PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. SECRETARY OF LABOR G.R. No.

96425 / 205 SCRA 802

Topic: Government Regulation: Union Registration Requirements

FACTS:

1. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development
Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153.

2. Respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP claimed that there was no existing
collective bargaining agreement and that no other legitimate labor organization existed in the
bargaining unit.

3. Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss contending that the local union failed to comply with Rule
II Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the
submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or
members; and (c) books of accounts.

4. Respondent KILUSAN-TUCP submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to dismiss claiming that it had
submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-
laws of the local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan further averred
that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local union was only recently organized.

5. Petitioner PDC insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it found that
the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did not
bear the corresponding signatures of the purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did not
bear the signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private respondent
KILUSAN-TUCP therefore failed to substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by
the rules.

6. MED-ARBITER Dela Cruz: held that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the
formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the
federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the establishment was
unorganized, he maintained that a certification election should be conducted to resolve the question of
representation.

7. Petitioner filed an MR to the Office of the Secretary.

8. SECRETARY Laguesma: denied the MR.

9. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was correct that a labor organization such as the respondent
(KILUSAN)-TUCP may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through the mere
expedient of issuing a charter certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR and as such local or
chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission of duly subscribed
constitution and by-laws, list of officers and books of accounts

RULING:

1. YES, because, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under
oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.

In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted documents and papers
be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by president is
apparent.

The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the
Bureau's basis for approval of the application for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires
legal personality and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona fide
organization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The
inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these
apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation a
ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal
charge of perjury.

In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II,
Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:

(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and
by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the
reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.
(Emphasis supplied)

Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the
certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the
constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must
likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly
subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is
greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as
previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer
required in the case of formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater
bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures
against the commission of fraud.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation won.

DOCTRINE: Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly
registered with the DOLE and includes any branch or local thereof."

Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as
"any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE and includes any branch, local or affiliate thereof.

Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. A local or
chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the
BLR:

1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and

2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of
which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or
chapter, and attested to by its president.

Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a
legitimate labor organization.

The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of
fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into
joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the
union for dubious ends.

San Miguel Corp.

VS

Mandaue

467 SCRA 107

[Aug. 16, 2005]

Facts

-CA affirmes DOLE Undersecretary for Labor Relations, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, ordering the
immediate conduct of a certification election among the petitioner’s rank-and-file employees.
-Federation of Free Workers (FFW/ respondent) filed a petition for certification electionwith the DOLE
Regional Office No. VII. It sought to be certified and to represent the permanent rank-andfile monthly
paid employees of the petitioner. The following documents were attached to the petition: (1) a Charter
Certificate certifying that respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter of FFW; (2) a
copy of the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary, Noel T. Bathan and attested by its
President, Wilfred V. Sagun; (3) a list of respondent’s officers and their respective addresses, again
prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun; (4) a certification signifying that respondent had just been
organized and no amount had yet been collected from its members, signed by respondent’s
treasurer Chita D. Rodriguez and attested by Sagun; and (5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid
employees of the Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared by Bathan and
attested by Sagun. -SMC (Petitioner) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election on the
sole ground that herein respondent is not listed or included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations
based on the certification issued by the Officer-In representative, then right to be represented by a
bargaining agent should not be denied to other members of the bargaining unit.”

HELD

1. NO. Ratio EFFECT NON-PARTICIPIATION PREVIOUS ELECTION. No law, administrative rule or precedent
prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past certification
elections.

2. NO. Ratio RELIGION/PAST NON-PARTICIPATION. Neither law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence
requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a
certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernibleintendment of the law is to grant the right to
vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization
or not.

6.3.

CERTIFICATION ELECTIONPROCESS

1. The Union as Initiating Party ART. 212. Definitions. -(h) “Legitimate labor organization” means any labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any branch or
local thereof. Charge, Regional Director of the DOLE Regional Office No. VII, Atty. Jesus B. Gabor.

-Respondent submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations the same documents earlier attached to its
petition for certification. The accompanying letter, signed by respondent’s president Sagun, stated that
such documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter
pursuant to the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules; and it was hoped that the submissions would
facilitate the listing of respondent under the roster of legitimate labor organizations.The Chief of Labor
Relations Division of DOLE Regional Office No. VII issued a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter No. ITD.
I-ARFBT-058/98, certifying that from 30 July 1998, respondent has acquired legal personality as a labor
organization/worker’s association, it having submitted all the required documents.

Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs Liberty Cottons Mills, PAFLU

Makasiar, J.
Facts:

 This a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the Supreme Court in 1975 in the dispute
between the same parties. The petitioner-workers only ask for reconsideration of the awards
given.

 The original decision held the defendants Liberty Cotton Mills and Philippine Association Of Free
Labor Union (PAFLU) liable for dismissal and ordered that:
o Liberty Cotton Mills reinstate the workers within 30 days, failing that shall make
respondent company liable to the workers for the payment of their wages from and
after the expiration of that period.
o PAFLU pay the workers the equivalent of three (3) years backwages without deduction
or qualification

 The reliefs sought in this MR by the workers are the ff:

o That Liberty Cotton Mills be made jointly if not solidarily liable for the payment of the 3
years backwages
o That when the workers are reinstated, their wages should be at the same rates as those
of their contemporaries in 1964
o That the backwages to be paid be increased from 3 years to 5.5 years

Issue and Holding:

1) Whether Liberty Cotton Mills should be held liable with PAFLU for the backwages. Yes. Liberty
Cotton Mills is solidarily liable. The other reliefs sought do not merit consideration.

