G.R. No. 161400 September 2, 2005
2003-13 (PR 2003-13) was subsequently filed
ZENAIDA ORTEGA, represented by Her Attorney-in Fact
OCTAVIO ALVAREZ and/or ZEMVE ORTEGA
ALVAREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
THE QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY & THE NATIONAL HOME
MORTGAGE CORP., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Zenaida Ortega comes directly to this Court assailing the
validity of Quezon City Ordinance No. SP 1304, Series of 2003, and
praying that the following agencies, National Housing Authority
(NHA), Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
Department of Environment and Natural Resources – Bureau of Land
Management, National Home Mortgage Financing Corporation, and
Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation, be restrained from
implementing the said ordinance.
Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07 (PO 2002-07) was filed on January
10, 2002 before the City Council. PO 2002-07 sought to approve "the
Subdivision Plan of Samahang Kapitbahayan ng Barangay Vasra (Samahang
Kapitbahayan), a Socialized Housing Project (B.P. Blg. 220) with
seventeen (17) lots (Community Mortgage Program) containing [a total]
area of Six Hundred Sixty Seven (667) square meters, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, owned by the City Government of
Quezon City (Vendor) located at a portion of [an] easement [in]
Barangay Vasra, Quezon City, Metro Manila, as applied for by the
Samahang Kapitbahayan ng Barangay Vasra (Vendee) subject to the
conditions prescribed under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-56, S-93
and Batas Pambansa Blg. 220."1
Proposed Resolution No.
on January 20, 2002 to complement PO 2002-07. The proposed
resolution sought to authorize Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R.
Belmonte to enter into a contract to sell a portion of an easement
located at Barangay Vasra, Quezon City with the SAMAHANG
KAPITBAHAYAN to be represented by its President, through the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).2
On August 5, 2003, the Quezon City government enacted Ordinance
No. SP-1304, Series of 2003 (the ordinance), which is being challenged
in the present petition,3 reclassifying "as residential or converted from
its original classification to residential for distribution or for sale to its
informal settlers" a "parcel of land which may be considered an
accretion/excess lot and previously conceived and referred to in
Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07 and Proposed [Resolution] 2002-13
as portion of [an] easement situated between Block 14, Psd-39577 of
the original subdivision plan and Culiat Creek, Barangay Vasra, Quezon
City."4
The provisions of the assailed ordinance read:
SECTION 1. A parcel of land which may be considered an
accretion/excess lot and previously conceived and referred to in
proposed ordinance no. PO 2002-07 and proposed ordinance no. PO
2002-13 as portion of easement, situated between Block 14. Psd-39577
of the original subdivision plan and Culiat Creek, Barangay Vasra,
Quezon City, is hereby classified as residential or converted from its
original classification to residential for distribution or for sale to its
informal settlers.
SECTION 2. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its
approval.5
Petitioner, who claims to be the rightful owner of the land subject of
the ordinance, alleges that in enacting the ordinance, her various letter-
protests to the City Council against proposed Resolutions No. 2002-13,
2002-07 and 2002-2396 were not heeded in the City Council, thus The petition must be dismissed.
violating her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection
of the law. Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution provides:

Petitioner further claims that the lot referred to in the ordinance SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
overlaps her properties as their technical descriptions in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. RT-70472 (296026) and N-152137 issued in xxx
her name show;7 and that assuming that there exists accretion or
easement of the Culiat Creek, she, being the owner of the adjoining (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
land, is the rightful owner thereof following Articles 4578 and Article the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
6209 of the Civil Code. of lower courts in:
Petitioner likewise claims that the intended beneficiaries under the (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
proposed ordinance and resolution are not informal settlers as required international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
under City Ordinance No. SP-56, Series of 1993,10 but lessees of her proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
properties who had been ordered ejected after she filed several unlawful
detainer cases against them.11
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
By Comment12 filed on April 14, 2004, the Quezon City Government,
This Court can thus only review, revise, reverse, modify on appeal or
through the Office of the City Attorney, alleges that the present
certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in
petition is premature and raises questions of fact which entail reception
which the constitutionality or validity of, among other things, an
of evidence; and that petitioner has not yet established her right of
ordinance is in question. Foremost, therefore, is that there must be first
ownership over the property referred to in the ordinance, whereas its
a final judgment rendered by an inferior court17 before this Court can
clear right thereover is evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
assume jurisdiction over a case of this nature.
735 issued in its name.13
Verily, this Court does not conduct original and full trial of a main
The NHA, by Comment14 filed on May 17, 2004, prayed for the
factual issue like what petitioner is raising in the present petition.18 It
dismissal of the petition, pointing out that the petition is actually one
does not analyze or weigh evidence brought before it at the first
for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
instance, otherwise, it would preempt the primary function of the lower
over which this Court has no original jurisdiction.
court to try the case on the merits, receive evidence, and decide the
case definitively.19 Its jurisdiction in cases which assail the validity of an
The NHMFC, by Comment15 filed on June 17, 2004, alleged that it is ordinance is limited to reviewing or revising final judgments or orders
not a party to any of the transactions with any of the parties in the of lower courts and applying the law based on their findings of facts
present case. It nevertheless adopted the comment of the Quezon City brought before it.20
government that the petition is premature and alleges facts which still
need to be proven.16
In another vein, if this petition was to be considered as one for
declaratory relief, as observed by the OSG, it is not embraced within
the original jurisdiction of this Court.21 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
government regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, or to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership
under Article 1607 of the Civil Code may be brought under this Rule.
xxx
SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. – In any action involving the validity
of a local government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or
attorney of the local government unit involved shall be similarly
notified and entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respecting petitioner’s contention that since the ordinance violates
national laws, the present petition delves on questions of law over
which this Court has original jurisdiction,22 the same fails.
As reflected above, petitioner’s assertion that the invalidity of the
ordinance is premised on her claim that she has a better right to the
parcel of land referred to in the ordinance is a factual issue.
At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no
statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original
and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only
questions of law.23
Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for
prohibition if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that
need to be resolved,24 there is no allegation of facts by petitioner
tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy
must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it,
except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court’s
primary jurisdiction.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA,
EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO
and LEONORA DANAO, the last twoare represented herein by
their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA,
Petitioners,
- versus -
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI
and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN,
Respondents.
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Orders[1] dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October
2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the
Complaint of petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to
Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao, Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for
against respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna, Saturnino Cambri, conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted
Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil Case No. 6868. that they owned the subject property and presented documents
ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership.
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages[2] against respondents According to petitioners, respondents documents were highly
on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latters claim of
in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937[3] situated upon petitioners title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled
in TuguegaraoCity, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their
subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died title.[8] Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an award
intestate.[4] During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo against respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00,
Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and resulting from the latters baseless claim over the subject property that
occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil
Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time Code on Human Relations.[9] Petitioners likewise prayed for an award
that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.[5] against respondents for exemplary damages, in the amount
of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family unlawful means to establish their claim over the subject
members,[6] continued to occupy the subject property even after her property. Finally, petitioners asked to recover from
death, already building their residences thereon using permanent respondents P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, because the latters refusal to
materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage the services of a
ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed lawyer.[10]
it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the
same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners demand.[7] Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an
Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No.
7691,[11] amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with
jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a
value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the
same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4
May 2007 Order that:
The Court has no jurisdiction over the action,
it being a real action involving a real property with
assessed value less than P20,000.00 and hereby
dismisses the same without prejudice.[12]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint. They argued
that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief
from respondents. Petitioners Complaint should not have been
dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court[13] states that
an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.[14]
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a
real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions
where the assessed value of real property does not
exceed P20,000.00.Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax
Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the
same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.[15]
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion,
in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30
May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated
their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their
joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in
a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez.[16] And even if the two
causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the
misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal
of their Complaint.[17]
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying
petitioners Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not
on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
 governmental regulation may, before breach or In view of the foregoing considerations, the
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Motion is hereby denied.[19]
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole
An action for the reformation of an issue of:
instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under I
this Rule. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second PROPRIO.[20]
paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first
paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be
Petitioners statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem
brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a
that they are only challenging the fact that their Complaint was
different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real
dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments
property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic
set forth in the instant Petition, however, the Court determines that the
Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions,
fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committed
where the assessed value of the real property involved does not
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners Complaint for lack
exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other
of jurisdiction.
places.[18] The dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the
RTC reads:
The Court rules in the negative.
This Court maintains that an action to quiet
title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
the assessed value of the property at P410.00 under
Tax Declaration No. 02-48386.Hence, it has no interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument,
jurisdiction over the action. and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy
includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the
written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties rights or
duties thereunder.[21]
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first
and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,
describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a
petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Emphasis ours.)
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory
relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought
before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its
second paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under
this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an
instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code;
(2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil
Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article
1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three
remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also
result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often
without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.[22]
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions
identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed
before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word may that an action for
quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on petitions for
declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory
relief may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court. The use of the word may in a statute denotes that the provision
is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or
an option.[23]
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and
explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of
real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00,
thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.)
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject
property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00;
therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the
said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC,
not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that
there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights
arising thereunder.[24] Since the purpose of an action for declaratory
relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their
guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not
to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or
contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the
state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the
need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they
lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.[25]
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior
to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no
more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has
already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the
action.[26]
In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title
was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused
to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only
subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject
property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to
petitioners title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had
already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper
remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit
for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones
recovery of possession over the real property as owner.[27]
Petitioners Complaint contained sufficient allegations for
an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on
the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property
herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has
jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore,
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without
prejudice, petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of
jurisdiction.
As for the RTC dismissing petitioners Complaint motu proprio,
the following pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v.
Abellana[28] proves instructive:
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and
the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the
time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the
tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action
is conferred only by law and not by the consent or
waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an
action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action
or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by
the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent
of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over
the nature of an action, it may dismiss the
same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners Complaint, acted in
complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have
done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to
have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so

patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[29] No
such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 10, 2002
dismissing herein petitioner's Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 679442 and the Resolution3 of the CA dated June 17, 2002
which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the re-filed
Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 694074, and found
petitioner and his counsel guilty of forum shopping, sentencing each of
them to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos, failing which, each of
them is to suffer imprisonment of three (3) months.

A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the narration of the

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition
antecedent facts set forth in the Order5 of the Regional Trial Court of
is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) dated October 24, 2001 is undisputed;
October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch hence, the pertinent portion of said Order is reproduced hereunder:

3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, THE ANTECEDENT: Petitioner [herein private respondent Kavoori]
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered is employed with the Philippine Postal Corporation as POSTMAN II
and assigned at the Registry Delivery Section of the Cagayan de Oro
to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or City Post Office.
the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against
the petitioners. Respondent [herein petitioner] Alfredo Estrera is the Regional
Director, Region 10 of the Philippine Postal Corporation.

SO ORDERED. Sometime in the second week of March 2001 BOMBO RADYO,

DXIF, Cagayan de Oro City aired about the alleged pilferage and/or
loss of PVAO checks and foreign mail matters and other alleged
[G.R. NO. 154235-36 : August 16, 2006] anomalies.

ALFREDO O. ESTRERA, (in his Official Capacity as the On March 21, 2001 Regional Office Order No. 01-06 was issued
Regional Director, Philippine Postal Corporation, Postal Region creating an investigation team to look into the said allegations. x x x
10), Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
LEONARDO DEMECILLO, and VENUS After investigation, the investigating team submitted the following
KAVOORI. Respondents. recommendation.

DECISION "RECOMMENDATIONS:

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FACTS and CIRCUMSTANCES,
it is strongly recommended that:
xxx
xxx
POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be ADMINISTRATIVELY charged
for DISHONESTY, GROSS VIOLATION OF REGULATIONS
and/or NEGLIGENCE and/or LAXITY IN THE PERFORMANCE
OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS
POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be criminally charged for
DISHONESTY (infidelity in the custody of official documents) and
VIOLATIONS of the ANTI-GRAFT LAW
POSTMAN VENUS KAVOORI be reassigned/transferred/detailed
immediately in a work area not directly handling mails, preferably at the
APDM Office or Administrative and Finance Division, Philippine
Postal Corporation."
On May 5, 2001, Cayetano T. Pacana IV, Director II and Concurrent
Chief of the legal staff submitted his evaluation of the report of the
investigating team. x x x
On same date also, respondent [herein petitioner] filed a formal charge
against petitioner [herein private respondent].
xxx xxx xxx
On June 25, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner] issued Regional
Office [Order] No. 01-12. In this Order, petitioner [herein private
respondent] was reassigned from the Cagayan de Oro City Office to
the Motor Transport Section, Mail Distribution Center.
Relative to the formal charge, petitioner [herein private respondent]
filed a motion to quash based on the following grounds:
(a) that the complaint was not under oath;
(b) the complaint was only signed by Alfredo Estrera and not the
Postmaster General;
(c) that the complaint should have been signed by the fact-finding
body;
(d) that there was no preliminary investigation conducted before the
filing of the charge;
(e) that the alleged affidavit of complaining witnesses were executed
after respondent was investigated.
On June 14, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner] issued an Order
denying the motion to quash - citing as ground, Sec. 16, par. 3, Rule II
of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 25, 2001 petitioner [herein private respondent] filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to quash.
On July 2, 2001, respondent [herein petitioner] issued an order denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and required petitioner [herein
respondent] to submit her answer within five (5) days from receipt of
said order.
Feeling no more other recourse, petitioner [herein private respondent]
came to this court on prohibition, injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order and
damages.6 (Words in brackets, supplied)
The RTC ruled in favor of herein private respondent, stating thus:
x x x The complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by complainant
and respondent Alfredo Estrera. It should have been sworn as he is not
a Postmaster General. Sec. 1 (b) Rule II of the Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures of the Philippine Postal Corporation provides:
"Except when initiated by the Postmaster General, no complaint
against the subordinate official or employees shall be given due course
unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant."
The complaint not being sworn, had no effect. The proceedings initially
had are hereby invalidated including the creation of the fact-finding
committee and the designation of the members thereof and their report
as well as the evaluation report of the Chief Legal Staff relative to the
findings of the fact finding committee and the designation of Lilia F.
Eduarte as hearing officer and Rafael S. Suangco and Guiling
Manalocan as prosecuting officers. Consequently, the injunction prayed
for is hereby granted. Mrs. Lilia Eduarte, Rafael Suangco and Guiling
Manalocan are hereby enjoined from proceeding with the hearing.
Respondent Alfredo Estrera may however, refile again the formal
charge. In so doing he should observe the Disciplinary Rules and
Procedures of the Philippine Postal Corporation and Circular No. 97-
29.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
RTC Order and proceeded to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67944.
On January 10, 2002, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution, stating
thus:
However, after going over this petition, it was found out that
petitioners failed to attach or incorporate the authority of Alfredo O.
Estrera who signed the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping to sign for and in behalf of petitioner Lilia F. Eduarte in
violation of Section 3, paragraph 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, hence, dismissible.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner did not to file a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Resolution and instead filed another Petition for Certiorari with the CA
on February 8, 2002, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 69407.
On March 13, 2002, the CA issued a Resolution, to wit:
RESOLUTION
Upon examination of the present Petition for Certiorari, with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, and it
appearing that:
a) The petition assails the Orders dated August 21, 2001 and October
24, 2001, granting a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction, respectively, issued by respondent Judge Leonardo
Demecillo of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
24, in Civil Case No. 2001-190, entitled: "Venus Kavoori, Petitioner v.
Alfredo Estrera, et al., Respondents," which were previously the
subjects of another Petition for Certiorariwith prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order earlier filed with this Court
by Alfredo O. Estrera and Lilia F. Eduarte, and docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 67944, which was dismissed by the former Fifteenth Division
on January 10, 2002. Except for the exclusion of Lilia F. Eduarte, the
present petition, which is filed solely by Alfredo O. Estrera,
appears to be exactly the same petition as the one docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 67944 which, to repeat, has already been dismissed,
without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, so that
it cannot be revived as an entirely new petition;
b) Treated as a new petition, the instant petition appears to have
been filed out of time, considering that the petitioner received a copy
of the assailed Order dated October 24, 2001 on November 7, 2001, so
that the last day of the 60-day period within which to file the same
expired on January 6, 2002, whereas the instant petition was filed only
on February 8, 2002 and, hence, already late by thirty-three (33)
days;
c) Moreover, the petitioner did not first file with the respondent
court a motion for the reconsideration of the assailed October 24,
2001, which is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition
for certiorari; and
d) Lastly, the certificate of non-forum shopping incorporated in
the petition at bar is defective in that it does not disclose the
earlier filing of a similar petition by herein petitioner Alfredo O.
Estrera and Lilia F. Eduarte which was, however, dismissed, thereby
violating Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 7 of the same Rules.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT, and the petitioner Alfredo O. Estrera and counsel Atty.
Rene Artemio T. Pacana are both directed to show cause cause, within
fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, why they should not be dealt with
for contempt of court for engaging in forum shopping.
SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner then filed his Manifestation/Explanation10 and his Motion
for Reconsideration11 both dated March 26, 2002. He explained that his
failure to disclose the previous Petition for Certiorari was through sheer
inadvertence or oversight and the belief that since the previous petition
had already been dismissed, there is no longer any similar case pending
with the court.
On June 17, 2002, the CA issued the second assailed Resolution, the
dispositive portion of which states thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED; and the petitioner Alfredo O. Estrera and counsel, Atty.
Rene Artemio T. Pacana, are found guilty of forum shopping and
EACH is sentenced to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00)
Pesos, failing in which, EACH is to suffer imprisonment of three (3)
months.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari where petitioner alleges that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals:
A.) FAILED SERIOUSLY TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT
THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
INCORPORATED TO THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R.
SP NO. 67944 WAS DEEMED IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 3, PARAGRAPH 3,
RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
HENCE, GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION.
B.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION UNDER SECTION 3,
PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN RELATION TO SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE
SAME RULES SHALL BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
C.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION
DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 WAS A REVIVAL OF
THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 67944 WHICH
IT EARLIER DISMISSED;
D.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING THE PETITION
DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 AS A NEW PETITION
AND IN FINDING THAT THE SAME WAS FILED OUT OF
TIME;
E.) SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER
AND UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING AND IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF FINE IN THE
AMOUNT OF FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) EACH
OR TO SUFFER IMPRISONMENT OF THREE (3) MONTHS IN
CASE OF FAILURE THEREOF, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW;
F.) SERIOUSLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER
THE PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
JUSTIFIED HEREIN PETITIONER IN FILING THE PETITION
WITHOUT FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
AND
G.) FAILING TO DECIDE THE PETITION ON ITS MERITS.13
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner must be reminded of the function of the remedy of certiorari.
In People v. Court of Appeals,14the Court expounded thus:
As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d etre
for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a
scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision - not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision - the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari . x x x15 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
As can be gleaned from the afore-quoted assignment of errors in the
petition, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment,
questioning the correctness of the CA's rulings. Hence, since the issues
involved do not affect the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ
of certiorari cannot be availed of by petitioner.
Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that the CA
committed no errors.
Indeed, the CA acted properly in dismissing CA-G.R. No. 67944 as the
Section 3, Rule 46 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
failure of petitioner to comply with any of the requirements, such as the
submission of a sworn certification of non-forum shopping by all the
petitioners, is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated January 10, 2002, hence, the same attained finality.
Although it is true that the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67944 was without prejudice and petitioner could have re-
filed such petition, such re-filing should still be done within the
prescribed period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, or not later than sixty days from notice of the assailed
Order of the RTC. The CA was correct in ruling that since petitioner
received said RTC Order dated October 24, 2001 on November 7,
2001, the last day for filing a Petition for Certiorari was on January 6,
2002. Thus, the filing of the Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 69407 on February 8, 2002 was undoubtedly beyond the 60-day
period provided for under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On this point alone, CA-G.R. SP No. 69407 was clearly
dismissible and should not be given due course.
It is also too late for petitioner to question the CA Resolution dated
January 10, 2002 through the present Petition for Certiorari. As
discussed above, a Petition for Certiorari should be filed within 60 days SO ORDERED.
from notice of the questioned resolution. Since petitioner received said
CA Resolution on January 22, 2002,16the last day for filing a Petition LAGUNA METTS G.R. No. 185220
for Certiorari to question the same was on March 23, 2002. The present CORPORATION,
petition was filed only on July 31, 2002, thus, filed beyond the Petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM and
reglementary period for filing a Petition for Certiorari. This Court, GERALDINE ESGUERRA, Respondents. Promulgated:
therefore, can no longer entertain any arguments against the propriety July 27, 2009
of the dismissal of CA-G.R. No. 67944.

Lastly, the issue of the propriety of finding petitioner guilty of RESOLUTION

contempt for forum shopping is also not within the province of a
special action for certiorari. As stated in People v. Court of Appeals,17 issues CORONA, J.:
merely questioning the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not
the jurisdiction of the court rendering it, are not proper for a Petition
for Certiorari.
This petition arose from a labor case filed by private
Petitioner's remedy to question the CA's finding of contempt should
have been to appeal via a Petition for Review on Certiorari . However, respondents Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
such petition should be filed 15 days after receipt of the CA Resolution Laguna Metts Corporation (LMC).[1] The labor arbiter decided in favor
dated June 17, 2002. Petitioner having received said Resolution on June
24, 2002, the last day for filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari was of private respondents and found that they were illegally dismissed by
on July 9, 2002, but no such petition was filed.
LMC. On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission
The axiomatic rule, as stated in Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in a decision dated
Holdings Corporation,18 is that:
February 21, 2008. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was
x x x Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Basic is the rule denied in a resolution dated April 30, 2008.
that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of
appeal.19(Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008
Thus, since appeal was available to petitioner, the present Petition
for Certiorari cannot be granted. resolution of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.[2] The motion alleged that, for reasons[3] stated Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions dated August 7,

therein, the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in this petition for

the prescribed 60-day period.[4] Thus, a 15-day extension period was certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It contends that the

prayed for.[5] Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted

private respondents motion for extension of time to file petition for

In a resolution dated August 7, 2008,[6] the Court of Appeals
certiorari as the Court of Appeals had no power to grant something
granted the motion and gave private respondents a non-extendible
that had already been expressly deleted from the rules.
period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC

moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that We agree.

extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed

Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and
under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.[7] This was denied in a
substantial merit.[8] As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing
resolution dated October 22, 2008. According to the appellate court,
specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are
while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65
considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and
admittedly calls for stricter application to discourage the filing of
to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very
unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of
nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[9]
Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in

exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice. In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals,[10] we ruled:

Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60

days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The
 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient
time for a party to mull over and to prepare a
petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a
lower court. The period was specifically set to
avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. (emphasis supplied)
While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend
the period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day
period,[11] the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the
deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.
Section 4, Rule 65 previously read:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if
it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It
may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or
in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided
by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for compelling reason and in no
case exceeding 15 days.[12] (emphasis supplied)
With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60)
day period shall be counted from the notice of the
denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a
municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an
officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be
filed in the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of
the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and be
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or omission of a
municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall
 be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on

compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or Rule now stands,petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60

phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for

that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no reconsideration.

intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The

In granting the private respondents motion for extension of
amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction
time to file petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded
different from that previous to its amendment.[13]
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The action amounted to a modification, if not

If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper outright reversal, by the Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In

courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itself a power it did not

providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal possess, a power that only this Court may exercise.[14] For this reason,

of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC the challenged resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008

of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any were invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in excess of

extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for its jurisdiction.

certiorari.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
discretion to grant extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari for
is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari
compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by private respondents
under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice.
counsel did not qualify as compelling. Heavy workload is relative and
often self-serving.[15] Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to ASIDE and the petition in the said case is ordered DISMISSED for

deviate from the 60-day rule.[16] having been filed out of time.

As to the other ground cited by private respondents counsel,

SO ORDERED.
suffice it to say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any

proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition
G.R. No. 192908 August 22, 2012
on time with a motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), Petitioner,
sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license to
vs.
disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental rule of human relations ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.

enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe LEONARDO DE-CASTRO,*

procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his DECISION

due and observing honesty and good faith.[17] For indeed, while REYES, J.:

technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly
procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are
devoted.[18]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104510 are REVERSED and SET
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, where petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways through the Office of the Solicitor General, questions the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499,
to wit:
1. Resolution dated October 30, 20092 dismissing petitioner’s
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being filed out of time;
and
 2. Resolution dated July 15, 20103 denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The instant case arose from two cases filed by the Republic seeking
expropriation of certain properties in the name of St. Vincent de Paul
Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent). In Civil Case No. 0062-04, the Republic
sought to expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of 6,068
square meters of land for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll
Expressway Project (MCTEP). Said property belongs to St. Vincent
covered by TCT No. T-821169 and located in Binakayan, Kawit,
Cavite. In Civil Case No. 0100-04, on the other hand, the Republic
sought to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039
square meters, also belonging to St. Vincent and covered by TCT No.
T-821170. Said property adjoins the property subject of Civil Case No.
0062-04.
Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint
alleging that the subject land originated from a free patent title and
should be adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation
pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No. 0062-04 a
motion for the issuance of an order of expropriation.4 It was granted by
the trial court per Order5 dated August 16, 2005, ruling that the
Republic has a lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters portion of
the subject property, with "no pronouncement as to just
compensation" since the subject property originated from a free
patent.6 A motion for the issuance of an order of expropriation was
likewise filed by the Republic in Civil Case No. 0100-04 but before this
could be resolved, the Republic moved to consolidate the two cases,
which was granted by the trial court.7
On November 16, 2006, the trial court denied St. Vincent’s motion for
reconsideration of its Order dated August 16, 2005 granting
expropriation.8 As alleged in the petition, no appeal was taken by St.
Vincent from said orders.9
After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Clarification of the Order dated August
16, 2005,10 contending that although it does not oppose the ruling
regarding the determination of public purpose and the Republic’s right
to expropriate the subject land, it, however, claims that it is entitled to
just compensation.
Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order dated
August 16, 2005 by entering the subject portion of St. Vincent’s
property. Aggrieved, the latter demanded upon the Republic and its
agents to immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment or
structures they introduced on its property in a demand-letter11 dated
October 3, 2008.
Due to St. Vincent’s refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the
Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, which was denied by the lower court in its Order12 dated
November 25, 2006 2008. The lower court, however, modified its Order
dated August 16, 2005 and required the Republic to immediately pay St.
Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the
value of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved
for reconsideration but it was denied by the lower court per
Order13 dated January 29, 2009 for lack of factual and legal basis.
Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a motion for
additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The
CA granted the motion in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and the
Republic was given a non-extensible period of fifteen (15) days or until
May 4, 2009 within which to file its petition for certiorari.
On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorari assailing
the lower court’s orders dated November 25, 2008 and January 29,
2009 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution15 ordering
the Republic to show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be
dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation16 dated July 1, 2009
pleading for the relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in the case and in consideration of
substantial justice. St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition17 dated
July 15, 2009 alleging among others that the said explanation is merely
pro forma due to the Republic’s failure to justify its explanation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution
dismissing the Republic’s petition for certiorari on the ground that the
petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are now
disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC18 and as applied in Laguna Metts
Corporation v. Court of Appeals.19
On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for
reconsideration alleging that it merely relied in good faith on the
appellate court’s resolution granting the former an additional period of
fifteen (15) days within which to file the subject petition.
On July 15, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed resolution denying the
Republic’s motion for reconsideration, stating that it cannot disobey the
ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation.20
Hence, this petition.
The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for
extension of time and upon the strength of the substantial merits of its
petition. The Republic also invokes Domdom v. Third and Fifth
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,21 where the Court ruled that absent a
prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Court’s
sound discretion.
St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition fails to neither
allege any circumstance nor state any justification for the deliberate
disregard of a very elementary rule of procedure like Section 4 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. And in the absence of any such circumstance
or justification, the general rule on pro forma motions/pleadings must
apply.
The Issue
The Republic discussed the substantial merits of its case; however, the
CA did no more than include such matters in its narration of facts, and
neither did St. Vincent dwell on said issues. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved in this petition is whether the CA committed a reversible error
when it dismissed the Republic’s petition for certiorari for being filed out
of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which
initially granted the Republic’s motion for extension, was premised on
the mistaken notion that the petition filed by the latter was one for
petition for review as a mode of appeal. The CA resolution stated,
among others: "Provided that this Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review is seasonably filed, as prayed for, x x x."22 Thus,
the CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are
allowed by the rules.23 On this score alone, the CA should have
admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely relied
on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009 granting the extension prayed
for.
Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the
Republic on the ground that the same was filed out of time, following
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In its Resolution dated July 15, 2010, which
dismissed the Republic’s motion for reconsideration, the CA also relied
on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation that the sixty (60)-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari is non-extendible. The
petitioner, however, insists that Domdom allows extensions of time to
file a petition.
In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it
necessary to discuss the relationship between its respective rulings in
Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with respect to the
application of the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution.
In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court
or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of
Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid
of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an
omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a
regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the
Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation,
held that:
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases
indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the
deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to
effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or
rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that
previous to its amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to
grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing
for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said
paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4,
Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the
60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is
essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of
justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on
compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the
Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.24 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Nevertheless, Domdom later stated:
On the People’s argument that a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for certiorari is no longer allowed, the same rests on shaky
grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section
4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely
prohibit motions for extension:
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for the most compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days."
The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC, reads:
xxxx
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of
Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike in the previous for
formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely
prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just
have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file
the petition shall be granted." Absent such prohibition, motions for
extensions are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound discretion. The
present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the
extension sought and, at all events, given its merits.25 (Citation omitted
and emphasis and underscoring ours)
What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A
reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that
Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general
rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60)
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and
allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court’s
sound discretion.26
Labao v. Flores27 subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the
strict application of the rule, viz:
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from
notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The
60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition
of their case.
xxxx
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance,
such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the
merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11)
in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the
issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule that the sixty
(60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is non-extendible, only that there are certain exceptional
circumstances, which may call for its non-observance. Even more
recently, in Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,29 the Court, taking into consideration Laguna Metts
Corporation and Domdom, "relaxed the procedural technicalities
introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial
justice and safeguard strong public interest" and affirmed the extension
granted by the CA to the respondent Power One Corporation due to
the exceptional nature of the case and the strong public interest
involved.
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the
reason behind the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to
prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order
to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the
clause that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition
for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as
reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to
prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion by a lower
court. The period was specifically set and limited in order to avoid any
unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could
violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of
their case.
x x x.
Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,
we ruled that the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for
extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in
Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the deleted
portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an
extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an
express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be
allowed, subject to this Court’s sound discretion, and only under
exceptional and meritorious cases.
Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard
strong public interest. x x x:
xxxx
The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which
relaxing the procedural rules would serve substantial justice and
safeguard strong public interest. x x x Consequently, in order to protect
strong public interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to
relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition.
Considering that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and
meritorious circumstance, the parties herein should be allowed to
litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was
able to file the Petition before the CA within the 15-day extension it
asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable
to the CA when it granted respondent Power One’s Motion for
Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.30 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)
To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as
applied in Laguna Metts Corporation, the general rule is that a petition
for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional
circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the
Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and
Mid-Islands Power cases.
Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first,
due to its own lapse when it granted the extension sought by the
Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the
public interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for
public use (MCTEP); and finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be
caused to either party in admitting the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated October 30, 2009 and July 15, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The Court
of Appeals is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the
petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines in CA-G.R.
SP No. 108499 and to proceed with the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014
THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE
MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION
LTD. and NICANOR B. ALTARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (In
behalf of her deceased husband GUILLERMO
MENDIGORIN), Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the Resolution1 dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 for allegedly having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The CA, through the said Resolution, entertained private
respondent's Petition for Certiorari2 despite having been filed 15 days
late and allowed her to correct the technical infirmities therein. Also
assailed is the CA's February 10, 2010 Resolution3 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss4 and giving private
respondent another chance to cure the remaining deficiencies of the
petition.
Factual Antecedents
This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries,
sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s
fees filed by Amanda C. Mendigorin (private respondent) against
petitioner Thenamaris Philippines, Inc., formerly Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc./Oceanic Navigation Ltd., (Thenamaris), represented by
its general manager, Capt. Nicanor B. Altares (petitioner), filed with the
Labor Arbiter (LA). Private respondent is the widow of seafarer
Guillermo M. Mendigorin (Guillermo) who was employed by
Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and eventually, as second engineer
in the latter’s vessels. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of colon
cancer during the term of the employment contract between him and
Thenamaris.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Ultimately, the LA promulgated his Decision5 dated January 29, 2008 in
favor of private respondent. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the complainant [herein private respondent] and
finding respondents [herein petitioners] liable to pay jointly and
severally: (a) death benefits amounting to US $50,000.00 at its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment; (b) reimbursement of medical
expenses amounting to ₱102,759.74; [(c)] moral and exemplary
damages amounting to ₱100,000.00 and ₱50,000.00 respectively; and
(d) attorney’s fees in the [amount of] ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award.
All other claims are DENIED.6
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
On appeal, the NLRC reversed7 the LA’s Decision.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration.8 In a Resolution9 dated
June 29, 2009, however, her motion was denied for lack of merit.
Private respondent, through counsel, received the June 29, 2009
Resolution of the NLRC on July 8, 2009. Sixty-two days thereafter, or
on September 8, 2009, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Certiorari10before the CA. Private respondent alleged that
she had until September 7, 2009 (as September 6, 2009, the actual last
day for filing, fell on a Sunday) within which to file a petition for
certiorari. However, as her counsel was then saddled and occupied with
equally important cases, it would be impossible for him to file the
petition on time, especially since the case involves voluminous
documents necessary in the preparation thereof. Accordingly, private
respondent asked for an extension of 15 days from September 7, 2009,
or until September 22, 2009, within which to file the petition.
On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for
Certiorari11 before the CA.
Action of the Court of Appeals
In a Resolution12 dated November 20, 2009, the CA noted that private
respondent’s Petition for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers
from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial
justice, the CA entertained the petition and directed private respondent
to cure the technical flaws in her petition. Thus:
The Court, in the interest of justice, resolved to NOTE the petition for
certiorari filed on September 22, 2009, albeit the same was filed fifteen
(15) days late.
A perusal of the instant petition reveals the following procedural
infirmities, namely:
(1) The attached Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping does not conform with the requirements under
Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, as a
Community Tax Certificate is no longer considered competent
evidence of an affiant’s identity; and
(2) Except for the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration
filed with the National Labor Relations Commission, no other
copies of pertinent and relevant pleadings/documents are
attached therewith, such as petitioner’s Complaint,
respondent’s Memorandum of Appeal, petitioner’s Opposition
to Respondent’s Appeal, if any, all of which may aid this Court
in judiciously resolving the issues raised in the petition.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court, in line with the rule that cases should be
determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses have been given, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections, resolved to DIRECT
petitioner to submit anew a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping which complies with the requirements of the rules, and clear
and legible copies of the aforementioned pleadings/documents, within
ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to
Dismiss,14 strongly opposing private respondent’s Motion for
Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an absolutely
prohibited pleading. Citing Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,15 petitioners argued that A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC16 effectively
rendered the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari non-
extendible after it deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining to extension of
time to file petition. Thus, as the rule now stands, petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment 1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED
or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.17 GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still NOTED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY
allowable, private respondent’s motion for extension is nevertheless a THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF
useless piece of paper as it was filed beyond the 60-day period for filing DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT FOR HAVING BEEN
a petition for certiorari. FILED BEYOND THE MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY PERIOD REQUIRED BY
Lastly, petitioners asserted that as private respondent’s motion for SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT, AS
extension is a prohibited pleading, as well as one filed outside of the AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC.
reglementary period, then private respondent’s Petition for Certiorari is
a mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever. 2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED
Consequently, the Decision of the NLRC has become final and GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, IN NOTING
executory and is beyond the ambit of judicial review. THE VERY LATE PETITION FILED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, IT GROSSLY IGNORED THIS
In the meantime, private respondent submitted her Compliance18 with HONORABLE COURT’S VERY RECENT RULING IN
the CA’s Resolution of November 20, 2009. Nevertheless, she still LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. COURT OF
failed to attach thereto copies of her Complaint filed before the LA and APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM AND GERALDINE
Memorandum filed with the NLRC. ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 185220, JULY 27, 2009), WHICH
DISALLOWED ANY MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF
In a Resolution19 dated February 10, 2010, the CA denied petitioners’ TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
motion and, instead, gave private respondent one last opportunity to UNDER RULE 65.21 (Underscoring and emphasis in the
fully comply with its November 20, 2009 Resolution by submitting original)
clear and legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five days
from notice thereof. Our Ruling

Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari. There is merit in the petition.

Entry of Judgment20 was already issued by the NLRC on August 13,
2009. Per NLRC Rules, the June 29, 2009 Resolution became final and
executory on July 18, 2009 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
Issues
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.22 we had the occasion
to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon
the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be
extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in
Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,23 is that a petition for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment
or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in
accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC24 where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file
a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule
6525 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.26 Under exceptional cases,
however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan,27 the 60-day period may be extended subject to the
court’s sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of
the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make
the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the
intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to
state that ‘no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.’
Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject
to the court’s sound discretion."28
Then in Labao v. Flores,29 we laid down some of the exceptions to the
strict application of the 60-day period rule, thus:
[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1)
most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the
merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11)
in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the
issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances.1âwphi1 Thus, there should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules.
In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29,
2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until
September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as
September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a
Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009.30 It
is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of
time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no
longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will
have become final and executory.31
Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the
part of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or
she was unable to abide by the rules.32 Here, the reason offered for
availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private
respondent’s counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious
reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the
excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing
alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."33
Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been
denied outright.
Notably, the CA’s November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling
on the timeliness of private respondent’s motion for extension. Instead,
it directly ruled on the Petition for Certiorari as seen by its statement
"[t]he Court x x x resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari x x x,
albeit the same was filed fifteen (15) days late." To our mind, the
foregoing pronouncement is an indirect acknowledgment on the part of
the CA that the motion for extension was indeed filed late. Yet it opted
to still entertain and "note" the Petition for Certiorari, justifying its
action as being "in the interest of justice."
We do not approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the
motion for extension should have been denied outright, it necessarily
follows that the Petition for Certiorari is, in the words of petitioners, a
"mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever."
In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng,34 which likewise dealt with the late
filing of a petition for certiorari, we recognized that although
procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to
impart stability in the legal system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the
rigid application of the rules of procedure in several cases to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This
is because the ends of justice would be better served if the parties were
given the chance to argue their causes and defenses. We are likewise
constantly reminded that the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims of the
competing parties and always be guided by the principle that procedure
must not hinder but, rather, promote the administration of justice.
Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to
speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due process. In
numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and
equity. x x x35
Here, even assuming that the late filing of the petition would merit
relaxation of the rules, the CA’s resolution would have only been
acceptable had private respondent shown respect for the rules by
submitting a petition for certiorari which is sufficient in form. In
contrast, what private respondent filed was a petition plagued by
several infirmities. Worse, when the CA allowed petitioner to cure the
deficiencies, she failed to fully comply such that she had to be given,
albeit undeservingly, one last chance to submit the still lacking copies of
the pertinent pleadings required of her by the CA.
More importantly, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright
in view of the fact that the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC
denying private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration had already
become final and executory as of July 18, 2009.36 Thus, it has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition, except to order its dismissal. In
Labao, we held that:
The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s
receipt, and the respondent’s failure to file the petition within the
required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction
to review the resolution.
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. All the issues between
the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment
becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a
matter of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just
as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period,
the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-
barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there will
be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of
courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies
with finality.37
In sum, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended
underserved and unwarranted liberality to private respondent. "There is
grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on
law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism xx x."38 Such is
present here as shown by the CA's obstinate refusal to dismiss the case
despite the late filing of the motion for extension and the flimsy excuse
for the extension sought, the late filing of the petition and the
numerous infirmities attending the same, and private respondent's
continued defiance of its directive. These circumstances serve to
highlight private respondent's propensity to disregard the very rules
that the courts, the litigants and the lawyers are duty-bound to follow.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate
of Appeals Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 and February 10, jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to exercise original
2010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such
The Petition for Certiorari filed by private respondent Amanda C. authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the
Mendigorim in CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 is DISMISSED. doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC2 — that neither the
Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC
SO ORDERED. to issue such writs — still finds application under the 1987
Constitution.
G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995
In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner, Elections, 3 this Court reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.
vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC
ELECTIONS, respondents. adhered to the affirmative view of the issue, citing as authority
therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the
last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:

DAVIDE, JR., J.: Sec. 50. Definition. —

This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court xxx xxx xxx
revives the issue of whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive
and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate authority to hear and decide petitions
jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated for certiorariprohibition, and mandamus involving
cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections,1 this Court election cases.
ruled in the negative because of the absence of any specific conferment
upon the COMELEC, either by the constitution or by legislative fiat, of The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and
jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the
exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant
and since these two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and
each must expressly conferred by law. One does not flow, nor is purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasang
inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state that in the Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute
Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the which self-destructed after such election.
exercise of original jurisdiction which has always been expressly
conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are
uncomplicated and undisputed.
In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and
private respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of
Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter
was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-
two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was
assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found
the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private
respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the
court hereby declares the protestant as having won the
mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the
local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant
having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the
protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and
the private respondent on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the
COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate
docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for
execution pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22
July 1994.
On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for
execution pending appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was
forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a
reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff held in
abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5
August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a
petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid other of the trial court
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution
granting the petition.4 The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases as
authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction
of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August
3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the
Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.
Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered
restored to her position .as Municipality Mayor of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of
the appeal before this Commission in the case of
Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC maintains that there is
a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct
that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It further
reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial functions, the
COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it has
appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:
It is therefore clear that if there is a law which
specifically confers jurisdiction to issue the prerogative
Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.
Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.
B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled
"AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF
MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA
ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF
SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES
THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-
proclamation controversy refers to
any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the
Board of Canvassers which may be
raised by any candidate, political party
or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the
Commission.
The Commission Elections shall be
the sole judge and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-
proclamation controversies.
The Commission is hereby vested
with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving
election cases.(Emphasis supplied).
We have debated among ourselves whether Section
50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been repealed. We have come to
the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The
repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code
(BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:
Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. —
Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise
known as the The 1978 Election Code, as
amended, is hereby repealed. All other
election Laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code is hereby
repealed, except Presidential Decree
No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg.
20 governing the election of the
members of the Sangguniang
Pampook of Regions IX and XII.
(Emphasis supplied).
B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section
50 thereof is not inconsistent with the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the cited
Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the
Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases,
that implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus:
 Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned
upon, so also should the grant of
original jurisdiction by mere
implication to a quasi-judicial body be
tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases:
Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
It is equally clear that Executive
Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or
repeal, whether expressly or
impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No.
1752. It is common place Learning
that implied repeal are not favored in Law
and are not casually to be assumed. The
first effort of a court must always be
to reconcile or adjust the provisions
of one statute with those of another
so as to give sensible effect to both
provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55
SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs.
Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197
(1971); National Power Corporation
vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S.
vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13
SCRA 377·(1965). Only when there is
clear inconsistency and conflict between the
provisions of two (2) statutes, may a court
hold that the provisions later in point
of time have impliedly repealed the
earlier ones" that (Philippine
American Management Co., Inc., vs.
Philippine American Management
Employees Association, 49 SCRA
194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido,
41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs.
Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3,
1984, 164 SCRA 25).
It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697
self-destructed after the Batasang Pambansa elections
of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title
and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be
known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang
Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for
the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on
May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral
representatives thereafter as provided by the
Constitution.
While that may be true with most of its provisions
which were applicable only for the particular election
(like election and campaign periods, voting
constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining
provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is
not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was
passed also "for other purposes."
But the important consideration is that the authority
granted to the Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not
inconsistent with our election laws. It should be
mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No.
6638 which governed the local elections of January 18,
1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities
(Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang members in
different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still
applicable up to this day. In fact, it became one of the
important controlling provision which governed the
May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act
No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with the present
election laws did not self-destruct, why should Section
50 of B.P. Blg. 697?
Another provision which did not self-destruct is that
which provides that "any city or municipal judge, who
includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis
in inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty
of an election offense," although this provision is
found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134
supposedly with limited application as the enabling act
for the elections for Members of Congress on May 11,
1987 and for other purposes.
Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari,
jurisdiction to the Commission on Elections because
the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in
the law, and avoid an incongruous situation.
A statute's clauses and phrases must
not be taken separately but in its
relation to the statute's totality. Each
statute must, in fact, be construed as
to "harmonized it with the pre-
existing body of laws." Unless clearly
repugnant, provisions of statutes
must be reconciled. . . .
(Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO
Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329,
August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory construction rule is:
"When the Legislature enacts
provision, it is understood that it is
aware of previous statutes relating to
the same subject matter and that in
the absence of any express repeal or
amendment therein, the new
provision should be deemed enacted
pursuant to the legislative policy
embodied in the prior statutes."
(Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-
36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA
253).
The Commission is the most logical body whenever it
performs judicial functions to take jurisdiction of
petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in
election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The
Court of Appeals has no more appellate jurisdiction
over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court,
Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in
his dissenting opinion that under the Constitution
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
election cases should properly be limited to decisions,
orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not
from lower courts.
It was of course different under the Election Code of
1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2, 1971) because the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had
appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the
lower courts.
In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the
lower courts because after reiterating the ruling in the
Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:
In view of this pronouncement, an
original civil action of certiorari,
 prohibition or mandamus against a
regional trial court in an election
contest may be filed only in the Court of
Appeals or in this Court being the only
courts given such original jurisdiction
under the Constitution and the Law.
(Emphasis supplied).
While these two appellate Courts do have the
jurisdiction under the Constitution and the law, it is
most logical for the Commission whenever it performs
judicial functions to have the authority to issue these
prerogative writs. . . .
...
In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision
laid down in the case of Antonio Dictado vs. Hon.
Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated
on July 29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en
banc had occasion to rule on the question of whether
or not the Commission has the authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari in election cases.
The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon.
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong, ruled that
there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the
exclusive authority to issue special writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there
are also Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which
declare that the Commission has no such authority
precisely because; according to the decisions, there is
no law granting such authority, and without any hint
whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs.
Pambansa Blg. 697.
As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents
were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697 was repealed
by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881,
December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their answer,
respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it
was declared that, indeed, the Commission has no
jurisdiction to issue special writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50,
BP Blg. 697 has not been repealed.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power"
includes the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).
Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a
court of justice performing judicial power and said
power includes the determination of whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that
the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorariin aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. 5
It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the
trial court's order of execution pending appeal and the writ of execution
because
 [a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the court a quo had
already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as
July 8, 1994, it had already acknowledged through its
order issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal
of petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the
records of the case to this Honorable Commission. 6
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil
action.
In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to cease and
desist from enforcing is challenged resolution.
As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment,
opposed the petition by invoking the very arguments adduced by the
respondent COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the
dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy cases.
In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
respondent COMELEC postulates that it issued the said resolution
after it had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private
respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases,
and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent
powers to employ means necessary to carry into effect
the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135
of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily, there was no
need for any statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed,
in annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional
Trial Court, public respondent did not exceed its
jurisdiction since its action in this regard was necessary
to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain
the status quo of the parties pending the final outcome
of its review of the correctness of the appealed
decision. 7
It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had
jurisdiction over the cases unlike in the instant case where the trial
court had already given due course to the appeal and elevated the
records of the case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance of
the appeal.
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it
on its merits.
The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the
Office of the Solicitor General is unacceptable. It goes against its
theory in the assailed resolution and is not supported by the facts. The
challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC docketed
as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of
Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal
from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the challenged resolution;
docketed as EAC No. 108-94.8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had
recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal
from the RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special civil
action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-94. The two cases were not
consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no further
elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter
case, it cannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in
the former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous contention of the
Office of the of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position
taken by the COMELEC in its resolution now in question paves the
way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in
the Garcia and Uy cases.
As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court
ruled that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific
constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.
The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of
B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did.
Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1 thereof,
"to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall
be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives
thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage
of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang
Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin issues of
whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984
election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection
thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it
was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.
The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are
provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984
election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. In fact,
by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:
Sec. 50. Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
(Emphasis supplied).
it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a
specific period of time. Taken in the context of the conspicuous
absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on
Elections, 12 it seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as a
remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality
resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting
opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case.
But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg.
697? The repealing clause of the latter reads as follows:
Sec. 282. Repealing clause. — Presidential decree No.
1296, otherwise known as The 1978 Election Code, as
amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree
No. 1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the
election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook
of Regions IX and XII.
The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has
been said:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that.
all inconsistent enactments are repealed; is in legal
contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be
expressed or result by implication. Although it has in
some instances been held to be an express recognition
that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is
included and as indicative of the legislative intent to
repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be
deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or
designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be
determinative of an implied repeal for if does not
declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely
predicates a repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict is found under application of the
rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than
mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment
than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such
clause is construed as an express limitation of the
repeal to inconsistent acts.13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory
construction that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and
provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or
code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides
otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14
By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently
appear that the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior
election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in
fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes
or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall
remain in force. That sentence
predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that
a substantial conflict must be found on existing and
prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the
case, the presumption against implied repeals and the
rule on strict construction regarding implied repeals
apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws so that, if repeal of particular or
specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to
express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing
law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the
new and the old laws.15
This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last
paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if
the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter, It
found none.
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now
does, abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uyand Veloria cases, We
now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697
providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under
paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now
proceed to review the substance of the challenged resolution.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of
discretion in granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending
appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both
the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the
decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five
days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for
execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the
perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules
Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary
effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of
the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any
of the parties to appeal,17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private
respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July
1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the
perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction
over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was
filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial
court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise
if the motion was filed before the perfection of the
appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting
the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued
by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged
resolution of 9 February 1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR
No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is
AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby
LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L.
ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her
capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay
City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR
APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL
CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.;
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE
LINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer,
petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from
January to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart, Inc.,
SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace
Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature
Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private
respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue
Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business
taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the
same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition
for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were
constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or
Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business
Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public
respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed
on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in relation to
Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM
were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of
Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which
amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already been declared to
be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.2
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents'
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it
in its Order5 dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed
petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over
the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over
private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the
RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its
expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it
follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with
the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in
its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the
petitioners, their agents and/or authorized representatives
from implementing Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code
of Manila, as amended, against private respondents.
III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of
private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or
refund with the City Treasurer of Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the Manila
Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting agents of
the City Government.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner
City of Manila and its constituents would result to greater
damage and prejudice thereof. (sic)8
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the
instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court
discovered that a Decision9 in the main case had already been rendered
by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders
JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to
grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the
Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in
the following amounts:
P
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. -
11,462,525.02
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - 419,689.04
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care
- 231,453.62
Health
 Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - 220,204.70
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34
P with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such
TOTAL: - dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA
19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21,
Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.10
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the
above Decision had already become final and executory per the
Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October 20,
2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on
November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the
issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve the incident
on the preliminary injunction issued by the RTC, have already become
moot and academic considering that the trial court, in its decision on
the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents
and that the same decision is now final and executory. Well entrenched
is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the
same of no practical use or value.13
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on
jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and for future
guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction,
the Court deems it proper to likewise address a procedural error which
petitioners committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in
assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed
are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition
completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or
order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal.
Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case.15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent
action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 As such, it
cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of
Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before,
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari,
particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there
is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering
that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that
an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the
issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax
the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central
issue in this case. The basic question posed before this Court is whether
or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125)
creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the
following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases
involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected fines,
forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or
other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or
part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment
Appeals in cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property or other matters arising under the Assessment Law,
including rules and regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No.
9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of
the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of
a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the
amendatory act provides thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a
specific period of action, in which case the inaction
shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases
involving liability for customs duties, fees or other
money charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other laws administered by the
Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
 over cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided by the provincial or
city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs
cases elevated to him automatically for review from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are
adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in
the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or
article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving
dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301
and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code,
and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800,
where either party may appeal the decision to impose
or not to impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein
provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses arising from violations of the National
Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code
and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided,
however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less
than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) or where there
is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the
regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court
to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action
and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined
in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with
it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve
the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their
respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction
over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases
involving final and executory assessments for taxes,
fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however, that
collection cases where the principal amount of taxes
and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is
less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be
tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them,
in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of
the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction
over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in
their respective jurisdiction.19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly
stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions,
orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided
or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as
the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that th e CTA has
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders
issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari
involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from
the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of
Pimentel v. COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v.
COMELEC,23Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v.
Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25 this Court has ruled against
the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the
ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such
power.26 It must be observed, however, that with the exception of
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts
but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the
Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now provides that the special
criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a
writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to
Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of
BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such
power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others,
a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed
tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no
perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early
as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.29 that "if a case
may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then
said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction."30 This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of
Appeals,31 where the Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction
to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the
lower court."32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated
in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis v.
Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court
provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary
to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction
over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-
jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice.35 The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive,
especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the
tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the
role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other
court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows
that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same
court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on
an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the
pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the
intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed
with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to
the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial
court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal
soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the
power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA
to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-
exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review,
by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have
complete supervision over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the
power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective.
The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may, when
necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might
interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases
pending before it.37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is
endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These
should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and
the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice
and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the
same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a
court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers
as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or
are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well
as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it
effective in behalf of the litigants.38
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted
the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates."39 Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or
incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the
above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the
principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to
consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would
not be within its cognizance.40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded
that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for
certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local
tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as
inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the
rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority
to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence
of their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to
quasi-judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 193253, September 08, 2015
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ACTING SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; HONORABLE JOVENCITO
R. ZU�O, PEDRITO L. RANCES, ARMAN A. DE ANDRES,
PAUL CHI TING CO, KENNETH PUNDANERA, MANUEL
T. CO, SALLY L. CO, STANLEY L. TAN, ROCHELLE E.
VICENCIO, LIZA R. MAGAWAY, JANICE L. CO, VIVENCIO
ABA�O, GREG YU, EDWIN AGUSTIN, VICTOR D.
PIAMONTE, UNIOIL PETROLEUM PHILIPPINES, INC.,
AND OILINK, INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated March 26, 20101 and August 4,
2010,2and to reinstate the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
113069, or in the alternative, to issue a decision finding probable cause
to prosecute the private respondents for violation of Sections 3601 and
3602, in relation to Sections 2503 and 2530, paragraphs f and 1 (3), (4)
and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), as Audit Team4 and the representatives of OILINK.5 During the
amended. conference, the Audit Team explained to OILINK representatives the
purpose of the post-entry audit and the manner by which it would be
The antecedents are as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary conducted, and advised it as to the import documents required for such
audit.
Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in
marketing, distribution, and sale of petroleum, oil and other products, On March 14, 2007, OILINK submitted to the Audit Team the
while its co-respondent OILINK International, Inc. is engaged in following documents: Post-Entry Audit Group General Customs
manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying, selling, or otherwise Questionnaire, General Information Sheet for the year 2006, SEC
dealing in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of any and Registration, Articles of Incorporation, Company By-laws, and Audited
all refinements and by�products thereof. Except for respondent Financial Report for the year 2005.
Victor D. Piamonte who is a Licensed Customs Broker, the following
private respondents are either officers or directors of UNIOIL or On April 20, 2007, the Audit Team requested OILINK to submit the
OILINK:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary other documents stated in the List of Initial Requirements for
Submission, namely: 2004 Audited Financial Report, 2004-2006
1. Paul Chi Ting Co - Chairman of UNIOIL and OILINK Quarterly VAT Returns with the accompanying schedule of
2. Kenneth Pundanera - President/Director of UNIOIL importations, Organizational chart/structure, and List of foreign
3. Manuel T. Co - Officer/Director of UNIOIL suppliers with details on the products imported and the total amount,
4. Sally L. Co - Officer/Director of UNIOIL on a yearly basis.
5. Stanley L. Tan - Officer/Director of UNIOIL
6. Rochelle E. Vicencio - Corporate Administrative Supervisor of On May 7, 2007, OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the
UNIOIL request for the production of the said documents, but claimed that it
7. Liza R. Magaway - President of OILINK was hampered by the resignation of its employees from the Accounting
8. Janice L. Co - Director of OILINK and Supply Department. OILINK also averred that it would refer the
9. Vivencio Aba�o - Director of OILINK matter to the Commissioner of Customs in view of the independent
10. Greg Yu - Director of OILINK investigation being conducted by the latter.
11. Edwin Agustin - Corporate Secretary of OILINK
On June 4, 2007, OILINK sent a letter stating that the documents
which the Audit Team previously requested were available with the
On January 30, 2007, Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner Special Committee of the BOC, and that it could not open in the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Audit Notification Letter (ANL) No. meantime its Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) - registered books of
0701246,3 informing the President of OILINK that the Post Entry accounts for validation and review purposes.
Audit Group (PEAG) of the BOC will be conducting a compliance
audit, including the examination, inspection, verification and/or In a letter dated July 11, 2007, the Audit Team informed OILINK of
investigation of all pertinent records of OILINK's import transactions the adverse effects of its request for the postponement of the exit
for the past three (3)-year period counted from the said date. conference and its continuous refusal to furnish it the required
documents. It advised OILINK that such acts constitute as waiver on
On March 2, 2007, a pre-audit conference was held between the BOC
its part to be informed of the audit findings and an administrative case
would be filed against it, without prejudice to the filing of a criminal
action.
On July 24, 2007, Commissioner Morales approved the filing of an
administrative case against OILINK for failure to comply with the
requirements of Customs Administrative Order (CAO) No. 4-
2004.6 Such case was filed on July 30, 2007.
On September 20, 2007, an Order was issued by the Legal Service of
the BOC, submitting the case for resolution in view of OILINK's
failure to file its Answer within the prescribed period.
On December 14, 2007, the Legal Service of the BOC rendered a
Decision finding that OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c) and (e) of
CAO 4-20047 when it refused to furnish the Audit Team copies of the
required documents, despite repeated demands. The dispositive portion
of the Decision states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds herein
respondent liable for violating Sections IV.A.2 (c) and (e) of Customs
Administrative Order No. 4-2004, and a DECISION is hereby
rendered:cralawlawlibrary
1. Ordering OILINK� INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION to
pay the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) ad valorem on the article/s
subject of the Importation for which no records were kept and
maintained as prescribed in Section 2504 of the Customs Code in the
amount of Pesos: Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million
Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Three Hundred Four and
80/100 (Php 2,764,859,304.80);
2. Ordering the Bureau of Customs to hold the delivery or release of
subsequent imported articles to answer for the fine, any revised
assessment, and/or as a penalty for failure to keep records.
This is without prejudice to the filing of a criminal case or any
appropriate legal action against the importer in order to protect the
interest of the government and deter other importers from committing
the same offense.
SO ORDERED8
Pursuant to the Decision dated December 14, 2007, Commissioner
Morales, in a letter9 of even date, directed the President of OILINK to
pay the BOC the administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 for violation
of CAO No. 4-2004, in relation to Section 2504 of the TCCP. Copy of
the said Decision and letter were served to OILINK through personal
service on December 28, 2007.10cralawrednad
On March 13, 2008, Atty. Noemi B. Alcala, Officer-in-Charge,
Collection Service, Revenue and Monitoring Group, sent a final
demand letter for OILINK to settle the administrative fine, otherwise,
the BOC will be compelled to file the necessary legal action and put in
force Section 150811 of the TCCP against its succeeding shipments to
protect the government's interest.12cralawrednad
On April 23, 2008, a Hold Order13 was issued by Horacio P. Suansing,
Jr., District Collector, Port of Manila, against all shipments of OILINK
for failure to settle its outstanding account with the BOC and to protect
the interest of the government pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP.
On May 2, 2008, Rochelle E. Vicencio, Corporate Administrative
Supervisor of UNIOIL, citing the existing Terminalling Agreement
dated January 2, 2008 with OILINK for the Storage of UNIOIL's
aromatic process oil and industrial lubricating oils (collectively, "base
oils"), requested District Collector Suansing Jr. to allow it to withdraw
base oils from OILINK's temporarily closed Terminal.
On May 6, 2008, Commissioner Morales granted the request of
UNIOIL to withdraw its base oils stored at OILINK's terminal/depot
based on the Terminalling Agreement between the two companies,
subject to the following conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.� Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper
inventory by the BIR and BOC.
2.� Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn excise taxes and value added taxes for this product have already been
are fully paid or settled. settled. However, we are still unable to withdraw these products in
3.� The company should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely order to serve our customers who are using the product to supply
monitored and continuously underguarded by assigned Customs major government infrastructure projects in the country.
personnel.14
In line with the endorsement coming from the Bureau of Customs
On May 9, 2008, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD), docketed Commissioner Napoleon D. Morales issued last May 6, 2008, Unioil
as Seizure Identification (S.I.) No. 2008-082, was issued by District has complied with the conditions stipulated therein which
Collector Suansing Jr., directing the BOC officials to seal and padlock are:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the oil tanks/depots of OILINK located in Bataan.
1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory
On May 12, 2008, Kenneth C. Pundanera, Operations Manager of by the BIR and BOC.
UNIOIL, requested Zaldy E. Almoradie, District Collector of
Mariveles, Bataan, for permission to release UNIOIL-owned products 2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn
from OILINK's storage terminal. Pertinent portion of the request letter are fully paid or settled.
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3. The company (Unioil) should allow the operation/withdrawal to be
Unioil is a licensed importer of various Petroleum Products by virtue of closely monitored and continuously underguarded by assigned Customs
its import license LTAD-0-021-2002 issued on March 26, 2002 which personnel.
was revised to include all other petroleum products in 2007 through
LTAMII (P) 001-10-07-13639. To pursue its line of business, Unioil In this regard, may we respectfully request your good office to please
has an existing Terminalling Agreement with Oilink for the storage of allow Unioil to withdraw from Oilink's terminal its products which are
various Unioil products at the Oilink terminal located at Lucanin Pt, stored in the following tanks[:]15cralawrednad
Mariveles, Bataan.
TANK PROD CONTENTS (Liters)
In view of the said temporary closure of Oilink's terminal, Unioil is 2 diesel 2,171,670.00
currently unable to fully utilize its leased tanks as well as make use of
the products contained therein. We understand that there is still an 6 rexo 1,862,846.00
unresolved issue between Oilink and the Bureau of Customs. However, 10 asphalt 4,573.14
with all due respect, said issue should not affect Unioil because it is not 13 gasoline 809,345.00
a party to the same, furthermore there is a legal and binding
terminalling agreement between Oilink and Unioil which should be 14 gasoline 746,629.00
honored. 17 diesel 360,097.00
19 sn500 203,659.00
Last May 8, 2008, an asphalt importation for Unioil Petroleum
Philippines, Inc. arrived in Mariveles, Bataan. This was issued the 20 sn500 643,236.00
corresponding discharging permit by the Bureau of Customs. All duties,
In the same request letter, District Collector Almoradie approved the
release of the above petroleum products through a handwritten note
dated May 12, 2008: "All concerned: Pls. allow the release of the Unioil-
owned products from the Oilink Storage Terminal per this
request. Thanks."16cralawrednad
On May 15, 2008, Pundanera wrote a clarificatory letter pursuant to the
verbal instruction of District Collector Almoradie to explain the
withdrawal of products from the Terminal of OILINK, to
wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As far as Unioil is concerned, we affirm to your good office that the
products withdrawn/loaded at the Terminal are entirely Unioil
products. Unioil owns these products pursuant to its supply and
terminalling agreements with Oilink. (We shall be submitting to you
copies of these documents as soon as they arrive from our office in
Manila.) In addition, due to the issue involving Oilink and the Bureau
of Customs, Unioil was forced to secure its petroleum products from
local sources in order to comply with its valid contractual
commitments.
Unioil intended to withdraw these products because it believed in good
faith and based on documents in its possession that it is allowed to do
so. Unioil based its intention pursuant to the Indorsements of the
Collector of the Port of Manila as well as the Office of the
Commissioner that allowed the withdrawal of Unioil products subject
to compliance with the three (3) conditions specified in the
abovementioned Indorsements.
This being the precedent, we believe in good faith that, since Unioil
owns the products, and it is considered a stranger to the issue between
Oilink and the Bureau, then Unioil is allowed to withdraw the products
it owns subject to the compliance with the three (3) stated conditions.
Besides, any withdrawal is covered by an appropriate delivery receipt,
which would clearly indicate that Unioil owns the products being
withdrawn.17
In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M.
Valdez, a member of the petitioner BOC's Anti-Oil Smuggling
Coordinating Committee that investigated the illegal withdrawal by
UNIOIL of oil products consigned to OILINK, valued at
P181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes in the amount of
P35,507,597.00, accused the private respondents of violation of
Sections 360118 and 3602,19in relation to Sections 250320 and
2530,21 paragraphs f and 1 (3), (4) and (5), of the TCCP.
In a letter22 dated December 15, 2008, Commissioner Morales referred
to the Office of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno the said
complaint-affidavit, together with its annexes, for preliminary
investigation. During the said investigation, BOC's counsel appeared
and all of the private respondents submitted their respective counter-
affidavits.
In a Resolution23 dated May 29, 2009, public respondent Arman A. De
Andres, State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause. The Resolution was approved by public respondents
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Pedrito L. Ranees and Chief State
Prosecutor Zuflo. On automatic review, the Resolution was affirmed
by then Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales.24cralawrednad
Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the public respondent, the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes
VST Devanadera, in a Resolution25cralawred dated December 28, 2009.
On March 11, 2010, the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
In the Resolution dated March 26, 2010, the CA dismissed outright the
petition due to procedural defects:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The instant petition (i) contains no explanation why service thereof was
not done personally (Sec. 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure);
(ii) shows that it has no proper verification and certification against
forum shopping and (iii) the docket and other lawful fees payment is
short by P1,530.0026
In the Resolution dated August 4, 2010, the CA denied the private
respondents' motion for reconsideration of the March 26, 2010
Resolution, as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We made a cursory examination of the petition filed in this case as well
as the whole rolloof the case. It is our finding that, up to the date hereof,
the petitioner has not duly submitted to this Court another set of
petition with a certification against forum shopping embodied therein
or appended thereto. Thus, the petition really suffers from a fatal defect
until now, and so, the petitioner has to bear the consequence thereof.27
The CA stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required
to be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does
not mean that Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to
the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues
and their just resolution.
Aggrieved, the BOC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari,
raising the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SOLELY ON THE
GROUND THAT, ALLEGEDLY, IT DID NOT RECEIVE THE
SECOND AND COMPLETE COPY OF THE PETITION,
CONTAINING THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN
IT AFFIRMED ITS 26 MARCH 2010 RESOLUTION, DISMISSING
THE PETITION ON ACCOUNT OF MERE TECHNICALITIES.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT LOOK
INTO THE MERITS OF THE CASE, WHERE IT WAS CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR TRIAL FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3601 AND 3602 IN RELATION TO SECTION 2530,
PARAGRAPHS (E), AND SECTION 3604 (D), (E), (F), AND (H)
OF THE TCCP, AS AMENDED.28
The petition is partly meritorious.
Although the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not
raised at bench by either of the parties, the Court will first address such
question before delving into the procedural and substantive issues of
the instant petition. After all, it is the duty of the courts to consider the
question of jurisdiction before they look into other matters involved in
the case, even though such question is not raised by any of the
parties.29 Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority
and, even if such question is neither raised by the pleadings nor
suggested by counsel, they may recognize the want of jurisdiction and
act accordingly by staying pleadings, dismissing the action, or otherwise
noticing the defect, at any stage of the proceedings.30 Besides, issues or
errors not raised by the parties may be resolved by the Court where, as
in this case, the issue is one of jurisdiction; it is necessary in arriving at a
just decision; and the resolution of the issues raised by the parties
depend upon the determination of the unassigned issue or error, or is
necessary to give justice to the parties.31cralawrednad
On the issue of whether or not the CA has certiorari jurisdiction over the
resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice, affirming the dismissal of
the complaint-affidavit for violation of provisions of the TCCP due to
lack of probable cause, the Court rules in negative.
The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the
resolution of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court on the ground that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.32 However, with the enactment33 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9282, amending R.A. No. 112534 by expanding the jurisdiction of
the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of
a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which
between the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to review through a
petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in preliminary investigations
involving tax and tariff offenses.
Apropos is City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo35 where the Court en banc
declared that the CTA has appellate jurisdiction over a special civil
action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in
a local tax case, despite the fact that there is no categorical statement to
that effect under R.A. No. 1125, as well as the amendatory R.A. No.
9282. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power
to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court
of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives
the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the
power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to
issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is
provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such
power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by
constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its
appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others,
a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed
tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no
perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.
x x x x
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court
provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary
to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction
over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter - precisely the split-
jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive,
especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the
tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the
role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other
court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows
that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order
issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To
rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court
decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an
incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the
pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the
intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed
with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to
the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial
court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal
soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the
power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate
jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue
a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with,
and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal,
the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete
supervision over the acts of the latter.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the
power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final
determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective.
The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere
with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending
before it.
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is
endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These
should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and
the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice
and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the
same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a
court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers
as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or
are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well
as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it
effective in behalf of the litigants.
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted
the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates."
Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter,
even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded
that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions
for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a
local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as
well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.36
Since the Court ruled in City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo31 that the
CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari questioning
an interlocutory order of the RTC in a local tax case via express
constitutional mandate and for being inherent in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, it can also be reasonably concluded based on the
same premise that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation
involving tax and tariff offenses.
If the Court were to rule that jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari assailing such DOJ resolution lies with the CA, it would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of
jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter - precisely the split-
jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative intent,
especially considering that R.A. No. 9282 expressly confers on the
CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention
of any other court that may exercise such power.38cralawrednad
Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the
amendatory R.A. No. 9282, let alone in the Constitution, that the CTA
has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. By virtue of Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial power in the
Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law, to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, in
relation to Section 5(5), Article VIII thereof, vesting upon it the power
to promulgate rules concerning practice and procedure in all courts, the
Court thus declares that the CA's original jurisdiction39 over a petition
for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation
involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to the CTA
pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282,40 and that such petition shall
be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has jurisdiction over the
petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of
the TCCR
On the procedural issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari on the sole ground of lack of verification and
certification against forum shopping, the Court rules in the affirmative,
despite the above discussion that such petition should have been filed
with the CTA.
In Traveno, et al. v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et
al.,41 the Court restated the jurisprudence on non-compliance with the
requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and
certification against forum shopping:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may
order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served
thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there
is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will
be dropped as parties to the case.' Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by
the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a
Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
his behalf.42
While it admittedly filed a petition for certiorari without a certification
against forum shopping on March 11, 2010, the BOC claimed to have
subsequently complied with such requirement by filing through
registered mail a complete set of such petition, the following day which
was also the last day of the reglementary period. The problem arose
when the CA failed to receive such complete set of the petition
for certiorari with the verification and certification against forum
shopping. In support of the motion for reconsideration of the CA's
March 26, 2010 resolution which dismissed outright the petition, the
BOC asserted that it filed a complete set of petition by registered mail.
It also submitted an affidavit of the person who did the mailing as
required by Section 12,43 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, including the
registry receipt numbers, but not the receipts themselves which were
allegedly attached to the original copy mailed to the CA. Instead of
ordering the BOC to secure a certification from the postmaster to
verify if a complete set of the petition was indeed filed by registered
mail, the CA -after examining the whole case rollo and finding that no
other set of petition with a certification against forum shopping was
duly submitted - denied the motion for reconsideration.
Faced with the issue of whether or not there is a need to relax the strict
compliance with procedural rules in order that the ends of justice may
be served thereby and whether "special circumstances or compelling
reasons" are present to warrant a liberal interpretation of such rules, the
Court rules -after a careful review of the merits of the case - in the
affirmative.
Despite the BOC's failed attempt to comply with the requirement of
verification and certification against forum shopping, the Court cannot
simply ignore the CA's perfunctory dismissal of the petition on such
sole procedural ground vis-a-vis the paramount public interest in the
subject matter and the substantial amount involved, i.e., the alleged
illegal withdrawal of oil products worth P181,988,627.00 with
corresponding duties and taxes worth P35,507,597.00. Due to the
presence of such special circumstances and in the interest of justice, the
CA should have at least passed upon the substantive issue raised in the
petition, instead of dismissing it on such procedural ground. Although
it does not condone the failure of BOC to comply with the said basic
requirement, the Court is constrained to exercise the inherent power to
suspend its own rules in order to do justice in this particular case.
Given that the petition for certiorari should have been filed with the
CTA, the mistake committed by the BOC in filing such petition before
the CA may be excused. In this regard, Court takes note that nothing in
R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282, indicates that a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed with the CTA. Despite the
enactment of R.A. No. 9282 on March 30, 2004, it was only about ten
(10) years later in the case of City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo44 that
the Court ruled that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of
such petitions is included in the powers granted by the Constitution, as
well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. While the
rule on perfection of appeals cannot be classified as a difficult question
of law,45 mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful
question of law, as in this case, may be considered as a mistake of fact,
excusing the BOC from the consequences of the erroneous filing of its
petition with the CA.
As the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari solely due to a procedural
defect without resolving the issue of whether or not the Acting
Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion in affirming the
dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause,
the Court ought to reinstate the petition and refer it to the CTA for
proper disposition. For one, as a highly specialized court specifically
created for the purpose of reviewing tax and customs cases,46 the CTA
is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of revenue-
related problems, and has necessarily developed an expertise on the
subject.47 For another, the referral of the petition to the CTA is in line
with the policy of hierarchy of courts in order to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of its docket.48cralawrednad
Be that as it may, the Court stressed in The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections49 that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not
an iron-clad rule, and that it has full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in
the petition. Recognized exceptions to the said doctrine are as follows:
(a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are
of transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression where no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on the matter;
(d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; (e)
where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the
resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews the act of a
constitutional organ; (g) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (h) the petition
includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities,
or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.50 Since
the present case includes questions that are dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, as well as to avoid multiplicity of suits and further
delay in its disposition, the Court shall directly resolve the petition
for certiorari, instead of referring it to the CTA.
On the substantive issue of whether the Acting Secretary of Justice
gravely abused her discretion in affirming the dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause, the settled policy of
non�interference in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires the
courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. As the
Court explained in Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan:51cralawrednad
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of
information in court is essentially an executive function that is lodged,
at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the
Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice have
wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation;
and their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of
probable cause are generally not subject to review by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion requires the courts to leave to the
prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts can neither
override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that
of the latter. They cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused
when the prosecutor has not found a prima facie case.
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception.
The Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action where
executive discretion has been gravely abused. In other words, the court
may intervene in the executive determination of probable cause, review
the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or
non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the
preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration
of justice.52
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined
as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.53 As explained in Sy v. Secretary of
Justice,54 citing Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice:55cralawrednad
x x x [Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The
term does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.56
To find out if there is a reasonable ground to believe that acts or
ommissions complained of constitute the offenses charged, the Court
must first examine whether or not the allegations against private
respondents in the BOC's complaint-affidavit constitute the offenses of
unlawful importation under Section 3601 and various fraudulent
practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP.
In Jardeleza v. People,57 the Court discussed the concepts of unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP, and various fraudulent
practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3601 of the TCC was designed to supplement the existing
provisions of the TCC against the means leading up to smuggling,
which might render it beneficial by a substantive and criminal statement
separately providing for the punishment of smuggling. The law was
intended not to merge into one and the same offense all the many acts
which are classified and punished by different penalties, penal or
administrative, but to legislate against the overt act of smuggling itself.
This is manifested by the use of the words "fraudulently" and "contrary
to law" in the law.
Smuggling is committed by any person who: (1) fraudulently imports or
brings into the Philippines any article contrary to law; (2) assists in so
doing any article contrary to law; or (3) receives, conceals, buys, sells or
in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment or sale of such
goods after importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law.
The phrase "contrary to law" in Section 3601 qualifies the phrases
"imports or brings into the Philippines" and "assists in so doing," and
not the word "article." The law penalizes the importation of any
merchandise in any manner contrary to law.
The word "law" includes regulations having the force and effect of law,
meaning substantive or legislative type rules as opposed to general
statements of policy or rules of agency, organization, procedures or
positions. An inherent characteristic of a substantive rule is one
affecting individual rights and obligations; the regulation must have
been promulgated pursuant to a congressional grant of quasi-legislative
authority; the regulation must have been promulgated in conformity to
with congressionally-imposed procedural requisites.
x x x x
Section 3602 of the TCC, on the other hand, provides:cralawlawlibrary
Sec. 3602. Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue. � Any
person who makes or attempts to make any entry of imported or
exported article by means of any false or fraudulent invoice,
declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false
statement, written or verbal, or by any means of any false or fraudulent
practice whatsoever, or knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or
merchandise, at less than the true weight or measures thereof or upon a
false classification as to quality or value, or by the payment of less than
the amount legally due, or knowingly and wilfully files any false or
fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of drawback or refund of
duties upon the exportation of merchandise, or makes or files any
affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or other document, with a view to
securing the payment to himself or others of any drawback, allowance
or refund of duties on the exportation of merchandise, greater than that
legally due thereon, or who shall be guilty of any wilful act or omission
shall, for each offense, be punished in accordance with the penalties
prescribed in the preceding section.
The provision enumerates the various fraudulent practices against
customs revenue, such as the entry of imported or exported articles by
means of any false or fraudulent invoice, statement or practice; the
entry of goods at less than the true weight or measure; or the filing of
any false or fraudulent entry for the payment of drawback or refund of
duties.
The fraud contemplated by law must be intentional fraud, consisting of
deception, willfully and deliberately dared or resorted to in order to give
up some right. The offender must have acted knowingly and with the
specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing financial loss to
another; even false representations or statements or omissions of
material facts come within fraudulent intent. The fraud envisaged in the
law includes the suppression of a material fact which a party is bound
in good faith to disclose. Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent
concealment are of the same genre.
Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and
that disclosure was not made when opportunity to speak and inform
was present, and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure as to a
material fact was due was thereby induced to act to his injury. Fraud is
not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of
deeds, acts or artifice of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus
allow one to obtain an undue advantage.58
In unlawful importation, also known as outright smuggling, goods and
articles of commerce are brought into the country without the required
importation documents, or are disposed of in the local market without
having been cleared by the BOC or other authorized government
agencies, to evade the payment of correct taxes, duties and other
charges. Such goods and articles do not undergo the processing and
clearing procedures at the BOC, and are not declared through
submission of import documents, such as the import entry and internal
revenue declaration.
In various fraudulent practices against customs revenue, also known as
technical smuggling, on the other hand, the goods and articles are
brought into the country through fraudulent, falsified or erroneous
declarations, to substantially reduce, if not totally avoid, the payment of
correct taxes, duties and other charges. Such goods and articles pass
through the BOC, but the processing and clearing procedures are
attended by fraudulent acts in order to evade the payment of correct
taxes, duties, and other charges. Often committed by means of
misclassification of the nature, quality or value of goods and articles,
undervaluation in terms of their price, quality or weight, and
misdeclaration of their kind, such form of smuggling is made possible
through the involvement of the importers, the brokers and even some
customs officials and personnel.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court holds that private
respondents cannot be charged with unlawful importation under
Section 3601 of the TCCP because there is no allegation in the BOC's
complaint-affidavit to the effect that they committed any of the
following acts: (1) fraudulently imported or brought into the
Philippines the subject petroleum products, contrary to law; (2) assisted
in so doing; or (3) received, concealed, bought, sold or in any manner
facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of such goods after
importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law.
The said acts constituting unlawful importation under Section 3601 of
the TCCP can hardly be gathered from the following allegations in the
BOC's complaint-affidavit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
19.1 From May 23, 2007 to February 10, 2008, UNIOIL is not an
accredited importer of the BOC;
19.2 From the time UNIOIL was accredited on February 11, 2008 until
the time of its request to withdraw its oil products on 02 May 2008,
they did not import Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas Gasoline;
19.3 The Terminalling Agreement allegedly executed between OILINK
and UNIOIL was obviously for the purpose of circumventing the
Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued against the shipments of
OILINK aside from the fact that it was only executed on 02 January
2008 after the decision of the Commissioner finding OILINK liable to
pay an administrative fine of Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four
Million Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Three Hundred Four
Pesos and 80/100 (Php2,764,859,304.80);
19.4 Only base oil should have been withdrawn by UNIOIL since it is
the only product subject of its request and approved by the
Commissioner;
19.5 UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas which were not
covered by importations;
19.6 Finally, the illegal release/withdrawal of the oil products deprived
the government of the supposed partial payment on the Php2.7 billion
liability of OILINK in the" approximate amount of Phpl81,988,627
representing the customs value of the released/withdrawn oil products
and estimated duties and taxes of Php35,507,597 due thereon or the
total amount of Php217,496,224.00.59cralawrednad
x x x x
21.1 When UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas without filing
the corresponding Import Entry, the shipment becomes unlawful per
se and thus falls under unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended;
21.2 The fact that UNIOIL and OILINK executed a belated
Terminalling Agreement after the issuance of the Warrant of Seizure
and Detention showed the fraudulent intent of the respondents
whereby UNIOIL can still withdraw the oil products stored at
OILINK's depot likewise in clear violation of section 3601 and 3602 of
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended;
21.3 The fact that the UNIOIL make [sic] it appear that they are the
owner of Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas when in truth and in fact they did
not import said products make them liable for [violation of] Section
3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended
and falsification;60
Since the foregoing allegations do not constitute the crime of unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP, the Acting Secretary of
Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the
State Prosecutor's dismissal the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause.
Neither could private respondents be charged with various fraudulent
practices against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP as
the above allegations do hot fall under any of the following acts or
omissions constituting such crime/s: (1) making or attempting to make
any entry of imported or exported article: (a) by means of any false or
fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means
of any false statement, written or verbal; or (b) by any means of any
false or fraudulent practice whatsoever; or (2) knowingly effecting any
entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than the true weight or
measures thereof or upon a false classification as to quality or value, or
by the payment of less than the amount legally due; or (3) knowingly
and wilfully filing any false or fraudulent entry or claim for the payment
of drawback or refund of duties upon the exportation of merchandise;
or (4) making or filing any affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or other
document, with a view to securing the payment to himself or others of
any drawback, allowance or refund of duties on the exportation of
merchandise, greater than that legally due thereon.
Related to various fraudulent practices against customs revenue by
means of undervaluation, misclassification and misdeclaration in the
import entry is the following provision of R.A. No. 7651 - An Act to
Revitalize and Strengthen the Bureau of Customs, Amending for the
Purpose Certain Sections of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, as amended:61cralawrednad
Sec. 2503. Undervaluation, Misclassification and Misdeclaration in Entry. -
When the dutiable value of the imported articles shall be so declared
and entered that the duties, based on the declaration of the importer on
the face of the entry, would be less by ten percent (10%) than should
be legally collected, or when the imported articles shall be so described
and entered that the duties based on the importer's description on the
face of the entry would be less by ten percent (10%) than should be
legally collected based on the tariff classification, or when the dutiable
weight, measurement or quantity of imported articles is found upon
examination to exceed by ten percent (10%) or more than the entered
weight, measurement or quantity, a surcharge shall be collected from
the importer in an amount of not less than the difference between the
full duty and the estimated duty based upon the declaration of the
importer, nor more than twice of such difference: Provided, that an
undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or
quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the value,
weight, measurement, or quantity declared in the entry, and the
actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement shall constitute a
prima facie evidence of fraud penalized under Sec. 2530 of this
Code: Provided, further, that any misdeclared or undeclared imported
articles/items found upon examination shall ipso facto be forfeited in
favor of the Government to be disposed of pursuant to the provisions
of this Code.
When the undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or
misdeclaration in the import entry is intentional, the importer
shall be subject to the penal provision under Sec. 3602 of this
Code.62
A careful reading of the BOC's complaint-affidavit would show that
there is no allegation to the effect that private respondents committed
undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of
more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight,
measurement, or quantity declared in the entry, and the actual value,
weight, quantity, or measurement which constitute prima facie evidence
of fraud. Nor is there an allegation that they intentionally committed
undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in
the import entry. Since the allegations in the BOC's complaint-affidavit
fall short of the acts or omissions constituting the various fraudulent
acts against customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP, the
Acting Secretary of Justice correctly ruled that there was no probable
cause to believe that they committed such crime/s.
While it is true that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not
include a correction of the public respondents' evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings thereon, it is sometimes necessary to
delve into factual issues in order to resolve the allegations of grave
abuse of discretion as a ground for the special civil action
of certiorari63 In light of this principle, the Court reviews the following
findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice in affirming the State
Prosecutor's dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondents are being charged for unlawful importation under Section
3601, and fraudulent practices against customs revenues under Section
3602, of the TCCP, as amended. For these charges to prosper,
complainant must prove, first and foremost, that the subject articles
were imported. On this score alone, complainant has miserably failed.
Indeed, except for complainant's sweeping allegation, no clear and
convincing proof was presented to show that the subject petroleum
products (gasoil and mogas) withdrawn by Unioil from the oil
depot/terminal of Oilink were imported. For, only when the articles are
imported that the importer/consignee is required to file an import
entry declaration and pay the corresponding customs duties and taxes.
The fact that complainant's record fails to show that an import entry
was filed for the subject articles does not altogether make out a case of
unlawful importation under Section 3601, or fraudulent practices
against customs revenue under Section 3602, of the TCCP, without
having first determined whether the subject articles are indeed
imported. Thus, in this case, complainant still bears the burden of
proof to show that the subject petroleum products are imported, by
means of documents other than the import entry declaration, such as
but not limited to, the transport documents consisting of the inward
foreign manifest, bill of lading, commercial invoice and packing list, all
indicating that the goods were bought from a supplier/seller in a
foreign country and imported or transported to the Philippines.
Instead[,] complainant merely surmised that since the subject products
were placed under warrant of seizure and detention[,] they must
necessarily be imported. Regrettably, speculation and surmises do not
constitute evidence and should not, therefore, be taken against the
respondents, x x x Taken in this light, we find more weight and
credence in respondent Unioil's claim that the subject petroleum
products were not imported by them, but were locally purchased, more
so since it was able to present local sales invoices covering the same.
Even assuming gratia argumenti that the subject petroleum products were
imported, it still behooves the complainant to present clear and
convincing proof that the importation was unlawful or that it was
carried out through any fraudulent means, practice or device to
prejudice the government. But again, complainant failed to discharge
this burden.
As can be culled from the records, the warrant of seizure and detention
docketed as Seizure Identification No. 2008-082, which covers various
gas tanks already stored at Oilink's depot/terminal located at Lucanin Pt,
Mariveles, Bataan, was issued pursuant to Section 2536, in relation to
Section 1508, of the TCCP because of Oilink's failure to pay the
administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 that was previously meted
against the company for its failure/refusal to submit to a post entry
audit. In fact, the delivery of all shipments consigned to or handled
directly or indirectly by Oilink was put on hold as per order of the
Customs Commissioner dated April 23, 2008 pursuant to Section 1508
of the TCCP, also for the same reason. There was nothing on record
which shows, or from which it could be inferred, that the warrant of
seizure and detention or hold order were imposed pursuant to Section
2530 of the same Code which relates, among others, to unlawfully
imported articles or those imported through any fraudulent practice or
device to prejudice the government, much less due to non-payment of
the corresponding customs duties and taxes due on the
shipments/articles covered by the warrant of seizure and detention.
Again, what complainant's evidence clearly shows is that Oilink's failure
to pay the administrative fine precipitated the issuance of the warrant
of seizure and detention and hold order.64
After a careful review of records, the Court affirms the dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause, but partly
digresses from the reasoning of the Acting Secretary of Justice in
arriving at such conclusion. While the Acting Secretary of Justice
correctly stated that the act of fraudulent importation of articles must
be first proven in order to be charged for violation of Section 3601 of
the TCCP, the Court disagrees that proof of such importation is also
required for various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under
Section 3602 thereof.
As held in Jardeleza v. People,65 the crime of unlawful importation under
Section 3601 of the TCCP is complete, in the absence of a bona
fide intent to make entry and pay duties when the prohibited article
enters Philippine territory. Importation, which consists of bringing an
article into the country from the outside, is complete when the taxable,
dutiable commodity is brought within the limits of the port of
entry.66 Entry through a customs house is not the essence of the
act.67 On the other hand, as regards Section 3602 of the TCCP which
particularly deals with the making or attempting to make a fraudulent
entry of imported or exported articles, the term "entry" in customs law
has a triple meaning, namely: (1) the documents filed at the customs
house; (2) the submission and acceptance of the documents; and (3) the
procedure of passing goods through the customs house.68 In view
thereof, it is only for charges for unlawful importation under Section
3601 that the BOC must first prove that the subject articles were
imported. For violation of Section 3602, in contrast, what must be
proved is the act of making or attempting to make such entry of
articles.
The Court likewise disagrees with the finding of the Acting Secretary of
Justice that the BOC failed to prove that the products subject of the
WSD were imported. No such proof was necessary because private
respondents themselves presented in support of their counter-affidavits
copies of import entries which can be considered as prima facie evidence
that OILINK imported the subject petroleum products. At any rate,
the Acting Secretary of Justice aptly gave credence to their twenty (20)
sales invoices70 covering the dates October 1, 2007 until April 30, 2008
which tend to prove that UNIOIL locally purchased such products
from OILINK even before the BOC rendered the Decision dated
December 14, 2007 imposing a P2,764,859,304.80 administrative fine,
and holding the delivery or release of its subsequently imported articles
to answer for the fine, any revised assessment and/or penalty for failure
to keep records.
The Court also finds as misplaced the BOC's reliance on the
Terminalling Agreement dated January 2, 2008 and the
Certification71 that UNIOIL made no importation of Gasoil (diesel)
and Mogas gasoline from January 2007 up to June 2008 in order to
prove that it illegally imported the said products. Such documentary
evidence tend to prove only that UNIOIL was engaged in the
importation of petroleum products and that it did not import the said
products during the said period. Such documents, however, do not
negate the evidence on record which tend to show that OILINK was
the one that filed the import entries,72 and that UNIOIL locally
purchased from OILINK such products as indicated in the sales
invoices.73 Not being the importer of such products, UNIOIL, its
directors and officers, are not required to file their corresponding
import entries. Hence, contrary to the BOC's allegation, UNIOIL's
withdrawal of the Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas gasoline without filing the
corresponding import entries can neither be considered as unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP nor as a fraudulent
practice against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof.
Moreover, the fact that private respondent Paul Chi Ting Co is both
the Chairman of UNIOIL and OILINK is not enough to justify the
application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. In fact, mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of a
substantial block of shares of a corporation does not, standing alone,
provide sufficient justification for disregarding the separate corporate
personality.74 In Kukan International Corporation v. Hon. Judge Reyes, et
al.,75 the Court explained the application of the said doctrine in this
wise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In fine, to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, it must be
shown by clear and convincing proof that the separate and distinct
personality of the corporation was purposefully employed to evade a
legitimate and binding commitment and perpetuate a fraud or like
wrongdoings. To be sure, the Court has, on numerous occasions,
applied the principle where a corporation is dissolved and its assets are
transferred to another to avoid a financial liability of the first
corporation with the result that the second corporation should be
considered a continuation and successor of the first entity.
In those instances when the Court pierced the veil of corporate fiction
of two corporations, there was a confluence of the following
factors:cralawlawlibrary
1. A first corporation is dissolved;
2. The assets of the first corporation is transferred to a second
corporation to avoid a financial liability of the first corporation; and
3. Both corporations are owned and controlled by the same persons
such that the second corporation should be considered as a
continuation and successor of the first corporation.76
Granted that the principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity comes
into play only during the trial of the case for the purpose of
determining liability,77 it is noteworthy that even the BOC itself
virtually recognized that OILINK and UNIOIL are separate and
distinct entities when it alleged that only the base oil products should
have been withdrawn by UNIOIL, since they were the only products
subject of its request and approved by the Customs Commissioner. As
discussed above, however, private respondents were able to present
sales invoices which tend to show that UNIOIL locally purchased
Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas gasoline products from OILINK. Hence, the
BOC cannot invoke the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity
in this case.
On a final note, the Court stresses that OILINK, its directors or
officers, and Victor D. Piamonte, the Licensed Customs Broker, may
still be held liable for various fraudulent practices against customs
revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP, if the final results of the
post-entry audit and examination would show that they committed any
of the following acts or omissions: (1) making or attempting to make
any entry of imported or exported article: (a) by means of any false or
fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means
of any false statement, written or verbal; or (b) by any means of any
false or fraudulent practice; or (2) intentional undervaluation,
misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in the import entries;
or (3) undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or
quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight,
measurement, or quantity declared in the entries, and the actual value,
weight, quantity, or measurement. This is consistent with Section
230178 (Warrant for Detention of Property-Cash Bond) of the TCCP
which states that nothing therein shall be construed as relieving the
owner or importer from any criminal liability which may arise from any
violation of law committed in connection with the importation of
articles, which in this case were placed under a WSD for failure of the
importer, OILINK, to submit the required post-entry audit documents
under CAO No. 4-2004.
In addition, OILINK and its directors or officers may be held liable
under Section 16 of R.A. No. 9135:79cralawrednad
SEC. 16. A new section to be known as Section 3611 is hereby inserted
in Part 3, Title VII of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
as amended, which shall read as follows:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 3611. Failure to Pay Correct Duties and Taxes on Imported Goods. - Any
person who, after being subjected to post-entry audit and
examination as provided in Section 3515 of Part 2, Title VII
hereof, is found to have incurred deficiencies in duties and taxes
paid for imported goods, shall be penalized according to three (3)
degrees of culpability subject to any mitigating, aggravating or
extraordinary factors that are clearly established by the available
evidence:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Negligence - When the deficiency results from an offender's failure,
through an act or acts of omission or commission, to exercise
reasonable care and competence to ensure that a statement made is
correct, it shall be determined to be negligent and punishable by a fine
equivalent to not less than one-half (1/2) but not more than two (2)
times the revenue loss.
(b) Gross Negligence - When a deficiency results from an act or acts of
omission or commission done with actual knowledge or wanton
disregard for the relevant facts and with indifference to or disregard for
the offender's obligation under the statute, it shall be determined to be
grossly negligent and punishable by a fine equivalent to not less than
two and a half (2 1/2) but not more than four (4) times the revenue
loss.
(c) Fraud - When the material false statement or act in connection with
the transaction was committed or omitted knowingly, voluntarily and
intentionally, as established by clear and convincing evidence, it shall be
determined to be fraudulent and be punishable by a fine equivalent to
not less than five (5) times but not more than eight (8) times the
revenue loss and imprisonment of not less than two (2) years but not
more than eight (8) years.
The decision of the Commissioner of Customs, upon proper hearing,
to impose penalties as prescribed in this Section may be appealed in
accordance with Section 2402 hereof.80
With respect to the directors or officers of OILINK, they may further
be held liable jointly and severally for all damages suffered by the
government on account of such violation of Sections 3602 and 3611 of Presidential CHICO-NAZARIO, Commission for the Urban Poor
the TCCP, upon clear and convincing proof that they willfully and (PCUP), GARCIA, and MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE,
knowingly voted for or assented to patently unlawful acts of the in VELASCO, JR., JJ. his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City,
corporation or was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of
its corporate affairs. the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and SECRETARY FLORENTE Promulgated: SORIQUEZ, in
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Appeals Resolutions dated March 26, 2010 and August 4, 2010, in CA- Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL
G.R. SP No. 113069, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The GOVERNMENT August 3, 2006 CENTER
Resolution dated December 28, 2009 of the Acting Secretary of Justice ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE,
Agnes VST Devanedera, which upheld the State Prosecutor's dismissal Respondents.
of the complaint-affidavit filed by the Bureau of Customs for lack of
probable cause, is AFFIRMED. This is without prejudice to the filing
of the appropriate criminal and administrative charges under Sections The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
3602 and 3611 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
amended, against private respondents OILINK, its officers and
directors, and Victor D. Piamonte, if the final results of the post-entry order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent
audit and examination would show that they violated the said respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations
provisions.
(IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the National
SO ORDERED.cha Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS G.R. No. 163980
ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
F. APOLINARIO, in his personal
capacity and as President of Holy homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., Present: represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-
Petitioners, - versus - SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ, petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association.

