G.R. Nos.
L-66075-76 July 5, 1990 However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to
EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO
BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO
MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, respondents.
The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the
east in the province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo
Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river
were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No.
5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner
Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).
As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on
the western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these
occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents,
namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878,
7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who
owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession
in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12
hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead
Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug).
Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. F-
Binayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the
predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its
eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh.
E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo
Binayug on the western bank.
its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad,
and the spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on
the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross
the river.
In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on
their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners,
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same
lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.
On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a
complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares
and its 6.6-hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug
filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their
accretions.
On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made:
In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao,
Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their
representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together
with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of
Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these defendants to restore ownership in favor of
Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario
Melad.
In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor,
Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan,
Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad,
Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri
and Juan Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots
3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and
7892, together with its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo
1
 Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages which
were not properly proven and to costs.
SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-
25, Rollo.)
Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in
Civil Case No. 344-T, only defendants-petitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero
Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But
upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution
pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi
and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented
evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).
On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendants-
appellants.
In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals erred:
1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents'
estate as a result of accretion;
2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to
pertain to petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being
the owners thereof; and
3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is
not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan
River when it reverted to its old bed
The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the
private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they
were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a
finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457
of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters. (366)
Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that
the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found:
. . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of
49 years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has
become greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases.
Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern
it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial
evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is
overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar
Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so.
Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor
impliedly said so when he testified that when Solana Cadastre was executed in
1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919. This
could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by
the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by
the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . .
. (p. 27, Rollo.)
The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan
River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was
gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5
hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956,
was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it.
Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug,
grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through
alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to
2
riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason,
9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is
because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to
the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers
as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right
of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).i•t•c-aüsl
The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it
reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other
side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply
to this situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an
estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the
owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the
ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a
piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by
the current. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a
strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be
"separated from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the
ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against
the petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989
LEONIDA CUREG, ROMEO, PEPITO, HERNANDO, MANUEL, ANTONIO
AND ELPIDIO (ALL SURNAMED CARNIYAN) petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES DIVISION),
DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES
GERARDO, FLORDELIZA GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD, respondent.
This petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated October 15,1985 in
AC-G.R. CV No. 03852 entitled "Domingo Apostol, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.
Leonida Cureg, et al., Defendants-Appellants", which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch XXII declaring private respondent Domingo
Apostol the absolute owner of a parcel of land, situated in Barangay Casibarag-Cajel,
Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 5.5000 hectares, and bounded, on the north,
by Cagayan River; on the east, by Domingo Guingab; on the south, by Antonio
Carniyan; and on the west, by Sabina Mola, with an assessed value of P3,520.
(par. 9 of complaint, p. 4, Record; Emphasis supplied)
On November 5, 1982, private respondents Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo, Rosa
Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad, filed a complaint
for quieting of title and damages with preliminary injunction against herein petitioners
Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed
Carniyan with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela and docketed as Civil Case No. Br.
111-373. A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court on November 12,
1982.
The complaint alleged that private respondents, except Domingo Apostol, are the legal
and/or the forced heirs of the late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the
latter being the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before the outbreak
of the second world war; that since time immemorial and/or before July 26, 1894, the
late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and
adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their "motherland"),
situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela, more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2.5000 hectares, more or less, and bounded on
the North, by Cagayan River;on the East, by Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa
3
 Cureg); on the south by Antonio Carniyan; and on the West by Sabina Mola, ...
(p. 2, Record)
that said land was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-3023
in the name of Francisco Gerardo, which cancels Tax Declaration No. C-9669, also in
the name of Francisco Gerardo; that upon the death of Francisco Gerardo, the
ownership and possession of the "motherland" was succeeded by his only issue,
Domingo Gerardo who, together with three (3) legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad
Gerardo, one of private respondents herein, Primo Gerardo and Salud Gerardo, both
deceased, have also been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the
same; that Primo Gerardo is survived by herein respondents, Rosa, Nieves and
Flordeliza, all surnamed Gerardo and Salud Gerardo is survived by respondent Lilia
Maquinad; that in 1979, respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo,
Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the "motherland" to co-
respondent Domingo Apostol; that on September 10, 1982, the verbal sale and
conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed an "Extra-Judicial
Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance (Exhibit "Q", p. 206, Rollo); that about the
time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland" already
showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the north caused
by the northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo Apostol declared the
motherland and its accretion for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 08-13281 on
September 15, 1982.
The complaint also stated that sometime about the last week of September and/or the
first week of October 1982, when private respondents were about to cultivate their
"motherland" together with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by
defendants (petitioners herein) from continuing to do so. Named defendants in said
case are herein petitioners Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel,
Antonio and Elpidio, all surnamed Carniyan, surviving spouse and children,
respectively, of Antonio Carniyan. Further, the complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan
was the owner of a piece of land situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela and
more particularly described as follows:
... containing an area of 2,790 sq. m., more or less bounded on
the north by Domingo Gerardo; on the East, by Domingo Guingab; on the
south, by Pelagio Camayo; and on the west by Marcos Cureg, declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 13131, with an assessed value of
P70.00. (P. 5, Record)
that deceased Antonio Carniyan revised on November 28, 1968 his Tax Declaration
No. 13131 dated July 24, 1961 to conform with the correct area and boundaries of his
Original Certificate of Title No. P-19093 issued on November 25, 1968; that the area
under the new Tax Declaration No.15663 was increased from 2,790 square meters to
4,584 square meters and the boundary on the north became Cagayan River, purposely
eliminating completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo Gerardo.
Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is
non-existent; that Antonio Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the
owner of a piece of land bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land
of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by private respondents; that the "subject land" is an
accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have been in possession and
cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now.
The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was denied on July
28,1983 (pp. 244-250, Rollo) on the ground that the defendants were in actual
possession of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. In a decision rendered on
July 6, 1984, the trial court held that respondent Domingo Apostol, thru his
predecessors-in-interest had already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and
accordingly, rendered judgment: 1. declaring Domingo Apostol its absolute owner; 2.
ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against herein petitioners; 3.
ordering that the writ be made permanent; and 4. ordering herein petitioners to pay
private respondents a reasonable attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of
P1,500.00 and costs (pp. 143-145, Rollo).
On July 17, 1984, petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the trial court on October 15, 1985. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on January 8, 1986. Hence, this petition for review on the
following assigned errors:
A. It erred in ruling that the subject land or "accretion" (which is bounded on
the north by the Cagayan River) belongs to the private respondents and not to
the petitioners when the petitioners "Original Certificate of " Title No. 19093
states clearly that the petitioners' land is bounded on its north by the Cagayan
River.
B. It erred in construing the tax declarations against the interest of the herein
petitioners who are only the heirs of the late Antonio Carniyan since the late
4
 Francisco (supposed predecessor of the respondents) could not have executed
the recently acquired tax declarations (Exhibits "A" to "A-2") as he died long
before World War II and since the late Antonio Carniyan could no longer stand
up to explain his side.
C. Contrary to the evidence and the finding of the Regional Trial Court, it
wrongly ruled that petitioners have never been in possession of the land (p. 7 of
Annex "A", ibid.).
D. It erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to the private respondents
who incredibly claimed that the accretion occurred only in 1982 and is a "gift
from the Lord. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
This petition is impressed with merit.
The object of the controversy in this case is the alleged "motherland" of private
respondents together with the accretion of about 3.5 hectares, the totality of which is
referred to in this decision as the "subject land."
In this case, petitioners claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the "subject
land" which is an accretion to the registered land while private respondents claimed to
be entitled to the 3.5 hectares accretion attached to their "motherland."
It should be noted that the herein private respondents' claim of ownership of their
alleged two and a half (2 & ½) hectare "motherland" is anchored mainly on four (4)
tax declarations (Exhibits "A", "A-1", "A-2" and "B", pp. 191, 192, 193, 194, Rollo).
This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of
assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.
(Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v. Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384;
cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437, 444). For their part, petitioners relied on
the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of their Original Certificate of Title No. P-
19093, dated November 25, 1968 (Exhibit "3", p. 189, Rollo) issued in the name of
Antonio Carniyan (petitioners' predecessor-in-interest) pursuant to Free Patent No.
