but the trip proved futile because the victim died at noontime of the same day from the
stab wound sustained
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23249 November 25, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CUNIGUNDA BOHOLST-CABALLERO, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Attorney
Concepcion F. Torrijos for plaintiff-appellee.
Accused-appellant in her own behalf.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p
Convicted for having killed her husband, Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Ormoc City finding her guilty of PARRICIDE and sentencing her "to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period, as
the minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as the maximum; to indemnify the heirs of Francisco Caballero in the sum of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS (P6,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs", and prays for an
acquittal based on her plea of self-defense.1
The Solicitor General however asks for the affirmance of the appealed decision predicated on the following
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution before the trial court:
Cunigunda Boholst and Francisco Caballero, both at the age of twenty, were married on June 7, 1956, at a
ceremony solemnized by the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church in Ormoc City.2 The marriage was not a
happy one and before the end of the year 1957 the couple separated. Late in the evening of January 2, 1958,
Francisco Caballero and two companions, namely, Ignacio Barabad and Kakong Sacay, drank "tuba" in a certain
house in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City. At about midnight, Francisco Caballero and his companions proceeded home.
On the way, they saw Francisco's wife, Cunigunda, standing at the corner of the yard of Igmedio Barabad
Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter approached her, Cunigunda suddenly stabbed Francisco with a
knife marked by the prosecution as its Exhibit C. Francisco called for help to his two companions who upon
seeing that Francisco was wounded, brought him to the St. Jude Hospital. 3 Dr. Cesar Samson, owner of the
hospital, personally attended to the victim and found a "punctured wound on the left lumbar region measuring
1 inch externally" (Exhibit B). First aid was given, but because there was a need for blood transfusion and the
facilities of the hospital were inadequate to provide the necessary treatment, Dr. Samson suggested that the
patient be transported to Cebu City.4 In the meantime, Cunigunda Caballero had gone to the Police Department
of Ormoc City, surrendered to desk sergeant Restituto Mariveles and informed the latter that she stabbed her
husband.5 While Francisco Caballero was confined at the hospital, he was interrogated by Patrolman Francisco
Covero concerning the identity of his assailant and he pointed to his wife Cunigunda. The questions propounded
by Pat. Covero and the answers given by the victim were written down in a piece of paper on which the victim
affixed his thumbmark (Exhibit D) in the presence of his brother, Cresencio Caballero, and another policeman,
Francisco Tomada.6 On January 4, 1958, Francisco Caballero was brought to Cebu City on board the "MV Ormoc"
ART 11-13 CASES
by him.7
Appellant, on the other hand, pleads that We discard the proof adduced by the prosecution and believe instead
what she declared before the trial judge briefly summarized as follows:
After her marriage to Francisco Caballero on June 7, 1956, appellant lived with her husband in the house of her
parents in barrio Ipil, Ormoc City, and their marriage, although not a harmonious one, was blessed with a
daughter; her married life was marked by frequent quarrels caused by her husband's "gambling, drinking, and
serenading", and there were times when he maltreated and beat her; after more than a year she and her
husband transferred to a house of their own, but a month had hardly passed when Francisco left her and her
child, and she had to go back to live with her parents who bore the burden of supporting her and her child; in
the month of November, 1957, her daughter became sick and she went to her husband and asked for some help
for her sick child but he drove her away and said "I don't care if you all would die"; in the evening of January 2,
1958, she went out carolling with her friend, Crispina Barabad, and several men who played the musical
instruments; at about 12:00 o'clock midnight they divided the proceeds of the carolling in the house of Crispina
Barabad after which she went home, but before she could leave the vicinity of the house of Crispina, she met
her husband Francisco, who upon seeing her, held her by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you
been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch."; she replied: "What is your business. Anyway you have already left
us. You have nothing to do with us"; upon hearing these words Francisco retorted: "What do you mean by saying
I have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all, I will kill you all"; Francisco then held her by the hair, slapped her
face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards the ground, to keep herself from falling she held on to his
waist and as she did so her right hand grasped the knife tucked inside the belt line on the left side of his body;
because her husband continued to push her down she fell on her back to the ground; her husband then knelt
over her, held her neck, and choked her saying. "Now is the time I can do whatever I want. I will kill you";
because she had "no other recourse" as she was being choked she pulled out the knife of her husband and
thrust it at him hitting the left side of his body near the "belt line" just above his left thigh; when she finally
released herself from the hold of her husband she ran home and on the way she threw the knife; in the morning
of January 3, she went to town, surrendered to the police, and presented the torn and blood-stained dress worn
by her on the night of the incident (see Exhibit I); Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look for the weapon but
because they could not find it the policeman advised her to get any knife, and she did, and she gave a knife to
the desk sergeant which is the knife now marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution.8
The sole question thus presented in this appeal is: did appellant stab her husband in the legitimate defense of
her person?
The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in man's natural
instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it is based on that
impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being. Thus, in the words of the
Romans of ancient history: Quod quisque ob tutelam sui fecerit, jure suo ficisse existimetur.9 To the Classicists in
penal law, lawful defense is grounded on the impossibility on the part of the State to avoid a present unjust
aggression and protect a person unlawfully attacked, and therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require
that the innocent succumb to an unlawful aggression without resistance; while to the Positivists, lawful defense
is an exercise of a right, an act of social justice done to repel the attack of an aggressor.10
Our law on self-defense is found in Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
1
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
xxx xxx xxx
As part of this law is the settled jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the presence of the aforecited circumstances, the rationale being that having admitted the
wounding or killing of his adversary which is a felony, he is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he
establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense. 11
In this case of Cunigunda Caballero, the trial court did not find her evidence clear and convincing, and gave these
reasons for its conclusion: a) appellant's testimony is inherently improbable as brought out by her
demonstration of the incident in question during the trial of the case; b) there was no wound or injury on
appellant's body treated by any physician: c) appellant's insistence that the weapon used by her was Moro
hunting knife and not Exh. C is incredible; d) she gave contradictory statements concerning the report made by
her to the police authorities that she was choked by her husband; and e) her husband's abandonment of her and
her child afforded the motive behind appellant's
attack. 12
We are constrained, however, to disagree with the court a quo and depart from the rule that appellate court will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified to by the witnesses.
An examination of the record discloses that the trial judge overlooked and did not give due importance to one
piece of evidence which more than the testimony of any witness eloquently confirms the narration of appellant
on how she happened to stab her husband on that unfortunate night. We refer to the location of the wound
inflicted on the victim.
Appellant's account of that fatal occurrence as given in her direct testimony follows:
Q At that precise time when you were going home to the place of your parents, did any unusual incident occur?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was it?
A At the time when I went down from the house of Crispina Barabad, when I reached near the banana hill, my
husband held me.
Q What happened when your husband, Francisco Caballero, held you?
A He asked me from where did I prostitute myself.
Q What did you answer?
A I answered that I did not go (on) prostituting. I told him that I was only forced to accompany with the carolling
in order to earn money for our child.
ART 11-13 CASES
Q What part of your body did your husband, Francisco Caballero, hold you?
A He held me at the collar of my dress. (Witness holding the right portion of the collar of her dress.)
Q After you answered Francisco, what did he do?
A He said "Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch." Then I told him "What is your business.
Anyway you have already left us. You have nothing to do with us."
Q When Francisco heard these words, what did he do?
A Francisco said "What do you mean by saying l have nothing to do with you. I will kill you all. I will kill you all."
Q And then, what happened?
A He held my hair and slapped my face twice. Then I staggered and my nose was bleeding.
Q Do you mean to say that blood flowed out of your nose?
A Yes, sir.
Q After you were slapped twice and your nose begun to bleed, what happened next?
A He held the front part of my dress just below the collar and pushed me towards the ground. .
Q While your husband was holding your dress below the neck and tried to push you down, what did you do?
A I held a part of his body in order that I would not fall to the ground.
Q And then what happened?
A Because I struggled hard in order that I would not fall to the ground I held his belt and that was the time I got
hold of a weapon along his belt line.
Q After that what happened?
A He shoved my hands upward and pushed me to the ground and that was the time my hands were released. He
was choking me.
Q When you said your hands were released, was that before or after you were choked by Francisco Caballero?
A At that time when I was about to fall to the ground that was the time I released my hands.
Q When you were almost fallen to the ground, where were the hands of Francisco Caballero?
A On my hair.
Q You mean to say the two hands of Francisco Caballero?
2
A One of his hands was holding my hair. The other hand pushed me.
COURT:
Q What hand was holding your hair?
A His right hand was holding my hair while his left hand pushed me.
ATTORNEY GARCIA:
Q When you were fallen to the ground what happened?
A While I lay prostrate on the ground and believing that I have no other recourse, while his left hand was holding
my neck, I was able to take hold of the weapon from his belt line and I thrust it to him.
Q What was this weapon which you were able to get from his belt line?
A It was a hunting knife." (tsn. pp. 53-55, witness Cunigunda Caballero)
On cross-examination, appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show her position when she stabbed
her husband and she did, and although the stenographic notes on that demonstration are very sketchy which
We quote:
Q Please demonstrate to this Court when you made the thrust to your husband?
A When I took hold of the hunting knife I made the thrust in this manner. (Witness held the ruler with her right
hand kneeled on the floor)" (tsn. p. 67, ibid)
still We can get a clear picture of what appellant must have done, from the questions and answers immediately
following the above-quoted portion of the transcript, viz:
Q You want to make us understand that when you thrust the weapon to the body of your husband you were
lying down flat to the ground?
Thus, with her husband kneeling over her as she lay on her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck,
appellant, as she said, had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband's
belt and plunge it at his body hitting the left back portion just below the waist, described by the attending
physician, Dr. Cesar Samson, as the left lumbar region. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where
the knife was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of appellant's testimony, for as she lay on the ground with
her husband bent over her it was quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left side
of the man's belt and thrust it at that section of the body nearest to her hand at the moment.
We do not agree with the trial judge's observation that as demonstrated by the accused it was physically
impossible for her to get hold of the weapon because the two knees of her husband were on her right thigh
"which would have forced her to put her right elbow towards the ground"(see p. 9 of Decision), for even if it
were true that the two knees of Francisco were on his wife's right thigh, however, there is nothing in the
record to show that the right arm of the accused was held, pinned down or rendered immobile, or that she
pressed her elbow to the ground, as conjectured by the trial judge, in such a manner that she could not reach for
the knife. On the contrary, as indicated earlier, accused testified and so demonstrated that she was lying flat on
her back, her husband kneeling over her and her right arm free to pull out the knife and strike with it.
The trial judge also referred the a demonstration made by appellant of that portion of her testimony when she
was held by the hair and pushed down to the ground, and His Honor commented that "(S)he could not be falling
to the ground, as shown to the Court by her, considering the fact that the pushing was to and fro as shown in
her demonstration." (p. 8, Decision) The trial judge, however, failed to consider that it is humanly impossible to
have an exact and accurate reproduction or reenactment of an occurrence especially if it involves the
participation of persons other than the very protagonists of the incident being re-enacted. In this particular
instance appellant was asked by the private prosecutor to show how she was pushed down by her husband, and
her demonstration is described in the stenographic transcript as follows:
Q Please demonstrate to this Court the position of your husband and you while your husband held your hair.
A He did this way. (Witness held the hair of the Court Interpreter with his left hand and his right hand held the
right shoulder of the Interpreter and pulled the Interpreter to and fro. The Interpreter represented as the
accused and the accused as the deceased.)
Q Where were your two hands?
A My two hands held his waist line. (tsn. 66, witness Cunigunda Caballero; emphasis supplied)

A I was lying flat on the ground face upward. I was a little bit inclined because tried to struggle trying to get away In that demonstration, accused represented the victim while she in turn was impersonated by the court
from the hold of my husband. interpreter, and so it was difficult if not impossible for the two to give an accurate reenactment considering that
the accused assumed a role not hers during the actual incident and the court interpreter played a part which
Q You want to make us understand that your back was touching the ground when you made the thrust to your was not truly his. At any rate, the accused showed how one hand of her husband held her hair while the other
husband? pushed her down by the shoulder, and to portray how she in turn struggled and tried to push back her husband
to keep herself from falling, she "pulled the interpreter (representing the accused) to and fro." The fact is that
A Yes, sir. Francisco succeeded in forcing appellant down to the ground as portrayed by the latter when, following the
foregoing demonstration, she was asked by the private prosecutor to show how she stabbed her husband — a
COURT: matter which is discussed in pages 8 and 9 of this Decision.

Q Where were you kneeled by your, husband? It is this particular location of the wound sustained by the victim which strongly militates against the credibility
of the lone prosecution witness, Ignacio Barabad. This witness declared that on that night when husband and
wife met on the road, Cunigunda called Francisco and when the latter was near, she immediately stabbed him. If
A On my right thigh. (ibid; emphasis supplied)
that were true, that is, husband and wife were standing face to face at a distance of one-half meter when the
stabbing occurred (tsn. p. 11, witness Ignacio Barabad), it would have been more natural and probable for the

3
ART 11-13 CASES
weapon to have been directed towards the front part of the body of the victim such as his abdomen or chest,
rather than at his back, left side, just above the left thigh.
In cases such as the one now before Us where there are directly conflicting versions of the incident object of the
accusation, the Court in its search for the truth perforce has to look for some facts or circumstances which can
be used as valuable aids in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony, for after all the element of
probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence13, so much so that when a court as a judicial fact-
finder pronounces judgment that a set of facts constitute the true happening it does so not of its own personal
knowledge but as the result of an evaluating process of the probability or improbability of a fact sought to be
proved.
Thus, in People vs. Aquino, L-32390, December 28, 1973, a decision of the First Division of this Court penned by
Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal, the plea of self-defense of the accused-appellant was sustained on the basis
of certain "physical and objective circumstances" which proved to be of "decisive importance" in ascertaining
the veracity of the plea of self-defense, to wit: the location of the wound on the right side of the throat and right
arm of the deceased, the direction of the trajectories of the bullets fired by the accused, the discovery of
bloodstains at the driver's seat, the finding of the dagger and scabbard of the deceased, and so on. 14
In the case of appellant Cunigunda Caballero, We find the location of the fatal wound as a valuable circumstance
which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Another, is the lack of motive of appellant in attacking and killing her husband on that particular night of January
2. Although it is the general rule that the presence of motive in the killing of a person is not indispensable to a
conviction especially where the identity of the assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is
not disputed, as in this case, nonetheless, the absence of such motive is important in ascertaining the truth as
between two antagonistic theories or versions of the killings. 15
We disagree with the statement of the court a quo that appellant's motive for killing her husband was his
abandonment of her and his failure to support her and her child. While appellant admitted in the course of her
testimony that her marriage was not a happy one, that she and her husband separated in the month of October,
1957, and since then she and her child lived with her parents who supported them, nevertheless she declared
that notwithstanding their separation she still loved her husband (tsn. p. 59, cross-examination of appellant). As
a matter of fact, appellant had been living with her parents for several months prior to the incident in question
and appeared resigned to her fate. Furthermore, there is no record of any event which occurred immediately
prior to January 2 which could have aroused her feelings to such a degree as to drive her to plan and carry out
the killing of her husband.
On the other hand, it was Francisco Caballero who had a reason for attacking his wife, Cunigunda. Meeting his
wife unexpectedly at past midnight on the road, Francisco reacted angrily, and suspecting that she was out for
some bad purpose he held her by the collar of her dress and said: "Where have you been prostituting? You are a
son of a bitch." This was followed by a slapping on the face until Cunigunda's nose bled, pulling of her hair,
pushing her down to the ground, and strangling her — all of which constituted the unlawful aggression against
which appellant had to defend herself.
Next to appellant's lack of motive for killing her husband, is her conduct shortly after the occurrence. As soon as
the sun was up that morning of January 3 (the stabbing occurred past midnight of January 2), Cunigunda went to
the city and presented herself at the police headquarters where she reported that she stabbed her husband and
surrendered the blood-stained dress she wore that night. On this point, the trial judge stated that appellant
made contradictory statements in her testimony concerning the report made by her to the police authorities, for
while at the start she declared that she did not report the "choking by her husband", she later changed her
testimony and stated that she did relate that fact. (p. 10, Decision)
ART 11-13 CASES
We have gone over the stenographic transcript of the testimony of appellant on direct examination
and nowhere is there a positive and direct statement of hers that she did not report that she was choked by her
husband. What the trial judge asked of appellant was whether or not she told the police about the fist mark on
her face and her answer was "No, sir, I forgot." (tsn. p. 55, supra) And on appellant's cross-examination, there
was no question propounded and therefore there was no answer given on the subject-matter of appellant's
report to the police concerning the incident except for the following:
COURT:
Q Did you show that dress to the police authorities the following day?
A I was not able to wear that, Your Honor, because it was torn out.
Q You did not bring that to the police authorities?
A I showed it to the police authorities, and they told me to keep it, not to touch it. (Tsn. p. 65, ibid)
We do not see, therefore, the alleged contradiction in appellant's testimony which was singled out by His Honor
as one of his reasons for discrediting her plea of self-defense.
That appellant made it clear to the police that she stabbed her husband because he attacked her is confirmed by
no less than the prosecution witness, Patrolman Restituto Mariveles, who was on duty at the desk when
appellant arrived at the police headquarters. This witness on cross-examination declared:
Q And she also told you that on that night previous to the incident her husband Francisco Caballero beat her up,
is that right?
A She told me that she was met on the way by her husband immediately after carolling and she was
manhandled by her husband and when she was struggling to get loose from her husband she happened to take
hold of a knife that was placed under the belt of her husband and because she was already half conscious she
did not know that she was able to thrust said knife to the stomach of her husband. (tsn. p. 23, witness R.
Mariveles)
It is indeed regrettable that the statements made by appellant to the police upon her surrender were not taken
down in writing to serve as a faithful and reliable account of her report, nevertheless, We are satisfied by the
fact, which is not disputed, that of her own accord appellant went to the police authorities early in the morning
of January 3, informed Policeman Mariveles that she stabbed her husband because he manhandled her which
rendered her "half-conscious", and brought and showed the dress she wore during the incident which was torn
by the collar and with blood stains due to the bleeding of her nose. Another policeman, Joventino de Leon, who
at the time was property custodian of the Ormoc City police, corroborated appellant's testimony concerning the
dress marked Exhibit 1 for the defense. (tsn. p. 70 witness J. de Leon) If there was no clear and positive
statement in appellant's testimony either on direct or cross examination that she informed the police that she
was choked by her husband, it was because, as We noted, no question was propounded to her on that point.
While We are on this subject of appellant's surrender, mention is to be made of the knife marked as Exhibit C for
the prosecution. In her testimony, appellant stated that Exhibit C was not the knife actually used by her in
stabbing her husband because the true weapon was her husband's Moro hunting knife with a blade of around
six inches which she threw away immediately after the incident; that when she was asked by Pat. Mariveles to
look for the weapon and she could not find it, she was advised by policeman Cabral who helped her in the
search to get any knife and surrender it to the desk officer and so she took the knife Exhibit C and presented it to
4
Pat. Mariveles. (tsn. appellant pp. 56-57, 60) This testimony of appellant was taken against her by the court a
quo which held that her declaration could not have been true. We find however no strong reason for
disbelieving the accused on this point. Appellant does not deny that she turned over Exhibit C to Pat. Mariveles
as the knife with which she stabbed her husband but she claims that she did so upon advise of another
policeman, Pat. Cabral, and it is quite significant that the latter was not called upon by the prosecution to refute
such declaration. There is sincerity in appellant's attempt to rectify a misstatement made by her to Pat.
Mariveles and We are inclined to believe and in fact We do believe that the fatal weapon must have had indeed
a blade of around six inches as stated by appellant for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region to the
victim's large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter (tsn. Dr. C. Samson, p. 6)
All the elements of self-defense are indeed present in the instant case.
The element of unlawful aggression has been clearly established as pointed out above.
The second element, that is, reasonable necessity for the means employed is likewise present. Here we have a
woman who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and rendered almost unconscious by the strong
pressure on her throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within her reach to save herself
from impending death. Early jurisprudence of this Court has followed the principle that the reasonable necessity
of the means employed in self-defense does not depend upon the harm done but rests upon the imminent danger
of such injury. (U.S. vs. Paras, 1907, 9 Phil. 367, citing Decision of Dec. 22, 1887) And so the fact that there was
no visible injury caused on the body of the appellant which necessitated medical attention, a circumstance
noted by the trial court, is no ground for discrediting self-defense; what is vital is that there was imminent peril
to appellant's life caused by the unlawful aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's belt
afforded appellant the only reasonable means with which she could free and save herself from being strangled
and choked to death. What this Court expressed in the case of People vs. Lara, 1925, 48 Phil. 153, 160, is very
true and applicable to the situation now before Us, and We quote:
It should be borne in mind that in emergencies of this kind human nature does not act upon processes of formal
reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent, as in this case, that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the
actor irresponsible in law for the consequences. 16
Equally relevant is the time-honored principle: Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity knows no law.
The third element of self-defense is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel
one to attack the person claiming self-
defense. 17 Undoubtedly appellant herein did not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or attack
on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it was understandable for Francisco to be angry at his wife for
finding her on the road in the middle of the night, however, he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment
with an intent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that appellant did was to provoke an imaginary commission
of a wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not a sufficient provocation under the law of self-defense. Upon
being confronted by her husband for being out late at night, accused gave a valid excuse that she went carolling
with some friends to earn some money for their child. January 2 was indeed within the Christmas season during
which by tradition people carol from house to house and receive monetary gifts in a Christian spirit of goodwill.
The deceased therefore should have given some consideration to his wife's excuse before jumping to
conclusions and taking the extreme measure of attempting to kill his wife.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, We find that accused-appellant acted in the legitimate defense of her
person, and We accordingly set aside the judgment of conviction and ACQUIT her with costs de oficio.
ART 11-13 CASES
So Ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-162 April 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO ALCONGA, appellant.
Jose Avanceña for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr. and Solicitor Barcelona for appellee.
HILADO, J.:
On the night of May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes in the Municipality of San Dionisio, Province of
Iloilo several persons were playing prohibited games (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). The deceased Silverio Barion was the
banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo, a witness for the prosecution, was one of those playing
the game (t.s.n., p. 95). Upon invitation of the said Maria de Raposo, the accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her as
a partner, each of them contributing the sum of P5 to a common fund (t.s.n., pp. 95, 125). Maria de Raposo
played the game while the said accused posted himself behind the deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards of
the latter and communicating by signs to his partner (t.s.n., pp. 95-96, 126). The deceased appears to have
suffered losses in the game because of the team work between Maria de Raposo and the accused Alconga
(t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). Upon discovering what the said accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant
and expressed his anger at the former (t.s.n., pp. 96, 126). An exchange of words followed, and the two would
have come to blows but for the intervention of the maintainer of the games (t.s.n., p. 96). In a fit of anger, the
deceased left the house but not before telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will give you a
breakfast" (t.s.n., p. 96), which expression would seem to signify an intent to inflict bodily harm when uttered
under such circumstances.
The deceased and the accused Alconga did not meet thereafter until the morning of May 29, 1943, when the
latter was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of Santol, performing his duties as "home guard" (t.s.n., pp.
98-100). While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, the deceased came along and,
addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing of his "pingahan"
(t.s.n., p. 100). The accused avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench with the intention to
crawl out of the guardhouse (t.s.n., pp. 100-101). A second blow was given but failed to hit the accused, hitting
the bench instead (t.s.n., p. 101). The accused manage to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his abdomen
(t.s.n., p. 101). While the deceased was in the act of delivering the third blow, the accused, while still in a
crawling position (t.s.n., p. 119), fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and to fall to the ground
(t.s.n., p. 101). Rising to his feet, the deceased drew forth his dagger and directed a blow at the accused who,
however, was able to parry the same with his bolo (t.s.n., pp. 101-102). A hand-to-hand fight ensued (t.s.n., p.
102). Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away but was followed by the accused (t.s.n., p. 6).
After running a distance of about 200 meters (t.s.n., pp. 21, 108), the deceased was overtaken, and another fight
took place, during which the mortal bolo blow — the one which slashed the cranium — was delivered, causing
the deceased to fall to the ground, face downward, besides many other blows deliver right and left (t.s.n., pp. 6,
28). At this instant, the other accused, Adolfo Bracamonte, arrived and, being the leader of the "home guards"
of San Dionisio, placed under his custody the accused Alconga with a view to turning him over to the proper
authorities (t.s.n., pp. 102-105).
On their way to San Dionisio, the two accused were stopped by Juan Collado, a guerrilla soldier (t.s.n., pp. 80,
104). Adolfo Bracamonte turned over Alconga to Collado who in turn took him to the headquarters (t.s.n., pp.
5
81, 104). In the afternoon of the same day, Collado delivered Alconga to Gregorio Barredo, a municipal
policeman of San Dionisio, together with the weapons used in the fight: a revolver, a bolo, and a dagger (t.s.n.,
pp. 81, 104).
The injuries sustained by the deceased were described by police sergeant Gil G. Estaniel as follows:
P. ¿Y que hicieron ustedes cuando ustedes vieron a Silverio Barion? — R. Examine sus heridas.
P. ¿Donde ha encontrado usted las heridas, en que parte del cuerpo? — R. En la cabeza, en sus brazos, en sus
manos, en la mandibula inferior, en la parte frente de su cuello, en su pecho derecho, y tambien en el pecho
izquierdo, y su dedo meñique habia volado, se habia cortado, y otras perqueñas heridas mas.
P. ¿En la cabeza, vio usted heridas? — R. Si, señor.
P. ¿Cuantas heridas? — R. Una herida en la region parietal derecha y una contusion en la corona de la cabeza.
P. ¿Vio usted el craneo? — R. En la craneo llevaba una herida, en quel el craneo se ha roto.
P. ¿En el pecho, herida ha encontrado usted? — R. Debajo de la tetilla derecha, una herida causada por una bala.
P. ¿Y otras heridas en el pecho, puede usted decir que clase de heridas? — R. Heridas causadas por bolo.
P. ¿Como de grande acquellas heridas en el pecho? — R. No recuerdo la dimension de las heridas en el pecho.
P. ¿Pero en la cabeza? — R. La cabeza se rajo por aquella herida causada por el bolo. (T.s.n., p. 25.)
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased. The initial stage
commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without sufficient provocation on the part of the latter.
Resisting the aggression, appellant managed to have the upper hand in the fight, inflicting several wounds upon
the deceased, on account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that moment there was no longer any danger
to the life of appellant who, being virtually unscathed, could have chosen to remain where he was. Resolving all
doubts in his flavor, and considering that in the first stage the deceased was the unlawful aggressor and
defendant had not given sufficient provocation, and considering further that when the deceased was about to
deliver the third blow, appellant was still in a crawling position and, on that account, could not have effectively
wielded his bolo and therefore had to use his "paltik" revolver — his only remaining weapon — ; we hold that
said appellant was then acting in self-defense.
But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in self-defense, there being then no more
aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the moment the deceased took to his heels. During
the second stage of the fight appellant inflicted many additional wounds upon the deceased. That the deceased
was not fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the fact that he was still able to run a distance
of some 200 meters before being overtaken by appellant. Under such circumstances, appellant's plea of self-
defense in the second stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no
aggression.
Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt from criminal liability for the reason that it is
shown that he struck several blows, among them the fatal one, after the necessity for defending himself had
ceased, his assailant being then in retreat. Therefore one of the essential ingredients of self-defense specified in
No. 4, article 8 of the Penal Code is wanting (now article 11, case No. 1, Revised Penal Code). (United
States vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil., 475, 476; words in parenthesis supplied.)
ART 11-13 CASES
. . . Even if it be conceded for the moment that the defendants were assaulted by the four (offended parties),
the right to kill in self-defense ceased when the aggression ceased; and when Toledo and his brothers turned
and ran, without having inflicted so much as a scratch upon a single one of the defendants, the right of the
defendants to inflict injury upon them ceased absolutely. They had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure. A
fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees. When danger ceases, the right to injure ceases.
When the aggressor turns and flees, the one assaulted must stay his hand. (United States vs. Vitug, 17 Phil., 1,
19; emphasis supplied.)
Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of homicide has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The learned trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating circumstances: voluntary
surrender and provocation on the part of the deceased. The first was properly appreciated; the second was not,
since it is very clear that from the moment he fled after the first stage of the fight to the moment he died, the
deceased did not give any provocation for appellant to pursue much less further to attack him.
The only provocation given by him was imbibed in, and inseparable from, the aggression with which he started
the first stage of the fight. The evidence, as weighed and appreciated by the learned trial judge, who had heard,
seen and observed the witnesses testify, clearly shows that said stage ended with the flight of the deceased
after receiving a bullet wound in his right breast, which caused him to stagger and fall to the ground, and several
bolo wounds inflicted by appellant during their hand-to-hand fight after both had gotten up. The learned trial
judge said:
The evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense in support of their respective theories of the case
vary materially on certain points. Some of these facts have to be admitted and some have to be rejected with
the end in view of arriving at the truth. To the mind of the Court, what really happened in the case at bar, as can
de disclosed by the records, which lead to the killing of the deceased on that fatal morning of May 29, 1945
(should be 1943), is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In the morning of May 29, 1943, while Dioscoro Alconga was alone in the guardhouse performing his duties as
guard or "ronda" in Barrio Santol, the deceased Silverio Barion passed by with a "pingahan". That was the first
time the deceased and the accused Alconga had met since that eventful night of May 27th in the gambling
house of Gepes. Upon seeing the accused Alconga, who was then seated in the guardhouse, the deceased cried:
"Coroy, this is now the breakfast!" These words of warning were immediately followed by two formidable
swings of the "pingahan" directed at the accused Alconga which failed to hit him. Alconga was able to avoid the
blows by falling to the ground and crawling on his abdomen until he was outside the guardhouse. The deceased
followed him and while in the act of delivering the third blow, Dioscoro Alconga fired at him with his revolver
thereby stopping the blow in mid-air. The deceased fell to the ground momentarily and upon rising to his feet,
he drew forth a dagger. The accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and both persons being armed, a hand-to-
hand fight followed. The deceased having sustained several wounds from the hands of Alconga, ran away with
the latter close to his heels.
The foregoing statement of the pertinent facts by the learned trial judge is in substantial agreement with those
found by us and narrated in the first paragraphs of this decision. Upon those facts the question arises whether
when the deceased started to run and flee, or thereafter until he died, there was any provocation given by him
from appellant to pursue and further to attack him. It will be recalled, to be given with, that the first stage of the
fight was provoked when the deceased said to appellant "Cory, this is now the breakfast," or "This is your
breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing or two of his "pingahan." These words without the immediately
following attack with the "pingahan" would not have been uttered, we can safely assume, since such an
utterance alone would have been entirely meaningless. It was the attack, therefore, that effectively constituted
the provocation, the utterance being, at best, merely a preclude to the attack. At any rate, the quoted words by
themselves, without the deceased's act immediately following them, would certainly not have been considered
6
a sufficient provocation to mitigate appellant's liability in killing or injuring the deceased. For provocation in
order to be a mitigating circumstance must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. (Revised Penal
Code, article 13, No. 4.)
Under the doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, supra, when the deceased ran and fled without having inflicted so
much as a scratch upon appellant, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot
and several bolo slashes, as aforesaid, the right of appellant to inflict injury upon him, ceased absolutely —
appellant "had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure" said deceased — for the reason that "a fleeing man is
not dangerous to the one from whom he flees." If the law, as interpreted and applied by this Court in the Vitug
case, enjoins the victorious contender from pursuing his opponent on the score of self-defense, it is because this
Court considered that the requisites of self-defense had ceased to exist, principal and indispensable among
these being the unlawful aggression of the opponent (Rev. Penal Code, article 11, No. 1; 1 Viada, 5th ed., 173).
Can we find under the evidence of record that after the cessation of said aggression the provocation thus
involved therein still persisted, and to a degree sufficient to extenuate appellant's criminal responsibility for his
acts during the second stage of the fight? Appellant did not testify nor offer other evidence to show that when
he pursued the deceased he was still acting under the impulse of the effects of what provocation, be it anger,
obfuscation or the like. The Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
It is therefore apparent that the Code requires for provocation to be such a mitigating circumstance that it not
only immediately precede the act but that it also be sufficient. In the Spanish Penal Code, the adjective
modifying said noun is "adecuada" and the Supreme Court of Spain in its judgment of June 27, 2883, interpreted
the equivalent provision of the Penal Code of that country, which was the source of our own existing Revised
Penal Code, that "adecuada" means proportionate to the damage caused by the act. Viada (Vol. 11, 5th ed., p.
51) gives the ruling of that Supreme Court as follows:
El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que la provocacion o amenaza que de parte del ofendido ha de preceder para
la disminucion de la responsabilidad criminal debe ser proporcionada al daño que se cause, lo cual no concurre a
favor del reo si resulta que la unica cuestion que hubo fue si en un monton de yeso habia mas omenos cantidad,
y como perdiera la apuesta y bromeando dijera el que la gano que beberia vino de balde, esa pequeña cuestion
de amor propio no justificaba en modo alguno la ira que le impelio a herir y matar a su contrario. (S. de 27 de
junio de 1883, Gaceta de 27 de septiembre.)
Justice Albert, in his commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 edition, page 94, says: "The provocation or
threat must be sufficient, which means that it should be proportionate to the act committed and adequate
to stir one to its commission" (emphasis supplied).
Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be affirmatively proven by the accused.
This the instant appellant has utterly failed to do. Any way, it would seem self-evident that appellant could never
have succeeded in showing that whatever remained of the effects of the deceased's aggression, by way of
provocation after the latter was already in fight, was proportionate to his killing his already defeated adversary.
That provocation gave rise to a fight between the two men, and may be said, not without reason, to have spent
itself after appellant had shot the deceased in his right breast and caused the latter to fall to the ground; or —
making a concession in appellant's favor — after the latter had inflicted several bolo wounds upon the deceased,
ART 11-13 CASES
without the deceased so much as having scratched his body, in their hand-to-hand fight when both were on
their feet again. But if we are to grant appellant a further concession, under the view most favorable to him, that
aggression must be deemed to have ceased upon the flight of the deceased — upon the end of the first stage of
the fight. In so affirming, we had to strain the concept in no small degree. But to further strain it so as to find
that said aggression or provocation persisted even when the deceased was already in flight, clearly accepting
defeat and no less clearly running for his life rather than evincing an intention of returning to the fight, is more
than we can sanction. It should always be remembered that "illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least
threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.
Agresion ilegitima. — Agresion vale tanto como acometimiento. Para que exista el derecho de defensa es
preciso que se nos acometa, que se nos ataque, o cuando menos, que se nos amenace de atacarnos de un modo
inmediato e inminente; v. gr., desenvainando el puñal para herirnos con el o apuntando la pistola para
dispararla contra nosotros. (Viada, 5. a edicion, 173.)
After the flight of the deceased there was clearly neither an assault nor a threatened assault of the remotest
kind. It has been suggested that when pursuing his fleeing opponent, appellant might have thought or believed
that said opponent was going to his house to fetch some other weapon. But whether we consider this as a part
or continuation of the self-defense alleged by appellant, or as a separate circumstance, the burden of proof to
establish such a defense was, of course, upon appellant, and he has not so much as attempted to introduce
evidence for this purpose. If he really thought so, or believed so, he should have positively proven it, as any
other defense. We can not now gratuitously assume it in his behalf.
It is true that in the case of United States vs. Rivera (41 Phil., 472, 474), this Court held that one defending
himself or his property from a felony violently or by surprise threatened by another is not obliged to retreat but
may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself from danger. But that is not this case. Here from the very
start appellant was the holder of the stronger and more deadly weapons — a revolver and a bolo, as against a
piece of bamboo called "pingahan" and a dagger in the possession of the deceased. In actual performance
appellant, from the very beginning, demonstrated his superior fighting ability; and he confirmed it when after
the deceased was first felled down by the revolver shot in right breast, and after both combatants had gotten up
and engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, the deceased using his dagger and appellant his bolo, the former received
several bolo wounds while the latter got through completely unscathed. And when the deceased thereupon
turned and fled, the circumstances were such that it would be unduly stretching the imagination to consider
that appellant was still in danger from his defeated and fleeing opponent. Appellant preserved his revolver and
his bolo, and if he could theretofore so easily overpower the deceased, when the latter had not yet received any
injury, it would need, indeed, an unusually strong positive showing — which is completely absent from the
record — to persuade us that he had not yet "secured himself from danger" after shooting his weakly armed
adversary in the right breast and giving him several bolo slashes in different other parts of his body. To so hold
would, we believe, be unjustifiably extending the doctrine of the Rivera case to an extreme not therein
contemplated.
Under article 249, in relation with article 64, No. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, the crime committed by appellant
is punishable by reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which would be from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years
and 8 months. However, in imposing the penalty, we take into consideration the provisions of section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), as amended by Act No. 4225. Accordingly, we find appellant guilty
of the aforesaid crime of homicide and sentence him to an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and 1 day
of prision mayor to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
As thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
7
 There was some testimony tending to show that when the shooting took place the deceased was under the
[G.R. No. L-3515. October 3, 1907. ] influence of liquor, and that he bore resentment against the accused arising out of a quarrel about a woman, but
these contentions are not satisfactorily sustained by the evidence, nor it is necessary to take them into
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDERSON MACK, Defendant-Appellant. consideration in deciding the case.

