Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 11

TANADA VS ANGARA G.R. No.

118295

Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The
WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the
vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers
in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common
interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution 21 is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by
Dean Vicente Sinco. 22 These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready
for enforcement through the courts. 23 They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise
of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 24 the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and
some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation."

CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG


PILIPINAS G.R. No. 148208

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation
or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because
of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS


COMMISSION GR NO. 103532

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that when the
pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled
in favor of labor. While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code
shall be resolved in favor of labor,[20] it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is
essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of
the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are,
likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC,[21] we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier
influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC,[22] we declared:


Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.

JENNY M. AGABON and VIRGILIO C. AGABON vs. NATIONAL LABOR


RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 158693

Justice Isagani Cruz strongly asserts the need to apply a balanced approach to labor-management
relations and dispense justice with an even hand in every case:

We have repeatedly stressed that social justice or any justice for that matter is for the
deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true
that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom
the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to
give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or reject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike,
according to the mandate of the law.[35]

Justice in every case should only be for the deserving party. It should not be presumed that every case of
illegal dismissal would automatically be decided in favor of labor, as management has rights that should
be fully respected and enforced by this Court. As interdependent and indispensable partners in nation-
building, labor and management need each other to foster productivity and economic growth; hence, the
need to weigh and balance the rights and welfare of both the employee and employer.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations
Commission.[36] The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of
dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the
nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 170830

A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the course of
setting their terms and conditions of employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic war
between labor and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and
its members, and one that must also necessarily affect management and its members.[14]
In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be exercised responsibly and must always
rest on rational basis, free from emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot heads;
it must focus on legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to public
welfare, and must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice
is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.[15]

Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management but also the general peace
and progress of the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. Procedurally, for a
strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 263[16] of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of
strike be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date
thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; and (c) a notice be given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike.

These requirements are mandatory, and the unions failure to comply renders the strike illegal.[17] The 15
to 30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the
dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended
to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the
majority of the union members.[18]

Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike
may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal.[19] The means become illegal when they
come within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides:

No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or


intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for
lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.

Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC and the CA, we
find the PILA strike illegal. We intervene and rule even on the evidentiary and factual issues of this case
as both the NLRC and the CA grossly misread the evidence, leading them to inordinately incorrect
conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike undisputably had not been marred by actual violence
and patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA officers and members undertook as part of
their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs premises, thus
preventing non-striking employees and company vehicles from entering the PHIMCO compound. In this
manner, the picketers violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.
DOMINADOR ANUCENSION AND 114 OTHERS vs. NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS G.R. No. L-26097

Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to
discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even as I though the burden may be
characterized being only indirect. But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a
general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, wordly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy
and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can
make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is
enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor
and capital and industry. More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that 'the State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment and security in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects
that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection i of said employees
against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a
burden or, other religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the with, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the
Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption The effects of closed shop
agreement does not directly advance diminish, the interests of any particular religion, Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The
establishment clause' (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely
happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the
Constitution has been interpreted to required that religious exercise be preferentially aided.

ROSALINA PEREZ ABELLA/HDA. DANAO-RAMONA vs. THE HONORABLE


NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 71813

The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious-the protection of the workers whose employment is
terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law,
employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled —
for the thirty three years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco.
Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing
that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new
employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing.
In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration. (Volshel Labor Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 43 [1985]). It is
the kind of interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of
the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a
greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with
the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.

ANTONIO SERRANO VS GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES G.R. No. 167614

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18,[63] Article II and Section 3,[64] Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place
of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security
and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is
enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.[65]

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of
classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is
based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions
only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.[66]

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law:
a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally
related to serving a legitimate state interest;[67] b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government
must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at
least substantially related to serving that interest;[68] and c) strict judicial scrutiny[69] in which a legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right[70] or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class[71] is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.[72]

The Court notes that the subject clause or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less contains the qualifying phrases every year and unexpired term. By its ordinary meaning, the word term means a
limited or definite extent of time.[105] Corollarily, that every year is but part of an unexpired term is significant in many
ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, there would be no occasion for such
unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for
otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive
factor in the determination of when the subject clause for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less shall apply is not the length of the original contract period as held in Marsaman,[106] but the
length of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired portion
of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more than
one year.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are
for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled
to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries
for three months only.

