. The armed men went inside the car
and Johnny was ordered to transfer at the back seat at that time. Inside
the car, Johnny was handcuffed, blindfolded and was even boxed. The
armed men asked for the names and telephone numbers of his mother-
in-law. The armed men called his mother-in-law giving the
information that Johnny was in their custody and they would just meet
each other at a certain place. They travelled for a while and then they
stopped and Johnny was brought to a safehouse.
After Johnny and Mike were kidnapped, the kidnappers
communicated with Johnny’s wife Ana Marie Corpuz (Ana Marie)
giving the information that they have in their custody her husband
Johnny and her brother Mike Adrian. Ana Marie tried to confirm the
kidnapping incident by talking to her husband, who confirmed to his
wife that he and Mike Adrian were indeed kidnapped and they were
in the custody of their abductors. Ana Marie sought the assistance of
the PACER [Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response] and stayed
in a PACER safehouse located at P. Tuazon, Cubao, Quezon City.
During her stay, she had several communications with her husband’s
kidnappers. The latter started demanding the amount of P20 million
for the release of her husband and her brother but the amount was
considerably reduced up to the time that Ana Marie was able to raise
the amount of P538,000.00 which was accepted by the kidnappers.
Finally, on September 30, 2003 at 10 PM, the kidnappers set up the
manner on how the ransom money would be delivered. Ana Marie
travelled to Quiapo Church, then to Quezon City circle up to SM
Fairview and to Robinsons Fairview. She was made to stop at Red
Lips Beer House and go to the nearby Caltex Auto Supply where she
would see a man wearing a red cap and who would ask her “saan yong
padala ni boss”. She was instructed to deliver the wrapped bundled
ransom money to the man wearing red cap. When she saw the man
with red cap, she was asked for the money. At first, she did not give
the money because she wanted to be sure that she was giving the
money to the right man. Using her own cellphone, she called up the
man who had been instructing her all along and asked him to confirm
if the man in front of her is the right man to give the ransom money
to, saying “kausapin mo muna ito kung siya ba.” The man in the
phone and the man in the red cap talked for a while in another dialect
which Ana Marie did not understand. When she asked the man to give
back her cellphone to her, he refused and, instead instructed her to give
the money to him. She described the man wearing red cap to be
goodlooking, lightly built, in his early 20s, around 5’4” in height and
with dimples, which she later identified in court as accused Estanly
Octa.
On October 1, 2003, Johnny was released by his captors after the
payment of ransom money. He was detained for the duration of six
(6) days. After his release, he removed his blindfold and handcuffs
but he could hardly regain his sight and see things. He flagged down
a private pick-up and learned that he was in Camarin, Caloocan
City. He asked a favor that he be driven to Meycauayan, Bulacan
where he took a jeepney to Monumento, and from there, he took a taxi
bound home. When he was released, his brother-in-law Mike Adrian
was also released.

The defense recounted a different set of facts, to wit:
x x x [O]n September 25, 2003, he was still in Daet, Camarines Norte
working as a welder in the welding shop of his uncle Edwin delos
Reyes. He went to Daet on the second week of August 2003 and
returned to Manila when he was called by his father sometime in
November 2003. In addition to his defense of denial and alibi, he
clings to the theory that he himself was a victim of abduction. He
testified that, on December 1, 2003, while crossing the street, his way
was blocked by a van and thereafter, two (2) persons alighted and a
gun was poked at him then he was boarded inside the van. His hands
were tied and eyes covered. The incident happened at Susano Road,
Camarin, Caloocan City. He was eventually brought to the PACER
Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City. He claims that he was tortured to
admit the charge filed against him. At the PACER’s office, he was
presented to a State Prosecutor of the DOJ but he claimed he was not
assisted by counsel. He said that he did not submit himself for medical
examination. He categorically stated that, when he was inquested by
a State Prosecutor, he did not tell of the alleged torture that he suffered
because he was afraid.
On 4 December 2003, accused-appellant was arrested by the operatives
of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) on
S[u]sano Road, Camarin, Caloocan City, in connection with another
kidnap for ransom incident. He was identified by prosecution witness
Ana Marie Corpuz from a police line-up as the person who had received
the ransom money from her.
