ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT

G.1 Vargas vs. Rilloraza (1948)

FACTS: People’s Court Act (CA No. 682) was enacted. Section 14 thereof provides for the
disqualification of Supreme Court Justices who held office in the Philippine Republic, to try and/or
decide on cases involving persons who also held office in the Philippine Republic, or any branch
thereof; and in such a case, the President will appoint a RTC Judge to substitute.

HELD: The provision is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Congress cannot modify or add disqualification of

judicial officers. To disqualify any component of the SC, equates to depriving the SC itself of its
jurisdiction established by the Constitution. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his
judicial power. This disqualification made by Congress affects the very heart of judicial
independence. Further, the designated Judges under Sec. 14 do not have the constitutional
qualifications of a regular member of the SC.

ARTICLE IX – CONCOMS

G.2 CSC vs. DBM (2005)

FACTS: DBM refuses to release FY-2002 appropriations to CSC because of the latter’s failure to
submit reports and documents.

HELD: The basis of refusal is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The application of the no-report, no-release
policy upon independent constitutional bodies is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy. By
parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner means
that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
NOTE: 1.) The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
2.) Congress may reduce ConCom’s budget lower than last year’s. Such prohibition against
reduction of appropriation below the amount of previous year is only applicable to the Judiciary.

G.3 Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (1985)

FACTS: “Filipinas” was one of the bidder for the supply of voting booths to COMELEC for the 1982
elections. It filed an injunction suit in CFI Manila against respondents COMELEC and the winning
bidder “ACME”. Respondents assailed that CFI has no jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Lower courts has jurisdiction. Determinations made by the COMELEC which are merely
administrative (not quasi-judicial) in character, may be challenged in an ordinary civil action before
trial courts. Compare with the rule: (It is the SC, not CFI, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review
on certiorari final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections
and enforcement of election laws).
NOTE: 1.) Check if the order of COMELEC is out of its adjudicatory power (quasi-judicial –
reviewable by SC) or out of its administrative power (reviewable by lower courts)
2.) The case was nevertheless dismissed because petitioner was found to have no cause of
action.

G.4 Saligumba vs. CA (1982)

FACTS: An administrative case was filed (but was later dismissed by COA for insufficiency of
evidence) against a COA employee, involving rape charges. Complainant elevated the case directly
to SC.

HELD: SC has no jurisdiction. Its power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to
administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. Even assuming arguendo that SC has
jurisdiction over admin matters, their power of review is limited to legal issues only, not factual.

G.5 NaSeCo vs. NLRC (1988)

FACTS: An employee of NASECO files a labor (illegal dismissal) case against the latter in the NLRC.
NASECO avers that it is the CSC, and not the NLRC, which has jurisdiction over the case, it being a
subsidiary of a government-owned and controlled corporation.

HELD: NLRC has jurisdiction. NASECO was incorporated under the general corporation law.
NOTE: The test is whether or not the GOCC has its own original charter (if with orig. charter, under
Civil Service Law; if without, under Labor Code)

G.6 MWSS vs. Hernandez (1986)

FACTS: In a money claims case, the Labor Arbiter asserts that it has jurisdiction over the case
because the complainants were contractual, not regular, employees of MWSS. Stated otherwise, it
maintains that what is covered by the civil service law is the employment contract between the
GOCC (with orig. charter) and its REGULAR personnel.

HELD: There is NO legal basis for distinction between regulars and non-regulars/contractuals of
GOCCs. All are covered by Civil Service Law. LA/NLRC has no jurisdiction

G.7 CSC vs. Sojor (2008)

FACTS: Faculty member of NORSU (Negros Oriental State U) filed administrative cases against their
University President Sojor, before the CSC Regional Office. Sojor claims that CSC has no jurisdiction
over the case because the same is lodged with the Board of Regents which appointed him to the
position.

HELD: CSC has CONCURRENT jurisdiction with the BoR. The University President is within reach of
the disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the CSC over all civil servants and officials.
Although the administrative power over the school exclusively belongs to BOR, this power is not
exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials. They are still
covered by CSC. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the
CSC. The guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory basis.

G.8 De los Santos vs. Mallare (1950)

FACTS: Delos Santos was appointed by the President as Baguio City Engineer. Later, Mallere was
extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the president. Delos Santos refused to
vacate the position, but the City Mayor released the salaries for the position to Mallare. Thus a quo
warranto petition was filed by Delos Santos.
HELD: Delos Santos is entitled to remain as the City Engineer. The office of city engineer is neither
primarily confidential, policy determining, nor highly technical; thus, cannot be removed without
cause.
NOTE:
GR: Sec. 2 (3), Art IX of 1987 Consti: No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.
XPN: Dismissal at pleasure; only to positions "which are (1) policy-determining, (2) primarily
confidential or (3) highly technical.

G.9 CSC vs. Salas (1997)

FACTS: Salas, appointed by PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff Member, was terminated
from employment by the BOD, allegedly for loss of confidence. He appealed his termination case to
CSC which denied his appeal on the ground that he was a confidential employee and hence,
dismissal at pleasure doctrine applies.

HELD: Salas is NOT a confidential employee. It is the actual NATURE of an employee’s functions,
and not his designation or title, which determines whether or not a position is primarily
confidential. Executive pronouncements declaring positions to be confidential in nature are merely
initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. Facts of the case reveal that Salas’
functions were routinary, remote, and did not enjoy such “close-intimacy” with the appointing
authority. Not being a confidential employee, he is protected by security of tenure clause under the
Constitution for civil service employees.

G.10 CSC vs. Javier (2008)

FACTS: Javier, Corporate Secretary of GSIS, retired from service on her 64th birthday, but was later
reappointed to the same position by the Board of Trustees, this time as a confidential employee.
CSC alleges that such was meant to illegally extend her service and circumvent the laws on
compulsory retirement (65yrs).

HELD: The position of Corporate Secretary in a GOCC is primarily confidential, belonging to the non-
career service. The position requires highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is
crucial to maintaining between them freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom
from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

The court is not bound by the classification of a position as confidential already made by executive
or legislative department, or even a constitutional body. These are no more than mere declarations,
and do not foreclose judicial review, especially in the event of conflict.

G.11 Griño vs. CSC (1991)

ISSUE: 1.)Are Provincial Attorneys’ positions primarily confidential? 2.) How about their assistants
and legal subordinates?

HELD: 1.) YES (same as City Legal Officer). It is considered confidential if the predominant reason
they were chosen by the appointing authority is so that they can share a close intimate
relationship without fear of embarrassment or possible betrayal of personal trust on confidential
matters.
 2.) No. There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff which
assists the confidential employer above described. Since the positions occupied by these
subordinates are remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them
is no longer predominant. The importance of these subordinates to the appointing authority now
lies in the contribution of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential employee.

G.12 Briones vs. Osmena

G.13 Abakada Group Party List vs Purisima
G.14 CSC vs. Sojor
G.15 CSC vs. Magnaye
G.16 Santos vs. Yatco
G.17 De La Cruz vs. CA
G.18 Flores vs. Drilon
G.19 Peralta vs. Mathay
G.20 Cayetano vs. Monsod
G.21 Matibag vs. Benipayo