G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. FILEMON
REMIGIO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS

I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure
proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27
had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands.
There is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as accelerated under
P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of
the police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that the
Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the state (citations omitted). One limitation on the contract clause arises from the police
power, the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights (citation omitted). The situation
here, is like that in eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public
use, and the only condition to be complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically, the
condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate
or take for public use (citation omitted). As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by
the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation. (Opinion No. 92, Series of 1978; Rollo,
pp. 88-89.)
G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995 THE CONFERENCE OF
MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC VS POEA

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the Humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to
all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be
read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value
and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating
to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by
the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
morals; comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected,
for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them. 19

Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power
of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 20 And
under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they
are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:

Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with
public interest that labor contracts lust yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject
to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
G.R. No. 164301 BPI VS BPI EMPLOYEES UNION

At the outset, we should call to mind the spirit and the letter of the Labor Code provisions on union
security clauses, specifically Article 248 (e), which states, x x x Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall
stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for
employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the
signing of the collective bargaining agreement.[1] This case which involves the application of a collective
bargaining agreement with a union shop clause should be resolved principally from the standpoint of the
clear provisions of our labor laws, and the express terms of the CBA in question, and not by inference from
the general consequence of the merger of corporations under the Corporation Code, which obviously
does not deal with and, therefore, is silent on the terms and conditions of employment in corporations or
juridical entities.

A closed-shop agreement has been considered as one form of union security whereby
only union members can be hired and workers must remain union members as a
condition of continued employment. The requirement for employees or workers to
become members of a union as a condition for employment redounds to the benefit and
advantage of said employees because by holding out to loyal members a promise of
employment in the closed-shop the union wields group solidarity. In fact, it is said that
"the closed-shop contract is the most prized achievement of unionism."
xxxx
This Court had categorically held in the case of Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co., Inc., et
al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-16561, Jan. 28, 1961, that the closed-
shop proviso of a collective bargaining agreement entered into between an employer and
a dulyauthorized labor union is applicable not only to the employees or laborers that are
employed after the collective bargaining agreement had been entered into but also to old
employees who are not members of any labor union at the time the said collective
bargaining agreement was entered into. In other words, if an employee or laborer is
already a member of a labor union different from the union that entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the employer providing for a closed-shop, said employee or
worker cannot be obliged to become a member of that union which had entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with the employer as a condition for his continued
employment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, since the former FEBTC employees are deemed covered by the Union Shop Clause, they
are required to join the certified bargaining agent, which supposedly has gathered the support of the
majority of workers within the bargaining unit in the appropriate certification proceeding. Their joining
the certified union would, in fact, be in the best interests of the former FEBTC employees for it unites their
interests with the majority of employees in the bargaining unit. It encourages employee solidarity and
affords sufficient protection to the majority status of the union during the life of the CBA which are the
precisely the objectives of union security clauses, such as the Union Shop Clause involved herein. We are
indeed not being called to balance the interests of individual employees as against the State policy of
promoting unionism, since the employees, who were parties in the court below, no longer contested the
adverse Court of Appeals decision. Nonetheless, settled jurisprudence has already swung the balance in
favor of unionism, in recognition that ultimately the individual employee will be benefited by that
policy. In the hierarchy of constitutional values, this Court has repeatedly held that the right to abstain
from joining a labor organization is subordinate to the policy of encouraging unionism as an instrument
of social justice.

G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000 INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF


EDUCATORS (ISAE) vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School,
mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in
other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for
work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on
fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," [25] "to
afford labor full protection."[26] The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital.[27] These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public
interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common
good.[28] Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no
reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not
deserve the sympathy of this Court.

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the
entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."[29] The
factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and
duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.[30] The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure
to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.[31]
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-
hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that
these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security
of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the
local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related
to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-
hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective
collective bargaining rights.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi