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A Constitutional Coup D'Etat: An Analysis of the Birth and Victory of the Berjaya Party in

Sabah, Malaysia
Author(s): Sin Fong Han
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Apr., 1979), pp. 379-389
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643858
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A CONSTITUTIONAL COUP D'ETAT:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BIRTH AND
VICTOCRYOF THE BERJAYA PARTY
IN SABAH, MALAYSIA

Sin Fong Han

THE FORMATION OF the Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah


(Berjaya-Sabah People's United Front) in Sabah on July 15, 1975 and
its subsequent victory over the ruling Sabah Alliance party in the April
15, 1976 state election was a constitutional "coup d'etat." The success
of Berjaya was achieved not by guns, but by persuading dissident mem-
bers of the ruling Sabah Alliance to break away from their autocratic
leader, Tun Mustapha bin Datu Harun. The present paper is an at-
tempt to examine a series of important events from which the "coup"
developed and to provide a geographical analysis of the voting patterns
of the 1976 state election.'

The Birth of Berjaya

The Coup: The revolt against Tun Mustapha was led by former
Minister of Finance, Dutak Harris Salleh, with the active participation
of several state cabinet ministers and assemblymen from Mustapha's
own United Sabah National Organization (USNO) including: Datuk
Salleh Sulong, Minister for Local Government; Datuk Ghani Gilong,
'the Federal Minister of Transport and Works and Deputy President

1 This paper is based on: (a) the news accounts from Sabah's major newspapers:
Daily Express, Overseas Chinese Daily News, Sabah Times, and Sandakan Daily
News, and related articles in Far Eastern Economic Review; and (b) the writer's
personal interviews and conversations with many key officials of SCA, USNO, and
Berjaya when he visited Sabah during February-April 1977.
379

? 1979 by the Regents of the University of California


0004-4687/79/040379+ 11$00.50
380 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979

of USNO; Datuk Yaakub Tingkalor, assistant to the Minister for Local


Government; Datuk Peter Mojuntin, assistant to the Minister for In-
dustrial Development; and Datuk Suffian Koroh, assistant to the Minis-
ter for Communications and \/Vorks.Other key members of the original
Berjaya party included: Dr. James P. Ongkili, a kadazan and former
history professor at the University of Malaya; Mohammed Noor, former
Secretary-General of United Sabah Islamic Association; Haji Ampong
Puyon, former USNO Youth vice-president; Chong Thiam Vun, one
of Sabah's well-known Chinese lawyers; and Datuk Yeh Pao Tsu, a
Chinese newspaper proprietor.
The formation of Berjaya was announced on July 15, 1975, at a
press conference called by Datuk Harris Salleh, Berjaya President, who
claimed that the objectives of forming this new multiracial political
party were to save Sabah from mismanagement, corruption, and dic-
tatorship. The Berjaya leaders also promised a return to democracy
and a more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunities to all
Sabahans. Berjaya was reportedly formed at a time when Tun Musta-
pha was in London and other top USNO leaders were out of state.
On July 16, the widely read Chinese language Chinese Daily News
and the English language Daily Express, both owned by Berjaya vice-
president, Datuk Yeh Pao Tsu, mounted furious attacks on Tun Mus-
tapha's globe-trotting playboy lifestyle and his personal extravagances.
The papers cited the purchasing of two Grumman jet aircraft with
state funds for Mustapha's exclusive use, his misuse of state power and
reserves for his own financial gain, and the overall corruption and
mismanagement of his regime. These criticisms were printed not only
in English and Chinese, but also in the Malay and Kadazan languages.
As a result, Sabahans of all ethnic groups for the first time had access
to extensive coverage of the wrongdoings of their Chief Minister. It
was a bombshell for many Sabahans, since open attacks on political
leaders had been virtually unheard of in post-independent Sabah.
Sabahans began to realize that a new day might be dawning in Sabah
politics and many welcomed the changes, the resulting opportunity to
breathe the fresh air of democracy, and the birth of the new Berjaya
party.

The Secession Issue: Berjaya received a tremendous boost when Tun


Haji Mohammed Fuad Stephens (Donald Stephens) resigned as the
Head of State (Yang di-Pertua Negara) and joined Berjaya on July 27,
1975. Tun Fuad, who was also Sabah's first Chief Minister, in his resig-
nation message to Sabahans revealed Mustapha's intention of separat-
ing Sabah from the Federation of Malaysia and forming his own Mus-
lim state of Sulu-Mindanao-Sabah. Tun Fuad's resignation statement
stressed secession as the key difference between him and his blood-
brother Mustapha.2 Misuse of power, corruption, and mismanagement
2 Since 1961 Tun Fuad's political career had at times run parallel with and at
times crossed that of Tun Mustapha, whom he had known since childhood. When
THE BERJAYAPARTY IN SABAH, MALAYSIA 381

were listed by Fuad as faults that could not be condoned but might be
forgiven. Unforgivable, however, was Mustapha's plot to take Sabah
out of Malaysia.3 Secession thus replaced corruption as the key issue
of the Berjaya Party. Upon his resignation, Tun Fuad was immediately
elected as Berjaya's president and Datuk Harris Salleh stepped down
as president to become one of the three vice-presidents.
It was generally believed that the Berjaya was formed with the
knowledge and blessing of Tun Abdul Razak, the late Prime Minister
of Malaysia. Mustapha's lavish lifestyles and his abuse of detention
and immigration powers had been an embarassment to Tun Razak.
Mustapha's autonomous actions, dictatorial habits, and the concrete
power which he built around him in Sabah were a grave concern to
Kuala Lumpur. At the end of 1974, Tun Razak went out of his way to
offer Mustapha the Defence Ministry-the third in the federal list of
seniority-in an effort to get Mustapha out of Sabah and into Kuala
Lumpur where the federal government could keep an eye on him.
Mustapha initially accepted the post of Defence Minister but changed
his mind on realizing that he would have to resign from his state As-
sembly seat and his Chief Ministership. Not only would he have to
relinquish the absolute power he had built up in Sabah but, more
importantly, he would be subjected to close scrutiny by the Prime
Minister himself. His refusal to accept the Defence Ministership was
interpreted by the federal government as a personal slight to Tun
Razak. Reliable sources, however, indicated that Mustapha's accep-
tance-in-advance of the Defence Ministership was strictly linked to his
becoming Deputy Prime Minister-the second post in the federal list
of seniority-as well, so that he could become a potential successor to
Tun Razak. But that post was already allocated. The realization that
his dream of becoming the head of Malaysia was not to be and his
awareness of the legend that surrounded his larger-than-life person-
ality might have turned Mustapha's thoughts to secession from Malay-
sia and confederation with Sulu and Mindanao.
The other incident that reinforced Mustapha's thoughts of seces-
sion was Kuala Lumpur's refusal to give him a free hand in raising over-
seas petrodollar funds. When the Sabah timber market began 'to col-
lapse in late 1974 and early 1975, Mustapha was short of cash to meet
budgeted commitments, the most significant of which was the purchase
of two Boeing jets. Mustapha wanted the federal government to reim-
burse the sum of $100 million he had authorized for expenditures.
Unsurprisingly, Kuala Lumpur agreed only to reimburse $20 million
for projects that had previously been approved by the federal govern-
ment. Desperate, Mustapha began to negotiate with Arab states to float
a massive petrodollar loan through Sabah Development Corporation,
with Sabah state itself as the guarantor. The federal government

they were boys together in Kudat they once took a blood oath to remain brothers
forever.
3 Daily Express, July 28, 1975.
382 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979

promptly intervened.4 Angered with Kuala Lumpur's rejection of the


loan floatation, Mustapha wrote a memorandum entitled "The future
position of Sabah in Malaysia" that was read and circulated at a
USNO meeting on April 23, 1975. The memorandum outlined the
gradual federal undermining of Sabah's autonomy, and pointed out
that the future position of Sabah in Malaysia would be a loss to the
state since Sablah would have to share its enormous agricultural pro-
duce, timber industry, and mineral and energy resources with the fed-
eral government. A lack of armed forces and manpower were considered
minor and temporary problems if Sabah chose to break away from the
Federation of Mialaysia. The state, according to Mustapha, had the
means of carrying on its administration as well as resources for devel-
opment and defence.5
The secession memorandum was distributed at the meeting where
former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sarawak Chief
Minister Rahman Yakub were present, indicating that the memoran-
dum was probably a veiled threat to prod the federal government into
acceding to Mustapha's loan-floating wishes. But for Tun Razak and
Berjaya leaders, Mustapha's secessionist threat was not to be taken
lightly in view of the absolute power he had held in the Sabah. Shortly
after getting word of Mustapha's secession memorandum, Tun Razak
removed Mustapha's detention power and intimated to him that it
was probably the right time for him to step down as Chief Minister.
Instead of resigning, Mustapha was planning to dissolve the Sabah
Legislative Assembly and call for a snap election. It was suggested that
if Mustapha swept all 48 seats, he would proclaim this victory as -a
mandate for taking Sabah out of Malaysia. This threat of a snap elec-
tion in which he would manipulate total victory was too real to be
ignored by the federal government. Tun Razak quietly summoned
Datuk Harris Salleh to Kuala Lumpur and told him that if he would
lead a breakaway from Mustapha's USNO to form a new political party
to oppose the Chief Minister, he would have his blessing and support.
Thus, in a very real sense, the recognition of the necessity of a "coup"
came after the April 23, 1975 secession meeting, and the vehicle to
carry out the "coup" was created on July 15 with the formation of
Berjaya, whose objective was to oust Mustapha from Sabah politics.
Its goal was partially attained when Mustapha finally stepped down as
Chief Minister on October 31, 1975.

Berjaya Setbacks: Berjaya suffered its first stunning blow when its
founder and vice-president Datuk Harris Sal.leh lost his state Assem-
bly seat to Mohamad Omar Bledram in the December 1975 Labuan
bye-election. Bledram, a relatively unknown USNO representative,
4 Bruce Ross-Larson, The Politics of Federalism (Singapore: Bruce Ross-Larson,
1976), p. 155.
5 Harvey Stockwin, "Sabah: The Maestro Holds Fast," Far Eastern Economic
Review, August 8, 1975, pp. 10-14.
THE BERJAYAPARTY IN SABAH, MALAYSIA 383

won the contest by a considerable margin-3299 to 2211 votes. This


bye-election defeat was a personal disaster for Harris, who was the
former president of the Labuan USNO and whose political base was
in the Island. It also shattered the confidence of many Berjaya follow-
ers. In addition, Berjaya lost its seat in the Kuala Kinabatangan bye-
election. The USNO candidate Datuk Pengiran Digadong Galpam
easily defeated Berjaya's Abdullah Hussein, 3174 to 1853 votes. This
defeat was made possible when Salleh Sulong, a former state minister
and one of the founders of Berjaya, chose not to run again for his state
Assembly seat. USNO's easy win in the two bye-elections triggered the
ruling Alliance party's decision to call for an early state election, thus
allowing them to capitalize on the turn of events.
The shaky Berjaya's greatest blow after the bye-election defeats
was the sudden death of Tun Razak on January 14, 1976. He had been
Berjaya's staunchest federal government supporter. This event was
followed shortly by another major setback: its founding member and
vice-president, Datuk Abdul Ghani Gilong, resigned the party on
March 15, 1976 and rejoined the USNO. This defection, together with
the arrest of Haji Mohamed No-or, the Secretary-General of Berjaya,
in connection with an alleged plot against Mustapha's life severely
eroded the credibility of Berjaya.6 The prospects of Berjaya's forming
the next government of the state would seem to have evaporated after
these preelection developments, and most political observers did not
think Berjaya had much chance of forming a new government.

The Berjaya Victory

The 1976 Election Results: At midnight on April 15, 1976, Berjaya


had achieved a political "mission impossible"-a party only nine
months old had toppled the Sabah Alliance, a party that had been in
power for 13 years. Berjaya won 28 of the 48 seats and thus formed the
state government. The other 20 seats went to USNO, while its partner
the Sabah Chinese Association (SCA) failed to deliver the crucial seats
it needed to retain power. And other party and independent candi-
dates did not win a single seat (see Table 1).
The Berjaya victory was impressive in view of the preelection set-
backs and the fact that it fought a well-funded Alliance party, whose
political machinery had had 13 years to expand and organize. Further-
more, overcoming the last minute money maneuvers of Tun Mustapha
in Sabah politics was next to impossible, as evidenced by his skillful
manipulations in the past two elections to attain political control. Yet
despite all these handicaps, Berjaya leaders were able to convince the
Sabah electorate to join them to dethrone Mustapha and his Alliance

6 Mohamed Noor was released after the victory of Berjaya and is presently the
state Minister of Finance and Secretary-General of Berjaya.
384 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979

TABLE 1: Result of 1976 Sabah General Election


Assembly Total votes Percentage
Party seats contested Seats won received of total votes
Berjaya 48 28* 101,393 54.10
Sabah Alliance
USNO 40 20 69,286 36.97
SCA 8 0 12,075 6.44
Pekemas 11 0 3,044 1.62
Bersatu 3 0 83 0.04
Independent 16 0 1,527 0.81
* According to the Sabah Constitution, Berjaya was allowed to appoint six
nominated members with full voting rights to the Assembly, thus giving Berjaya a
total of 34 seats in the Assembly. Two crossovers would give Berjaya exactly two-
thirds of all seats and the power to change the Constitution.

government. As we shall see, Berjaya's success was in large measure


determined by the Chinese community of Sabah.

The Rural Votes: The voting patterns of the rural districts in the
1976 election are somewhat identical to those of 1967 when the USNO
drew the bulk of its support from Muslim-dominated coastal areas,
and the United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO) drew
its support from the Kadazan-dominated rural constituencies, which
in 1976 supported the multiracial Berjaya party.
The 20 seats won by the USNO primarily came from: (a) the
Bajau-dominated Northwest and Bajau-Saluk-dominated northeast
and southeast coastal regions, including the Sulaman, Usukan Tempa-
suk, Bengkoka, Banggi, Sugut, Semawang, Kunak, and Semporna con-
stituencies; and (b) Brunei's Kedayan-Malay-dominated southwest
coastal constituencies of Lubuan, Sipitang, Kuala Penyu, Lumbadang,
Klias, and Bongawan. Berjaya, however, put up a good fight in these
districts. In three of these six constituencies, Berjaya lost by only a
very small margin. Orang Sungei-dominated regions of Kinabatangan
and Sekong also gave their support to USNO. USNO's narrow victory
in the two ethnically more balanced Merotai and Balung constituen-
cies received their votes primarily from the Muslim Indonesian and
Tidong communities, while Chinese in the -two areas supported the
Berjaya candidates. USNO's narrow win over Berjaya in the pre-
domninatelyKadazan district of Ranau, however, was surprising.
Berjaya, on the other hand, received the bulk of its support from
the Kadazan-domrinatedwest coast and interior district. With the ex-
ception of the Ranau constituency, Berjaya swept the Kadazan-domi-
nated rural areas and Kadazan-Chinese-dominated interior town cen-
ters, which included Kawang, Moyog, Bingkor, Tambunan, Kiulu,
Inanam, Tamrporuli, Kemnbayan,Kundasang, Langkon, Tandek, Ma-
tunggong, and the Sook constituencies. Berjaya also received its support
from the non-Muslim Murut population of the interior districts of
Kemabong, Pensiangan, Tenom, and Kuamut.
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386 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979
The Chinese Urban Votes: With USNO's having only a slight edge
over Berjaya in rural constituencies, split between the Muslim commu-
nities (Bajau, Suluk, Bruneis, Kedayan, and Malay) and the largely
Christian Kadazan population, the urban Chinese votes become the de-
ciding factor. In the 1967 election, six SCA candidates had taken five
seats in the Chinese-dominated urban constituencies, losing only one
seat to an independent, and giving the Tun Mustapha-led USNO-SCA
coalition a winning margin off 19-12 over the UPKO, led by Tun Fuad
Stephens.7 In the 1976 election, -however, the Chinese in Sabah did not
support the SCA's candidates. Instead, they backed the Chinese candi-
dates from the multiracial Berjaya.
In Sabah, 22% of 'the state population of about 770,000 are Chi-
nese, and they also made up roughly the same percentage of the 239,000
voters who were eligible to vote in the 1976 election. They formed the
majority in six of the 48 constituencies-Kota Kinabalu, Likas, Elo-
pura, Sandakan Bandar, Karamunting, and Bandar Tawau-the major
urban centers and suburbs in Sabah. The Chinese also comprised 25%
to 35% of the voters in eight other constituencies which covered the
coastal ports of Labuan, Kudat, and Lahad Datu as well -as the interior
towns of Tenom, Keningau, Beaufort, Penampang, and Papar. The
SCA placed eight candidates to compete in the constituencies of Kota
Kinabalu, Likas, Elopura, Sandakan Bandar, Karamunting Bandar,
Tawau, Kudat, and Tenom. With the exception of Tenom, Berjaya
put usp its own Chinese candidates 'to face the SCA's in competing for
the Chinese votes. The seven Berjaya Chinese candidates defeated their
SCA counterparts by a convincing margin. Datuk Harris, Berjaya's
vice president, also overwhelmed SCA's candidate Young Pet Fong in
his Tenom seat election (see Table 2).

The Sabah Chinese Association: The disastrous defeat of the SCA in


the 1976 election was due to the inexperience and indecision of its
younger leaders in handling a very complicated political situation. In
the nine years of Mus'tapha'sregime, the SCA had been largely inactive
because the 1971 state assembly elections and parliamentary contests
had been mostly uncontested since that time. With the birth of Ber-
jaya, SCA leaders were forced to make a public response to this new
political development that affected the Chinese community. They were
divided in their reactions. A few leaders, such as Yeh Pao Tsu and Lim
Guan Sing, deserted SCA and joined Berjaya. Those who had made
tremendous financial gain during Mustapha's regime continued to
pledge their support to the Alliance. l4any chose to take "business
trips" abroad just to avoid pressure from Mustapha and Berjaya. The
SCA, thus, was wrecked by internal dissension.
In September 1975, a group of well-educated young Chinese busi-
nessmen, most of whom were former education officers and high school

7 In 1967 there were 32 state constituencies; the number of state constituencies


increased to 48 in the 1976 election.
THE BERJAYA PARTY IN SABAH, MALAYSIA 387

TABLE 2: A Comparison between SCA and Berjaya Voting Results in the Eight
Chinese-dominated Urban Constituencies
Berjaya SCA Berjaya Berjaya
candidate candidate winning winning
and and margin margin Voting %
Contested his votes his votes (majority (% of total of total
constituency received received votes) votes) electorate
Kota Kinabalu 4203 1405 2798 74.9 76.0
Likas 4119 1273 2846 76.4 75.8
Elopura 4450 1954 3196 78.0 76.0
Bandar Sandakan 3018 1732 1286 63.5 73.9
Karamunting 3616 1751 1865 68.0 75.8
Bandar Tawau 3445 2120 1352 60.8 77.9
Kudat 2920 1777 1143 62.2 81.0
Tenom 2992* 763 1529 75.0 82.6
* Datuk Harris chose to compete in this constituency and not in Labuan where
he lost the bye-election. This was a strategic move to ensure his seat in the Assembly
since Tenom is predominantly a Chinese-Murut district.

teachers, staged their own mini coup d'etat and successfully ousted the
party "old guards," including Datuk Pang Tet Tshung, former presi-
dent and a long-time minister in Tun Mustapha's government. Most
of the other former SCA leaders either quit politics, established resi-
dence abroad, or joined Berjaya. The new SCA was led by Michael
Liaw Chin Yu, a young Kota Kinabalu businessman who was principal
of Sabah College from 1967 to 1973.
At the beginning, the younger SCA leaders proposed that the SCA
take an independent stand and contest the elections on its own and
not in partnership with the USNO. They also tried to disassociate
themselves from traditional SCA leaders who had long been accused
by the Chinese electorate of selling out Chinese interests for personal
gain. This move drew some respect and public support from the Chi-
nese community. The renewed support from the Chinese electorate
gave them a stronger position to negotiate with Mustapha and Berjaya
leaders in seat allocations. The SCA wanted to set up at least 12 can-
didates in the 48 constituencies, but Mustapha offered them only eight
urban constituencies. They then negotiated secretly with Berjaya lead-
ers and expressed the desire to have their candidates compete in all the
Chinese-dominated urban constituencies. Berjaya agreed to compromise
but insisted in fielding the stronger Chinese candidates, either from
SCA or Berjaya, to contest these urban seats. Names of candidates
from both parties were discussed. But no agreement was reached.
Berjaya leaders then urged the SCA to withdraw from all competition
and pledge its support to the new party, enabling Berjaya to secure at
least eight uncontested urban seats. Berjaya, in turn, would allocate
-thesix nominated assembly seats to SCA representatives should Berjaya
win the election.8 Partly because of their egos, having just emerged
8 Chinese Daily News, April 4, 1976. The Sabah constitution allows for six
nominated members with full voting rights in the Assembly.
388 ASIAN SURVEY,Vol. XIX, No. 4, April 1979

from obscurity to political eminence, and partly succumbing to the con-


tinuing pressure from the traditional SCA leaders and Mustapha, they
chose to compete in the eight Chinese-dominated urban constituencies
in partnership with USNO's Sabah Alliance. Their continued affilia-
tion with Mustapha disappointed many of the Chinese electorate, and
was the principal cause of the subsequent disastrous defeat in all eight
contests. Chinese voters perceived the new SCA leaders as opportunists
who aimed at personal gain rather than serving as the voice of the
Chinese community. Moreover, the credentials of the eight SCA can-
didates were, comparatively speaking, less impressive than those of
their Berjaya counterparts. For example, of the eight SCA candidates,
Datuk Lim Pui Ho, Datuk Hong Kee Sui, and Datuk Chong Fook
Tien were men of wealth and substantial timber, property, and other
business interests. Their past association with Mustapha did not fare
well among the majority of Chinese voters. The other five SCA candi-
dates were young businessmen in their early thirties who were not
only inexperienced in political campaigning but were also relatively
unknown to the Chinese electorate, especially the working-class popu-
lation.
On the other hand, most of the Berjaya Chinese candidates were
New Zealand and Australian educated professionals with several estab-
lished lawyers (Chong Thain Vun, Wong Yau Ket, Hiew Nyuk Yin,
and Lau Pui Kong) and accountants (Yap Pak Leung, Stephen Chan,
and Wong Soon Yu) among them. Some of them (Chong Thain Vun
and Yap Pak Leung) had previously contested elections in the state as
independent candidates. They were viewed by the Chinese electorate as
men of courage and integrity who risked their lives to oppose Mustapha
and restore the democratic rights of the people in Sabah. Consequently,
Chinese voters in all urban constituencies supported the Chinese can-
didates from the multiracial Berjaya party rather than the representa-
tives from SCA. This switch of votes from the Alliance to Berjaya in
the predominantly Chinese constituencies was the key factor which
brought about a change of government in Sabah.

The Role of the Malaysian Government:Looking from a broader Malay-


sian perspective, the success of Berjaya was made possible because of
the support it received from the late Tun Razak at the party forming
stage and the impartiality of the new Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein
Onn, in his handling of the 1976 election. As stated earlier, when Tun
Razak received the words of Mustapha's secession meeting on April 23,
1975, he promptly removed Mustapha's detention power. Shortly after
the formation of Berjaya on July 15, 1975, Tun Razak had also ordered
the release of all political prisoners held by Mustapha in Sabah. A new
Commissioner of Police, Yusoff Khan, was hurriedly transferred to
Sabah to ensure the political neutrality of the state's police force. The
constant personal onslaught against Mustapha's wrongdoings by Ber-
THE BERJAYAPARTY IN SABAH, MALAYSIA 389

jaya leaders together with the continuing pressure exerted by Tun Ra-
zak finally forced Mustapha out of office on October 31, 1975. Although
he remained president of the USNO and the Sabah Alliance and still
had influence in the state, Mustapha was no longer in a position to
monopolize the instrumentalities of government to isolate and elimi-
nate his opposition. For the first time in about eight years, the ruling
regime in Sabah was not in a position to exert almost total control over
campaign activities of the candidates, media coverage, polling, and
counting. The federal government used its power to guarantee relative
openness while it stood aside to watch the election results. The out-
comes were costly to USNO, which had depended heavily on a tightly
controlled election environment in previous elections.

The Refugee Issue: Another factor that contributed to the defeat of


Mustapha's regime was his generous policy towards the influx into
Sabah of more than 50,000 Muslim refugees from the Southern Philip-
pines. Mustapha, in the eyes of many Sabahans, is a "suluk" (a generic
name used in Sabah for all those from the Southern Philippines) and
he himself often claimed to have a blood relationship to the Sulu royal
families. His generosity, together with his fervent championing of Mus-
lim causes, had aroused suspicion and fear among native Sabahans,
especially the Kadazan and Chinese. Many believed that his interest
in secession and building his own Sultanate state of Sulu-Mindanao-
Sabah was more than just a passing fancy. This factor gained added
impact because he openly supported the Muslim separatist leaders in
the Southern Philippines and generously issued visas and working
permits to any Suluk who made a short journey from the Philippines
to Sabah while many West Malaysians and non-Muslim permanent
residents could not get their work permits revalidated. Also, many
Sabahans believed that Mustapha had in fact helped smuggle arms
and money from Libya to Muslim rebels in the Southern Philippines.
There were suspicions that he also had his own arm caches around the
state, and his acceptance of large numbers of Filipino refugees was
viewed as an effort to gain numerical support rather than as a pious
act of helping Muslim brothers. Many Sabahans were convinced that
Mustapha was, in fact, planning to fulfill his dream of becoming the
Sultan of a new Muslim state if he won the 1976 election. The coin-
cidential arrival of Southern Philippines hijakers in the middle of the
polling further enhanced this attitude and also aroused resentment
over his predilection for supporting non-Sabah causes with Sabah fi-
nances. Thus, in the 1976 election Sabahans, and especially the non-
Muslim communities, shattered Mustapha's dream of becoming the
Sultan of a new Muslim state of Sulu-Mindanao-Sabah.

SIN FONG HAN is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and Urban
Studies at California State University, Los Angeles.

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