G.R. No.

504 September 16, 1902

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,

vs.
TOMASA DE LOS REYES, defendant-appellee.

LADD, J.:

This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila, taken by the complaining witness, Julian Gonzalez, from a judgment of acquittal,
upon a complaint for bigamy under article 471 of the Penal Code.

The defendant was married to the complaining witness in Manila, May 27, 1897. After living together in Manila for a time they separated, the
defendant remaining in the house where they had been previously living until some time subsequent to July 12, 1900. On that day she was
married in Manila by a Protestant clergyman to Ramon Martinez. Her defense is that she honestly believed her first husband was dead when she
married Martinez.

It appears that the mother and some other relatives of Gonzalez lived, after the separation, in the same house with the defendant. Gonzalez
testifies that the separation took place in March, 1900, and that he also lived for some months in the lower story of the same house, the defendant
living in the upper story. He further testifies that after he left this house and went to live elsewhere he visited his relatives there nearly every day
down to a few days before the trial, which took place in September, 1901. He says that he often saw his wife at these times, supplying her with
means for her support through his relatives, but that he never spoke with her. A short time after her second marriage the defendant moved away
from the house and has since lived elsewhere.

The defendant testifies that she and Gonzalez had been living together a year and two months when the separation took place. That would fix the
date of the separation in July, 1898. She testifies that some time during the year following the separation she was told by the mother of Gonzalez
that she had been informed that her son was dead, that thereupon prayers were said for his soul for nine nights, and that she put on mourning and
wore it a year. She says that she contracted the second marriage with the consent of the mother of Gonzalez, and believing that the information
which she had received from her as to the death of Gonzalez was true. The mother of Gonzalez died before the trial.

There was some further evidence from other witnesses on both sides, but it was of such a character as to throw but little light upon the facts of the
case. On the whole, we have reached the conclusion, though not without some hesitation, that the story told by the defendant is in the main more
likely to be true than false, and that she probably did contract the second marriage under a bona fide belief that the first marriage had been
dissolved by the death of Gonzalez.

(FIRST) We have recently held, in the United States vs. Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique Rodriguez, decided January 27, 1902, that there can be no
conviction under article 475 of the Penal Code, where by reason of a mistake of fact the intention to commit the crime does not exist, and we
think the same principle must apply to this case. The defendant was therefore properly acquitted of the crime charged in the complaint.

We are, however, of the opinion that the defendant is chargeable with criminal negligence in contracting the second marriage, and should have
been convicted under article 568 of the Penal Code. (See G.O., No. 58, sec. 29.) It does not appear that she made any attempt to ascertain for
herself whether the information received by her mother-in-law as to the death of Gonzalez was to be relied upon. She never even saw or
communicated directly in any way with the persons who gave her mother-in-law this information. Moreover, viewing the testimony in the light
most favorable to her, she waited less than two years after hearing the death of her husband before contracting the second marriage. The diligence
with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is to perform. In a
matter so important to the good order of society as that in question, where the consequences of a mistake are necessarily so serious, nothing less
than the highest degree of diligence will satisfy the standard prescribed by the law. We can not say that the defendant has acted with that
diligence in the present case.

Applying the provisions of article 568 of the Penal Code, the act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage, the prior marriage not having
been lawfully dissolved, being one which, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, the offense committed by the defendant is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree. There being no aggravating circumstance,
and as we think the extenuating circumstance of article 11 of the Penal Code may properly be considered in this case, this penalty should be
applied in its minimum degree.