399431 dated May 21, 1968, clearly showing that the boundary of petitioners' land on
the north is Cagayan River and not the "motherland" claimed by respondents. The said
registered land was bought by the late Antonio Carniyan from his father-in-law,
Marcos Cureg, on October 5, 1956, as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale (Exhibit
"8", p. 195, Rollo) which states that the land is bounded on the north by Cagayan
River.
In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150
SCRA 393,401-402, We ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax
declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor
proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title indicates true and legal
ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises. Petitioners' OCT
No.P-19093 should be accorded greater weight as against the tax declarations (Exhibit
"A', dated 1979; Exhibit "A-1 " undated and Exhibit "A2" dated 1967, pp. 191, 192,
193, Rollo) offered by private respondents in support of their claim, which declarations
are all in the name of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo,
and appear to have been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established
during the trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak of the last war.
Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p.
203, Rollo), which the appellate court considered as an admission by him that his land
is bounded on the north by the land of Domingo Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now
estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said tax declaration, being of an
earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later date. Since
petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the
north by the Cagayan River, private respondents" claim over their "motherland,"
allegedly existing between petitioners" land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred
and nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of title.
It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which
arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA,
supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto
quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39, Act 496 (now Sec. 44 of PD
No. 1529). Moreover, the tax declarations of the late Antonio Camiyan subsequent to
the issuance of OCT P-19093 (Exhibit "D", p. 204, Rollo) already states that its
northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any previous
acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the accomplishment of the tax
declarations in his name before the issuance of OCT No. P- 19093, of the existence of
Francisco Gerardo's land.
Finally, the trial court concluded that petitioners have never been in possession of the
"subject land" but the evidence on record proves otherwise. First, the trial court on
5
page 11 of its Decision (p. 121, Rollo), stated the reason for denying private
respondents' petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, that is, "... the
defendants (petitioners herein) were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior
to September, 1982" (p. 121, Rollo). Second, witness for private respondents, Esteban
Guingab, boundary owner on the east of the land in question and whose own land is
bounded on the north of Cagayan River, on cross-examination, revealed that when his
property was only more than one (1) hectare in 1958, (now more than 4 hectares) his
boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan (T.S.N., 5 May 1983, pp. 19-
20). Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on direct examination
stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested him to survey the land covered
by his title and the accretion attached to it, but he did not pursue the same because he
learned from the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion
is the subject of an application for homestead patent of one Democrata Aguila,
(T.S.N., May 18, 1984, pp. 12-13) contrary to the statement of the trial court and the
appellate court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did not
continue to survey because persons other than defendants were in possession of the
land," which statement appears only to be a conclusion (p. 7, Rollo). Fourth, We note
Exhibit "20" (p. 273, Rollo) for petitioners which is an order by the Director of Lands
dated August 14,1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata
Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela. Aguila's
application was disapproved because in an investigation conducted by the Bureau of
Lands of the area applied for which is an accretion, the same was found to be occupied
and cultivated by, among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to
his land. It is worthy to note that none of the private respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest appeared as one of those found occupying and cultivating said
accretion.
On the other hand, the allegation of private respondents that they were in possession of
the "motherland" through their predecessors- in-interest had not been proved by
substantial evidence. The assailed decision of the respondent court, which affirmed the
decision of the trial court, stated that since the "motherland" exists, it is
also presumed that private respondents were in possession of the "subject land"
through their predecessors- in-interest since prior to July 26, 1894. The trial court
relied on the testimony of Soledad Gerardo, one of the private respondents in this case,
an interested and biased witness, regarding their possession of the "motherland." From
her testimony on pedigree, the trial court presumed that the source of the property, the
late Francisco Gerardo, was in possession of the same since prior to July 26, 1894 (pp.
137-140, Rollo).
The foregoing considerations indubitably show that the alleged "motherland" claimed
by private respondents is nonexistent. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by
the northward movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New
Civil Code:
To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
However, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four
thousand five hundred eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to
said land is approximately five and a half (5.5) hectares. The increase in the area of
petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the change of course or the northward
movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land just
because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See
Grande v. Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed
under the operation of the Torrens System. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING Civil Case No. Br. III-373 for quieting of
title and damages. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77294 December 12, 1988
ANGELICA VIAJAR and CELSO VIAJAR, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONOR P. LADRIDO, LOURDES LADRIDO
IGNACIO, EUGENIO P. LADRIDO and L P. LADRIDO, defendants-appellees.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 29, 1986, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69942 entitled, "ANGELICA VIAJAR, et. al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus LEONOR LADRIDO, et. al., Defendants-
Appellees," affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Iloilo dated December 10, 1981.
The antecedent facts in the instant case are as follows: The spouses Ricardo Y. Ladrido
and Leonor P. Ladrido were the owners of Lot No. 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo. This lot contained an area of
6
154,267 square meters and was registered in the names of the spouses under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo.
Spouses Rosendo H. Te and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land
described in their title as Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan.
On September 6, 1973, Rosendo H. Te, with the conformity of Ana Te, sold this lot to
Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in
the names of Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar.
Later, Angelica F. Viajar had Lot No. 7340 relocated and found out that the property
was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return
but Ladrido refused.
On February 15, 1974, Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar instituted a civil action
for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9660 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. Summoned to
plead, defendant Ladrido filed his answer with a counterclaim. Plaintiffs filed their
reply to the answer.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo H. Te as another
defendant. Plaintiffs sought the annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the
purchase price with interest in the event the possession of defendant Ladrido is
sustained. Defendant Te filed his answer to the amended complaint and he counter
claimed for damages. Plaintiffs answered the counterclaim.
During the pendency of the case, plaintiff Celso F. Viajar sold his rights over Lot No.
7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this reason, plaintiff
Angelica F. Viajar now appears to be the sole registered owner of this lot.
On May 25, 1978, defendant Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his
wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P.
Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties defendants.
The facts admitted by the parties during the pre-trial show that the piece of real
property which used to be Lot No. 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was
located in barangay Guibuanogan Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 square
meters; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot No. 7511 and Lot No. 7340
were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819 square meters of what was
Lot No. 7340 has been in the possession of the defendants; that the area of 14,036
square meters, which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral
survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of the defendants; and that the
plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession of Lot No. 7340.
After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was
admitted.
The plaintiffs raised the following issues to be resolved:
1. Whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed
by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the defendants;
2. Assuming arguendo it was gradual, whether or not the plaintiffs are still
entitled to Lot "B' appearing in Exhibit "4" and to one-half (½) of Lot "A," also
indicated in Exhibit "4;" and
3. Damages (pp. 12-13, Rollo).
On December 10, 1981, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F.
Viajar with costs against them;
2. Declaring defendants Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio,
Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of
land indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan (Exhs. 'C' as well as '4,'
'4-B' and '4-C') situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan
Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 square meters, more or
less; and
7
 3. Pronouncing that as owners of the land described in the preceding
paragraph, the defendants are entitled to the possession thereof.
Defendants' claim for moral damages and attorney's fees are dismissed.
SO ORDERED (p. 36, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals and
Contrariwise, the lower court found that:
assigned the following errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS
ARE ENTITLED TO LOT B APPEARING IN EXHIBIT "4" AND TO ONE-
HALF (½) OF LOT A IN THE SAID EXHIBIT "4."
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFFS (p. 42, Rollo).
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo.
Plaintiffs (the petitioners herein) now come to Us claiming that the Court of Appeals
palpably erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on the ground that the change
in the course of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Appeals held:
This appeal is not impressed with merit.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.
The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual
and caused by accretion and erosion (Martinez Canas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil.
668; Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H.
Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133). In the case at bar, the lower court
correctly found that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff to show that
the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it
occurred through avulsion is not clear and convincing.
... the defendants have sufficiently established that for many years after
1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot No. 7511 took place
by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial
deposit of 29,912 square meters (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had
been added to Lot No. 7511. (Exhs. '1' as well as Exhs. 'C' and '4').