Ratio:

Respondent company is equally liable for the payment of backwages for having acted in bad faith in
effecting the dismissal of the individual petitioners. Bad faith on the part of the respondent company
may be gleaned from the fact that the petitioner workers were dismissed hastily and summarily.

While respondent company, under the Maintenance of Membership provision of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, is bound to dismiss any employee expelled by PAFLU for disloyalty, upon its
written request, this undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily.

The company acted in bad faith in dismissing petitioner workers without giving them the benefit of a
hearing. It did not even bother to inquire from the workers concerned and from PAFLU itself about the
cause of the expulsion of the petitioner workers.

Instead, the company immediately dismiss the workers on May 30, 1964 after its receipt of the request
of PAFLU on May 29, 1964 — in a span of only one day — stating that it had no alternative but to comply
with its obligation under the Security Agreement in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, thereby
disregarding the right of the workers to due process, self-organization and security of tenure.

Philippine Skylanders vs NLRC

GR 127374
Facts:
In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees Association (PSEA), a local labor union affiliated
with the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification election
conducted among the rank and file employees of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union,
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association-WATU (PSEA-WATU) immediately protested the result of
the election before the Secretary of Labor.

Several months later, PSEA sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation.

PSEA subsequently affiliated itself with the National Congress of Workers (NCW), changed its name to
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association – National Congress of Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to
maintain continuity within the organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue
occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-formed PSEA-NCW.

On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective bargaining agreement with PSI which was
immediately registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.

Meanwhile, apparently oblivious to PSEA’s shift of allegiance, PAFLU Secretary General Serafin Ayroso
wrote Mariles C. Romulo requesting a copy of PSI’s audited financial statement. On 30 July 1994 PSI
through its personnel manager Francisco Dakila denied the request citing as reason PSEA’s disaffiliation
from PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.

Issue: WON PSEA’s disaffiliation is legitimate.

Held:
At the outset, let it be noted that the issue of disaffiliation is an inter-union conflict the jurisdiction of
which properly lies with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and not with the Labor Arbiter.

We upheld the right of local unions to separate from their mother federation on the ground that as
separate and voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and existence to the national
federation to which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members. Yet the local unions
remain the basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to the restraints imposed
by the constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon
the terms laid down in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.

There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the local union was expressly
forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid
breakaway. As such, the pendency of an election protest involving both the mother federation and the
local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation.

It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with PSEA-NCW.
As PSEA had validly severed itself from PAFLU, there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder
it from subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a collective bargaining agreement in behalf
of its members.
Policy considerations dictate that in weighing the claims of a local union as against those of a national
federation, those of the former must be preferred. Parenthetically though, the desires of the mother
federation to protect its locals are not altogether to be shunned. It will however be to err greatly against
the Constitution if the desires of the federation would be favored over those of its members. That, at
any rate, is the policy of the law. For if it were otherwise, instead of protection, there would be
disregard and neglect of the lowly workingmen.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, et.al., petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th Division), PATALON COCONUT ESTATE and/or
CHARLIE REITH as General Manager and SUSIE GALLE REITH, as owner, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners are bona fide members of the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. They were employed by
private respondents Charlie Reith and Susie Galle Reith, general manager and owner, respectively, of the
354-hectare Patalon Coconut Estate located at Patalon, Zamboanga City. Patalon Coconut Estate was
engaged in growing agricultural products and in raising livestock.
In 1988, Congress enacted into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which mandated the compulsory acquisition of all covered
agricultural lands for distribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries under the so-called Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP).
Pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, the Patalon Coconut Estate was awarded to the Patalon Estate Agrarian
Reform Association (PEARA), a cooperative accredited by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), of
which petitioners are members and co-owners.
As a result of this acquisition, private respondents shut down the operation of the Patalon Coconut
Estate and the employment of the petitioners was severed on July 31, 1994. Petitioners did not
receive any separation pay.

Subsequently, the cooperative took over the estate. Being beneficiaries of the Patalon Coconut Estate
pursuant to the CARP, the petitioners became part-owners of the land.
Petitioners, thereafter, filed individual complaints before the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Zamboanga City, praying for their reinstatement with full
backwages on the ground that they were illegally dismissed.
RAB dismissed the complaints for lack of merit. However, ordered respondents thru [sic] its owner-
manager or its duly authorized representative to pay complainants’ separation pay in view of the latter’s
cessation of operations or forced sale, and for 13th month differential pay.
NLRC on appeal, set aside the decision of RAB ordering respondents to pay separation pay and
13th month differentials stating that, the severance of employer-employee relationship between the
parties came about INVOLUNTARILY, as a result of an act of the State. MR Denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not an employer that was compelled to cease its operation because of the
compulsory acquisition by the government of its land for purposes of agrarian reform, is liable to pay
separation pay to its affected employees
HELD: NO

Petitioners contend that they are entitled to separation pay citing Article 283 of the Labor Code (see
codal)
It is clear that Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and
reduction of personnel.1âwphi1 The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar, however, involves
neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated under the
aforesaid article. When the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed because a large portion of the estate was
acquired by DAR pursuant to CARP, the ownership of that large portion of the estate was precisely
transferred to PEARA and ultimately to the petitioners as members thereof and as agrarian lot
beneficiaries. Hence, Article 283 of the Labor Code is not applicable to the case at bench.
In other words, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of
the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the
employees.
Capital and management sectors must also be protected under a regime of justice and the rule of law.
PETITION DENIED.

Abbot Laboratories Philippines Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union [323 SCRA 392, January 26,
2000]
Thursday, January 22, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Labor Law

FACTS: Abbott Laboratories Employees union (ALEU) filed an application for union registration with DOLE.
The Bureau of Labor Relations approved the petition and issued the corresponding certificate of
registration, thereby transforming ALEU sought to operate, sought to cancel ALEU’s certificate of
registration, on the grounds that the latter’s application was not signed by at least 20% of the rank
and file employees of Abbot, and that it failed to submit copies of its books of account. Subsequently, the
Regional Director of the BLR upheld the said petition and cancelled ALEU’s certificate of registration.
Or appeal, the BRL reversed the judgment of the Regional Director, and upheld ALEU’s
legitimacy. Abbott appealed the BLR’s decision to the Secretary of Labor. The latter refused to act
on Abbott’s appeal, citing he fact that the SOLE has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the BLR on
appeals in cancellation cases emanating from the BLR Regional Office. The decision of the BLR in such
cases is final and executory, and any appeal on the same must be filed with the BLR as a motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE: Does the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction to review the decision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations in such a case?

HELD: No. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of labor is limited to a review of cancellation
proceedings decided by the BLR in the exercise of its (BLR) exclusive and original jurisdiction. In this case,
the BLR exercised its appellate power to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel
a union’s certificate of registration. The Secretary of Labor has no jurisdiction over such a case since the
BLR’s decision in the same is final and not appealable.
Progressive development corporation-pizza hut,petitioner v.Laguesma,Undersec of labor,&NLM
defendant

Facts

NLM-Katipunan filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE in behalf of the rank''n file
employees of the progressive dev. corp(pizza hut).Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging
fraud,falsification and misrepresentation in the respondent.The motion specifically alleged that a.)
respondent union registration was tainted with false,forged,double or multiple signatures of those who
allegedly took part in the ratification of the respondent union's constitution and by-laws and in the
election of its officers that there were 2 sets of supposed attendees to the alleged organizational
meeting that was alleged to have taken place on june26,1993. b.) while the application for registration
of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the organizational meeting held on much less, c.)
application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the organizational
meeting held on 1993, the charter cert issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated 1993 or 1 day
prior to the formation of the chapter, thus, there were serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of
the charter cert and the organization meeting of the alleged chapter. d.) voting was not conducted by
secret ballot in violation of atr. 241,sec(c) of the labor code (e) the constitution & by laws submitted.

Issue

Challege the legal personality of the respondent union.

Ruling

The court held that to determine the validity of labor unions art.234 requiremets of registration must be
complied with. If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious
irregularities,especially those appearing on the face of the application and the supporting documents, a
labor organization should be denied recognitin as a legitimate labor org.

Wherefore, inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent union had been seriously challenge,it would
have been more prudent to have granted petitioners request for the suspension of proceedings in the
cert election case,until the issue of the legality of the unions registration shall have been
resolved.Failure of the med-arbiter and public respondent to heed the request constituted a grave
abuse of discretion.

TOYOTA MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION vs. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, and
DOLE-SEC G.R. No. 135806, 8 August 2002
FACTS:

TMPCLU filed a petition for certification election before Med-Arbiter which dismissed TMPCLU’s petition
on the ground that the labor organization’s membership was composed of supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in violation of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, and that at the time of the filing of its petition,
TMCPLU had not even acquired legal personality yet;

The Supreme Court ruled that since TMPCLU’s membership list contained the names of at least twenty-
seven (27) supervisory employees in Level Five positions, “the union could not, prior to purging itself of
its supervisory employee members, attain the status of a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, it
cannot possess the requisite personality to file a petition for certification election.Two months after,
respondent TMPCEWU filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Med-Arbitration. TMPCLU
intervened contending that the decision of the Supreme Court had not ripened into a final and
executory judgment so the Med Arbiter dismissed TMPCEWU’S petition for CE. Then the SC’s Decision
has become final and executory. TMPCEWU revived its Petition for Certification Election but was
dismissed because it was violative of the “one-union in one-company” policy and likewise dismissed
TMPCLU’s Petition-in-Intervention for lack of legal personality.

ISSUE: Whether or not possession of a certificate of registration is an adequate and unassailable proof
that it possesses the requisite legal personality to file a Petition for Certification Election.

RULING:

No. The Court said that the issuance of a certificate of registration in its favor is an adequate and
unassailable proof that it possesses the requisite legal personality to file a Petition for Certification
Election. Not necessarily. It was evident that the union has been issued a certificate the day after it
applied for it considering that processing course had to pass through routing, screening, and
assignment, evaluation, review and initialing, and approval/disapproval procedure, among others, that a
30-day period is provided for under the Labor Code for this purpose. As emphasized in Progressive
Development Corp. – Pizza Hut v. Laguesma, if a labor organization’s application for registration is
vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a
legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of registration has been issued, the propriety of its
registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance
with Arts. 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an
order for certification election. We believe the procedural requirements to impugn the registration by
petitioner were more than adequately complied with as shown in the 1997 case of Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union.

There is no reason to belabor the primordial importance of strictly complying with the registration
requirements of the Labor Code. As we have explained in a long line of cases, the activities of labor
organizations, associations and unions are impressed with public interest, hence, must be protected.

AIR PHIL. CORP VS. BLR 492 SCRA 241

Topic: Cancellation of Union Certificate of Registration

FACTS:

Respondent Air Philippines Flight Attendants Association (APFLAA) was issued a Certificate of
Registration by the DOLE

APFLAA filed a petition for certification election as the collective bargaining representative of the flight
attendants of APC

After the Med-Arbiter rendered a ruling ordering the holding of a certification election, such election
was held, with majority of votes cast in favor of AFPLAA

APC filed a petition for De-Certification and Cancellation of Union Registration against APFLAA with
DOLE

- APFLAA could not be registered as a labor organization, as its composition consisted of “a mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file flight attendants

- Flight attendants holding the position of “Lead Cabin Attendant,” which according to it is supervisory
in character, were among those who comprised APFLAA

DOLE: dismissed petition, holding that Article 245 of the Labor Code does not provide a ground for
cancellation of union registration, which is instead governed by Article 239 of the LC

ISSUE: Whether or not APFLAA’s union registration may be cancelled considering that the union is
allegedly composed of a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees

RULING:
NO. For the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that the rank-and-file union
includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code, it
must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the
adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, or in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of
voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed
officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

In its Petition for De-certification and Cancellation of Union Registration, APC did not impute on APFLAA
such misrepresentation of the character necessitated under Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code.
APC merely argued that APFLAA was not qualified to become a legitimate labor organization by reason
of its mixed composition of rank-and-file and supervisory employees; and that APFLAA committed
misrepresentation by making it appear that its composition was composed purely of rank-and-file
employees. Such misrepresentation (if it can be called as such) as alleged by APC, is not conformable to
Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code. Indeed, it appears from the record that APC instead devoted
the bulk of its arguments in establishing that supervisory employees comprised part of the membership
of APFLAA, a ground which is not sufficient to cause the cancellation of union registration. And this is of
course all under the assumption that Lead Cabin Attendants are indeed supervisory employees, a claim
consistently denied by APFLAA and which was not confirmed by either the DOLE-NCR or the BLR.

DISPOSITIVE: APFLAA won.

DOCTRINE: For the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that the rank-and-file
union includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor
Code, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with
the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, or in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of
voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed
officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

Francisco Salunga vs Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), San Miguel Brewery, Inc. NABAILUP-PAFLU & etc.

Facts:

 Petitioner is an employee of San Miguel Brewery, Inc and a member of PAFLU.

 Petitioner by being a member of PAFLU adheres to its collective bargaining agreement that upon
 resignation from latter he would be forfeiting his position in the company.
 Due to open criticism by petitioner against the union, he had been treated badly and teased by
the members of the latter, which prompt his resignation. The Union accepted the resignation
and transmitted it to the company.
 The company informed petitioner of the consequence of resignation which prompted the latter
to withdraw his resignation. The union did not accept his withdrawal and urged company to
implement the collective agreement. Petitioner notified the union that it was appealing to the
PAFLU National Convention, hence urging to defer his case pending appeal. Notwithstanding
such appeal, he was given notice of dismissed. Hence, petitioner filed for unfair labor practice
against PAFLU, the company and etc.
 The trial judge ruled that the union and company had committed unfair labor practice, but upon
motion by respondents to the CIR, the latter reversed the decision. Hence, this appeal to the
Court.

Issue:

WON CIR committed error in judgment in not rendering PAFLU and the company guilty of unfair labor
practice as ruled by the trial court.

Held:

The appeal is well taken. Although, petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted
the resignation, the former had, soon later – upon learning that his withdrawal would result in
separation from the company, withdrawn said resignation. The refusal to consent by the union was
without just cause, furthermore upon the facts, the refusal is based due to his critical attitude towards
measures taken by them. It should be noted that the CIR did not reverse these findings or even question
the accuracy thereof. The officers of the union even admitted to such when they branded petitioner as
disloyal to the union.

Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to admit thereto any given
individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is
qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality,
or as regards a particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement. The reason is that

. . . The closed shop and the union shop cause the admission requirements of trade union to
become affected with the public interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance
of membership clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to be affected with the
public interest.

Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants
for membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in
 insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership,
without any reasonable ground therefor. Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new
members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise
the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to
provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or
revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and can
not arbitrarily he denied readmission.

On the otherhand, the court did not agree with the trial court on holding the company guilty of unfair
practice. The company was reluctant in discharging the petitioner. On the contrary, it did not merely
show a commendable understanding and sympathy for his plight. It even tried to help him, although to
such extent only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain from interfering in purely internal affairs
of the Union. At the same time, the Company could not safely inquire into the motives of the Union
officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as the true motives
were not manifest, without such inquiry, and petitioner had concededly tendered his resignation of his
own free will, the arbitrary nature of the decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to
justify the company in regarding said decision unreasonable. On the other hand, the Company cannot be
blamed for assuming the contrary, for petitioner had appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and
the latter had sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the PAFLU had
inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives of the Union Officers.

