Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Sabah, Malaysia
Author(s): Sin Fong Han
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Apr., 1979), pp. 379-389
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643858
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A CONSTITUTIONAL COUP D'ETAT:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BIRTH AND
VICTOCRYOF THE BERJAYA PARTY
IN SABAH, MALAYSIA
The Coup: The revolt against Tun Mustapha was led by former
Minister of Finance, Dutak Harris Salleh, with the active participation
of several state cabinet ministers and assemblymen from Mustapha's
own United Sabah National Organization (USNO) including: Datuk
Salleh Sulong, Minister for Local Government; Datuk Ghani Gilong,
'the Federal Minister of Transport and Works and Deputy President
1 This paper is based on: (a) the news accounts from Sabah's major newspapers:
Daily Express, Overseas Chinese Daily News, Sabah Times, and Sandakan Daily
News, and related articles in Far Eastern Economic Review; and (b) the writer's
personal interviews and conversations with many key officials of SCA, USNO, and
Berjaya when he visited Sabah during February-April 1977.
379
were listed by Fuad as faults that could not be condoned but might be
forgiven. Unforgivable, however, was Mustapha's plot to take Sabah
out of Malaysia.3 Secession thus replaced corruption as the key issue
of the Berjaya Party. Upon his resignation, Tun Fuad was immediately
elected as Berjaya's president and Datuk Harris Salleh stepped down
as president to become one of the three vice-presidents.
It was generally believed that the Berjaya was formed with the
knowledge and blessing of Tun Abdul Razak, the late Prime Minister
of Malaysia. Mustapha's lavish lifestyles and his abuse of detention
and immigration powers had been an embarassment to Tun Razak.
Mustapha's autonomous actions, dictatorial habits, and the concrete
power which he built around him in Sabah were a grave concern to
Kuala Lumpur. At the end of 1974, Tun Razak went out of his way to
offer Mustapha the Defence Ministry-the third in the federal list of
seniority-in an effort to get Mustapha out of Sabah and into Kuala
Lumpur where the federal government could keep an eye on him.
Mustapha initially accepted the post of Defence Minister but changed
his mind on realizing that he would have to resign from his state As-
sembly seat and his Chief Ministership. Not only would he have to
relinquish the absolute power he had built up in Sabah but, more
importantly, he would be subjected to close scrutiny by the Prime
Minister himself. His refusal to accept the Defence Ministership was
interpreted by the federal government as a personal slight to Tun
Razak. Reliable sources, however, indicated that Mustapha's accep-
tance-in-advance of the Defence Ministership was strictly linked to his
becoming Deputy Prime Minister-the second post in the federal list
of seniority-as well, so that he could become a potential successor to
Tun Razak. But that post was already allocated. The realization that
his dream of becoming the head of Malaysia was not to be and his
awareness of the legend that surrounded his larger-than-life person-
ality might have turned Mustapha's thoughts to secession from Malay-
sia and confederation with Sulu and Mindanao.
The other incident that reinforced Mustapha's thoughts of seces-
sion was Kuala Lumpur's refusal to give him a free hand in raising over-
seas petrodollar funds. When the Sabah timber market began 'to col-
lapse in late 1974 and early 1975, Mustapha was short of cash to meet
budgeted commitments, the most significant of which was the purchase
of two Boeing jets. Mustapha wanted the federal government to reim-
burse the sum of $100 million he had authorized for expenditures.
Unsurprisingly, Kuala Lumpur agreed only to reimburse $20 million
for projects that had previously been approved by the federal govern-
ment. Desperate, Mustapha began to negotiate with Arab states to float
a massive petrodollar loan through Sabah Development Corporation,
with Sabah state itself as the guarantor. The federal government
they were boys together in Kudat they once took a blood oath to remain brothers
forever.
3 Daily Express, July 28, 1975.
382 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979
Berjaya Setbacks: Berjaya suffered its first stunning blow when its
founder and vice-president Datuk Harris Sal.leh lost his state Assem-
bly seat to Mohamad Omar Bledram in the December 1975 Labuan
bye-election. Bledram, a relatively unknown USNO representative,
4 Bruce Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism (Singapore: Bruce Ross-Larson,
1976), p. 155.
5 Harvey Stockwin, "Sabah: The Maestro Holds Fast," Far Eastern Economic
Review, August 8, 1975, pp. 10-14.
THE BERJAYAPARTY IN SABAH, MALAYSIA 383
6 Mohamed Noor was released after the victory of Berjaya and is presently the
state Minister of Finance and Secretary-General of Berjaya.
384 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979
The Rural Votes: The voting patterns of the rural districts in the
1976 election are somewhat identical to those of 1967 when the USNO
drew the bulk of its support from Muslim-dominated coastal areas,
and the United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO) drew
its support from the Kadazan-dominated rural constituencies, which
in 1976 supported the multiracial Berjaya party.
The 20 seats won by the USNO primarily came from: (a) the
Bajau-dominated Northwest and Bajau-Saluk-dominated northeast
and southeast coastal regions, including the Sulaman, Usukan Tempa-
suk, Bengkoka, Banggi, Sugut, Semawang, Kunak, and Semporna con-
stituencies; and (b) Brunei's Kedayan-Malay-dominated southwest
coastal constituencies of Lubuan, Sipitang, Kuala Penyu, Lumbadang,
Klias, and Bongawan. Berjaya, however, put up a good fight in these
districts. In three of these six constituencies, Berjaya lost by only a
very small margin. Orang Sungei-dominated regions of Kinabatangan
and Sekong also gave their support to USNO. USNO's narrow victory
in the two ethnically more balanced Merotai and Balung constituen-
cies received their votes primarily from the Muslim Indonesian and
Tidong communities, while Chinese in the -two areas supported the
Berjaya candidates. USNO's narrow win over Berjaya in the pre-
domninatelyKadazan district of Ranau, however, was surprising.
Berjaya, on the other hand, received the bulk of its support from
the Kadazan-domrinatedwest coast and interior district. With the ex-
ception of the Ranau constituency, Berjaya swept the Kadazan-domi-
nated rural areas and Kadazan-Chinese-dominated interior town cen-
ters, which included Kawang, Moyog, Bingkor, Tambunan, Kiulu,
Inanam, Tamrporuli, Kemnbayan,Kundasang, Langkon, Tandek, Ma-
tunggong, and the Sook constituencies. Berjaya also received its support
from the non-Muslim Murut population of the interior districts of
Kemabong, Pensiangan, Tenom, and Kuamut.
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386 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979
The Chinese Urban Votes: With USNO's having only a slight edge
over Berjaya in rural constituencies, split between the Muslim commu-
nities (Bajau, Suluk, Bruneis, Kedayan, and Malay) and the largely
Christian Kadazan population, the urban Chinese votes become the de-
ciding factor. In the 1967 election, six SCA candidates had taken five
seats in the Chinese-dominated urban constituencies, losing only one
seat to an independent, and giving the Tun Mustapha-led USNO-SCA
coalition a winning margin off 19-12 over the UPKO, led by Tun Fuad
Stephens.7 In the 1976 election, -however, the Chinese in Sabah did not
support the SCA's candidates. Instead, they backed the Chinese candi-
dates from the multiracial Berjaya.
In Sabah, 22% of 'the state population of about 770,000 are Chi-
nese, and they also made up roughly the same percentage of the 239,000
voters who were eligible to vote in the 1976 election. They formed the
majority in six of the 48 constituencies-Kota Kinabalu, Likas, Elo-
pura, Sandakan Bandar, Karamunting, and Bandar Tawau-the major
urban centers and suburbs in Sabah. The Chinese also comprised 25%
to 35% of the voters in eight other constituencies which covered the
coastal ports of Labuan, Kudat, and Lahad Datu as well -as the interior
towns of Tenom, Keningau, Beaufort, Penampang, and Papar. The
SCA placed eight candidates to compete in the constituencies of Kota
Kinabalu, Likas, Elopura, Sandakan Bandar, Karamunting Bandar,
Tawau, Kudat, and Tenom. With the exception of Tenom, Berjaya
put usp its own Chinese candidates 'to face the SCA's in competing for
the Chinese votes. The seven Berjaya Chinese candidates defeated their
SCA counterparts by a convincing margin. Datuk Harris, Berjaya's
vice president, also overwhelmed SCA's candidate Young Pet Fong in
his Tenom seat election (see Table 2).
TABLE 2: A Comparison between SCA and Berjaya Voting Results in the Eight
Chinese-dominated Urban Constituencies
Berjaya SCA Berjaya Berjaya
candidate candidate winning winning
and and margin margin Voting %
Contested his votes his votes (majority (% of total of total
constituency received received votes) votes) electorate
Kota Kinabalu 4203 1405 2798 74.9 76.0
Likas 4119 1273 2846 76.4 75.8
Elopura 4450 1954 3196 78.0 76.0
Bandar Sandakan 3018 1732 1286 63.5 73.9
Karamunting 3616 1751 1865 68.0 75.8
Bandar Tawau 3445 2120 1352 60.8 77.9
Kudat 2920 1777 1143 62.2 81.0
Tenom 2992* 763 1529 75.0 82.6
* Datuk Harris chose to compete in this constituency and not in Labuan where
he lost the bye-election. This was a strategic move to ensure his seat in the Assembly
since Tenom is predominantly a Chinese-Murut district.
teachers, staged their own mini coup d'etat and successfully ousted the
party "old guards," including Datuk Pang Tet Tshung, former presi-
dent and a long-time minister in Tun Mustapha's government. Most
of the other former SCA leaders either quit politics, established resi-
dence abroad, or joined Berjaya. The new SCA was led by Michael
Liaw Chin Yu, a young Kota Kinabalu businessman who was principal
of Sabah College from 1967 to 1973.
At the beginning, the younger SCA leaders proposed that the SCA
take an independent stand and contest the elections on its own and
not in partnership with the USNO. They also tried to disassociate
themselves from traditional SCA leaders who had long been accused
by the Chinese electorate of selling out Chinese interests for personal
gain. This move drew some respect and public support from the Chi-
nese community. The renewed support from the Chinese electorate
gave them a stronger position to negotiate with Mustapha and Berjaya
leaders in seat allocations. The SCA wanted to set up at least 12 can-
didates in the 48 constituencies, but Mustapha offered them only eight
urban constituencies. They then negotiated secretly with Berjaya lead-
ers and expressed the desire to have their candidates compete in all the
Chinese-dominated urban constituencies. Berjaya agreed to compromise
but insisted in fielding the stronger Chinese candidates, either from
SCA or Berjaya, to contest these urban seats. Names of candidates
from both parties were discussed. But no agreement was reached.
Berjaya leaders then urged the SCA to withdraw from all competition
and pledge its support to the new party, enabling Berjaya to secure at
least eight uncontested urban seats. Berjaya, in turn, would allocate
-thesix nominated assembly seats to SCA representatives should Berjaya
win the election.8 Partly because of their egos, having just emerged
8 Chinese Daily News, April 4, 1976. The Sabah constitution allows for six
nominated members with full voting rights in the Assembly.
388 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979
jaya leaders together with the continuing pressure exerted by Tun Ra-
zak finally forced Mustapha out of office on October 31, 1975. Although
he remained president of the USNO and the Sabah Alliance and still
had influence in the state, Mustapha was no longer in a position to
monopolize the instrumentalities of government to isolate and elimi-
nate his opposition. For the first time in about eight years, the ruling
regime in Sabah was not in a position to exert almost total control over
campaign activities of the candidates, media coverage, polling, and
counting. The federal government used its power to guarantee relative
openness while it stood aside to watch the election results. The out-
comes were costly to USNO, which had depended heavily on a tightly
controlled election environment in previous elections.
SIN FONG HAN is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and Urban
Studies at California State University, Los Angeles.