Apropos it should be observed that the accretion consisted of Lot A with
an area of 14,036 square meters; Lot B, 11,819 square meters; and Lot
C, 4,057 square meters. (Exhs. '4-B,' '4-C' and '4-D'). Only Lot C is not
involved in this litigation. (See Pre-trial Order, supra)
The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot No. 7511
was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more
than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its
banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received
deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The
consequent increase in the area of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion or
accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and
planted the same with coin and tobacco.
The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years.
The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground of any
abandoned river bed. The river bed is definitely no longer discernible
now.
What used to be the old river bed (Lot A) is in level with Lot No. 7511.
So are the two other areas to the East. (Lots B and C) Lots A, B and C
are still being cultivated.
8
 Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the
property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old
Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on August 30,
1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to Lot
No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B (see Exhs. 'C' and '4') belongs
to the defendants (pp. 34-35, Record on Appeal).
We find no cogent reason to disturb the foregoing finding and
conclusion of the lower court.
The second assignment of error is a mere offshoot of the first assignment
of error and does not warrant further discussion (pp. 4244, Rollo).
The petition is without merit.
The petitioners contend that the first issue raised during the trial of the case on the
merits in the Court of First Instance, that is, "whether the change in the course of the
Suague River was sudden as claimed by the plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the
defendants," was abandoned and never raised by them in their appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals, in holding that the appeal is without merit,
because of the change of the Suague River was gradual and not sudden, disposed of
the appeal on an issue that was never raised and, accordingly, its decision is void. In
support of its contention, petitioners cite the following authorities:
It is a well-known principle in procedure that courts of justice have no
jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue (Lim Toco vs. Go Fay, 80
Phil. 166).
A judgment going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something
upon which the parties were not heard, is not merely irregular, but extra-judicial
and invalid ( Salvante vs. Cruz, 88 Phil. 236-244; Lazo vs. Republic Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc., 31 SCRA 329, 334).
The pivotal issue in the petitioners' appeal was whether the change in the course of the
Suague River was gradual or sudden because the trial court below resolved the same in
its decision thus subjecting the same to review by respondent appellate court. By
simply abandoning this issue, the petitioners cannot hope that the affirmance of the
decision wherein this issue was resolved makes the decision of the Court of Appeals
void. In effect, the petitioners are expounding a new procedural theory that to render a
questioned decision void, all that has to be done is to simply abandon on appeal the
pivotal issue as resolved by the lower court and when its decision is affirmed on
appeal, attack the decision of the appellate court as void on the principle that a court of
justice has no jurisdiction or power to decide the question not in issue. This is not
correct. Even the authorities cited by the petitioners, more specifically the Salvante
and Lazo cases, supra, do not support their contention. They were heard in the trial
court and they cannot complain that the proceeding below was irregular and hence,
invalid.
The trial court found that the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual
and this finding was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. We do not find any
valid reason to disturb this finding of fact.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code (reproduced from Article 366 of the Old), the law
applied by the courts a quoprovides:
Art. 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.
Petitioners contend that this article must be read together with Sections 45 an 46 of Act
No. 496 which provides:
SEC. 45. 1 The obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate
of title shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding
upon the applicant and all successors in title that the land shall be and always
remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts
amendatory thereof.
SEC. 46. 2 No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
As a result, petitioners contend, Article 457 of the New Civil Code must be construed
to limit the accretion mentioned therein as accretion of unregistered land to the riparian
9
owner, and should not extend to registered land. Thus, the lot in question having
remained the registered land of the petitioners, then the private respondents cannot
acquire title there in derogation to that of the petitioners, by accretion, for that will
defeat the indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the
course of an adjoining stream is well settled. In Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55, We ruled:
The controversy in the present cases seems to be due to the erroneous
conception that Art. 366 of the Civil Code does not apply to Torrens registered
land. That article provides that "any accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the owners of the
estates bordering thereon." Accretions of that character are natural incidents to
land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration laws.
It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against
diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the
adjoining stream.
In C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, We also ruled:
It clearly appearing that the land in question has become part of defendant's
estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The
fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is
covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from
being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner
against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the
owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New).
Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and
the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the
Registration Act.
We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited rulings.
As the private respondents are the owners of the premises in question, no damages are
recoverable from them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO
TAPIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS.
LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO
I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR.,
in their official and/or private capacities, respondents.
Petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Nazareno Tapia challenge the
decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of petitioners' complaint
by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 22. The complaint was for
annulment of the verification, report and recommendation, decision and order of the
Bureau of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted
administrative remedies before having recourse to the courts.
The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod,
Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the
dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river.
Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the
subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly
stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for
ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A
decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.
10
The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the
same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of
judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which
dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of
judgment but private respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower
court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of
the subject lots they occupied..
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the
survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over
the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be
released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the
Bureau of Lands.
In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera,
respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and
rendered a report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-
10-06-000571-D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio
Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate
public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto
Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of
Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private
respondents who, if qualified, may file public land applications covering their
respective portions.
Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,
Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the
Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo
Palad then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and
remove whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that
private respondents be placed in possession thereof.
Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the
RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent
Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent
Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and
order of execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative
decision of the Bureau of Lands.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the
approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence,
factual findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land
cannot be held to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey plans
belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources. 1
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by
Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the
same had been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as
Officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno
to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does
not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
It also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the
orders were issued and executed..
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PREVAILING
FACTS AND THE LAW ON THE MATTER;
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN A WHIMSICAL,
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER AFFIRMED THE DECISION
11
 OF THE LOWER COURT DISMISSING THE ORIGINAL CASE WHICH
FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EXECUTION ORDER OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
MANILA, PRACTICALLY CHANGED THE DECISION OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT ROBERTO HILARIO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF LANDS, REGION 10, THUS MAKING THE CASE PROPER SUBJECT
FOR ANNULMENT WELL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
LOWER COURT.
The resolution of the above issues, however, hinges on the question of whether or not
the subject land is public land. Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land
being an accretion to his titled property, applying Article 457 of the Civil Code which
provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In the case of Meneses v. CA, 2 this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites
: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are
called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the
effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the
above-mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion
was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of
the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. 3 It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling
materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v. City of
Manila, 4 this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body
of water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission
not having met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot
claim the rights of a riparian owner.
In any case, this court agrees with private respondents that petitioners are estopped
from denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales
Application MSA (G-6) 571. 5 The mere filing of said Application constituted an
admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of
Survey Plan No. MSi-10-06-000571-D (Equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad-237) which
was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno's Miscellaneous Sales
Application wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by
Antonio Nazareno was, however, controverted by respondent Labis in his investigation
report to respondent Hilario based on the findings of his ocular inspection that said
land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy portion of
Cagayan River. The investigation report also states that, except for the swampy portion
which is fully planted to nipa palms, the whole area is fully occupied by a part of a big
concrete bodega of petitioners and several residential houses made of light materials,
including those of private respondents which were erected by themselves sometime in
the early part of 1978. 6
Furthermore, the Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area
which was formed by deposits of sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan
river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the Bureau of
Lands. 7 This Court has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters
are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. 8 Again, when said factual
findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties
and not reviewable by this Court. 9
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or
artificial. In Republic v. CA, 10this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit
should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes
from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it
differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco
v. Director of Lands, et al., 11 where the land was not formed solely by the natural
effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the consequence
of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made accretion
and, as such, part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by
the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill
12
operations. 12 Even if this Court were to take into consideration petitioners' submission
that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno's labor consisting in
the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and
Cagayan River bounding his land, 13 the same would still be part of the public domain.
Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands,
as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law. Accordingly, the
court a quo dismissed petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.
However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been
exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an
Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the
decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands". 14 It would be
incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands
acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands.
In any case, respondent Rolleo Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-
Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion
for reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was
acting on said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the
Department. In the case of Hamoy v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 15 this Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of
Lands with respect to questions involving public lands under the administration and
control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his
jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 16
As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being
an artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction,
authority and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and 4 of the Public
Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which states, thus:
Sec. 3. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the
exclusive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act through
the Director of Lands who shall act under his immediate control.
Sec. 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive
control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession
or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain, and his
decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In connection with the second issue, petitioners ascribe whim, arbitrariness or
capriciousness in the execution order of public respondent Abelardo G. Palad, the
Director of Lands. This Court finds otherwise since said decision was based on the
conclusive finding that the subject land was public land. Thus, this Court agrees with
the Court of Appeals that the Director of Lands acted within his rights when he issued
the assailed execution order, as mandated by the aforecited provisions.
Petitioners' allegation that respondent Palad's execution order directing them to vacate
the subject land practically changed respondent Hilario's decision is baseless. It is
incorrect for petitioners to assume that respondent Palad awarded portions of the
subject land to private respondents Salasalans and Rabayas as they had not yet been
issued patents or titles over the subject land. The execution order merely directed the
segregation of petitioners' titled lot from the subject land which was actually being
occupied by private respondents before they were ejected from it. Based on the finding
that private respondents were actually in possession or were actually occupying the
subject land instead of petitioners, respondent Palad, being the Director of Lands and
in the exercise of his administrative discretion, directed petitioners to vacate the
subject land on the ground that private respondents have a preferential right, being the
occupants thereof.
While private respondents may not have filed their application over the land occupied
by them, they nevertheless filed their protest or opposition to petitioners'
Miscellaneous Sales Application, the same being preparatory to the filing of an
application as they were in fact directed to do so. In any case, respondent Palad's
execution order merely implements respondent Hilario's order. It should be noted that
petitioners' own application still has to be given due course. 17
13
As Director of Lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control
over any form of concession, disposition and management of the lands of the public
domain. 18 He may issue decisions and orders as he may see fit under the
circumstances as long as they are based on the findings of fact.
19
In the case of Calibo v. Ballesteros, this Court held that where, in the disposition of
public lands, the Director of Lands bases his decision on the evidence thus presented,
he clearly acts within his jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the
error is one of judgment, but not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable
by certiorari. Thus, except for the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
this Court finds no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO
PASCUAL, respondents.
Unique is the legal question visited upon the claim of an applicant in a Land
Registration case by oppositors thereto, the Government and a Government lessee,
involving as it does ownership of land formed by alluvium.
The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining the land sought to be
registered. His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the
west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and
the Bulacan River flow down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the
applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.
The land sought to be registered was formed at the northern tip of the applicant's land.
Applicant's registered property is bounded on the north by the Manila Bay.
The issue: May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense
that it naturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land be considered
as foreshore land?
Before us is a petition for review of: (1) the decision 1 and (2) two subsequent
resolutions 2 of the Intermediate Appellate Court 3 (now the Court of Appeals) in Land
Registration Case No. N-84, 4 the application over which was filed by private
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, before the
Court of First Instance 5 (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for
foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having
an area of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on
January 15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano
Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five
(25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially, such
application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that the property
formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director of
Fisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of
seven (7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as
suitable for fishpond purposes.
The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed Emiliano Navarro's
application. Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the
Secretary of Natural Resources who, however, affirmed the grant. The then Executive
Secretary, acting in behalf of the President of the Philippines, similarly affirmed the
grant.
On the other hand, sometime in the early part of 1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an
application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of land, situated in Sibocon,
Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to have an area of 146,611
square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property, situated in
Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
14
6830. It is bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the
Bulacan River, and on the northern side by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River as well
as the Bulacan River flow downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing
sand and silt on Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual
claimed the accretion as the riparian owner.
On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor
General, filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-
in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of
the public domain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. The
Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal, similarly opposed Pascual's
application for the same reason as that advanced by the Director of Lands. Later on,
however, the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition. The Director of Forestry
become the sole oppositor.
On June 2, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default excepting the
Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry.
Upon motion of Emiliano Navarro, however, the order of general default was lifted
and, on February 13, 1961, Navarro thereupon filed an opposition to Pascual's
application. Navarro claimed that the land sought to be registered has always been part
of the public domain, it being a part of the foreshore of Manila Bay; that he was a
lessee and in possession of a part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond permit
issued by the Bureau of Fisheries and confirmed by the Office of the President; and
that be bad already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960,
Sinforoso Pascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one
Marcelo Lopez and their privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and
possessed, through stealth, force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered
by Plan Psu-175181. The defendants in the case were alleged to have built a
provisional dike thereon: thus they have thereby deprived Pascual of the premises
sought to be registered. This, notwithstanding repeated demands for defendants to
vacate the property.
The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan, the appeal having
been docketed as Civil Case No. 2873. Because of the similarity of the parties and the
subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with the land
registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.
During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died on
November 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the
herein private respondents.
On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject
property to be foreshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the
subject of land registration proceedings.
The decision's dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
(1) Dismissing plaintiff [private respondent] Sinforoso Pascual's complaint for
ejectment in Civil Case No. 2873;
(2) Denying the application of Sinforoso Pascual for land registration over the
land in question; and
(3) Directing said Sinforoso Pascual, through his heirs, as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 2873 and as applicant in Land Registration Case No. N-84 to pay costs in
both instances." 6
The heirs of Pascual appealed and, before the respondent appellate court, assisted the
following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not finding the land in question as an accretion by
the action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers to the land admittedly owned by
applicants-appellants [private respondents].
2. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question is foreshore land.
15
 3. The lower court erred in not ordering the registration of the land in
controversy in favor of applicants-appellants [private respondents].
4. The lower court erred in not finding that the applicants-appellants [private
respondents] are entitled to eject the oppositor-appellee [petitioners]. 7
On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the court a quo and granted
the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding therefrom fifty (50)
meters from corner 2 towards corner 1; and fifty meters (50) meters from corner 5
towards corner 6 of the Psu-175181.
The respondent appellate court explained the reversal in this wise:
The paramount issue to be resolved in this appeal as set forth by the parties in
their respective briefs is — whether or not the land sought to be registered is
accretion or foreshore land, or, whether or not said land was formed by the
action of the two rivers of Talisay and Bulacan or by the action of the Manila
Bay. If formed by the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers, the subject land
is accretion but if formed by the action of the Manila Bay then it is foreshore
land.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land
immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which is
covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the
west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay
and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila
Bay. In other words, between the Talisay River and the Bulacan River is the
property of applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and
the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject
land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land
adding thereto the land now sought to be registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject
land is immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and
forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila
Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this
case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy
problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action
of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at
the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it
would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the
patrimonial property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It is however undisputed that appellants' [private respondents'] land lies
between these two rivers and it is precisely appellants' [private respondents']
land which acts as a barricade preventing these two rivers to meet. Thus, since
the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of
sand and silt are deposited at their mouths.
It is, therefore, difficult to see how the Manila Bay could have been the cause of
the deposit thereat for in the natural course of things, the waves of the sea eat
the land on the shore, as they suge [sic] inland. It would not therefore add
anything to the land but instead subtract from it due to the action of the waves
and the wind. It is then more logical to believe that the two rivers flowing
towards the bay emptied their cargo of sand, silt and clay at their mouths, thus
causing appellants' [private respondents'] land to accumulate therein.
However, our distinguished colleage [sic], Mr. Justice Serrano, do [sic] not
seem to accept this theory and stated that the subject land arose only when . . . .
Pascual planted "palapat" and "bakawan" trees thereat to serve as a boundary or
strainer. But we do not see how this act of planting trees by Pascual would
explain how the land mass came into being. Much less will it prove that the
same came from the sea. Following Mr. Justice Serrano's argument that it were
the few trees that acted as strainers or blocks, then the land that grew would
have stopped at the place where the said trees were planted. But this is not so
because the land mass went far beyond the boundary, or where the trees were
planted.
On the other hand, the picture-exhibits of appellants [private respondents]
clearly show that the land that accumulated beyond the so- called boundary, as
well as the entire area being applied for is dry land, above sea level, and bearing
16
innumerable trees . . . The existence of vegetation on the land could only
confirm that the soil thereat came from inland rather than from the sea, for what
could the sea bring to the shore but sand, pebbles, stones, rocks and corrals? On
the other hand, the two rivers would be bringing soil on their downward flow
which they brought along from the eroded mountains, the lands along their
path, and dumped them all on the northern portion of appellants' [private
respondents'] land.
In view of the foregoing, we have to deviate from the lower court's finding.
While it is true that the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay
fronting appellants' [private respondents'] land, said land is not foreshore but an
accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan rivers. In fact, this is
exactly what the Bureau of Lands found out, as shown in the following report
of the Acting Provincial Officer, Jesus M. Orozco, to wit:
"Upon ocular inspection of the land subject of this registration made on
June 11, 1960, it was found out that the said land is . . . . sandwitched [sic]
by two big rivers . . . . These two rivers bring down considerable amount
of soil and sediments during floods every year thus raising the soil of the
land adjoining the private property of the applicant [private respondents].
About four-fifth [sic] of the area applied for is now dry land whereon are
planted palapat trees thickly growing thereon. It is the natural action of
these two rivers that has caused the formation of said land . . . . subject of
this registration case. It has been formed, therefore, by accretion. And
having been formed by accretion, the said land may be considered the
private property of the riparian owner who is the applicant herein [private
respondents] . . . .
In view of the above, the opposition hereto filed by the government should
be withdrawn, except for the portion recommended by the land
investigator in his report dated May 2, 1960, to be excluded and
considered foreshore. . . ."A
Because of this report, no less than the Solicitor General representing the
Bureau of Lands withdrew his opposition dated March 25, 1960, and limited
"the same to the northern portion of the land applied for, compromising a strip
50 meters wide along the Manila Bay, which should be declared public land as
part of the foreshore" . . . . 8
Pursuant to the aforecited decision, the respondent appellate court ordered the issuance
of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of private respondents and the
reversion to private respondents of the possession of the portion of the subject property
included in Navarro's fishpond permit.
On December 20, 1978, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforecited
decision. The Director of Forestry also moved for the reconsideration of the same
decision. Both motions were opposed by private respondents on January 27, 1979.
On November 21, 1980, respondent appellate court promulgated a resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by the Director of Forestry. It, however, modified
its decision, to read, viz:
(3). Ordering private oppositors Heirs of Emiliano Navarro to vacate that
portion included in their fishpond permit covered by Plan Psu-175181 and hand
over possession of said portion to applicants-appellants, if the said portion is
not within the strip of land fifty (50) meters wide along Manila Bay on the
northern portion of the land subject of the registration proceedings and which
area is more particularly referred to as fifty (50) meters from corner 2 towards
corner 1; and fifty (50) meters from corner 5 towards corner 6 of Plan Psu-
175181. . . . 9
On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting as counsel for the
Director of Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in this court, a petition
for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate court
and of the aforecited resolution dated November 21, 1980.
Thereafter, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director of Forestry, filed a petition
for review entitled, "The Director of Forestry vs. the Court of Appeals." 10 We,
however, denied the same in a minute resolution dated July 20, 1981, such petition
having been prematurely filed at a time when the Court of Appeals was yet to resolve
petitioners' pending motion to set aside the resolution dated November 21, 1980.
On October 9, 1981, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the decision dated November 29, 1978.
17
On October 17, 1981, respondent appellate court made an entry of judgment stating
that the decision dated November 29, 1978 had become final and executory as against
herein petitioners as oppositors in L.R.C. Case No. N-84 and Civil Case No. 2873 of
the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan.
On October 26, 1981, a second motion for reconsideration of the decision dated
November 29, 1978 was filed by petitioners' new counsel.
On March 26, 1982, respondent appellate court issued a resolution granting petitioners'
request for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration.
On July 13, 1984, after hearing, respondent appellate court denied petitioners' second
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was filed out of time, citing
Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides that a motion for
reconsideration shall be made ex-parte and filed within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the final order or judgment.
Hence this petition where the respondent appellate court is imputed to have palpably
erred in appreciating the fact of the case and to have gravely misapplied statutory and
case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article 457 of the Civil Code.
We find no merit in the petition.
The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters
of Manila Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the
action of the sea which brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the
palapat and bakawan trees planted thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in
1948
Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code, petitioners
vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course on the eastern and
western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the
river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of
the river. 11 Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is
the soil deposited on the estate fronting the river bank 12; the owner of such estate is
called the riparian owner. Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral
owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other
tidal waters. 13 The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is
automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil deposit can be
seen 14 but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons 15.
Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of
accretion, is misplaced.
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be
Manila Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay
and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account
for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified
in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of
the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in
1948, the land began to
rise. 16
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b)
petitioners' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan
Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of
their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay
the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of
the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or
both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the
northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is
the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion
of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the
Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled
as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is. It is to be remembered that we
held that:
18
 Appellant next contends that . . . . Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea.
We find said contention untenable. A bay is part of the sea, being a mere
indentatiom of the same:
"Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides
except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct
from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. " 7
C.J. 1013-1014." 17
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on
what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of
land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil
Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
The process by which the disputed land was formed, is not difficult to discern from the
facts of the case. As the trial court correctly observed:
A perusal of the survey plan . . . . of the land subject matter of these cases
shows that on the eastern side, the property is bounded by Talisay River, on the
western side by Bulacan River, on the southern side by Lot 1436 and on the
northern side by Manila Bay. It is not correct to state that the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers meet a certain portion because the two rivers both flow towards
Manila Bay. The Talisay River is straight while the Bulacan River is a little bit
meandering and there is no portion where the two rivers meet before they end
up at Manila Bay. The land which is adjacent to the property belonging to
Pascual cannot be considered an accretion [caused by the action of the two
rivers].
Applicant Pascual . . . . has not presented proofs to convince the Court that the
land he has applied for registration is the result of the settling down on his
registered land of soil, earth or other deposits so as to be rightfully be
considered as an accretion [caused by the action of the two rivers]. Said Art.
457 finds no applicability where the accretion must have been caused by action
of the bay. 18
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is
that the disputed land is part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the
public domain. The respondent appellate court, however, perceived the fact that
petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, to be basis to
conclude that the disputed land must be an accretion formed by the action of the two
rivers because petitioners' own land acted as a barricade preventing the two rivers to
meet and that the current of the two rivers carried sediments of sand and silt
downwards to the Manila Bay which accumulated somehow to a 14-hectare land.
These conclusions, however, are fatally incongruous in the light of the one undisputed
critical fact: the accretion was deposited, not on either the eastern or western portion of
petitioners' land where a river each runs, but on the northern portion of petitioners'
land which adjoins the Manila Bay. Worse, such conclusions are further eroded of
their practical logic and consonance with natural experience in the light of Sulpicio
Pascual's admission as to having planted palapat and bakawan trees on the northern
boundary of their own land. In amplification of this, plainly more reasonable and valid
are Justice Mariano Serrano's observations in his dissenting opinion when he stated
that:
As appellants' (titled) land . . . . acts as a barricade that prevents the two rivers
to meet, and considering the wide expanse of the boundary between said land
and the Manila Bay, measuring some 593.00 meters . . . . it is believed rather
farfetched for the land in question to have been formed through "sediments of
sand and salt [sic] . . . . deposited at their [rivers'] mouths." Moreover, if "since
the flow of the two rivers is downwards to the Manila Bay the sediments of
sand and silt are deposited at their mouths," why then would the alleged cargo
of sand, silt and clay accumulate at the northern portion of appellants' titled
land facing Manila Bay instead of merely at the mouths and banks of these two
rivers? That being the case, the accretion formed at said portion of appellants'
titled [land] was not caused by the current of the two rivers but by the action of
the sea (Manila Bay) into which the rivers empty.
The conclusion . . . . is not supported by any reference to the evidence which,
on the contrary, shows that the disputed land was formed by the action of the
sea. Thus, no less than Sulpicio Pascual, one of the heirs of the original
applicant, testified on cross-examination that the land in dispute was part of the
shore and it was only in 1948 that he noticed that the land was beginning to get
higher after he had planted trees thereon in
1948. . . . .
19
 . . . . it is established that before 1948 sea water from the Manila Bay at high
tide could reach as far as the dike of appellants' fishpond within their titled
property, which dike now separates this titled property from the land in
question. Even in 1948 when appellants had already
planted palapat and bakawan trees in the land involved, inasmuch as these trees
were yet small, the waves of the sea could still reach the dike. This must be so
because in . . . . the survey plan of the titled property approved in 1918, said
titled land was bounded on the north by Manila Bay. So Manila Bay was
adjacent to it on the north. It was only after the planting of the aforesaid trees in
1948 that the land in question began to rise or to get higher in elevation.
The trees planted by appellants in 1948 became a sort of strainer of the sea
water and at the same time a kind of block to the strained sediments from being
carried back to the sea by the very waves that brought them to the former shore
at the end of the dike, which must have caused the shoreline to recede and dry
up eventually raising the former shore leading to the formation of the land in
question." 19
In other words, the combined and interactive effect of the planting of palapat and
bakawan trees, the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bay eventually resulting in the
drying up of its former foreshore, and the regular torrential action of the waters of
Manila Bay, is the formation of the disputed land on the northern boundary of
petitioners' own tract of land.
The disputed property is an accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an
arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866, part of the public domain
At the outset, there is a need to distinguish between Manila Bay and Laguna de Bay.
While we held in the case of Ignacio v. Director of Lands and
Valeriano 20 that Manila Bay is considered a sea for purposes of determining which
law on accretion is to be applied in multifarious situations, we have ruled differently
insofar as accretions on lands adjoining the Laguna de Bay are concerned.
In the cases of Government of the P.I v. Colegio de San Jose 21, Republic v. Court of
Appeals 22, Republic v. Alagad 23, and Meneses v. Court of
Appeals 24, we categorically ruled that Laguna de Bay is a lake the accretion on which,
by the mandate of Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, belongs to the
owner of the land contiguous thereto.
The instant controversy, however, brings a situation calling for the application of
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the disputed land being an accretion
on the foreshore of Manila Bay which is, for all legal purposes, considered a sea.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the
action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard
service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law, unequivocal is the public nature
of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank
which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of Manila Bay is. As part of the public
domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in
litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not
capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express
authorization granted in due form by a competent authority." 25 Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the
declaration that the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for
purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for
coast guard services. 26 Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or
legislative department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as
owners of the estates adjacent thereto.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
20
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.
By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of
the current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of
rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up
river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the
registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less,
was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in
the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in
the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to
include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the
property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been
in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than
30 years.2
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating
that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within
the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the
property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be
registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that
had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A.
SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the
TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in
the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty
five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-
000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec.
No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following
technical description, to wit:
xxxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for
the Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO
BE REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY
OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO
C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A
RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT
OF THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION DESPITE APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
21
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND
ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
October 20, 2003.7
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8
I
RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION
TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER
IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY
THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS
"PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN
ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED
UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN
EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR
LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein;
and whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the currents of the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this
application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an
orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same
property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him
through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased. Conformably
with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
22
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9
The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and
Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the
Parañaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4
which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained by the
latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article
457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence
did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic’s submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to
establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is
meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in
opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and
apply for its registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed,
the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b)
made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion
to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that
the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of
the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was
the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to
themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the
Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the
original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B
came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River,
the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been
deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation
of Lot 4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore
that the effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of
land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the
river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both
lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the
increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the
effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of
soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had
been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the
span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4
was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not
yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue
alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only
plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-
up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own
testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Parañaque River
that had dried up and become an orchard.
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot
4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-
002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried
River Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot
4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676),
23
in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the
Northeast."15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion
that became respondents’ property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land
was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land
involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land
did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil
on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did
not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners
had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and
categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only
to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells
us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for
application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law. 17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their
natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry
up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the
State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides
that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other person. 19
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B
also because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the
adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following
ratiocination, viz:20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the
fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-
000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and
the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque
River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant
the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view
of the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration
Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds
and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are
essential to a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate
of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not
entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
[Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
24
xxxx
Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove
the following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more
than thirty (30) years."22
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not
be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the
Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the
following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,
or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in
making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings
are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the
fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-
00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services
and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the
Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court
opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more
than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining
owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts
respondents had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only
that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be made.
That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the
payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land
the taxes were paid for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a
claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved
was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil
does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are
necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to
belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the
water becomes manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-
B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to the
river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of
Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse
possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The
admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for taxation
purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 1999 28 signified that their
alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their
application for land registration on March 7, 1997.
25
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B
for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire
the land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land
was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that
declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion
or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as
part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil
Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not
was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v.
Cachopero,29 a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up
portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:
As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed
of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that
of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966,
when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of
accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the
Civil Code, the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible
to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which
may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only
to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the
Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that
the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for
purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1)
of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the
public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the
creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.
xxxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code
took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-
in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which
are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong
to the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining
lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau
of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a
result of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration.
Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370
applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands
that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier
finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and,
hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of
the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the
course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not
even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation,
commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public
dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)
26
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State.31Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares
river beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as
ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which
gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river
beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change
of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of
public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously
declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot
4998-B was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable,
respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable
and disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable
and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC.
MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional
Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map
"classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan.
1968" sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the
Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or
statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap34 that:
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants
were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They
call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
27
In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we
specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was
sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey
plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map
No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on
Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed,
"occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the
land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit
"E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation
does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the
land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the
public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the
certification by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community
Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable
and disposable in the following manner, viz:
x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that
the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted
by respondent.1âwphi1 The government officials who issued the certifications were
not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should
not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein.
Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they
have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
xxxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by
the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance,
prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class
of documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such,
the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance
but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis
supplied)
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B,
Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was
already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not
validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of
28
Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a
total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging
to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 219811
REX DACLISON, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BAYTION, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review 1 are the February 5, 2015 Decision2 and the August
3, 2015 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99627, which
affirmed in toto the April 27, 2012 Decision 4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 224, Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-09-66145, a case for forcible
entry.
The Antecedents
On January 27, 2009, respondent Eduardo Baytion (Baytion) filed a Complaint5 for
Forcible Entry and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 43, Quezon City (MeTC) against
petitioner Rex Daclison (Daclison), which was docketed as Civil Case No. 39225.
In the complaint, Baytion alleged that he was a co-owner of a parcel of land consisting
of 1,500 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 221507. The
said property was inherited by him and his siblings from their parents and, as agreed
upon, was being administered by him. As administrator, he leased portions of the
property to third persons.
Erected on the said property was a one-storey building which was divided into seven
units or stalls. One of the stalls was leased to a certain Leonida Dela
Cruz (Leonida) who used it for her business of selling rocks, pebbles and similar
construction materials.
When the lease of Nida expired sometime in May 2008, Daclison and other persons
acting under her took possession of the portion leased and occupied by Leonida
without the prior knowledge and consent of Baytion. Since then, Daclison had been
occupying the contested portion and using it for his business of selling marble and
other finishing materials without paying anything to Baytion.
Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized entry into the subject portion of the
property, sometime in June 2008, Baytion demanded that he vacate it. Despite oral and
written demands to vacate, Daclison refused to do so. This prompted Baytion to file
the complaint for forcible entry and damages.
Daclison, in his answer, averred that sometime in 1978, Baytion leased the subject
portion to Antonio dela Cruz (Antonio) where the latter started a business; that ten or
fifteen years later, a stone walling, called a riprap, was erected at the creek lying
beside Baytion’s property, leaving a deep down-sloping area; that Antonio negotiated
with a certain engineer so he could be in possession of the said down-slope; that
Antonio had the down-slope filled up until it was leveled with the leased portion; that
Antonio paid for the right to possess the same; that in 2000, Antonio’s business was
taken over by Leonida, who suffered a stroke in December 2007; that after her death,
the business was taken over by Ernanie Dela Cruz (Ernanie); that in February 2008, he
(Daclison) entered into a business venture with Ernanie in the same leased property
and he took over the management of the business; that he received a letter from
Baytion addressed to Ernanie requesting the latter to vacate the subject premises; that
Baytion and Ernanie came to an agreement that the latter would continue the lease of
the property; that he issued a check in the amount of ₱100,000.00 as payment for the
rental arrears; that two weeks thereafter, Baytion returned the check and demanded
that Ernanie vacate the property; that Baytion promised that he would no longer bother
them if they would just transfer to the filled-up and plane-leveled property; that on
account of the said promise, he and Ernanie vacated the leased area and transferred
their business to the filled-up portion; that despite the fact that they already vacated the
leased portion of the property, Baytion still filed a complaint with the barangay
claiming that the filled-up portion was part of his property; that the executive officer of
the barangay who conducted the investigation made a report indicating that
a mojon was placed by him (Daclison) which showed the boundary of Baytion’s
property; that Baytion acknowledged the said report and agreed to put an end to the
controversy; and that despite Baytion’s agreement to put an end to the dispute, he still
sent a demand letter to vacate. 6
29
On August 25, 2009, the MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that Baytion failed to
include his siblings or his co-owners, as plaintiffs in the case. The dismissal, however,
was without prejudice.
Baytion appealed the case to the RTC, which ruled that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction
to decide the case because the allegations in the complaint failed to constitute a case of
forcible entry. Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, however, the RTC
did not dismiss the case and, instead, exercised its original jurisdiction over the same.
The RTC then decided that Baytion had a better right of possession over the property.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:
1) The defendant and other persons claiming under him to vacate and to turn
over the possession of the subject property to the plaintiff; and,
2) The defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of ₱20,000.00/monthly for the
use of the premises commencing from May 2008 until the subject premises is
vacated.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, Daclison filed an appeal with the CA.
The CA tackled two issues, namely: a) whether the RTC committed a reversible error
when it exercised original jurisdiction of the case and decided the same on its merits
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court; and, b) who, between Baytion
and Daclison, had a better right to possess the subject property.
The CA ruled that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case in a
summary proceeding for forcible entry because Baytion failed to allege that he was in
prior physical possession of the property and that he was deprived of his possession
under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was of the view that the
present action for forcible entry had actually ripened into one for recovery of the right
to possess or accion publiciana, which was an action in an ordinary civil proceeding in
the Regional Trial Court. The action was aimed at determining who among the parties
had a better right of possession of realty independent of the issue of ownership or title.
It was an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 8 Thus, it
agreed with the RTC when the latter correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case
following the mandate of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court. 9
As to the issue of possession, the CA concluded that Baytion, as co-owner of the
subject property, had a better right to possess. It wrote:
Xxx, it is clear that Antonio, Leonida and Ernanie were all lessees of the subject
property and its improvements owned by the plaintiff. Ernanie, who is a sub-lessee of
the subject property, again sub-leased the same to appellant, without authority or
consent from appellee. Thus, since appellant have been possessing the subject property
in his capacity as a mere sub-lessee, he cannot own the subject property and its
improvements through open, continuous and adverse possession of the property. It
follows then that appellee has the right to repossess the subject property. 10
On February 5, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed decision, disposing in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the
Decision 27 April 2012 rendered by Branch 224 of the RTC of Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-09-66145 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Daclison filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in the assailed
resolution.
Hence, the present petition for review raising the following
ISSUES
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD
THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS AN ACCION PUBLICIANA, MORE
SIGNIFICANTLY [WITH] RESPECT TO THE LAND OUTSIDE TCT NO.
30
221507; THAT, EFFECTIVELY, THE RESPONDENT HAS PRIOR
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY OUTSIDE TCT NO. 221507.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER WAS A LESSEE OF THE
SECOND PROPERTY
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE SECOND PROPERTY OR LAND WAS AN
UMPROVEMENT ON THE PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENT.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL CAPACITY TO
SUE.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED UNDER THE LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD PAY THE
[RESPONDENT] THE AMOUNT OF ₱20,000 MONTHLY FOR THE USE OF
THE PREMISES.12
Daclison insists that what is really in dispute in the present controversy is the filled-up
portion between the riprap constructed by the government and the property of Baytion
and,13 therefore, outside of the land co-owned by Baytion. Accordingly, the RTC and
the CA should have dismissed the case because the leased property was already
surrendered to its owner, thereby, mooting the complaint. 14
Daclison insists that Antonio, from whom he derived his right over the contested
portion, made an open, continuous and adverse possession and use of the property
when the latter extended his place of business to the filled-up portion.15 He claims that
the filled-up portion is not an improvement on the leased property as found by the
RTC and the court a quo. It is a property separate and distinct from the leased
property.16
The Respondent’s Position
Baytion basically posits that although the disputed portion is outside the description of
the property covered by TCT No. 221507, it forms an integral part of the latter because
it is an accretion, construction, or improvement on the property and, under the law, any
accretion or anything built thereon belongs to him and his co-owners.17
The Court’s Ruling
At the outset, it was clear that the disputed property was the filled-up portion between
the riprap constructed by the government and the property covered by TCT No.
221507. According to Daclison, the property covered by TCT No. 221507 had already
been surrendered to Baytion which the latter never disputed. As such, the Court is now
confronted with the question as to who between the parties has a better right over this
contested portion between the land co-owned by Baytion and the constructed riprap.
Baytion does not have a better
right over the contested portion
The RTC and the CA erred in holding that Baytion has a better right to possess the
contested portion.
Baytion’s contention that he owns that portion by reason of accretion is misplaced.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
In other words, the following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be
considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
31
 (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers.18
In the case at bench, this contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. To begin
with, the land came about not by reason of a gradual and imperceptible
deposit.1âwphi1 The deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive
result of the current from the creek adjacent to his property. Baytion failed to prove the
attendance of the indispensable requirement that the deposit was due to the effect of
the current of the river or creek. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not
a result of human intervention.19
Furthermore, the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or
accession. Article 445 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the
improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the
provisions of the following articles.
[Emphases supplied]
It must be noted that Article 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as
"on the thing that has been mentioned." 20 In other words, the supposed improvement
must be made, constructed or introduced within or on the property and not outside so
as to qualify as an improvement contemplated 'by law. Otherwise, it would just be very
convenient for land owners to expand or widen their properties in the guise of
improvements.
In view of all the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Court that Baytion, not being the
owner of the contested portion, does not have a better right to possess the
same.1âwphi1 In fact, in his initiatory pleading, he never claimed to have been in prior
possession of this piece of property. His claim of ownership is without basis. As earlier
pointed out, the portion is neither an accretion nor an accession. That being said, it is
safe to conclude that he does not have any cause of action to eject Daclison.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 5, 2015 Decision and the
August 3, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99627
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for possession is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA
IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact,
MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and
EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL,Respondents.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 28,
2006 and the Resolution3dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 57618 which reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated August 20, 1996 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Civil Case No. D-
6978, declared (a) the descendants of Ciriaco Abrio 5 as the exclusive owners of the
Motherland covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1462,6 (b) the
descendants of respondent Victoriano Imbornal (respondent Victoriano) as the
exclusive owners of the first accretion (First Accretion) covered by OCT No. P-
318,7 and (c) the descendants of Pablo Imbornal (Pablo) as the exclusive owners of the
second accretion (Second Accretion) covered by OCT No. 21481, 8 and dismissed the
complaint and counterclaim in all other respects for lack of merit.
The Facts
Basilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina,
Catalina, and Pablo.Francisco I. Narvasa, Sr.9 (Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro)
were the children10 of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was the
daughter of Balbina.11 Petitionersare the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco,
Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.). On the other hand, respondentsEmiliana,
Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal,
are the descendants of Pablo.12
32
During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay
Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan with an area of 4,144 square meters (sq. m.),
more or less (Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters
Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920. 13
Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a
homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the
Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan.14 He was eventually awarded Homestead
Patent No. 2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in
his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10149516 was issued in the name of Ciriaco’s heirs,
namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio,
married to Crisenta Corpuz; Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito
Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of
Ciriaco).
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portionof the Motherland, while
respondents occupied the southern portion.17
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined
the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was
issued in thename of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering
the First Accretion.18 Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an
area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern
portion.19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the
respondents covering the Second Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of
Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an Amended Complaint 20 for
reconveyance, partition,and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case
No. D-6978. They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of
his wifeCatalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property, and that
Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent
application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead
patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the Motherland – which now
included both accretions – in trust for the Imbornal sisters.21
Likewise, Francisco, et al.alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and
misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the
respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered
the said accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they werenot the
riparian owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely
formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert
their inheritance claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they
respected respondents’ rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have
repudiated their (Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon. 22 Thus, bewailing that respondents
have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland, but also to the
subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties,
or, in the alternative, the payment of their value, as well as the award of moral
damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of ₱150,000.00,
including attorney’s fees and other costs.23
In their Amended Answer dated March 5, 1984, 24 respondents contended that: (a) the
Amended Complaint statedno cause of action against them, having failed to clearly
and precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions they have
allegedly committed; (b) the action was barred by prescription; and (c) that the
properties sought to be reconveyed and partitioned are not the properties of their
predecessors-ininterest but, instead, are covered by Torrens certificates of titles, free
from any encumbrance, and declared for taxation purposes in their names. In this
regard, respondents prayed that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that
Francisco, et al.be held liable for the payment of moral damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs of suit in their favor.
During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland
was eventually sold bythe Heirs of Ciriaco to a certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera),
and thatsaid heirs and deVera were not impleaded as parties in this case.25
The RTC Ruling
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision26 in favor of Francisco, et al. and
thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective
portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent;
and (b) pay actual damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of ₱100,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of ₱10,000.00, as well as costs
of suit.
33
The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed
that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters with respect to
the Motherland.27 It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.’s allegation that the
Sabangan property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother, Basilia, was
sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending homesteadpatent
application. In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in
trust for them once his homestead patent application had been approved. As Ciriaco
was only able to acquire the Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the
proceeds realized from the sale of the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and,
consequently, Francisco, et al. (as the children of Alejandra and Balbina) are entitled
to their proportionate shares over the Motherland, notwithstanding the undisputed
possession of respondents over its southern portion since 1926. 28
With respect to the accretions thatformed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled
that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the owner of the said accretions.
Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the
Motherland by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Ciriaco, they
(Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said accretions
despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s ruling, respondents elevated the matter on appeal to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision29 reversing and setting aside the
RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the
exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano
asthe exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e.,
respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.
With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a
homestead patent, which later became the basis for the issuance of a Torrens certificate
of title in his name; as such, saidcertificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally
through an action for reconveyance filed by his wife’s (Catalina’s) relatives (i.e.,
Francisco, et al.being the children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are the
sisters of Catalina). The CA further observed that the homestead patent was not
aninheritance of Catalina; instead, it was awarded by the government to Ciriaco after
having fully satisfied the stringent requirements set forth under Commonwealth Act
No. 141,30 as amended,31and his title thereto had already become
indefeasible.32 Consequently, since the entire Motherland was titled in Ciriaco’s name,
his descendants should be regarded as the absolute owners thereof.
On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that
respondents – i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the First Accretion, and all
the respondents withrespect to the Second Accretion – need not be the owners of the
Motherland in order to acquire them by acquisitive prescription. Considering that
accretions are not automatically registered in the name of the riparianowner and are,
therefore, subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons, any occupant may apply
for their registration. In this case, the CA found that respondents have acquired title to
the subject accretions by prescription,33 considering that they have been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept of an owner since 1949
(when the First Accretion was formed), which resulted in the issuance of a certificate
of title in the name of respondent Victoriano covering the same. Accordingly, they
have also become the riparian owners of the Second Accretion, and given thatthey
have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in their names over the said Accretion,
they have also become the absolute ownersthereof. Since Francisco, et al. took no
action to protect their purported interests over the disputed accretions, the respondents’
titles over the same had already become indefeasible, to the exclusion of Francisco, et
al.34
At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration
which was, however,denied by the CA in a Resolution35 dated May 7, 2008, hence,
this petition taken by the latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in declaring that:
(a) the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the
descendants of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First Accretion;
and (c) the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of
the Second Accretion on the basis of the following grounds: (a) prescription of the
reconveyance action, which was duly raised as anaffirmative defense in the Amended
Answer, and (b) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and
Ciriaco.
34
 The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and
the First Accretion are barred by prescription.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully
registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. 36 Thus, reconveyance is a remedy
granted only tothe owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s
name.37
As the records would show, the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest, Francisco, et al. is for the reconveyance of their purported
shares or portions in the following properties: (a) the Motherland, originally covered
by OCT No. 1462 in the name of Ciriaco; (b) the First Accretion, originally covered by
OCT No. P-318 in the name of respondent Victoriano; and (c) the Second Accretion,
covered by OCT No. 21481 in the name of all respondents. To recount, Francisco, et
al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the
same in trustfor their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of
the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired the First and
Second Accretions by means of fraudand deceit.
When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is
created by law in favor of the true owner.38 Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides
that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee
ofan implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the
date of registration of the deed or the date ofissuance of the certificate of title over the
property,39 if the plaintiff is not in possession. However, if the plaintiff is in possession
of the property, the action is imprescriptible. As held in the case of Lasquite v. Victory
Hills, Inc.:40
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The
reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed
or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual
need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
However, if the plaintiff, as the realowner of the property also remains in possession of
the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property
does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless
filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible.41 (Emphases supplied)
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the
registration of the respective titles covering the disputed properties within which to file
their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in
possessionof the said properties. Hence, with respect tothe Motherland covered by
OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for
reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to
the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952in the name
of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed
untilAugust 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by
OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the respondents, a suit
for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.
A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended
Complaint42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed only on February 27,
1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which
to seek the reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and
the First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second
Accretion having been seasonably filed. Thus, considering thatrespondents raised
prescription as a defense in their Amended Answer, 43 the Amended Complaint with
respect to the Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have beendismissed based
on the said ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the Second Accretion
surviving. As will be, however, discussed below, the entirety of the Amended
Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on its
substantive merits since the existence of the implied trust asserted in this case had not
been established. In effect, the said complaint is completely dismissible.
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.’s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had
arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with
35
respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the
proceeds from the sale of the Sabangan property – an inheritance of their predecessors,
the Imbornal sisters – were used for the then-pending homestead application filed by
Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively,
coowners of the Motherland together with Ciriaco’s heirs.
An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by
operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect
against unfair dealing or downright fraud.44 To reiterate, Article 1456 of the Civil
Code states that "[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes."
The burden of proving the existence ofa trust is on the party asserting its existence, and
such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements.45 While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence must be
trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made
to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required
because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.46
In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by
Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either mistakenly or fraudulently
registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely
a trustee of an implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal
sisters or their heirs.
As the CA had aptly pointed out,47 a homestead patent award requires proof that the
applicant meets the stringent conditions48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the
homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process
and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent
application. As such, it is highly implausible thatthe Motherland had been acquired
and registered by mistake or through fraudas would create an implied trust between the
Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing
that the Imbornal sisters entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion
thereof, orasserted any right over the same at any point during their lifetime. Hence,
when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to
Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco’s titleto the Motherland
had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration
that led to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462
in Ciriaco’s name are presumptively regular and proper,49 which presumption has not
been overcome by the evidence presented by Francisco, et al.
In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral
testimony offered by Francisco, et al. on the alleged verbal agreement between their
predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland.
Weighed against the presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent to
Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and registered by
mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of Francisco, et al.would not effectively
establish their claims of ownership. It has been held that oral testimony as to a certain
fact, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written
or documentary evidence,50 especially since the purported agreement transpired
decades ago, or in the 1920s. Hence, with respect to the Motherland, the CA did not
err in holding that Ciriaco and his heirs are the owners thereof, without prejudice to the
rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the said property.
Consequently, as Francisco, et al.failed to prove their ownership rights over the
Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily,
the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners
of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja v.
Lim,51 the Court, citing paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated
April 30, 1936, in relation to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, as well
as related jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the
riparian owner over the land formed by accretions, viz.:
Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or
littoralowner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under
paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which
reads:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore
lands, marshylands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining
36
his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and
regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within
sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right.
The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary[170 Phil. 567; 80 SCRA
548 (1977)] the reason for such grant of preferential right to the riparian or littoral
owner, thus:
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential
right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shore by accretions and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such
lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries, or for the
coast guard service, "shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,. are not the
riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had .attached, hence,
they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second
Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the
Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties
through prescription as it was ·not established that they were in possession of any of
them. Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription,
the discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over
the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said
properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other
end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering
the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which
give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for
reconveyan.ce with respect to both accretions must altogether fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2006 and
the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618
are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended
Complaint dated February 27, 1984 filed in said case. SO ORDERED.

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian
according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretionsor alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea.

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving
accretions to the riparianowner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner
for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the
waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea
should gain by its recession.52

Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not
form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the
owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for
by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the
Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.53

37