We therefore sentence the defendant to four months and one day of arresto mayor and costs. The judgment of the court below will be modified in
accordance with this opinion. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very
nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts
was available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the weight of
the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts
disclose by the record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual
Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from
the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants,
who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the
building, by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire
length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a
small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing
against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there
were no other openings of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of the
porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter
the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In
the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden
opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called
to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in
which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an
understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the
house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at officers' quarters
No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their
room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano heard cries for
assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back
to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron"
because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was
playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he
was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on
the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the
death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder
if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape, with the thief
advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such
an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the
property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part
of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the knife to defend
his person or his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to
the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this
question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law
is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal
Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met.,
596; Yates vs. People, 32 N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal
intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been
said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and expressly
declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held
criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein, unless it
appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But
while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the
Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the
general provisions of article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts
negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is
different from that which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is
little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is
criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is
so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the
measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has
been otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the corruption was of one
particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be
different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free,
intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and
that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the
code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and
included in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act
which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p.
16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . . in order to
affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of
ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use
of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and
an intent to cause the injury which may be the object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his
three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary
element or criminal intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act defined and
punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein
defined becomes clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished
with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less
grave crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed
in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in
the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions
is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose
any criminal liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and
American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation,
"wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in a
statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes
"malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a particular
individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that
reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent
must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this
doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between private
parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind.
So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness, without which
it can not be. And neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other,
that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to
us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus
me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of the like sort. In this, as just said,
criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves
without any respect to the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty
simply on the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine
among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But
 with the return of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his neighbors does not offend.
And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for
what he did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy
itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that
the plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her immutable
truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that
no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption of
the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in
our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited
class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases
cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure
from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and
if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that
in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point
of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from
no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as
laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C.,
387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox
C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith,
and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent,
criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or,
in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
— he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately
extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine
of reason and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man
undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not punish him though
they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large
array of cases there cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a
footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is
killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life and property
are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be
innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the facts when he took
the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent
mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of the
"act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that
the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious design against him, and under that
supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either
manslaughter or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the
grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:

A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and
using violent menaces against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
 hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was
loaded with powder only, and that the real design of B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that
he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a man so attacked must,
before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential
right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable
grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are
somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light
than reflected from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom
he did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he turned, seized
the person and took from his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking
him to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It
turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died
in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always
sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence.
Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances related in
paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor,
without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force used, and in accordance
with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs.
Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the facts found
by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was
nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might have executed their
criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts
executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more especially because his
assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not
exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with
which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house
and the consteration which naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish whether there
was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did not apply
paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
266.) .

QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point
where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!"
because of which, and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice of one of his
friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the
body lying upon the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of
a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in
toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so find, but only found in favor of the
accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and,
therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his
appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the
person calling to him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were rational and the
shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window —
at this, he puts his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise
his house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of whom
addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall
this man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the
accused a majority of the requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for the means,
employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the
supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night in a remote
spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23,
1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the
information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no
more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt
from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in
falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened
his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which
he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000 – Saksakan Simbahan, Insane Murderer

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal
Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition.

In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of
one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to kill one
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said
weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab
Wound" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City,
to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2

At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that accused-appellant could not properly
and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the
psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an order
confining him at the said hospital. 3

The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused-appellant. Finding that
the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. 4

The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellant's behalf. 5

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death
certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the
policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victim's sister. The prosecution established the following
facts:

In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M.,
nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While the Bishop was
giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned
around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting
the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping
the chair's armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will happen, I will not move out!" Hearing this, Santillan moved
away. 6

Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant and told him to
vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellant's
hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latter's hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when
suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell.
Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him.
He got up, went to the microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on
it again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. 7

Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the
cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the
altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands.
Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went
near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other.
Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard
tucked around his waist. 8 He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.

In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-
respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound." 9 He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just below the left
throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following findings:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 1/2" x 1 1/2" penetrating. The edge of
one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.

2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2". The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and
pointed.

INTERNAL FINDINGS

Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel
was severely cut. 10

After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a "Demurrer to Evidence." He claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression
by the victim when he tapped accused-appellant's hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate
his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind. 11

The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused "pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound
mind;" that after he made the first stab, he "furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he
was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted;" and the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial
court in its order of January 6, 1995. 12

On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez
requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine
whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with appellant
because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his family. 13

As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail warden's letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of accused-
appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the
city jail warden was not the proper person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not. 14

In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the "Demurrer to Evidence". 15 Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for
Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Appellant's counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not
been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while asleep;
that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste matter and burned them inside the cell which again
caused panic among the inmates. Appellant's counsel prayed that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at
the Baguio General Hospital. 16 Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail
Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge informing him of appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court
order for the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant. 17 The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to
Inspector Llopis from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president,
secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of appellant's unusual behavior and requested that immediate action be taken
against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail. 18

On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the "Demurrer to Evidence." The court ordered accused-
appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996. 19

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, 20 a resident
physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellant's medical and clinical records at the said
hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered
from "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;" 22 and after four (4) days of confinement, he
was discharged in improved physical and mental condition. 23 The medical and clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr.
Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and
treatment after "a relapse of his violent behavior;" 24 (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH; 25 (3) the consent slip of appellant's wife
voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; 26 (4) the Patient's Record; 27 (5) the Consent for Discharge signed by appellant's wife; 28 (6) the
Summary and Discharges of appellant; 29 (7) appellant's clinical case history; 30 (8) the admitting notes; 31 (9) Physician's Order Form; 32 (10) the
Treatment Form/medication sheet; 33 and (11) Nurses' Notes. 34

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in view
of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced
to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt

The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED. 25

In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.

II

THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS
ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE. 36

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him. 37 Under the classical theory on which
our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free Will. 38 Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free
will to choose between good and evil. 39 When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done
voluntarily, 40 i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. 41 Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as
free will appears unimpaired. 42

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind 43 and that all acts are voluntary. 44 The moral and
legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. 45 This presumption, however, may
be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability. 46

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
 When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall
order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused
insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum
for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a
verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution. 47

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. 48 The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." 49 He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. 50

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive
evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 52

To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a
reasonable period both before and after that time. 53 Direct testimony is not required. 54 Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by
overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to the practice
of people of sound mind. 56

In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct
proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto
Santillan 57 attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not
have been in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit
in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes
against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during
sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He
nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which the rational person would have
been made. He then returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing happened.

Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the court's attention on the day of arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved
for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental condition. The
Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. — The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary,
his confinement for such purpose.

(b) x x x xxx xxx

The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition of such
nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court
must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such
confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor
can he give an intelligent plea thereto. 58

The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. 59 And the test to determine whether the proceedings will
be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. This rule was laid
down as early as 1917, thus:

In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused person on the ground of present insanity,
the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such
suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law
secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not
necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself. 60
In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present insanity" or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is separate and distinct
from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the crime's commission. "Present insanity" is commonly referred to as "competency to stand trial" 61 and relates to the
appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendant's present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. 62 In
competency cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of the offense which relates to a determination of his guilt.
However, if he is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be found competent. Incompetency to
stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones the trial. 63

In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his counsel
to the end that any available defense may be interposed. 64 This test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of
the rule at common law. 65 Thus:

[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place, and [has] some recollection of events, but
that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 66

There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with
information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation
to it. 67 The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer coherently with his
counsel. The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings. 68

The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public. 69It has been held that it is
inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. 70 To put a legally incompetent person on trial
or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial 71 and due process of law; 72 and this has several reasons
underlying it. 73 For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the
proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of
the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the
right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may
be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and
one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the
courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension
fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a
conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and
becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension
which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of
his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who
cannot comprehend its significance. 74

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. 75 Mere
allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt" 76 or a "bona fide doubt" 77 as to
defendant's competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior, history of
mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or even lay
testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular case. 78

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accused's mental condition, the trial court
denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered
intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.

The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 79

The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough
to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that "effectively renders [the accused] unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto." It is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as
to fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea of "not guilty" was not made by
accused-appellant but by the trial court "because of his refusal to plead." 80

The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some
other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellants
competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light
of the latter's history of mental illness.

If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge's mind of accused-appellants competency to stand trial,
subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge
informing him of accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain
in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant's counsel filed a "Motion to
Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Attached to this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of
Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2)
attached letters, 81 the judge ignored the "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." The records are barren
of any order disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence. 82

Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a "lifetime illness" and that this requires
maintenance medication to avoid relapses. 83 After accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the hospital, not
even for a check-up. 84

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf
because he was "suffering from mental illness." 85 This manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after the crime, and still,
the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellant's state of mind, the
judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the
judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!

Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." 86 The human mind is an entity, and understanding
it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. 87 Thus, an intelligent
determination of an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental
condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal
question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time, the accused's abilities may be measured against the specific demands a
trial will make upon him. 88

If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have served a dual purpose 89 by determining both
his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made
immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused. 90 The crime in the instant case was
committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to
evaluate appellant's mental condition at the time of the crime's commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. 91 Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant's competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable
him to participate, in his trial meaningfully.

By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial.1awphil The trial court's negligence
was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People v.
Serafica, 92 we ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The
accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of "guilty" to all three charges
and was sentenced to death. We found that the accused's plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was "not in full possession
of his mental faculties when he killed the victim;" and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical examination to determine his
degree of insanity at the time of commission of the crime. 93

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-
appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental
examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.