Consequently, on 26 February 2004, an Information was filed against
accused-appellant charging him with the crime of kidnapping for
ransom as follows:
That on or about 6:40 a.m. of September 25, 2003, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously kidnap and deprive JOHNNY L. CORPUZ and MIKE
ADRIAN BATUIGAS, a minor, of their liberty and against their will
by means of threats and intimation with the use of firearms, and then
bring them through the use of a motor vehicle to a house, wherein they
were detained for a period of six (6) days, and that the abduction of
the said victims was for the purpose of extorting Php538,000.00 was
actually delivered to the above-mentioned accused in exchange for the
release of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on 5 July 2004, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
On 15 May 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which is herein quoted:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Estanly Octa y Bas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the felony charge [sic] and
pursuant to law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer maximum
prison term of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private
aggrieved party of the following:
1. The amount of P538,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages;
2. The amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. The amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and
cost.
In view of the conviction of the accused, the Manila City Jail is
ordered to commit his person to the National Penitentiary
immediately without necessary [sic] delay.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC ruled that prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz,
wife of victim Johnny Corpuz, steadfastly testified that she gave the
ransom money in the amount of P538,000 to accused-appellant. She did
not waiver in identifying and describing him as good-looking, wearing
red cap, light in built, in his early 20’s, 5’4” and with dimples. The
assertion of Ana Marie Corpuz that accused-appellant was sporting
dimples was squarely corroborated by the court’s observation when he
took the witness stand.
The trial court also viewed the act of receiving ransom money as
sufficient evidence to establish accused-appellant’s conspiratorial act in
the kidnapping for ransom of the victims in this case.
With respect to the defense of denial and alibi, the RTC found them to
be inherently weak as opposed to the straightforward testimony of
Corpuz. The claim of accused-appellant that he was abducted did not
convince the court either, inasmuch as it was not supported by evidence,
nor was it the subject of an investigation.
Upon intermediate appellate review, the CA rendered a Decision
promulgated on 19 July 2010, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appeal in
this case is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 48, in Manila in Criminal Case No. 04-
224073 finding Estanly Octa y Bas guilty of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered him to pay P538,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and cost, is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
The CA found the positive identification of accused-appellant by
prosecution witness Ana Marie Corpuz to be unwavering and steadfast.
It stressed that his positive identification, when categorical, consistent,
straightforward, and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, would prevail over mere alibi and
denial. Such positive identification constituted direct evidence, and not
merely circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, the CA ruled that accused-appellant had been rightly found
to be a co-conspirator in this case. At the time he received the ransom
money, the crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims
were still illegally detained by the kidnappers. Accused-appellant’s act
of taking the ransom money was an overt act made in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity.
Hence, the instant appeal.
Issues
In seeking a reversal of the decisions of the CA and the RTC, accused-
appellant Octa argues that:
1. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the
prosecutions’ failure to positively identify him as the ransom
taker;
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding him to be a conspirator
to the crime charged; and
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime
charged based on circumstantial evidence.
 The Court’s Ruling
We deny accused-appellant’s appeal.
When the credibility of a witness is at
issue, the findings of fact of the trial court
are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect, more so if those findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court.
In his Brief, accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was the one who received the
ransom money. He primarily argues that prosecution witness Ana Marie
Corpuz could not have positively ascertained the identity of the ransom
taker, because the area where the transaction took place was dark, and
the man was wearing a cap. Neither did Corpuz declare in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay that the person who received the ransom money
was sporting a dimple, a fact that she mentioned on direct examination.
Accused-appellant further insinuates that the police might have
influenced his out-of-court identification in the line-up when they
informed Corpuz that they had apprehended some people who were
suspects in other kidnap for ransom cases, and that information might
have conditioned her mind that the ransom taker had already been
apprehended.
We disagree.
In People v. Basao, the Court held that:
[T]the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand
is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had
the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the
record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line
between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause,
the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere
gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch – these can reveal if the
witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth.
xxxx
[Thus], when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of
fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not
conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by
the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
binding upon this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court
and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be
disturbed.”
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found Corpuz to be a credible
witness who had categorically testified that she saw the face of the
ransom taker, and that he was actually the accused-appellant.
The fact that Corpuz failed to declare in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that
the ransom taker was sporting a dimple was not fatal to her testimony
because she was able to positively and categorically identify accused-
appellant during the police line-up and in open court.
Even accused-appellant’s insinuation that Corpuz could have been
influenced by the police during the line-up cannot be given weight in
the face of his positive identification as the ransom taker. On this point,
we agree with the observation of the CA that “assuming arguendo that
the accused-appellant’s out of court identification was defective, her
subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially
attended it. We emphasize that the ‘inadmissibility of a police line-up
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of
an independent in-court identification.’”