Amzi B. Kelly, for Appellant. Upon the foregoing statement of facts the defendant’s contention that he shot the deceased in self-defense and
is therefore exempt from punishment, must be sustained
Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellee.
The trial court was of opinion that the evidence offered by the accused established "an in complete defense,"
SYLLABUS which entitles the defendant to a reduction of the penalty, but not to complete exception from punishment; in
support of his opinion the trial judge reasons as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
1. EXCEPTION FROM CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ON PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE. — An accused person is not entitled
to complete exemption from criminal responsibility on the plea of self-defense unless each and all of the "The accused claims exemption from criminal liability on the ground that the act was committed in self defense.
following facts are established to the satisfaction of the court: First, that there was an unlawful aggression; At the outset of the discussion of this point it may be well to quote the following from an opinion cited by his
second, that there was reasonable necessity for the employment of the means taken to prevent or resist such counsel:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
unlawful aggression; third, that there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
"‘The defendant, having admitted the killing, has assumed the task of establishing his defense, not that the
2. EFFORTS TO EVADE ASSAULT. — One who is unlawfully assailed need not attempt to retreat where there is no burden of proof shifted in the case, but it was necessary for him to, establish his defense to the satisfaction of
reasonable ground to believe that by so doing he can safely avoid the threatened attack; nor is he required to the court.’ (United State v. Capisonda 1 Phil. Rep., 575.)
continue his retreat when there is no reasonable ground to believe that he can do so with safety.
"It is true that the presumption of innocence is always in favor of the accused, but when, as here, the
Government has actually proven the crime of homicidio, it need not go, farther and negative a particular and
DECISION
exculpatory plea on the part of the accused such as self-defense. That must be established by the accused
himself ’to the satisfaction of the court.’
CARSON, J. :
"Article 8, subdivision 4, of the Penal Code prescribes the elements which must exist in order that self-defense
may be established. Counsel for the accused maintains that it is sufficient if he establishes two of these
elements, namely, illegal aggression and lack of sufficient provocation. But in each of the authorities which he
cites on this propositions, although the court does not emphasize it, there was also present the third element
The defendant was charged with the crime of asesinato (assassination) and convicted of the crime of homicidio "reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it" (aggression). Thus in United States v.
(homicide). From this judgment of conviction he appealed to this court. Salandanan (1 Phil. Rep., 478) the court lays stress (p. 479) on the fact that "it can not be asserted that the
danger to the defendant had ceased" because disarmament by the deceased "was the contingency which the
It is admitted that upon the night of May 4, 1906, the accused, a negro soldier, shot and killed a municipal accused might well have reasonable feared." In other words, there was or seemed to be a "reasonable
policeman named Estanislao Indic. The evidence of record is contradictor and conflicting in the extreme, but we necessity" or defendant’s part of continuing the struggle. So in United States v. Patala (2 Phil. Rep., 752) the
think that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the veracity and credibility of the witnesses, the court says (p. 756): "Considering the nature of the aggression the defendant could have reasonably believed that
following relation of the incidents, as the occurred must be held to be in accordance with the weight of the his life was in danger and that it was a case of life or death with him." This again could mean nothing less than
evidence. that the means employed seemed reasonably necessary. In United States v. Regis (2 Phil. Rep., 113) the
deceased was the aggressor and the accused, although he had succeeded in wresting the bolo from the
Just before the shooting, the accused was sitting on a bench a few feet back from the street, in the town of deceased Languido inflicted the wounds because (p. 116) "fearing that Languido might again possess himself of
Tacloban, in the Province of Leyte, in an open space some 3 or 4 feet, width, between the tienda or content of a the weapon In none of these cases does not court say that this reason able necessity of the means employed" is
woman named Olimpia and another building. The deceased, with another policemen, approached the place not essential the establishment of self-defense and that is failure to especially mention this element is not to be
directed Olimpia to close her tienda, and, later, ordered the accused and another soldier who was standing near construed prescribing the rule for which counsel contends is parent from United States v. De Castro (2 Phil. Rep.,
by to go to their quarters. The accused did not obey this order, and it is probable that some words passed 67), in which the opinion was written by the name judge (Mapa) who wrote the opinions in United States
between the soldiers, the policemen, and the woman which angered the deceased, though the weight of the Salandanan and United States v. Patala (supra) and where after reviewing the facts it is observed (p.
evidence clearly maintain the contention of the accused that he did and said nothing to provoke or offend the 70):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
deceased, except in so far as his failure to obey the order to go to his quarters may have had that effect. The
deceased, who was standing some 10 or 12 feet from the accused, cursing and abusing him for his failure to "‘. . . such means were not reasonably required or necessary to repel the attack . . . It follows that there is absent
obey the order, wrought himself into a passion dragged himself free from his companion, who was endeavoring in this case one of the three requisites section 4 of article 8 of the code — that is, the reasonable necessity of
to restrain him and take him away, and started toward the accused, at the same time drawing his bolo and the means employed to repel the attack — in order that the necessity for self-defense may be a complete
brandishing it in a threatening manner. Thereupon the accused got up, drew his revolver, and the deceased exemption from criminal liability.’
having then approached within a distance of from 3 to 6 feet, the accused fired three shots, one of which took
effect in the left breast of the deceased, just above the nipple, and another in the back of his head. "Indeed such a constructions as counsel urges would effect a virtual repeal of article 8, subdivision 4, which
recognizes the validity of self-defense only provide ’there are the following attendant circumstances; not, as in

8
ART 11-13 CASES
article 403, ’if the deed is attended by any of the following circumstances.’ It is clear therefore that in order to inches shorter than the accused and he would have had to reach accordingly in order to strike the accused in the
show himself entitled to complete acquittal in this case the accused must ’establish to the satisfaction of the face or head, which would be the most vulnerable because least protected portion. Again the accused is a man
court’ a ’reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel’ the attack. On this point let us hear of powerful physique, well proportioned and strong of limb. Could he not have parried the blow or wrested the
the accused. weapon from the man who he says was drunk and unable to walk straight?

"He testifies (Def., pp. 47, 49) that saw the deceased approaching when he was ’quite a distance away, . . . might
have been or 10 feet.’ This was apparent (p. 51) before he had turned his dead around and seems that the rear
entrance was obstructed by a barrel and other articles mentioned. He had been sitting (Def., pp. 21, 42) on a
each between the tienda and the next house on the right. But he could not have been seated much in the rear of
the front of either house for Adams, who was leaning against the corner of the tienda, was not more than 2 feet
way (Def., pp. 9, 22), near enough indeed for the accused to reach over and touch him (Def., pp. 21, 47) and it
seems also (p. 39) that the tendera who had been seated on the steps behind the accused was only about a foot
and a half from Adams. Moreover one step seems to have bought the accused to the edge of the street (Def.,
pp. 19, 459. He testifies (Def., p. 49) that there were no fixtures built into the street and he mentions no
obstruction of the right except the house and its inmate, Townsend, who was standing on the corner (Def., pp.
48, 49). According to his own testimony the accused, after recognizing his danger, had time enough to rise from
his seat, look backward for a way of escape, push Adams aside, extricate his revolver from the left side of his
oath (Def., p. 43) with his right hand (Def., p. 2), change the weapon from the right hand to the left (Def., p. 43),
and fire the shot that killed the deceased. Since one step brought him to the edge of the street and he ’had to
wheel to the right’ anyway (Def., p. 19), it would seem that during this interval he might have found time to
move farther to the right, passing around Townsend if necessary, in order to dodge the deceased. While the
latter was coming 9 or 10 feet, it should not have been impossible, and hardly difficult, for the accused to have
covered the distance necessary to place him out of the deceased’s path. If this case were being tried in any of
the Federal courts it would be necessary for the accused to show, in order to establish his plea of self-defense,
that he had retreated as far as he safely could, even though he was without fault and was in no danger of a
murderous attack. [125 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.) , p. 271-272. ] This is not the rule in all or perhaps a
majority of the State courts, but in view of the recent decision in United States v. Grafton 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 364) it
seems more than likely that the above rule would be followed in this jurisdiction. Besides, can it be said that
there was ’a reasonable necessity’ of shooting the deceased so long as the accused could escape?
"Finally, if the use of a firearm seemed necessary, could it not least have been employed in such a way that fatal
results might have been avoided? a shot directed at the menacing arm with the same unerring accuracy as that
actually fired would have stayed the threatened blow. A bullet in the leg or foot not less surely than that which
pierced the assailant’s heart would have halted him and still spared his life. But the accused directed his first ball
at a vital spot and although he saw that this ’took effect’ and that the deceased ’became helpless within a
second’ (Def., p. 43) he fired two additional shots (Def., pp. 11, 18, 28-44). This certainly did not indicate that the
accused was doing no more than was ’reasonably necessary to prevent or repel’ the attack. It demonstrates a
considerable degree of recklessness and, in spite of the witnesses who speak of his apparent ’coolness,’ that the
accused was in fact greatly excited. Human life is too sacred and the tendency to disregard it too common to
justify a court in finding that the destruction of it under such circumstances is wholly blameless.
"But although the accused has not established ’to the satisfaction of the court . . . reasonable necessity’ for
killing the deceased in order to save himself, he has made what the courts call an ’incomplete defense’ under
article 86 of the Penal Code (United States v. Mendoza, 2 Phil., Rep., 109; United States v. De Castro, 2 Phil. Rep.,
67), which entitles him to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees."cralaw virtua1aw library
We agree with the trial court that on a plea of self-defense under the provisions of case 4 of article 8 of the
Penal Code, an accused person is not entitled to exemption from criminal responsibility unless each and all the
following facts are established to the satisfaction of the court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First. That there was an unlawful aggression;
Second. That there was reasonable necessity for the employment of the means taken to prevent or resist such
unlawful aggression;

"Again if escape were impracticable, was it ’reasonably necessary’ for the accused to employ a firearm to repel Third. That there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
or prevent the threatened attack? The Supreme Court has held, in considering this section, that it is not
necessary to use revolver in order to repel an attack with a calicut (United States v. Mendoza, 2 Phil. Rep., 109), We think it affirmatively appears from the evidence of record that there was an unprovoked, illegal aggression
nor to inflict a mortal wound with a dagger when assailed with a bamboo club. (United States v. Castro, 2 Phil. on the part of the deceased, as held by the trial court, after a careful analysis of the testimony; and further that
Rep., 67.) there was reasonable necessity for the use of the means employed by the accused to defend himself from this
unlawful aggression.
"The bolo carried by the deceased is a formidable-looking weapon with a blade fourteen and a half inches in
length, but it is not a sharp-pointed instrument and the blade is almost blunt through rust and dullness. Indeed it The trial court held that in shooting and killing the deceased, the defendant adopted a mode of defense which
is more than doubtful whether, if applied with ordinary force against any portion of the accused’s body covered was not "reasonable necessary," because it was of opinion, first, that it was possible by taking to flight he might
by clothing, it would penetrate the latter. According to the testimony of the accused and his witnesses the have escaped injury, second, that he might have parried the blow aimed at him or wrested the bolo from his
deceased was hardly in condition to use the weapon with more than ordinary force. Following is the accused’s assailant without the necessity for the use of his revolver; and third, against his assailant, the accused might
description of the appearance of the deceased at the time (Def., p. 53):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph have successfully defended himself against the attack by directing his aim at the arm or hand with which the
bolo was held, or at the legs or feet of his assailant.
"‘He did not walk exactly straight, but he was not exactly staggering about; he was doing the same as any other
than man under the influence of liquor.’ We do not think that under all the circumstances in this case it was the duty of the defendant to take refuge in
flight. Without attempting to lay down a rule covering all the cases wherein it is the duty of one who is
"This is corroborated by Adams (Def., p. 4) and the tendera (p. 14), A man under the influence of liquor and unlawfully assailed to ’give ground" instead of resisting the attack, it is sufficient to hold, that under such
unable to walk straight cold hardly wield a weapon with full force or in such a manner that it could not be circumstances that assailed person need not attempt to retreat where there is no reasonable ground to believe
dodged. that by so doing he can safely avoid the threatened attack; not is he required to continue his retreat when there
is no reason able ground to believe that he can do so with safety. These prepositions fall within the rule of the
"Moreover the accused admits (Def., pp. 51, 79) — and it is a material circumstance [25 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Federal courts relied upon in the opinion of the trial court and applied by him to the facts in this case.
Law. (2 ed.) , 282] — that he was taller than the deceased and he is unable to say (Def., p. 52) that the latter was (Wheaton’s Criminal Law, 10th ed., p. 486, and many cases there cited; Bishop’s Criminal Law, 8th ed., secs. 864
taller the Lieutenant Soledad, who was then present in court. If not, the deceased must have been four or five and 869, and cases cited; Clark’s Criminal Law, p. 154, and cases cited.)

9
ART 11-13 CASES
 A murderous attack with a formidable-looking boo is a very different from an assault with a small chisel or a
The defendant was sitting on a beach in a narrow alleyway when the deceased started to advance upon him piece of bamboo, and the fact that this court has held that the taking of life was not reasonably necessary in
from a distance of from 9 to 12 feet, brandishing a formidable looking bolo." We do not think that under the defending oneself against assault in the latter cases does not sustain a ruling that taking the life of one’s
circumstances the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that he could safely make his escape by flight. assailant in the former case may not become reasonably necessary in the defense of one’s person, as we think it
In order to do so it was necessary that the defendant, in the second or two required by his assailant to advance was in the case at bar.
the couple of space which would bring him within striking distance, should recognize his danger, resolve upon
flight rather than resistance, rise from his seat, look backward only to discover that there were obstacles with Finally, if it be admitted that it was reasonably necessary to make use of the revolver, it would be unreasonable
made it impracticable to escape to the rear, step forward a few feet toward his approaching assailant, turn to to hold that in the shades of night the defendant, with his adversary advancing upon him and within a few feet
the right or to the left. on reaching the street, thus exposing his unprotected body to this assailant’s attack, and of striking distance, should be held responsible for a failure to take deliberate and careful aim at the arm or
finally distance his pursuer in flight. If the deceased was in fact endeavoring to reach the defendant and to strike hand that held the bolo or at the legs or the effect of his assailant. The reasonable and natural thing for him to
him with his bolo, it is very doubtful whether there was time to avoid the blow by instant flight; certainly the do under the circumstances was to fire at the body of his opponent, and thus make sure of his own life.
accused had reasonable grounds to believe that he could not hope to make his escape with safety; and even
though it were true that "he might have found time" to dodge the deceased" and make his escape by flight, yet It is suggested that since the first shot inflicted a fatal wound there was no necessity for the firing of the two
it is too much to ask of one who is in imminent peril of felonious and murderous attack that without reasonable succeeding shows in order to prevent or repel the attack. The record discloses that there shots were fired in
grounds to believe can safely do so, he should "give ground" rather than use any other more certain means to rapid succession. Not every wound which proves fatal is sufficient to stop an enemy’s attack, and the accused
defend himself which he may have at hand. and his assailant were so close at hand that until the assailant fell to the ground it can be said that the accused
was out of danger. Even a wounded man with a drawn bolo in his hand might prove to be no mean antagonist at
Nor can we agree with the opinion of the trial court that there was no reasonable necessity for the use of the close quarters.
revolver because the deceased was a smaller man than the accused and perhaps under the influence of liquor,
or because on examination. after the occurrence, it is discovered that the bolo in the hands of the deceased was The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the appellant acquitted of the crime with which he was charged,
"almost blunt through rust and dullness."cralaw virtua1aw library with the costs of both instances de oficio; and if in custody, he will be discharged forthwith, or if a liberty under
his bond will be cancelled and his sureties exonerated. ordered.
Mere physical superiority in no protection to an unarmed man, as against an assailant armed with a large bolo,
and if it be true that the deceased was under the influence of liquor when he made that attack, his intoxication Torres, Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
probably rendered him the more dangerous unless he was so drunk as to be physically helpless, which is not
suggested in the evidence. Arellano, C.J., dissents.

Nor does the fact that after the occurrence the blade of the bolo was found to be "almost blunt through rust and
dullness," and that it is "more than doubtful whether if applied with ordinary force against any portion of the
accused’s body covered by clothing it would penetrate the latter," justify the conclusion that there who no
reasonable necessity for the defendant’s use of the only weapon at land to resist the onslaught of his adversary.
Lying on the desk in the trial court, in the broad light of day, that bolo was, in the language of the trial court a
"formidable looking weapon, with a blade fourteen and a half inches in length;" the accused, in apparent
imminent danger of his life, court not reasonably be excepted to take the chance that mere ordinary force would
be used in striking, or that the blow would be given upon some protected part of his body, or that the cutting
edge of the blade was not keen enough to give him his death blow.

The findings of facts occurring in the cases cited in the opinion of the trial judge are not applicable in this case.
On a plea of self-defense the question as to the "reasonable necessity" for the use of the means employed is one
of fact to be determined in accordance with the particular facts proven in each case.

In the case of the United States v. Mendoza (2 Phil. Rep., 109), the court held that the character of the weapon EN BANC
in the hands of the aggressor, a calicut, was such that in our opinion the defendant could not have reasonably
believed that it was necessary to kill his assailant in order to repel the attack. A calicut is a comparatively G.R. No. L-35524 March 18, 1932
harmless weapon. It is an instrument shaped like a small chisel (escoplo) with no point or cutting edge on either
side, and is used for the purpose of taking out the contents of betel nuts or the like. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
In the case of the United States v. De Castro (2 Phil. Rep., 67) the accused inflicted a mortal wound with a dagger JULIAN SUMICAD, defendant-appellant.
and the court held that such means were not reasonably required or necessary to repel the attack, in view of the
fact it was made with nothing more than a piece of bamboo (una simple caña partida), a weapon insufficient to Felipe K. Medina for appellant.
put the life of the person attacked in imminent peril, more especial in consideration of the significance of the Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
attack itself, for, according to the witnesses, the blow struck by the deceased did not even bruise the accused.

10
ART 11-13 CASES
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Occidental
Misamis, finding the appellant, Julian Sumicad, guilty of the offense of homicide and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, and requiring him to indemnify the family of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000, as well as to pay the costs of prosecution.
On February 23, 1931, the accused, a resident of Buenavoluntad, in the municipality of Plaridel, Occidental
Misamis, was engaged with others in the gratuitous labor of hauling logs for the construction of a chapel in the
barrio above-mentioned. At about 5.30 o'clock in the afternoon on the day mentioned, when the laborers were
resting from the work of the day, one Segundo Cubol happened to pass the place where the accused was sitting.
Prior to this date the accused had rendered five and one-half days service to Cubol, and as the latter passed, the
accused said to him, "Segundo, pay me for the five and one-half days work for which you owe me." Cubol
replied, "What debt!," an exclamation which was followed by an insulting expression. At the same time he struck
the accused with his fist. The accused arose from the log upon which he was sitting and moved backward, trying
to escape, but Cubol pursued him and continued striking him with his fists. As the accused receded he found
himself cornered by a pile of logs, the wings of which extended out on either side, effectually preventing any
further retreat. As Cubol pressed upon him, the accused drew his bolo and delivered a blow on Cubol's right
shoulder. Upon this Cubol lunged at the accused with the evident intention of wresting the bolo from the
accused. To prevent this the accused struck two other blows with the bolo, inflicting two deep cuts on Cubol's
forehead above the left eye. One of these blows broke through the cranium. The other made a cut extending
from the left eyebrow to the nose and upper lip. Upon finding a seat on a log nearby. A witness, named
Francisco Villegas, who came up in a moment, after learning something about the matter, asked Cubol whether
he had struck the accused blows with his fist. Cubols replied that he had. The witness Villegas then turned to the
accused, who was standing a short distance away, and told him to put up his bolo and go to the poblacion.
Acting upon this suggestion the accused immediately repaired to the office of the justice of the peace and
surrendered himself to the authorities. Cubol lived only an hour or so, and died from the effect of the wounds
received. In one of the pockets of the deceased a knife was found, and the accused testified that, when he
struck the deceased with his bolo, the latter was attempting to draw a knife from his pocket.
The accused was 25 years of age when this case was tried, has a height of 5 feet and 1-½ inches, and weight of
105 pounds. The deceased appears to have been taller, larger and stronger man. The evidence shows that the
deceased was quarrelsome and in the habit of making frequent trouble by fighting in the places where he
happened to be present with others. In the local courts he had been convicted and sentenced to jail for assault
and battery in two different cases. In another case he was convicted of the offense of inflicting minor physical
injuries, being sentenced to imprisonment for one month and one day. In still another case he had been
convicted of theft and sentenced to imprisonment for the same period of one month and one day. The proof
leaves no reason to doubt that the deceased was hot-tempered and that he had the reputation of being a
trouble maker. It is a safe inference from this proof — and there is nothing to the contrary, — that the deceased
was with good reason considered by his neighbors to be a dangerous man.
From the facts above stated it is evident that the quarrel which resulted in the death of Segundo Cubol was of
his own making, and that the accused was not materially to blame in bringing about the trouble. Two of the
elements of self-defense were therefore clearly present, namely, that the deceased was the aggressor and that
there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The only further question that can therefore
arise in discussion the criminal liability of the accused is whether there was reasonable necessity for the means
employed by him to prevent or repel the aggression to which he was subjected. Upon this point it will be noted
that, when the aggression was begun by the deceased, the accused retreated until he was cornered in the angle
of a pile of logs. His further retreat was this effectually cut off both in the rear and at the sides. In response to
the blows which the deceased delivered with his fists, the accused first delivered a cut on the left shoulder of
the deceased; but, if we rightly interpret the transcript of the record on this point , the sanitary officer who
exclaimed the body of the deceased meant to say that this wound alone could not have resulted in death. This
ART 11-13 CASES
we consider to be the decisive turning point in the case. Upon receiving that cut the deceased should have been
admonished that further aggression on his part would be met by determined resistance and that any further
advance would be at grave peril to himself. Instead of acting upon this warning, the deceased pressed forward in
the attempt to possess himself of the bolo, the only means of defense then at the command of the accused.
Under these circumstances what might the accused have been reasonably expected to do. Was he to surrender
the weapon to his assailant, a larger and stronger man than himself, who was now infuriated by the blood that
had been drawn from his shoulder? Or was he justified in keeping the weapon in his hands and, as an ultimate
resort, in using it as a means for his own defense? Our reply is that he was justified in pursuing the latter
alternative; for it would probably have been an act of suicide to permit that weapon to pass into the hands of his
assailant. In judging a question of this kind the reputation of the deceased for violence is pertinent, for it tends
to show that when the fatal blows were struck the accused had reasonable grounds for believing that he was in
grave peril to life or limb.
It is undoubtedly well established in jurisprudence that a man is not, as a rule, justified in taking the life of one
who assaults him with his fist only, without the use of a dangerous weapon. The person assaulted must, in such
case, either resist with the arms that nature gave him or with other means of defense at his disposal, short of
taking life. But that rule contemplates the situation where the contestants are in the open and the person
assaulted can exercise the option of running away. It can have no binding force in the case where the person
assaulted has retreated to the wall, as the saying is, and uses in a defensive way the only weapon at his disposal.
One is not required, when hard pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to the extent of the injury which a reckless
and infuriated assailant might probably inflict upon him (Browell vs. People, 38 Mich., 732). And it was not
incumbent on the accused in this case, when assailed by a bully of known violent disposition, who was larger
and stronger than himself. On the contrary, under the circumstances stated, he had the right to resist the
aggression with the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it must be considered to have been given
in justifiable self-defense. Upon this point it may be recalled that the deceased, when asked about the
circumstances of the homicide, admitted that he himself was the aggressor; and it is noteworthy that he used no
word placing blame upon the accused.
We are of the opinion that all the elements necessary to constitute justifiable self-defense were present in this
case and the accused should have been acquitted.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed and the appellant absolved from the information, with
costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real and Imperial, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the
battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts, however,
she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and
unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
11
 Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This psychological paralysis she
suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered
that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on parole, because
she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this
case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and
none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue
slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
ART 11-13 CASES
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain,
spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and
meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3,
1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of the facts in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived
with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived
with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay
Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had
two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching his. When they
arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went
inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to
place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas rented
house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That
was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house appeared
uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50)
meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant
likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no
money to buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw
appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking
her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented
house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph
noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from his house
being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but the house was
locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a
borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to
reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was
coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was
12
only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to
the mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified
the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel,
Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares,
SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom
where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape
of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and
six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a
red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back
of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been
dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo
yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that the
cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a
depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she got
worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday. With her
cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find
him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants
request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored
him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently disappointed with her
reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to
keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for
help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed
clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards
a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he
got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing
him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to
pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly distorted
the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had
graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and
ART 11-13 CASES
was working, at the time of her husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple
had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were
classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their relationship, but Ben
was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her
constant partner at fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel,
Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple
would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic married.
He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would
inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had
shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his
father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty
bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in 1986 or
1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage went along, Marivic became already very
demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3)
misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second
incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead using a sharp instrument until
the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third
incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens
hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we collected our salary, we
went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks
and drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to
wait for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers
was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about
9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently
overheard by him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am
innocent. Basobas thought they were joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted
that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before
when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always take
her back after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been quarreling. He
said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
13
 6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She
said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat
her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her
and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten,
she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the
injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every
time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence
she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995,
he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through the open jalousies,
he saw the spouses grappling with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had
come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his
neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window of his hut which
is located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was
holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to
extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing
that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house
was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be living together for
13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items
and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was
so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while Ben was alive he used to
gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, Teody because that was what he
used to call me, mokimas ta, which means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben
would box his wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed
to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben
had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of
November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in the market
place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic
wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband. When they
got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was already there and
was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his staggering walking and I can also detect his face.
Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as
that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to
sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time
when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her room and
they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife through the
window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination,
she said that when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
ART 11-13 CASES
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte.
Marivic was his patient many times and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that
from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic.
These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all
the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were
directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the
psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2)
months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help to settle or
confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning,
but he did not hear from her again and assumed that they might have settled with each other or they might
have forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive
towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their
quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for
Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and
got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was
leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo,
Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know what
happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo;
and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer
when he saw that she had packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor
emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some
defense witnesses during the trial.
14
 10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the
incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the
examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took
the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and
when she got there, she saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a
blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the head which
she described as a fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did
not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of
PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly
weapon x x x which caused his death.
12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12
November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L.
Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus
sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000,
Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as
a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of
her own, were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of
undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief
Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records
Office, wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19
February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court
allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed
her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists.
ART 11-13 CASES
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic
pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem
findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivics URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter
to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona,
RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra.
Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical
interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic
and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head of the
Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de
Manila University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College.
She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling],
Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological
Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of
the International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology
Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine
Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first
case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of
families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10)
years and discovered that there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic
violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse,
and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a
self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of themselves and so when
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the
violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said
that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from broken homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low opinion of himself. But then
emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and
very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like
15
gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent. The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional
family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their
parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty,
self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her husband will
change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in
another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence on both of them. She said that in a
normal marital relationship, abuses also happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening
day in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and
even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her opinion that
Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at
times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as
a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the
past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal
separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of herself as a
victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and testified
before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry
and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38)
years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he
gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from
government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the
University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon
City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the
Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored The Mental Health
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a
medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate
(siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
ART 11-13 CASES
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with
the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a
doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit
involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent
family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial
intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a
consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is physical
abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such
that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the
vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence
may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is
stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is
very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real,
although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is
irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-
world is damaged.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness, such as the deprivation of
the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him
within the environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the
time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without
thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who
administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot
control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and primarily
with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a
hospital x x x because that abound in the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached
the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.
16
 xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and
seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband
Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said that we are trying to explain
scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and
probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her
mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in
accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were
elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly
defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his
head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse;
and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants Motion, remanding the
case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered
woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as
well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical
psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their
testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court
before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
ART 11-13 CASES
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence
adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that
she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased
witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in
concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were
indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the existence
of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and in
defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of
the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in
the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case. In any
event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on
the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona
summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and
of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page
discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may
17
not agree with the trial judges conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that child. Any reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final
he failed to reflect on the evidence presented. resolution of the case.

Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty manner. The First Legal Issue:
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13
hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken
against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which he handled
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of
the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his constitutional
her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed
obligation.[15]
justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-
defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally the defense.[22]
married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The Battered Woman Syndrome
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a
spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new
the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the
in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or,
trial court if such proof is not objected to.
at the least, incomplete self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state of mind of a person who has
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellants deceased spouse -- been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.[24]
attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies.
Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only when
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
made.[19] Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made
least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
through a palpable mistake.
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.[25]

Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens death -- whether by a
gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000
Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting
his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is
unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the victims death. Determining
which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense
of battered woman syndrome, for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then
the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing
jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his
personal character, especially his past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellants children. As
correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary
to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented appellant
from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for not requiring them to
testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her
subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the
home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to
accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of
violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or
another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be
abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence
exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and passive
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful,
and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing
tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally.
But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and
abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering
incident.[29]

18
ART 11-13 CASES
 The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, Q What will happen when he follow you?
death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he said sorry.
no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband, were
explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with you able to see a doctor?
him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition. A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may later A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the xxxxxxxxx
batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent A Yes, sir.
bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30] Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During
A Yes, sir.
this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender
xxxxxxxxx
and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for
[Court] /to the witness
it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the
A Everytime he got drunk.
better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she loves.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after your
marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. A Everytime he got drunk.
Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. A Three times a week.
Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically. A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me. [32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans psyche. In this phase, foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?
her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner may believe A Yes, sir.
that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
without the other.[31] A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
History of Abuse A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending
physician: Dr. Lucero;
in the Present Case 2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She 4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
herself described her heart-rending experience as follows: 5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
ATTY. TABUCANON 6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa? Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that correct?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior of habitual A Yes, sir.
drinker. Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what way was A Yes, sir.
this abusive and cruelty manifested to you? Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you mean by
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the bed and abrasion furuncle left axilla?
sometimes beat me. A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force is applied.
Q How many times did this happen? Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A Several times already. A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you? Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other. A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home? tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
A He is following me, after that he sought after me. Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

19
ART 11-13 CASES
xxxxxxxxx A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Were you able to talk with the patient? Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, severe.
Q What did she tell you? Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that it was A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
done to her by her husband. Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he
Q You mean, Ben Genosa? had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to him with
A Yes, sir. bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
xxxxxxxxx Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa
ATTY. TABUCANON: house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of November, 1995 sleep over, she was awakened about ten oclock at night, because the couple were very noisy and I heard
when this incident happened? something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben showed
A As per record, yes. up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
Q What was the date? On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were
A It was on November 6, 1995. unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when
A Yes, sir. she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant? On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the
A Yes, sir. couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she? out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
A Eight (8) months pregnant. ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy? Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Yes, sir. A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded the service
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for some other bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father, then my
findings? second child said, he was not home yet. I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy. gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined? Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days? Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A One day. A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q Where? Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital. A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx Q Did you come back to your house?
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her personally A Yes, sir.
on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant. Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
What is this all about? A Bilwang.
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record here, Q Is this your house or you are renting?
also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times. A Renting.
Q For what? Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A Tension headache. A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension? Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response when the A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I had fears
medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature. that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature? me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of giving the Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
domestic problem. Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
Q You mean problem in her household? A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.
A Probably. Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor? A Yes, 8 months.
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is unfortunately does Q How advance was your pregnancy?
not response to the medication. A Eight (8) months.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused? Q Was the baby subsequently born?

20
ART 11-13 CASES
A Yes, sir. ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time? Q Where did he bring you?
A Marie Bianca. A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you might as
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband? well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.
A Yes, sir. Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
Q What time? A Yes, sir.
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior. Q What is there in the drawer?
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition? A I was aware that it was a gun.
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior. COURT INTERPRETER:
Q What was he yelling all about? (At this juncture the witness started crying).
A His usual attitude when he got drunk. ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any? Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him. A Yes, sir.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know? Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might be overly A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he
drunk and he would beat me again. did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any? he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch off the smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
light and I said to him, why did you switch off the light when the children were there. At that time I was also myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was
attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his about to vomit.
challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching COURT INTERPRETER:
television. (The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
Q What did he do with the bolo? xxxxxxxxx
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V. ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q What else happened after he cut the wire? Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already holding A Outside.
the bolo. Q In what part of the house?
Q How do you described this bolo? A Dining.
A 1 1/2 feet. Q Where were the children during that time?
Q What was the bolo used for usually? A My children were already asleep.
A For chopping meat. Q You mean they were inside the room?
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo? A Yes, sir.
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room. Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you? does it look like?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside. A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you? Q Is it a flexible blade?
A I screamed for help and then he left. A Its a cutter.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside? Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going? Q How did he do it?
A Outside perhaps to drink more. A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time? Q With the same blade?
A I packed all his clothes. A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes? In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in
A I wanted him to leave us. understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions? about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged follows:
me again of the bedroom holding my neck. Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in laymans term describe to this
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you? Court what her life was like as said to you?
COURT INTERPRETER: A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional anguish.
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck) There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband
A And he dragged me towards the door backward. had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband

21
ART 11-13 CASES
was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight
and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of
taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was
saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very
depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in
and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put
forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three hours,
what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information were
escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the case or at
least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of battering their
wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering their
wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband
followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the first time
that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I also
believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to
suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person who
had lost shes not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional
battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find out
about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate or x x x
[will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the data that Im
gathering from her are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report,[42] which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the
ART 11-13 CASES
first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy --
until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x
x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his
wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became
physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk.
It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a drinking
[spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling
ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more frequent and more
severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary,
reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has
aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it?
The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of
requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why
does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted
with the so-called battered wife syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an
ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe
beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar
experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about battered
women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had a
significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in
which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the
cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively
in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no means of escape. [46] In her years of
research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in
greater danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence
would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the
violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
22
 According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an
abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that she provoked the violence,
that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the
only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits
involving violent family relations, having evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes
within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As such, he got
involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on the woman would
sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a
form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered
persons may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute
battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping responses to the trauma at the
expense of the victims ability to muster an active response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x
the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that
even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to respond to
that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the
individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he
truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions
concerning the situation. Battered women dont attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem
to outsiders that escape is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they
or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of
her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape. [55] Battered women
feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is
available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also
because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant,
due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with
the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a
conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential
characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a
quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building
phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However,
that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at
least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did
Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the
situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
ART 11-13 CASES
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply
mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask
for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common
abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe
that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and
well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship?
Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would
clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were
able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman
usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or
spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds
of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had
related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in
order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials
of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is
the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent
harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face
a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.[64] In the present case,
however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
23
 unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from hisQ You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress
violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer
in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head,
banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and based on past stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual,
violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to
then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only
already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder byQ But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior
to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
required imminence of danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may
be appreciated.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.[67] In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of theA The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a severe emotional
victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances. instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will
be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that
would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigateA The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer than six (6)
her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become chronic. It is
issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties. [69] stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering
but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic
personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with her
husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological resistance andQ But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her
husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state ofA Yes, your Honor.
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of repetitious pain
taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity and the prolongedA Of course obfuscated.[73]
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he said:
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in cumulative
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness? provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis, and
difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering. Third, the
prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the psychological and Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness that
constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support available to the victim. If diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her
nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder.... acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to
paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor
xxxxxxxxx and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]

24
ART 11-13 CASES
 In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably. Only the
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state of following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by priorQ You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. [77] To appreciate thisCOURT:
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produceThe witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerableA And he dragged me towards the door backward.
length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78] ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his beingA Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be
killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which killed so there will be nobody to nag me
he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt onQ So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
her life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79]His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at theA Yes, sir.
lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason.Q What is there in the drawer?
Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental state continued. AccordingA I was aware that it was a gun.
to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her babyCOURT INTERPRETER
were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she(At this juncture the witness started crying)
took the weapon and used it to shoot him. ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of time
[80] Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony that
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it because he did
with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim
not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at the time. She cannot
was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the
control re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the trauma that she suffered. She thinks of
drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I
nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances,
smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
must have been what Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was
normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
about to vomit.
obfuscation.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and xxxxxxxxx
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts. Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does
it look like?
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the batteryA Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted inQ It is a flexible blade?
her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power withoutA Its a cutter.
depriving her of consciousness of her acts. Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on herQ How did he do it?
prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was deemedA He wanted to cut my throat.
by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturallyQ With the same blade?
produced passion and obfuscation on her part. A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
Second Legal Issue: ATTY. TABUCANON:
Treachery Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods orA Yes, because I smashed him.
forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party mightQ What happened?
make.[81] In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably asA Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other room.
the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in theQ What else happened?
appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved asA When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
conclusively as the killing itself.[83] Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon my blood pressure.
appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been COURT INTERPRETER:
found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how
25
ART 11-13 CASES
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same time pointed at the back
of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about to
die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the
victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that
when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression
from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have
been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk
from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the present
appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself
from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun
occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of
any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the
crime in order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph
5[88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable, considering that
two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other
modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in
degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion
temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already
served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple
to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how to apply
the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -
- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and proper
resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here and abroad in order to
understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically abused person.
Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina
Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
ART 11-13 CASES
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law,
jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code.
Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the
offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of
the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible
for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43588 November 7, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD LUAGUE and WENCESLAO ALCANSARE, defendants-appellants.
Vicente E. Calanog for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The spouses Wenceslao Alcansare and Natividad Luague having been charged with homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros and sentenced, the former to the penalty of from eight years and one day
of prision mayor, as the minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum, with the accessories of the law, and the latter to that of from six years and one day of prision mayor,
as the minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum, with the accessory
penalties of the law, both to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Paulino Disuasido in the sum of one
thousand pesos, with costs, appealed to this court for a review of the judgment rendered against them, praying
that the same reversed and that they be acquitted.
26
Upon examination of the appeal, it appears: that in the morning of February 18, 1935, while the accused
Natividad Luague was in her house situated in Lupuhan, barrio of Agpañgi, municipality of Calatrava, Occidental
Negros, with only her three children of tender age for company, her husband and co-accused Wenceslao
Alcansare having gone to grind corn in Juan Garing's house several kilometers away, Paulino Disuasido came and
began to make love to her; that as Natividad could not dissuade him from his purpose, she started for the
kitchen where Paulino followed her, notwithstanding her instance that she could by no means accede to his
wishes, for Paulino, bent on satisfying them at all costs, drew and opened a knife and, threatening her with
death, began to embrace her and to touch her breasts; that in preparing to lie with her, Paulino had to leave the
knife on the floor and the accused, taking advantage of the situation, picked up the weapon and stabbed him in
the abdomen; and that Paulino, feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through the window and falling on
some stones, while the accused set forth immediately for the poblacion to surrender herself to the authorities
and report the incident.
Natividad Luague's act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido, unaided her husband and co-accused Wenceslao
Alcansare, and in the circumstances above set out, constitutes the exempting circumstance defined in article 11,
subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code, because, as stated by a commentator of note, "aside from the right to
life on which rest the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to party acquired by us, and the right
to honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony." (1 Viada, 172, 173, 5th edition.) "Will the attempt to
rape a woman constitute an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense?" asks the same
commentator. "We think so," he answer, "inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as
precious, if not more, cannot her very existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed
susceptible of judicial redress, in an outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim, for, as the Roman
Law says: quum virginitas, vel castitas, corupta restitui non protest (because virginity or chastity, once defiled,
cannot be restored). It is evident that a woman who, imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be
afforded exemption from criminal liability provided by this article and subsection since such killing cannot be
considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great
an outrage." (1 Viada, 301, 5th edition.)
Similar to the present question was the one determined the Supreme Court of Spain in a decision of February
21, 1911: "This court in due homage to the principles of morality and in strict observance of the provision of law
justly interpreted, has always held that one of the rights referred to in article 8, subsection 4, of the Penal Code,
is that which assists a woman in defense of her honor when an attempt is made to repel the aggression or to
avoid in time the imminent danger of its consummation; and in view of this, it must be conceded upon the
findings of the trial court, that the accused Maria Sanchez Cañistro acted in legitimate self-defense, because the
conduct of Diego Cardenas, who made love to her, in blowing in at midnight, knocking at the door and
demanding admittance and against Maria's refusal, insisting in his purpose and threatening to break open the
door, in the light of prior events and the circumstances of the case, implies the imminence of an affront against
honor, involving an actual and certain danger to the person so threatened, while at the same time the fact that
she was alone that no help was forthcoming; her founded fear that the door might give way and the dreaded
evil wrought, her consequent helplessness on the advent of that crisis, and her natural desire to attest openly
her conjugal fidelity by foiling all suspicious aspersions, show the reasonableness of the defensive measures
availed of by her and warrant her complete exemption from liability, inasmuch as, aside from all these, it does
not appear from the decision that said accused had previously committed any act deserving of censure or
marring the just motive which obviously induced her to repel, as she did, a violence unprovoked by her. Thus
viewed, all the requisites of the exempting circumstance above mentioned are present and should be taken into
consideration, etc." (1 Viada, 304, 5th edition.)
The theory the prosecution, which we consider a trifle unsubstantial is as follows: The accused Wenceslao
Alcansare, thinking that Paulino importuned his wife with unchaste advances, out of jealousy, decided to get rid
of him. His chance to bring about his plan can when, in the morning of the crime, Paulino happened to pass in
front of the house of the spouses with his friend Olimpio Libosada. The accused wife invited Paulino to drop in,
which the letter and his friend did. The spouses met them at the threshold. The accused wife asked Paulino
ART 11-13 CASES
whether he had a knife and as the latter answered in the affirmative, she asked him to lend it to lend it to her
because she wanted to cut her nails, to which Paulino willingly acceded, while the accused wife was cutting her
nails, she asked Paulino where he came from and the latter answered, turning his head around, that he came
from the house of one Inting, whereupon the accused wife slashed him in the abdomen. Paulino tried to return
the blow but the accused husband picked up a stone and struck him in the forehead. Wounded in the abdomen
and in the forehead, Paulino fled therefrom.
The government presented three witnesses to establish this theory. Pablo Alvarez, barrio lieutenant of
Cabuñgahan, testified that on his way to "communal" the day before the crime, he met the accused wife who
told him that she had wanted to see him and ask his help because her husband, who was jealous of Paulino, was
maltreating her and he was furthermore resolved to assault Paulino at sight. On the following day, Alvarez, in his
way to Bacacay, dropped in the house of the accused spouses to inquire whether they had tobacco seeds and, as
they answered him in the negative, he went his way. He had hardly left the place when Paulino and Olimpio
arrived, the accused wife inviting the former to drop in. Paulino and Olimpio went to the threshold of the house
and the accused spouses, in turn, went down, and the four engaged in a conversation which, to Alvarez, seemed
a friendly one. The witness left and when he returned to the place sometime later, he was informed that Paulino
had been stabbed.
The accused were from the barrio of Agpañgi and not from Cabuñgahan where the witness was the barrio
lieutenant. Had the accused wife gone to complain against the alleged conduct of her husband, she would have
sought the lieutenant of Agpañgi, her barrio. The accused wife, by reporting the incident directly to the
municipal authorities without seeking the intervention of any barrio lieutenant, showed that she knew where to
go in a difficulty.
Were it true that the accused husband, prompted by jealousy, designed to do away with Paulino, it would have
been because he observed that his wife somehow returned Paulino's attentions, for otherwise he would not
have indulge in tragic cogitations. From any point of view, however, it is quite incomprehensible why the wife
would take upon herself and the husband would charge her with, the execution of the plan. The observation is
no less true if the spouses plotted in common for it would have been patently disgraceful and cowardly of the
husband to thrust its execution upon the wife at the hazard of her life, and liberty to shield his own, in the event
of prosecution; and there is the husband was thus minded. Under the theory of the prosecution, whether the
accused husband doubted his wife's fidelity or was sure of it, in connection with Paulino's attentions, the natural
thing in either case would be for him, unaided by his wife, to avenge the affront or punish the offender. In the
case at bar, we must assume that, if the motive attributed to him by the prosecution were true, the accused
would have acted, as would the great majority of men in identical circumstances.
The witness Alvarez, himself testified that he was informed the day before by the wife of the accused husband
that the latter would get even with Paulino at the first opportunity. The witness saw them together in the
morning of the crime and he should have surmised that the announced tragedy might take place. Rather than
foil it, as an agent of the law, if for no other reason, he went his way unconcerned, as if nothing serious was
impending.
We find his conduct, or that which he claims to have followed, so extremely strange to be considered true.
When the truth is beyond our reach, as is often the case, we have to be contented with the probable. This is the
basis of the so-called presumptions of fact. The acts which this witness claims to have done are so out of
ordinary conduct of men as to be devoid of probability. Occasionally, indeed, there are those who behave
strangely, but this is the exception and not the rule.
In addition to this, the theory of the prosecution that the accused husband and his wife had conspired to kill
Paulino is overcome by the very facts which the prosecution itself has attempted to prove. If such conspiracy
had really existed, the accused spouses would have been fully prepared to carry it into execution, because
rational beings differ from those who are not in that when they embark on anything, they make the s equal to its
27
realization. However, these amused, on the on, had neither a rusty bolo nor an outworn club to cope with
Paulino. The weapon with which Paulino was first wounded was his own knife which, according to the
prosecution, the accused wife had to borrow from him on the pretext that she wanted to cut her nails, and later
a stone which the accused husband casually picked up from the ground. Yarns of this kind make good material
for fables.
Angel Emia, the other government witness who testified at the trial that he saw the crime attributed to the two
accused by the prosecution, made a previous statement wherein he disclaimed knowledge of who had stabbed
Paulino. Required to explain the contradiction, he bungled in his attempt. The trial judge erred in giving him
credit. Olimpio Libosada, another government witness, likewise affirmed that he had seen all that bad
transpired, claiming that he then accompanied Paulino, It seem strange, however, that in the two statements
made by Paulino before his death he did not state that he was accompanied by Libosada or by any other person
in the morning of the crime. It likewise happens that the conduct of this witness, according to his own
testimony, appears to be inconsistent because he did nothing to defend and help Paulino, his friend and
companion, in that most critical moment, and did not report the crime to the authorities, disappearing from the
scene all of a sudden with a very frivolous excuse that "he was afraid to be implicated". Furthermore, after
discarding the testimony of Angel Emia, there is nothing to corroborate that of Olimpio Libosada which, by its
inherent weakness, cannot be alone and unsubstantiated by other reliable incriminatory circumstances, support
a judgment of conviction.lawphil.net
As to the two statements, Exhibit C and D, styled, ante mortem by the Solicitor-General, the trial court properly
disregarded because them there is no evidence of record that Paulino had made them under a sense of
impending death and with no hope of recovery.
The trial judge gave unusual importance to the testimony of the two policemen who testified that they made an
ocular inspection of the scene of the crime and found no bloodstain in the kitchen of the house of the accused
spouses. This, according to the trial judge, destroys the theory of the defense that Paulino was stabbed in said
kitchen by the accused wife when he tried to lie with her through intimidation and violence. We are of the
opinion that the trial judge erred on this point as he did on others. It appears that the said policemen did not
also find any bloodstain on the threshold of the house of the accused spouses where, according to the
prosecution, the aggression took place. Therefore, said testimony contradicts the defense no less than it does
the prosecution.
In resume, we are of the opinion that we should, as we do hereby hold that the accused Natividad Luague in
wounding Paulino Disuasido to death, acted in legitimate self-defense, and that the other accused Wenceslao
Alcansare had no participation in said act; wherefore, reversing the appealed judgment, we hereby acquit both
accused, and order their immediate release, if in confinement, with costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41674 March 30, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Silvino Lopez de Jesus for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
ART 11-13 CASES
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, finding the defendant guilty of
homicide and sentencing her to suffer not more than fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporaland not less than eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Francisco Rivera in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
I. El Juzgado a quo, erro al dar absoluto credito a las pruebas de la acusacion, las que son insuficientes para
apoyar una declaracion de conviccion.
II. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que los celos fueron el motivo que impulso a la acusada al agredir al occiso
Francisco Rivera.
III. El Juzgado a quo al declarar increible el testimonio de la acusada en esta causa.
IV. Y el Juzgado a quo erro al no absolver a la acusada.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida
Vistada; his sister, Baltazara Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of
the defendant and asked her to go with them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the house of
Maria Inguit. About nine o'clock the defendant and her friends started home. They were followed about five
minutes later, according to Enrique Bautista, by the deceased Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in
the house where the wake was held. He was accompanied by Enrique Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook
defendant's party. When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time the
members of the defendant's party were walking in single file. Baltazara Ramos was in the lead and the
defendant was the hindmost. She was about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco
Ramos, the only one of defendant's companions that was called to testify, heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios
mio". He went back and found that Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. The wounded
man was taken to the hospital, where he died the next afternoon.
Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place where Francisco Rivera
was. He found and that Enrique Bautista was with the wounded man, and the defendant had started back
towards the house of mourning. He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house of
Maria Inguit, Remedios de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco Rivera because
he embraced her.
The case for the prosecution rests upon the testimony of Enrique Bautista. According to him the defendant
waited on the right side of the path near some guava trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right
hand when he arrived in front of her; that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant turned
around and returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya). He further
testified that the defendant stabbed the deceased before either of them had said anything; that the distance
between him and the deceased was about one foot; that he did not see any of the companions of the defendant
after they reached the path and had to walk one behind the other.
The defendant on the other hand testified that after they had passed a fork in the trail and reached a narrow
part a man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and
seized her in her private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that
when she felt weak and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her pocket,
opened it, and stabbed him in defense of her honor. She further testified that the man who attacked her did not
28
say anything; that she asked him who he was but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for
help, saying "Madre mia; Dios mio"; that when she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her nearest
companion; that when she was face to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize
his face in the darkness and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera.
Her testimony as to what occurred is as follows:
P. ¿Y que paso siendo usted la ultima de entre sus compañeros? — R. Despues de pasar nosotros en una
bifurcacion de los caminos cuando llegabamos en una parte estrecha el occiso subitamente me abrazo por
detras cogiendome los pechos y basandome.
P. ¿Y entonces que hizo usted cuando usted sintio ese abrazo y beso? — R. todavia me agarro en mi parte
genital y en eso yo trataba de desasirme de el; el me siguio abrazando cogiendome de los pechos y basandome,
y yo a mi vez seguia tratando de desasirme de el insistentemente.
P. ¿Y que sucedio? — R. Cuando yo trataba de desasirma de el, el me siguio abrazando y yo a mi vez seguia
tratandome de desassirme de el y el llego a agarrarme en la parte genital y trato de lanzarme.
P. ¿Y que hizo usted cuando le trataba de lanzarle a usted el occiso? — R. Yo procuraba desasirme de el y cuando
me quede debilitada y ya no podia hacer nada contra la fuerza de el yo saque de mo bolsillo un cortaplumas.
P. ¿Y que hizo usted del cortaplumas? — R. Lo abri porque cuando ya no podia hacer nada y estaba y a debil yo
hice lo que debia hacer en defensa de mi pudor, le apuñale.
She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife in question was in a pocket of
the overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off with her friends without having an opportunity of
changing her clothes.
We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the
darkness ("Apenas se podia ver a alguien en esa obscuridad."); that he did not see any of the companions of the
defendant.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased had been making love to the defendant, and also to another girl
named Felicisima Sincaban; but the finding of the trial judge that Francisco Rivera and the defendant were
engaged, that she was madly in love with him and was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban is not sustained
by the evidence of record.
The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and undoubtedly
could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In other words she desisted as soon as he released
her.
The evidence shows that an officer of the Constabulary went to see the injured man about eleven o'clock that
night in the hospital, but it does not appear that Rivera told him anything about the circumstances under which
he had been stabbed.
The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old. We do not
believe her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is to be noted that almost immediately after the incident in
question took place, the appellant said she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. It is not
ART 11-13 CASES
improbable that she was reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit the
details of what had occurred.
We are convinced from a study of the record that the deceased did in fact grab hold of the defendant on the
night in question, and whether he intended to rape her or not, taking into consideration that it was a dark night
and that the deceased grabbed her from behind without warning and without making himself known and
refused to say who he was, and in the struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was
unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, we are of the opinion that she was justified in making use
of the pocket-knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means
of defending herself.
In the case of the United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488), this court held that a person is not criminally
responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were
as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time,
provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
The appellant claims to have cried for help, but so far as the record shows her cries were not heard by any of her
companions. Whether she did in fact cry for help, as claimed by her, or failed to do so because of the
suddenness with which the deceased grabbed her and the fright which it naturally caused, taking into
consideration the circumstances of the case, we still think she is exempt from criminal liability. In the case of the
United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos (22 Phil., 249), this court held that a woman in defense of her honor is
justified in inflicting wounds or her assailant with a bolo which she happens to be carrying, even though her cry
for assistance might have been heard by people near by.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant is acquitted, with the
costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Abad Santos, Imperial, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.
Jose Ma. Recto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee..
DE JOYA, J.:
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for the crime of
murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide
and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-
half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.
29
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern
Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate defense of her honor
and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances that (a) she did
not have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed, and that (b) she voluntarily
surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the following
facts:
That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the barrio of
Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of the deceased by
defendant and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been courting the latter in vain,
and that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief
belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and spoke to
her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her
breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and
kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when she informed her mother about it.
Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and
surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of
abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought them to her side.
Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed the hand of Nicolas
Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat Amado, her
husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not realize what he was doing. Nicolas
Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning.
Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as
Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control
himself.
In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely boasting in
the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked him to elope with her
and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that Avelina again received information of
Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of
the Seventh Day Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the provincial road from his
house, to attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar with the other officials of the
organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were
electric lights.
ART 11-13 CASES
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the
purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door. Amado
Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado
Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without saying a word,
Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this
highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and
honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her dress,
with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly
grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting
upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on
one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter
still holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him Avelina
said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio
lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and asked her why she did
that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take
care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate,
barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home immediately,
to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That
father and daughter went home and locked themselves up, following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and
waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10
o'clock that night, and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered
the knife marked as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel
and of the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already stated above, and went with said policemen to
the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which were presented as a part of the
evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is universal. It has
been entertained and has existed in all civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents the
only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the
defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means
available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of justice have entertained and
upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days of
chivalry. There is a country where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in their public
gardens, they always receive the protection of all. That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own person, we
have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of our patrimony
(1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate
defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her very
existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be
afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it
became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th
ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of
her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9 o'clock, in an isolated
30
barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind, without warning and without revealing his identity, and, in the
struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free herself by means of her
strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in repelling what she believed to be
an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she had no other means of defending herself, and
consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a bolo
which she happened to be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might have been heard by
people nearby, when the deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while she was going from her
house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases (United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil.,
249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm, and,
believing that some person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and receiving no reply,
attacked and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it was held that, notwithstanding the woman's belief in
the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or aggression to justify her completely in using deadly
weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the beginning of an attempt against her, she was not completely
warranted in making such a deadly assault, as the injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-law
returning home with his wife, did not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her
honor (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her house
late at night on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the purpose of
raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for help, she could have
been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above..
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case, when the
deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the barrio chapel and
placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with
electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own
father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there
was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base
of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few
moments later, the means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the
facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability..
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to the
barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the incident, and
agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the said barrio
lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she
had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and
upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control,
should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted to
punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single
wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor (United States vs.
Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).
ART 11-13 CASES
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the
defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to
religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant
had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She
happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of our country girls,
who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the
faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.
The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; and so is
the first assignment of error to a certain degree.
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina, in
the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the
crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three mitigating
circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of
article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to be
imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and appellant should
be accorded the most liberal consideration possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United
States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be reduced by
two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the
provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
herein defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in
its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently, with the modification of
judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and
one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant
and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked
Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered..
Ozaeta, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G. R. No. 120646 - February 14, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. APOLINAR DANDO, Accused-Appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Siniloan, Laguna finding PO3 Apolinar E.
Dando ("accused-appellant") guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about 6:19 o'clock in the evening of November 20, 1991 at Barangay M. Pandeño, Municipality of
Siniloan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while
31
conveniently armed with a deadly weapon (cal. 45) with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot several times one CESAR
CASTRO y VALMONTE with the said weapon, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his
body which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the surviving heirs of the victim.
That the qualifying and aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength attended the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On the same date, accused-appellant filed a motion for inhibition and for a change of venue of the case because
several staff members of Branch 33, RTC of Laguna were related to the victim. On February 12, 1992, Judge
Venancio M. Tarriela, the Presiding Judge of said branch, granted the motion.2 On May 14, 1992, this Court
approved the change of venue and designated Judge Jose C. Mendoza of Branch 26, RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, to
try and decide the case.3
Accused-appellant filed a petition for bail4 which was denied after hearing on the ground that the evidence
against accused-appellant is strong.5 Accused-appellant then went to the Court of Appeals via petition
for certiorari questioning the denial of his petition for bail.
Subsequently, on account of another motion for inhibition,6 filed by accused-appellant alleging that a
prosecution witness in the hearing for the petition for bail was related to a staff member of Branch 26, the case
was re-raffled and transferred to Branch 28, RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, presided by Judge Fernando Paclibon, Jr.
On June 18, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing accused-appellant's petition questioning
the denial of his motion for bail, for lack of merit.7
During trial and after the prosecution witness had already rested its case, the Presiding Judge of Branch 28, RTC
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, likewise, inhibited himself from further hearing the case when accused-appellant
questioned his impartiality because of his refusal to grant accused-appellant's motion to recall prosecution
witness Susana Masacupan to the witness stand as a hostile witness.8 The case was transferred back to Branch
26, RTC of Laguna, then presided by Judge Pablo Francisco.
On May 2, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Apolinar Dando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder as charged in the information, qualified by treachery and committed with the aggravating circumstances
of use of craft or disguise and evident premeditation and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Cesar Castro as follows:
a.) the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b.) the sum of P1,628,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and
c.) the sum of P35,974.00 as reimbursement for expenses incurred in the wake and burial of the victim; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
The prosecution's account of the case as narrated in the brief of the Solicitor General is as follows:
ART 11-13 CASES
Prosecution witness Aldwin Gemanel testified that on November 20, 1991, he went to the house located at
Pandiño Street, Siniloan, Laguna of his uncle, Angelito Millares, Jr. (Junior Millares) to look for his (Gemanel's)
father. Junior Millares' house was about 100 to 150 meters away from that of the victim, Cesar Castro. Upon
arrival at his uncle's place, a party was on-going as it was the birthday of the former (p. 3, tsn, June 17, 1992). At
the said party, gunshots were fired by appellant and Junior Millares to celebrate the occasion (p. 4, tsn, October
20, 1992 and pp. 14-15, tsn, August 26, 1993). After a few hours at the birthday party, Gemanel decided to go to his
grandmother's house, a mere three (3) houses away from his uncle's house (p. 5, tsn, June 17, 1992). On the way
to his grandmother's house, he saw appellant Apolinar Dando, sat on the side-car of a tricycle parked along
Pandiño Street in front of Junior Millares' house and placed a white handkerchief over his face (p. 5-6, tsn, Ibid).
Though puzzled by the action of appellant, Gemanel proceeded to his grandmother's house and stayed there for
almost an hour (pp. 20-21, tsn, September 22, 1993). When Gemanel went out of the house, he saw appellant
get off the tricycle with the handkerchief covering his face and walk towards the direction of the town plaza (pp.
30-31, tsn, Ibid.). At that time, Gemanel followed appellant and then he (Gemanel) entered a bakery to buy
bread (pp. 28-29, tsn, Ibid). While inside the bakery, Gemanel heard a shot, so he ran outside to look where the
shot came from (p. 36, tsn, Ibid). Thereupon, he saw appellant with the same white handkerchief covering his
face, firing three (3) more shots at Cesar Castro, who was standing on the street in front of his (Castro's) house.
After the fourth shot appellant ran towards the "paraanan" or alley, to the direction of the town plaza (pp. 37-
43, tsn, Ibid).
Gemanel rushed home and told his mother what he had just witnessed (p. 53, tsn, September 22, 1993). His
mother then went to the crime scene while he was left to tend their store (p. 54, tsn, Ibid.) When his mother
came back after about ten (10) minutes, he confided to her that he saw appellant shoot Cesar Castro (p. 54,
tsn, Ibid). His mother then advised him not to tell anyone. Then he went to the crime scene for a closer look of
the victim (p. 55, tsn, Ibid).
The following day on November 21, 1991, Gemanel was fetched by police officers from his school and was
brought to the municipal building for questioning. The day after, on November 22, 1991, he executed a
statement (Exhibit "A"; pp. 8-9, tsn, July 14, 1992).
Gemanel further testified that he was present when a slug was recovered from the front yard of his uncle's
(Millares') house (p. 11, tsn, July 14, 1992). He personally saw the slug which was subsequently handed to Celso
Castro, son of Cesar Castro. He learned that the slug found was one of those fired from the service pistol of
appellant when the latter fired his gun during the birthday party of his uncle (pp. 11-12, tsn, Ibid).
Susan Masakupan, 29 years of age, married and a resident of Pandiño Street, Siniloan, Laguna, corroborated the
testimony of Gemanel. She testified that on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of November 20, 1991, while
she was getting dry clothes hanging at their clothesline located at their front yard, a man wearing a white polo
shirt with designs and a pair of khaki pants and had a handkerchief covering his face passed by. Surprised with
the man's covered face, her gaze followed the man until the latter stopped by victim Cesar Castro. Thereupon
the man shot Cezar Castro and when the latter fell down, the man continued on shooting at Cesar Castro two (2)
or more shots. After the additional shots, the man ran towards an alley (pp. 2-5, tsn, July 21, 1992).
SPO4 Efren Palma, Deputy Station Commander of the PNP, Siniloan, Laguna, testified that three (3) slugs and
three (3) empty shells were recovered from the crime scene on the night of November 20, 1991 (p. 6, tsn,
October 5, 1992).
Josue Flores, property custodian of the PNP, Siniloan, Laguna, testified that he issued to appellant, who is a
member of PNP, Siniloan, Laguna, (one 1) service firearm, which was a caliber .45 pistol, Remington, with serial
number 1945012 (pp. 3, 5 and 7, tsn, August 11, 1992).
32
Florentino Rañada, a member of the Central Intelligence Service of Siniloan, Laguna, testified that he received
from the Siniloan, Laguna police station the following specimens:
- one (1) slug .45 caliber ammunition;
- three (3) pieces slug for .45 caliber ammunition;
- three (3) pieces empty shells for a .45 caliber ammunition;
- one (1) piece caliber Remington pistol with serial number 1945012.
and issued a receipt for them (Exhibits "E" and "E-1"; pp. 17-20, tsn, August 11, 1992).
Rañada further testified that one (1) slug of a .45 caliber pistol recovered from the body of the victim, which was
turned over to him by Arvee Castro, brother of the victim (pp. 27-28, tsn, Ibid) has [sic] sent together with the
above specimens to the PNP crime laboratory for ballistic examination (p. 30, tsn, Ibid).
Susan R. Jalla, PNP officer and criminologist, testified that she conducted a ballistic examination on the
specimens submitted (Exhibits "H", "I", "J" and "K"; pp. 11-13, tsn Ibid).
She issued a certification (Exhibit "N") stating: ". . . microscopic examination, MS-1, MRS-1, MRS-15 revealed the
same individual characteristics as the test bullets and test cartridges, respectively fired from the above-
mentioned firearm" (p. 17, tsn, Ibid).
Dr. Priscilla Realeza, Rural Health Physician of Pakil, Laguna, testified that she conducted
apostmortem examination on the cadaver of Cesar Castro. She issued an Autopsy Report (Exhibits "R" and "R-1")
finding that the victim sustained eleven (11) gunshot wounds (pp. 6-7, tsn Ibid) and that one (1) bullet slug was
extracted from his body (p. 12, tsn, Ibid).10
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, gave the following version of the incident: On November 20, 1991, he
was a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) with the rank of PO3 and detailed as security to the mayor
of Siniloan, Laguna. At around one o'clock in the afternoon of that day, he arrived at the house of Junior Millares
who was then celebrating his birthday. He participated in a drinking spree up to three o'clock in the afternoon.
On that occasion, there was no firing of a gun. He did not bring his gun to the birthday party because he was not
in a habit of bringing his gun when he attended such occasions.11 When he left the party, he went straight home
and slept. He woke up at around midnight because of an upset stomach and vomitted. He went back to sleep
and woke up the second time in the morning of November 21, 1991, changed his clothes, ate his breakfast and
went to work at around eight o'clock in the morning.12 It was only on November 22, 1991 that he learned from
his wife that the Chief of Police and the Mayor were looking for him and that he was a suspect in the killing of
Castro. After eating his supper, he went to the municipal building where the Chief of Police informed him that he
was a suspect in the killing of Castro and was placed under technical arrest. He surrendered his firearm for
ballistic examination to show that he had nothing to do with the killing. Thereafter, he did not know what
happened to firearm.13
The testimony of accused-appellant as to his whereabouts during the time the crime was committed was
supported by his wife Herninia Dando who testified before the trial court that on November 20, 1991 she went
home at 4 o'clock in the afternoon to cook their supper. Less than an hour later, her husband arrived, went to
the sala and slept until the next morning. They had breakfast together and after that, they went to their
respective places of work.14
ART 11-13 CASES
Accused-appellant assign the following errors committed by the trial court, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
ALDWIN OF GEMANEL THAT ACCUSED APPELLANT APOLINAR DANDO WAS THE ASSAILANT WHO SHOT THE
VICTIM CESAR CASTRO.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EMPTY SHELLS AND SLUGS SUBMITTED FOR BALLISTIC
EXAMINATION WERE THOSE RECOVERED FROM THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND ONE SLUG FROM THE BODY OF
THE VICTIM AND CAME FROM THE SERVICE FIREARM OF THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EMPTY SHELLS AND
SLUGS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION AS TAINTED OR POLLUTED, AND HIGHLY UNRELIABLE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ALDWIN GEMANEL AND THE BALLISTIC
EXAMINATION OF THE SERVICE FIREARM OF ACCUSED APPELLANT CONSTITUTED PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER AND IN SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO PAY
THE HEIRS THE SUM OF P1,620,000.00 FOR LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF THE VICTIM, AND OTHER
DAMAGES.15
The first and third issues shall be dealt with together as they are interrelated.
Accused-appellant assails the testimony of Aldwin Gemanel alleging that it was marred by inconsistencies and
was incredible, therefore, unworthy of belief. Among these inconsistencies, according to accused-appellant, are:
1. Gemanel testified that there was a birthday party attended by accused-appellant in the house of his
(Gemanel's) uncle, Junior Millares, and there he saw accused-appellant pull out his gun and fire a shot
downward on the floor. However, Millares himself testified that accused-appellant merely gave to him the gun
and it was he (Millares) who fired two shots. Then he handed the gun to another guest, Agustin Salinas, who
likewise fired said gun twice and then it was returned to accused-appellant.16
2. Gemanel testified that moments before the shooting of Castro, he saw accused-appellant in front of the
house of Millares putting a handkerchief to cover his face and then going inside the tricycle to rest. However,
during the summary examination by the Municipal Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, he
testified that he saw accused-appellant on board the tricycle sleeping.17
33
3. Gemanel testified that he was barely one house away from the place of the shooting when he heard a shot. Q: - But prior to proceeding to the house of your "lola" did you go to any other place?
When he looked at the place where the shot came from, he saw a man already sprawled on the ground and the
man, whose face was covered by a handkerchief, fired two (2) more shots at the victim and left passing through A: - Yes, sir.
a pathway. In other words, there were three (3) shots fired. Later, he changed his testimony stating that there
were four (4) shots fired.18
Q: - Where?

4. Gemanel testified that after the shooting, he approached the victim then he went to his mother telling her
A: - To my uncle Junior's house, sir, where there was a drinking spree.
that Castro was shot without naming the assailant. He later testified that after the shooting, he went home to
his mother and revealed to her the identity of the assailant as Apolinar Dando. Then he went back to the scene
of the crime and saw that policemen were already investigating the incident. When asked by the police Q: - Do you know why them was a drinking spree at the time?
investigator, he told him right then and there that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim.19
A: - Yes, sir, it was my uncle Junior's birthday.
The foregoing inconsistencies are but minor details and they do not discredit the positive identification of
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The testimony of Gemanel on the events that transpired on Q: - What was your purpose in going to the place of your uncle's birthday?
November 20, 1991 was clear, straightforward and consistent. Thus:
A: - I was going to look for my father, sir.
DIRECT-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL:
Q: - Did you. . .while you were there, by the way, where is the house of your uncle located?
Q: - On November 20, 1991, where were you?
A: - On Pandeño Street, sir.
WITNESS
Q: - How far from your house, how many houses apart?
A: - I was on Pandeño Street Siniloan, Laguna, sir.
A: - About 15 houses, sir.
Q: - In what particular place in Brgy. Pandeño?
Q: - What is the full name of your uncle Junior?
A: - About the middle of that area, sir.
A: - Junior Millares, sir.
Q: - You were at the middle part of that area. Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court your point of reference
as to the place where you were at the time? Q: - While you were there at the birthday celebration of your uncle Junior, what did you notice thereat?

A: - What I am saying is that I am at the middle of Pandeño Street, sir. WITNESS

FISCAL A: - There was a firing of gun, sir.

Q: - And when you said you were at the middle portion of Pandeño Street, will you tell this Honorable Court the Q: - Do you know the person who fired his gun at the time?
nearest house where you were at the time?
A: - Yes, sir, Polly Dando.
WITNESS
Q: - Do you know Polly Dando personally?
A: - Cesar Castro's house, sir.
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - And what are you doing then?
Q: - Do you know the real name of Polly Dando?
A: - None, sir, I was then going to my grandmother's house.
A: - Yes, sir, Apolinario Dando.
Q: - And were you able to proceed to the house of your grandmother?
Q: - Where did you see Apolinario Dando fired his gun?
A: - Yes, sir.
34
ART 11-13 CASES
A: - Under the table pointing downwards, sir. Q: - After that, what else happened?

Q: - Do you know the caliber used by Dando? A: - I went out, sir.

ATTY. RAGAZA Q: - Where did you go?

Incompetent, your Honor. A: - On the street, sir.

COURT Q: - Were you alone at the time?

Objection noted, if he knows. A: - Yes, sir.

WITNESS Q: - While you were on the street, did you notice of any unusual incident?

A: - Yes, sir. A: - Yes, sir.

FISCAL Q: - What was that incident?

Q: - Will you tell this Honorable Court the caliber? A: - I saw Polly boarded a tricycle, sir.

A: - A .45 caliber, "yung lapad", sir. Q: - When you said Polly Dando boarded a tricycle, you mean to say Dando went somewhere else?

Q: - Have you already seen a gun of that caliber? WITNESS

A: - Yes, sir. A: - No, he merely sat on board a tricycle which was parked there, sir.

Q: - Where? Q: - This tricycle has a driver?

A: - On TV and on posters, sir. A: - None, sir.

xxx-xxx-xxx Q: - What else did you notice?

Q: - After that, where did you go? A: - I saw Polly Dando placed a handkerchief over his face, sir.

A: - I went to my grandmother, sir. xxx-xxx-xxx

Q: - Where is the house of your grandmother located? FISCAL

A: - Also an Pandeño Street, sir. Q: - Do you know the color of the handkerchief?

Q: - How far from the house of your uncle Junior? A: - Yes, sir, white with small drawings.

A: - Three houses away, sir. Q: - Will you tell this Honorable Court the attire used by the accused Apolinario Dando?

Q: - What did you do in the house of your lola? A: - He was wearing a white polo shirt, sir, and a khaki pants.

A: - I entered the house, sir. Q: - After you saw Apolinar Dando sat on a tricycle and put a handkerchief on his face, what else happened?

35
ART 11-13 CASES
WITNESS FISCAL

A: - He merely rested for a short while, sir. Q: - Where did you proceed after that?

Q: - After that, what happened? A: - I heard a shot, sir.

A: - I left, sir. Q: - What did you do. . . .

Q: - You mean to say after you saw Apolinar sat on a tricycle and put a handkerchief on his face and rested for a ATTY. RAGAZA
while, you went to your lola's house?
I moved to strike out the answer for not being responsive.
A: - Yes, sir.
COURT
Q: - After that, where did you proceed?
Sustained
A: - I merely stayed on the street, sir.
FISCAL
Q: - And again, while there on the street, did you again notice any unusual incident?
Q: - While you were at the bakery, what else happened?
A: - Yes, sir.
WITNESS
Q: - What was that incident?
A: - I heard a shot, sir.
A: - Polly Dando got off the tricycle, sir.
Q: - What shot did you hear?
Q: - Where did he go?
A: - A gunshot, sir.
A: - Towards the plaza, sir.
Q: - When you heard that gunshot, what did you do?
Q: - And what did you do?
A: - I went beside the street, sir.
A: - I followed Polly, sir.
Q: - What did you find out?
Q: - Up to what point did you follow him?
A: - I saw Cesar Castro already sprawled on the ground, sir.
A: - About 2 houses, sir.
Q: - Was Cesar Castro alone at the time?
Q: - While following Dando, what happened next?
A: - Yes, sir.
A - I entered a bakery, sir.
Q: - And do you know what was the cause of Cesar's falling to the ground?
Q: - What was your purpose in going to that bakery?
ATTY. RAGAZA
A: - I was going to buy bread, sir.
Incompetent, your Honor, he already saw Cesar already sprawled on the ground.
Q: - Were you able to buy bread?
COURT
A: - No, sir.
36
ART 11-13 CASES
May answer. We will see the answer. Q: - And then you heard a shot?

WITNESS WITNESS

A: - No, sir. A: - Yes, sir.

FISCAL Q: - Exactly, where were you when you heard the first shot?

Q: - At that precise moment when you heard the gunshot and you go (sic) to the street to find our where the A: - In the bakery about to buy bread, sir.
shot came from, where was Apolinar Dando at the time?
Q: - Where were you facing?
ATTY. RAGAZA
A: - Towards the bakery, sir.
There is no testimony that Apolinar Dando was present at the time.
Q: - Was there anybody attending to you in the bakery?
COURT
A: - Yes, sir.
There was no testimony that Apolinar Dando was them. The fiscal was asking where was Apolinar at the time.
He was not asking why he was there. He did not assume. Q: - Now, you were merely waiting for bread that you would buy in that bakery?

WITNESS A: - Yes, sir, when suddenly I heard a shot.

A: - I saw him walked a few steps and then fired his gun at Cesar, on his side, sir. Q: - How many shots did you hear while you were in the bakery?

xxx-xxx-xxx A: - First, I heard one shot so I went out of the bakery and I saw Ka Cesar being shot, sir.

Q: - After you saw Apolinar for the second time at the sprawled body of Cesar, what else happened? Q: - How many shots in all did you hear?

A: - He ran and went towards an alley, "paraanan", sir.20 A: - Three, sir.

On cross-examination, Gemanel gave substantially the same testimony: Q: - What was the interval between the first and the second shot?

Q: - In answer to the question of the Court in the last hearing, you said you saw Dando going to the plaza and A: - First, I was inside the bakery when I heard a shot so I immediately went out and saw Dando firing two shots
you followed him far a distance of about 2 houses, during the time you were following, did you meet any on Ka Cesar who was already lying on the ground, sir.21
person?
xxx-xxx-xxx
A: - None, sir.
ATTY. BALCE:
Q: - And during all the time that you were following Dando, was he wearing a handkerchief over his face?
Q: - You heard a shot and you went out and stopped at this point marked by an "x"?
A: - Yes, sir.
A: - Yes, sir.
Q: - But you did not have much interest, that is why you stop following him and stopped at a bakery?
Q: - And it was only a gunshot that you heard?
A: - Yes, sir.
A: - On that moment, one.
ATTY. RAGAZA
Q: - Just after the shot, did you not hear any person crying out in panic.
37
ART 11-13 CASES
A: - Nobody, sir. alleged inconsistencies refer only to inconsequential details and not to the crux of the case that Gemanel saw
accused-appellant gun down Castro. Gemanel never wavered on this point even for a single moment. The
COURT: consistency on the part of Gemanel in identifying accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime makes him a
credible witness. His testimony cannot be discredited by a mere alibi and denial on the part of accused-
appellant.
Q: - After that first shot, did you hear any other shot?

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses in criminal cases and it should be rejected when the identity of the accused
A: - I heard, Your Honor.
is sufficient and positively established by the prosecution.24 Moreover, in order to overcome the evidence of the
prosecution, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed
COURT: but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.25 In the present case, accused-appellant failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to
Q: - How many shots did you hear after hearing the first shot? be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. He even admitted that his house was only about one-and-
a-half kilometers away from the house of Millares,26 which was very near the place where Castro was shot to
A: - Three to four shots, Your Honor. death. Undoubtedly, the distance did not render it impossible for accused-appellant to be at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed. Accused-appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail.
ATTY. BALCE:
As to the alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of Gemanel and that of Millares, we find the testimony
I move that the last answer be placed in tagalog. of Gemanel to be more credible since the inconsistency lies in the affidavit and testimony of Millares himself. In
his affidavit, Millares averted that he fired the gun first and then accused-appellant fired the gun twice.27 In his
testimony in court, however, he (Millares) claimed that after firing the gun, he gave the gun to Agustin
A: - "Mga tatlo o apat" Salinas.28 Confronted with the inconsistent statements of Millares and the straightforward and categorical
testimony of Gemanel, which was corroborated by that of Susana Masacupan, this Court believes and gives
Q: - What did you say? credence to the latter.

A: - "Tatlo po o apat". When he testified in court, Gemanel was then only thirteen (13) years old and a second year high school student
at Siniloan Public Highhool. Indeed "the testimony of a child of sound mind is likely to be more correct and
ATTY. BALCE: truthful than that of older persons, so that once established that he has fully understood the character and
nature of an oath, his testimony should be given full credence.29
But your first answer that I heard was "tatlo bale apat."
In the second and third issues raised in his brief, accused-appellant opines that there is no proof showing that
A: - Yes sir. the empty shells and slugs recovered at the scene of the crime were the same empty shells and slugs submitted
for ballistic examination. According to accused-appellant, the relatives of the victim tampered with these pieces
of evidence making the same tainted or polluted, therefore, unreliable.
COURT:

Other than these bare allegations, however, accused-appellant failed to prove by convincing evidence any
Q: - Did you know where the shots came from?
irregularity in the handling by the police officers of these particular pieces of evidence. The ballistic examination
report is thus clothed with the presumption of regularity. At any rate, the presentation of weapons (or the slugs
A: - Yes, Your Honor. and bullets, as in this case) used and ballistic examination are not prerequisites for conviction.30 The corpus
delicti and the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are more than enough
Q: - Where? to sustain his conviction.

A: - From the house of Ka Cesar. Anent the fifth issue, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him for murder and
awarding in favor of the victim's heirs the sum of P1,620,000.00 for his loss of earning capacity and other
COURT: damages.

Q: - After hearing those shots, what did you observe, if any? Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

A: - The person with his handkerchief covering his face, was running and entered an alley, "paraanan".22 Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty
of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death31 if committed with any
of the following circumstances:
Well-settled is the rule that "inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony."23 Moreover, the
38
ART 11-13 CASES
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxx-xxx-xxx
5. With evident premeditation.
xxx-xxx-xxx
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. 32 In this case,
accused-appellant, whose face was covered by a handkerchief; approached the victim, who was merely standing
by the gate in front of his house, and shot him. The victim was undoubtedly caught unaware and had no chance
of putting up any defense. Clearly, treachery attended the commission of the crime since the attack, although
frontally, was no less sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or offer any defense of
his person.33
The trial court further established that there was evident premeditation and that accused-appellant used "craft,
fraud or disguise" in committing his dastardly act:
. . . When DANDO (accused-appellant) boarded the tricycle parked in front of the residence of Angelito Millares,
Jr., he did so not to rest or sleep there. He was there, with a handkerchief over his face, lying in wait for Cesar
Castro to come out and stand by the gate of his house as he customarily did while taking a rest. And DANDO
stayed inside the tricycle for a couple of hours, like an eagle waiting for its prey. From the parked tricycle,
DANDO could clearly see the gate of Cesar Castro's house, 100 to 150 meters away. DANDO'S stay inside the
tricycle lasted for about two (2) hours, a sufficient time for him to reflect on the consequences of his plan to kill
Cesar Castro. And when Cesar Castro did finally come out, and stood there unarmed by the gate of his house,
DANDO swiftly swooped down on his prey and triggered the burst from his service firearm which snuffed the life
of his victim.34
Given the foregoing attendant aggravating circumstances, the trial court properly sentenced accused-appellant
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, the amount it awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim
should be modified in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000 as indemnity for the death for Cesar Castro. Said
amount is awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim.35 In addition, the heirs are
also entitled to receive a compensation for the loss of earning capacity of the victim. The formula for computing
the same as established in decided cases36 is as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income - Necessary Living Expenses
The life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of 80 and the age of the
deceased.37 Since Castro was 47 years old at the time of his death, his life expectancy was 22 more years.38 Celso
Castro testified that his father earned P3,000.00 monthly or P36,000.00 annually from the sash factory. In
addition, the victim's annual income from farming, as found by the trial court, was P53,000.00. The gross annual
income of the deceased was P89,000.00. Allowing for necessary living expenses of fifty percent (50%) of his
gross earnings, his total net earning capacity amounts to P979,000.00.39
ART 11-13 CASES
As to the expenses actually incurred by the family of the victim for the wake and burial, Celso Castro was able to
prove during trial that they incurred the sum of P39,974.00. The amount of P35,974.00 awarded by the trial
court as reimbursement of funeral expenses is, accordingly, increased to P39,974.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts:
1. death indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;
2. compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of P979,000.00; and
3. reimbursement of funeral expenses in the amount of P39,974.00.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5318 December 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL BUMANGLAG, ET AL., defendants. - GREGORIO BUNDOC, appellant.
Iñigo Bitanga for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, an inhabitant of the pueblo of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos
Norte, missed 4 baares or 40 bundles of palay which were kept in his granary, situated in the place called
"Payas," barrio No. 16 of the said pueblo, and on proceeding to search for them on the following morning, he
found them in an inclosed filed which was planted with sugar cane, at a distance of about 100 meters from his
granary; thereupon, for the purpose of ascertaining who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night,
accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the
person who might return to get the palay. A man, who turned out to be Guillermo Ribis, made his appearance
and approaching the palay, attempted to carry it away with him, but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and
Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the struggle
which ensued the person attacked fell down and died instantly, Bumanglag and his companions believing that
Guillermo Ribis was the author of several robberies and thefts that had occurred in the place.
In view of the foregoing, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint on January 15, 1909, charging Rafael Bumanglag,
Gregorio Bundoc, and Antonio Ribao with the crime of homicide, and the trial judge, on February 5 of the
present year, rendered judgment in the case, sentencing the three accused persons to the penalty of fourteen
years eight months and one day of reclusión temporal, with the accessories, and to the payment of an indemnity
of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and the costs in equal parts, from which decision only Gregorio Bundoc
appealed.
39
From the facts above mentioned, fully proven in this case, the commission of the crime of homicide, defined and
punished by article 404 of the Penal Code, is inferred, inasmuch as Guillermo Ribis was violently deprived of his
life in consequence of serious wounds and bruises, some of them of a mortal nature, as appears from a
certificate issued by a physician who examined the body of the deceased, and who ratified said certificate at the
trial under oath.
The accused Bundoc, the only appellant, pleaded not guilty, but, in the absence of justification, and his
exculpatory allegation being unreasonable, it is not proper to hold that he assaulted and killed the deceased,
with the help of his codefendants, in order to defend himself from an attack made by the former with a bolo.
Both Gregorio Bundoc and his codefendants Bumanglag and Ribao declared that, during the fight with the
deceased Ribis, they only beat the latter with sticks, because he unsheathed the bolo he carried; but from the
examination made of the body it appeared that several serious wounds had been inflicted with cutting and
stabbing weapons, besides some bruises, and according to the declaration of the health officer Felipe Barba,
which declaration was confirmed by the municipal president of Laoag, the bolo worn by the deceased was in its
sheath and hanging from his waist; therefore it can not be concluded that the deceased even intended to assault
his murderers with his bolo either before he was attacked by them or during the fight, because, had Ribis made
use of the bolo he carried sheathed, the bolo would have been found unsheathed at the place where the fight
occurred, and it is not reasonable to believe that, before falling to the ground in a dying condition he succeeded
in sheathing his bolo, in which condition it was found on his body.
It is therefore indisputable that, without any prior illegal aggression and the other requisites which would fully
or partially exempt the accused from criminal responsibility, the appellant and his two companions assaulted
Guillermo Ribis with sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, and
therefore, the said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-principal by direct participation, fully
convicted, together with his codefendants who are already serving their sentence.
In the commission of the crime we should take into account the mitigating circumstance No. 7 of article 9 of the
Penal Code, because the defendant acted with loss of reason and self-control on seeing that Guillermo Ribis was
taking material possession of the palay seized and hidden by him on the previous night, thus committing one of
the numerous unlawful acts perpetrated at the place, to the damage and prejudice of those who, by their labor
endeavor to provide themselves with the necessary elements for their subsistence and that of their families. The
special circumstance established by article 11 of the same code should be also considered in favor of the
accused, in view of the erroneous and quite general belief that it is legal to punish, even to excess the thief who,
in defiance of law and justice, while refusing to work, devotes himself to depriving his neighbors of the fruits of
their arduous labors; these two circumstances are considered in the present case as especially admissible,
without any aggravating circumstance, and they determine, according to article 81, rule 5, of the Penal Code, the
imposition of the penalty immediately inferior to that prescribed by the law, and in its minimum degree, and
therefore —
By virtue of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that, the judgment appealed from being
reversed with respect to Gregorio Bundoc only, the latter should be, and is hereby, sentenced to the penalty of
six years and one day of prisión mayor, to the accessories of article 61 of the code, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased jointly or severally with his codefendants, in the sum of P1,000, and to pay one-third the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
ART 11-13 CASES
Separate Opinions
MORELAND, J., dissenting:
The defendants in this case were convicted of the crime of homicide in causing the death of Guillermo Ribis, and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusión temporal, accessories, indemnification, and
costs.
Gregorio Bundoc is the only one who appealed.
On the night of the 21st of February, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, a resident of the pueblo of San Nicolas, Province
of Ilocos Norte, found missing from his granary, situated at a place called Payas, barrio No. 16 of said pueblo,
4 baaresand 40 manojos of palay, and the inclosure within which the palay was situated torn down and partly
destroyed. The following morning he discovered a portion of the missing palay in a field of sugar cane about 100
meters from the granary from which it was taken. For the purpose of discovering who was the author of the
crime and of bringing him to justice, he secured the assistance of Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and
Saturnino Tumamao, the first being his cousin and the others in his neighbors and friends, to watch with him the
succeeding night in the vicinity of thepalay, acting upon the expectation that the robber would return to secure
it. Some time after dark of the night succeeding the robbery, Bumanglag, and the other persons mentioned,
gathered together in said field of sugar cane, near to the palay in question, placing themselves so as to surround
it in a measure, and awaited the appearance of the malefactor. At about 10 o'clock there came into the field the
deceased, Guillermo Ribis, who approached the palay, picked it up, and started to carry it away. At this moment
Bumanglag presented himself in front of Ribis, stopping his further progress, whereupon Ribis attacked him
viciously with a bolo and they engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle. Bumanglag, upon finding that he was likely to
be killed by the robber because of his great strength and the fact that he was armed with a bolo, called for
assistance, whereupon his three companions rushed forward and seeing the extremity in which Bumanglag was,
joined in the struggle for the purpose of his protection. Within a few minutes Ribis fell to the earth mortally
injured and soon expired.
The only proofs in the trial relating to the death are the statements and testimony of the defendants
themselves. Immediately after the death of Ribis, they, acting voluntarily, went to the nearest justice of the
peace and stated what had occurred. Each one signed a statement of the facts constituting the occurrence as he
understood them. Later each one of defendants testified on the trial.
Bundoc, in the written statement made by him before the justice of the peace, said that at about 10 o'clock of
the night in question he saw Ribis enter the field, going toward the place where the palay was located, and a
little while afterwards Bumanglag called him and his companions to come to his assistance because a man was
attacking him and that thereupon he, Bundoc and his companions, "went to the assistance of Bumanglag, who
was fighting with Ribis, and, in view of the fact that it appeared that Bumanglag was not able to resist his
adversary because he had a bolo and Bumanglag had only a bamboo stick," he and his companions took part in
the fight solely to protect his cousin and that, during the struggle that followed, the decedent was killed. He said
further that he recognized the deceased, Ribis, as a resident of San Nicolas, and that he was a person of bad
character and was known as the author of various robberies and burglaries which had occurred in that vicinity.
The statements of the other defendants are substantially the same as that of Bundoc.itc-alf
40
Upon the trial Bumanglag testified, relative to the acts of defendants from which the death of Ribis resulted,
that Ribis came into the field, arranged the palay in handy form picked it up, and started to go away with it; that
thereupon Bumanglag told him to halt; that Ribis instantly dropped his bundle to the ground and immediately
attacked Bumanglag with a bolo, striking at him several times but failing to hit him on account of stalks of sugar
cane which Bumanglag interposed between himself and his assailant; that, while Ribis was trying to kill him with
his bolo, he called to his companions for help, at the same trying to defend himself with blows of his bamboo
stick; that his companions soon arrival, and, between the three, they struck him several blows, from which he
died immediately; that they carried no weapons except bamboo sticks, while the deceased was armed with a
large bolo.
The statement of Bumanglag made upon the trial is somewhat different from his statement made before the
justice of the peace but is more in accord with the statements of the other defendants in the case, both before
the justice of the peace upon the trial of the case. Bundoc testified that Bumanglag called for help because he
was being attacked by the robber, who was armed with a bolo, and that he was likely to be killed at any instant,
and that he and his companions, desiring to defend Bumanglag from his imminent peril, ran forward to his
assistance, and that during the fight which occurred, the deceased was killed.
These are the only proofs before us relative to the manner in which Ribis met his death. The court below,
however, refused to believe the story of defendants because of certain alleged contradictory circumstances
which appear in the proofs. These circumstances, as presented by the court below and here argued by the fiscal,
are that (1) while the defendants claim in their statements and testimony that the deceased attacked
Bumanglag with his bolo, nevertheless, when the body of the decedent was the nest day taken possession of by
the justice of the peace, the bolo was still in its sheath; and (2) that while the defendants stated and testified
that they were not armed with any kind of weapons except bamboo sticks or clubs, still the testimony of Barba,
the sanitary inspector of that district, shows that some of the wounds upon the deceased were made with sharp
instruments. Upon these two circumstances, impugning, as it is alleged they do, the evidence of the defendants
in their own behalf, the court below found the defendants guilty of homicide.
The only evidence in relation to these two circumstances is that of the justice of the peace and the sanitary
inspector, who assert that when they went to examine the body and take charge of it, the next day after the
death, they found the bolo in its sheath. It appears, however, that no one watched the body during the interval
running between the time when the death occurred and when the body was first examined, and therefore no
one knows how it was handled or what was done with or to it. As to the other point, namely, that the wounds
were made with sharp instruments, it may be said that the witness Barba, the sanitary inspector, who is the only
one who testified in relation to that matter, stated that the only two wounds that were mortal were located,
one in the right side of the head, caused by a sharp instrument, the other a contusion at the base of the neck
upon the left side, not made with a sharp instrument. He does not say which one of the wounds caused the
death of the decedent, neither does he state the fact upon which he bases his claim that the wounds were made
with sharp instruments. He is simply states his conclusions, without presenting the facts from which such
conclusions naturally spring. It is well known, however, that a wound, smooth edged and clean cut, and
simulating with remarkable closeness a wound made with a sharp cutting instrument, may be and frequently is
produced by a wooden instrument or club, particularly where, as in this case, said instrument or club is
extremely hard and has a sharp edge. The witness Barba was not a physician or surgeon and had had little
experience with wounds. His judgment was scarcely better than that of the average man. In no sense was he
qualified as an expert. Besides, and this is very important, the only wounds found upon the person of
deceased were about the head, neck, and face. No wound was found on any other part of the person. Does this
look like the use of knives or bolos by the defendants? If they had been using such weapons it is almost certain
that the fatal wound would have been found in the body and not the head; or, if in the head, the wound made
would have been far more extensive and ghastly than any of those found.
It appears from the undisputed testimony (if we except the two circumstances above referred to ) that the
decedent was a man of bad reputation; that he was a thief, a robber, and a convicted criminal, having served at
ART 11-13 CASES
least one term in prison for robbery; that he was known in all that country as a leader of criminal bands and as
an all-around desperado; that he was a man of exceptionally large stature and of unusual strength; that at the
time of his attack upon Rafael Bumanglag he was armed with a bolo; that on the evening before his death he
had robbed the granary of Bumanglag, taking a part of the property which he had stolen away with him at the
time and leaving the other portion, which he was unable to carry, in a place where it would be easily accessible
when he desired later to remove it; that on the night of the event he had returned to carry away the balance of
the property which he had stolen the night before; that while in the act of taking it he was surprised and
confronted by the owner thereof; that he immediately assailed said owner viciously with his bolo, and to
pressed him that, for the protection of his life, he called upon his friends for assistance; that his companions, on
arriving, saw that he was likely to be killed at any instant and they, endeavoring to save his life, attacked the
decedent.
It is not known who among the defendants killed the decedent or what blow caused his death. All that is known
is that in the struggle which occurred, resulting from the efforts of three of the defendants to save the life of the
fourth, the decedent met his death.
It nowhere appears, except from the fact of death itself, that the defendants sought or intended to kill the
decedent. Their sole purpose appears from the evidence to have been accomplished as well by disabling as by
killing him; and it must not be forgotten in this connection that the effect produced by the use of their bamboo
sticks was not that which is ordinarily produced. This consideration was regarded by this court as having much
importance in the case of the United States vs. Sosa (4 Phil Rep., 104). This court has, moreover, held that a
piece of bamboo (una simple caña partida), exactly what was used by defendants in the case at bar, was a
weapon insufficient ordinarily to put the life of a person attacked in imminent peril. (U. S. vs. De Castro, 2 Phil.
Rep., 67; U. S. vs. Mack, 8 Phil. Rep., 701).
I am convinced that there is a strong doubt of the criminal responsibility of the defendants, particularly of the
appellant. Article 8 of the Penal Code reads in part as follows:
The following are not delinquent and are, therefore, exempt from criminal liability:
5. He who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural,
or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those by consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree, provided the first and second circumstances mentioned in the foregoing number
are attendant, and provided that in case the party attacked first gave provocation, the defendant took no part
therein.
6. He who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided the first and second circumstances
mentioned in No. 4 are attended and that the defender is not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other illegal
motive.
Subdivision 4 is as follows:
4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.lawphi1.net
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
41
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
That there was an unlawful aggression seems to me to be undisputed under the evidence. The great
preponderance of the testimony, in fact the undisputed evidence, is to that effect. Every witness who touched
the subject testified positively that the assault upon Bumanglag was made with a bolo . It is admitted that the
decedent had one at the time of the assault. Nevertheless the fiscal contends that the assault was not made
with a bolo and bases that contention upon the single fact, before adverted to, that, many hours after the
assault, the bolo was found in its sheath on the dead man's body. The probative effect of that fact is founded
purely in an inference which necessarily presupposes that the bolo had not been replaced in its sheath by
anyone after the death of Ribis, his body having been left unwatched, as before stated, for a considerable period
of time. It seems to me, however, that that inference is met and sufficiently overcome by the manifest and
perfect unreasonableness of the assumption, which must necessarily arise from that inference, that a man f the
character f the decedent, having been caught red-handed in the commission of a robbery by the owner of the
property against which the felony had been and was being committed, and that owner armed with a club, would
attack such owner with his naked hands when he carried at his side a formidable weapon with which to defend
himself in precisely such an emergency. It is wholly unreasonable, if not positively unbelievable, that the
decedent, under all the circumstances of this case, did not draw his bolo. That he did unsheath it and did attack
Bumanglag therewith is the sworn statement of every witness who testified on that subject. This proof, taken in
connection with the unreasonableness of the claim that the decedent, caught red-handed in felony, attacked
with his bare hands a man armed with a club, the man against whose property he was in the very act of
perpetrating a felony, and permitted himself to be beaten to death, when he carried at his side a formidable and
effective weapon of aggression as well as defense, can not be overcome by a mere inference deduced from the
circumstance that the bolo, many hours after the event, was found in its sheath. The entire evidence, fairly
considered, reasonably establishes it seems to me, not only an unlawful but a dangerous aggression. (Supreme
court of Spain, 17 November, 1897; 6 July, 1898; 16 March, 1892; 11 December, 1896; 26 January, 1897; 11
December, 1896; 6 April, 1904; 27 June, 1894; 30 January, 1904; 16 February, 1905; 10 July, 1902; 27 June, 1903;
28 February, 1906; 17 March, 1888; 29 May, 1888; 13 February, 1890; 20 January, 1894; 24 October, 1895; 27
January, 1896; 11 December, 1896; 26 January, 1897; 30 September, 1897; 10 February, 1898; 6 July, 1898; 21
December, 1898; 24 January, 1899; 29 September, 1900; 12 January, 1901; 21 April, 1902; 20 December, 1902; 4
February, 1903; 11 July, 1903; 11 July, 1904; 22 March, 1905; 8 July, 1905.)
In the case of Stoneham vs. Commonwealth (86 Va., 523, 525, 526), where the defendant was being followed up
by deceased who was wholly unarmed and without any demonstration of violence except raising his fist, and the
defendant shot and killed him, the court said:
The accused was closely pressed by an attacking man, who was his superior in strength, and his situation was
one which justified his fear of grievous bodily harm; and, if the jury had found the facts as certified by the court,
they should have found the homicide to be excusable self-defense under all the circumstances of this case.
(Parishe's case, 81 Va., 1.)
Moreover it is admitted that the defendant, Bumanglag, was upon his own land and was, therefore, defending
his habitation against a violent and wrongful invasion when the assault upon him was made in the manner
proved.
A person may repel force by force in defense of his habitation or property, as well as in defense of his person,
against one who manifestly intends and endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon
either, and, if need be, may kill his adversary. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L., 275.)
In the case of United States vs. Brello (9 Phil. Rep., 424), the court said (p. 425):
ART 11-13 CASES
The evidence of the defendant and his witnesses was to the effect that at 10 o'clock at night Candelario came to
the house of the defendant, knocked at the door, and instead upon the defendant coming out saying that if he
did not he would burn the house. The defendant refused to go out and thereupon Candelario broke the door
down, came in and attacked the defendant with a cane, throwing him to the ground two or three times. He
defended himself as well as he could and finally seized a bolo and struck Candelario in the stomach. Immediately
after the affair the defendant presented himself to the authorities of the town, stating that had happened. It
does not appear that Candelario had any other weapon than a cane.
These facts to our mind constitute a complete defense.lawphi1.net Candelario committed a crime in entering
the house as he did, the defendant was justified in protecting himself with such weapons as were at his hand,
and if from that defense the death of the aggressor resulted, that result must be attributed to his own wrongful
act and can not be charged to the defendant.
(The italics do not appear in the original.)
If the defendant in the above case was in danger of death or of great bodily harm, and that danger was
imminent, and if the means employed by him to repel the assault were reasonably necessary to attain that
result, then, how much more perfectly were these conditions present in the case at bar! If the defendant in the
case cited was entitled legally to be relieved from all criminal liability, upon what subtle distinction, and, above
all, upon what principles of justice, shall we found a judgment declaring guilty the appellant at bar?
While the premises upon which the assault occurred were not, strictly speaking, the habitation of the defendant,
Bumanglag, still as matter of law no substantial distinction is made between habitation and premises. The
Supreme Court of the United States has held directly (Beard vs. United States, 158 U. S., 550) that for the
purpose of self-defense there is no difference between one's habitation and his premises. In that case the court
said, in part, Mr. Justice Harlan writing (p. 559):
But the court below committed an error of a more serious character when it told the jury, as in effect it did by
different forms of expression, that if the accused could have saved his own life and avoided taking the life of Will
Jones by retreating from and getting out of the way of the latter as he advanced upon him, the law made it his
duty to do so; and if he did not, when it was in his power to do so without putting his own life or body in
imminent peril, he was guilty of manslaughter. The court seemed to think if the deceased had advanced upon
the accused while the latter was in his dwelling house and under such circumstances as indicated the intention
of the former to take life or inflict great bodily injury, and if, without retreating, the accused had taken the life of
his assailant, having at the time reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith believing, that his own life
would be taken or great bodily harm done him unless he killed the accused, the case would have been one of
justifiable homicide. To that proposition we give our entire assent. But we can not agree that the accused was
under any greater obligation, when on his own premises, near his dwelling house, to retreat or run away from
his assailant, than he would have been if attacked within his dwelling house. The accused being where he had a
right to be, on his own premises, constituting a part of his residence and home, at the time the deceased
approached him in a threatening manner, and not having by language or by conduct provoked the deceased to
assault him, the question for jury was whether, without fleeing from his adversary, he had, at the moment he
struck the deceased, reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith believed, that he could not save his life or
protect himself from great bodily harm except by doing what he did, namely, strike the deceased with his gun,
and thus prevent his further advance upon him. Even if the jury had been prepared to answer this question in
the affirmative — and if it had been so answered the defendant should have been acquitted — they were
instructed that the accused could not properly acquitted on the ground of self-defense if they believed that, by
retreating from his adversary, by "getting out of the way," he could have avoided taking life. We can not give our
assent to this doctrine. (Erwin vs. State, 29 Ohio St., 186, 193, 199 Runyan vs. State, 57 Ind., 80, 84; Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1 par. 850; 2 Wharton's Criminal Law, par. 1019, 7th ed.; Gallargher vs. State, 3 Minn., 270;
Pond vs. People, 8 Mich., 150, 177; State vs. Dixon, 75 N.C., 275, 295; State vs. Sherman, 16 R. I., 631;
Fields vs. State, 32 N. E. Rep., 780; Eversole vs.Commonwealth, 26 S. W. Rep. 816; Haynes vs. State, 17 Ga., 465,
42
483; Long vs. State, 52 Miss., 23, 35; Tweedy vs. State, 5 Ia., 433; Baker vs. Commonwealth, 19 S. W. Rep., 975;
Tingle vs. Commonwealth, 11 S. W., 812; 3 Rice's Ev., par. 360.)
In the case of State vs. Cushing (14 Wash., 530), the court lays down the proposition that a defendant while on
his own premises outside of his dwelling house, was there he had a right to be, and if the deceased advanced
upon him in a threatening manner and the defendant at the time had reasonable grounds to believe, and in
good faith did believe, that the deceased intended to take his life or do him great bodily harm, the defendant
was not obliged to retreat nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground
and meet any attack made upon him in such way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he at the
moment honestly believed and had reasonable to believe was necessary to save his own life or protect himself
from great bodily harm.
It is also admitted that the defendant, Bumanglag, was defending his property from one who by surprise and
violence was endeavoring to commit a felony against it. Under such circumstances, if necessary to prevent the
felony, he could lawfully kill the person attempting it. (See 25 Am. & Ency. of Law, 275, above quoted; U.
S. vs.Wiltberger, 28 Fed. Cas., 727, 729; Commonwealth vs. Pipes, 158 Pa. St., 25, 30;
Stoneham vs. Commonwealth, 86 Va., 523, 525; Ayers vs. State, 60 Miss., 709, 714; Crawford vs. State, 35 Am.
St. Rep., 242; People vs. Stone, 82 Cal., 36, 37, 38.)
It must not be forgotten that the undisputed evidence in the case at bar shows that Bumanglag, when attacked
by deceased, although on his own premises and defending his own property, did all he could to avoid an
encounter, retreating as far as safety permitted, and interposing between himself and his assailant stalks of
sugar cane to impede the blows aimed at him, at the same time warding off the bolo thrusts with his bamboo
stick.
It appears, therefore, that there was not only an unlawful against the defendant, Bumanglag, personally, but
also that there was a wrongful invasion of his habitation and an attempt to commit a felony against his property.
It fairly appearing that there was an unlawful aggression, it is evident that the danger to Bumanglag was
imminent and certain. It is difficult to conceive how, with a weapon in the hands of decedent no more deadly
than a bolo, the defendant could have been in danger more imminent and certain. A notorious desperado
(Hood vs. State, 27 So. Rep., 643) had been caught red-handed in a felony. He was large, powerful
(Stoneham vs. Commonwealth, 86 Va., 523, 525), and vicious. It was dark. So far as he knew, he was alone with
his discoverer. He carried a fighting bolo. His discoverer had only a bamboo stick. A long term in State prison
stared him in the face. There was one way to avoid it and only one — to kill his discoverer. If Bumanglag
escaped, his arrest and conviction would surely follow. Can any one doubt, under these circumstances, what
such a man do? Bumanglag, as he confronted and recognized the man with whom he had to deal, realized
instantly the imminence and certainty of his danger; and, assault, Bumanglag knew that, without assistance from
appreciated and realized by his companions when they heard his cries for help. They knew Ribis, his criminal
record, his desperate character, his unusual strength. (People vs. Webster, 139 N. Y. 73; State vs. Martin, 9 Ohio
Dec., 778; State vs. Broussard, 39 La. Ann., 671; State vs.Bowles, 146 Mo., 6; State vs. Knapp, 45 N. H., 148.) They
knew he was armed and their companion was not. They knew it lay with them whether Bumanglag was killed or
not. From their viewpoint was not their participation in the struggle fully justified?
It has been suggested that the means used by the defendants were not reasonably necessary for the protection
of their companion, and that, being so many against one, they should not have struck the decedent with their
clubs, but rather, should have seized him with their hands, disarmed him and made him prisoner. Among all the
reasons assigned by the prosecution to sustain the conviction in this case this, to my mind, is the only one that in
anywise appeals to reason or judgment. In fact it is the only ground presented by the Government upon which
such conviction can be sustained, if it can be sustained at all. Still, giving that contention all of the weight which
it justly carries, I yet am entirely lacking in confidence that it is sound under the circumstances of this case and
ART 11-13 CASES
established law applicable thereto, and is, I believe, fully and fairly met by the substance of the following
observations:
I remember, on occasion, seeing, in the public square in my native town, a large and powerful American
attacked by a diminutive Italian armed with a stiletto. I remember seeing the American running backward,
leaping and dodging frantically to avoid the vicious thrusts aimed by the pursuing Italian at a vital part. I
remember also that at least a half dozen other Americans were at the rear of the Italian, closely following him
and yelling to him at the top of their voices to desist, but not one daring to grapple with him to save the person
attacked; and it was only when another American, having rushed into the yard of the hotel and secured a stick of
wood, returned to the scene and gave the Italian from behind a heavy blow over the head with the club,
stretching him senseless, that the assault was terminated.
The question naturally arises, Why did not some one seize the Italian? The answer is, for the simple reason that
a furious and vicious man armed with a dagger and skilled in its use is an individual dangerous to the very
extreme, and the man who seizes him with his naked hands runs the chances of his life. This is known to all. But,
comes the reply. Why not all seize him at once and thus avoid the danger to one? The suggestion is simple but
the execution is most difficult — in most cases little short of impossible. On such an occasion the time within
which action must be secured is of the very shortest. Everything is excitement and confusion. Everybody yells
and dreads, but no body thinks. If there happens to be one who does think, he has no companions in the
process. There is, and in the vast majority of cases there can be, no concert of action. The aid rendered in such
cases is almost invariably individual.
In the case at bar, as in the illustration, there was a fierce struggle between two men. The one was defending his
own property on his own premises and performing a service to society by doing his part to render amenable to
the law a desperate and reckless criminal. The other was an invader, a despoiler, wholly unrestrained by
conscience or deterred by law — an inveterate enemy of society and his kind. He was armed with a dangerous
weapon. He was desperate, vicious, criminal, and powerful, surprised in an act of felony. It was dark. He was
attempting to take the life of his opponent. It was unknown, and unknowable, when, in that struggle, the fatal
blow would be delivered. It might come at any instant. Ought it fairly to be required as a matter of law that the
defendants, rushing forward to assist their companion, should, under these circumstances, attempt the seizure
of this powerful and desperate man with their naked hands, in the dark, without the ability, be reason of the
conditions, to see the weapon and the manner in which it was being used? Would not such a requirement put
them in great danger of being themselves seriously wounded, even if it did not add to the danger of their
companion? It is the unquestioned law, and it be rigorously enforced, that life can not be taken except in
necessity, but it is as unquestioned that he who in danger of his life from an assault, as well as the one who
comes to his assistance, is not required to do anything which will increase his danger or enhance the opportunity
of the aggressor to accomplish his end. (U. S. vs. Mack, 8 Phil. Rep., 701; U. S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. Rep., 367;
supreme court of Spain, 25 September, 1875; U. S. vs. Herbert, 26 Fed. Cas., No. 15354a; State vs. Robertson, 50
La. Ann., 92; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L., 273.) Moreover if the life of Bumanglag was to be saved at all, the
aggressor must be dealt with quickly and summarily. Events were unrolling rapidly. There was a life in danger,
every instant becoming more imminent. There was no time to think; no time for deliberate, careful judgment
and nice precision; no opportunity to devise means or lay plans. Under such circumstances the law does not
hold men to the standards of careful thought and calm judgment. (Allen vs. U. S., 150 U. S., 551; State vs. West,
45 La. Ann., 14, 23; Brownell vs. People, 38 Mich., 732; supreme court of Spain, 7 December, 1886; Viada, Penal
Code, vol. 1, 157-160.)
In order to make perfectly available the defense that they were rightfully defending Bumanglag, and that the
means they employed were reasonably necessary, it is not essential that there should be absolute and positive
danger to the person whose protection is attempted. If there is a wellgrounded and reasonable belief that the
person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, an attempt to defend him by means which appear
reasonably necessary is justifiable. The reasonable appearance is the important thing. (Shorter vs. People, 2 N.
Y., 193, 197; Brown vs. Com., 86 Va., 466; Logue vs. Com., 38 Pa. St., 265; Murray vs. Com., 79 Pa. St., 311, 317;
43
Pond vs.People, 8 Mich., 149, 150; Hurd vs. People, 25 Mich., 404, 405; People vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207;
People vs. Herbert, 61 Cal., 544; Campbell vs. People, 16 III., 17; Enlow vs. State, 154 Ind., 664;
Hubbard vs. State, 37 Fla., 156; Alvarez vs. State, 37 Fla., 156; Oliver vs. State, 17 Ala., 587; Stewart vs. State, 1
Ohio St., 66, 71; 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 262, 263; U. S. vs. Paras, 9 Phil. Rep., 367.)
In deciding this case we must, therefore, under the law, put ourselves in the position of the defendants at the
time of the event. It is from their point of view that they are to be judged.
If they honestly believed, and had apparently reasonable grounds for that belief, that the life of their companion
was in imminent danger or that he was likely to suffer great bodily harm, and that the means which they used to
protect him were reasonably necessary to that end, they can not be convicted. (Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, 98;
People vs.Bruggy, 93 Cal., 476; Harris vs. State, 96 Ala., 24; U. S. vs. Outerbridge, 5 Sawy, (U. S. Circ.), 620.) I am
convinced that the facts and circumstances of this case were sufficient to induce and support the belief in the
minds of the defendants that their companion's life was in imminent danger and that the means which they
employed were reasonably necessary to secure his protection. (Supreme court of Spain, 2 January, 1873; 5 April,
1873; 30 April, 1874; 31 May, 1879; 17 March, 1885; 26 November, 1886; 26 November, 1886; 2 March, 1888; 4
April, 1889; 5 July, 1890; 6 December, 1890; 30 December, 1890; 11 February, 1896; 9 December, 1896; 24 May,
1898; 28 May, 1889; 10 December, 1898; 15 November, 1899; 9 January, 1900; 1 June, 1901; 16 April, 1902; 3
January, 1903; 14 January, 1903; 20 March, 1903; July, 1909; 26 October, 1904; 17 November, 1904; 20 October,
1904; 29 October, 1904; 8 March, 1905.) In other words, it would seem under all the circumstances, that it can
not fairly be charged that the defendants, particularly the appellant, acted otherwise than as reasonable men
would have acted in the same situation; and after all this is the real test. (Allen vs. U. S., 150 U. S., 551;
Hickory vs. U. S., 151 U. S., 303; Christian vs. State, 96 Ala., 89; People vs. Hurley, 8 Cal., 390; Gainey vs. People,
97 III., 270; State vs. West, 45 La. Ann., 14.)
While most of the authorities above cited refer to self-defense only, the principles they enunciate are fully
applicable to the case at bar, because, generally speaking, what one may do in his own defense another may do
for him. (25 Am. & Ency. of Law, 274, and cases there cited.)
Under the circumstances of this case I can not feel that the fair and impartial administration of justice requires
that we should refine doctrines, draw uncertain distinctions, invoke doubtful presumptions, employ fine
analyses, or seize upon equivocal circumstances for the purpose of the convicting the appellant of homicide, of
for the purpose of establishing a doctrine which may have as a result that a criminal, invading his neighbor's
premises feloniously and in the nighttime for the purpose of robbery, and surprised and taken in his wanton act,
may feel that he is in any way or to degree privileged under the law when, in attempting to make his outrage
against man and society secure from detention and punishment, he seeks by every means in his power to
destroy the life of his discover. Every man ought to lend his hand in assisting society to apprehend and punish
offenders against its institutions and laws, and while the wanton or illegal destruction of human life, under the
guise of such assistance, ought to be promptly, vigorously, and unrelentingly punished, still, where such person,
acting in the honest belief that he is saving the life of one who is viciously attacked by a criminal whose
recognition or apprehension is attempted, in the defense of such person, causes the death of the criminal, the
court ought not to be drawn from its usual, even and steady course in order to provide a punishment. (Supreme
court of Spain, 5 February, 1887; Viada, Penal Code, vol. 1, 160, 161.)
This court has gone very far in the direction of liberality in lying down the principles governing the defense of
self-defense and the means that may be legally employed to make that defense effective — very much further,
indeed, than it is necessary to go absolved the appellant in the case at bar. In the case of United States vs.
Patala (2 Phil. Rep., 752), the court says, page 756:
It appears from the testimony of the defendant that at the time of the occurrence he was cleaning fish on board
the steamship Compañía de Filipinas; that without any provocation on his part the deceased, who was the cock
of the boat, believing that some of the fish was missing, slapped him and kicked him; that no being satisfied with
ART 11-13 CASES
this, when the defendant started to run away from him, the deceased pursued him and attacked him with a
knife; that the defendant, taking advantage of some favorable chance during the struggle, succeeded in wresting
the knife from the deceased and inflicted upon him a wound in the left side, from the result of which he died a
few hours later.
. . . The aggression on the part of the deceased was in every respect unjustified, and the defendant had a perfect
right to repel the attack in the most adequate from within his power under the critical circumstances of a
sudden assault.
. . . He had reason to believe that he was placed in the alternative of killing or being killed when he was being
attacked and pursued with a deadly weapon. This was the only weapon used during the struggle and it
necessary had to be either in his possession or in the hands of the deceased. If through a fortunate accident he
came into possession of the knife, he could have lost control of it through a similar accident and then found
himself at the mercy of his assailant. Therefore the act of the defendant rendering his assailant powerless as
well as he could under the critical circumstances of the moment, and repelling his aggression, constitute, in our
opinion, a true case of self-defense, which exempts the defendant from any criminal liability under paragraph 4
of articles 8 of the Penal Code.
The same doctrine is laid down in the similar case of the United States vs. Salandanan (1 Phil. Rep., 478). (See
also U. S., vs. Brello, 9 Phil. Rep., 424; U. S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. Rep., 517; U. S. vs. Bailon, 9 Phil. Rep., 161.)
There is neither claim nor evidence that any of the defendants were actuated in their defense of Bumanglag by
revenge, resentment, or other illegal motive, and from this point of view the case requires no discussion.
As to the question of reasonable doubt.
In discussing the questions of burden of proof and reasonable doubt in cases involving self-defense, the courts
have stated various confusing and apparently contradictory propositions, but the general rule deducible from
the authorities seems to be that when the prosecution has made a prima facie case against the accused, it is for
him to introduce evidence showing self-defense, if he sets up the plea; but that if upon the whole testimony,
both on the part of the State and the accused, the jury has a reasonable doubt whether he acted in self-defense
or not, he is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and to an acquittal. (25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 283.)
The doctrine above stated is fully supported by the authorities.
In the case of Lillinienthal vs. United States (97 U. S., 237, 266), the court said:
In criminal cases the true rule is that the burden of proof never shifts; that, in all cases, before a conviction can
be had, the jury must be satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the affirmative of the issue
presented in the accusation, that the defendant is guilty in the manner and form as charged in the indictment. . .
. Where the matter of excuse or justification of the offense charged grows out of the original transaction, the
defense is not driven to the necessity of establishing the matter in excuse or justification by a preponderance of
the evidence, and much less beyond a reasonable doubt. If, upon a consideration of all the evidence, there be a
reasonable doubt of guilt of the party, the jury are to give him the benefit of such doubt.
To the same effect are Tweedy vs. State (5 Iowa, 433); Wharton's Criminal Evidence, p. 236;
Tiffany vs.Commonwealth (121 Pa. St., 165); People vs. Coughin (65 Mich., 704).
The section casts upon the defendant that burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or
excuse the commission of the homicide. This does not mean that he must prove such circumstances by a
44
preponderance of the evidence, but that the presumption that the killing was felonious arises from the mere
proof by the prosecution of the homicide, and the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, etc., is thereby
cast upon him. He is only bound under this rule to produce such evidence as will create in the minds of the jury a
reasonable doubt of his guilt of the offense charged." (People vs. Flanagan, 60 Cal., 3; 44 Am. Rep., 52;
People vs. Smith, 59 Cal., 607.) "It can make no difference whether this reasonable doubt is the result of
evidence on the part of the defendant tending show circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the
killing, or from other evidence coming from him or the prosecution. The well-settled rule that a defendant shall
not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every
material part of the case, no matter whether it is as to the act of killing, or the reason for a manner of its
commission. (People vs. Bushton, 80 Cal., 160, 164; Alexander vs. People, 96 III., 96; People vs. Riodan, 117 N. Y.,
71.)
Reading the evidence in this case in the light of reason and of the principles enunciated by the courts, I can not
but feel that, under all the circumstances, there is a strong doubt of appellant's legal responsibility for the crime
charged. In my opinion, therefore, the judgment of the court below should be reversed and the appellant
acquitted.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5749 October 21, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PONCIANO ESMEDIA and MENA ESMEDIA, defendants-appellants.
W. L. Wright, for appellants.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from a sentence rendered by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Antique,
condemning Ponciano Esmedia and Mena Esmedia to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, to jointly
and severally pay to the heirs of Ciriaco Abando the sum of P1,000, to the heirs of Santiago Abando the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs of the cause, for the crime of double homicide.
Ciriaco Abando, his wife, and their son, Santiago, lived in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Sibalom, in the
barrio of Bongboñgan, Province of Antique. Gregorio Esmedia, father of these two accused, son-in-law of Ciriaco
Abando and brother-in-law of Santiago Abando, lived in the same barrio. These tow families lived very near to
each other and owned adjoining rice lands. Before this trouble occurred there had been a dispute between
these two families relative to the ownership of the rice land then occupied by Ciriaco Abando. About 2 o'clock
on the afternoon of the 24th of June, 1909, Ciriaco Abando instructed his son, Santiago, to go to a certain place
in his rice field to let out the water in order that they could plant rice the said field. In compliance with these
instructions of his father, Santiago proceeded to the place designated, and while at work doing what he had
been ordered by his father to do, Gregorio Esmedia appeared on the scene and started a quarrel with Santiago.
Soon thereafter Gregorio drew a dagger and stabbed Santiago in the back. Santiago fell to the ground, but arose
immediately and attacked Gregorio with his bolo, inflicting several wounds on the said Gregorio in consequence
of which he fell to the ground. Before this trouble finally terminated the two accused and Ciriaco Abando
appeared in that immediate vicinity.
ART 11-13 CASES
These two accused contend that they were working in their rice field near by, and on seeing Ciriaco Abando and
Santiago Abando attacking their father, Gregorio, they started to the place to render their father assistance,
Ponciano starting first; that when Ponciano got near the place of the trouble he was met by Ciriaco and Santiago
who attacked him with bolos and clubs and that he, Ponciano, in self-defense, knocked them both down, and
after they had fallen the other accused, Mena Esmedia, arrived. Ponciano further contends that he did not use a
bolo in this fight, but used a club only.
The prosecution in the court below contended that when these two accused saw the fight between their father
and Santiago they rushed to the place and proceeded to kill, as they thought, Santiago, and on seeing Ciriaco
approaching they met him and killed him outright.
As a result of this fight Ciriaco was left dead on the scene, Gregorio received fatal wounds from which he died
within about four hours, and Santiago also received fatal wounds from which he died five days later.
Ciriaco Abando received two wounds on the top of his head, one 8 centimeters and the other 3 centimeters in
length, caused by some cutting instrument, and also sustained a fracture of the skull, apparently caused be
means of a blow. He also had a wound on the head 3 centimeters in depth; another on the neck below the left
ear 3 ½ centimeters in depth and 3 centimeters in lenght; the left eye was bruised and he also had a wound on
the palm of the right hand 3 centimeters in length and 2 millimeters in depth.
Santiago Abando received in all seven wounds, one crosswise of the head, back of the left ear, 8 centimeters in
lenght and 1 centimeter in depth, another on top of the head, just above the first wound, 5 centimeters in
length and a half centimeter in depth, a third wound on the left part of the neck 4 centimeters in length, all of
these three wounds having been caused by a cutting instrument; a fourth wound, also caused by some sharp
instrument, 1 centimeter in depth and 8 centimeters in length, on the top of the head; a fifth wound, 2 ½
centimeters in length and 5 millimeters in depth, which was in the nature of a contusion, appeared on the
frontal region of the head; a sixth wound, 2 centimeters in length and 3 ½ centimeters deep, in the back; and a
seventh wound on the left hand, 4 centimeters in length, 2 ½ centimeters wide, and 2 millimeters in depth,
which had apparently been caused by some cutting instrument.
The body of Gregorio Esmedia showed four wounds; a wound or bruise on the front of the head, 5 by 6
centimeters in dimension; another wound, caused by a cutting instrument, running across the head, 6
centimeters in lenght; another wound, apparently caused by a blow with some blunt instrument, on the breast;
and another wound 1 centimeter in depth, apparently caused by a cutting instrument, and also a bruise on the
left arm.
The accused Ponciano Esmedia, received one wound on the head, but it was not of serious nature; the other
accused, Mena Esmedia, escaped uninjured. 1awphil.net
The prosecution presented Andrea Lactoson, 60 years of age, wife of the deceased Ciriaco, and Julian Alagos, a
young boy about 16 years of age, a grandson of Ciriaco. These two witnesses saw the fight and gave a detailed
account of the same. While it is true that these two witnesses contradicted themselves to some extent on cross-
examination, they having testified on direct examination that Ciriaco never did reach the scene of the fight but
was killed by the two accused while on his way there, whereas on cross-examination they testified that Ciriaco
was therewhen the accused arrived, yet it is clear that they intended to say that when the two accused arrived
Ciriaco was in that vicinity but they did not mean to say that he was at the very side of his son.
The theory of the defense that Ponciano was attacked by Ciriaco and Santiago is untenable, as the nature and
character of the wounds on the bodies of these two persons show clearly that at least some of them were
inflicted by bolos, and Ponciano must have used a bolo in the fight, though he contends that he only made use
of a club. The bolo wounds on the heads of Gregorio and Santiago were of such a serious nature that it would
45
have been impossible for them to have gone any distance after having been wounded. So they could not have
rushed toward Ponciano and attacked him after having received these wounds. Santiago was stabbed in the
back by Gregorio, but this wound of itself was not necessarily fatal.
After a careful consideration of this entire record we are thoroughly satisfied that the following facts, aside from
those we have already related, have been established:1awphil.net
The two accused arrived on the scene about the time the fight between Santiago and Gregorio was terminating,
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
and on seeing their father, Gregorio, lying in the mud and water, fatally wounded and dying, and honestly
believing that Santiago, who was standing at the time, would inflict other wounds upon their father, they, in his
defense, immediately killed Santiago. Ciriaco was near the scene at this time and on seeing him to the two
accused, under this great excitement, proceeded to attack him, and as a direct result of the blows inflicted by
them he fell to the ground, dying immediately. Ciriaco was an old man, about 80 years of age, and used a cane
to assist him in walking about.
Under the provisions of No. 5, article 8 of the Penal Code, the two accused are exempt from criminal
responsibility for having caused the death of Santiago Abando, inasmuch as it has been shown that they inflicted
these wounds upon him in defense of their father who was fatally wounded at the time. They honestly believed,
and had good grounds upon which to found their belief, that Santiago would continue his attack upon their
father. They are, however, guilty of having caused the death of the old man, Ciriaco Abando. When they
attacked and killed him the other trouble had terminated and they were not in danger of bodily harm from him.
In the commission of this crime of homicide, we must take into consideration No. 20 of article 10 of the Penal
Code which provides, as an aggravating circumstance, that "when the act is committed with insult or in
disregard for the respect which may be due the aggrieved party on account of his rank, age, . . ." inasmuch as the
deceased, Ciriaco, was a man 80 years of age and did not arrive on the scene until after the trouble between the
two accused and Santiago had terminated.
As we have said, these two accused killed this old man, Ciriaco, while laboring under great excitement and in the
heat of passion, and it might be insisted that under these circumstances they should be given the benefit of No.
7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, as an extenuating circumstance. This provision should be applied to reduce the
penalty in cases where the provocation which caused the heated passion was made by the injured party. In the
case at bar the provocation was made by Santiago and not Ciriaco, as Ciriaco arrived after the fight had
terminated and there was then no provocation running from the old man, Ciriaco, to these accused. He was
entirely unarmed and made no demonstration and said no word prior to the assault upon him by the two
accused. So the state of mind into which these two accused were thrown by the provocation induced by
Santiago can not modify the extent of their punishment for killing the old man. In other words, before this
provision can be applied as an extenuating circumstance it is necessary, as we have said, that the person injured
should have executed the act producing arrebato y obcecacion. It can not be applied when an assault is made
upon a person who had taken no part in the quarrel and had not in any manner provoked the accused. (Decision
of the supreme court of Spain dated October 17, 1904, published in the Official Gazette on December 23
following; decision of the supreme court of Spain dated January 12, 1894; White vs. State, 44 Tex. Cr. Rep., 346;
State vs. Jackson, 45 La. Ann., 1031; State vs. Vinso, 171 Mo., 576.)
In view of the fact that these two accused are ignorant the aggravating circumstance is compensated by the
provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code which we applied in this case.
The sentence appealed from is, therefore, affirmed; provided, however, that these two accused, Ponciano
Esmedia and Mena Esmedia, be condemned to fourteen years eight months an one day of reclusion temporal,
and to the accessory penalties; and, provided further, that they be declared exempt from criminal responsibility
ART 11-13 CASES
for causing the death of Santiago Abando, which exemption relieves them from paying any indemnity to the
heirs of the said Santiago Abando.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004]
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside
the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July
2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22),
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the
RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The
accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value
to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the
amount of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within
five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.[3]
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue. The
data are hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00
46
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.[5]
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila
Doctors Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the
Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4
June 1992, the Statement of Account[7]shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Tys
sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in
the amount of P418,410.55.[8] The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June
1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.[9] To
assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the
hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due
dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency
of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty
by registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject
of the instant case.[10]
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING
mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject
to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to
change the latters gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her
mother. The debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical
health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst
for her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note,
open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mothers immediate discharge.[11]
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found that Ty
issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE
the defense.[12] Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of
violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation,
which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per
count or a total of forty-two (42) months.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated
her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when
evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee had
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the trial court should not have applied
the law mechanically, without due regard to the principles of justice and equity.[14]
ART 11-13 CASES
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand
pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.[15]
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of
the checks and the hospitals knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds.It held that B.P. 22 makes the
mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance.[16]
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance of
the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v.
Court of Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22,
the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human
material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard
to the protection of the social order.[19]
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of
Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds:
OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN
AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE
SUBJECT CHECKS.
ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED
CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a
check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as
an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment, the
drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or
merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose
for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum.[21]
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of
47
the case.[22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or
revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion.[23]
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that the
issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the
issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater
evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. And, as
previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment
accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below, rather
than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be
invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear
must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.[24]
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that
the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.[25] It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for
ones life or limb.[26] A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or
remote.[27] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. [28] It must be of such
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape.[29]
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal
liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she
invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument
without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did
not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words,
she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in
ART 11-13 CASES
the form of postdated checks or jewelry.[30] And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and
issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a
violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue
postdated checks because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem.[31] Besides, apart from
petitioners bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was
compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospitals demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this
case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability
under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater
than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.[32]
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.[33] Ty could
have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the
choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have
been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.[34] In this case,
the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear
and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as
bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full
volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a
greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case[35] for damages filed
by Tys mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the
findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a
preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable
Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a
consideration[38] or for value.[39] In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were issued
without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. Valuable
consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to
the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor,
or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an
obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or
indorser.[40]
48
 In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the care
given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by
force of her signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on
the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because she
was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et
al.[41] tells us that it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no
consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred
upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is enough if
the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and extinguishment of
the original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement.Appellee accepted one
debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for the note executed by the
appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the
obligation.[43] The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.[44] As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,[45] what is primordial is that such issued
checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a
required element under B.P. Blg. 22.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P.
22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds. [46] If not
rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[47]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds with
the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is
immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense
is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true
nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the
Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and
mechanical application of the law.
Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different
from those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a
warranty deposit in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was
ART 11-13 CASES
a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while privately financing those in
desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a
lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the
deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual
account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual account or for value.
Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were
issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that
petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith.Administrative Circular 12-
2000,[50] adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v. People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition
of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to
modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-2001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is
stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P.
Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions
of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as
the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more
appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion,
and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a
fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[54]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31
July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila
Doctors Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount
of the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18660 December 22, 1922
49
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, and shoot successively with an armalite rifle (M-16) FERNANDO B. BATALLER while the latter was intoxicated,
vs. thereby hitting and inflicting upon him multiple serious and mortal wounds on his head, at the right lower face,
FELIPE DELIMA, defendant-appellant. the chest (front) at the left antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, at the left
lateral waistline, thereby lacerating the liver, hitting the stomach portions of the large and small intestines and
Tancinco & Rosales for appellant. lower vertebrae, and the chest (back) at the middle back and another at the left back, lateral level of the lower
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee. rib, which caused Fernando B. Batallers direct and instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]

ROMUALDEZ, J.: When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.

Lorenzo Napilon had escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. The facts established during trial by the prosecution is summarized by the appellee in its brief, thus:

Some days afterwards the policeman Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge
Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The
fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his
revolver, but the bullet did not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. These peace
officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him.
The policeman was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory
penalties. He appeals from that judgment which must be reversed.
That killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and
had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the
hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal,
was justified by the circumstances.lawphil.net
Article 8, No. 11, of the Penal Code being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is hereby
acquitted with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
"In the evening of February 16, 1990, appellant Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned by the
Bacacay Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High
School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay.
Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, appellant, Pat. Pabon and Elmo Bes were watching the
dance, two students, Riselle Banares and Juliana Basaysay, approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems
that there is somebody making trouble." Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber
revolver, respectively, responded forthwith. Moments after the two police officers left, bursts of gunfire-- "Rat-
tat-tat-tat-tat" filled the air. Fernando Bataller, a graduating student of Pili Barangay High School, was hit on
different parts of his body and died.
Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in the company of Carlito Bataller
and Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the schools temporary
building, the bamboo splits broke. At this instance, appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared. Without warning,
appellant fired his gun. Fernando slumped on the ground, bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat. Pabon
fled from the crime scene.

Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the autopsy report, Fernando suffered
SECOND DIVISION
the following gunshot wounds: (1) head, located at the right lower face, skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves,
bone torn away; (2) chest (front, located at left, antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left
[G.R. No. 124670. June 21, 2000] nipple, another gunshot wound on the same location with tattooing located at left lateral waistline; (3) chest
(back) located at the middle back at the level of the lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away, another
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES, accused-appellant. gunshot wound located at the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, with tattooing. (Citations omitted)"[2]

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 18, Patrolman Domingo Belbes stood charged of
Murder. The information against him reads:
"That on or about the 16th of February, 1990 at 9:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, inside the campus of
Pili National High School, at Barangay Pili, Municipality of Bacacay, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery, taking advantage of nighttime,
employing means to insure or afford impunity, with the use of high powered firearm, and with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, suddenly, unexpectedly and without any warning, attack, fire
In his defense, the accused-appellant presented his version of the fatal incident, summed up by the trial court as
follows:
"The accused, Domingo Belbes in his defense testified that he was at Pili Barangay High School with P/Cpl. Jose
Pabon because they were detailed by their Station Commander. x x x At 9:00 p.m. two female students reported
to them and Mrs. Ulanca that somebody was making trouble at the back of the temporary building. They were
requested by Mrs. Ulanca to see what happened and they went to the place. There they came upon somebody
who was making trouble and destroying the wall of the temporary building. He came to know that it was
Fernando Bataller. Fernando Bataller had some companions, Carlito Bataller and certain Belista. Fernando
Bataller was more than 20 years old at that time and Carlito was about Fernandos age. He saw Fernando
destroying the wall of the temporary building which was made of bamboo splits. Pabon was in front of him. The
two companions were prevailing upon Fernando. Fernando was drunk or a little bit tipsy. He was not vomiting
but he smelled of wine. They approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen. Fernando did not

50
ART 11-13 CASES
mind them. Fernando stabbed Pabon with a knife. Belbes knew because he saw the glint of the blade when the
thrust was made on Pabon. Pabon and Bataller were about one (1) meter away from each other. Pabon was not
hit, for he was able to move backward. Fernando made two thrusts on Pabon. After Pabon retreated because of
the knife thrusts, he (Belbes) was also stabbed by Fernando. He was hit on his lower left shoulder. He was able
to hold Fernandos hand because he wanted to get the knife from him. His firearm was slung on his shoulder.
Fernando was able to free himself. Fernando made another thrust and Belbes moved to his left. Then he made a
warning shot. After the warning shot, Fernando suddenly grabbed his firearm. Belista was quite aggressive at
that moment, while Carlito wanted to kick him. Fernando was able to hold the barrel of the armalite. They
struggled with each other and the gun went off considering that his armalite was semi-automatic, with one
squeeze of the trigger one shot came out. During the process of grappling for the armalite he could not recall
how many shots came out. When his service armalite went off he saw Fernando fall to the ground. When
Fernando fell, he took the knife from his hand. The people gathered around them. They asked that Fernando be
brought to the hospital. After one hour, the police mobile car arrived. They proceeded to the Police Station.
There they turned over the knife to the Desk Officer. The knife is now with the Provincial Command."[3]
Defense witness Jose Pabon, also a policeman, who was present when the incident happened, corroborated the
testimony of the appellant. However, on cross-examination, Pabon belied the fact that the appellant fired a
warning shot. Pabon likewise failed to mention anything about aggression on the part of the companions of the
deceased, namely Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. He only recalled that said companions ganged up on
Belbes after he shot the deceased.
Finding the defense weak, while the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently strong, the trial court convicted
the appellant of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In this appeal, counsel de oficio raised one issue:
WAS THE TRIAL [Court] CORRECT IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER?[4]
We shall now consider this matter as well as the more basic issues of self-defense claimed by appellant and the
credibility of the witness for the prosecution. Appellant policeman admits firing the fatal gunshots that hit the
deceased student. But he claims that he did so in self-defense. He contends that he was only performing his
official functions when he responded in the course of police duties to the information that somebody was
making trouble and disturbing the peace. Being in charge of maintaining peace and order within the vicinity, he
ascertained the veracity of the information given by the students concerned. He asserts that in the absence of
intent and voluntariness, he cannot be faulted for the death of the deceased.
At the outset, we note that appellant questions the credibility of the sole eye-witness for the prosecution,
Carlito Bataller. He states that Carlito is the cousin and friend of the deceased. In his view, Carlito had strong
motive to falsely testify against him. Moreover, appellant says that Carlito kindled some moral guilt because he
contributed to the sudden death of his cousin. Appellant alleges that if only Carlito had prevailed over Fernando
(instead of tolerating the hostility of the deceased), he could have prevented the shooting incident.
Regrettably, appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of self-defense on the face of
mortal danger while on police duty. The cross-examination of Carlito Bataller did not bear out his averments of
fraternal bias and psychological guilt or moral taint in Carlitos testimony. The testimony of the single witness, if
positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a charge for murder.[5] Moreover,
when the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court deserve great respect
since it is in a better position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in court, and to discern
its dimensions, both verbal and non-verbal.[6] The relationship of a witness to the victim does not necessarily
diminish the formers credibility.[7]
ART 11-13 CASES
It is a settled rule that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of a witness deserve
respect because it is in a better position to determine whether the witness was telling the truth or not, having
observed the demeanor of the witness while testifying on the witness stand.[8] In the case at bar, there appears
to be no cogent reason why we should not adhere to this rule.
Where the accused owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him. He must
show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a
stranger.[9] To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) he is not
the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable
means to prevent or repel the aggression. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is
well settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the
deceased, it was incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance
claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the
prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it
could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing."[10]
Appellant testified that upon responding to the report of two students, he and Patrolman Pabon, saw Fernando
Bataller destroying the bamboo wall of the schools temporary building. Fernando appeared to be drunk and a
little bit tipsy. They approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen but the former ignored them.
Instead, Fernando lunged with a knife at Patrolman Pabon but the latter avoided the thrust. Afterwards,
Fernando also stabbed the appellant and hit his left shoulder. As another thrust was coming, appellant claims he
fired a warning shot. Fernando grabbed the armalite and they struggled until the gun went off hitting Fernando,
according to appellant.
We have serious questions on accused-appellants claim of self-defense, on his part, against the alleged
aggressiveness of the deceased student. First, why was the knife allegedly used by the deceased mis-handled? It
was not even subjected to fingerprinting. Second, why was the wound on appellants shoulder medically
examined only after the lapse of more than twenty-one hours? Was it possibly self-inflicted? According to the
doctor who examined him, Dr. Evelyn Amador, it was a possibility.[11] Lastly, as observed by the trial court, if it
was true that they grappled face to face with each other, why was the victim hit sideways, as testified to by
Amador?
The time factor here appears significant. Mrs. Mila Ulanca testified that it only took about six seconds from the
time Patrolman Belbes left his seat until she heard the burst of gunshots.[12]This testimony is not contradicted or
rebutted.
Thus, appellants claim of self-defense could not prosper. The evidence on record, however, reveals an
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal Code. [13] A
person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office. But we must stress there are two requisites for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in
the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right: and (b) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. [14] In
the instant case, only the first requisite is present; admittedly appellant acted in the performance of his duty.
However, the second requisite is lacking, for the killing need not be a necessary consequence of the
performance of his duty. His duty is to maintain peace and order during the Junior and Senior Prom. But he
exceeded such duty, in our view, when he fired his armalite without warning. No doubt, the concept of
mitigating circumstances is founded on leniency in favor of an accused who has shown less perversity in the
commission of an offense.[15] Though his protestation of innocence is unavailing, his offense could only be
characterized as homicide, not murder, as hereafter shown.
On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out murder. Treachery cannot be
presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For the same
51
to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means,
method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory
acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the
means, method or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.[16] There is no
showing that the shooting was premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means,
methods or forms to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
victim might make. Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery.[17]
On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide because the shooting
was intentional.[18] Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver
to a friend, who was killed by the accidental discharge brought about by negligent handling;[19] or (2) discharging
a firearm from the window of ones house and killing a neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the
balcony front;[20] or (3) where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and,
as the bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who
died soon thereafter.[21] In this case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim.
We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of
fulfillment of duty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, the
maximum of the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14
years and 8 months. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken
from prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellant Domingo Belbes of the crime of murder is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Arsenio Borjal was the elected mayor of La Paz, Abra, at the outbreak of war, and continued to serve as Mayor
during the Japanese occupation, until March 10, 1943, when he moved to Bangued because of an attempt upon
his life by unknown persons. On December 18, 1944, appellant Manuel Beronilla was appointed Military Mayor
of La Paz by Lt. Col. R. H. Arnold, regimental commander of the 15th Infantry, Philippine Army, operating as a
guerrilla unit in the province of Abra. Simultaneously with his appointment as Military Mayor, Beronilla received
copy of a memorandum issued by Lt. Col. Arnold to all Military Mayors in Northern Luzon, authorizing them "to
appoint a jury of 12 bolomen to try persons accused of treason, espionage, or the aiding and abetting (of ) the
enemy" (Exhibit 9). He also received from the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry a list of all puppet government
officials of the province of Abra (which included Arsenio Borjal, puppet mayor of La Paz), with a memorandum
instructing all Military Mayors to investigate said persons and gather against them complaints from people of
the municipality for collaboration with the enemy (Exhibit 12-a).
Sometime in March, 1945, while the operations for the liberation of the province of Abra were in progress,
Arsenio Borjal returned to La Paz with his family in order to escape the bombing of Bangued. Beronilla, pursuant
to his instructions, placed Borjal under custody and asked the residents of La Paz to file complaints against him.
In no time, charges of espionage, aiding the enemy, and abuse of authority were filed against Borjal; a 12-man
jury was appointed by Beronilla, composed of Jesus Labuguen as chairman, and Benjamin Adriatico, Andres Afos,
Juanito Casal, Santiago Casal, Benjamin Abella, Servillano Afos, Mariano Ajel, Felimon Labuguen, Felix Murphy,
Pedro Turqueza, and Delfin Labuguen as members; while Felix Alverne and Juan Balmaceda were named
prosecutors, Policarpio Paculdo as clerk of the jury, and Lino Inovermo as counsel for the accused. Later, Atty.
Jovito Barreras voluntarily appeared and served as counsel for Borjal. Sgt. Esteban Cabanos observed the
proceedings for several days upon instructions of Headquarters, 15th Infantry. The trial lasted 19 days up to
April 10, 1945; the jury found Borjal guilty on all accounts and imposed upon him instruction from his superiors.
Mayor Beronilla forwarded the records of the case to the Headquarters of the 15th Infantry for review. Said
records were returned by Lt. Col. Arnold to Beronilla on April 18, 1945 with the following instructions:
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP
In the Field

EN BANC 16 April 1945

G.R. No. L-4445 February 28, 1955

Msg. No. 337
Subject: Arsenio Borjal, Charges Against
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, To: Military Mayor of La Paz, Abra.
vs.
MANUEL BERONILLA, FILIPINO VELASCO, POLICARPIO PACULDO, and JACINTO ADRIATICO, defendants-
appellants. 1. Returned herewith are the papers on the case of Arsenio Borjal.
2. This is a matter best handled by your government and whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby
approved.
Agripino A. Brillantes, Valera, Eufemio and Bernardez for appellants.
Prospero C. Sanidad and Claro M. Recto for defendant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jaime R. de los Angeles and Martiniano P. Vivo for (Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD
appellee. Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Received April 18, 1945, 10:35 a.m.

