[G.R. No. L-30272. February 28, 1985.] 8.
8. That the said lots included in this application adjoins the National Road
RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., petitioner, vs. CONSUELO C. VILLAREAL,
ISABEL C. VILLAREAL, FLAVIANO C. VILLAREAL, ALFREDO V.
GOMEZ, AURORA V. GOMEZ and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the decision of the defunct Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 36700 which REVERSED the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 1204, LRC Rec. No. N-10480.
Sometime in December 1955, private respondents filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Pasig, an Application for Registration, alleging, inter alia:
"1. That the said land consists of two agricultural lots bounded and
described as shown on plan Psd-147662 as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 and technical
descriptions attached hereto and made integral part hereof;
2. That Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of plan Psd-147662 at the last assessment for
taxation were assessed at a total amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P1,500.00) PESOS per Tax Declaration Nos. 11994 and
11995 in the values of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY
(P1,190.00) PESOS and THREE HUNDRED TEN P310.00) PESOS,
respectively, in the Land Records of Rizal Province;
3. That to the best of their knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said parcels of land nor is
there any person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or equitable in
possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;
4. That the applicants have acquired said lands by purchase from the
spouses VICTORIANO CERVO and IGNACIA GUILLERMO as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former,
before Notary Public for the City of Manila, Mr. Manuel M. Paredes on the
3rd day of November, 1955, per Doc. No. 352, Page No. 42, Book No. II,
Series of 1955;
5. That the said parcels of land are not occupied by anybody;
xxx xxx xxx
and the applicants do not claim any part of the said National Road;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner then prayed that the aforesaid parcels be brought under the operation of the
Land Registration Act, and to have the title thereto confirmed and registered in their
names.
Petitioner filed an OPPOSITION to said application alleging —
"That the Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is the owner of unregistered three (3)
parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 4, located in Darangan,
Binangonan Rizal, the full technical description and bearing distance of
which can be found in Plan Psu-2260 approved by the Director of Lands in
1912;.
That the land which is the subject of this petition for registration, full
technical description of which are found in Psu-147662 approved by the
Director of Lands in October, 1955, covers portions of Lots 1 and 4 of Psu-
2260;
That Lot No. 1 under Psu-2260 contains an area of 122,982 square meters,
a portion of which is designated as Lot No. 2 of Psu-147662 containing an
area of 6,133 square meters;
That Lot No. 4 of Psu-2260 contains an area of 27,530 square meters, a
portion of which is designated as Lot No. 1 of Psu-147662 containing an
area of 19,916 square meters; and
That the oppositor Rizal Cement Co., Inc. is in possession of said land and
has been religiously paying the real estate tax in the Municipality of
Binangonan,Rizal from the time it had acquired said property from the
previous owner (Old Tax Declaration No. 30662) now 10570."
Petitioner then prayed that the said petition be dismissed.
Private respondents, in REPLY to said OPPOSITION, countered that the whole three
(3) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 4 of Plan Psu-2260 do not belong to
the petitioner; that a portion of Lot No. 1 consisting of 6,133 square meters and portion
of Lot No. 4 consisting of 19,916 square meters belong to them; that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, adverse and open possession of said
1
portion since time immemorial; and that they have been religiously paying the real
estate taxes thereon.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance on April 28, 1965
which was amended on May 21, 1965, denying the application for registration and
ordering the issuance of a decree of registration after finality of said decision in the
name of Rizal Cement Company.
Respondents appealed to the then Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
lower court's decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate court
denied the motion in its Resolution of February 11, 1969.
Hence, the present petition alleging that the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision
of the trial court, has arrived at grossly mistaken, absurd and impossible conclusions of
law and has decided the appeal in a manner totally at war with and entirely contrary to
law and the applicable decisions of this Court. In fine, petitioner submits the following
errors allegedly committed by the appellate court for Our review and consideration:
a) Reliance on the Deed of Sale purporting to have been executed by Maria
Certeza in 1924 in favor of Apolonia Francisco, the due execution of
which have been duly established, and made capital of this deed of sale as
having effected the transfer of rights over the lots in question, successively
from the original vendor down to herein private respondents;
(b) Giving much weight to private respondents' evidence to the effect that
former Justice Mariano de Joya and one Gonzalo Certeza were former
owners of the property in question, and that they are the predecessors-in-
interest of the applicants-respondents. However, the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the fact that these persons who were then available and
were the best witnesses to substantiate applicants' claim, were not
presented as witnesses thereby giving rise to the legal presumption that
their testimonies would have been adverse had they testified in this case;
c) Failure of the Court of Appeals to consider the fact that the two (2) lots
sought to be registered by private respondents were not listed in the
inventory of Maria Certeza's properties submitted to the court;
d) Failure of the Court of Appeals to rule that private respondents were not
able to prove that the properties covered by Exhibit "H" were the same
properties covered in Exhibit "I". The Court of Appeals has acted contrary
to the doctrine laid down in land registration cases to the effect that an
applicant must prove not only the genuineness of his title but also the
identity of the land applied for;
e) Stressing that the evidence of petitioner (then oppositor) was weak to
substantiate its claim but failed to apply the doctrine that the burden is
upon the applicant for registration of land to prove satisfactorily that he is
the owner and it is not enough to prove that the property does not belong to
the opponent. The evidence must be absolute and not merely preponderant;
and
f) In stating that applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest
have an unbroken adverse possession under claim of ownership for over
thirty years thus failing to consider that petitioner has also been in
possession of the properties since 1911, while several portions thereof
were only under lease to several persons.
Based on respondents-applicants' testimonial and documentary evidence, it appears
that the property applied for, designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662,
have a total area of 26,015 square meters; that these lots originally belonged to one
Maria Certeza; that upon her death, the property was involved in a litigation between
her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza and that the lots were given by the latter to
former Justice de Joya as the latter's attorney's fees; that the lots were then sold by de
Joya to Filomeno Sta. Ana who, in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano Cervo and
Ignacia Guillermo in 1939; that sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold the
said lots to the herein applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale; 1 that the
spouses Cervo declared the property for taxation purposes in the name of the wife,
Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes due thereon; that prior to the sale, the
spouses Cervo had the two parcels surveyed first in 1950 and then in 1955.
Upon the other hand, oppositor, (now petitioner) Rizal Cement Company, claims to be
the owner of the subject lots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to have
been in continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1911. To substantiate
its claim, petitioner submitted documentary evidence, the most important of which are
the following —
(a) Plan Psu-2260 which covers the survey of a big tract of land for the
company designated as Lots 1, 2 and 4 of the Plan with a total area of
210,644 square meters. The survey was made in 1911 and the plan was
approved in 1912;
2
 (b) A sketch plan of the geographical position of the real properties of
Madrigal and Company;
(c) Tax Declaration No. 1066 secured in 1949 from the Rizal Provincial
Assessor which is a consolidation of all lands of
the Rizal Cement Company located in Darangan with a total area of
2,496,712 square meters and which includes the land in litigation;
(d) Tax Declaration No. 10570 which cancels Tax Declaration No. 1066;
and
(e) Real estate tax receipts issued for Madrigal and Company, covering
among others the land applied for.
As to who had been in actual possession of the land in question, the Court of Appeals
gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents applicants, namely:
(a) Santiago Picadizo — one of the tenants of the land from the time it was
owned by Maria Certeza up to the present. He stated that he knew for a fact
that the lots in question were given to Justice Mariano de Joya as attorney's
fees, who in turn sold the same to Ignacia Guillermo; that from the time he
started working as tenant, he successively gave the share of the harvests to
Maria Certeza; and that during all the time that the parcels of land were
possessed by the previous owners, no other persons ever claimed
ownership of the property.
(b) Isaac Reyes — who started working on one-half of the 2 parcels of land
since 1934 up to the present, and declared that there was no other person
other than Ignacia Guillermo who claimed ownership of the parcels in
litigation; and
(c) Mr. Valentin Marquez — a rebuttal witness who averred that he begun
to live in Darangan, Binangonan, Rizal, since 1910; that he bought a
portion of his land from Maria Certeza when he was working
with Rizal Cement Company in 1924; that the sale was evidenced by an
absolute Deed of Sale; that he occupied the portion sold to him up to 1924;
that ever since he possessed the property there were no other adverse
claimants thereto; that he saw a small house on a portion of the land of
Maria Certeza built by Rizal Cement Company who intended to make a
location where it could built a factory; that after 4 to 5 months, the small
house was removed, after which, the witness purchased that portion from
Maria Certeza; that during his stay in Darangan, the company did not take
possession of the land; that Maria Certeza had the possession of the land
until her death and that the tenants gave the harvest of the land to Maria
Certeza.
On this score, the Court of Appeals in its assailed decision held and rightly so —
"Being an attribute of ownership, appellants' possession of the land in
question goes far to tip the scale in their favor. The right to possess flows
from ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession by another of
what belongs to him. Were the oppositor-appellee rightful owner of the
land in question, it would not have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land
and give the owner's share to appellants and/or their predecessors. It would
have opposed the survey for applicants' vendors on May 21 and 28, 1950
and July 31, 1955, but did not as shown in the surveyor's certificate,
Exhibit E. If oppositor really bought Lot 2 from Maria Certeza in 1909 as
claimed, it has not been explained how she could sell a portion thereof to
Apolonia Francisco, married to Valentin Marquez for P100.00 on April 15,
1924 by deed, Exhibit R, — an ancient document - as confirmed by the
husband in his deposition who as employee of oppositor would have
known of its acquisition. On the other hand, applicants' vendors in
mortgaging the two lots to Pedro Picones in 1952, Exhibits O and O-1, for
P11,000.00, exercised a dominical act; and Aniano Bautista's testimony
that the Cervos were not owners of the land challenges belief since
Bautista was a witness to Exhibits O and O-1, being uncle of Picones."
Very significantly petitioner did not present any witness in actual possession of the
land in question.
As aptly found by the appellate court, respondents possess the property in the concept
of an owner.
"Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the
exercise of a right or by the fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right."
Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey plan are not
conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in question.
Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest
ownership of the property upon the declarant. 3 Settled is the rule that neither tax
receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient
3
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by
other effective proofs. 5
Apropos thereto is the appellate court's finding that —
"Against the chains of tax declarations presented by the applicants-
appellants which originated beyond 1920 from Maria Certeza,
undisputably the original owner of Lots 1 and 2, the oppositor-appellee
presented no tax declaration which could refer specifically to the two lots
in question. Tax Declaration No. 10570 (Exhibit 35-1949) for the
oppositor-appellee admittedly does not indicate any of the two lots in
question. Indeed, the senior deputy assessor of Rizal, as witness for the
oppositor-appellee, categorically declared that his office refused to issue
tax declaration for the land covered by its Plan Psu-2260, for the reason
that the same had been in possession of various persons in Darangan."
Anent the allegation of petitioner to the effect that the subject lands, full technical
description of which are found in Psu-147662 approved in October 1955, covers
portion of Lots 1 and 4 of Psu-2260, the Court of Appeals correctly observed —
"The only documentary evidence which the oppositor-appellee may
capitalize for its claim of ownership is the notation in applicants' plan
Exhibit D that the lots in question are portions of a previous survey made
in 1911 for oppositor, Plan Psu-2260. The survey plan however has no
original record in the Bureau of Lands. Be that as it may, survey plans
merely delimit areas sought to be registered. Besides, the annotation relied
upon by the lower court in its judgment in favor of the oppositor is nothing
more than what it imports — a previous survey. Neither the plan nor its
approval carried with it any adjudication of ownership. The Director of
Lands through approval merely certifies that the survey has been made in
accordance with approved methods and regulations in force." (Philippine
Executive Commission vs. Antonio, CA-G.R No. 8456, February 12,
1943)
A painstaking review of the evidence on record failed to disclose any evidence or
circumstance of note sufficient enough to overrule said findings and conclusions. The
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to Us from the Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) is limited to the review of errors of law, said appellate
court's findings of fact being conclusive upon us except 6 (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee, none of which
obtain in the case at bar.
The appellate court did what is required of it under the law and it cannot be faulted
after reaching a conclusion adverse to herein petitioner. The decision on the merits of
the case hinges on the determination of the pertinent facts, and the findings of the
Court of Appeals when supported by substantial evidence are beyond our power of
review.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision dated January 6,
1969 of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 50264. October 21, 1991.]
IGNACIO WONG, petitioner, vs. HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and
MANUEL MERCADO, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari, certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals as it involves purely question of law, seeking the annulment of the September
29, 1978 decision of the then Court of First Instance * of Davao del Sur, Branch V, in
Civil Case No. 1258 which reversed the February 20, 1978 decision of the Municipal
Court of Sta. Maria, ** Davao del Sur in an action for Forcible Entry (Civil Case No.
13) ordering the dismissal of the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
The undisputed facts of this case, as found by both the trial court and the then Court of
First Instance of Davao del Sur, are as follows:
"On the basis of the admission of parties in their respective
pleadings, the oral testimonies of all witnesses for both plaintiff
and defendants and the documentary evidence offered and
admitted this Court finds that plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired
his rights to possess the land in litigation, particularly lot 3 (LRC)
Pcs-295, (situated at Colonga, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur) and
which is particularly described and embraced in Transfer
4
Certificate of title No. (T-4244) T-972 from William Giger by
virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was
executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3,500.00 (testimony of
plaintiff, T.S.N., p. 3, hearing of January 7, 1977). Then, in 1973,
William Giger again asked an additional amount of P2,500.00
from plaintiff and so he required William Giger to sign a new deed
of Pacto de Retro Sale (Exhibit "A") on November 5, 1973 at
Davao City before Notary Public Gregorio C. Batiller (T.S.N., p.
5, hearing of January 7, 1977). In 1972, plaintiff began harvesting
only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on the land (Exhibits
B to E) for Mr. Giger. He went periodically to the land to make
copra but he never placed any person on the land in litigation to
watch it. Neither did he reside on the land as he is a businessman
and storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria,
Davao del Sur while the land in litigation is at Colongan, Sta.
Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that he is in
actual possession (p. 8, T.S.N., p. 7, hearing of January 14, 1978).
He knew defendants' laborers were in the land in suit as early as
August, 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do
anything to stop them. Instead plaintiff was happy that there were
people and a hut on the land in suit (p. 14, T.S.N., hearing of
January 14, 1978).
Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in
litigation to find out if there were other people residing there or
claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So, in July,
1976, defendant Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in
litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela
(Exhibit 5). After the execution of Exhibit 5, defendant
Ignacio Wong asked for the delivery of the title to him and so he
has in his possession TCT No. (T-4244) T974 (Exhibit 6) in the
name of William Giger. Mr. Wong declared the land in suit for
taxation purposes in his name (Exhibit 7). He tried to register the
pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the
registration fee (Exhibit 8) but due to some technicalities, the
pacto de retro sale could not be registered. The
defendant Wong placed laborers on the land in suit, built a small
farm house after making some clearings and fenced the
boundaries. He also placed signboards (T.S.N., pp. 14-15, hearing
of September 15, 1977). On September 27, 1976, plaintiff Manuel
Mercado again went to the land in suit to make copras. That was
the time the matter was brought to the attention of the police of
Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur and the incident entered in the police
blotter (Exhibit 11). Then on November 18, 1976,
defendant Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts from the
land in litigation and nobody disturbed him. But on November 29,
1976, defendant received a copy of plaintiff's complaint for
forcible entry with summons to answer which is the case now
before the Court. During the pendency of this instant complaint for
forcible entry, spouses William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed
a case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First
Instance of Digos, Davao del Sur against plaintiff Mercado
(Exhibit 4). The case pertains to Exhibit "A" of plaintiff" (pp. 1-3,
CA Decision, pp. 82-84, Rollo).
On the basis of the aforestated undisputed facts, the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria,
Davao del Sur in its February 20, 1978 Decision found that herein petitioner
(defendant Ignacio Wong) had prior, actual and continuous physical possession of the
disputed property and dismissed both the complaint and the counter-claim.
On appeal, the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, in its September 29, 1978
Decision drew a completely different conclusion from the same set of facts and ruled
in favor of herein private respondent (plaintiff Manuel Mercado). The decretal portion
of the said decision, reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the plaintiff to have taken
possession of the property earlier in point of time and defendant is
an intruder and must, as he is hereby ordered to return, the
possession of the land in question to the plaintiff, paying a
monthly rental of P400.00 from August, 1976, till the property is
returned with costs against the defendant. Judgment is reversed."
Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Court of Appeals. But the Court of
Appeals, in its March 1, 1979 Resolution *** found that the only issue is a pure
question of law — the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the undisputed facts
and certified the case to this Court.
In its April 4, 1979 Resolution, the Second Division of this Court docketed the case in
this Court and considered it submitted for decision.
5
Petitioner alleged two (2) errors committed by respondent judge, to wit:
A) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE
THAT PETITIONER IS AN INTRUDER IS WITHOUT
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF A
FORCIBLE ENTRY.
B) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE
THAT PETITIONER MUST PAY A MONTHLY RENTAL OF
P400.00 FROM AUGUST, 1976 TILL THE PROPERTY IS
RETURNED HAS NO LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner, in claiming that the private respondent has not established prior possession,
argues that private respondent's periodic visit to the lot to gather coconuts may have
been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the owner thereof for the purposes of
paying an obligation that may be due to the person gathering said nuts and that a
person who enters a property to gather coconut fruits and convert the same to copras
may only be a hired laborer who enters the premises every harvest season to comply
with the contract of labor with the true owner of the property.
The argument is untenable.
It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing
or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." (Art. 531, Civil Code;
Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and that the execution of a
sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless
there is stipulation to the contrary . . . . If, however, notwithstanding the execution of
the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the
thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by
another, then delivery has not been effected. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
II, 1989 Ed., p. 400).
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession
passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of
the first sale a retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the later sale a retro (Exhibit 5) in
favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an
impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact
cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases
of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession,
if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art. 538,
Civil Code).
As to petitioner's query that "Is the entry of petitioner to the property characterized by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth in order to show that private respondent
has had possession so that the case is within the jurisdiction of the inferior court?" (p.
15, Petition; p. 16, Rollo). The same is answered in the affirmative.
The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom
necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary. Under the rule, entering upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally
as obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of the action is really the forcible
exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The
words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in
open daylight, under the very eyes of person already clothed with lawful possession,
but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior
possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other
than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the
ground and excluding the other party. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.
II, 1983 Ed., pp. 243-244; Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 [1987]). cdphil
Anent the award of rentals in favor of private respondent, the same is in order.
Petitioner's argument that there is no legal or factual basis for the payment of monthly
rentals because bad faith on the part of petitioner was never proved" deserves no merit.
It should be noted that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character
except in the case and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is
not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil
Code).
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known
to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the
true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can be deduced that
6
the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must
be considered sufficient to show bad faith. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. II, p. 226). Such interruption takes place upon service of summons (Manotok
Realty vs. Judge Tecson, 164 SCRA 587 [1988] citing Mindanao Academy, Inc. v.
Yap (13 SCRA 190 [1965]). In the latter case, this Court held:
" . . . Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the
other and hence as between themselves their rights would be as if
both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction,
this legal fiction of Yap's good faith ceased when the complaint
against him was filed, and consequently the court's declaration of
liability for the rents thereafter is correct and proper. A possessor
in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his possession
is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon
service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil Code)."
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner received private respondent's
complaint for forcible entry with summons on November 29, 1976 (Rollo, p. 46). His
good faith therefore ceased on November 29, 1976. Accordingly, the computation of
the payment of monthly rental should start from December 1976, instead of August
1976.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the computation of the monthly rental
should start from December, 1976 instead of August, 1976, the September 29, 1978
decision of respondent judge is Affirmed in all other respects, with costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 82680. August 13, 1994.]
NICANOR SOMODIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
EBENECER PURISIMA and FELOMINO AYCO, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 29, 1987 and the
Resolution dated February 2, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 11602.
I
On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a
Transfer of Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mabugat the possession of a residential lot
situated at Rajah Muda, Bula, General Santos City and described in the said instrument
as: LibLex
"Lot No. (Unnumbered), bounded on the North by Temporary
Road, on the South by Customs Zone (Sarangani Bay), on the East
by Public Land, and on the West by Public Land."
Nicanor Somodio, herein petitioner, contributed one-half of the purchase price. On
October 22, 1974, Mabugat executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the
right of petitioner over one-half undivided portion of the lot. Later, petitioner
discovered in the District Land Office that the lot was numbered "6328-X, Csd 2281-
D." Thereafter, petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property into two portions, with
petitioner taking the western part. Immediately after the partition, petitioner took
possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and other
fruit-bearing trees.
In 1976, petitioner began construction of a structure with a dimension of 22-by-18 feet
on his lot. His employment, however, took him to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he
left the unfinished structure to the care of his uncle. He would visit the property every
three months or on weekends when he had time.
Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco, to transfer
his hut to petitioner's lot. About six years later, petitioner demanded that Ayco vacate
the premises but such demand proved futile. Hence, on August 23, 1983, petitioner
filed an action for unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Ayco before the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch I, General Santos, docketed as Civil Case No. 2032-II.
Meanwhile, on June 26, 1983, respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and
constructed a house thereon. Four days later, petitioner filed against respondent
Purisima a complaint for forcible entry before the same court docketed as Civil Case
No. 2013-I. Said case was later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.
In his answer, respondent Purisima averred that the lot was a portion of the land
subject of his application for miscellaneous sales patent with the Bureau of Lands.
Purisima described the lot in question as:
"Lot No. 6328-Y, CSD-2281-D, Bula, General Santos,
Cotabato. Bounded on the North by 6328-X; on the South by
Sarangani Bay; on the East by a Municipal Road; and on the West
by Lot No. 6328-W, containing an area of 1,095 square meters and
7
 covered by Tax Declaration No. 9647" (Rollo, p. 36; Emphasis
supplied).
Respondent Purisima contended that his father, a geodetic engineer, had surveyed the
parcel of land comprising of Lots Nos. 6427 and 6328 for the Small Farmers Fishpond
Association, Inc. in February 1958, and that his father's survey plan was approved by
the Director of Lands in 1960. Respondent Ayco, on the other hand, did not present
any evidence but merely anchored his right to possess the property on the
evidence of Purisima.
On April 30, 1986, the trial Court rendered a decision finding that respondent Purisima
built his house "almost on the spot where Somodio's unfinished house" stood "thru
stealth and strategy," not knowing that the house was built on Lot No. 6328-X and not
on Lot No. 6328-Y, the lot said respondent was claiming (Rollo, p. 43).
The court went on to state that:
". . . He (private respondent Purisima) was a frequent visitor in
Rajah Muda and had sometimes stayed with Mrs. Maturan in
Judge Purisima's house on the adjoining lots, and could not have
remained unaware of the possession of Somodio. He must have
depended on the thought that it was his father who made the
subdivision survey and had fenced an area which he had claimed.
He did not exactly verify that the area fenced by his father had an
area of only 1,095 square meters, which did not include the area
Lot No. 6328-X. As the situation exists, there is no expectation on
his part that his house on Lot No. 6328-X could eventually be
standing on his property, for Lot No. 6328-X is not claimed by
him and has not been applied for even by his father. His father has
been abroad and has not taken steps to apply for Lot No. 6328-X.
This lot is not declared for taxation purposes in the name of any
claimant-applicant. Unless and until there would be an
administrative proceedings and the title ultimately issued in
favor of an applicant, the possession of the actual claimant and
occupant has to be respected and maintained in the
interest of public order . . ." (Rollo, p. 43-44).
The Municipal Trial Court further held that petitioner was the actual possessor of Lot
No. 6328-X. The court did not believe respondent Ayco's claim that the
administratrix of the estate of respondent Purisima's father authorized him to build a
hut on Lot No. 6328-X in 1976: At any rate, the court said that respondent Ayco was
willing to vacate the premises provided he be given financial assistance to do so
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).
Noting that the ocular inspection of the area showed that the houses of respondents
Purisima and Ayco were "inside Lot No. 6328-X" and not on Lot No. 6328-Y, the
Municipal Trial Court held that the case became one which entailed mere
removal of the houses from the lot in question. Accordingly, the courtordered private
respondents to remove their respective houses, to deliver the land to petitioner, and to
pay attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, General Santos City, affirmed in
toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court. Respondents then elevated the cases on
a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, which, in its decision dated September
27, 1987, set aside the decisions of the two trial courts and ordered the dismissal of the
two complaints filed by petitioner.
The Court of Appeals held that herein petitioner had not "clearly and conclusively
established physical, prior possession over Lot No. 6328-X."
Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied, he filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
We grant the petition.
II
The procedural issue raised by private respondents should first be resolved. The issue
is whether the instant petition is proper considering that petitioner "merely touch(es)
upon questions of fact which had been carefully considered" by the Court of Appeals
(Rollo, p. 92). As a general rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. This rule, however, is not without exceptions, one of which is
when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to
each other. In such a case, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on record in order to
arrive at the correct findings based on the record (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 191
SCRA 1 [1990]; Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 411 [1990]).
Upon a review of the records, we are convinced that petitioner indeed enjoyed
priority of possession over Lot No. 6328-X, notwithstanding respondent Purisima's
claim to the contrary.
8
In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim ofownership
set forth by any of the party-litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior
possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This
rule holds true regardless of the character of a party's possession, provided that he has
in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria (De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276 [1992]).
Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the
property to coconut trees, ipil-ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the
construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that the building was
unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment reasons and visited the
property only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a
man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he
is in possession (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is sufficient that
petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
"Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or
the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the
action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right."
Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing
improvements on the land only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession because
respondent Purisima entered the premises only in 1983.
It should be emphasized that the Court of Appeals noted that none of the parties had
produced tax declarations or applications as public land claimants. As such, what
should have been scrutinized is who between the claimants had priority of possession.
Moreover, neither is the fact that respondent Purisima's father surveyed the
property of help to his cause. As the Court of Appeals found, respondent Purisima's
father surveyed the land for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc., not for
himself. Although respondent Purisima now claims that Lot No. 6328-X was in
payment of his fee for the services of his father and that he caused the construction of a
perimeter wall in the area, these facts do not mean that respondent Purisima himself
had prior possession. He did not present any proof that his father had authorized him to
enter the land as his successor-in-interest. Neither did he present proof that between
1958, when his father allegedly took possession of the land, and 1983, when said
respondent himself entered the land, his father ever exercised whatever right
of possession he should have over the property. Under these circumstances, priority in
time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of possession.
The Court of Appeals opined that petitioner had not properly identified the lot he had
occupied. The matter of identification of the land, however, had been resolved by
respondent Purisima's admission in his pleadings, as well as by two ocular inspections.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent Purisima claimed possession over Lot No.
6328-Y, while petitioner identified the lot adjacent to it, Lot No. 6328-X, as the area
where private respondents built their houses. That these two lots are distinct from one
another was resolved by the ocular inspection conducted by a Senior Geodetic
Engineer of the Office of the City Engineer, who found that "south of lot 6328-H
across a 10-meter wide road is lot 6328-Y and from thence to the south is lot 6328-X."
On June 13, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court judge himself went to the premises in
question and discovered that aside from the houses of respondents Purisima and Ayco,
five other houses had been built on Lot No. 6328-X.
Petitioner's prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with his
right of ownership over the same. As earlier stated, resolution of the issue of
possession is far from the resolution of the issue of ownership. Forcible entry is merely
a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate (German
Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 495 [1989];
Manuel v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 603 [1991].
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and that of the trial courts REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000.]
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD
ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG,
EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs.
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT,
WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO
ALEJO, respondents.
9
 SYNOPSIS
In 1952, upon petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639, the then CFI of Negros
Oriental issued an order subdividing said lot into six (6) portions, Lot 1639-A to Lot
1639-F. Lot 1639-D was issued to Roberto Maglucot. Guillermo, Leopoldo and
Severo, all surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of Lot 1639-D and built houses on
their corresponding leased lots. In 1992, however, said lessees stopped paying rentals
claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging that there was no valid partition that
took place in the absence of a confirmed subdivision plan. The lower court ruled that
there was already a subdivision of Lot 1639. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled
otherwise, hence, this petition for review.
The parties did not object to the Order of Partition and manifested by their
conduct that they have assented thereto. Hence, they cannot thereafter question the
decree. When respondents here have occupied their respective lots in accordance with
the sketch/subdivision plan, they cannot, after acquiescing to the Order for more than
40 years, be allowed to question the binding effect thereof. The payment of rentals by
respondents revealed that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of
respondents over Lot 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner.
DECISION
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11
November 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed
and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession
and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been
effected in 1952. Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot;
hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D,
which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents,
upon the other hand claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot
No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where there is an order for
partition but there is no showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the
then Court of First Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was registered in
the Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was
originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No.
6775 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis,
Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. 1 On 19
April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639. 2 Consequently, on
13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order 3 directing the parties to
subdivide said lot into six portions as follows:
a) Hermogenes Olis lot 1639-A
b) Pascual Olis lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome Maglucot lot 1639-C
d) Roberto(Alberto) lot 1639-D
Maglucot
e) Anselmo Lara lot 1639-E
f) Tomas Maglucot lot 1639-F. 4
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D
(subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented
portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor.
Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental
amount P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of
Roberto Maglucot, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however,
said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.
Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The
RTC found the existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and
Pascual Olis (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively) 5 as
indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that
Tomas Maglucot, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the partition
as it was he, in fact, who commenced the action for partition. 6 The court a quo cited
Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or
10
representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disapproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provisions of law,
it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned,
its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-
interest, to deny the existence of an approved partition against the other co-owners
who claim that there was one. 7 Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax
declarations 8 over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are
constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by
them of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter. 9
The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the
defendants ordering the latter:
1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the
premises thereof and deliver the possession of
the same to Plaintiffs;
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of
P15,000.00 for attorney's fees;
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year
from 1993 for actual damages representing the
amount of unpaid rentals up to the time they
actually vacate the premises in question;
4. To pay the costs. 10
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court
ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not
conclusive evidence of partition. 11 The CA likewise found that the prescribed
procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that
there was no partition of Lot No. 1639.
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA
committed the following reversible errors:
I declarations covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land of
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT
1639-D SINCE 1946;
II
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL, THE FACT OF
PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE
DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT
1639-D. HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;
III
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION,
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT,
AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE
OUTCOME OF THE CASE;
IV
IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR
JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES;
THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE
CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE
LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN
THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL
PARTITION HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE
OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE; 12
Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and
physically subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in
the actual execution of the subdivision. Further the co-owners accepted their
designated shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for
partition. 13 Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court
proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that
only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the
partition. 14 Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in their tax
Roberto Maglucot." 16
11
 For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First,
they emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised
or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI
subsequently confirmed the same. 17 Second, they point to the fact that petitioners
were unable to show any court approval of any partition. 18 Third, they maintain that
Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and
perfectly valid title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition
whatsoever. 19
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the
evidence on record, we find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core
issue in this case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952.
Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive except
in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record." 20 This
case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are
in conflict with that or the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which then are based and are premised on absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider the
evidence on record to determine whether indeed there was partition.
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an
order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and
whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or
subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as
the case may be. 21 The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not
otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff
is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall
confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e., either the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed — the order is a final one, and may
be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.22 The second phase commences when it
appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court.
In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have
been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real
estate in question." Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. 23
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or
order decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable. 23 The order of partition is a
final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the
propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not
having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become
final and executory and cannot now be disturbed.
The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.
The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the
merits of the case. 24 An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence,
appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. 25
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the
ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, 26 which held that the order of partition is
interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having
been confirmed by the trial court are not binding. 27 In this case, both the order of
partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where
parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they
have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree, 28 especially, where,
by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of
12
the commission. 29 Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in
accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the
order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition
in Arcenas vs. Cinco. 30 In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it
required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its
approval." Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to
approve the sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the parties.
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being
confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties. 31 However, this rule does not
apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed
sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to the
sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order
for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and
continue to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the
court approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that
confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties
herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the
supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan. cdasia
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral
agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. 32 By virtue of this agreement, the
original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. 33 It was only in 1952
when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners,
namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided
and have separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the
parties in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest
occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such
possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the
tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears
that said court was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the
portions in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop,
said court ordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the
tentative sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the
parties therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with
the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision plan
which would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no showing
that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any
objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their
possession of the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision
plan.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a
partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in
severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. 34 It follows that a
party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and
held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have
enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who
took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion
allotted to another party. 35 A person cannot claim both under and against the same
instrument. 36 In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions,
and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all
or none. 37 Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from
subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it. 38 Here, respondents, by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots
in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was
filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other
co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the
sketch plan.
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so
as to mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action
and acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that
what is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the
adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance of benefits, which
arises when a party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is
free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses
to adopt such defective proceeding as his own. 39 Ratification means that one under no
disability, voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective
proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this
voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was
theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the
ratification. 40
13
 The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of
Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot
No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point
by presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the
amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma were for the
payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable that the
parties would be unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for
so long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax
declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are
tax declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents
would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily
verified this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As
such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in
the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another
a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or
wrong. 41 Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of
petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D
in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was
commenced.
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support
the presumption. 42 Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may
be presumed. 43 It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of
land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60
years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by
deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not
recorded. 44 And where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots,
and one of the lots has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenants
in common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common,
it may fairly be inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to
him whose name it bears. 45
Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title
showing any partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled
clearly indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unless
partition is shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or
that the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition.
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and
protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof,
but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the
parties thereto of their obligations thereunder. 46 As originally conceived, registration
is merely a species of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in
order to give it legal effect as between the parties. 47 Requirements for the recording
of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public
to act with the presumption that recorded instruments exist and are genuine. 48
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the
oral agreement was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the
confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took
possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted
because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the
original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is
no evidence that there has been any change in the possession of the parties. The only
significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that
respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude,
therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases
for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the
order of partition in 1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral
partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual
possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition
and the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency
and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-
settled. In Espina vs. Abaya, 49 we declared that an oral partition is valid.
In Hernandez vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in Tan vs. Lim, 51 this Court has ruled, thus:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the
statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce oral partition when
it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to
partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will proper cases
where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the
taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by
the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases
involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
14
 possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such
partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol
partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties
to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land
divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was
taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a
court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be
valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in
severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that
the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine
of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is
necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the
statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition
in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a
court of equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed
to by the parties.
Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents.
First, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the
share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain statements that the
houses of respondents were built on the land owned by RobertoMaglucot.
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after
respondents were informed that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D
belonging to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio
Alejo went to the house of said witness and offered to buy the share of
Roberto Maglucot. 52 Aida Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer
because they also intend to use the lot for a residential purpose. 53This testimony of
Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this
finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the unrebutted
evidence of the petitioners. Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at least
a co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of the
petitioners and that they are not co-owners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No.
1639-D.
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the
names of Constancio Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot, 54 Tax Declaration No. 04-87-
13 in the names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot, 55 Tax Declaration No. 04-
593 in the names of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida 56 showing that the houses of
the above-mentioned persons are constructed on the land of
Roberto Maglucot 57 constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same
persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax Declarations are
public documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents therein are
presumed to be true and accurate. 58 The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that
Roberto Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their respective
declarations because he was the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and
not supported by any other evidence.
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a
portion of Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of
Tomas Maglucot, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with
the sketch plan of said lot showing the partition into six portions.59
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for
petitioners in their petition for review on certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for
petitioners made reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of
scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law "by the researcher." 60 Second, he
cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference to the
record" 61 that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any
partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this
will only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher." 62
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system
and as an institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by
the courts and not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of
their office. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the
researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary
rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper
15
language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the researcher
of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or
menacing language or behavior before the courts. 63
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED the decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000.]
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA MENDOZA
LIRIO, petitioners, vs. HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
On October 15, 1975, respondent Honorata Bolante and Miguel Mendoza,
brother of petitioners, had a dispute on the ownership of the land during the cadastral
survey. Because of this dispute, herein petitioners filed a civil case against respondent
claiming ownership and possession of the parcel of land in question. After trial, the
court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of petitioners awarding the questioned
property to petitioners and ordered herein respondent to vacate the property subject of
the case and deliver possession thereof to the heirs of Margarito Mendoza. Aggrieved
by the decision, respondent filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this Petition.
The Supreme Court found the petition not meritorious. The Court ruled that
the appellate court was correct in not giving credence to the affidavit presented by the
petitioner for the reason that it cannot be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
under the dead man's statute. Likewise, the affidavit cannot be considered an ancient
document as the petitioner failed to explain how the purported signature of one of the
respondents could have been affixed as she was an illiterate woman who had never had
any formal schooling. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession
of the property for which taxes had been paid. In the absence of actual public and
adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal
basis. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition and the assailed decision and
resolution of the appellate court were affirmed.
DECISION
Tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of ownership or
possession of the property for which such taxes have been paid. Coupled with proof of
actual possession of the property, they may become the basis of a claim for ownership.
By acquisitive prescription, possession in the concept of owner — public, adverse,
peaceful and uninterrupted — may be converted to ownership. On the other hand,
mere possession and occupation of land cannot ripen into ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the March 19, 1999
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43423. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows: 3
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the
trial court appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered declaring . . . Honorata
Mendoza Bolante the rightful owner and possessor of the parcel of
land which is the subject of this appeal."
The Facts
The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad,
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 26-0027. LLjur
The undisputed antecedents of this case are narrated by the Court of Appeals
as follows: 4
"The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the
land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza, father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda
Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the daughters
of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot
was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito
Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is
the present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975,
[respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of
[petitioners], during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the]
ownership of the land.
16
 "During the pre-trial conference, parties stipulated the
following facts:
‘1) The land subject of the case was formerly declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza prior to 1954 but is now declared in
the name of Margarito Mendoza.
‘2) The parties agree[d] as to the identity of the land
subject of instant case.
‘3) [Petitioners] are the daughters of Margarito Mendoza
while the [respondent] is the only daughter of
Sinforoso Mendoza.
'4) Margarito Mendoza and Sinforoso Mendoza [were]
brothers, now deceased.
‘5) During the cadastral survey of the property on
October 15, 1979 there was already a dispute
between Honorata M. Bolante and Miguel
Mendoza, brother of [petitioners].
‘6) [Respondent was] occupying the property in question.
‘The only issue involved [was] who [was] the
lawful owner and possessor of the land subject of the
case.’
"After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in
favor of [petitioners], the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
‘Wherefore, in view of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the
[petitioners] and against the [respondent]:
‘1. Declaring that the parcel of land situated in Bangad,
Binangonan, Rizal covered by tax declaration
no. 26-0027 in the name of Margarito Mendoza
belong to his heirs, the [petitioners] herein;
‘2. Ordering [respondent] to vacate the property subject
of the case and deliver possession thereof to the
heirs of Margarito Mendoza.
‘3. Ordering the [respondent] to indemnify the
[petitioners] in the sum of P10,000.00, as actual
damages.
‘4. Ordering the [respondent] to pay the costs.’"
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the
due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had
not been sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed
the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent
witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.
The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial
of respondent and her mother. The former testified that the latter, never having
attended school, could neither read nor write. Respondent also said that she had never
been called "Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the affidavit.
Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax
receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent's proof of ownership of
the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by
respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538, Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
Insisting that they are the rightful owners of the disputed land, the petitioners
allege that the CA committed these reversible errors: 6
"1. . . . [I]n not considering the affidavit as an exception
to the general rule that an affidavit is classified as hearsay
evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand; and
"2. . . . [I]n holding that respondent has been in actual and
physical possession, coupled with . . . exclusive and continuous
possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence of the best
17
 kind of circumstance proving the claim of the title of ownership
and enjoys the presumption of preferred possessor."
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Admissibility of the Affidavit
Petitioners dispute the CA's ruling that the affidavit was not the best evidence
of their father's ownership of the disputed land, because the "affiant was not placed on
the witness stand." They contend that it was unnecessary to present a witness to
establish the authenticity of the affidavit because it was a declaration against
respondent's interest and was an ancient document. As a declaration against interest, it
was an exception to the hearsay rule. As a necessary and trustworthy document, it was
admissible in evidence. And because it was executed on March 24, 1953, it was a self-
authenticating ancient document.
We quote below the pertinent portion of the appellate court's ruling: 7
"While it is true that the affidavit was signed and
subscribed before a notary public, the general rule is that affidavits
are classified as hearsay evidence, unless affiants are placed on the
witness stand (People's Bank and Trust Company vs.
Leonidas, 207 SCRA 164). Affidavits are not considered the best
evidence, if affiants are available as witnesses (Vallarta vs. Court
of Appeals, 163 SCRA 587). The due execution of the affidavit
was not sufficiently established. The notary public or others who
saw that the document was signed or at least [could] confirm its
recitals [were] not presented. There was no expert testimony or
competent witness who attested to the genuineness of the
questioned signatures. Worse, [respondent] denied the
genuineness of her signature and that of her mother . . .
[Respondent] testified that her mother was an illiterate and as far
as she knew her mother could not write because she had not
attended school (p. 7, ibid). Her testimony was corroborated by
Ma. Sales Bolante Basa, who said the [respondent's] mother was
illiterate."
The petitioners' allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered
as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved first. 8 And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule
under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead,
insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the
declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same
was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence
of any motive to falsify. 9
In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive
and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against
interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. 10 Such
declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior
inconsistent statement.
The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient
document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody,
and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. 11 It must
on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners herein failed, however, to explain how
the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been affixed to the subject
affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never had any
formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.
Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication.
Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it
contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the
ownership of the subject land was transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito
Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Second Issue: Preference of Possession
The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article
538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous
possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she
came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Art. 536, Civil Code.
We concede that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not
lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or
violence. 12 To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still
deemed the legal possessor. 13 Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession,
regardless of its character, may recover such possession. 14
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the
respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also
18
acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners’ father and brother, as
well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of
the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's
father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced
by Tax Declaration No. 26425. 15 When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took
possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time,
respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years
1932-1948. 16 Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 17and paid
its realty taxes beginning 1952. 18 When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the
land. As found by the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land,
which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the
respondent. 19
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred
possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since
1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand,
petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
Third Issue: Possession of Better Right
Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical
coupled with the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] of the land
since 1985" proved her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent argues that she
was legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just title since she possessed it
in the concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to
show or prove such title.
The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 of
the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven.20 That is,
one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto
by the means established by law. 21 Article 538 settles only the question of
possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should
be established in one of the ways provided by law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the
claimants has proven acquisitive prescription. 22
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession for ten years. 23 Being the sole heir of her father, respondent
showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more
than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there
with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside
the disputed lot for their livelihood. 24
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners'
father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of
owner — public, peaceful, and uninterrupted 25 — had already ripened into
ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty
taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation,
when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a
claim for ownership through prescription. 26
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject
land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by
mere occupation. 27 Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true
owner, 28 occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or
adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably
acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse
possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), 29this supposed ownership cannot extend
to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the
disputed land was established before the trial court through the series of tax
declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents
prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a
sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against
the state and other interested parties. 30
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. 31 At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or
possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. 32 In the absence of actual
public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership. 33 In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel
has no legal basis.
19
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 177637. July 26, 2010.]
DR. DIOSCORO CARBONILLA, petitioner, vs. MARCELO ABIERA and
MARICRIS ABIERA PAREDES, SUBSTITUTED BY HER
HEIRS, respondents.
Assailed in this petition for review are the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated September 18, 2006 and the Resolution dated April 17, 2007,
which dismissed petitioner's complaint for ejectment against respondents.
The case arose from the following antecedents:
Petitioner, Dr. Dioscoro Carbonilla, filed a complaint for ejectment
against respondents, Marcelo Abiera and Maricris Abiera Paredes, with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Maasin City. The complaint alleged that
petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land, located
in BarangayCanturing, Maasin City, identified as Lot No. 1781-B-P-3-B-2-B
PSD-08-8452-D, Maasin Cadastre. The land is purportedly covered by a
certificate of title, and declared for assessment and taxation purposes in
petitioner's name. Petitioner further claimed that he is also the owner of the
residential building standing on the land, which building he acquired through a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and
Quitclaim of Ownership. He maintained that the building was being occupied by
respondents by mere tolerance of the previous owners. Petitioner asserted that he
intends to use the property as his residence, thus, he sent a demand letter to
respondents asking them to leave the premises within 15 days from receipt of the
letter, but they failed and refused to do so. Conciliation efforts with
the Barangay proved futile. 2
To corroborate his claim, petitioner presented copies of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3784; Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
(Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership dated November
10, 2002, executed by the heirs of Jovita Yanto Garciano; Tax Declaration (TD)
with ARP No. 07020-000019; and Demand Letter dated November 20, 2002. TCT
No. T-3784 shows that the land was originally registered on January 30, 1968 in
the name of Diosdado Carbonilla, petitioner's father, under Original Certificate of
Title No. 185.
In their defense, respondents vehemently denied petitioner's allegation
that they possessed the building by mere tolerance of the previous owners.
Instead, they asserted that they occupied the building as owners, having inherited
the same from Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano, respondent Marcelo's
parents and respondent Maricris' grandparents. They maintained that they have
been in possession of the building since 1960, but it has not been declared for
taxation purposes. As for the subject land, respondents claimed that they inherited
the same from Francisco Plasabas, grandfather of Alfredo Abiera. They pointed
out that the land had, in fact, been declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Francisco Plasabas under TD No. 4676, before the Second World War. This TD
was later cancelled by TD No. 8735 in 1948, TD No. 14363 in 1958, and TD No.
16182 in 1963. Respondents averred that the building was previously a garage-
like structure but, in 1977, Alfredo Abiera and Teodorica Capistrano repaired and
remodeled it, for which reason, they obtained a building permit on April 11, 1977
from the then Municipality of Maasin. Finally, respondents contended that the
case should be dismissed for failure to implead as defendants respondent
Marcelo's siblings, who are co-heirs of the subject properties. 3 Respondents
presented copies of the two TDs in the name of Francisco Plasabas and the
Building Permit dated April 11, 1977.
The MTCC decided the case in favor of respondents. It opined that
petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject parcel of land was not
successfully rebutted by respondents; hence, petitioner's ownership of the same
was deemed established. 4 However, with respect to the building, the court
declared respondents as having the better right to its material possession in light of
petitioner's failure to refute respondents' claim that their predecessors had been in
prior possession of the building since 1960 and that they have continued such
possession up to the present. 5 In so ruling, the court applied Art. 546 6 of
the Civil Code which allows the possessor in good faith to retain the property until
he is reimbursed for necessary expenses. Thus, in its decision dated March 15,
2004, the MTCC pronounced:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the collated
evidences at hand [have] preponderantly established, JUDGMENT
is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants DECLARING the
defendants to have the better rights of (material) possession to the
20
 assailed building and deemed as possessors in good faith and are
legally entitled to its possession and occupancy.
The plaintiff judicially affirmed as the land owner is enjoined to
respect the rights of the defendants pursuant to the provisions of
Art. 546, Chapter III, New Civil Code of the Philippines[, w]ithout
prejudice to the provisions of Arts. 547 and 548, New Civil Code
of the Philippines. No pronouncement as to costs as defendants'
predecessors-in-interest are deemed possessors and builders in
good faith.
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioner elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On July
12, 2004, the RTC reversed the MTCC decision. The RTC agreed with the MTCC
that the land is owned by petitioner. The two courts differed, however, in their
conclusion with respect to the building. The RTC placed the burden upon
respondents to prove their claim that they built it prior to petitioner's acquisition of
the land, which burden, the court found, respondents failed to discharge. The RTC
held that, either way — whether the building was constructed before or after
petitioner acquired ownership of the land — petitioner, as owner of the land,
would have every right to evict respondents from the land. As theorized by the
RTC, if the building was erected before petitioner or his predecessors acquired
ownership of the land, then Article 445 8 of the Civil Code would apply. Thus,
petitioner, as owner of the land, would be deemed the owner of the building
standing thereon, considering that, when ownership of the land was transferred to
him, there was no reservation by the original owner that the building was not
included in the transfer. On the other hand, if the building was constructed after
petitioner became the owner of the land, it is with more reason that petitioner has
the right to evict respondents from the land. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Reversing the decision of the court a quo;
2. Ordering defendants to immediately vacate the
residential house/building subject of this
litigation;
3. Ordering defendants to pay attorney's fee in the
amount of P30,000.00; and
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 9
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the CA. Finding no
evidence to prove that respondents' possession of the building was by mere
tolerance, the CA reversed the RTC decision and ordered the dismissal of
petitioner's complaint. Because of this, the CA, following this Court's ruling
in Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation v. Cruz, categorized the
complaint as one for forcible entry. It then proceeded to declare that the action had
prescribed since the one-year period for filing the forcible entry case had already
lapsed. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated Sept. 18, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
promulgated on July 12, 2004 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Maasin City, Southern Leyte in Civil Case No. R-
3382 is hereby declared NULL and VOID for failure of the
plaintiff (herein respondent) to prove that the case at bar is for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. Accordingly, the instant case is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 10
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied
petitioner's motion for lack of merit. 11 Hence, petitioner came to this Court
through a petition for review on certiorari.
On September 3, 2007, respondents' counsel informed this Court that
respondent, Maricris Abiera Paredes, died on June 25, 2006 of asphyxia due to
hanging, and moved that the latter's heirs be allowed to substitute for the
deceased. In the Resolution dated Nov. 14, 2007, the Court granted the motion.
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his ownership of the
subject properties; consequently, he asserts the right to recover possession thereof.
The petition has no merit.
To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his
ownership of the land, as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of
credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to
21
substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like
the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
(Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the
Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no
showing that the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any
proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents' proof of possession of the
building since 1977, petitioner's evidence pales in comparison and leaves us
totally unconvinced.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against
respondents. Ejectment cases — forcible entry and unlawful detainer — are
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. 14 The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de factoand not to
the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is
questionable. 15 For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided
in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be
averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents' possession of the
building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful
detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the person's withholding from another of the
possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or
termination of the former's right to hold possession under the contract, either
expressed or implied. 16
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that
possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned
unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. 17 It must be shown that
the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession
must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by mere
tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondents' possession was based on his
alleged tolerance. He did not offer any evidence or even only an affidavit of the
Garcianos attesting that they tolerated respondents' entry to and occupation of the
subject properties. A bare allegation of tolerance will not suffice. Plaintiff must, at
least, show overt acts indicative of his or his predecessor's permission to occupy
the subject property. Thus, we must agree with the CA when it said:
A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that herein respondent
miserably failed to prove his claim that petitioners' possession of
the subject building was by mere tolerance as alleged in the
complaint. Tolerance must be [present] right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered to be within the purview of
unlawful detainer. Mere tolerance always carries with it
"permission" and not merely silence or inaction for silence or
inaction is negligence, not tolerance. 18
In addition, plaintiff must also show that the supposed acts of tolerance
have been present right from the very start of the possession — from entry to the
property. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. 19 Notably, no mention was
made in the complaint of how entry by respondents was effected or how and when
dispossession started. Neither was there any evidence showing such details.
In any event, petitioner has some other recourse. He may pursue
recovering possession of his property by filing an accion publiciana, which is a
plenary action intended to recover the better right to possess; or an accion
reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership of real property. We stress, however,
that the pronouncement in this case as to the ownership of the land should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land. 20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The CA
Decision dated September 18, 2006 and Resolution dated April 17, 2007
areAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
22
 [G.R. No. L-6019. March 25, 1911.]
JUAN N. ARAGON, petitioner-appellee, vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, oppositor-appellant.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of Land Registration
adjudicating title to a small lot or parcel of land in the city of Manila in favor of
the appellees and ordering its registry in accordance with the provisions of "The
Land Registration Act."
The Government of the Philippine Islands , through its proper
representatives, objected to the application for registry on the ground that, as it
alleges, the land in question is a part of the public domain, as defined in
subsection 1, article 339, of the Civil Code, which is as follows:
ART. 339. Property of public ownership is
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that
of a similar character.
and also as defined in article 1 of "The Law of Waters" (Ley de Aguas)
of the 3d of August, 1886, which is as follows:
The following belong to the national domain and are for the public use:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The shores. "Shore" is understood to be that space which is
alternatively covered and uncovered by water with the movement of the tides. Its
interior or terrestial limit is marked by the lone reached by the highest tides and
equinoctials. Where the tides are not perceptible the shore begins at the line
reached by the water during tempests and ordinary storms.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, as alleged by the
opponent, the land in question, at the time when the trial was had in the court
below, was so located that at high tide it was completely covered by the waters of
the Bay of Manila, though the receding waters left it completely bare at low tide.
It can not be denied, therefore, that if there were no other evidence of record,
touching the physical status of this land or title thereto, the contention of
the Government would necessarily be sustained.
It appears, however, that in the year 1892 a possessory title to the land in
question was duly registered in favor of Inocencio Aragon, one of the
predecessors in interest of these applicants; that for a long period of years, and
perhaps from a time beyond which the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary, the applicant and their predecessors in interest have been in possession
of the parcel of land in question, under and undisputed claim of ownership; that it
is located toward the center of one of the most valuable residential sections of the
city of Manila, and that for many years a house stood upon this land, and was
occupied by some of the predecessors in interest of the applicants in these
proceedings; that with some relatively small expenditure by way of a "fill" or a
"retaining wall" it would still be a valuable building lot for residential purposes;
that the adjoining lots extend toward the bay to a line formed by the extension of
the outer boundary line of the lot in question, and that these adjoining lots would
be in substantially the same physical condition, by relation to the ebb and flow of
the tide, as lot in question, but for low retaining walls which protect them against
the incoming sea; that the water which spreads over the lot in question at high tide
is of but little depth, and would be wholly excluded by a very limited amount of
"filling" materials or a low retaining wall; that there are strong reasons to believe
that the land in question was originally well above the ebb and flow of the tide;
and that only in later years have the waters risen to such a height along the shores
of the Bay of Manila at this point as to cover the land in question completely at
high tide; though it does not definitely appear whether this is due to changes in the
current and flow of the waters in the bay, or to the gradual sinking of the land
along the coast.
We think that these facts conclusively establish the right of possession
and ownership of the applicants.
Article 446 of the Civil Code is as follows:
"Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he must be
protected or possession must be restored to him by the means
established in the laws of procedure."
Article 460 of that code is as follows:
"ART. 460. The possessor may lose his possession "
"1. By the abandonment of the thing.
"2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable
consideration.
23
 "3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the
thing becoming unmarketable.
"4. By the possession of another, even against the will of
the former possessor, if the new possession has lasted more than
one year."
Under these provisions of the code it seems quite clear that if
the Government is justified in disturbing the possession of the applicants, it can
only be on the ground that they have abandoned their property, or that it has been
totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain by the erosive
action of the sea. It is quite clear that applicants have never abandoned their
possession under a claim of ownership of this land. And we think the facts above
stated fully sustain a finding that there has been no such destructive or total loss of
the property as would justify a holding that the owners have lost possession.
Doubtless the property has been injured by the erosive action of the sea. Doubtless
the owners in order to profitably enjoy the possession of this property will be
compelled to make some relatively small expenditures by way of a "fill" or a
retaining wall. But the actual condition of the property as it appears from the
record makes a claim that it has been totally lost or destroyed preposterous and
wholly untenable. We need hardly add that if the applicants have not lost their
right of possession, the Government's claim of ownership, on the ground that this
is a part of the playa (shore) of Manila Bay, necessarily falls to the ground.
We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of
gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property
may not become "property of public ownership," as defined in article 339 of the
code, where it appears that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it
and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the "playa"
(shore of the sea), "rada" (roadstead), or the like. Our ruling in this case is merely
that it affirmatively appears that the owners of the land in question have never in
fact nor in intent abandoned it, and that keeping in mind its location and actual
condition it can not be said to have been totally destroyed for the purposes for
which it was held by them, so as to have become a part of the playa (shore) of the
Bay of Manila.
The decree entered by the lower court should be affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant. It is so ordered.
[G.R. Nos. 80294-95. March 23, 1990.]
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN
PROVINCE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO
OCTAVIANO and JUAN VALDEZ, respondents.
Before the Court are a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner relating to the decision of the Court dated
September 21, 1988. The comment and opposition thereto have been filed by the
private respondents and a reply was filed by petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
38830-R are: (1) contrary to the law; (2) contrary to the findings of the trial court; (3)
contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 08890-R; (4) contrary
to the admissions of the parties; and (5) based on a clear misapprehension of historical
and ecclesiastical facts made of judicial notice, which are well within the exceptions
consistently adhered to by this Court as inRepublic vs. Court of Appeals. 1
The Court finds no merit in this contention. The said decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 4, 1977 in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R was already elevated to this Court by
petitioner through a petition for review in G.R. No. L-46832 entitled Catholic Vicar
Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Egmidio
Octaviano, while the heirs of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez also filed a petition for
review of the same decision in this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-46872 entitled Heirs
of Juan Valdez and Pacita Valdez vs. CA, et al. In a minute resolution dated January
13, 1978, this Court denied both petitions for lack of merit.
It is in said petition for review wherein the petitioner should have questioned the
findings of facts of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R but since said petition
had been denied outright, the aforestated decision of the appellate court which has long
become final and executory, is res judicata as between the parties and the findings of
facts therein are conclusive. Thus, the factual findings in said final judgment cannot be
reviewed anew in the present proceedings.
The relevant question that should now be asked is, considering the aforestated decision
of the appellate court and guided by the findings of facts therein, who is entitled to the
possession of the lots in question? Who owns these lots?
CA-G.R. No. 38830-R was a land registration case where petitioner and private
respondents were asking for confirmation of their alleged imperfect titles to the lots in
question under Section 49 (b) of the Public Land Act. 2
24
In the said decision, the appellate court found that the petitioner was not entitled to
confirmation of its imperfect title to Lots 2 and 3. In separate motions for
reconsideration filed by private respondents Heirs of Octaviano and Heirs of Juan
Valdez relating to the same decision, they also asked that said two lots be registered in
their names. On August 12, 1977, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.
Effectively, therefore, in the said decision the appellate court ruled that neither the
petitioner nor the private respondents are entitled to the confirmation of imperfect title
over said two lots. That is now res judicata.
What is the nature of these two lots? Pursuant to the said decision in CA-G.R. No.
38830-R, the two lots in question remained part of the public lands. This is the only
logical conclusion when the appellate court found that neither the petitioner nor private
respondents are entitled to confirmation of imperfect title over said lots.
Hence, the Court finds the contention of petitioner to be well-taken in that the trial
court and the appellate court have no lawful basis in ordering petitioner to return and
surrender possession of said lots to private respondents. Said property being a public
land its disposition is subject to the provision of the Public Land Act, as amended. 3
The present actions that were instituted in the Regional Trial Court by private
respondents are actions for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and not for
recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria).
In the aforestated decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the
following are among the findings of facts:
"9th. The totality of foregoing together with evidence of
oppositors must convince this Court that as to lots 2 and 3, it was
oppositors who were possessors under bona fide claim of
ownership thru their predecessors since around 1906; and that
appellee came in only in the concept of a borrower in
commodatum, but that appellee took it upon itself to claim and
repudiate the trust sometime in 1951, and since from that time at
least, possession of oppositors had been interrupted, neither can
they claim registration under Sec. 48, par. b of the Public Land
Law, Com. Act 141, as amended by R.A. 1942; this must be the
final result, and there would be no more need to rule on the errors
impugning the personality of appellee to secure registration;" 4
From the foregoing, it appears that the petitioner was in possession of the said property
as borrower in commodatum from private respondents since 1906 but in 1951
petitioner repudiated the trust when it declared the property for tax purposes under its
name. When it filed its application for registration of the said property in 1962,
petitioner had been in adverse possession of the same for at least 11 years.
Article 555 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or
gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing or because it goes
out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of
Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one
year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse
of ten years. (460a)" (Emphasis supplied.).
From the foregoing provision of the law, particularly paragraph 4 thereof, it is clear
that the real right of possession of private respondents over the property was lost or no
longer exists after the lapse of 10 years that petitioner had been in adverse possession
thereof. Thus, the action for recovery of possession of said property filed by private
respondents against petitioner must fail.
The Court, therefore, finds that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring the private respondents to be entitled to the possession thereof. Much less
can they pretend to be owners thereof. Said lots are part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and the decision of this
Court dated September 21, 1988 is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby
rendered reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R.
Nos. 05148-49 dated August 31, 1987 and dismissing the complaints for recovery of
possession, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 198356. April 20, 2015].
ESPERANZA SUPAPO and the HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, namely:
ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO, JR.,
SHEILA LORENCE, all surnamed SUPAPO, and SHERYL
25
FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO
and SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, and THOSE
PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, respondents.
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioners
Esperanza Supapo and Romeo Supapo 2 (Spouses Supapo) to assail the February
25, 2011 decision 3 and August 25, 2011 resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
Factual Antecedents
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint 5 for accion publiciana against
Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario),
and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land
located in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot).
The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-
28441 6 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an
assessed value of thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (P39,980.00) as
shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the
Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. 7
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not
employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year. 8During one
of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses
were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the
Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one. 9
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate
surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriateLupong
Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa
Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably.10
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case 11 against the respondents
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law. 12The trial
court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court
finds accused ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and
MACARIO BERNARDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused
is hereby ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,000.00),and to vacate the subject premises.
SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. 14 While the
appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise
known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the
dismissal of the criminal case. 15
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became
final. 16
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the
execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the
subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ
of execution. The respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC
denied the same. The RTC also denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to
challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent's
motion for reconsideration. 17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the
repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities
were extinguished. 18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for certiorari with prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The
orders dated June 5, 2003 and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Criminal Case No.
C-45610 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is
hereby permanently ENJOINED from further executing or
implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting
Law does not mean that people now have unbridled license to illegally occupy
lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the property
rights of legitimate landowners. 19 In cases of violation of their property rights,
26
the CA noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for
recovery of possession.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana. 20
After filing their Answer, 21 the respondents moved to set their
affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing 22 and argued that: (1) there is
another action pending between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion
publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause
of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC Ruling 23
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments advanced by the respondents are
evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The
MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the RTC. 24
The RTC Ruling 25
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the
action has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the
MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed
within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the
complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23,
2009 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Public Respondent is hereby directed
to DISMISS Civil Case No. 08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 26
In their motion for reconsideration, 27 the Spouses Supapo emphasized
that the court's jurisdiction over an action involving title to or possession of land is
determined by its assessed value; that the RTC does not have an exclusive
jurisdiction on all complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of
the subject lot falls within MeTC's jurisdiction.
The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the assessed
value of the subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of action had already
prescribed, the action having been filed beyond the ten (10)-year prescriptive
period under Article 555 of the Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the
actual demand to vacate was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by
which the ejectment suit should have been filed is counted from the time the
certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to file action was issued on
November 25, 1992, while the complaint for accion publiciana was filed only on
March 7, 2008, or more than ten (10) years thereafter.
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the
CA. 29
The CA Ruling 30
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion
publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and that the period to file the
action had prescribed.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated June 30, 2009 and Order dated October 19, 2009
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The Spouses Supapo moved 31 but failed 32 to secure a reconsideration
of the CA decision; hence, they came to us through the present petition.
The Petition
In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially
argue that:
27
 (1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion
publiciana where the assessed value of the property does not
exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in
Metro Manila; and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is
imprescriptible under the Torrens system.
The Respondents' Case 33
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1)
filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.
Issues
The issues for resolution are:
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res
judicata.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause
of action has not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res judicata.
Accion Publiciana and
the Jurisdiction of the
MeTC
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed
after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 34
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery
of possession of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a
claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the
parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. 35
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the
issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive
on the issue of ownership. 36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership
over the subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or the
respondents should have the right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a real
property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, 37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over
actions involving title to or possession of real property is plenary. 38
RA No. 7691, 39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its
jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear
actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20, 000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the
property is located in Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,"
is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil
cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve
the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value
28
 exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) . outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if
. . . (Emphasis supplied.) within. 43 (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides: In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby
has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the action
amended to read as follows:
and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. 44
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of
xxx xxx xxx the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax
declaration 45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such over the complaint for accion publiciana.
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
The cause of action has
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
not prescribed
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.) The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is
dismissible for being filed out of time.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to
or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. 40The They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code,which states:
assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. 41
xxx xxx xxx
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, 42 we explained:
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of
provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property
longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not
involved?
lost till after the lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint
anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as
for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the
affirmed by the CA — that all cases of recovery of possession
certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents
or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless
contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject
of the value of the property — no longer holds true. As things
property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by law.
now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if

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 Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo hold a
TCT over the subject property, and assuming a Torrens title is imprescriptible and
indefeasible, they posit that the latter have lost their right to recover possession
because of laches.
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint
for accion publiciana more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action
was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible
since the subject property is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the
Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in
1979. 46 Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence,
authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT. 47
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have
allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the
subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The respondents contend
that they built their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the
subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be
disturbed in their possession. 48
Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the respondents'
contentions have no legal basis.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a
title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held
that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 1126 49 of the Civil Code in relation to Act
496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 50 ]. 51
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits
under the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present case is
concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to
prescriptions. — No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title
over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. 52 The right to possess and
occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of
ownership. 53 Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title
to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible. 54
In Bishop v. CA, 55 we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of
the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons' occupation of the
property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession
was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. 56
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a purported
sale or transfer of the property, we still rule in favor of the holder of the Torrens
Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in addition to the deed of sale, a duly-
registered certificate of title proving the alleged transfer or sale.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado 57 in which we gave greater
probative weight to the plaintiff's TCT vis-à-vis the contested unregistered deed of
sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents
did not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more
reason therefore that we uphold the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the
Spouses Supapo's title.
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the
Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court merely recognizes the value of the Torrens
System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land
registration.
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens System, viz.:
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due
to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity
of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim
of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title
thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that
his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be
unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public
confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
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 investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence
will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even
violent. 58
With respect to the respondents' defense 59 of laches, suffice it to say
that the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings. 60 In other words, the party alleging laches must
adduce in court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of
facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not pass
upon the same.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to
deny the Spouses Supapo's petition. 61 On the contrary, the facts as culled from
the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise their right over
and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the
appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3)
finally, they filed the accion publiciana. To our mind, these acts negate the
allegation of laches.
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's
right to recover possession of the subject lot is not barred by prescription.
The action is not barred
by prior judgment
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents invoke res
judicata. They contend that the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78649
barred the filing of the accion publiciana.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by
the respondents to challenge the RTC's issuance of the writ enforcing their civil
liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their conviction under
the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined
the execution of the respondents' conviction because their criminal liability had
been extinguished by the repeal of the law under which they were tried and
convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from the crime had also been
erased.
The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced.
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2)conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c). 62
"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been
judicially tried on the merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving
the same claim, demand or cause of action. 63
The requisites 64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior
judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the n there
is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action between thecriminal
case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery
of the subject property.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although
initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of the
Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the
name of the Spouses Supapo.
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case
involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while theaccion
publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the
Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests
by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed
the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject
property and recover its possession.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the
defense of res judicata has still no basis.
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 The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there
is identity of causes of action provided that there is identity of issues and identity
of parties. 65
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between
the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same. 66
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal
complaint under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana.
For this reason alone, "conclusiveness of judgment" does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity of
parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply because there is no
identity of issues. The issue in the criminal case is whether the respondents
(accused therein) committed the crime alleged in the information, while the only
issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than
the respondents to possess and occupy the subject property.
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
Final Note
As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the
issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This
adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As
such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the
determination of the issue of ownership.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and
consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 decision and
August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
SO ORDERED.

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