To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must
be shown to have performed an overt act
in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
Accused-appellant also claims that he cannot be considered as a
conspirator to the kidnapping in the absence of concrete proof that he
actually participated in the execution of the essential elements of the
crime by overt acts indispensable to its accomplishment. His receipt of
the ransom money transpired only after the kidnapping had been
consummated and was not an essential element of the crime.
We disagree.
On point is our dissertation in People v. Bautista, to wit:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where
all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the
offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose
or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is
sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to
indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
xxxx
Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose. x x x.
xxxx
Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of
Dexter, who testified that accused-appellant was the one who
received the ransom money x x x then the commonality of
purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the
other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the
common design or purpose to commit the felony of
kidnapping for ransom.
Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice
must fail. He is liable as a principal for being a co-conspirator in
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC,
as amended by R.A. 7659 x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-
appellant received the ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still
continuing, since both victims were still being illegally detained by the
kidnappers. While his receipt of the ransom money was not a material
element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the grand plan and was
in fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims. Ransom is money,
price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a
captured person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity.
Without ransom money, the freedom of the detained victims cannot be
achieved.
The positive identification of
accused-appellant constitutes direct,
and not merely circumstantial,
evidence.
Accused-appellant’s contention that he was convicted based only on
circumstantial evidence deserves scant consideration. We agree with the
conclusion of the CA that “[Corpuz] testified that she gave the ransom
money to accused-appellant, and as the trial court declared, his act of
receiving the ransom money is sufficient conspiratorial act in the
commission of the kidnapping for ransom. The positive identification of
the accused-appellant then constitutes direct evidence, and not merely
circumstantial evidence.”
With respect to the penalty imposed, we agree with the imposition by
the RTC and the CA on accused-appellant of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, considering the prohibition on the death penalty. To conform
to recent jurisprudence, we hereby modify the exemplary damages
awarded by increasing the amount from P50,000 to P100,000.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03490 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
P538,000 as actual damages, P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000
as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA,
CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and
ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and
research personnel should feel safest. After all, this is where ideas that
could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully
nurtured and debated. Universities produce hope. They incubate all our
youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced
concepts of perverse brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles
exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in a senseless death
whose justice is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these
cases are prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are credible
witnesses who present themselves courageously before an able and
experienced trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for
hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles. The perpetrators must
stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions. They must do
so for there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams
and the dreams of his family. Excruciating grief for them will never be
enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in
the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were
eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by
several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them
sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q95-6113
3, was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity,
namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L.
Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva,
Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano,
Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and
Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219. The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose
true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been
ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking
advantage of superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes,
and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head
and clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
DENNIS F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted
murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,
Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Leandro Lachica, and the frustrated murder of
Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio and Amel Fortes. Only
11 of the accused stood trial since one of the accused, Benedict
Guerrero, remained at large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina, Mervin
Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix Tumaneng, and Cesar
Magrobang, Jr. are all members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On
December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they were having lunch
at Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, Dennis
Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!”
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho
Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina shouted, and he saw about
ten (10) men charging toward them. The men were armed with baseball
bats and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either
handkerchiefs or shirts. Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started
attacking him, hitting him with their lead pipes. During the attack, he
recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because
his mask fell off.
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers, suffering
scratches and contusions.
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of Education.
Just before reaching it, he looked back and saw Warren Zingapan and
Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the
commotion was.Both of them did not have their masks on.He was
familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because he often saw them
in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan
used to be his friend. The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five
(45) seconds.
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of
Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina shouted.He saw about
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks,
running toward them. He was stunned, and he started running. He
stumbled over the protruding roots of a tree. He got up, but the attackers
came after him and beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until
he fell down. While he was parrying the blows, he recognized two (2)
of the attackers as Warren Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since
they were not wearing any masks. After about thirty (30) seconds, they
stopped hitting him.
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he saw another
group of four (4) to five (5) men coming toward him, led by Benedict
Guerrero. This group also beat him up. He did not move until another
group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to eight (8)
seconds.When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the ground.
Several bystanders brought him to the U.P. Infirmary where he stayed
for more than a week for the treatment of his wounds and fractures.
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he
also looked back when Venturina shouted and saw a group of men with
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them wore pieces of cloth around
their heads. He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces
were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with
lead pipes. While running and parrying the blows, he recognized them
as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo because their
masks fell off. He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main
Library. He then decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers
and turned back toward Beach House. There, he saw Venturina lying on
the ground. Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a lead
pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina. When they
saw him, they went toward his direction. They were about to hit him
when somebody shouted that policemen were coming. Feliciano and
Narag then ran away.Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes.