in his capacity as Chairman of the CARPIO,
Housing and Urban Development AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), CORONA,
ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, CARPIO MORALES,
in his capacity as General Manager of CALLEJO, SR.,the
National Housing Authority (NHA), AZCUNA, MR. PERCIVAL
CHAVEZ, in his TINGA, capacity as Chairman of the
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National
Government Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the
filing of the instant petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary
Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General
Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival
Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor
(PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea
Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH).
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential
issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now
known as the National Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution
Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national
government site to be known as the NGC.[1]
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the
reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and
authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct
sale to the bona fide residents therein.[2]
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the
portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of
families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments
socialized housing program.[3]
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed
into law R.A. No. 9207. Among the salient provisions of the law are the
following:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to secure the land
tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands
located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for
housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious
and other purposes.
SEC. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of
the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents.
Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby
amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184
hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east
side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the
same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona
fide residents on the west side shall be based on the
census survey conducted in 1994 and the
determination of the bona fide residents on the east side
shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994
and occupancy verification survey conducted in
 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal
agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or
implemented and actions taken, consistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
SEC. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of
the National Government Center Site for Local Government or
Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational
and Religious Purposes. Certain portions of land within
the aforesaid area for local government or community
facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and
religious institutions are hereby reserved for
disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only
those institutions already operating and with existing
facilities or structures, or those occupying the land
may avail of the disposition program established under
the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in
ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of
in favor of these institutions, the existing site
allocation shall be used as basis
therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the
reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without
specific lot allocations, the land area that may be
allocated to them shall be based on the area actually
used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of
this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207,[4] the
Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the
instant petition, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4),
3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING
AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003
SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID
FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW
IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4),
3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING
AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003
SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID
FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND
WHIMSICAL.[5]
First, the procedural matters.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that
petitioner Association cannot question the implementation of Section
3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right over the
NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the maximum lot area
that may be awarded to a resident-beneficiary of the NGC East Side,
while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a
qualified beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the
prescribed period.[6] Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner
association is not the duly recognized peoples organization in the NGC
and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot question operates to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR.
the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC.[7] Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury
arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
disqualified and eliminated from the selection process. While it is true
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side only and thus
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
cannot be affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
refers to the NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed provisions of the
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[8]

Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the

instant petition, whether or not it is the duly recognized association of
homeowners in the NGC. There is no dispute that the individual
members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such
they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the
enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of
beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus,
petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it
believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the
OSGs allegation that the failure of petitioner association and its
members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars them from
questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus
standi. The petition does not merit dismissal on that ground.
There are, however, other procedural impediments to the
granting of the instant petition. The OSG claims that the instant
petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of
prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function.[9] Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section
2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition
should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part,
respondent Mayor of Quezon City[10] and respondent NHA[11] contend
that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the
instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals,
which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be
spurned as a consequence.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-
making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within
the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers.[12]
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however,
applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.[13]
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative
power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The
petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the
Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object
and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is
assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.[14]
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of
its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must
follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give
the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[15]
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or
the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant.[16] A direct
invocation of the Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[17]
 In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[18] the Court said that it will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[19] A
perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling,
special or important reasons to warrant the Courts taking cognizance of
the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any
reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity
of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII
of the
Constitution,[20] the Courts power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus,
following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition
should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to
assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in
excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[21] Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not
against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose
of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly
channels.[22] Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance
the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
law by which such relief can be obtained.[23] Where the principal relief
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action
for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that
respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined
by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining
order.
In a number of petitions,[24] the Court adequately resolved
them on other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality
issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In

like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the
foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its
duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy
resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed
or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the
Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes
of justice require it cannot be questioned.[25]
Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The
outcome, however, is just as dismal for petitioners.
Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to
the bonafide residents
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
xxxx
(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall
be based on the Code of Policies and subject to the
condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only
one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and
maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject further to the
availability of lots.
xxxx
are constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in
(b.2) Applications for qualification as
beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated based on
the Code of Policies including the minimum and
maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
xxxx
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell
(a) Westside
(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall
execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty
(60) days from the effectivity of the IRR in
order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
xxxx
(c) for both eastside and westside
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who
failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in
item a.1 above in case of westside and in case
of eastside six (6) months after approval of
the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot
price escalation.
The rate shall be based on the
formula to be set by the National Housing
Authority factoring therein the affordability
criteria. The new rate shall be approved by the
NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC).
Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR
conflict with the object and purpose of the law sought to be
implemented.
First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be
awarded to qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the
IRR is not in harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which
mandates that the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based
on the area actually used or occupied by bona fide residents without
limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.
The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be
classified into two groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona
fide residents within the NGC site and certain government institutions
including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the
allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to
its bona fideresidents and the manner by which this area may be
distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the
other hand, governs the lot disposition to government institutions.
While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso
mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area actually
used or occupied at the time of the laws effectivity, this proviso applies
only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government,
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which
do not have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of
NGC. There is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of
the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him.
Petitioners interpretation is also not supported by the policy of
R.A. No. 9207 and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The
governments policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not
only the urban poor but also the local government and various
government
institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and
religious purposes.[26] Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized
the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the
entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject to the
condition that those portions being used or earmarked for public or
quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the housing program
for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land use
can be read in Proclamation No. 248 issued by then President Ramos.
Although the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the
population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional property
within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized the
vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified previously by
Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would
not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona
fide residents in the NGC.
In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the
institutional beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied
by them; hence, the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries
is fixed and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional
beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries
would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of
the NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation
on the area to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a
necessary consequence.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes
the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not
provide for the price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary
who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the
approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while
there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they
conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and
should be nullified. The argument deserves scant consideration.
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated
or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not
necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof.[27] All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law.[28]
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the
power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the
disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority
and the statutes objective of urban poor housing is the power of the
Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property
may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the
Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions
governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the
objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted from the
statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the
Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical
expertise over these matters.
The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots
may be likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In
case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been worth noting that petitioner association is not a duly recognized
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to peoples organization.
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.[29] In this regard,
In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or
petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is
regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process
unreasonable.
requirement is deemed complied with. That there is observance of
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption
imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.
the prescribed period is also within the Committees authority to
formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural
Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions deficiencies.
governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is
reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a
DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
period within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This
condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not
SO ORDERED.
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
IRR suffers from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN,
adopted and concurred in by several representatives of peoples ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE
BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO
organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that HENARES, petitioners,
only two representatives from duly recognized peoples organizations vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND
must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to
use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic
Situation Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB) of the National Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian
Development Bank,3 the Manila Observatory4 and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and
low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-
powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their
concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a
compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and
related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures
of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and
compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions –
have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure
and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of
certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to
other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons,
oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates
acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts
to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause
retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner,
another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned
but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the
necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the
nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the
country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel
stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of
power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high
demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely
to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us
to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that
in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and
Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into
the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430
million.8 The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused
the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at
about US$140 million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is
valued at about US$120 million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro
Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to
six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170
million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when
compared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for
Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in
1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila
have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among
jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of
respiratory symptoms among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent
among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in
Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than
their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to
the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from
PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners,
CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although
containing small amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and
odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces
much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90
percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces
NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half;
emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide.
Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it
produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for
their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require
PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section
414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean
Air Act of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted
petitioners' motion to implead the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor
General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy
since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation,
board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing existing
jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a
discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of
motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act
No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative
fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as
alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs
use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to
implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC.
Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under
Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the
specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve
fuel compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions. He
adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is
limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and
the herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission
standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court should declare
the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in
accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No.
8749, specifically Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that
under these laws and with all the available information provided by the
DOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence
of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by
PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the
emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the
people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the
law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to
the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the
Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as
follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS
SUPPORTED BY LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE
AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC
UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL
GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE
COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY
VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS
THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal
personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus
issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative
fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987
Constitution is the policy statement that bestows on the people the
right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is
enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation of this policy is articulated
in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for
their standing to file the instant petition. They aver that when there is
an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their
right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all
remedies to challenge this omission by the government. This, they say,
is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then,
the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents'
functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the
respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not
in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The
Solicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the
emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative
engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should be
addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would
compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only
procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and
unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
in his ponencia in the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners
have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents
do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one
fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover,
as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set
aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this
issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental
importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they
be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount
importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is
also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to
emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of
petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the
petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper
remedy, and if the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under
any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally
entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
this being its main objective. It does not lie to require
anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a
course of conduct, nor to control or review the
exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it
is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that
he should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the
respondent to perform the act required. It never issues
in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that
the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be
clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to
do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his
duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to
which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither
confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and
to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and
enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already
articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the
Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act
specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility
of implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as
follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall
implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set
pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve
the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review,
revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the
need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major
pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for
the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
 b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with
the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan for
the control and management of air pollution from motor
vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework
. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is
tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of
developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it
devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to
oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
InOposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government
agencies to advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air
Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel.
Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the
use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an
executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public
vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas
Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February
24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean
burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce
substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power
Project as representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the
Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its
objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport.
Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the
development of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in
strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-powered
PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series
of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the
natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB
and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly,
par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop
an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in
PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and
Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential
franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to
NGVs in newly opened routes…" A thorough reading of the executive
order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being
addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by
the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein
sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law
as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB
and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At
most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii),
Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the
results of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of
government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither
is inferior to the other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation
and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this
Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm.
Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we
give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by
themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a
balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice"
in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the
destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the
right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we
said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now
explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-
founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would
not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come. . ."29

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm
the premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in
the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air
pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the
environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the
citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air
pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that
petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable
legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of
mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It
appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems
bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is
taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus

is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.