People vs. Galacgac CA 54 O.G.

1027 Criminal Law, Generality principle in Criminal Law

JANUARY 11, 2018

FACTS:

On November 22, 1951, as a consequence of a shooting and beating spree which occurred in Sta. Cruz,
Manila, Enrique Galacgac, a naturalized American Citizen and Paulino Galacgac were accussed of
attempted parricide with physical serious injuries in Criminal Case NO. 19292 however, after trial
Paulino was acquitted. Enrique was also charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case 19293, with
two separate charges of attempted homicide, Criminal Case 19294 and 19295, and with illegal
possession of firearms in Criminal Case No.19296 however, likewise after trial was acquitted from the
Criminal Case 19293 and 19294 but convicted for Criminal Case 19292, 19295 and 19296. And Pablo
Soriano was accused of frustrated homicide in Criminal case 19297.

For the Criminal Case 19292, serious physical injuries; Criminal Case 19295, attempted homicide and
Criminal Case 19296, illegal possession of firearms he was sentenced to suffer respectively, four months
of arresto mayor, an indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight
months of prision correctional and an imprisonment of one year and one day.

Pablo Soriano was found guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries, and was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six months of arresto mayor to one year and eight months of prision
correctional and to pay the cost except for criminal case 19292, Enrique was ordered to pay one-half of
the cost. Not satisfied Enrique and Soriano appealed the judgments.

On appeal, Galacgac claimed that the firearm was a homecoming present for his wife and that he arrived
at 3:00pm in Manila however the Phil Constabulary closes at 4:00pm and therefore he failed to secure a
license for the firearm. Likewise, he claimed that being an American Citizen he couldn’t be prosecuted
and likewise convicted of illegal possession of firearm since in the United States it is a constitutional
right “to keep and bear arms.”

The indiscriminate shooting which resulted to the injury of Marina Ramos and Alfonso Ramos was
brought about by the hitting of Pablo Soriano with an iron bar on the forehead of Enrique twice causing
blood to profusely ooze from his head and thus making him dizzy and dimming his vision, when the
latter interfered in a marital argument.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Galacgac was liable for the crimes committed.

RULING:

The SC modified the judgment of the lower court, Enrique Galacgac was sentenced to suffer ten days of
arresto menor and pay one-half of the cost of Criminal Case 19292; undergo same number of days of
arresto menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case 19295; and an indeterminate imprisonment of from
one year to two years and six months, and to pay the cost for Criminal Case 19296.
Pablo Soriano was sentenced to suffer fifteen days of arresto menor and to pay the cost in Criminal Case
19297.

Enrique Galacgac claimed that he is exempt from prosecution being and American Citizen and an
employee of the U.S. Navy. The SC held that a mere civilian of the U.S. Navy is not entitled to any extra
–territorial privilege for, strictly speaking, he is not a member of the armed forces of the United States
Army.

With regards to the illegal possession of firearms, based on sec.892 of the Revised Administrative Code,
ordains that any person, whether a national or foreigner, coming to the Philippines and bringing with
him any firearm, must deposit the same with the Collector of Customs who in turn must deliver it to the
Phil Constabulary, from which the firearm cannot be taken until the importer shall have secured a
license to possess it.

With regards to Pablo Soriano’s claim that he acted in defense of Concepcion, his testimony was belied
by Concepcion Ramos and Mauricio Ramos proving that Soriano did not act in defense of his person and
his family

US V TAYONGTONG

11FEB

GR No. 6897 | February 15, 1912 | J. Moreland

Accident

Facts:

Driver Policarpio Tayongtong files for an appeal from the judgment of the lower court, which found him
guilty of homicide by negligence for running over Severino Resume, while the latter was painting
telephone poles along the highway of Jaro and Iloilo.

Tayongtong was driving a large passenger automobile at the time of the incident and was making his
third trip from Iloilo to Jaro, with the vehicle loaded at its fullest capacity (capable of carrying 35
passengers and their baggage).

Principal witness Pablo Tayson alleges that the driver was moving very fast towards them, raising a cloud
of dust, moving the steering wheel from one direction to another, causing the vehicle to zigzag from its
track, cross the other side of the road and strike the deceased – eventually creating “a suction” which
drew the victim under the vehicle’s wheel. From the testimony, the deceased did not appear to have
moved or stirred to avoid the collision.

The driver denies these, saying he was driving at a moderate speed when the victim suddenly crossed
the road.
Issue:

W/N the driver run over the victim by negligence or pure accident

Held:

Accident. Conviction was reversed and the accused acquitted because the Court finds that the witness
made unreasonable, improbable and conflicting comments in his testimony. It was established by the
Court upon fair preponderance of evidence that the driver, having been a thoroughly qualified driver
who served his apprenticeship on the very road, using the very machine employed, was actually driving
the vehicle under a moderate speed. There was no reason to show that he was doing otherwise, as
corroborated by other disinterested witnesses, and the fact that a vehicle so large couldn’t have gone at
the rate of speed described. Per Tayson’s testimony, it was also unreasonable that the deceased, seeing
plainly that the vehicle was moving towards him, did not move to save himself.

It was finally established in the trial that the deceased, upon seeing the cloud of dust, decided to cross
the street to avoid it, but upon miscalculation of time and distance, was struck by the automobile and
run over. The Court finds that where the death is due to the negligence of the decedent himself and not
the negligence of the driver, the latter cannot be held for homicide.

VIRGILIO TALAMPAS Y MATIC v. PEOPLE, GR No. 180219, 2011-11-23

Facts:

Jose Sevillo... testified that on July 5, 1995 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he together with

Eduardo... and Ernesto... were infront of his house... repairing his tricycle when he noticed the appellant
who was riding on a bicycle passed by and stopped. The latter alighted at about three (3) meters away
from him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a... revolver, and poked the same to Eduardo
and fired it hitting Eduardo who took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant again fired his gun three (3)
times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the
ground with his face... down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back
(patihaya). Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he (Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims to
the hospital.

On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been

Eduardo, not victim Ernesto... that Eduardo... had hit him with a monkey wrench, but he... had parried
the blow; that he and Eduardo had then grappled for the monkey wrench; that while they had grappled,
he had notice that Eduardo had held a revolver; that he had thus struggled with Eduardo for control of
the revolver, which had accidentally fired and hit Ernesto... during their struggling with each other; that
the revolver had again fired, hitting Eduardo in the thigh; that he had then seized the revolver and shot
Eduardo in the head; and that he had then fled the scene when people had started swarming around.

On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found Talampas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide
Issues:

that the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and accidental death.

Ruling:

In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim.

here... it was Talampas who had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not
been at any time a target... of Talampas' attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of
the attack. In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against
Talampas.

Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense.

Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,[10]... the legal provision pertinent to accident, contemplates a
situation where a person is in fact in the... act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence
and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in
the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.[11]

Indeed, accident... is an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.[12]

In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the... wrong done.

And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas' assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his
hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of
Talampas' felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas' poor aim... amounted to aberratio ictus,
or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor
mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause
of the cause is the cause... of the evil caused).[13]

Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[14]... criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a
felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain for themselves and without the consent of the
owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away one motor
vehicle valued at more or less Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to the damage and
prejudice of its owner, Lourdes Eleccion, in the aforestated amount and in the course of the commission
thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the said vehicle, was killed.

Issue:

Whether or not there is special complex crime of carnapping with homicide attended in the case.
Held:

Yes.

Ratio:

To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the
essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
Thus, the prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2)
his original criminal design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was
perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."

In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity
of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
foregoing circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari
participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by Medel and in killing him

fallorina

Facts:

At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent Jorojoro, an eleven-year old minor and the third
child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro, residing at Sitio Militar, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon
City, asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She agreed. Together with his
playmate Whilcon “Buddha” Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned
carinderia beside the road.

Beside the carinderia was a basketball court, where a fourteen-year old witness Ricardo Salvo and his
three friends, were playing basketball. Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from
the main road across the basketball court. Cognizant to Ricardo of the appellant, PO3 Ferdinand
Fallorina, a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer, detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG),
knew that he abhorred kids playing on the roof, since one of his friends was previously been scolded by
the appellant before.

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When PO3 Fallorina saw them, the
former stopped his motorcycle, he shouted and badmouthed at them. After hearing the shouts of the
appellant, Whilcon rushed to jump off from the roof while Vincent was lying on his stomach on the roof
flying his kite. When he heard the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. As soon
as Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof, suddenly, the appellant pointed the .45
caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent fell from the roof, lying prostrate
near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.
The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter’s hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought
him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival caused by a single
gunshot wound in the head.

Issues:

(a) Whether the appellant is exempted from criminal liability?

(b) Whether the appellant can offset an aggravating circumstance by taking advantage of his public
position from a mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender?

Held:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cites that the basis for exemption from a criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), is the complete absence of intent and
negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty for a felony, it must be committed
either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.

Thusly, the elements of exempting circumstances are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with
due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it.

In the case at bar, the Court a quo erred in inequitably appreciating exculpatory and inculpatory facts
and circumstances which should have been considered in favor of the accused. The court also failed to
appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the accused since it was only
after three days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service firearm. And lastly, the
court considered the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his position by the accused.