Fortes accompanied him to his car so they could bring Venturina to the
U.P. Infirmary.When they brought the car over, other people,
presumably bystanders, were already loading Venturina into another
vehicle. They followed that vehicle to the U.P. Infirmary where they
saw Natalicio. He stayed at the infirmary until the following morning.
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, he
immediately stood up when he heard someone shout, "Brods!" He saw
a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball
bats. Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces. He was
about to run when two (2) of the attackers approached him. One struck
him with a heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed
instrument. He was able to parry most of the blows from the lead pipe,
but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm.
He was able to run away. When he sensed that no one was
chasing him, he looked back to Beach House Canteen and saw Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano. He decided to go
back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers. When he arrived, he
did not see any of his fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who
attacked them.He ended up going to their hang-out instead to meet with
his other fraternity brothers.They then proceeded to the College of Law
where the rest of the fraternity was already discussing the incident.
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he also ran
when he saw the group of attackers coming toward them. When he
looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina. He was also
able to see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the College of
Education, boarded a jeepney to the College of Law to wait for their
other fraternity brothers. One of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera,
told him that he received information that members of Scintilla Juris
were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and were regrouping in
SM North. Lachica and his group then set off for SM North to confront
Scintilla Juris and identify their attackers.
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were
thrown at them.63 Lachica saw Robert Michael Beltran Alvir and
Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo Taparan. They had no choice but
to get away from the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma
Rho Fraternity members held a meeting.
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of Sigma Rho
advised the victims to lodge their complaints with the National Bureau
of Investigation.66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told the U.P.
Police that the victims would be giving their statements before the
National Bureau of Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police
copies of their statements. In the meantime, Venturina was transferred
from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital on December 8, 1994. He
died on December 10, 1994. On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was
conducted on the cadaver of Dennis Venturina. Dr. Rolando Victoria, a
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, found that
Venturina had "several contusions located at the back of the upper left
arm and hematoma on the back of both hands,""two (2) lacerated
wounds at the back of the head,generalized hematoma on the skull,"
"several fractures on the head," and "inter-cranial hemorrhage." The
injuries, according to Dr. Victoria, could have been caused by a hard
blunt object. Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic
head injuries.
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang,
Fortes, and Gaston executed their respective affidavits before the
National Bureau of Investigation and underwent medico-legal
examinationswith their medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio Villena.
According to Dr. Villena, he found that Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated
wounds on the top of the head, above the left ear, and on the fingers;
contused abrasions on both knees; contusion on the left leg and thigh,"
all of which could have been caused by any hard, blunt object. These
injuries required medical attendance for a period of ten (10) days to
thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.
 Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on the head
and on the right leg which could have been caused by a blunt
instrument." These injuries required hospitalization for a period of ten
(10) days to thirty (30) days from date of infliction. He also found on
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the left forearm which
could possibly be caused by contact with [a] rough hard surface and
would require one (1) to nine (9) days of medical attention." He found
on Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left
forearm and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left side." On
Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior
chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands; contusions
on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the
infra scapular area, left side."
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its
evidence-in-chief, the court granted the demurrer to evidence filed by
Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on the ground that he was not identified by the
prosecution's witnesses and that he was not mentioned in any of the
documentary evidence of the prosecution.
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense introduced
their own statement of the facts, as follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera, a member of the U.P. Police, he
was on foot patrol with another member of the U.P. Police,
Oscar Salvador, at the time of the incident. They were near the
College of Arts and Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely
heard somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place
where the alleged rumble was happening and saw injured men
being helped by bystanders. They helped an injured person
board the service vehicle of the Beach House Canteen. They
asked what his name was, and he replied that he was Mervin
Natalicio. When he asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was
not able to reply but instead told him that his attackers were
wearing masks. Oscar Salvador corroborated his testimony.
Benjamin Lato, a utility worker of the Beach House Canteen,
likewise testified that the identities of the attackers were unrecognizable
because of their masks. He, however, admitted that he did not see the
attack; he just saw a man sprawled on the ground at the time of the
incident.
Frisco Capilo, a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the Main
Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor located nearby. From there,
he allegedly saw the whole incident. He testified that ten (10) men,
wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with shirts covering
their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He also saw three (3)
men being hit with lead pipes by the masked men. Two (2) of the men
fell after being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to help him,
but the attackers overtook him. Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He
then saw students helping those who were injured. He likewise helped
in carrying one of the injured victims, which he later found out to be
Amel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority,
Eda Panganiban, testified that she and her friends were in line to order
lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion happened. She
saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked men attack a group of
Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask fall off. Her sorority sister and
another U.P. student, Luz Perez, corroborated her story that the masked
men were unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however,
admitted that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a
statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon, testified on
substantially the same matters as Panganiban and Perez. She also stated
that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being beaten up by
about three (3) to five (5) masked men. She also stated that some of the
men were wearing black masks while some were wearing white t-shirts
as masks. She did not see any mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano, accused-appellant Danilo
Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in Pampanga to visit his sick
grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son went to
Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school where she
teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, he had not been
feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that he could not have
possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was absent even
from work. He also testified that he wore glasses and, thus, could not
have possibly been the person identified by Leandro Lachica. He also
stated that he was not enrolled in U.P. at the time since he was working
to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla, he and another classmate,
Michael Vibas, were working on a school project on December 8, 1994.
He also claimed that he could not have participated in the rumble as he
had an injury affecting his balance. The injury was caused by an incident
in August 1994 when he was struck in the head by an unknown assailant.
His testimony was corroborated by Jose Victor Santos who stated that
after lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him and, afterwards, they
went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva, on the other hand, testified that he was
eating lunch with his girlfriend and another friend in Jollibee, Philcoa,
on December 8, 1994. They went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and
went straight to their fraternity hang-out where he was told that there
had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also met several Sigma
Rhoans acting suspiciously as they passed by the hang-out. They were
also told by their head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans
and just go home. Anna Cabahug, his girlfriend, corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan also testified that he was not in U.P. at the time
of the incident. He claimed to have gone to SM North to buy a gift for a
friend's wedding but ran into a fraternity brother. He also alleged that
some Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM North that day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the
finding that Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher
Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced
to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial
court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo,
Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag. The case
against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension. The trial court, in evaluating the voluminous evidence at
hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is of the
considered view that of the ten accused, some were sufficiently
identified and some were not. The Court believes that out of the
amorphous images during the pandemonium, the beleaguered
victims were able to espy and identify some of the attackers
etching an indelible impression in their memory. In this regard,
the prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic that they saw the
attackers rush towards them wielding deadly weapons like
baseball bats, lead pipes, pieces of wood and bladed ones, and
pounce on their hapless victims, run after them, and being
present with one another at the scene of the crime during the
assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place
his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not one .of them
testified against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses,
who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting
Scintilla Juris members for that matter, they could have easily
tagged each and every single accused as a participant in the
atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure that no one else
would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only
one or two and some were candid enough to say that they did not
see who delivered the blows against them.
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case
was brought to this court on automatic appeal. However, due to the
amendment of the Rules on Appeal, the case was remanded to the Court
of Appeals. In the Court of Appeals, the case had to be re-raffled several
Times before it was eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. for the writing of the decision.
 On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a Special First
Division of Five, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, with
three (3) members concurring a one (1) dissenting.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought to this
court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants attacked
private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this court
by both parties, the issue may be further refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional rights were
violated when the information against them contained the
aggravating circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the masks fell off;
and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled, on the basis of the evidence, that accused-
appellants were sufficiently identified.
I
An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information filed against
them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them. They argue that
the prosecution should not have included the phrase "wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information since
they were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the
accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law." This includes
the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and
"to be informed of the nature and accusation against him."
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the
prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with the due process of
the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended pary; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea, this court has stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court
to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused
to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial.
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does
not violate their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being
alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as
such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the
aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of
disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to
that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
 In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance
because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and
unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that
tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does
not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating
circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused.
The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to
sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense
they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the
accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be
informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused.
Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of all." This would
mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity
even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not
have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of
murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for
the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have
been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place,
and persons involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight and credence on
review. The rationale for this was explained in People v. Daniel Quijada,
as follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat,
the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the
scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage
and mien.
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. In
People v. Leticia Labarias, this court stated that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial
court on the reasonable assumption that it is in a better position to
assess the evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the
witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their deportment on the
stand. The exception that makes the rule is where such findings arc
clearly arbitrary or erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or
hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that they were reached
without the careful study and perceptiveness that should characterize
a judicial decision. (Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more importance
since the presumption is always in favor of innocence. It is only upon
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the prosecution
and forty-two (42) witnesses for the defense were put on the stand from
1995 to 2001. In an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial court
acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of the accused. On the basis of
these numbers alone, it cannot be said that the trial court acted arbitrarily
or that its decision was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without
a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold great
persuasive value, there is also nothing that precludes this court from
coming to its own conclusions based on an independent review of the
facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently
identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. In its
decision, the trial court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to place
his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not one testified
against all of them. If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were
all Sigma Rhoans, were simply bent on convicting Scintilla
Juris members for that matter, they could have easily tagged
each and every accused as a participant in the atrocious and
barbaric assault to make sure no one would escape
conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two
and some were candid enough to say that they did not see
who delivered the blows against them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis Gaio
and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have seen it all but they could
not, and did not, disclose any name. Lachica, on the other hand,
said that he did not have the opportunity to see and identify the
person who hit him in the back and inflicted a two-inch cut. His
forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not see who did it.
Natalicio, one of the other three who were hospitalized, was
severely beaten by three waves of attackers totalling more than
15 but he could only name 3 of them. He added, however, that
he would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them
again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but he stressed
that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario,
Daraoay, Denoista, and Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston
could have named any of the accused as the one who repeatedly
hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he frankly said
their faces were covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly
beaten by several groups but did not name any of the accused as
one of those who attacked him. The persons he identified were
those leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of
Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing while he was
running away. He added that he saw some of the accused during
the attack but did not know then their names.(Emphasis
supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the swiftness of
the incident," there would be slight inconsistencies in their statements.
In People v. Adriano Cabrillas, it was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the
occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some
details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe
or remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that
their testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed. (Emphasis
supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify
Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla; Natalicio was able to identify Medalla,
Zingapan, and Soliva; and Fortes was able to identify Feliciano,
Medalla, and Zingapan. Their positive identification was due to the fact
that they either wore no masks or that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim or an eyewitness
of a crime would endeavor to find ways to identify the assailant so that
in the event that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended.
It has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to
strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe
 the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the
face of the assailant and body movements thereof, creates a
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the masked
assailants could have lost their masks. It had been testified by the
victims that some of the assailants were wearing masks of either a piece
of cloth or a handkerchief and that Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, and
Feliciano had masks on at first but their masks fell off and hung around
their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness Frisco
Capilo during cross-examination who observed that some of the
attackers were wearing masks and some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were a
lot of people eating in the Beach House Canteen, and
then running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some were
not?
A Yes, sir.
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would have
had the presence of mind to take a look at their assailants if they were
identifiable. Their positive identification, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give Mangrobang's
testimony credence while Gaston's testimony was found to be "hazy."
This argument is unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that stated that
the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris members identified by Mangrobang
"should not be misinterpreted to mean that the tesstimony of
Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication." The court went on to state
that they "were exonerated merely because they were accorded the
benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under
tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were [sic] not corroborated and
their alibis, not refuted." There was, therefore, no basis to say that
Mangrobang was not credible; it was only that the evidence presented
was not strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered "hazy" by
the trial court only with regard to his identification of Zingapan's
companion. Gaston testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with
Zingapan moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes, however,
testified that both Zingapan and Morano were running after him.
Lachica also testified that it was Medalla, not Morano, who was with
Zingapan. Because of this confusion, the trial court found that there was
doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan. The uncertainty resulted
into an acquittal for Morano. Despite this, the court still did not" impute
doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further
prove that its decision was brought about only upon a thorough
examination of the evidence presented: It accepted that there were
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that these were
minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that "[s]uch
inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual 'for there is no
person with perfect faculties or senses."'
Evidence as part of the res
gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
 According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,139
when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the bystanders who all told
him that they could not recognize the attackers since they were all
masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as part
of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, x x x." All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are
inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several
exceptions to the general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is
part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person
while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca, this court has previously discussed the
admissibility of testimony taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res
gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. x x x x
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances
which are the undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way,
res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow
out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae
encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence
as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part
of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully
eating lunch on a school campus is a startling occurrence. Considering
that the statements of the bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in
res gestae.
In People v. Albarido, however, this court has stated that "in accord to
ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same from
their respective points of reference. Therefore, almost always, they
have different accounts of how it happened. Certainly, we cannot
expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all
aspects because different persons have different impressions and
recollections of the same incident. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible,
have little persuasive value since the bystanders could have seen the
events transpiring at different vantage points and at different points in
time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of the attack,
testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some
remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against those of
the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to
end at close range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact
that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be
given considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The belated identification by
the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the
incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon City Police but instead
executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four (4)
days after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their
testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera testified that on their way to
the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the victims who all told him they
could not recognize the attackers because they were all wearing masks.
Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang testified to the effect that when she asked
Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio answered that he did not know
because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case
belong to rival fraternities. While this court does not condone their
archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are
certain practices that are unique to fraternal organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the
identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose it without first
conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability is
bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which showed
that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in SM North.
Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it would not
have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against the wrong
fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P.
Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the police officer or the doctor's
testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It should not be
forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the entire incident, while
Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely
relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation
four (4) days after the incident also does not affect their credibility since
most of them had been hospitalized from their injuries and needed to
recover first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be understandable
that they decided to wait until all of them were well enough to go to the
National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in order to give their
statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was upon the
advice of their senior "brads" and their legal counsel that they executed
their sworn statements before the National Bureau of Investigation four
(4) days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National Bureau of
Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police was the call of their legal
counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of Investigation
more equipped to handle the investigation. This does not, however,
affect the credibility of the witnesses since they were merely following
the legal advice of their counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National Bureau of
Investigation is better equipped than the U.P. Police to handle the
investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of Economics
website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with maintaining
campus security. Their station is located in front of the College
of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and
order, secure and protect lives and property, enforce basic laws,
applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and
Regulations including policies and standards; and to perform
such other functions relative to the general safety and security of
the students, employees, and residents in the U.P. Diliman
Campus. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
 It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P. primarily
for campus security. They are by no means an actual police force that is
equipped to handle a full-blown murder investigation. Fraternity-related
violence in U.P. has also increasingly become more frequent, which
might possibly have desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that
would prevent their objectivity in the conduct of their investigations.
The victims' reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation, therefore,
is understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the victim. In People v. Benjamin Peteluna,
this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive
identification of the appellant by a witness destroys the defense
of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial
are inherently weak and have always been viewed with
disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they
can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or
none at all and cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove
that appellant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed; he must also demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any
weight in law. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification[,] is inherently weak and if uncorroborated
regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot
be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify their
attackers while the accused-appellants merely offered alibis and denials
as their defense. The credibility of the victims was upheld by both the
trial court and the appellate court while giving little credence to the
accused-appellants' alibis. There is, thus, no reason to disturb their
findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder.
Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed
with lead pipes and baseball bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his
companions, which resulted in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, the
offense committed against Dennis Venturina was committed by a group
that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed
men. The appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of
treachery in the commission of the offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz, this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the
attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to
be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to
defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-
appellants, ruled that contrary to the findings of the trial court, there was
no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the attack
was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot
of people who could see them" and that "there was a possibility for the
victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have
helped the victims."
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were
eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they would be
reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival
fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead
pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was
with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the
attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would
preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until
after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no
opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves.
Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.
The presence of conspiracy
makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants
were found guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted
murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica,
Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however,
modified their liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were
guilty of attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not
against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and
Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the attackers," it concluded that
accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from
inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to
do more than to make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them." It also
pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have
been done with an intent to kill."
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty
only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
 It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was
conspiracy among the accused-appellants and the appellate court
sustainedthis finding. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of
attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of
participation, thus:
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all
of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of
the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two
or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally
or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the
whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."
Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit
a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in
furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in
one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of
each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the
close and inseparable relation of each of them with the
criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted
by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in
view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band
or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission
of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused
conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the
court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at
the scene of the crime. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from
a single incident wherein the accused-appellants were armed with
baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount
of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take
cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The
intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent
was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the presence of
conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish
between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to
determine the respective liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is
only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and
whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-
appellants guilty only of slight physical injuries. It would be illogical to
presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the
attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only
intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to
kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first
swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill.
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the
murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin
Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life; rather, it is
also the effect on the five other lives whose once bright futures are now
put in jeopardy because of one senseless act of bravado. There is now
more honor for them to accept their responsibility and serve the
consequences of their actions. There is, however, nothing that they can
do to bring back Dennis Venturina or fully compensate for his senseless
and painful loss.

This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to this court;

neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case and many cases like it can
empower those who have a better view of masculinity: one which
valorizes courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving pursuits.

"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the University of

the Philippines. It colors the stories of many who choose to expend their
energy in order that our people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles
are an anathema, an immature and useless expenditure of testosterone.
It fosters a culture that retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at
dangal."

This kind of shameful violence must stop.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR

N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is AFFIRMED insofar as the
accused-appellants Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla,
Christopher Soliva, Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in.
Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the MODIFICATION that they be
fouhd GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138,
and Q95-61137.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189833 February 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y
Avellano (Morilla) from the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed his conviction and that of his co-accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena
(Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang)
and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal
information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran,
Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, one of
them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon
Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime group as
they all help one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of illegal
drugs, and in fact, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
aiding and abetting one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of two (2) motor
vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with
commemorative plate to read "Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug which is commonly known as shabu, and with an
approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68)
kilos, without authority whatsoever.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 1 August 2007
convicted Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent
Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of illegal transport of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, with an approximate weight
of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it
absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecution's failure to present
sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The
dispositive of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each.
Accused Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately released from custody
unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as
representative sample which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime
Laboratory is ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for proper disposition.
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on
the vehicles driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control
number 888 and the other an ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as
the police officers have already acquired prior knowledge that the said
vehicles were suspected to be used for transportation of dangerous
drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information turned
out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor
vehicles more than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was
without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was
merely requested to transport them to Manila on board his Starex van.
He explained that he only accommodated the request of a certain Ben
Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the
defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of knowledge of the
illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he was
just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with
Dequilla. The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense,
did not bother to inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was
merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra
as they were caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs
in two vehicles driven by each of them. Absent any convincing
circumstance to corroborate their explanations, the validity of their
apprehension was sustained.
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based
on the testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was found by the
trial court that the two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra
and the ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route
to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead of the ambulance was able
to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the
ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through
the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks
inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the
sacks contained narra wooden tiles. Unconvinced, the police officers
requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further inspection.
When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline
granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla
to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that
he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass.
His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the
contents of the sacks turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. This discovery prompted the operatives to chase the
Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake
the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the
mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that his van
was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus,
Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for
inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but
the same was rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were
likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted
by the trial court for failure on the part of the prosecution to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Dequilla's and
Yang's mere presence inside the vehicle as passengers was inadequate
to prove that they were also conspirators of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
It upheld the finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in
their common intent to transport several sacks containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their respective vehicles.
The singularity of their intent to illegally transport methamphetamine
hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive the
ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor
Mitra, who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of
knowledge of the illegal contents of the sacks. The claim that the sacks
were loaded with wooden tiles was implausible due to the obvious
disparity of texture and volume.
Court's Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may
be convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans
allegation of conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the
prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged in the
Information.
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure to substantiate his argument that he should have
been informed first of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. He pointed out that the Information itself failed to state the word
conspiracy but instead, the statement "the above-named accused, one of
them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon
Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they
all help one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy was only inferred
from the words used in the Information.
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the
information, at this point, is deemed to have been waived due to
Morilla's failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash before
entering his plea.
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented
his defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial
and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a
reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a
felony.
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he
was apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a
syndicated group involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous
drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came
together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the
crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which,
taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole. In
this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion
that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to
transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks
of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor
Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police
operatives. When it was Morilla's turn to pass through the checkpoint,
he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing
white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested
Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy
with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was
with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the
sacks and he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior
Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the
act of transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles.
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or
convey from one place to another." It was well established during trial
that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor
Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum
since it is punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of
transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
In a similar case of People v. Libnao, this Court upheld the conviction
for illegal transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were
caught carrying a bag full of marijuana leaves when they were flagged
down on board a passing tricycle at a checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, the penalty for
illegal transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a
fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1683, the penalty was amended to life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand
pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659,
where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of
P10,000,00.00 to be paid by each of the accused but amend the penalty
to reclusion perpetua following the provisions of Republic Act No.
7659 and the principle of retroactive application of lighter penalty.
Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years
after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with
it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc.
Life imprisonment, on the other hand, does not appear to have any
definite extent or duration and carries no accessory penalties.
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People, thus:
"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994)
this Court ruled (a) that the amendatory law, being more
lenient and favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded
retroactive application, x x x."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life
imprisonment, and considering the rule that criminal statutes with a
favorable effect to the accused, have, as to him, a retroactive effect," the
penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is proper.
Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is
reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial
court upon petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the

appellate court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the
It should be recalled that at the time of the commission of the crime assailed 13 July 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was already H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with respect to
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree provided that
the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead of Life
for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be
Imprisonment and payment of fine of P10,000,000.00 by each of the
imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659 further introduced accused.
new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the SO ORDERED.
penalty prescribed in Section 15 was changed from "life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to
"reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to
P10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659
amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new
penalty provided by the amendatory law shall be applied depending
on the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved.

The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of

reclusion perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment
ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could be given retroactive
application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its
having a less stricter punishment.

We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held: