The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View

Author(s): John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), pp. 471-488
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 9 (I978), 47I-488 Printed in Great Britain

47I

John S. Galbraith and AfafLutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT:

ANOTHER VIEW

Historians, among others, expose the lies and deceptions of politicians, dead and

alive. But historians themselves often are deceived by the limitations of their

own approaches to history. While they themselves may act emotionally or some-

times irrationally in their personal lives, they are too often committed to seek

rational explanations for the behavior of statesmen. Grossly underestimated

in many instances is the power of rationalization as a factor in the 'decision-

making process.' Often great decisions have been made on the basis of inadequate

or false information, with consequences that the decision-makers could not

foresee. Sometimes decisions are the result of muddleheadedness. Sometimes

a governmental decision seems to be the product of a succession of miscalcula-

tions. But it is the natural impulse of those in positions of authority to justify

their decisions by some explanations that relate to their zeal for the 'national

interest.' In so doing they do not necessarily deliberately lie; often they deceive

themselves as well as others. Reasons developed after the fact provide a cerebral

gloss for unintelligent decisions leading to unintended actions. The background

for the occupation of Egypt in i882 provides an illustration.

The motives for the British occupation of Egypt have been examined by

publicists and scholars from the time that Wolseley's expeditionary force landed

to the present. There is no prospect that the debate will soon be ended, for not

only is there no consensus, but there is a gulf between the advocates which

seems beyond human ingenuity to bridge.

What was the 'motive' for governmental action? Was intervention dictated

by fear of a foreign challenge to British supremacy by 'strategic' considerations?

Some historians have held this view despite the fact that before the British

occupation there was close Anglo-French collaboration. Was intervention moti-

vated by the demands of British industry, that is, by economic considerations?

Some historians have argued this line despite the fact that Egypt was already

open to British trade. The proponents of the 'bondholders' school have no

common ground with the 'Suez Canal' forces, and vice versa. Each, as is

invariably the case in such historians' debates, presents arguments convincing

to themselves. A recent article presents a subtheme not entirely supportive of the

'bondholders' position but emphatically negative on the 'Suez Canal' inter-

pretation. The writer makes a strong case that historians have been deluded by

the rationalizations of involved statesmen who sought to cover their blunders by

belatedly deciding that the security of the Canal made necessary the occupation

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 472 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

of Egypt. Whitehall, the author asserts, relied excessively on the 'men on the

spot,' who by misleading, inaccurate, or false information deluded their superiors

into taking a course of action that led to intervention.l

The first part of the writer's contention - the 'Suez Canal argument' as

afterthought - is impressively documented, though in his preoccupation with the

'men on the spot' he does not cite much supportive evidence from members of

the Gladstone cabinet itself. Gladstone did not believe that the security of the

Canal justified military action. In mid-July I882, after the bombardment of

Alexandria had set the stage for the events that led to the occupation, Gladstone

told Granville that he did not worry about an Egyptian attack on the Canal

but that the French and British admirals at Port Said might be forewarned to

be on the alert.2 He did not suggest the need for more drastic measures than

were within the power of the Navy. In taking this position he essentially re-

affirmed the view he had expressed five years before in an article in Nineteenth

Century. In 1877 he had envisaged the possibility that Russia might be able to

close the canal. What would be the result? At worst, he wrote, communication

with India would be delayed a maximum of three weeks by the necessity of

using the route around the Cape of Good H-ope. True, commercial interests

would be affected, but the loss would be a 'tax only, not a disaster, and certainly

would not justify the occupation of Egypt.'3

The Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, likewise prior to the bombardment of

Alexandria, saw no reasons for massive military action to protect the canal. On

12 May I882, he asked Sir Edward Malet, the British consul general, what

dangers he feared regarding the security of the canal, adding that expert advice

indicated that though the canal might be temporarily blocked, it was not possible

to do it any permanent damage.4 Malet, who by this time had become an advocate

of strong measures to shatter the power of Urabi Pasha and the nationalist

movement,5 replied that at the first alarm of British intervention the Egyptians

would sink ships in the canal. But even Malet admitted that such action could

probably be prevented by policing the canal with gun boats.6

Expert testimony in the possession of the Admiralty discounted the gravity

of a threat to the canal from sunken ships. The best available information was

that the current made it 'next to impossible' to sink a ship broadside with its

bow on the one bank and the stern on the other. If a ship touched only one bank, the

work of making a channel would require from four to eight or nine days.7

1 Alexander Scholch, 'The "Men on the Spot" and the English Occupation of Egypt

in 1882', Historical Journal I9, 3 (1976), 773-785.

2 Gladstone to Granville, i6 July 1882, Granville Papers, PRO 30/29/126, quoted in

Agatha Ramm, The Political Correspondence of IMr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-

i886 (2 vols.; Oxford, I962), I, 372.

3 W. E. Gladstone, 'Aggression in Egypt and Freedom in the East', Nineteenth Century,

2 (Aug., I877), I49-I66.

4Telegram, Granville to Malet, 12 May 1882, PRO 30/29/284, Public Record Office.

5 Scholch, 'The "Men on the Spot"', p. 782.

6 Telegram, Malet to Granville, 12 May 1882, PRO 30/29/284, Public Record Office.

7 George Royle to the Admiralty, 27 July 1882, ADM 116/35, Public Record Office.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 473

The 'security of the canal' argument as justification for the occupation of

Egypt was put forward not because the gravity of the menace justified such

weighty action in the view of the well informed, but because it provided the

most palatable explanation to the Liberal party and the general public. Sir

Charles Dilke, one of the leading interventionists, noted in his diary on 4 July

i882: 'There is a belief among the great majority of Liberals that intervention

in Egypt is only contemplated on account of financial interests. If we intervene

to protect the Canal, or if we confine ourselves to exacting the reparation due us

for the Alexandria outrages, this feeling need not be taken into account.'8

This statement has significance as an indication of Dilke's position that the

security of the canal was a rationalization for the occupation. It does not prove

that this view was accepted by the cabinet, nor does it prove that other motiva-

tions were central to the decision to intervene. What were the 'true' reasons for

the occupation? The question assumes a degree of coherence in the Gladstone

cabinet which has little relationship to reality. Any analysis of the factors that

led to the occupation should take into consideration the fact that the Liberal

government of 1880-85 was a collection of disparate elements. In certain areas

of great importance, particularly in foreign policy, decisions were made in ways

that were quite obscure to members of the cabinet, including those who were

actively involved.

Viewed from the perspective of officials in Egypt, in particular Sir Auckland

Colvin, the British controller-general, intervention was made necessary by the

threat to Anglo-French dictation of Egyptian finances. In October i88i the

khedive decreed that the Chamber of Notables should assemble on December

23. This body, created by a law of i866, had performed the role of giving a

veneer of popular sanction to the decisions of the khedival government, but

had not met for some time. The khedive was forced to call a meeting of the

Assembly after Urabi had led a military demonstration the preceding month.

Urabi, speaking as a 'delegate of the people,' demanded that the khedive call

for a 'constituent assembly,' and secondly that the army be increased to its full

complement of i8,ooo men as was decreed in the firmans granted to Muhammad

Ali in I841.9 During the previous years, and under the advice of Wilson and de

Blignieres who had been nominated cabinet members, the Khedive Ismail had

allowed the cabinet to cashier a large number of army officers in an attempt at

retrenchment and allegedly to save the country from bankruptcy. These men

now demanded reinstatement.

The Chamber of I88i, unlike previous Assemblies, early manifested an

unwonted independence. It set to drawing up a constitution that would impose

limits on khedival autocracy, and declared that the portion of the revenues not

allocated to the payment of interest on the debt should be subject to the Chamber's

jurisdiction. The proposed increase of the army to i8,ooo men would involve

8 Dilke's Diary, 4 July I882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS 43880, British Library.

9 See account of incident in Abd al-Rahman al Rafii, al-Thawra al-Urabiyya (Cairo,

1937), pp. 119 ff.; also A. Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer (London, 1967), pp. 5 ff.

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 474 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

an outlay of an additional LE 280,000 or, concomitantly, the dismissal of

European employees in the Egyptian government who were earning high salaries

in positions that were virtual sinecures. These developments alarmed Colvin.

In the first place a cabinet that was constitutionally responsible to an Assembly

would be more difficult to influence than a timorous Khedive Tawfiq. In the

second place he maintained that they jeopardized the security of the debt-

liquidation system as it would mean, he believed, a change in the method of

assessment, imposition, and collection of taxes. This movement, he recognized,

transcended the self-interest of the military - it was indeed nationalist and

this fact made it all the more dangerous, for if it was not stopped immediately

Egypt would throw off foreign control and repudiate its financial obligations,

the Chamber's promises to the contrary notwithstanding. Consequently he and

his French counterpart recommended to their respective governments that they

would not tolerate this threat to their interests.10

Colvin never deviated from his advocacy of a tough uncompromising line

toward any manifestations of Egyptian independence. His colleague Malet, on

the other hand, at first was much more sympathetic. He considered Egyptian

resentment at the number of foreign functionaries and their exorbitant salaries

to be eminently justified. There were over 1,300 such officials, he wrote to

Granville, and they were paid far too much. The Chamber of Notables had

good cause for wishing to reduce this drain on the Egyptian treasury.'1 At the

end of December I88i he wrote Dilke that he believed that he could manage

Urabi and his fellow colonels, who were moderates and progressives, not at all

the Europhobes that they had been painted. His go-between was the poet

Wilfrid Blunt, more Arab than the Arabs, who in turn imagined that he could

manage Malet and Urabi to promote an Arab state in accordance with Blunt's

ideals.12

There is nothing irrational in Colvin's adamant opposition to the Nationalists

or in Malet's initial efforts to control them. Their deficiency was in their com-

plete lack of understanding of currents agitating Egyptian society. Whether or not

Blunt was correct in his assertion that Colvin's knowledge of Arabic was

rudimentary, Colvin had no knowledge of Arabs beyond the stereotypes common

among Britons of his day who 'knew their Orientals.' In late I88I and the early

months of 1882 he imagined that a pliant Egyptian regime could be established

without the necessity of employing massive force. Malet spoke the truth more

than he realized when he asserted that 'Colvin has been accused of the deliberate

intention to bring about armed foreign intervention. A more unjust accusation

was never made against a public official.'13

10 Memo by Colvin, 21 Dec. i88i; enclosure in Malet to Granville, 26 Dec. I88I,

CAB 37/7, Public Record Office.

11 Malet to Granville, Private, 24 Oct. I88i; same to same, Private, 12 Dec. i88I,

both in PRO 30/29/I59, Public Record Office.

12 Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The Life of the Right Honorable Sir

Charles W. Dilke (2 vols.; London, 1917), I, 452.

13 Edward Malet, Egypt, I879-I883 (London, 1909), p. 68.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 475

Malet's transformation from advocacy of mild measures to support of armed

force was a painful process and probably contributed to the mysterious ailment

that beset him in the summer of 1882. Before the issuance by England and France

of the Joint Note of 6 January 1882, he professed continued confidence that he

could 'manage' the Nationalists. The terms of the Note, drawn up by Gambetta,

were essentially an ultimatum to any reform elements that the two powers would

not tolerate any infringement on the authority of the khedive, which Egyptians

recognized as the privilege of doing the bidding of his European masters. The

issuance of the Joint Note transformed the situation in Egypt. Lord Cromer

later commented that it 'operated like a candle in a mine.'14 Malet reported that

previously the country had been calm, but that the fear of Anglo-French inter-

vention had brought Urabi and the colonels to the fore and destroyed the chance

of civilian control over the military,15 and the prospects of a stable government

responsive to advice from the British and French consuls-general. He wrote to

Granville that 'the Joint Dispatch has at all events temporarily alienated from

us all confidence.' Before, 'everything was proceeding capitally.' Egyptians had

believed the English were 'sincere well-wishers and protectors.' Now they were

bracketed with the French, the despoilers of Tunisia.16 He appealed to Granville

to soften the terms of the note to eliminate any threat of intervention.17 When,

on the insistence of Gambetta, Granville decided to leave the Note in its full

stringency, Malet was distraught. He told Granville that Egyptian nationalists

now considered him an 'arch traitor, who lured them into believing that England

was favorable to reform only to obtain an excuse for intervention.'18 Briefly

he contemplated resignation. He told Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador to

France, that the Note had upset 'all he had hoped to effect.'19 The Note had

caused Sharif Pasha, the more pliable prime minister, to resign, and brought to

power Barudi Pasha, the eminence grise of the Urabists, who nominated Urabi

undersecretary for war. Both were men on whom Malet had no influence.