This is an appeal by accused Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico from
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra (Criminal Case No. 70) convicting them of murder for the
execution of Arsenio Borjal in the evening of April 18, 1945, in the town of La Paz , Province of Abra. (Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra

52
ART 11-13 CASES
(Exhibit 8, 8-a) Upon motion of defense counsel, the case against defendant Jesus Labuguen, who had been granted amnesty by
the Amnesty Commission of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was ordered provisionally dismissed:
and on the night of the same day, April 18, 1945, Beronilla ordered the execution of Borjal. Jacinto Adriatico defendant Juan Balmaceda was discharged from the information so that he might be utilized as state witness,
acted as executioner and Antonio Palope as grave digger. Father Luding of the Roman Catholic Church was asked although actually he was not called to testify; while the case against defendants Antonio Palope (the grave
to administer the last confession to the prisoner, while Father Filipino Velasco of the Aglipayan Church digger) and Demetrio Afos( a boloman) was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
performed the last rites over Borjal's remains. Immediately after the execution, Beronilla reported the matter to
Col. Arnold who in reply to Beronilla's report, sent him the following message: Trial proceeded against the rest of the defendants; and on July 10, 1950, the Court below rendered judgment,
acquitting the members of the jury and the grave digger Antonio Palope on the ground that they did not
HEADQUARTERS 3RD MILITARY DISTRICT participated in the killing of Arsenio Borjal; acquitting defendants Jesus Labuguen, Felix Alverne, Severo Afos,
15TH INFANTRY, USAFIP and Lauro Parado upon insufficiency of evidence to establish their participation in the crime; but convicting
In the Field defendants Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco, and Jacinto Adriatico as conspirator and co-
principals of the crime of murder, and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of from 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Arsenio Borjal jointly and severally in
22 April 1945 the amount of P4,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one fourth of the
costs. In convicting said defendants the Court a quo found that while the crime committed by them fell within
the provisions of the Amnesty Proclamation, they were not entitled to the benefits thereof because the crime
Msg. No. 398 was committed after the expiration of the time limit fixed by the amnesty proclamation;: i.e., that the deceased
Subject: Report and information Re Borjal case Arsenio Borjal was executed after the liberation of La Paz, Abra.
To: Military Mayor Beronilla
In view of the sentence meted by the Court below, the accused Beronilla, Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico
1. Received your letter dated 18 April 1945, subject, above. appealed to this Court.
2. My request that you withhold action in this case was only dictated because of a query from Higher
Headquarters regarding same. Actually, I believe there was no doubt as to the treasonable acts of the accused
The records are ample to sustain the claim of the defense that the arrest, prosecution and trial of the late
Arsenio Borjal and I know that your trial was absolutely impartial and fair. Consequently, I Can only compliment
Arsenio Borjal were done pursuant to express orders of the 15th Infantry Headquarters. (Exhibit 9 and 12-a),
you for your impartial independent way of handling the whole case.
instructing all military mayors under its jurisdiction to gather evidence against puppet officials and to appoint
juries of at least 12 bolomen to try the accused and find them guilty by two thirds vote. It is to be noted that
(Sgd.) R. H. ARNOLD Arsenio Borjal was specifically named in the list of civilian officials to be prosecuted (Exhibit 12-b).
Lieut.-Colonel, 15th Inf., PA
Commanding In truth, the prosecution does not seriously dispute that the trial and sentencing of Borjal was done in
accordance with instructions of superior military authorities, altho it point to irregularities that were due more
to ignorance of legal processes than personal animosity against Borjal. The state, however, predicates its case
Received April 26, 1947 7:00 a.m. principally on the existence of the radiogram Exhibit H from Col. Volckmann, overall area commander, to Lt. Col.
Arnold, specifically calling attention to the illegality of Borjal's conviction and sentence, and which the
(Sgd.) MANUEL BERONILLA prosecution claims was known to the accused Beronilla. Said message is as follows:
Military Mayor, La Paz, Abra
"Message:
(Exhibit 21, 21-a)
VOLCKMANN TO ARNOLD CLN UNDERSTAND THAT MUNICIPALITIES OF ABRA HAVE ORGANIZED JURY SYSTEM
Two years thereafter, Manuel Beronilla as military mayor, Policarpio Paculdo as Clerk of the jury, Felix Alverne PD BELIEVE THAT THIS BODY IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT TRY PUNISHMENTS THEREOF PD SPECIFIC INSTANCE IS
and Juan Balmaceda as prosecutors, Jesus Labuguen, Delfin Labuguen, Filemon Labuguen, Servillano Afos, BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION FRO PROPER AND IMMEDIATE ACTION ON ONE ARSENIO BORJAL OF LA PAZ
Andres Afos, Benjamin Adriatico, Juanito Casel, Santiago Casel, Mariano Ajel, Felix Murphy, Benjamin Abella, and WHO HAS BEEN TRIED CMA CONVICTED AND SENTENCED TO BE HANGED PD REPORT ACTION TAKEN BY YOU ON
Pedro Turqueza as members of the jury, Jacinto Adriatico as executioner, Severo Afos as grave digger, and THIS MATTER PD MSG BEGINS CLN"
Father Filipino Velasco as an alleged conspirator, were indicted in the Court of First Instance of Abra for murder,
for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the execution of Arsenio Borjal. Soon thereafter, the late President (EXH. H)
Manuel A. Roxas issued Executive Proclamation No. 8, granting amnesty to all persons who committed acts
penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy against persons aiding in The crucial question thus becomes whether or not this message, originally sent to Arnold's quarters in San
the war efforts of the enemy. Defendant Jesus Labuguen, then a master sergeant in the Philippine Army, applied Esteban, Ilocos Sur, was relayed by the latter to appellant Beronilla in La Paz, Abra, on the morning of April 18,
for and was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission, Armed Forces of the Philippines (Records, pp. 618- 1945, together with the package of records of Borjal's trial that was admittedly returned to and received by
20). The rest of the defendant filed their application for amnesty with the Second Guerrilla Amnesty Beronilla on that date, after review thereof by Arnold (Exhibit 8-8-a). Obviously, if the Volckmann message was
Commission, who denied their application on the ground that the crime had been inspired by purely personal known to Beronilla, his ordering the execution of Borjal on the night of April 18, 1945 can not be justified.
motives, and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Abra for trial on the merits.

53
ART 11-13 CASES
We have carefully examined the evidence on this important issue, and find no satisfactory proof that Beronilla
did actually receive the radiogram Exhibit H or any copy thereof. The accused roundly denied it. The messenger,
or "runner", Pedro Molina could not state what papers were enclosed in the package he delivered to Beronilla
on that morning in question, nor could Francisco Bayquen (or Bayken), who claimed to have been present at the
delivery of the message, state the contents thereof.
The only witness who asserted that Beronilla received and read the Volckmann message, Exhibit H, was Rafael
Balmaceda, a relative of Borjal, who claimed to have been, as Beronilla's bodyguard, present at the receipt of
the message and to have read it over Beronilla's shoulder. This testimony, however, can not be accorded
credence, for the reason that in the affidavit executed by this witness before Fiscal Antonio of Abra (Exhibit 4),
Balmaceda failed to make any mention of the reading, or even the receipt, of the message. In the affidavit, he
stated:
Q. In your capacity as policeman, do you know of any usual occurrence that transpired in La Paz, Abra? — A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Will you state what is the event? — A. On April 17, 1945, I was assigned as guard at the Presidencia where
Mayor Arsenio Borjal is confined. On the 18th of April, 1945, six bolomen came to me while I was on duty as
guard, that Mayor Borjal should be tied, on orders of Mayor Beronilla, Mayor Borjal wanted to know the reason
why he would be tied, as he had not yet learned of the decision of the jury against him. Mayor Borjal wrote a
note to Mayor Beronilla, asking the reason for his being ordered to be tied. I personally delivered the note of
Borjal to Mayor Beronilla. Mayor Beronilla did not answer the note, but instead told me that I should tie Mayor
Borjal, as tomorrow he would die, as he cannot escape. I returned to the Presidencia, and Mayor Borjal was tied,
as that was the ordered of Mayor Beronilla.
The plain import of the affidavit is that the witness Rafael Balmaceda was not with Beronilla when the message
arrived, otherwise Beronilla would have given him his orders direct, as he (Balmaceda) testified later at the trial.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that having learned of the contents of the Volckmann message, Balmaceda
should not have relayed it to Borjal , or to some member of the latter's family, considering that they were
relatives. In addition to Balmaceda was contradicted by Bayken, another prosecution witness, as to the hatching
of the alleged conspiracy to kill Borjal. Balmaceda claimed that the accused-appellants decided to kill Borjal in
the early evening of April 18, while Bayken testified that the agreement was made about ten o'clock in the
morning, shortly after the accused had denied Borjal's petition to be allowed to hear mass.
Upon the other hand, Beronilla's conduct belies his receipt of the Volckmann message. Had he executed Borjal
in violation of superior orders, he would not have dared to report it to Arnold's headquarters on the very same
day, April 18th, 1945, as he did (Exhibit 20), half an hour after the execution. And what is even more important,
if Borjal was executed contrary to instructions, how could Lt. Colonel Arnold on April 21, 1945, write in reply
(Exhibit 21, 21-a) "I can only compliment you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole
case" instead of berating Beronilla and ordering his court martial for disobedience?
Our conclusion is that Lt. Col. Arnold, for some reason that can not now be ascertained, failed to transmit the
Volckmann message to Beronilla. And this being so, the charge of criminal conspiracy to do away with Borjal
must be rejected, because the accused had no need to conspire against a man who was, to their knowledge,
duly sentenced to death.
The state claims that the appellants held grudges against the late Borjal. Even so, it has been already decided
that the concurrence of personal hatred and collaboration with the enemy as motives for a liquidation does not
operate to exclude the case from the benefits of the Amnesty claimed by appellants, since then "it may not be
held that the manslaughter stemmed from purely personal motives" (People vs. Barrioquinto,* G. R. Nos. L-2011
and 2267, June 30, 1951). Actually, the conduct of the appellants does not dispose that these appellants were
ART 11-13 CASES
impelled by malice (dolo). The arrest and trial of Borjal were made upon express orders of the higher command;
the appellants allowed Borjal to be defended by counsel, one of them (attorney Jovito Barreras) chosen by
Borjal's sister; the trial lasted nineteen (19) days; it was suspended when doubts arose about its legality, and it
was not resumed until headquarters (then in Langangilang, Abra) authorized its resumption and sent an
observer (Esteban Cabanos, of the S-5) to the proceedings, and whose suggestions on procedure were followed;
and when the verdict of guilty was rendered and death sentence imposed, the records were sent to Arnold's
headquarters for review, and Borjal was not punished until the records were returned eight days later with the
statement of Arnold that "whatever disposition you make of the case is hereby approved" (Exhibit 8), which on
its face was an assent to the verdict and the sentence. The lower Court, after finding that the late Arsenio Borjal
had really committed treasonable acts, (causing soldiers and civilians to be tortured, and hidden American
officers to be captured by the Japanese) expressly declared that "the Court is convinced that it was not for
political or personal reason that the accused decided to kill Arsenio Borjal" (Decision, p. 9; Record, p. 727).
It appearing that the charge is the heinous crime of murder, and that the accused-appellants acted upon orders,
of a superior officers that they, as military subordinates, could not question, and obeyed in good faith, without
being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on their part, we can not say that criminal intent
has been established (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507; Peo. vs. Pacana, 47 Phil., 48; Sent. of the Tribunal Supremo
of Spain, 3 July 1886; 7 January 1901; 24 March 1900; 21 Feb. 1921; 25 March 1929). Actus non facit reum nisi
mens si rea.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal
intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal
intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea-a crime is not committed if the minds of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent. (U. S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil., 507).
But even assuming that the accused-appellant did commit crime with they are charged, the Court below should
not have denied their claim to the benefits of the Guerrilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 (42 Off. Gaz., 2072)on
the ground that the slaying of Arsenio Borjal took place after actual liberation of the area from enemy control
and occupation. The evidence on record regarding the date of liberation of La Paz, Abra, is contradictory. The
Military Amnesty Commission that decided the case of one of the original accused Jesus Labuguen, held that La
Paz, Abra, was liberated on July 1, 1945, according to its records; and this finding was accepted by Judge Letargo
when he dismissed the case against said accused on March 15, 1949. On the other hand, Judge Bocar and
Hilario, who subsequently took cognizance of the case, relied on Department Order No. 25, of the Department
of the Interior, dated August 12, 1948, setting the liberation of the Province of Abra on April 4, 1945, fifteen days
before Borjal was slain. The two dates are not strictly contradictory; but given the benefit of the Presidential
directive to the Amnesty Commissions (Adm. Order No. 11, of October 2, 1946) that "any reasonable doubt as to
whether a given case falls within the (amnesty) proclamation shall be resolved in favor of the accused" (42 Off.
Gaz., 2360), as was done in People vs. Gajo, Phil., 107 46 Off. Gaz., (No. 12) p. 6093.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with costs de
oficio.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
54
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging Celestino
Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any
justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos
Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the right lobe of
the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region,
and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel forthwith
objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital
to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist,
rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the
arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring
the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record
pertaining to the mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared
before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense
asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the
accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an
order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic
Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition
of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit
5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and
ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof,
the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged from the
hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused
was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-quoted
and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay
the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had dementia only
occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
ART 11-13 CASES
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and immediately after
the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language
and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense to show hat
the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the defense did not
establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased
Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the
time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw the
accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will
pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The
assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took
possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days
later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to indulge in
any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of
insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane
at the time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal
presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp
conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred
W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p.
11 et seq.) Thefirst view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not
made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of
insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of
insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the
rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West
Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United
States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law.
ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs.
Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption
of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged, and
hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to
prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The
burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental
incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308,
309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
55
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the
deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine
distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence,
direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at the time of
the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W.,
1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler,
Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity
as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and
emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44
Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission of the
act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not
permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the
preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe
contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity,
mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane
murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the
intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission
of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of
the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be
overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in
arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the herein
defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926,
was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed
as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the
offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the
ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a degree
that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr.
Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr.
Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain
peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the
mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia
præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts."
(P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is
largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have to be
considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which
impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson,
Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at San
LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the crime was
committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and
may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
ART 11-13 CASES
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very same day
of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from
him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police
department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication
that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found
confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made within
the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive
psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed with his eyes closed and
practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he
apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities
and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food offered
by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On
several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear
untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive
acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short interview,
he struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes
laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and would not answer in
any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he
was mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with
a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the
literature as for example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are
among the attributes of a dependable character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
56
(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and rather irritable. He
himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as to place and person but
he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he could not sleep he could hear
voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed
because he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital.
There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he could not talk in his first
day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead
and already buried in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory for recent events or for
example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He could not, however, do
simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been insane during his first
days in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment
were, of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement
in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form of physchosis,
called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another assistant
alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of psychosis.
It might be premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this
person is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly
serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and
many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate — beyond normal
acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the
average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
ART 11-13 CASES
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon
arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-
appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife,
Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in order to kill
him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and corroborated the testimony of policeman
Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of
the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg,
said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime
is ussually preceded by much complaining andplanning. In these people, homicidal attcks are common, because
of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he
perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal
liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant
acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the
insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the
Court of First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicting him of
parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos
to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near the house of
Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally
wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised hammock
and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to
the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling.
57
After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a
policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered with
blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which were
exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the night
in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal
who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula told her husband that it would
be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to
attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a preliminary
examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against
Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of
Ambal was insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor Maximino R.
Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in the National
Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter's mental condition (p.
65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive, emotionally
unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to November 3,
1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and was normal (44-
46 tsn November 3,1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied: "Before the
commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but during the commission
of the crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45 tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of mental cases
and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of mental disorders, attended
to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous
system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal
was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the incident. He
said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full
possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was charged with the capital
offense of having killed his wife.
ART 11-13 CASES
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During his
confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the
town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle when he
surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while plowing.
He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he had chills. That was the
commencement, his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not insane and that
he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane person is one who
has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto como escaso de razon y es loco el
que ha perdido el juico." An insane person may have lucid intervals but "el embecil no puede tener, no tiene
estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada,
Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more
or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized
by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or
disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (Art. 800, Civil
Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308). The law always presumes all acts to be
voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292;
People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the criminal act
charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or that he was
generally considered to be insane — his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy — the legal
presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant to overcome
this presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition (U.S. vs. Hontiveros
Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of establishing
that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed (People vs. Bascos, 44
Phil. 204.)
58
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish
jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of
intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People vs.
Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent measures to
the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an imbecile
(Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his acts of
breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not insanity, especially
considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after he had killed his wife. (Cruz
case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of
anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel or fight
seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman.
The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word I "crazy" is
not synonymous with the legal terms "insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or "lunatic" (U.S.
vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity. (People vs. Foy,
138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge, which
may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shielded from
the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act,
when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the
direct consequence of his insanity (State vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-year-old girl,
who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders, cooked the flesh
and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 155).
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs. Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 20-
21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces briefly the origin of the rule regarding
insanity as a defense. He says:
In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times, insanity was never a defense for crime. The insane
killer, like the man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from the king, and would often get one. He
had no defense at law. Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits This was what was become
known as the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then the limits of the defense were expanded, but still slowly and
narrowly. The killer was excused if the disease of the mind was such that he was incapable of appreciating the
difference between right and wrong. At first this meant, not the right and wrong of particular case, but right and
ART 11-13 CASES
wrong generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes said, between good and evil. Later, the
rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to distinguish between right and wrong generally
would not charge with responsibility if there was no capacity to understand the difference in relation to the
particular act, the subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer made by the House of Lords to
questions submitted by judges in the famous case of McNaghten, who was tried for the murder of one
Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down: "To establish a
defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not, to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20, 1843.
Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the private
secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was Sir Robert. M'Naghten
labored under the the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his enemies and that the prime minister
was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that M'Naghten was affected by morbid delusions which
carried him beyond the power of his own control, leaving him unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he
was incapable of controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by reason
of insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted, is the
capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is
the subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's knowledge of
the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind,
defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself from
doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of the crime is excused even if the accused knew
what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease he lacked the power to resist the
impulse to commit the act. (State v. White, 270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp.
170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible impulse test,
does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person alleged mental
incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a
mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition
considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental defect having such effect on criminal
responsibility is a condition not considered capable of improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or
the result of injury or of a physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R.
2d. 1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to
understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with the "irresistible impulse"
test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, although he knew the
act was wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.
59
Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits inability to distinguish
between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to limit the inquiry to that topic, it would
appear that insanity which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions and that the only
controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test is not met, but in which a
defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The
presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom
of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is
incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should be
imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating circumstances
(Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting circumstance of insanity.
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney
driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the
area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang
bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a hammer until she
was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina
Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and
menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he
made the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na
umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said:
ART 11-13 CASES
"Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his
second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening.
How he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal
Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody.
Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police
station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record).
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy. He certified that the victim
had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On
opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial,
traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the
municipal court. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the
information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing, pretended that he did
not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam,"
"mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or
his hands might swan. Puno believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or a
swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill
the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children. He finished third year high
school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (Exh- B).
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He
complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee
was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use that cord in
tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog
to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog.
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno's eyes
were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression.
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in Barrio San
Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he
called "Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the
puppy.
60
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked him to change his
wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father
had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell asleep.
Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought
they were his fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that puno was insane when he killed
Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom
Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno
was an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic
reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno
admitted to Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability was his financial
problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to that hospital on
July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as
kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from
"schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his
environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's testimony.
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that from his examination of
Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could
distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was not
suffering from any delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third
year high school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles and
Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental
Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same mental illness when
he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He was
relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication. On September 8, 1970, according to
information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and without undue display of
emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other personnel of the
ward. He knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
ART 11-13 CASES
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit
the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a
markedly, retarded individual of which he is not.
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like schizophrenia may retain some
residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from wrong of the
offense committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the order of the trial court
dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine
whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and that he
would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old
woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would have killed
also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he
thought that she was a witch.
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of the
accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced
"that the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim
an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining
the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as
aggravating circumstances.
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to
the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil.
547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia
since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87
Phil. 658, 660).
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031,
61
May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el trastorno mental transitorio as an
exempting circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish
Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the circumstances
surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless
and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not
completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the National Mental Hospital for
thirteen days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was
recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a laborer.
About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him for re-
employment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder.
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien al publico
puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben
ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente
aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised
Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity
imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his
superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any
resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ". PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless
woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act
afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446). Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the evidence does not show (a)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit
had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution
of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July 31, 1974, PARAS, J.:
58 SCRA 241, 247).
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54,
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival
meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de The pertinent facts of the case are:
tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident, meaning
that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information charging
1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3). Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:

Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age should be appreciated as
generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the
accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her
womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404,
People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis
or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of consciousness of
his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil.
658.)
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a
knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in
the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and the generic
aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking
advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)

62
ART 11-13 CASES
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00
and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua
was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew
a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act,
he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied
bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained
fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the
accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so
many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the Department of
Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified
that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related
expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her
husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in
December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his
two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for
one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not
able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two
weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their
children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter
had paid; chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day of
March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not
bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to the
store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in his
proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived.
While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as
"stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around,
including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is
the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be able
to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony
on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their
conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here
is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That
same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused
was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987.
Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long before,
during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic mental
ART 11-13 CASES
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August
2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to finish his
two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he
claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to
know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused was his
patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the
accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending physicians
concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr.
Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620,
September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of murder, the Court
hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The act of
concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended
and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to the
mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-appellant.
The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime
changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense
entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product
of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it
is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete absence or
deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and insanity.
Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely:
delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false
belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the
same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things,
the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by
reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act
63
in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane
when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for insanity.
However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect
of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged
and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person
has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence
of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his
previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue, at the
very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his
mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct testimony
is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of
the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person;
and through which we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v.
Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder
secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of the crime charged.
(Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual disturbances
manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation,
and hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of
the brain, therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did not
have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately are not
present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated with
medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation
of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has been mentally ill?
ART 11-13 CASES
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my record, the
record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his contract expired and he
was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He
was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and
loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3)
months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the
testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological examinations on
the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was
really insane or not during the commission of the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane, has no
lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged
the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained
against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim. We quote
hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused at your
residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know
from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him to be interviewed and file the
necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want to
transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen Macalino
Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a request for
the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the accused?
64
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of the landholding
in the name of my father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill during this
confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have
wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We
infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was not
insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have been aware
of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court the
whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel
to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of the case and
to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in short all the
assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for postponement and fleeing
from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to
explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he
can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is
one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we prepared this
case we have really deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are the things we
considered. Like for example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was
aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs.
Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the expert
witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes
it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial court:
ART 11-13 CASES
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence shows
that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was
hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of
the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene
of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an
indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was
conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v.
Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the
witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting premise is that the law
presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated,
the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously
(People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving
its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity.
Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the
crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.
(People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDO YAM-ID alias ELY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision dated June 17, 1997 of Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court of the
7th Judicial Region stationed in Toledo City in its Criminal Cases No. TCS-2381 and 2382 finding accused-
appellant ERLINDO YAM-ID guilty of murder and frustrated homicide, respectively, and sentencing him to suffer
the supreme penalty of death in the first case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
65
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, in Crim. Case No. TCS-2381 this Court finds the accused
GUILTY of the crime of Murder and pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 hereby imposes the Mandatory penalty of DEATH
and to indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay actual damages in the amount of
P40,000.00.
In Crim. Case No. TCS-2382, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of Frustrated Homicide under Art.
249 RPC in relation to Art. 50 and after applying the indeterminate sentence law, it is hereby the sentence of this
Court that said accused will suffer the penalty of SIX (6) Years and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor in its minimum
period to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision mayor in its maximum period. The OIC, Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to remand the records of these cases to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 45, Rollo.)
The case for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General as follows:
Julius Cantutay was a resident of Saksak, Pinamungajan, Cebu. Appellant Erlindo was his neighbor. So, too, was
Danilo Tejamo, his uncle, and six (6) year old Jerry Tejamo his cousin (p. 2, tsn, July 31, 1995).
On April 1, 1994, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, Julius was sent by his grandmother, Amanda Ceniza, to
Brgy. Tutay, Pinamungajan, Cebu, to deliver benignit, a local delicacy, to his aunt Bebing Dequiado. Jerry Tejamo
was with Julius. On their way to Dequiados house, they passed by the house of appellant who greeted them,
Good Evening. After said salutation, appellant suddenly unsheathed a long bolo. On instinct, Julius pushed Jerry,
who was then walking in front of him, and told the latter to run. Appellant ran after the two. Jerry was
overtaken by Julius. Julius momentarily stopped to wait for Jerry, but appellant caught up with Jerry. Appellant
stabbed Jerry with the bolo on the left portion of his back. Not content, appellant held Jerry by the hair and
hacked him on the nape. Jerry fell to the ground. As a coup de grace, appellant stabbed Jerry on the right side of
his back. Jerry died on the spot. Appellant then knelt over the prostrate body of Jerry and sucked the blood from
his neck (pp. 3-9, tsn, July 31, 1995).
Scared out of his wits, Julius ran towards the house of Jerry to the latters father, Danilo Tejamo. Danilo was then
sleeping, Julius narrated the harrowing incident to Aniceta Tejamo, wife of Danilo. Aniceta Tejamo is the sister of
Juliuss father, hence, an aunt (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Aniceta roused Danilo from his sleep and both of them ran to the site of the incident. Before they could reach
the place, however, they were met by appellant, who had a bolo in hand. Danilo asked appellant the
whereabouts of his son. Appellant instead answered, I will kill all of you, and immediately hacked Danilo. Danilo
was able to dodge the attack, but he slipped and fell to the ground. Appellant struck at the fallen Danilo, who
tried to parry the attack, but Danilo nevertheless got hit on the bridge of his nose. Danilo tried to stand, but
appellant hacked him anew. This time, Danilo was hit on the head, and he fell to the ground, bloodied (pp. 7-11,
tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Since Danilo was not moving anymore, Aniceta shouted that Danilo was already dead. Appellant took hold of
Danilos collar to finish him off. Inexplicably, the tip of the bolo hit appellants stomach and blood oozed from the
wound. Perturbed, appellant ran towards his house and threw the bolo to the ground. Danilo regained
consciousness and sought treatment (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Expenses for the wake and burial of Jerry amounted to P40,000.00 (p. 14, tsn, ibid.)
ART 11-13 CASES
(pp. 109-112, Rollo.)
During the trial, accused-appellant denied killing the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo and pleaded self-defense for his
assault on Danilo Tejamo, Jerrys father. He contended that due to a land dispute between his family and the in-
laws of Danilo Tejamo, the latter tried to kill him by firing at his house. In retaliation, he hacked Danilo Tejamo at
the forehead but Danilo shot him, hitting him below the navel, in the process, causing a prolapse (the exposure
of his intestines). Then, he lost consciousness.
The trial court did not give credence to accused-appellants tale and after trial on the merits, it found him guilty
as charged.
In this automatic review, accused-appellant now makes a complete turn-around and admits killing Jerry
Tejamo. He, however, would plead insanity, and, as to his conviction for frustrated homicide regarding his attack
on Danilo Tejamo, accused-appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his intent
to kill.
The People contends that accused-appellant should not be allowed to change his theory on appeal. We do not
agree. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole action for review on any question including those not raised
by the parties (People vs. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People vs. Godines, 196 SCRA 765 [1991]; People vs.
Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 [1993]; see also Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). The reason for
this rule is that every circumstance in favor of the accused should be considered (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]). This legal maxim acquires greater significance in this case where accused-appellant faces the
supreme penalty of death. It is our policy that in a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even
when a despicable homicidal felon is involved for an erroneous conviction will have a lasting stain in our
escutcheon of justice (People vs. Alicundo, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]).
At this instance, the defense, now as represented by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), contends that at the
time of the incident, accused-appellant was suffering from a chronic mental disorder, otherwise known
as schizophrenia, which is characterized by a persons inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and is
often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and
Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860 cited in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 63, Rollo).
Accused-appellants defense of insanity is anchored on the testimony of Dr. Antonio Yapha who treated his
wound. Said doctor testified that contrary to accused-appellants claim that Danilo shot him, he did not find any
entrance for the alleged gunshot wound. The doctor said that a wound caused by a .38 caliber slug will not result
in a prolapse, that is, the intestines slipping out of the usual place. In the words of the defense, this belied the
testimony of accused-appellant that his stomach had a prolapse and instead bolstered the testimony of the
prosecution witness that accused-appellant tried to kill himself with a long bolo (Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
p. 63, Rollo). As further proof of insanity, the defense cites accused-appellants gruesome act of sucking Jerry
Tejamos blood after he had mercilessly stabbed the boy to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as such must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt (People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 35[1980]). In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a criminal
prosecution, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind, or otherwise stated,
the law takes for granted that acts are done consciously. Insanity being the exception rather than the rule in the
human condition, the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal
condition of a person and that a felonious or criminal act (delicto deloso) has been done with deliberate intent,
that is, with freedom, intelligence and malice and that whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence (People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 [1987] citing Article 800, Civil Code; US vs.
Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308 [1916]; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292 [1960]; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153
66
[1939]; US vs. Guevarra, 27 Phil. 547 [1914]; People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275, 286 [1974]; US vs. Zamora, 32
Phil. 218 [1915]; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 [1923]).
In the case at bar, the defense regrettably failed to discharge its burden of proving that accused-appellant was
insane at the time of the commission of the crime. The only intimation of insanity that accused-appellant could
point at is the non-medical opinion of the PAO that accused-appellant was suffering from schizophrenia because
he sipped his victims blood and tried to kill himself afterwards. No medical certificate was presented to
substantiate the claim of insanity. No testimony was proffered to support the allegation. We are not aware that
the PAO now has the expertise, more so the authority, to diagnose its clients of their mental condition. While we
agree that sucking Jerrys blood and stabbing ones self in the stomach are not acts expected of a normal person,
we, however, have to be careful in distinguishing between insanity and passion or eccentricity, mental weakness
or mere depression resulting from some physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity (People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708 [1995]; People vs. Dungo,
199 SCRA 860 [1991] citing People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87; see also People vs. Ambal, supra).
We do not discount the possibility that accused-appellant may have lost his mind after killing the 6-year old Jerry
as manifested by his slurping of the boys blood and his attempt to commit suicide.However, for insanity to be
appreciated as an exempting circumstance, it must be present immediately before or at the very moment the
crime is committed, and not thereafter. We do not believe that accused-appellant was insane when he killed
Jerry and hacked Danilo before attempting to take his own life. To reiterate, no iota of evidence was presented
to prove the same. Verily, the defense of insanity was not even raised during the trial of the case. It is invoked
only now on appeal, giving us the impression that it is but an afterthought.
And now to the propriety of the penalty imposed.
The trial court cited the following as the attendant circumstances that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to
murder, or aggravated the same, to wit:
1. Bad blood existed between the family of the accused and the complainants father-in-law due to a land dispute
prior to the incident therefore premeditation exist;
2. Treachery - the sudden and unexpected attack by the accused against unarmed minor who is 6 years old
without any means to defend himself and the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack (Pp. vs. Molato,
G.R. No. 66634, 29 February 1989; Pp. vs. Canzano, 95 SCRA);
3. The killing of the victim Jerry Tejamo, a minor 6 year old child constitutes an aggravating circumstance. There
is treachery when an adult illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death (U.S. vs. Butag, 38 Phil.
746).
(p. 43, Rollo.)
and having earlier explained that
. . . The brutal and senseless killing of Jerry Tejamo, a 6 year old child manifest accuseds perversity and
callousness as a cold blooded murderer and brings him to fore as a heinous criminal under Rep. Act 7659 which
defines heinous as a grievous, odious and hateful offense by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity and repugnant and outrageous to the common standard and norms of
decency and morality in a just civilized and orderly society. This is the kind of man the accused is.
(p. 42, Rollo.)
ART 11-13 CASES
meted out on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. TCS-2381.
We affirm the finding of the trial court that treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for
when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death, treachery exists (People vs.
Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527 [1997]; see also People vs. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1 [1996]).
The trial court, however, erred in finding that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. The
following requisites must concur before evident premeditation may be appreciated: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Magno, 260 SCRA 300 [1996]). Here, the prosecution omitted or
failed to present any evidence to show any, much less, all of the above elements. The bad blood that allegedly
exists between accused-appellants family and the in-laws of Danilo Tejamo, Jerrys father, does not, in any way,
prove evident premeditation.
It was thus treachery that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder. However, there being neither an
aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty of death imposed by the trial court must be
reduced to the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with our decisions in People vs. Magno, supra,
and People vs. Lucas, (240 SCRA 66 [1995]) where we explained that if there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, then the crime, although falling under Republic Act No. 7659, will not be punished by
death but by the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Anent the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, the Office of the Solicitor General correctly observes
that the crime committed by accused-appellant in stabbing Danilo Tejamo constituted only attempted homicide
since the wounds suffered by Danilo were not life threatening. Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code provides
the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for an attempted crime is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. Attempted homicide is thus
punishable by prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be meted
out on accused-appellant should be anywhere within the range of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months of arresto mayor, and the maximum should be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional (Art. 64, par. 1) the range of which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4)
years and two (2) months.Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission
of the Attempted Homicide, the accused-appellant shall be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two
(2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional medium as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant GUILTY of MURDER in
Criminal Case No. TCS-2381 and sentencing him to suffer the reduced penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is
likewise ordered to indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and to pay
actual damages in the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. In Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, accused-
appellant is found guilty of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE instead and sentenced to two (2) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correcional, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129291. July 3, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENRICO A. VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
67
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47,
in Criminal Case Nos. 9359, 9401, and 9489, convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of murder, attempted
murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The informations filed against accused-appellant read:
In Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with treachery and evident
premeditation, with intent to kill and while armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Elsa Villon Rodriguez thereby inflicting upon the latter
stabbed (sic) wound on the chest, which was the immediate cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No.9401, for attempted murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premiditation (sic) and while armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith one Ricardo Maglalang thereby inflicting upon the latter
physical injuries on the different parts of his body, thus commencing the commission of the crime of murder
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the felony by reason
of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In Criminal Case No.9489, for frustrated murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill with treachery and
evidence (sic) premeditation and while armed with a butcher knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith on (sic)Roger Cabiguen, hitting him on his right forearm, thus
performing all the acts of execution which produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical attendance rendered to him which saved his life.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus,
he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty.[5] Thereafter, the cases were
archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial.[6] This
time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of
insanity. The lower court thus conducted reverse and joint trial, at which the following facts were established:
ART 11-13 CASES
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos Street, Barangay
Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He was working on a lettering job inside his bedroom together with his first
cousin, then 25-year old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua. Roger was
working at his table and seated on his bed while Elsa was across the table. Antonio was on the left side,
while Simplicio was seated near the door, on the right side of Roger.[7]
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered Rogers nickname (Jer) and immediately attacked
him with a knife, but Roger was able to parry the thrust and was stabbed instead on the right forearm. Accused-
appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, Ako akabales den, Elsa. (I had my revenge,
Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant fled, leaving the stunned Simplicio and Antonio unharmed.[8]
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a commotion and
saw that Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor of the victim, was wounded.Antonio learned from the by-standers that
Ricardo was likewise stabbed by accused-appellant.[9]
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other hand was treated for the 5-
centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm.[10]
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in 1980, accused-appellant suspected him of killing
his pet dog. In 1989, accused-appellant courted Elsa but she jilted him.On one occasion, Elsa spat on and slapped
accused-appellant.[11]
Accused-appellants defense of insanity was anchored on the following facts:
Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City, and
employed as provincial jail guard at the Palawan Provincial Jail. Sometime in January 1990, Pacita Valledor, his
mother noticed that accused-appellant was behaving abnormally. For days he was restless and unable to
sleep. He likewise complained that their neighbors were spreading rumors that he was a rapist and a thief. This
prompted Pacita to bring his son to Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman, a medical practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de
Guzman that insanity runs in their family. After examining accused-appellant, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as
suffering from psychosis with schizophrenia.[12] He prescribed a depressant known as Thoracin, which kept
accused-appellant sane for a period two months.[13]
On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant was again acting strangely. She left to buy Thoracin but
when she returned he was nowhere to be found.[14]
On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant was seen swimming across the river of
Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Rufino Nuez and Barangay Councilman Antonio
Sibunga took accused-appellant out of the water and took him on board a pump boat. Inside the boat, accused-
appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that accused-
appellant was mentally ill, Barangay Captain Nuez, asked Councilman Sibunga to accompany accused-appellant
to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with accused-appellant at Barangay
Bahile. At about 1:00 in the afternoon, they reached Junction I at the intersection of the National Highway and
Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City. Suddenly, accused-appellant jumped off the jeepney. Sibunga tried but failed
to chase accused-appellant, who immediately boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he learned that accused-
appellant killed and harmed somebody.[15]
Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991, Pacita Valledor was awakened by her daughter
who told her that accused-appellant has returned. She rushed out of the house and saw him standing in the
middle of the road, dusty and dirty. She asked him where he came from but his answer was Pinatay niya kayong
68
lahat. Pacita dragged him inside the house and later learned that he killed and wounded their neighbors. Thirty
minutes later, accused-appellant was arrested and detained at the city jail.[16]
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of Puerto Princesa City interviewed accused-appellant
and thereafter made the following conclusions and recommendation, to wit:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Cooperative; talkative but incoherent
Disoriented as to time, place and person
DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDATION:
Respectfully recommending that subject patient be committed to the National Mental Hospital, Metro Manila
for proper medical care and evaluation soonest.[17]
The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical findings on accused-appellant by Dr. Guia Melendres
of the National Center for Mental Health, pertinent portion of which reads:
REMARKS AND RECCOMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing history, observations, physical mental and psychological examinations the patient Enrico
Valledor y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia. This is a thought
disorder characterized by deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of
reference, delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of insight.
Likewise, he is found to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol, abuse. This is
characterized by a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use indicated by continued use despite
knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social, occupational, psychological or physical problems.[18]
Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical Service of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City was likewise
presented by the defense to interpret the aforecited findings of Dr. Melendres.[19]
On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion
thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ENRICO A. VALLEDOR is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9359; of FRUSTRATED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9489;
and of ATTEMPTED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9401 as charged herein. Accordingly he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9359; reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9489;
and imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS in Criminal Case No. 9401. It is
understood that the accused shall serve these penalties successively or one after the other.
The accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Elsa Villon Rodriguez the sum of
P50,000.00 and to indemnify the victim Roger Cabiguen, the sum of P14,000.00 as actual damages, and the sum
P15,000.00 for loss of income.
ART 11-13 CASES
Considering that the accused is found to be suffering from a serious mental disorder at present as certified to by
the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, the service of his sentence is hereby
ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to Article 12 and 79 of the Revised Penal Code. He (Enrico Valledor) is ordered
shipped to and confined at the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, for his
treatment, until such time that he becomes fit for the service of his sentence at the national penitentiary,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. As to his civil liability, the same is subject to execution after this judgment shall have
become final executory.
IT IS ORDERED.[20]
Accused-appellant interposed this appeal and raised the lone assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED THE OFFENSE CHARGED HE WAS MENTALLY ILL, OUT OF HIS MIND OR INSANE AT THE (sic) TIME.[21]
The appeal has no merit.
In considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of
sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts
were done unconsciously.[22]
In People v. Estrada,[23] it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be
incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of
the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must
prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act
under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of
his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject,
such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident
bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts,
motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to the practice
of people of sound mind.[24]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption of sanity at
the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that
accused-appellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio
Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-
appellant called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who
were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accused-appellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the
words, Ako akabales den, Elsa. (I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly
left the room after stabbing the victims.
69
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a complete
absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of
what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also inside
the room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the
victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and
uttering the words, I had my revenge after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene
after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof.
Accused-appellants acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his clothes on;
and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the
commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is legally so.[25]Then, too, the medical findings showing that accused-appellant was
suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is
decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of
proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated
murder. The wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm was not fatal. The settled rule is that
where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder,
since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.[26]
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon the principal of an attempted
crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Before its amendment by
R.A. No. 7659, Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower would be prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. As there is no modifying circumstance, the medium period of the penalty, which is prision
mayor minimum, should be imposed. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is entitled to a
minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correcional in its medium period, the
penalty next lower than the penalty for attempted murder.[27]
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No. 9359, the trial court correctly imposed upon accused-
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was
proven by the prosecution.
Accused-appellants civil liability must be modified. Not being substantiated by evidence, the award of
P14,000.00 as actual damages, and P15,000.00 for loss of income, to Roger Cabiguen in Criminal Case No. 9489,
should be deleted. However, in lieu thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the Civil Code may be
recovered, as it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty. For this reason, an award of P10,000.00 by way of temperate damages should
suffice.[28]
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which was properly awarded by the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 9359, the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez are entitled to another P50,000.00 as moral damages which
needs no proof since the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of murder is sufficient justification for
said award.[29] The heirs of the deceased are likewise entitled to the amount of P29,250.00 representing actual
damages[30] based on the agreement of the parties.[31]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 47, is MODIFIED as follows:
ART 11-13 CASES
1. In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A. Valledor is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Elsa Rodriguez the following amounts: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P29,250.00 as actual damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of
attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to indemnify Roger Cabiguen in
the amount of P10,000.00 by way of temperate damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148695. May 27, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review before this Court is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental
(Branch 50 stationed in Bacolod City) in Criminal Case No. 00-20595, dated February 26, 2001, finding Randy
Belonio y Landas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to death.
The Amended Information dated April 27, 2000, charged appellant with Murder as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 2000, in the City of Talisay, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an improvised knife,
with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one RAMY TAMAYO, thus causing injuries in the vital parts of the body of the
latter which caused his instantaneous death.
That accused RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS is a recidivist for having been convicted by final judgment of 4 years,
two (2) months, one day to six years in Crim. Case 94-16609 entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Randy Belonio
y Landas for Homicide.[2]
Upon his arraignment on May 24, 2000,[3] appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
In his Brief,[4] the Solicitor General narrates the factual antecedents of the case, as summarized by the trial court,
as follows:
70
Jennifer Carampatana testified that on January 6, 2000, her grandmother was buried and there was a wake in
their house at Brgy. Zone 14 in the evening. Her first cousin, the late Ramy Tamayo, also called Ramon Tamayo,
arrived in their house at about 10:00 P.M. together with his wife.
Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house. Before they could sit on a nearby bench, Ramy decided to
buy cigarettes from a store only a few meters away. The store was furnished with a small opening for the store-
keeper to attend to the customers and Ramy was occupying that space in front of the opening to pay when the
accused Randy Belonio arrived. Randy tried to force his way in front of the opening and as a consequence, he
bumped on Ramy. Jennifer saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard look.
Jennifer said that he and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The accused came over and sat on the other end of
the bench. Then the accused asked Ramy for the latters cigarette lighter. The accused asked Ramy from what
place did he come from and why was he there. Ramy answered the accused in a normal manner.
The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, Jennifer, who was facing the direction of the approaching
accused, saw him and noticed that he was wearing long sleeves. Ramy Tamayo could not see the accused as he
was facing sideways to Jennifer. Without saying a word and without warning, the accused delivered a stabbing
blow with a dagger which was concealed in his hand. Ramy was hit on the right chest, Jennifer stood up and ran
towards her house shouting for help. There at the gate of the fence of her house, she heard another thudding
sound of a stabbing blow. When Jennifer entered her house, she announced that Ramy was stabbed.
Jennifer and her relatives rushed out of the house. Jennifer saw the accused running away towards the back of
the barangay hall. The Tanods who came over failed to find the accused. Then when the Barangay Captain and
the policemen arrived, Jennifer informed them of the direction towards which the accused fled. The accused
was arrested from one (1) of the houses near the barangay hall where he took refuge.
Dr. Raul V. Pama, Jr. was the acting City Health Officer of Talisay City on January 6, 2000. He conducted an
autopsy on the remains of Ramy Tamayo and listed his findings in a necropsy report which he prepared. These
findings are as follows:
1. Stabbed wound, 1.7 cm. in length, sutured sharp on one (1) and (inferior portion) and blunt on the other end
(superior portion) located at the 4th intercostal space;
Dr. Pama explained that the wound is just above the left nipple and it penetrated downward hitting the left side
on the heart;
2. Stabbed wound at the sternal. The wound is situated just above the site of the first wound.
The first wound was fatal as it damaged the heart.[5]
In his Brief,[6] Randy Belonio adopted the above findings of the trial court and the prosecution. However, he
raises the defense of insanity, an exempting circumstance, and for such purpose, depends on the expert
assessment of his witness, Dr. Antonio Gauzon, who certified thus:
This is an individual who is suffering from (Schizophrenia), Chronic Undifferentiated and probably triggered by
(s)ubstance abuse of Shabu and Marijuana.
Recommending treatment and rehabilitation in a mental institution like the National Center for Mental (H)ealth
in Mandaluyong City or treatment in the psychiatric unit of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Regional Hospital in
ART 11-13 CASES
Bacolod City and later rehabilitation in the Negros (O)ccidental Mental Health Center at Paglaum Village,
Bacolod City.[7]
The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of Murder and that he had full
control of his mental faculties. It held that the testimony of Dr. Ester Regina Servando was more weighty and
credible than that of Dr. Gauzon.[8]
The trial court convicted appellant, thus:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Randy Belonio y Landas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the
Information, as Principal by Direct (Participation) with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery and
the special aggravating circumstance of recidivism. There are no other aggravating circumstances nor is there
any mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the accused is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The accused is held civilly liable to pay the heirs of Randy Tamayo the following amounts:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
2. The sum of P3,629.70 as reimbursement for hospital expenses;
3. The sum of P940,716.00 as compensatory damages; and
4. The sum of P100,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Jinky Tamayo as moral damages.[9]
Hence this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns this lone alleged error of the court a quo for our consideration:
The trial court seriously erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of insanity pursuant to Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended favoring the accused-appellant.[10]
In support of his appeal, appellant argues that he was not in his right and normal frame of mind when the killing
took place. He avers that no normal person would ever bump another person, give the latter a hard look and
eventually stab him to death. He adds that he and the victim did not know each other at that time.[11]
Appellant also asseverates that Dr. Gauzon is a reliable expert witness and is more knowledgeable and
experienced than Dr. Servando.[12] He explains that Dr. Servando was once under the tutelage of Dr. Gauzon and
that at the time of their respective testimonies, the former was only 37 years old, while the latter was 57 years
old.[13] Appellant also cites portions of the trial courts Decision where Dr. Gauzon referred him to the Bacolod
City Health Office for psychiatric examination. The trial court also branded the accused as a homicidal maniac,
which appellant says, is judicial notice of his mental sickness.[14] In sum, he concludes that all of these
circumstances show that he was insane at the time of the killing.
We find these arguments without merit.
The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free will and intelligence, and that a felonious or criminal
act has been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom and intelligence.[15] Whoever, therefore, invokes
insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.
71
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as such must be adequately proved.[16] The
law presumes that all persons are of sound mind, and that acts are done consciously.[17]
In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving that appellant was insane. The
testimony or proof of appellants insanity must relate to the time preceding or the very moment of the
commission of the offense charged.[18] We find the evidence adduced by the defense sorely insufficient to
establish his claim that he was insane at the time he killed Tamayo.
The main circumstances presented by the defense that remotely evinces that appellant was insane at that time
was his act of bumping the victim, without any apparent reason, giving him a long hard look, and then eventually
stabbing him. However, this sequence of events cannot overcome the legal presumption of sanity, let alone
prove appellants insanity.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act. Proof of the existence of some abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it can be
shown that the offender was not completely deprived of freedom and intelligence.[19] As culled from the trial
courts findings, Belonio, after giving the victim a hard and resentful look, sat near the latter, lighted his cigarette
and conversed with him.[20] Afterwards, he left and came back armed with a dagger with which he stabbed
Tamayo.Immediately thereafter, he escaped and went into hiding. Contrary to a finding of the existence of
insanity, these acts tend to establish that Belonio was well aware of what he had just committed, and was
capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would not have attempted to escape and go into
hiding.
Aside from the bumping incident earlier discussed, the only other evidence of insanity that appellant could
relevantly point to is the medical certificate prepared by Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that Belonio was suffering
from schizophrenia. This witness was presented to refute the findings of the prosecutions expert witness Dr.
Ester Regina Servando which negated the existence of this mental condition.
A run-through of Dr. Gauzons testimony strengthens this Courts resolve to affirm the lower courts findings. Part
of his testimony is reproduced as follows:
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q. Now, from this Medical Certificate, Doctor, there is specifically mentioned here that the subject here was
found to be incoherent and irrelevant and disoriented as to time, person and place, and that there was plight of
ideas and adjustment, as well as insights. Will you kindly explain this to this Honorable Court?
A. What meant there is that, when you talk to the individual, sometimes you get answers right, sometimes it is
wrong. That is when you say that he is incoherent. When you say irrelevant, that pertain to the question. Now,
as far as dates, he could not remember the date. As far (as) the place, he could not recall the place when he was
in my office. And some of the persons that were with him, he could not identify them. Now, when I say that
there was plight of ideas, that (was) when he was talking. As a matter of fact, I gave an example, when I asked a
question when I asked him about the first killing incident and his answer was, face to face kami, simbahan
namon kag inagaw namon ang baril because of warship. That is only one, because there were others that you
could not understand what he was talking about whether you have to rely only on other things. And sometimes,
he would talk on things which are not there. That means he was hallucinating. Now, judgment is usually
poor. Because, when I asked him of what he will do regarding the case, he would just say that, Ti, amo na
ya. And he said, Ano kamo da ya? kay ang warship. So, I was asking him about the values of what he was doing
and he could not give me that answer. And he does not know what he was doing. That means that there was no
reality testing. He does not know what is the real fantasy.
ART 11-13 CASES
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Now in your opinion as an expert in terms of Psychiatry, about how long has the subject, Randy Belonio, been
suffering from his mental disorder that you mentioned in your Medical Certificate?
A. Since childhood. If you would notice, I put there in the history that his father was medically disabled when he
was ten (10) years old, and the mother was only a fish vendor and there were, I think, eight (8) to ten (10) in the
family and with a meager income and have to (fend) for themselves. And in a very young age of ten (10), the
parents had the attitude of Bahala na ang kabata-an. That means, they have to take care of themselves. At age
13, he was brought by the relative to Manila, and although he was incoherent, you can get from his answer by
mentioning so many places, (like) Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, Novaliches, MRT, Cubao. That means, at age 13, he
was already around these areas (f)ending for himself. And the (s)treet (u)rchins, you know for a fact, that they
are influenced by drugs. So, by that time, with that dysfunctional family, and without any family to take care of
himself, he was not doing what the society expects him to do. So that they have dysfunctional family and with
dysfunctional relatives. So, the value system was really poor. So that the thinking process of this individual was
not developed to what the society expects him to be.So, it started at that time. So, when he was taking shabu, it
triggered every tissue that the symptoms came out. Thats why, he became suspicious, (he) became irritable and
anybody who would try to not befriend him and tried to be angry with him, he would immediately suspect that
something would happen to him in which he would react by defending himself, and probably by killing. This
individual had, actually, committed, say, killing. I would not say murder because thats your term, but he had
killed already three (3) persons in different years. So, he does not already know what he was doing because he
was psychotic, which in your parlance is insane.
Q. Now, Doctor, on January 6, 2000, and even prior to this date, what you are trying to say is that, this subject,
Randy Belonio, was already suffering from schizophrenia?
A. Yes.[21]
Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with Belonio on October 25, 2000 (around nine months after the
stabbing incident) the latter was suffering from schizophrenia. However, the evidence of insanity after the fact
of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of alleged abnormal behavior
immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime.[22]
The first set of facts narrated by the doctor relates to Belonios condition during the interview, months after the
incident. His report was silent as regards the incidents occurring prior to or during the circumstance for which
Belonio stands trial. The second part of his testimony dwelt on Belonios life history, which was offered to prove
that he had been suffering from his alleged condition since childhood.
However, perusing the story as narrated by the doctor, the same was a mere statement of Belonios life and
family history, explaining what brought about his supposed mental condition.There was no showing that he was
actually suffering from schizophrenia during his juvenile years. To demonstrate that he had been suffering from
this condition, the doctor pointed to the fact that he has already killed three (3) persons, including the present
incident. However, such conclusion is non sequitur and, at best, a circuitous argument. Further, the veracity of
these findings is belied by the fact that the accused did not raise this defense during his prosecutions for the
other killings. No other circumstances evincing its existence were presented during trial.
Furthermore, Dr. Gauzons examination cannot surmount Dr. Servandos punctilious and overwhelming analysis,
which took two days to narrate. She explained the history of the accused, including his family and medical
background, conducted a mental status examination, which was based on her direct interviews with him, and
gave a series of other written psychological examinations.[23]
72
The portion of Dr. Servandos testimony pertinent to her findings regarding Belonios mental condition is quoted
as follows:
FISCAL AGRAVIADOR:
Q. Can you please read for the record this (r)esult which consist only of one (1) sentence?
A. Psychiatric Evaluation Result. Base(d) on history, mental status examination, and psychological examination,
patient was noted to be evasive, suspicious, and manipulative but no psychotic features were observed upon
evaluation. x x x.
Q. So, let us first, may I ask, what do you me(a)n by patient was noted to be evasive, suspicious, and
manipulative?
A. Actually, during the psychological examination, we have to give series of questions. And then the patient
(does) not answer directly to our question. He would go around the bush. And then, after that, we also found
out during the result of the psychological examination that the same pattern was noted.
Q. Does this mean that he was totally capable of being manipulative or evasive?
A. Yes.
Q. He did it intentionally?
A. Yes.
Q. With the knowledge that he knew the answer but does not want to give the answer?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say, that he has full control of his mental faculties that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Because there was an intention to be manipulative and there was an intention to be evasive because he was
suspicious?
A. Yes.
Q. When you said that there was no psychotic features(,) x x x (w)hat does this mean?
A. When you say psychosis, those are compose[d] of symptoms such as delusion and hallucination that are being
extracted from the patient or being displayed by the patient. However, during the examination, the symptom or
the patients answers are not enough to put him to a criteria of psychosis because the delusion and the
hallucination as well as the thought process, the thought contents must be concretized enough in order for us to
determine to diagnose that this patient is actually suffering from psychosis.
Q. So, subjected to your examination, this patient did not come up to the level where he could be diagnosed as
having delusion and hallucinations?
ART 11-13 CASES
A. Leading to psychotic features.
Q. So, that is the meaning of not having psychotic features?
A. Yes.[24]
The insanity issue raised by appellant boils down to the credibility of these two expert witnesses and their
respective testimonies. The time-honored doctrine is that the question of which witness to believe is one best
addressed by the trial court. The findings of fact of the judges who heard the evidence are accorded great
respect and are seldom disturbed on appeal for they had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, and
to determine by their demeanor on the stand the probative value of their testimonies. [25] The Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court which found Dr. Servandos testimony more credible for the
following reasons:
1. It could not be gainsaid that Dr. Servando is a disinterested and unbiased witness. She does not know the
accused and she is not known to the accused. She will not be benefited if the Court upholds her findings and she
had no reason to testify falsely. On the other hand, Dr. Gauzon was admittedly paid for his services, hence, it
could not be truly said that he is an impartial and disinterested witness. If his findings (are) upheld, the benefit
to the practice of his profession is enormous;
2. As a government official, Dr. Servando has the presumption of regularity in the performance of her duty. No
such presumption arises in favor of Dr. Gauzon;
3. The findings of Dr. Servando that the accused is evasive and manipulative is supported by the Courts own
observation. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
4. The conclusion of Dr. Gauzon is principally based on his interview with the accused and the members of the
accuseds family. It was the members of the accuseds family, the sister of the accused who informed Dr. Gauzon
that at the age of 13, the accused began to use drugs. The information that the family of the accused was
impoverished; that the accused spent his adolescence in Metro-Manila; that the accused was a neglected child
were all supplied by the kins of the accused who were not presented as witnesses. There was no showing that
Dr. Gauzon took precautionary steps to validate the information.On the other hand, Dr. Servando also
conducted interview of the accused and his accompanying relatives including the BJMP guard who escorted
him. In addition, Dr. Servando conducted a series of written tests which are tailored to determine the mental
capacity of a person. The result of the written tests confirms the observation of Dr. Servando in the interview
that the accused is evasive and manipulative.[26]
Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more stringent criterion for the acceptance of
insanity as an exempting circumstance. In our jurisdiction, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not
enough; there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Every individual is presumed to have acted with complete grasp of ones mental faculties. Appellants past does
not discredit the facts that (1) he did not act with complete absence of the power to discern; (2) he was not
deprived of reason; and (3) he was not totally deprived of his will.
As held in People vs. Madarang,[27]
73
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime A. He came from their house because their house is near our house.
but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried
on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the Q. In relation to you, where is this house located?
issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. x x x.[28]
A. Witness indicating that he came from her side, where the house is situated.
Inasmuch as Belonio failed to present convincing evidence to establish his alleged insanity at the time he
stabbed Tamayo, we are constrained to affirm his conviction.
Q. And which side did you sit, the side near the direction of the house of Randy Belonio or far from the house of
Belonio?
We must add that we have meticulously reviewed the records of this case, especially the evidence of the
prosecution. We find no reason to modify, much less reverse, the findings of the trial court that, indeed,
A. The other side.
appellants guilt for murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

COURT:
We now look into the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

It was Ramy who was sitting near the house of Ramy?

Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, any person found guilty of murder shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The same Code further instructs that when in the commission of the
crime there is present an aggravating circumstance which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the WITNESS:
greater penalty shall be applied.[29]
Yes, sir.
A review of the records supports the conclusion of the trial court on the presence of treachery, which qualified
the crime to murder. For treachery to be appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the means of execution APP AGRAVIADOR:
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.[30] Q. And what was the position of Ramy Tamayo when he was suddenly stab.

In the present case, Jennifer Carampatana testified on how the killing was executed, as follows: A. He was sitting in this manner.

Q. What did you do there? COURT INTERPRETER:

A. While we were conversing at that bench, after a short while, or five (5) minutes, Randy Belonio came and he Witness illustrating by crossing her legs over the other legs and move slightly her body was in side way.
asked to light his cigarette because Ramy was smoking at that time. He was allowed by Ramy to light his
cigarette. APP AGRAVIADOR:

Q. Was there any conversation between Ramy Tamayo and Randy Belonio aside from asking lighting of Q. That means that Ramy Tamayo did not see Randy Belonio who was coming from the house?
cigarette?
A. Yes, Maam.
A. While asking to light the cigarette, Randy inquired from Ramy why he was there, Ramy told him that he is
attending the wake of his grandmother. Further, Randy asked him where he came from?And Ramy answered
that he is from Hda. Bubog. COURT:

Q. After that what did Randy Belonio do if he did anything? Let me interrupt. He was facing you? Ramy was facing you while you were facing the direction where the house
of Randy Belonio, so that Ramy was facing on the other side?
A. He (sat) for a while, and a little while after that, he took a look at Ramy. After some minutes, he went out.
WITNESS:
Q. And after few minutes was there any incident happened?
A. Yes, sir.
A. After three (3) minutes Randy went back. He just walk normally, and when he was near Ramy he stabbed
Ramy hitting on the chest and while the weapon was still on the breast of Ramy I stood up and ran away. COURT:

Q. From what direction did Randy came when he approach you? Proceed.

74
ART 11-13 CASES
APP AGRAVIADOR: =P1,362,545

Q. When Randy Belonio suddenly thrust the knife on the chest of Ramy Tamayo, did you see the reaction of The award for loss of earning capacity should therefore be P1,362,545.
Ramy Tamayo?
There being testimonial evidence in support of moral damages, an award for it is proper. However, it should be
A. He was not able to move. After that, I want to ran to the house. reduced to the more reasonable amount of P50,000 considering that it is not meant to enrich an injured party.

APP AGRAVIADOR: Actual damages for the hospital expenses in the amount of P3,627.70 were duly supported by receipts. However
instead of awarding actual damages, we grant temperate damages in accordance with People vs.
Q. When for the first time did you see the weapon used by Randy Belonio in taking the life of Ramy Tamayo? Andres,[36] where the Court said:

A. When he thrusted that knife. [W]e declared in the case of People vs. Villanueva that:

COURT: when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, as in this case, the award
of temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the
amount of actual damages proven exceeds P25,000, then temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual
Before or after he delivered the stabbing blow?
damages based on the receipts presented during trial should instead be granted.

A. At the moment he delivered the stabbing blow, that was the first time I saw that knife.
The victims heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.[37]

APP AGRAVIADOR:
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty. Nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the
Q. When you saw Randy Belonio approaching Ramy Tamayo x x x, you did not see the knife? death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

A. Because he was wearing long sleeve to cover his hand.[31] WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-20595 convicting the appellant of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to DEATH is AFFIRMED. The award for loss of earning capacity
Appellants acts of leaving, then returning after a few minutes armed with a knife -- which he concealed while is INCREASED to P1,362,545; moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000; actual damages is DELETED but temperate
approaching the victim and which he used in stabbing him -- while the latter was sitting, unaware and not damages of P25,000 and exemplary damages of P25,000 are awarded.
forewarned of any danger, manifest a deliberate employment of means to ensure the killing without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the victim might make. In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659 amending Section 23 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of
this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this decision, to the Office of the President for possible
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which was alleged in the Information was also duly proven. A exercise of the pardoning power.
recidivist is one who at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment
of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.[32] The records[33] show that appellant was previously Costs against appellant.
convicted by final judgment of Homicide, which like Murder, falls under the title of Crimes against Persons.
SO ORDERED.
The award by the court a quo of P50,000 as civil indemnity is in accordance with jurisprudence.[34] The amount
of P25,000 as exemplary damages should also be given because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance
EN BANC
of recidivism. However, the court erred in awarding the amount of P940,716 as loss of earning capacity. In
accordance with the formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and
using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality,[35] the loss of Tamayos earning capacity is to be computed as G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income Living vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Expenses)
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 the age of the deceased)

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
= 2/3 (80-24) x [(P200x365)- P36,500]
75
ART 11-13 CASES
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte.
On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house.
Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and
while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him,
he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack
his father after which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five
days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced by the
trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum
of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over
a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when
he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The defendant
states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held
his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come
down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As
his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her
dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for
committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to
us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden away and
inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a
man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the special
circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking
into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose
protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be
inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit
the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that considering
the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and
not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct result of
the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not
clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the
wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her
say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the
defendant at the door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting
ART 11-13 CASES
his wife but he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in
desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined
in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his
liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19, 1938, in the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the accused acted with discernment
in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent to the Training School
for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority. From this order the accused interposed an
appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had acted with discernment and in not having dismissal
the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The incident
that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and one
Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual,
Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed
it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos chased him around the
yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then turned against the deceased
assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist,
returning immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing with him. The
accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust
than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding
none, he approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio
Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his
knife because he might attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the
knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña approached
Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered
that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan Ragojos, ignorant of
76
the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared and in the act of stopping
the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to alter, not
being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by section 138 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in question, he was
a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was
one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the
time he was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in
committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and
so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken from
said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to by
the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a
minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances which gave
rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime was committed, the time
he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree
of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the defense mistakes the
discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for
lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article
13 of said Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the
very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial (U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This
was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 129566. October 7, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL NAVARRO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In rejecting this appeal, the Court reiterates the following doctrines: (1) a retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier credible testimony; (2) the testimony of a single witness, if positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction, even in a charge for murder; (3) the rule on res gestae relates to the admissibility of
evidence, not to its weight and sufficiency; (4) alleged violations of the rights against illegal arrest and seizure
are deemed waived by the appellant's failure to assert them prior to arraignment; (5) where the killing is
qualified by treachery, which is alleged in the information, the crime committed is murder; and (6) where the
existence of the unlicensed firearm allegedly used in the killing has not been clearly established, the charge of
illegal possession of firearm cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance in murder.
ART 11-13 CASES
The Case
On January 6, 1994, two Informations, one for murder[1] and the other for violation of Presidential Decree
1866,[2] were filed at the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan against Noel Navarro. On January 19,
1994, Navarro, through Counsel Romeo L. Gutierrez, filed two motions, one to remand the case to the provincial
prosecutor for preliminary investigation and the other to
suspend the proceedings before the court.[3] Judge Segundo B. Paz granted the motions.[4] Thereafter, on March
3, 1994, filed against the appellant was this amended Information for murder:[5]
"That on or about January 5, 1991, in the evening, near Enok Theater at Poblacion, [M]unicipality of Alaminos,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, New [sic] Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot FERDINAND RABADON @ "BOYET" several times which caused
his instantaneous death as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."[6]
Affirmed, on the other hand, was this Information for violation of PD 1866:
"That on or about January 5, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of Alaminos, [P]rovince of Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one short firearm without first securing the necessary
license and permit to possess the same and said firearm was used in the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon.
Contrary to P.D. 1866."[7]
On April 5, 1994, appellant, assisted by his aforementioned counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him.[8] He then filed a petition for bail. A protracted full-blown hearing on the matter then ensued, during which
the prosecution and the defense presented their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. The petition
was denied. The trial court adopted the proceedings during said hearing and thereafter, rendered the assailed
22-page Decision,[9] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the accused
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [m]urder as described in the Information in Criminal Case No.
2762-A and, therefore, he is ordered to suffer the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. The said
accused should indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00 as provided for by law plus
another sum of P50,000.00 for actual damages that the mother of the victim has spent for the funeral services
and wake.
"That the illegal possession of firearm subject of the Information in Criminal Case No. 2763-A is considered
merely as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime of murder, considering that the alleged
firearm used was not recovered by the authorities and never presented in court.
xxxxxxxxx
"SO ORDERED."[10]
Hence, this appeal.[11]
The Facts According to the Prosecution
77
The solicitor general narrated the People's version of the facts as follows:
"On January 5, 1991, around 9:00 in the evening, Jose Rabago went to Enoc Theater located at Poblacion,
Alaminos, Pangasinan to view some stationary pictures exhibited outside the theater (p. 11, TSN, May 20, 1994).
When he was about to go home on board his motorcycle, he was invited by Ferdinand Rabadon, who was
drinking beer inside Adela's Restaurant, to join him. Rabago obliged (p.12, id.).
"Later, Rabadon borrowed Rabago's motorcycle which he used in going to the bus terminal to check if his wife
had already arrived from Zamboanga (p. 13, id.) Upon his return, Rabadon invited Rabago to Five Doors Disco
but the latter opted to go home (p. 14, id.). Rabadon, who was still on the motorcycle holding its handle bars,
offered to drive Rabago home. (id.).
"When Rabago was about to mount the motorcycle, he was pushed by one Ming Basila, causing him to fall on his
buttocks, after which Basila shot Rabadon twice at the back. While Rabadon was already lying down with his leg
pinned by the motorcycle, appellant shot him three (3) times (pp. 14-15, id.).
"Rabago ran away, but after noticing that appellant and Basila [had] left the scene, he returned and saw
Rabadon dying and gasping for breath (pp. 17-18, id.).
"Rabago saw Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, a policeman, to whom he reported Rabadon's killing (pp. 19-20, id.). On
January 6, 1991, Rabago was investigated by policeman Rolando Rabadon but he said that he did not see
anything (p. 3, TSN, June 13, 1994).
"During the hearing of the case, Rabago explained that he did not divulge the identities of the assailants for fear
of his life (p. 37, TSN, May 20, 1994). He claimed that some policemen in Alaminos, Pangasinan [were] members
of the Aguila Gang which kill[ed] people (pp. 41-42, TSN, June 13, 1994). The gang [was] allegedly led by one
Ramon Navarro, appellant's brother.
"The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) interrogated Rabago on January 3, 1994, at which time, Rabago
named appellant and Ming Basila as the authors of Rabadon's killing (p. 20, TSN, June 13, 1994).
"Dr. Francisco Viray, who autopsied Rabadon's cadaver, found five (5) gunshot wounds and concluded that the
immediate cause of death [was] "cardio-respiratory arrest; antecedent cause: brain injury and underlying cause:
gunshot wounds" (p. 11, TSN, August 8, 1994)."[12]
According to the Defense
Appellant Noel Navarro denied any participation in the killing of Rabadon in his 16-page Brief,[13] which we
quote:
"On January 5, 1991, in the evening, one Ferdinand Rabadon was shot to death near the Enoc Theater at
Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan. Almost immediately after the shooting incident, Jose Rabago reported the
incident to one policeman, Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, was inside a restaurant near the Victory Liner Terminal that
his (Jose Rabago) companion was shot without him telling the policeman Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon who shot his
companion. Policeman Rabadon responded by going to the place pointed to by Jose Rabago, but the victim was
no longer at the place of the incident as he was brought to the hospital. Later, Jose Rabago was investigated by
policeman Rolando "Lando" Rabadon regarding the shooting incident, but Jose Rabago, when asked, told
policeman Rolando[14] Lando Rabadon that he did not see anything. Considering the negative result of the police
investigation, no case was filed by the police against anybody for the shooting to death of Ferdinand Rabadon.
ART 11-13 CASES
"Three (3) years later, on January 5, 1994, at about 8:00 o' clock in the evening, a composite team of the
National Bureau of Investigation led by Atty. Teofilo Gallang served a search warrant and warrant of arrest to
one Ramon Navarro, brother of accused-appellant in his residence and failing to find Ramon Navarro, the
composite team of the NBI went to the house where accused-appellant was staying where they saw him (Noel
Navarro). Accused-appellant was searched, but [nothing was found] in his body. Accused-appellant was arrested
right then and there without any warrant of arrest shown to him by the NBI. In fact, it was admitted that the NBI
composite team at the time [had] no warrant of arrest against accused-appellant.
"The NBI composite team boarded accused-appellant in a white van and was brought to the house of now
Congressman Hernani Braganza in Alaminos, Pangasinan. Later, the NBI composite team went to Lucap,
Alaminos, Pangasinan to fetch Fiscal Rabina and from there, they all proceeded to the police station of Alaminos,
Pangasinan. Accused-appellant inquired from Fiscal Rabina if there [was] a warrant for his arrest and Fiscal
Rabina simply said, sorry, my son, I cannot do anything, okay?
"The following day, January 6, 1994, Prosecutor Rabina filed the [I]nformation charging accused-appellant of
[m]urder, x x x for allegedly killing Ferdinand Rabadon on January 5, 1991, three (3) years earlier, without
conducting a preliminary investigation. Also filed [was] an [I]nformation for [violation] of P.D. 1866 x x x."[15]
The defense presented three witnesses: Jose Rabago, who recanted his previous testimony; NBI Director
Teodoro Galang, who testified as to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the appellant without warrant;
and Noel Navarro, the appellant himself.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found the appellant guilty of murder, based on Jose Rabago's testimony as a prosecution witness,
which it found to be positive, credible and sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. It ratiocinated as
follows:
"Jose Rabago was positive about the identity of the killers of the victim. He was just one (1) meter away from
Ming Basila and he was facing Ming Basila when he fell down. He saw the gun firing when it was Noel Navarro's
turn to [shoot] the victim, and he [had] already taken three steps to [run] away towards the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Station, but he claim[ed] that he looked back.
"There is no doubt from his testimony that Jose Rabago recognized Noel Navarro. He knew Noel Navarro when
they were both students of the Royal Carpenter Academy. [In spite] of the hour of the night, he recognized Noel
Navarro because there were three lights x x x [h]is distance [was] just three steps away from Noel Navarro. Even
assuming that he [had] his back turned toward the accused, because he scampered away, Jose Rabago testified
that upon reaching the bus station, he looked at the two who lingered at the scene of the shooting. He also saw
them [leave] and disappear at the corner."[16]
Rabago's recantation of his testimony as a prosecution witness was disregarded by the court a quo in this wise:
"x x x the Court cannot find any evidence or any indications that Jose Rabago [had] a sinister scheme to
prevaricate and therefore this Court must respect as trustworthy, and with full faith and credence, his testimony
as eyewitness for the prosecution."[17]
Citing jurisprudence, the lower court further declared that "mere retraction by [the] prosecution witness does
not necessarily deshape the original testimony, if credible," and that " [courts] look with disfavor upon
retractions of testimonies previously given in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious; the retraction can
easily be secured from witnesses usually through intimidation or monetary consideration."[18]
78
In all, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder, after finding that the killing was qualified by treachery prosecution witness, he maintained this assertion. Third, when presented as a defense witness, he changed his
and merely aggravated by illegal possession of firearms.[19] testimony and swore that it was not the appellant who had shot Rabadon, but a "short and stout man."[21]

The Assigned Errors The argument does not persuade. True, Rabago did not mention the name of the appellant when he reported
the killing to both SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon and Patrolman Rolando Rabadon;[22] however, he explained that he was
The appellant contends that the lower court committed the following errors: apprehensive about talking to the police, as he suspected that some of them were members of the dreaded
Aguila Gang, viz.:
"1. In not considering the report of Prosecution Witness Jose Rabago to policeman Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon that
his companion was killed, but did not tell policeman Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon that accused-appellant and one "x x x x x x x x x
Ming Basila killed the deceased, as part of the res gestae;
Q Mr. Witness, when you were asked by policeman Lando Rabadon about what you learned of the shooting to
"2. In not considering the result of the investigation conducted by Policeman Rolando Lando Rabadon when death of Boyet Rabadon, you told him you did not see anything, why did you tell policeman Lando Rabadon that
Witness Jose Rabago was asked if he saw the assailant and did not mention the name of the accused-appellant you did not see anything?
and one Ming Basila, but instead, answered he did not see anything, as part of the res gestae;
A I was afraid, sir.
"3. In giving credence to the testimony of witness Jose Rabago despite the fact that he narrated three (3)
versions of the incident, in his report to the police authorities and the investigation conducted by the police Q And why were you afraid?
authorities later immediately after the incident, and in his testimony as a prosecution witness and as a defense
witness; A I did not have confidence [in] the police.

"4. In finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder despite serious and Q Didn't you have confidence [in] the police?
material inconsistencies in the testimony of Jose Rabago, the lone witness of the prosecution who [claimed] to
have [witnessed] the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon."[20]
A Because some policemen are members of Aguila.