Florencio Pelobello vs Gregorio Palatino

72 Phil. 4

Absolute Pardon

FACTS

 Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging
that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and was even
imprisoned.
 Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from
voting and being voted upon.
 Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.

HELD:

 Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into
an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after
Palatino’s election but prior to him assuming office.
 The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached
to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in
question.
 Cristobal vs Labrodor
Pardon – Restoration of Civil & Political Rights
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his
pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his
conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors
in Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment “for any crime against property”. This is
pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is
exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his “full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or
property responsibility.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that
such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain
where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is
entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which
there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which
the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and
the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment
has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f conviction. In the present case,
while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that “he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property
responsibility,” it is absolute insofar as it “restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. Upon
other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall
within the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment of the
pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to
the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action.
TANCINCO vs CALLEJA

Who may vote> election of officers

FACTS: Private respondents are the prime organizers of ITM-MEA. While said respondents were preparing
to file a petition for direct certification of the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of ITM's
bargaining unit, the union's Vice-President, was promoted to the position of Department Head, thereby
disqualifying him for union membership. Said incident, led to a strike spearheaded by Lacanilao group,
respondents. Another group however, led by petitioners staged a strike inside the company premises.
After 4 days the strike was settled. On May 10, 1986 an agreement was entered into by the
representatives of the management, Lacanilao group and the Tancinco group the relevant terms of which
states that all monthly employees shall be united under one union, the ITM Month Employees Association
(ITM-MEA) to be affiliated with ANGLO. The management of ITM recognizes ANGLO as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the monthly-paid employees;
 However, during the pre-election conference attended by MOLE officers, ANGLO through its
National Secretary, made a unilateral ruling excluding some 56 employees consisting of the Manila office
employees, members of Iglesia ni Kristo, non-time card employees, drivers of Mrs. Salazar and the
cooperative employees of Mrs. Salazar. The election of officers was conducted, the 56 employees in
question participated but their votes were segregated without being counted. Lacanilao's group won.
Lacanilao garnered 119 votes with a margin of 3 votes over Tancinco prompting petitioners to make a
protest.

BLR ruled holding the exclusion of the 56 employees as arbitrary, whimsical, and wanting in legal
basis but set aside the challenged order on the ground that 51 ** of 56 challenged voters were not yet
union members at the time of the election per April 24, 1986 list submitted before the Bureau.

ISSUE: WON the 56 employees have the right to vote even though some of them are not included in the
list of union members submitted to the Bureau.

HELD: YES

RATIO: Submission of the employees names with the BLR as qualified members of the union is not a
condition sine qua non to enable said members to vote in the election of union's officers. It finds no
support in fact and in law. Per public respondent's findings, the April 24, 1986 list consists of 158 union
members only wherein 51 of the 56 challenged voters' names do not appear.

It is true that under article 242(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, only members of the union can
participate in the election of union officers. The question however of eligibility to vote may be determined
through the use of the applicable payroll period and employee's status during the applicable payroll
period. The payroll of the month next preceding the labor dispute in case of regular employees and the
payroll period at or near the peak of operations in case of employees in seasonal industries.

It can also be shown that their act of joining the election by casting their votes is a clear
manifestation of their intention to join the union. They must therefore be considered ipso
facto members. Said employees having exercised their right to unionism by joining ITM-MEA their
decision is paramount. Their names could not have been included in the list of employee submitted on
April 24, 1986 to the Bureau of Labor for the agreement to join the union was entered into only on May
10, 1986. Indeed the election was supervised by the Department of Labor where said 56 members were
allowed to vote. Private respondents never challenged their right to vote then.

HOLY CROSS VS. JOAQUIN

NOVEMBER 13, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 110007 October 18, 1996
HOLY CROSS OF DAVAO COLLEGE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JEROME JOAQUIN, in his capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, and HOLY CROSS OF DAVAO COLLEGE
UNION-KALIPUNAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMAPI), respondents.
FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement, effective from June 1, 1986 to May 31, 1989 was entered into
between petitioner Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. (hereafter Holy Cross), an educational institution,
and the affiliate labor organization representing its employees, respondent Holy Cross of Davao College
Union-KAMAPI (hereafter KAMAPI).
Shortly before the expiration of the agreement, KAMAPI President, Jose Lagahit, wrote Holy Cross under
date of April 12, 1989 expressing his union’s desire to renew the agreement, withal seeking its extension
for two months, or until July 31, 1989. Granted.

Thereafter an election of officers was held, and at which Rodolfo Gallera won election as president. To
the surprise of many, and with resultant dissension among the membership, Gallera forthwith initiated
discussions for the union’s disaffiliation from the KAMAPI Federation.

Gallera’s group subsequently formed a separate organization known as the Holy Cross of Davao College
Teachers Union, and elected its own officers.

For its part, the existing union, KAMAPI, sent to the School its proposals for a new collective bargaining
contract; this it did on July 31, 1989, the expiry date of the two-month extension it had sought.

Holy Cross thereafter stopped deducting from the salaries and wages of its teachers and employees the
corresponding union dues and special assessments (payable by union members), and agency fees
(payable by non-members), in accordance with the check-off clause of the CBA, 4 prompting KAMAPI, on
September 1, 1989, to demand an explanation.