What had the Note upset? Malet's language made clear that his efforts to

establish his ascendancy over the civilian Egyptian authorities had been upset

by the brutal intervention of Gambetta, acquiesced in by Whitehall. He had

made the khedive his dependent, he had used Wilfrid Blunt to quiet Urabi and

his colonels. He had made Egypt quiet under his beneficent influence, and now

his work was in ruins. Gambetta on his part saw Malet as deluded by Blunt and

Urabi, and suggested the British government shock him back to his senses.20

Malet later declared that 'the action of the Queen's Government in con-

junction with the action of the French Government made the necessity of inter-

14 Bernard Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke of Devonshire (2 vols.;

London, 1911), I, 362.

15 Malet, Egypt, p. 229.

16 Telegram, Malet to Granville, 9 Jan. I882, PRO 30/29/283, Public Record Office.

17 Malet to Granville, 13 Jan. i882, ibid.

18 Malet to Granville, Private, ii Jan. I882, PRO 30/29/160, Public Record Office.

19 Malet, Egypt, pp. I98-I99.

20 Dilke's Diary, I8 Jan. I882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS, 43880, British Library.

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 476 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

vention certain.'21 His letters to Granville for a few days after he received the

Joint Note indicate that this was indeed his view. He looked with abhorrence on

the use of force in what he considered a bad cause. He wrote on 23 January:

'I trust there may be a way out of the difficulty, for I own to having a repugnance

to a war engaged on behalf of bondholders and which would have for effect

to repress the first attempt of a Mussulman country at Parliamentary Govern-

ment. It seems unnatural for England to do this.'22

This phase did not last long. By the beginning of February, he had passed

from protest to acquiescence in the hard line of the Joint Note. On 6 February

he presented the alternatives before Britain as either passively accepting gradual

transition of power to Egyptian hands or imposing a violent solution based on

maintenance of the status quo. Both options, he said, were bad.23 But Malet's

attitude toward the Nationalists was changing. Earlier he had manifested sym-

pathy for their efforts to reduce the numbers of highly paid European function-

aries. Now he saw this desire as a menace to the stability of the country. He

confessed to Granville on 13 February that 'I am prejudiced against the

Nationalists.' Obviously he meant that the cabinet intended to govern without

bowing to foreign intervention in internal affairs, and without relying on his

and Colvin's advice; thus they had become dangerous opponents. And he

added a comment that suggested a subtle change in emphasis from his earlier

opposition to armed intervention: 'It is much easier to judge from a distance

whether the interests of private persons, including bondholders, justify inter-

ference.'24

Malet by February was moving toward advocacy of force. The alternative,

he wrote on 2o February, was to 'allow the pot to simmer' while the European

powers did nothing. So passive a policy was doomed to failure, since it would

not be long before the pot boiled over. Stern measures were needed - but he

ventured the hope they would not be undertaken until the visit of Prince Albert

Victor and Prince George, who were scheduled for a trip up the Nile in early

March - Malet indicated he would be pleased to accompany them, and to his

delight his request was granted.25

At the end of I88I Malet had been confident he could manage the Egyptians

with the assistance of Wilfrid Blunt. In February he and Blunt had parted

company, and Malet believed the Nationalist Egyptians to be unmanageable.

But his attitude toward the Egyptians' capacity for self-government had not

changed. They were incapable of self-government, at least in their present

state of development. He had once thought they might be led; he was now

convinced they must be dominated. When he returned at the end of March from

his journey with the princes he reiterated his view that the European powers

21 Malet, Egypt, pp. 59-60.

22 Malet to Granville, Private, 23 Jan. I882, PRO 30/29/160, Public Record Office.

23 Malet to Granville, Private, 13 Feb. I882, ibid.

24 Malet to Granville, Private, 20 Feb. I882, ibid.

25 Malet to Granville, Private, 20 Feb. I882, same to same, 27 Feb. I882, Private,

both in ibid.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 477

must insist on Egyptian acceptance of the status quo, including the financial

control, and that Urabi and his associates would submit, albeit after vehement

protest. A firm diplomatic line would thus probably obviate the necessity of

military action.26

As the weeks went by Malet's tone became increasingly urgent. The country,

he said in April, was falling under the control of the Egyptian militarists; soon,

unless strong action was taken, it would be ruled by officers dedicated to the

elimination of European influence.27 The former advocate of subtle diplomacy

now had become a zealous convert to the hard line advocated by his colleague

Colvin. He believed that the earlier a crisis could be produced the better, and he

was not averse to provoking that crisis. An opportunity was presented in April

when the Egyptian government arrested forty Circassian officers on the charge

that they were plotting the murder of Urabi. The court martial of these officers

Malet saw as a great opportunity. He encouraged the khedive to refuse his

cooperation in what Malet described as a show trial.28 The resultant breach

between the khedive and his ministry produced the crisis for which Malet had

hoped. The confrontation, he reported, had produced a serious situation. What

Urabi and his forces might now do was unpredictable. There could be no guaran-

tee of the safety of Europeans, and stability could only be restored by an Anglo-

French naval demonstration timed to coincide with the arrival of Turkish

commissioners who would back the authority of the khedive.29

There were risks, he admitted, in the dispatch of the combined squadron.

There might be anti-European outbreaks in Cairo; but, he said, he and the

French consul-general agreed that the political advantages of the naval demon-

stration outweighed the danger to European residents.30 'Excellent ground has

been chosen for the quarrel,' he wrote Granville: 'We come in support of the

Khedive who in turn is supported by the Chamber and the general voice of the

people. Therefore there is no question of crushing honest aspirations for self-

government. We have merely to liberate Egypt from military despotism.'31

Contrary to Malet's assertions, far from being supported by the 'Chamber and

the general voice of the people' the khedive was being coerced by both to bow

to Urabist demands to reinstate him.

Malet conceived there would be no necessity for an invasion (at this time he

assumed any action would be by Turkish troops). All that could likely be

required would be to make it known that the troops would be sent when they

were needed. He naively added, evidently as further reassurance, that Urabi

had expressed pleasure that the squadron was coming, as the officers would come

26 Malet to Granville, Private, 28 March 1882, ibid.

27 Malet to Granville, 14 April 1882, ibid.

28 Malet to Granville, Private, 2 May I882, ibid.

29 Ibid.; telegram, Malet to Granville, Io May I882, PRO 30/29/284, Public Record

Office.

30 Telegram, Malet to Granville, 14 May 1882, in Malet, Egypt, p. 235.

31 Malet to Granville, Private, i6 May i882, PRO 30/29/160, Public Record Office.

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 478 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

to Cairo to see the sights and the sailors would spend a good deal of money in

Alexandria.32 Urabi was quite obviously being sarcastic.

Malet's advice, which the British government accepted, set in motion the

train of events which led directly to the British invasion of Egypt. He com-

pletely miscalculated the results of his recommendations.33 His blundering had

led to consequences that he had not intended. But after the fact he rationalized

that the policies he had advocated had been brilliantly conceived and had pro-

duced excellent results. After the battle of Tel-el-Kebir he wrote to Granville:

I congratulate you and Her Majesty's Government on the complete success which

has crowned your Egyptian policy. It has been a struggle between civilization and

barbarism. Had Her Majesty's Government held back and allowed Arabi to gain the

upper hand in Egypt the country would have been thrown back a hundred years

and the lives of Christians in all Mussulman states would have been in danger. You

have fought the battle of all Christendom and history will acknowledge it. May I

also venture to say that it has given the liberal party a new lease of popularity and

power.34

The policies Malet so effusively praised were, of course, his policies.

Malet's rationalization of his conduct was to be expected, But why did the

British government follow his advice and that of Colvin? And who was 'the

British government' that was involved in the Egyptian crisis? The answer is not

a simple one. The Gladstone cabinet of I880--885 had several power centers;

this congeries of Whigs and Radicals generally maintained an uneasy truce;

the alternative was loss of office. But in matters of foreign policy there was

no strong leadership and cabinet members filled the vacuum by making decisions

for themselves.

On occasion, the prime minister appeared to be not only uninformed but

forgetful. In the case of the chartering of the British North Borneo Company

he wrote to Granville in January 1882 that he could not recall having seen the

North Borneo papers, and that, if he had, he would have opposed the charter.

Yet the evidence is that the documents had been delivered to him on this not-

insignificant issue.35

No such flagrant illustration of failing memory occurred in the Egyptian

crisis but here as well Gladstone was not in control of cabinet decisions. His

first reactions to the emergence of an Egyptian nationalist movement were

vaguely "Liberal." On 4 January 1882, he wrote Granville, 'I am by no means

pained, but I am much surprised at the rapid development of a national senti-

ment and party in Egypt.'36 The desire of the Chamber of Notables to control

a portion of the revenues evoked a sympathetic response in him. Provided that

the payments on the national debt were guaranteed, he felt that the Chamber's

32 Ibid.

33 Scholch, 'The "Men on the Spot"', p. 783.

34 Malet to Granville, Private, i8 Sept. i882, in PRO 30/29/I60, Public Record Office.

35 K. G. Tregonning, Under Chartered Company Rule (Singapore, 1958), pp. 27-28.

36 al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. 14.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 479

aspirations should be supported.37 Of course, there was a caveat- Egyptian

nationalists must not menace the 'pecuniary interests' on behalf of which the

Control had been established.38 As his private secretary Edward Hamilton put it,

Gladstone desired 'to give scope to Egypt for the Egyptians were this feasible

and attainable without risk.'39 But these sentiments had no force behind them.

Gladstone was not prepared to argue with his contentious colleagues or to

influence the 'men on the spot' on behalf of Egyptian nationalism. Nor was he

inclined to press Gambetta to modify his uncompromising position.

Gladstone in I882 had other preoccupations than Egypt. He was deeply

involved in the problems of Ireland; and he depended primarily on Granville

to make the decisions on Egyptian policy. He once complained that he had to

rely on newspapers for information on Egypt and that the telegrams from

local officials to the Foreign Office gave him little or no additional insight,40

but he made no effort to correct this condition. He intimated to his colleagues

that he intended to retire at the end of the year and this expectation affected both

his energy in leadership and their receptivity to being led.

Whether Gladstone in the fullness of his powers could have altered the course

of events is highly doubtful. The genius of Gladstone was not in his mastery of

international affairs. Indeed, by the testimony of his contemporaries, he had little

understanding of foreign relations though he did not hesitate to pontificate on

the subject, usually with an elevated moral tone. The waspish Sir Charles Dilke,

who was parliamentary undersecretary for Foreign Affairs during the Egyptian

crisis, had a low opinion of Gladstone's competence in the area. 'When Mr. G.

begins to talk on Foreign Affairs,' he noted in his diary, 'it is impossible to tell

what he will say.'41 Dilke's comments might be discounted since he had a low

opinion of most of his colleagues, Chamberlain being a notable exception. But

the same judgment was made by another, and much wiser, man, Lord Cromer.

Writing to John Morley many years later about his impressions of Gladstone he

told of an experience in the mid-i88os when he had shared a railway carriage

with Lord Wolseley. Wolseley asked Cromer whether he had talked to Gladstone

about Egyptian and Sudanese affairs. Cromer had replied, 'Yes, but unfortu-

nately, Mr. G., with all his remarkable talents, knows nothing of the few political

questions with which I happen to be acquainted.' Wolseley commented:

'It is odd you should say that. Only this morning I saw Boehme, who is doing

Gladstone's statue. I said it must be interesting to have such a sitter, to which he

replied, "Yes, but unfortunately Mr. G. always will talk to me about art, about

which he knows nothing."'42

This, wrote Cromer, applied also to Egypt. Gladstone's ignorance of Egyptian

and Near Eastern affairs was 'amazing.' In discussions on such matters Gladstone

37 Gladstone to Granville, 6 April 1882, in Ramm, Political Correspondence, I, 355.

38 Ibid., I, 327.

39 Hamilton's Dairy, 20 Jan. i882, Hamilton Papers, Add. MSS, 4863 1, British Library.

40 Gladstone to Granville, 6 April i882, in Ramm, Political Correspondence, I, 355.

41 Dilke's Diary, I June 1882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS 43924, British Library.

42 Cromer to Morley, ix April I90I, FO 633/8, Public Record Office.

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 480 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

reminded him of a comment by Kaunitz, Maria Theresa's minister, that 'c'est

prodigieux ce que les Anglais ignorent.'43

Gladstone's ignorance, however, was not the main cause of the bunglings and

miscalculations that characterized Egyptian policy. The prime minister at first

pallidly espoused a conciliatory policy but in this line he had consistent support

only from John Bright and Sir William Harcourt. Against him were a majority

of the cabinet, who agreed that the policy of the Joint Note must be uncom-

promisingly maintained, even after Gambetta was succeeded by Freycinet

whose policies came to deviate widely from those of his predecessor. They were

agreed that 'something must be done' to crush the Nationalists, though they

differed on the precise measures to be undertaken. And several, notably

Hartington and Dilke, underscored the intensity of their convictions with

threats of resignation. Before these aggressive, restive associates, Gladstone

withdrew. Dilke wrote in his diary on 19 May, 'Mr G. must say to himself "surely

I am about to die for I am not obeyed." '44 After one of his defeats by the majority

of the cabinet, Gladstone, according to Dilke, flew into a 'homeric rage.'

Chamberlain told Dilke that Granville had begged his colleagues to 'remember

who Mr. G. was, and not to push him too hard in discussion. In other words,

he told them to remember that they were dealing with a magnificent lunatic.'45

Discounting Dilke's rhetoric, it was still clear that Gladstone was not in control

of his cabinet.

Given Gladstone's preoccupation with other matters, primary responsibility

for Egyptian policy would normally have been shouldered by the foreign secretary.

But Earl Granville was unusually ill-equipped to assume such leadership.

Granville, his friends asserted, was a diplomatist, by which they meant that he

was adept in the art of soothing irritations. But not even his most devoted

admirers considered him a strong personality. His nickname 'Puss' appro-

priately described him. Coupled with his lack of force was a considerable

distaste for dreary drudgery. A large proportion of his correspondence with Glad-

stone and others was conducted from his home in Walmer Castle rather than

from Whitehall, and the evidence is that he paid little attention to the contents

of dispatch boxes. His colleague Dilke noted in his diary in February 1884

in the midst of the Sudanese crisis that Granville had not answered an important

telegram delivered the day before because he had not seen it and that his room

was full of untouched red-label danger boxes; 'If you seek the cause of our

Egyptian troubles,' Dilke fumed, 'there it is.'46

Granville's principal concern in the first half of 1882 was to maintain harmony

with France. Given the bewildering shifts in French policy toward Egypt, such

43 Ibid. Cromer was equally unimpressed with Gladstone's knowledge of Indian

affairs. The only Indian subject that elicited Gladstone's enthusiasm in all their dis-

cussions, Cromer said, was the question of how Cook's tourists could be encouraged to

travel in the country.

44 Dilke's Diary, I9 May I882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS, 43924, British Library.

45 Dilke's Diary, 7 July I882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS, 43925, British Library.

46 Dilke's Diary, 14 Feb. 1884, ibid.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 48I

a burden would have taxed the ablest of statesmen. But Granville's character-

istics compounded the problem. He mildly suggested to Gambetta that the

harshness of the Joint Note be softened by an explanatory message reassuring

the Egyptians that the two powers were averse to military intervention and that

they looked with favor on the Chamber of Notables' desire for a larger role.47

On Gambetta's summary rejection of this proposal, however, Granville did not

press the point further.

Egyptian sources are unanimous in pointing out that the effect of the Joint

Note was to rally behind the Urabists all the differing factions, even those who

had previously been in opposition to them.48 They believed, as Malet and Cromer

later asserted, that the Joint Note created an environment that made British

intervention inevitable, and Egypt's only defense thus lay in support of its

army. Granville was certainly a principal culprit in creating that situation.

After Freycinet succeeded Gambetta and French policy began to fluctuate

wildly, the British line of 'no concessions to the Nationalists' remained frozen.

A young diplomat in Egypt, Ardern G. Hulme-Beaman, later recalled his per-

plexity at the lack of flexibility of British policy. He wrote: 'It is . . quite certain

that the war might have been avoided if the colonels and Mahmoud Sami [al-

Barudi] had been approached in a different spirit. As things were managed, the

denouement was prepared beforehand and hurried on with giant strides. . . '49

Responsibility for this uncompromising policy cannot be personalized in

Gladstone or Granville or in Malet or Colvin. It was widely shared. Hard-liners

in the cabinet gained support by the argument that concessions to Urabi and

the military would involve a loss of face which would cost Britain dearly not only

in Egypt but in its general position in the Near East and even in India. Britain's

power over non-European peoples depended to a large extent upon the awe

with which it was regarded, their belief in British invincibility. This myth

would be shattered if Britain made terms with the leader of a ragtag army, a man

whom it had vowed to eliminate as a force in Egypt. One cabinet member who

was influenced by this argument was Joseph Chamberlain. When the Joint

Note was issued, Chamberlain was in the minority, arguing that too little was

known about the Nationalists to justify so harsh a line, that it was possible they

represented legitimate grievances, and that they ought to be guided rather

than repressed. But by the spring he had been converted to the view that there

must be no concessions and by June he was the most hard-line member of the

cabinet.s5

After the Joint Note, cabinet members had to decide how it could be trans-

lated into concrete measures. There was a wide spectrum of opinion. Granville,

47 Granville to Lyons, Io Jan. i882, in Confidential (5540), II, PRO 30/29/283,

Public Record Office.

48 Rashid Rida, Tarikh al-Ustadh al-Imam al-Shaikh Muhammed Abduh (Cairo, 193I),

1, 213.

49 Ardern G. Hulme-Beaman, Twenty Years in the Near East (London, I898), p. 43.

50 Dilke to Ripon, i6 June x882, Ripon Papers, I6 June I882, Additional MSS, 43528,

British Library.

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 482 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

prodded by Dilke, favored recourse to the Concert of Europe. Some advocated

Turkish intervention.51 Bright and Harcourt, initially supported by Chamberlain,

were averse to precipitous decisions. The strongest advocate of immediate action

to smash the Nationalists was Hartington, who at first was alone in his advocacy

of Anglo-French intervention.52 Hartington was a strange combination of activ-

ism and ennui. It is said that he yawned in his maiden speech to Parliament.

He disliked leaving the pleasures of his estate for the necessities of politics.

But when Gladstone withdrew from leadership of the opposition in 1874,

Hartington was selected as his successor, and his performance in that role had

been sufficiently impressive that he was regarded by many as the next Liberal

prime minister. The Queen asked him to form a government in I880 but,

confronted by Gladstone's refusal to accept office in any role other than that of

first minister, Hartington had loyally supported him and accepted the office

of secretary of state for India. Gladstone's vacillations, however, had weakened

the prime minister's position, and in the fractionated cabinet Hartington occu-

pied a strategic position. His resignation could produce disintegration, and he

made it clear that if the government did not take a strong line on Egypt his

departure could be expected. He continued to argue for Anglo-French inter-

vention for weeks after the French had rejected it and against the unanimous

opinion of his colleagues. But in the process he put pressure on Granville and

Gladstone to take other measures of coercion. His relation with his kinsman

Granville, which had been cool since the election, became increasingly strained

as inaction continued into the late spring of 1882. On 27 May he sarcastically

'congratulated' Granville on his successful resolution of the Egyptian problem.

It must have been settled, he said, as there had been no cabinet meeting for some

time and Granville was at his estate.53 On 14 and 19 June he wrote that he was

becoming very restive about continuing inaction, and on the latter date he

warned that unless Urabi was squashed, he would likely leave the government.54

At the time Hartington was making these threats the government had already

agreed to a French proposal to send a joint squadron to Alexandria. The

ostensible reason for the squadron's presence was protection for the European

population but the primary basis was the calculation that this display of force

would cause the collapse of Urabi's movement.

Granville had consented to the dispatch of the squadron with grave misgivings.

He believed that a naval demonstration unsupported by troops would be danger-

ous and he pressed Freycinet to agree to the use of Turkish troops, should

disturbances break out. First Lord of the Admiralty, Northbrook, also expressed

disquiet. To send ships before Turkish intervention was announced, he said,

would likely have two bad effects. The khedive's position would be weakened,

51 Dilke's Diary, 24 Jan. I882; 26 Jan. I882; I Feb. I882; in Dilke Papers, Additional

MSS, 43924, British Library. Gladstone's notes of these meetings provide little informa-

tion of what was said. See Gladstone Papers, Additional MSS, 44643, British Library.

52 Dilke's Diary, i Feb. I882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS, 43924, British Library.

53 Hartington to Granville, 27 May 1882, PRO 30/29/I32, Public Record Office.

54 Same to same, I4 June I882; 19 June i882, both ibid.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 483

and the cowardly Egyptian soldiery 'would attack defenseless Europeans, while

the fleet would stand by helpless to defend their compatriots.'55 Yet when

Freycinet declined to agree to the use of Turkish troops Granville authorized

the Admiralty to proceed with the naval demonstration,56 and on 20 May

three French and three British warships arrived in Alexandria. Six days earlier

the British and French consuls had been instructed to warn Urabi that if he

caused any disturbance he would bring the power of Europe down on him. After

the squadron arrived, the khedive prodded Malet and Sienkiewicz into effecting

the cabinet's ouster. Accordingly both consuls were instructed to send the

Egyptian government a note that demanded the dismissal of the Barudi ministry

and the temporary exile of Urabi. The cabinet refused the note as an unwarranted

intrusion into internal affairs, but Khedive Tawfiq accepted it, and consequently

the cabinet resigned. The action produced a considerable reaction. The leaders

of the troops and the police at Alexandria declared that they would not accept

Urabi's resignation and leaders of religion and members of the Chamber of

Notables called upon the khedive to reinstate Urabi. The khedive decided that

it was prudent to follow their advice,57 and three days after the cabinet had

resigned Urabi was reinstated as minister for war and made responsible for the

maintenance of public security.58 Thus the stage was set for the catastrophe

that Northbrook had predicted and Granville had feared. Urabi was the un-

crowned leader of Egypt, and the threats of France and Britain had been

successfully defied. In Alexandria the tension between Europeans and Egyptians

increased, intensified by the ironclads in the harbor, and the navy was helpless

to quell any outbreak of violence in the city. On 11 June riots erupted in Alex-

andria. Europeans, including a British naval officer, were killed, the British

consul was wounded, and considerable damage was done to property before the

Egyptian garrison restored order.

The specific causes of the riot were in dispute, but the jingo members of the

British cabinet and many of their fellow parliamentarians, and much of the

British press chose to believe that Urabi had instigated the disturbances. Had

it not been between two and three hours before the garrison was ordered under

arms? This was the consequence, they asserted, of the temporizing policy that

Granville had pursued. At the time the riots broke out, the khedive and his court

were residing in Alexandria while Urabi was in Cairo. There seems some

evidence to support the later contention that the khedive or one of his men had

deliberately not informed Urabi of the outbreak of violence in order to discredit

him and lay the blame at his door. Urabi got word of the riots several hours

later in the afternoon and immediately called out the troops to quell the riots,

giving the lie to the accusation that he had fomented the riots (although later

he was tried on that charge).

55 Northbrook to Granville, Private, 13 May i882, PRO 30/29/138, Public Record

Office.

56 Granville to Lyons, 14 May I882, PRO 30/29/284, Public Record Office.

57 Telegram, Malet to Granville, 28 May x882, ibid.

58 Rafii, al-Thawra al-Urabiyya, p. 291, also al-Waqai al-Misriyya. 31 May i882.

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 484 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

Hartington considered that these developments made necessary intervention,

if not by the Turks or by a joint expedition with the French, then by British

troops alone. He had strong support from the Liberal party for this position.

Dilke noted on 15 June that 'Our side in the Commons is very jingo about

Egypt. They badly want to kill somebody. They don't know who.'s9 Dilke was

even more emphatic than Hartington - failure to act, he said, 'would destroy

not only the prestige of this country, but also of Europe in the East.'60 Chamber-

lain, the erstwhile advocate of caution, had now become the most ardent

jingo in the cabinet, and he was the principal force behind a cabinet decision

on i5 June for strong action against Urabi.61

Thereafter the de facto decisions of the British government were made, not

by the cabinet as a whole, but by a self-constituted group, including Hartington,

Northbrook, Childers, and Lord Granville. Gladstone did not participate in their

deliberations, but was informed in general terms by Granville. This group,

which Dilke called the 'cabal,' made the critical decisions that led to the

bombardment of Alexandria on 1 i July. The khedive had been secretly advocat-

ing such a line of conduct. On 7 July he wrote to Cartwright, the acting consul-

general, in terms suggesting that the Anglo-French fleet should bombard

Alexandria and that British troops should disembark immediately after the

bombardment since the Egyptian army was likely to disperse, but if given time

it would be emboldened to come together again.62 Two days later he had

reiterated his request for a bombardment.

The presence of the squadron involved the British government in a basic

contradiction. The avowed purpose was to strengthen the authority of the

khedive by quelling the 'disorderly' elements led by Urabi.63 Yet the members of

the 'cabal' were aware that the warships were a provocation to riots which

would endanger the lives and property of the European population.64 These

cabinet members did not deliberately provoke disorder as the means of destroy-

ing Urabi but they were willing to take that risk to achieve that objective.

The commander of the British squadron, Admiral Beauchamp Seymour, was

a perfect choice for a policy involving strong measures. He was ambitious and

eager for action, and the information he supplied the Admiralty became the

justification for the bombardment. The issue became the safety of the British

fleet in view of the alleged activities of the Egyptians in strengthening earth-

works and bringing in guns. Both Seymour and his superiors in the Admiralty

were aware that the squadron was in little danger. Northbrook wrote on 8 June,

'We have sufficient knowledge of the fortifications of Alexandria and of the

59 Note by Dilke, 15 June 1882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS, 43880, British Library.

60 Dilke's Diary, i8 June I882, Dilke Papers, Additional MSS, 43925, British Library.

61 Dilke to Ripon, i6 June I882, Ripon Papers, Additional MSS, 43528, British

Library.

62 Cartwright to the Foreign Office, 7 July I882 in FO 78/3449, Public Record Office.

63 Lyons to Granville, I4 May I882, PRO 30/29/160, Public Record Office.

64 See, for example, a Memo by Northbrook, I3 May I882, PRO 30/29/138, Public

Record Office.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 485

position of the earthworks which were being erected not to entertain the slightest

apprehension in regard to them.'65 The work was almost entirely on forts over-

looking the eastern harbor, and the squadron was anchored in the western harbor.

That fact was not communicated to the British public, and Gladstone himself

was misled.66

The menace to the fleet was the theme of Seymour's urgent telegrams.

Not only did he exaggerate the danger from the forts, but he described a plot

by Urabi to trap the allied fleet by sinking stone barges to block the channel out

of the harbor. Urabi, he suggested, was now dedicated to a holy war against

the West, inspired by the Prophet with whom he communicated nightly.67

The Admiralty on 3 July gave him the authority he desired. They told him that

he must prevent any attempt to bar the channel and that he should inform the

Egyptian commander that if work was resumed on the forts or earthworks he

would take all measures necessary to protect the fleet.68

Two days later, in response to a question from Granville as to what Seymour

would do in response to the strengthening of the forts, Northbrook wrote:

He has no orders to do anything. If we want to bring on a fight we can instruct

B. Seymour to require the guns to be dismounted.

My advisers do not think they will do much harm where they are.69

This communication to the foreign secretary exhibited, at the least, a consider-

able lack of candor. The Admiralty had committed itself to bombardment with-

out authorization from the prime minister, the Foreign Office, or the cabinet.70

Furthermore, they did so with the knowledge that the French had instructed

their squadron not to take any action unless they were fired on. On i July, the

French admiral had been instructed to remove his ships from proximity to the

British squadron, and on 5 July the French cabinet decided not to join the British

in the bombardment of Alexandria.71 By then the French seemed to have realized

the potentially negative aspects of their policy and attempted to steal a march on

the British by negotiating on their own with the Urabists.72 But on 8 July

Northbrook presented Seymour's information to the cabinet, which unani-

mously authorized Seymour to issue his ultimatum. Gladstone, and even

John Bright, concurred.73

When Seymour issued his ultimatum, however, Gladstone was shocked. Sey-

mour had demanded the 'surrender' of the forts, and he had been authorized only

to demand a halt to reinforcements. 'What right can he have to demand the

65 Northbrook's proposed answer to Lamington, 8 June I882, ibid.

66 al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. 25.

67 Seymour to Admiralty, I July i882, ADM 116/33, Public Record Office.

68 Admiralty to Seymour, 3 July 1882, ibid.

69 Note by Northbrook, 5 July I882, PRO 30/29/138, Public Record Office.

70 Admiralty to Seymour, 8 July I882, ADM I16/34, Public Record Office.

71 Agatha Ramm, 'Great Britain and France in Egypt, 1876-1882,' in Prosser Gifford

and W. Roger Louis, eds., France and Britain in Africa (New Haven, 1971), . I Io.

72 Edmond Fitzmaurice, Life of the Second Earl Granville (London, 1905), Vol. II, 279.

73 Hamilton's Diary, 7 July i882, Additional MSS, 48632, British Library.

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 486 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot

surrender of any forts,' Gladstone exclaimed, 'and this without instructions?'74

But then, he wrote, 'I thought to myself, "If he is authorized to blow them to

pieces, may he not think it as well to give the Egyptians the option of placing

them in his hands?"' Then Gladstone talked to Sir Cooper Key of the Admiralty

who pointed out that if Seymour changed his ultimatum from 'surrender' to

'disarmament,' Urabi could use the opportunity to argue for several weeks'

delay. Not being able to find any ministers in London, Gladstone decided to

change 'surrender' to 'temporary surrender for the purposes of disarmament.'75

Seymour refused to parley with the Egyptian commanders; they had the

choice of surrendering the forts or resistance to the attack by the British fleet.

The Egyptian cabinet under the presidency of the khedive rejected the ultimatum.

They denied Seymour's allegations and offered to allow him to dismantle three

guns from any fort he chose. Furthermore, they added that should Seymour

persist in bombarding the forts they would reply to British fire only after the

fifth volley had been fired.76 The khedive who had secretly been urging the

British fleet to bombard his city, in public urged his cabinet to resist British

pressure. On the night of io July, the Marquis of Dufferin, Britain's envoy

to Turkey, the nominal suzerain of Egypt, informed the Turkish foreign minister

of the impending bombardment. The foreign minister urged that the ultimatum

be countermanded. He assured Dufferin that if this was done a satisfactory

solution could be found in a few hours. His plea was rejected. On the morning

of the i ith the Turkish ambassador read Granville a telegram from his govern-

ment again appealing for a delay and repeating the assurance of a peaceful

settlement. The ships had already opened fire.77 Seymour had rejected a last-

minute offer to dismount three guns from a fort overlooking the harbor where the

squadron was anchored.78 On the second day of the bombardment, the Egyptian

commander under a flag of truce sought to come to terms without further

bloodshed. Seymour rejected the plea and resumed firing. 'There was an

immense conflagration in Alexandria last night,' he reported on the morning of

13 July. The forts had been abandoned and the garrison had withdrawn from

the town,79 and the khedive promptly sought refuge on board a British ironclad.

The Urabists were confirmed in their suspicions that the khedive had sold them

out and called him a traitor. In turn the khedive empowered General Sir

Garnet Wolseley to quell the 'rebellion' and dismissed Urabi as a mutineer and

an outlaw for offering resistance to the British forces invading Egypt. Edward

Hamilton recorded in his diary:

The ironclads seem to have done their work well. Without any damage to our ships

74 Gladstone to Granville, 9 July 1882, in Ramm, Gladstone-Granville, I, 388.

75 Gladstone to Granville, 9 July I882, ibid., p. 389.

76 Egyptian State Archives, Documents concerning the Urabi Revolution, Box 3, No. I28.

77 Draft dispatch, Granville to Dufferin, Oct. I882, printed for Cabinet, 27 Oct.

I882, CAB 37/9, Public Record Office.

78 Telegram, Secret, Seymour to Northbrook, 19 July i882, ADM II6/34, Public

Record Office.

79 Telegram, Seymour to Admiralty, 13 July I882, ibid.

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 The British Occupation of Egypt 487

and without much loss of life on shore, it will be a creditable business, and will

redound to the honor of the government. Except among the extreme Peace Party

the action of the government seems generally approved. It will have a good effect

in Egypt and the East and will raise the estimation of our European neighbors. It

will show that a Liberal government can and will act if necessity arises, as firmly as a

Government under Lord Beaconsfield, only with less bounce and less fluster.80

Hamilton's comments revealed little knowledge of the facts. This deficiency

he shared with his chief. Gladstone was out of touch with events, but in Parlia-

ment he had to appear to be in charge. When the tiny opposition within his

own party attacked the bombardment as a crime against humanity for the benefit

of the bondholders, Gladstone replied:' . . . undoubtedly it is not for the

exclusive or special interest of the bondholders of Egypt - and indeed it is

almost wholly without reference to them - that the proceeding of yesterday was

taken.'8s

Gladstone did not indicate the reasons that had led to the bombardment;

in his own mind obviously they were none too clear. But the opposition was

overwhelmed by a tidal wave of enthusiasm for the decisive action of Seymour.

'The bombardment of Alexandria,' said Dilke, 'like all butchery, is popular.'82

Gladstone, the former advocate of peace, became a warrior. After Urabi's

forces were routed at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir he exulted at this great triumph

of British arms and instructed Childers, his war minister, to fire the guns in

celebration. 'I fired them (as War Minister) in 1846 for victories in India,'83

and, he added, 'I hope the guns will crack all the windows.'84

Gladstone had little idea of what had produced the violence that made the

occupation of Egypt inevitable. But what of the clear-eyed members of the cabal,

who as the de facto government on Egyptian affairs, had set the policy? Did

they foresee the consequences of their acts? Certainly Hartington did not.

He had expected Urabi to collapse after the bombardment and was surprised

to learn that he was determined to fight.85 And his colleagues did not anticipate

the prolonged involvement in Egypt which the bombardment and the subsequent

invasion by Wolseley's forces produced.

Statesmen, like historians and others, are not often favored with the gift of

prophecy. The Gladstone cabinet cannot justly be indicted for its failure to

predict the future. Its failure was in its inability to see clearly the present and

to respond flexibly to changes in the environment with which it had to deal.

After January i882, when French policy changed drastically, the British line

against Egyptian nationalism remained inflexible. Once committed to a hard

line against Urabi, the cabinet committed its prestige to removing him without

80 Hamilton's Diary, i July i882, Additional MSS, 48632, British Library.

81 Parliamentary Debates, 3d Ser, 272, 12 July I882, vol. 173.

82 Dilke to Ripon, 3 July I882, Ripon Papers, Additional MSS 43528, British Library.

83 Gladstone to Childers, i6 Sept. i882, Childers Papers, Royal Commonwealth

Society.

84 Gladstone to Childers, I8 Sept. I882, ibid.

85 Hartington to Ripon, 4 Aug. 1882, Ripon Papers, Additional MSS, 43569, British

Library.

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 488 John S. Galbraith and Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot -

regard to whether it was in the British national interest to do so. To retreat

before Urabi would mean a loss of prestige, it was said, and the West could not

lose face and maintain its mastery over the 'Oriental races.' Urabi was des-

cribed as a firebrand who was dedicated to the ousting of the Europeans. There

was little or no objective evidence to support this view. Urabi may or may not

have been successful in maintaining law and order had he been allowed to remain

in power, but he was no disciple of anarchy and xenophobia.86 The disorders of

1882 were incited by the actions of Europeans, not by Urabi. It was the British

and French fleets that stirred the rioting of June. It was the British fleet that

opened a bombardment in July against forts and earthworks which had been

ineffectually strengthened to defend Alexandria. It was the British, not Urabi,

who violated the neutrality of the Suez Canal under the pretext that they were

merely acting as the agents of the khedive against rebels. What were the sub-

stantive reasons for this aggressive conduct? Gladstone's secretary, Edward

Hamilton, was bemused by the actions of the cabinet. On 25 June i882, about

two weeks before the bombardment, he wrote:

Intervention will mean serious resistance of the Egyptians. War. And for what?

Compare our aims with the program of the new Egyptian ministry accepted by Arabi

and prompted by the Khedive and they will be found to be practically identical. But

to recognize the new ministry we'd have to eat our words when we demanded a few

weeks ago expulsion from the country of Arabi, and then to decline to recognize the

new ministry means an Egyptian war while the points of difference in the terms we

demand and the Egyptians profess are to all intents and purposes nil. Morever, on the

two horns of the dilemma we find ourselves confronted with the risk of losing our

prestige among the Muslims on one side, and another risk of incurring the enmity of

the Arabian race.

Our hands have been tied by the dual system and our natural and proper dislike to

terminate it and thereby to break up our intimate relations with France, our nearest

neighbor and most appropriate ally. But despite all this I can't help thinking great

mistakes have been made by the Government and that all things considered the

line they should have taken should have been this: They should have first recognized

Arabi and his party and should have held toward them this language: That it made no

difference to this country of whom the Egyptian ministry was composed and who was

the moving spirit, provided the Khedive's throne was supported, international obliga-

tions respected, and the control maintained.87

Hamilton's analysis was perceptive. But within three weeks he had joined the

jingoes. The 'canal in danger,' as Dilke had predicted, was an issue that united

Britain behind the intervention that led to the occupation of Egypt. The Liberal

party indeed had demonstrated that it could be as aggressive as its Conservative

opponents. The level of irrationality of the Afghanistan adventure was matched

in Egypt.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

86 al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer, p. 32.

87 Hamilton's Diary, 25 June I882, Additional MSS, 48632, British Library.

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