* In the meantime, there ensued between the two unions (KAMAPI vs. GALLERA GROUP) a full-blown
action on the basic issue of representation, which was to last for some two years. KAMAPI won.
After its success in the certification election case KAMAPI presented a revised bargaining proposals to
Holy Cross; asking for Holy Cross counter-proposal. Holy cross refused to submit its counter-proposal
(based on many many grounds not relative to the topic in our syllabus ).

* Several conciliation meetings were thereafter held between them, and when these failed to bring
about any amicable settlement, the parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary arbitration. On both
issues, Voluntary Arbitrator Jerome C. Joaquin found in favor of KAMAPI. Petition by Holy Cross with the
SC, denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not an employer is liable to pay to the union of its employees, the amounts it failed
to deduct from their salaries — as union dues (with respect to union members) or agency fees (as
regards those not union members) — in accordance with the check-off provisions of the collective
bargaining contract (CBA) which it claims to have been automatically extended.
HELD: NO
A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on agreement with the union recognized as
the proper bargaining representative, or on prior authorization from its employees, deducts union dues
or agency fees from the latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union.

Indeed, this Court has acknowledged that the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the
union and, only indirectly, of the individual laborers.

No provision of law makes the employer directly liable for the payment to the labor organization of
union dues and assessments that the former fails to deduct from its employees’ salaries and wages
pursuant to a check-off stipulation. The employer’s failure to make the requisite deductions may
constitute a violation of a contractual commitment for which it may incur liability for unfair labor
practice. 23 But it does not by that omission, incur liability to the union for the aggregate of dues or
assessments uncollected from the union members, or agency fees for non-union employees.

The obligation to pay union dues and agency fees obviously devolves not upon the employer, but the
individual employee. It is a personal obligation not demandable from the employer upon default or
refusal of the employee to consent to a check-off. The only obligation of the employer under a check-off
is to effect the deductions and remit the collections to the union.
The principle of unjust enrichment necessarily precludes recovery of union dues — or agency fees —
from the employer, these being, to repeat, obligations pertaining to the individual worker in favor of the
bargaining union. Where the employer fails or refuses to implement a check-off agreement, logic and
prudence dictate that the union itself undertake the collection of union dues and assessments from its
members (and agency fees from non-union employees); this, of course, without prejudice to suing the
employer for unfair labor practice.
PETITION GRANTED.
_______________

NOTES:
Issues presented by them for resolution to the voluntary arbitrator:

a. Whether or not the CBA which expired on May 31, 1989 was automatically renewed and did not serve
merely as a holdover CBA; and

b. Whether or not there was refusal to negotiate on the part of the Holy Cross of Davao College.

 The legal basis of check-off is thus found in statute or in contract. 19 Statutory limitations on check-
offs generally require written authorization from each employee to deduct wages; however, a resolution
approved and adopted by a majority to the union members at a general meeting will suffice when the
right to check-off has been recognized by the employer, including collection of reasonable assessments
in connection with mandatory activities of the union, or other special assessments and extraordinary
fees.

 Authorization to effect a check-off of union dues is co-terminous with the union affiliation or
membership of employees.

 On the other hand, the collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees,
from employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248 (e) of the Labor Code. No
requirement of written authorization from the non-union employee is imposed. The employee’s
acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of
agency fees from his pay and the union’s entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis of the
union’s right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the
established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from
employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.

.R. No. 115949 March 16, 2000

EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA, RODOLFO EUGENIO, ISAGANI MAKISIG,
and DEMETRIO SALAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON SARMIENTO et. al (AND ALL
OTHER SOLID BANK UNION MEMBERS)

FACTS: Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly recognized collective
bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of Solid Bank Corporation. Private respondents are
members of said union.
The union’s Executive Board decided to retain anew the service of Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina (now
deceased) as union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA); majority of all union members approved and signed a resolution confirming the
decision of the executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel.
As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total economic benefits that may be
secured through the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as attorney’s fees. It also contained an
authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off said attorney’s fees from the first lump sum
payment of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty. Lacsina
and/or his duly authorized representative.

The bank then, on request of the union, made payroll deductions for attorney’s fees from the CBA
benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the abovementioned resolution.
Private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the union counsel before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of attorney’s fees as well as for
quantification of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.

Med-arbiter granted the complaint; Secretary partially granted and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated
22 April 1993 is hereby modified as follows: (1) that the ordered refund shall be limited to those union
members who have not signified their conformity to the check-off of attorney’s fees; and (2) the
directive on the payment of 5% attorney’s fees should be deleted for lack of basis. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the deductions made by petioner-company is valid.

HELD: NO
Private respondent’s contention: claim that the check-off provision in question is illegal because it was
never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called for the purpose and that it failed
to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor Code.
In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from employees,
deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union. It
assures continuous funding; for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of
check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees.

The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241 (o) of the Labor
Code.
Art. 222 (b) states:

No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining
negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of
the contracting union: Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may be charged against unions funds in
an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the
contrary shall be null and void. (Emphasis ours)

Art. 241 (o) provides:

Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney’s fees, negotiation
fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without
an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically
state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. (Emphasis ours).

Art. 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union’s incidental
expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written
resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the
purpose; (2) secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization
for check off duly signed by the employees concerned.
Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee
without his written consent.

After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General Membership Resolution of October 19,
1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the
validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and
representation expenses. There were no individual written check off authorizations by the employees
concerned and so the assessment cannot be legally deducted by their employer.

From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public respondent did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the
expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly the reimbursement should be charged to
the union’s general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned
employees other than those mandated by law.

Petition is DENIED.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS CONFESOR
GR. NO. 114974
J. CALLEJO SR.

FACTS:
Standard Chartered is foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines. The exclusive
bargaining agent is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union.

In August 1990, the bank and the union signed a five year CBA and renegotiate after 3 years. Prior to the
expiration of the three year period and before the 60 day freedom period, the union initiated the
negotiations. The bank gave a counterproposal . The parties agreed to settle the differences in a
meeting.

The non economic provisions were noted as deferred however it was manifested that it should be
changed to deadlock to indicate that it is not yet resolved. The negotiations of the economic provisions
were commenced. Umali, the president of the union, said that the means on how the union got what it
wanted during the first negotiation of the 1987 will be applied again if needed in order to get what it
wanted.

The union insisted the economic provisions however, the union proposed that the bank make a revision
of itemized proposal. On June 15, 1993 the union said that is would be best if they seek third party
assistance if the counter proposal was not revised. Afterwards, the bank presented a counterproposal.

The union, then declared deadlock and filed a notice of strike before NCMB. The bank filed a complaint
for ULP alleging that the union did not bargain in good faith, violated the no strike-no lockout clause,
and that the bank suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced to litigate and hire the services
of a lawyer.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordered the parties to execute a
CBA incorporating the dispositions: CBA shall be retroactive to April 1, 1993; effective for two years; the
provisions which are not expressly repealed or modified are retained and without prejudice to the
agreements as as the parties may arrive at in the meantime. The bank’s complaint for ULP was
dismissed for lack of merit. Both parties filed for MR to no avail.

On March 22, 1994, the parties signed the CBA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bank violated its duty to bargain by committing surface bargaining
Whether or not the Union committed ULP through Blue Sky Bargaining

HELD:
It was held that the Union failed to show that the Bank committed such acts.
Surface bargaining is the going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to reach an
agreement.

The determining factor is a question of intent of the party in question and intent is inferred from the
totality of the challenged party’s conduct away or at the bargaining table.

The Bank likewise failed to show that the economic demands by the union are exaggerated or
unreasonable.

Coastal Subic Bay Terminal v DOLE

Quisimbing|Nov 20 2006
Union Registration : Registration Proceeding ; Union Affiliation
Facts:
· Petition for Certification Election. Private respondents Coastal Subic Bay
Terminal, Inc. Rank-and-File Union (CSBTI-RFU) and Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc.
Supervisory Union (CSBTI-SU) filed separate petitions for certification election before
Med-Arbiter Eladio de Jesus of the Regional Office No. III. The rank-and-file union
insists that it is a legitimate labor organization having been issued a charter
certificate by the Associated Labor Union (ALU), and the supervisory union by the
Associated Professional, Supervisory, Office and Technical Employees Union
(APSOTEU).
· Petitioner’s Claims. The petitioner-company claims that the two unions are not
legitimate organizations. The opposition was acted on favorably by the Med Arbiter,
who did not rule on the legitimacy but dismissed the petitions of the respondents on
the ground that the APSOTEU and ALU are one and the same and thus the two unions
were affiliated with one and the same federation.
· Secretary of Labor and Employment. The sec reversed the rulings of the med
arbiter. He declared that they separate and distinct labor unions having secured
separate certifications of registration from the DOLE. A certification election was
ordered. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
1. WON the supervisory union and the rank-and-file union can file separate
petitions for certification election
See third issue
2. WON the secretary’s decision based on stare decisis was correct in holding
that the Secretary’s ruling that APSOTEU is a legitimate labor organization
and its personality cannot be assailed unless in an independent action for
cancellation of registration certificate
a. Yes. Section 5, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules states:
Section 5. Effect of registration – The labor organization or workers’ association shall be
deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate
of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but
maybe questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these
Rules.
Thus, APSOTEU is a legitimate labor organization and has authority to issue charter to its
affiliates. It may issue a local charter certificate to CSBTI-SU and correspondingly, CSBTI-SU
is legitimate.
3. WON the private respondents were guilty of commingling
“Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for
membership in a labor union of rank-and-file employees. The supervisory employees are
allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file union
because of potential conflicts of interest. Further, to avoid a situation where supervisors
would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors’ labor union would
represent conflicting interests, a local supervisors’ union should not be allowed to
affiliate with the national federation of unions of rank-and-file employees where that
federation actively participates in the union activity within the company”
Both unions share a common set of officers therefore possible conflicts of
interests will arise. So as long as they are respectively affiliated with APSOTEU and ALU,
they do not meet the criteria of legitimate labor organizations. This is in line with the
idea that unions are supposed to increase the collective bargaining power of employees,
something that will be compromised if supervisory employees commingled with the rank
and file unions. They cannot file separate petitions for certification election.
Held: Petition granted

PHOENIX IRON AND STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.SECRETARY

OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and PISCOR WORKERS UNION —
ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
(PISCOR-ANGLO), respondents.
G.R. No. 112141, May 16, 1995
[First Division]
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.
FACTS: Private respondent PISCOR Workers Union — Alliance of Nationalist
and Genuine Labor Organizations (PISCOR-ANGLO) asserting to be a
legitimate labor organization filed a petition for certification election with the
Med-Arbiter. Petitioner Phoenix Iron and Steel Corporation (PHOENIX) sought
clarification of the legal personality of PISCOR-ANGLO (UNION). Med-Arbiter
dismissed the petition of the UNION because it had not complied with the
requisites of law.
On appeal to the Office of Secretary of Labor, Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma, acting by authority of the Secretary of Labor, issued a resolution
"calling for the immediate conduct of a certification election since the UNION
has complied with the requirements of the law on organization of a local after
it was shown that it has submitted duly certified copies of its constitution and
by-laws, list of officers and charter certificate. Anent the minutes of
organizational meeting, it is obvious that the same is not required to be
submitted by the union to establish its legitimacy. Having complied with all
the requirements aforementioned, technicalities may not be allowed to stand
in the way of certification election.
Solicitor General supported PHOENIX’s stand that UNION has no personality
to file a petition for certification election it not being a legitimate labor
organization; that said Union failed to comply with the attestation and
certification requirements for the attainment of a legitimate status with
respect to certain documents submitted with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR); and, that the dismissal of such requirements as mere technicalities by
Undersecretary of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma, acting in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor, directly contradicts the categorical pronouncement
in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary of Labor that the failure
of a labor union to certify under oath the required documents submitted with
the BLR is fatal to the attainment of a legitimate status.
ISSUE: Whether or not PISCOR-ANGLO (UNION) has complied with the
requirements to become a legitimate labor organization?
HELD: NO. PISCOR-ANGLO (UNION) has not complied with the requirements
to become a legitimate labor organization.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Progressive Development Corporation
v. Secretary of Labor, to wit:
A local or chapter . . . becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the BLR:
1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter
does not become a legitimate labor organization.
In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the
submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by the president is apparent.
The submission of the required documents and payment of registration
feebecomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for
registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is
entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by the law to a legitimate
labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it
is dealing with is a bona-fide organization, one which has not submitted false
statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures
against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of
protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining
unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union
funds or to use the union for dubious ends.
In the case at bar, there are no books of account filed before the BLR, the
constitution, by-laws and the list of members who supposedly ratified the
same were not attested to by the union president, and the constitution and
by-laws were not verified under oath. Hence, PISCOR-ANGLO (UNION) is not a
legitimate labor organization.

TROPICAL HUT EMPLOYEES’ UNION-CGW et al vs.TROPICAL HUT FOOD MARKET, INC., et al

G.R. No. L-43495-99

January 20, 1990

FACTS: The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market Incorporated (respondent company)
organized a local union called the Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU) and immediately sought
affiliation with the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). The NATU accepted the THEU
application for affiliation.
The CBA between respondent company and THEU-NATU contains a union security clause:
xx
Union Membership and Union Check-off
Sec. 1 —. . . Employees who are already members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this
Agreement or who become so thereafter shall be required to maintain their membership therein as a
condition of continued employment.
Xx
Attached to the Agreement is a check-off Authorization Form, the terms of which are as follows:
We, the undersigned, hereby designate the NATU, of which the THEU is an affiliate as sole collective
bargaining agent in all matters relating to salary rates, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
employment in the Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc…xx
Later on, NATU received a letter jointly signed by the incumbent officers of the local union informing the
NATU that THEU was disaffiliating from the NATU federation. The employees were dismissed because,
as respondent company contended, they violated the union security clause.
ISSUE: Was the disaffiliation of the local union from the national federation valid?
HELD: YES
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-settled. A local union, being a
separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom
to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association
The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local union THEU in the registration with the
Department of Labor is merely to stress that the THEU is NATU’s affiliate at the time of the registration.
It does not mean that the said local union cannot stand on its own. Neither can it be interpreted to
mean that it cannot pursue its own interests independently of the federation. A local union owes its
creation and continued existence to the will of its members and not to the federation to which it
belongs.
Further, there is no merit in the contention of the respondents that the act of disaffiliation violated the
union security clause of the CBA and that their dismissal as a consequence thereof is valid. A perusal of
the CBAs shows that the THEU-NATU, and not the NATU federation, was recognized as the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all matters concerning wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. Although NATU was designated as
the sole bargaining agent in the check-off authorization form attached to the CBA, this simply means it
was acting only for and in behalf of its affiliate. The NATU possessed the status of an agent while the
local union remained the basic principal union which entered into contract with the respondent
company. When the THEU disaffiliated from its mother federation, the former did not lose its legal
personality as the bargaining union under the CBA. Moreover, the union security clause embodied in the
agreements cannot be used to justify the dismissals meted to petitioners since it is not applicable to the
circumstances obtaining in this case. The CBA imposes dismissal only in case an employee is expelled
from the union for joining another federation or for forming another union or who fails or refuses to
maintain membership therein. The case at bar does not involve the withdrawal of merely some
employees from the union but of the whole THEU itself from its federation. Clearly, since there is no
violation of the union security provision in the CBA, there was no sufficient ground to terminate the
employment of petitioners.