In sum, the defense disputes the trial court's ruling identifying appellant as one of the authors of the crime. To
Q And what is Aguila?
resolve the appeal fully, the following issues will be discussed: (1) credibility and sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, (2) res gestae, (3) the defenses of denial and illegality of arrest and (4) the characterization of the
killing. In addition, the Court will discuss the validity of the lower court's ruling that illegal possession of firearms xxxxxxxxx
should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the killing.
A Aguila gang, sir.
The Court's Ruling
xxxxxxxxx
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Q What is the Aguila gang?
First Issue: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
A It is killing people, sir.
In the present controversy, the judge who penned the assailed Decision did not hear all the evidence presented
by the parties. In fact, three judges handled the case: Judge Segundo B. Paz, in whose court the Informations x x x x x x x x x"[23]
were filed and the evidence of the parties was heard until August 17, 1994; Judge Leo M. Rapatalo, who took
over on December 7, 1994 and resolved the petition for bail; and Judge Jules A. Mejia, who presided over the He further testified to the pervasive climate of fear engulfing his town:
case from February 26, 1997 onwards. Hence, the rule granting finality to the factual findings of trial courts is
inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, the Court meticulously pored over the records, especially the transcript of "x x x x x x x x x
stenographic notes, but after a careful study and deliberation, the Court finds no reason to disturb the factual
findings of Judge Mejia.
Q In your affidavit, Mr. Witness, you mentioned that there were other witnesses [to] the killing. [A]ccording to
you, on January 5, 1994, there were other witnesses x x x, and your answer was "yes", but nobody there talked
Appellant contends that the testimony of Prosecution Witness Jose Rabago was filled with serious and material anymore due to fear for their lives.
inconsistencies, allegedly because he gave three versions of the incident. First, he did not mention appellant's
name when he reported the incident to SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon; and when asked by Patrolman Rolando Rabadon,
he said that he did not see anything. Second, he identified the appellant as one of Rabadon's killers only when A Yes, sir.
he was questioned by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation three years after the incident. As a

79
ART 11-13 CASES
xxxxxxxxx Q How many lights were there?

Q And what about your statement that these other witnesses fear for their lives, was that not your statement in A About three.
your sworn statement?
xxxxxxxxx
A Yes, sir, they are afraid.
Q How far were you from Boyet Rabadon when Ming Basila and Noel Navarro shot him?
Q And what about you, are you not afraid of the Navarros?
A About three steps, sir.
A I am afraid, sir.
x x x x x x x x x"[25]
Q Are you saying, Mr. Witness, that a lot of people here in Alaminos are afraid of the Navarros?
It must be stressed also that Rabago's testimony was compatible with the findings of Dr. Francisco E.
A Yes, sir. Viray,[26] the medicolegal officer who autopsied the victim's body. Rabago said that Rabadon had been shot five
times, once in the nape and four times in other parts of his body.[27] Such details of his testimony as a
x x x x x x x x x"[24] prosecution witness, aside from the fact that no ill motive or bias was ascribed to him by the appellant, lends
earmarks of truth to said testimony.
With regard to Rabago's recantation of his previous testimony as a prosecution witness, narrating the killing of
Rabadon and identifying the appellant as one of the malefactors, suffice it to say that this earlier testimony was In contrast, Rabago's testimony as a defense witness was bereft of particulars that should have indicated, at the
clear, candid and consistent, as shown hereunder: very least, that his testimony as a prosecution witness was false. His testimony as a defense witness, albeit brief,
did point out that it was not the appellant but a "stout and short" man, along with Ming Basila, who shot the
victim. He claimed that he was testifying anew because he was bothered by his conscience; however, he did not
"x x x x x x x x x
state any reason why he had previously identified the appellant as one of Rabadon's killers. Also suspect was the
way he parried questions regarding his appearance as a defense witness. Worth repeating is the trial court's
Q After Ming Basila shot Boyet Rabadon, what happened next? elucidation on the matter:

A Noel Navarro followed. "The Court wonders why of all things, Rabago will apply for witness protection program of the government, if it
[was] not true that he had witnessed the occurrence of the events as he related them when he was presented as
Q What did Noel Navarro do after Ming Basila shot Rabadon from behind? [a] prosecution witness.

A Boyet Rabadon was already lying down and he [shot] him. "And later on, after giving his version of the incident that happened as a witness for the prosecution, why of all
things, will he come to know the date of the trial or hearing for [the] defense when according to him, not even
xxxxxxxxx the accused, not even the lawyer of the accused, not even the subpoena had reached him, and yet, surprisingly,
he was present on June 16, 1995 to given again his testimony in favor of the accused.
Q You said that Noel Navarro shot Ferdinand Rabadon, how many times did Noel Navarro shoot Boyet Rabadon?
xxx xxx xxx
A Thrice, sir.
"His only reason why he [had] to testify for the defense [was] that his conscience bothered him, but this Court
xxxxxxxxx cannot buy that kind of explanation and believe it."[28]

Q Mr. Witness, considering that it was about nine o' clock in the evening when Ming Basila and Noel Navarro Because the prosecution was able to substantiate its charge of murder against the appellant through the
shot Boyet Rabadon, how were you able to see Basila and Noel Navarro shoot Boyet Rabadon? detailed, clear and consistent testimony of Rabago as a prosecution witness (pointing to the appellant as one of
the malefactors), the defense should have emphatically and clearly established that such testimony was false
and ill-motivated. Appellant failed to do this.
xxxxxxxxx
The Court has held in a number of cases that a recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is
A There was a light, sir. always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated.[29] Courts look with disfavor upon
retractions, because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
xxxxxxxxx consideration.[30] A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.[31] Where a witness who
testified for the prosecution subsequently testifies for the defense by retracting his previous testimony, as in the

80
ART 11-13 CASES
present case, the test to decide which testimony to believe is a comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence.[32]
In all, we agree with the court a quo in upholding the detailed, clear and straightforward testimony of Jose
Rabago as a prosecution witness and in debunking his brief and indecisive recantation of such testimony.
It is a legal truism that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To
sustain conviction, the prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the
weakness of that of the defense.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of Appellant Noel Navarro with moral
certainty. Indeed, the Court has held that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient
to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a charge for murder.[33]
Second Issue: Res Gestae
The appellant contends that, in considering the statements which Rabago gave to both SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon
and Patrolman Rolando Rabadon, the trial court erred in concluding that such statements were not part of res
gestae.[34]
At the outset, it must be stated that res gestae pertains to the admissibility of evidence, and not to its weight
and sufficiency,[35] as the Office of the Solicitor General correctly pointed out. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted
and its tendency to convince and persuade.[36]
Res gestae is defined as follows:
"Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be
received as part of the res gestae."[37]
Rabago's statement to SPO2 Rabadon that someone had killed his companion can be considered part of the res
gestae, and is thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. It was a spontaneous statement
that was made right after a startling occurrence and that refers to such occurrence. However, the same cannot
be said of his statement to Patrolman Rabadon, as it lacked the requisite spontaneity, having been given in
answer to questions propounded in an investigation, a day after the incident in question.
The appellant seems to imply that when Rabago reported the incident to SPO2 Rabadon, Rabago's silence
regarding the identity of the killers created doubt as to the appellant's culpability for such killing and, thus,
should have been likewise considered by the lower court in appellant's favor as part of the res gestae.[38] This
proposition deserves scant consideration.Such omission cannot be taken to mean that appellant was not the
culprit. The witness was simply silent as to the identity of the assailant. Such omission, as has been discussed,
can be attributed to Rabago's fear of the Navarros.
Witnesses' delayed reporting of what they know about a crime does not render their testimonies false or
incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get
involved in a criminal case. But more than this, there is always the inherent fear of reprisal, which is quite
understandable, especially if the accused is a man of power and influence in the community.[39] In People v.
ART 11-13 CASES
Vias,[40] it was held that "[t]he natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case, as well as to give
information to the authorities is a matter of judicial notice."
Third Issue: Denial and Illegal Arrest
While the appellant denied that he killed Ferdinand Rabadon,[41] he did not offer any evidence to prove his
assertion; instead, his testimony focused on the circumstances surrounding his alleged illegal arrest and
subsequent detention.
Contrary to the appellant's assertion that he was denied due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, such
claim is negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, as manifested by the voluntary
and counsel-assisted plea he entered during arraignment and by his active participation in the trial thereafter.[42]
Faced with the detailed, clear and consistent testimony of Jose Rabago, against whom no ill motive was
imputed, Appellant Navarro, whom the former pointed to as one of the killers of Ferdinand Rabadon, cannot
escape conviction merely by issuing an unsubstantiated denial and resorting to constitutional guarantees which
he has already voluntarily waived.
Fourth Issue: The Crime
The crime committed was murder. As alleged in the Information, the trial court correctly concluded that the
killing of Ferdinand Rabadon was qualified by treachery.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of
the person attacked.[43] Treachery exists when any of the crimes against persons is committed with the
employment of means, methods or forms that tend directly and especially to insure its execution, such that
the offender faces no risk that may arise from the defense which the offended party might make.[44] In the
present case, not only was the victim caught off guard by the unexpected attack of the appellant and Ming
Basila, but the testimony of Jose Rabago likewise indubitably established that the appellant shot the victim when
the victim was already lying prostrate and defenseless.[45]
Illegal Possession of Firearms
While we affirm the trial court's conviction of the appellant for murder, we do not agree with its disquisition
finding the charge of illegal possession of firearms to have aggravated the killing.
To prove illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must establish two things: first, the existence of the
subject firearm; second, the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the
corresponding license or permit to carry the same outside his residence.[46]
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5, 1991, the appellant had in his possession an
unlicensed firearm which he used in killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was allegedly recovered on January
5, 1994, when appellant was arrested. However, said firearm was not presented in court or offered as evidence
against the appellant. Although Rabago testified that he saw the appellant with a "short" firearm when the latter
shot Rabadon on January 5, 1991, no other proof was presented to show that such gun, allegedly used on
January 5, 1991, was the same one recovered on January 5, 1994. The prosecution was not able to establish
sufficiently the existence of the subject firearm, and this fact was not offset by SPO1 Edmund Garcia of the PNP
Firearms and Explosives Unit, who testified that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder in Pangasinan. Since
the charge of illegal possession of firearms was not proven, the same could not be considered to have
aggravated the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon.
81
The court a quo would have been correct in considering illegal possession of a firearm an aggravating
circumstance, if such possession had been established beyond reasonable doubt.This is in line with RA 8294
(amending PD 1866), which regards the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide.[47]
In any case, since the killing was qualified by treachery, the crime committed was murder. Whether with or
without this alleged generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty, reclusion perpetua, would still be the
same, because the killing was committed in January 1991, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still
proscribed by the Constitution, and RA 7659 had not yet been enacted.
Damages
While we affirm the award of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Ferdinand Rabadon, we have found no
evidence in the records that can support the lower court's additional award of P50,000 as actual damages. To
justify a grant of actual damages, it is necessary to show the amount of actual loss with the best evidence
obtainable.[48] In the present case, while Ofelia Rabadon testified that P25,000 was spent for the wake and burial
of her son, she did not present receipts or any other documents to substantiate such claim.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of actual damages
is DELETED. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005]
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289
affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting
the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in an Information, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
and deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a
regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
ART 11-13 CASES
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the following:
[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received an information
from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior
Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100
grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo
and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked
money consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe money bills supposedly amounting
to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a
Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking
Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a
commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was
the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the
informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams
of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he
had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited
bundle of money bills. Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to
Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of money bills.
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was consummated (TSN, July
30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced
themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of money
bills and the shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon
conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30,
1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined
the shabu. She reported and testified that the specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine
hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic),
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and ordered them
to handcuff themselves. They were later able to identify three of these people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas
Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another car while
another person drove Sonny Zarragas car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They
were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the gloves compartment of
Sonny Zarragas car. One of the men saw a substance inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said person
asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of
Sonny Zarragas mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny Zarragas cellular phone rung. It
was a call from Sonny Zarragas wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay P1.5
Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead offered to withdraw money from the
bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The agreement was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the
money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarragas release. The agreement did not materialize.
82
Col. Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as Sonny
Zarraga was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank manager to
call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and brought them to Camp
Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarragas
car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarragas
ATM card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime charged and
sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for
violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be credited in
their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the confiscated
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows:
I to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is not necessary for the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN
COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE
CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT
PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
ART 11-13 CASES
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION
PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The appellate court reduced
the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he
committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a
reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the
Information failed to allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was committed and that the
prosecution failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD
WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA,
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER
SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and
under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless
he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information and prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists
that the court is mandated to make a finding that he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the Information that the
petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell the shabusubject of the Information
sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was no need for the public prosecutor
trial and appellate courts to make an express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It is enough
that the very acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with judgment
to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and
penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to
be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking
the mental element of a crime the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is right or to
determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which the term is used in moral wrong. [9] However,
such presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is
burdened[11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with
discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence
may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime
relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness;
his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti.
83
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the money, Sir.
thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale
of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after which the accused
A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The
petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the same to the
poseur-buyer: Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?

Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu? A I made signs to my companions, Sir.

A The two of them, Sir. Q What signs did you give?

Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them? A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.

A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir. Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?

Q And what was your response? A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.

A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir. Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?

Q And what happened next? A Yes, Sir.

A After that I showed my money, Sir. Q Tell us.

Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically. I withdraw that. A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.

Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you that question? Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by these police officers?

A Sonny Zarraga, Sir. A Yes, Sir.

Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response? Q Please tell us.

A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir. A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir.

Q Did his companion bring out the shabu? Q And after that, what happened?

A Yes, Sir. A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13]

Q What happened to the shabu? Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused?

A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga. A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.

Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu? Q Who made the request for its examination?

A He handed it to me, Sir. A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.

Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next? Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the shabu?

84
ART 11-13 CASES
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir. WITNESS:

Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container was it contained? A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.[15]

A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper, Sir.[14] Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts and circumstances
showing his capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of the public prosecutor on cross-
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It examination and the petitioners answers thereto:
was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and
handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other FISCAL:
participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no
evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of
COURT:
the poseur-buyer:

Please proceed.
ATTY. VERANO:

FISCAL:
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?

Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right that you
A No, Sir.
went to Manuela at 5 oclock in the afternoon?

Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?
WITNESS:

A I dont know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.

Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?

Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12
oclock?
A I dont know, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of the boy?
Q What time did you leave?
A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
A After lunch, Sir.
Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not surprised that a young boy like
that would be in a group selling drugs?
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the police, you said that at one
occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that
FISCAL: [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the car, is that correct?

It calls for an opinion, Your Honor. A Yes, Sir.

ATTY. VERANO: Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to anybody since the day that you
were arrested?
May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams
of shabu. A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.

COURT: Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car?

The witness may answer. A No, Sir.

85
ART 11-13 CASES
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted by a male person at the COURT:
workshop and then you went out of Megamall and when you went outside, this man saw the key of the car
dangling at the waist. At whose waist? Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen any shabu. In support of your
claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an examination?
A From my cousin.
WITNESS:
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car was?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A No, Sir.
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area of SM Megamall, is that
correct? A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir. COURT:

Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody? The witness is discharged.[16]

A No, Sir. The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to
sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had not made any call? untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from
A No, Sir. what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot
thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed, in People v. Estepano,[17] we held that:
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you claimed that there was already this
group which met you? Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to show
his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and
A Yes, Sir.
whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt
from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by
Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person who arrested you? virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract
from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably squandered
A Yes, Sir. the opportunity to incriminate him.[18]

Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time? IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE.
A No, Sir. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.[19]

Q These people do not know your car? No costs.

A No, Sir. SO ORDERED.

FISCAL: FIRST DIVISION

No further question, Your Honor. G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011

ATTY. VERANO: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
No re-direct, Your Honor. HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.

86
ART 11-13 CASES
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 1 For it to prosper, the court must be
convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at the locus criminis at
the time of the commission of the crime.2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and executory only
after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation,
and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the
Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of
the judgment of his conviction.4
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035
filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No.
1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening more or less, at barangay
xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto],
with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a
five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years
old.7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the existence of
the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police
blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon
identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of the
story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be summarized in the
following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF’s house is along the road. That of appellant
lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass by FFF’s house, the
frequency of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF
because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to the incident.13
ART 11-13 CASES
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time – playing at the
basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road. She and
appellant used to be friends until the incident.14
At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store
of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed.
He thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita].15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum. 16 At the store, he
saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left
the store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held
the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area or place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held her hand
while on the road near the store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses Alejandro and
Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and
boxed her on the chest.24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs were
pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. 26 She felt pain and
cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found her face
greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head. 33 He checked for any
injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black.34 She had no underwear on and he saw
white substance and mud on her vagina.35 AAA told him that appellant brought her from the store36 to the
grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of slippers, removed her
panty, choked her and boxed her breast;38 and that he proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos.40 He asked the appellant what he did to
AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF went home
to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again,44 and boxed him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the house of
Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and asked what
happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the
Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter
ignored his question.51Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the
appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees."52 Julito did
found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered. 54 FFF also
had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural
Health Physician, issued a medical certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
87
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination at the provincial
hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the provincial hospital,
attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,58 the pertinent portion of which
reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this
time of examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his testimony,
Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the
time of the commission of the crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she actually saw Julito, not
appellant, pick up AAA on the road.61 In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellant’s aunt,
Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of FFF’s
house.64He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch
water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy
something from the store, AAA always approached him.67
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party.
At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were
gathered together in a drinking session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the
store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of
the time because he had a watch .68
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the birthday party;
and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She
recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed that appellant’s white shorts
and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69
ART 11-13 CASES
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his
uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the
road next to the house of the Perochos.72 From where she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short
pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s face was covered and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her
because she thought it was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she
returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the
house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito
embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that appellant was
twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF
came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellant’s
uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished
FFF.83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening, she was watching the television along with
other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short pants without
a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito
tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonia’s advice, Julito released
her and went out of the house.84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a
bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 o’clock in the evening. This time, he
boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-
year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was
apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was committed
on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in order to
consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused,
therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling
in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91
88
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal. 92 This Court A He mounted me.
required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.93 Both parties manifested that
they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their respective briefs and would no longer file any Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
supplement.94
A Yes.
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the
test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction."96 A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.

Our Ruling Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?

We sustain the judgment of conviction. A They were apart.

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well- Q Who pushed them apart?
entrenched principles:
A Hermie.
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from A Yes.
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.97
Q What was that?
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused.98More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.99 A His penis.

Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of the Q Where did he push his penis?
crime,100except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101
A To my vagina.
I
Q Was it painful?
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of
any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is A Yes.
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority.102 Q What was painful?

That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion A My vagina.
of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently
proved such fact. Q Did you cry?

AAA testified: A Yes.103

PROS. OMANDAM: The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in order to
test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all – she had been raped. When a
xxxx woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape was
committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.105
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?

89
ART 11-13 CASES
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5
o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the redness of the
introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that such object could have
been an erect male organ.107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration conclusively established
the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108
II
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of the
crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere
when the crime was committed.109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant, especially
when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him during the commission of
the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the
road near the store to the situs criminus111 that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man
who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called "kuya"
and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and
shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to
someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it
was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the credibility
of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to observe the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their
oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued,
or misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a
vain exercise in view of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused and other corroborative
circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked
him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latter’s testimony that he confronted accused after
hearing of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi
weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over
their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave
the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
ART 11-13 CASES
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she
revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident because he was then at
work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the second time and boxed appellant.117 It
was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay. 118 Further, the drinking
session started only after the appellant’s errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria’s
statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled
that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the
house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as
testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection
differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after she
returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30.
In this respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had
raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as
Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito
Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita
Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been offered
preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they
being related or were one way or another linked to each other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the
defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the location of
the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the crime was
considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the
accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense
witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several
hours after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout.126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was
in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this Court in the
following manner:
90
Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law and co-
worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It
is, however, an established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape occurred, was a stone’s throw away
from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4,
1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours,
since she testified that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes
being harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have
focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily
sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and ravished her,
then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and
shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to
perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are
indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of
his unlawful action.139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.

As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was only five
the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering that the
(5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is
farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only
committed against a child below seven (7) years old141 applies.
a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and
consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the
rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle’s house.129 Unfortunately, the The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of the
testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;142 and (2) the privileged mitigating circumstance of
the scene of the crime.130 minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by
law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.143
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the time and
place of the commission of the crime. Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties provided in
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond
appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision
reasonable doubt.
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as
maximum.146
III
We differ.
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No.
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3) years before it was
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro,
enacted on 28 April 2006.
clarified:

We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant
18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Civil Liability
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate
We have consistently ruled that:
proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed.134

The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed,
We determine discernment in this wise:
which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually
imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.135 Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case.136

91
ART 11-13 CASES
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing on the
gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and
moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively
lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the amount of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension
of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding
that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that,
consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, 154 the aforestated provision does not
apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling
in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the
law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the
benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has
been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38
of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has
been found guilty of a heinous crime.157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous
crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a
serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children
ART 11-13 CASES
(LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go
through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a
primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the
Law,which reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to
appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter.
Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so
long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance
to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with
the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the
offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51
of Republic Act No. 9344.164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in
conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant’s
confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding
appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
(2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate
action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183563
Plaintiff-Appellee,
92
 Present:
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged[4] with eight (8) counts of rape in separate
informations, the accusatory portions of which state:

CORONA, C.J.,

Chairperson, Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by
lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said
DEL CASTILLO, and
[AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her consent and against her will.

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[5]
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Promulgated:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
Accused-Appellant.

December 14, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use
of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.

DECISION
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[6]

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48

That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and
00560, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
(RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-appellant
Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of
rape against the private complainant AAA.[3]

93
ART 11-13 CASES
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[7]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use
of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[8]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use
of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[9]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use
of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
ART 11-13 CASES
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[10]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use
of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[11]
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-
old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use
of force and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[12](Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he entered a plea of not guilty.[13] On
March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on the identity
of the accused-appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused appellant is the
uncle of the victim.[14]
94
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the accused and his counsel. The cases
were then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against the accused-appellant. AAA
testified that she was born on November 1, 1987.[15] In one afternoon when she was only eight years old, she
stated that the accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember, though, the exact
month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and went on top
of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina
and did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her vagina. When he
pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.[16]
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on different nights. The
accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He
came to AAAs house, took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it
was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her
for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top of her and
pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA
said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night and their window
was only covered by cloth. He entered through the kitchen as the door therein was detached.[17]
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her
and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest
because he was heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-
appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the
rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he
proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.[18]
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit
A - the Medico-Legal Report,[19] which contained the results of the medical examination conducted on AAA by
Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the Social Case
Study Report[20] pertaining to AAAs case, which was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and Development
Office of the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
ART 11-13 CASES
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so many times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 oclock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE[21]
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness stand to deny the informations
filed against him and to refute the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape allegedly
happened in 1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in
Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996. He stated
that he was working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When he
would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred Antoni. He did not go to the house
of AAA as the latters parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAAs parents because he did
not work with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that in July 1999, he was also living
in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to September
1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the same restaurant
in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with work. He denied that he
would have drinking sprees with AAAs stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.[22]
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and they were
close to each other. He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then
resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents house was about two kilometers away from
the house of AAA.While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once every
month, mainly on Sundays.[23]
The Judgment of the RTC
95

On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended,
and further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found
accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN
COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and
to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape and pay
moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.[24] (Emphases in the
original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that AAA was in tears when she testified
convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If there were
inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that AAA was
pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an
indication that the charges were fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal
officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-appellants defense of alibi was likewise disregarded
by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the
day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant
was positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him. The
trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against the accused-appellant the aggravating
circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the RTC Decision, asserting that the trial court
failed to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct examination, the
accused-appellant claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old
when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In a Resolution[26] dated November
6, 2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellants motion, holding that the latter failed to substantiate with
clear and convincing evidence his allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.[27] The
parties then filed their respective briefs.[28] On February 7, 2006, we resolved[29] to transfer the cases to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[30] The cases were docketed in the appellate court as
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
ART 11-13 CASES
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in
Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to
[AAA] in the amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape and clarification that
the separate award of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count of
rape. The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.[31]
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of
AAA were not sufficient to discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when the incidents
of rape occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her
straightforward, categorical and candid testimony that she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The
Court of Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAAs charges of rape conformed with the physical
evidence and the accused-appellants uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive
identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the relationship of the accused-
appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate
court, however, differed in appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAAs
minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor. The
aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was
purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages
in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[32] of the above decision and the same was given due course by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[33] dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice. [34] Thereafter, in a Manifestation and
Motion[35] filed on December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed
that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted a
Supplemental Brief.[36]
96
 The Ruling of the Court

The Issues

After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to deny the appeal, but with a
modification of the penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded.
In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:

To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape
I and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.

Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in
1995 when AAA was only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the prosecution failed
to substantiate the said fact as AAAs testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to be worthy of any
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first time when she was eight years
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
old. Nonetheless, during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she said that
the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old. On her redirect
examination, AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.

II

Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

III
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.[37]
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight to the incredible testimony
of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was first supposedly
raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates
of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies cannot c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
merely be discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAAs minority and
her relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-appellant, thus,
prays for a judgment of acquittal.
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

97
ART 11-13 CASES

In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which
are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented.[38]
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353, [39] or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
which took effect on October 22, 1997.[40] Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code,[41] which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of
committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years
old. Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her
own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern evil from good.[43] (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions of law are essentially the
same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the
ART 11-13 CASES
prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the
commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman.[44] Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not
grounds for acquittal.[45]
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs testimony. On this
matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes[46] that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often
accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment and manner of
testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or
the scant or full realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty
and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds
an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of Appeals].[47]
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found no cogent reason to
disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape
charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears
in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were still 8 years old?
[AAA]
98
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and date.

PROS. SABARRE:

Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?

A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry. Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?

A: In the afternoon.

Q: How did he rape you?

A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts. xxxx

Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you? Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did he do to you next if any?

A: Yes, sir in our house. A: He went on top of me.

Q: Who were the persons present then at that time? Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?

A: My younger brother and I. A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled down the zipper.

Q: About your mother and step father where were they? Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what did he do next if any?

A: In the ricefield. A: He was pumping on me.

PROS. SABARRE: Q: Did he pull out his organ?

A: Yes, sir.

May we make it of record that the witness is crying.

Q: And where did he place his organ?

COURT: A: In my vagina.

Have it on record. Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

99
ART 11-13 CASES
A: Pain.[48] Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you please narrate to the court?

A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out my panty and went on top of me.

The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, Q: With whom was he drinking?
who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. [W]hen the testimony of a
rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been A: With my step father.
carnal knowledge.[49]

Q: Where did they drink?

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with
the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The testimony of AAA on the
A: In our neighbor.
said incidents is as follows:

Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused wearing at that time?
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July 1999?

A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.
A: Five times.

Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?

A: No, sir.
A: Night time.

Q: What did he do with his penis?

Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?

A: He made me hold it.

A: Different nights.

Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?

Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?

A: He left.
A: My Kuya and other siblings.

xxxx
Q: You have companions why were you raped?

A: Because they were sleeping.

ATTY. SABARRE:

100
ART 11-13 CASES
 Q: When he pump what did you feel?

Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did he rape you? A: Pain.

A: (witness did not answer)

PROS. SABARRE:

COURT:

Make it of record that the witness is crying again.

Why did you feel pain?

Q: Why are you crying?

A: I am angry and hurt. A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.

PROS. SABARRE: ATTY. SABARRE;

Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding considering that the witness is psychologically How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night time?
incapable of further proceeding.

A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by cloth as cover.[50]
xxxx

From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please narrate the whole incident to this honorable to the other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999.
court?

A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999. AAA narrated only one
incident of rape in this manner:

Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?

A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump. Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month of August 1999?

A: Two times.

101
ART 11-13 CASES
Q: Was it during day time or night time?
A: Nighttime.
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?
A: He kissed me.
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?
A: He took off his shirts.
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?
A: He went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
ART 11-13 CASES
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his name answered Henry Arpon).[51]
It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law requires to be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that
the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence.[52] Thus,
including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a uniform
manner does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAAs narration of the sexual abuses committed by the
accused-appellant contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that
he placed his organ in her private part.[53] Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage
crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid detail of a
frightening experience a verity born[e] out of human nature and experience.[54]
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi
is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the
accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the
time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime when it was committed.[55] [S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over
and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the
crime.[56]
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger bus in less
than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of the day after
working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to
him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually molested her beginning that
afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She can not be mistaken
on the identity of the accused, because the first sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is
familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her mother.[57]
102

Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may have been prompted to
falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latters quarrel with AAAs parents when he refused
to work with them in the rice fields.[58] Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and
implausible. Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if
true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny
that a rape trial brings in its wake.[59]
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or
relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.

As to the accused-appellants objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the trial courts 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of rape were to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases ours.)
committed. The testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987, [60] the voluntary stipulation of the
accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony
regarding his recollection of the age of the victim,[61] his own niece, all militate against accused-appellants
theory. In People v. Pruna,[62] the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:

Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand (when she was 14
years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.[63]
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate
of live birth of such party.

That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation need no longer be
belabored upon. [I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-
law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.[64]
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

Penalties

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under punishes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:
the following circumstances:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 circumstances:
years old;

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law-spouse of the
years old; parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)

103
ART 11-13 CASES

Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the
parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3) counts of rape
committed by the accused-appellant. As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence
of the victims minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[65] In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when
the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the
third civil degree. The said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference of the case and again admitted by him during his testimony.[66]
In People v. Pepito,[67] the Court explained that [t]he purpose of entering into a stipulation or admission of facts
is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which will not be
disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the
pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by appellant therein
must be given weight. Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the same occurred in
1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the second and third counts of rape, the
imposable penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
ART 11-13 CASES
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, we still take
cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the
entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be
found in the appealed judgment.[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict with the
law,[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She
shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age
or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,[70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial
evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions concur, namely: (1)
the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused
and/or a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's
and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue.[71]
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 and that he was only
13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.[72] Other than his testimony, no other
evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any
objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the
same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellants minority in
ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and
are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years
at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
104
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions
provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if
they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia[73] further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a] case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing
that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,[74]i.e., from under nine years of age and above nine
years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) - to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen
but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability.[75]
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly
committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old
at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of
rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. [76] The Court, thus, exempts the accused-
appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
ART 11-13 CASES
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was
already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with
discernment. In Madali v. People,[77] the Court had the occasion to reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental
capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case. In this case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established
by the testimony of AAA, which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not
tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told
her that he would kill her mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to
conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware
of the consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity
with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the circumstance of his minority, the
latter would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape under
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with
the Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case given that the
accused-appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the
105
application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision
states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.(Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case,
to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict
with the law may after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the
[Department of Social Welfare and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third incidents of rape shall not be
affected by the above disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and the
pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.[78] that [c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to
have been committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim
as civil indemnity for each count. We also explained in Sarcia that [t]he litmus test x x x in the determination of
ART 11-13 CASES
the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition
of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.[79] The trial courts award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore increased
to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified without need of proof other than the fact of rape
because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she underwent]. [80] We
also increase the trial courts award of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein
established in keeping with the recent case law.[81]
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages. As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,[82] [t]he
award of exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the
aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of
which were alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The appellate courts award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the current
jurisprudence on the matter.[83]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is
hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3) counts of
rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
106
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.
Florentino Saguin for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years
and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is homicide, according to the
following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of
Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with his bolo
wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant
death, in violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends that the
court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio
market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of
the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato Bindoy, who
was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy
threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy,
and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This
occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near
the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the
bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo
from the latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached
Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any
indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the
testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy his
curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears
they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to
ART 11-13 CASES
wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only defending his possession of the bolo,
which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary inspector
who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the
defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab Omamdam with his
bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded Omamdam by
accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement
to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam in the
chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was
endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no
evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with
Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam,
he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs
criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal
Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy
were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so
violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was
therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same
witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied:
"I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she
doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a
mishap." The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly
facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos
(15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely
ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of a crime under
investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime
by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind of the guilty
person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to acquittal
according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused
Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
107
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the information, as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano
Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the
breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide
the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that
the accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could see
it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and
costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important facts. The
accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro
Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant
took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers
at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a stream to
see how the alteration which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the
other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he
met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the
rice-harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which
to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a
young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a short distance from the
shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the
question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There
is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point.
The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild
chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused, however, testified that he did not invite the
deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga
tree "trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is
unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens were to be found, I
proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to eat
on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I
heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that
ART 11-13 CASES
I had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my companions were working, running back, and
when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my companions were working; and
I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is
my friend and besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and myself
went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found
in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The
defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left his
laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the
laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way toward
the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and
removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the
body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow
laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the
witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused,
who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That
evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon
grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place where it
had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of
the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because
he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do
so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the
body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the deceased had
been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity
and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have been no
motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden
quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man
were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or
intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
108
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident
while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417;
Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875;
U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any
question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all
suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State
to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State and the
prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury
should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it
was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury
that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in
the Cross case was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be
submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which
constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from custody
ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004]
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and the
innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme Court may
conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful reexamination convinces this Court that an accident
ART 11-13 CASES
caused the victims death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses create a reasonable doubt
on appellants guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 28,
2001 Decision[2] and the October 30, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CR No. 18759. The
CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment[4] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)[5] of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of
homicide. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.[6]
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with his .45 service pistol, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was
then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which directly caused the
death of said victim thereafter.[7]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondents version of the facts as follows:
Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.
On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the Concepcion College to arrest
Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. With the
arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by the Concepcion Elementary School where his wife, Jessica,
was in a get-together party with other School Administrators. When his wife asked him, Why will you be
arrested? [H]e answered [Even I] do not know why I am arrested. That is why I am even going there in order to
find out the reason for my arrest.
Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company
at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in
the robbery case.
Later that day, about a little past 2 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went near the
door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical
interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa: Lets go to the investigation room. The investigation
109
room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado
Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation room.
At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side of his
belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the investigation room, two (2) gunshots
were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol,
facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the Commanding Officer of the
Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma
(first name not provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in the Philippine
Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to
the hospital for he was dead.
Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the medico-legal officer
of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an autopsy on the remains of Tomas
Balboa. The following were his findings:
Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified by sutures, surrounded by abrasion
collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel, directed medially
backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space into thoracic cavity, perforating
thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture, 8 th thoracic
vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges, modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms.
From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel (2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges
sutured, 0.7 cm. on its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms. From
anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal cavity,
perforating thru and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm.,
oriented medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9th intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior
midline, 110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen.
REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.
Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboas body were gunshot wounds. The
entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple and exited to the right side of
the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to right. As to the possible position of the
assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was probably in front of the victim and was more to the
left side, and the gun must have been a little bit higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located
immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta
estimated that when it was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the guns nozzle to the right side front of
the victim. The distance between the entrance points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0
centimeters.[8]
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them from the trial
court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness to the
incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:
ART 11-13 CASES
Erna Basa:
x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the afternoon; at about past 2
oclock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of words which were
not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and
Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she was inside the room and one meter away from the
door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters away from the door; the grappling happened
so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she was
not certain who pulled the gun. x x x.
Eden Legaspi:
x x x [A]s early as 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside the investigation room of the PC
at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 oclock that same afternoon while there inside, she heard a commotion
outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the commotion started they were seated on the bench
and after the commotion that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door and she
saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun and immediately two successive shots rang out; she did
not leave the place where she was seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two men fall down x
x x.
Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company then attached to the defunct
321st PC Company; he was one of the investigators of their outfit; about 2 oclock or past that time of January 4,
1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as he was already holding the door
knob of their investigation room and about to open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach
him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was
apprehended by the police of Concepcion and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he
asked the sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with
Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then
as he was holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the victim, who was two meters away
from him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of his gun with
his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he held the handle of his
gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa)
from holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he held the handle
of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and
Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the gun;
more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to his
right side when the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its
holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber and
cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling he used his left hand to
prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the
gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though the latter was
bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who of them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted
saying stop that and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding
officer, came, got his gun, and said that the case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that when
his gun was put in its holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.
Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case that happened during the first
week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that case in the town of San Dionisio and that case involves
other persons who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also the chance to invite and interrogate
Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t was after he took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang
110
called him to conduct the interrogation; when he took Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that he
(Balboa) was to be investigated in the investigation room which was housed in the main building which is fifty
meters, more or less, from the stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office of the commanding
officer, officer of the operations division and that of the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the victim
tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the victim; the
hand of the victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun; that the entire
handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell whether the victim, while struggling
with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is
located; during the incident his gun was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed
them and probably reported the incident to their commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he
(Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when his commanding officer came some five to ten minutes later and took
away his gun he did not tell him anything.
Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas Balboa that
afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings respecting which he made an autopsy report he said he
found two entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with trajectory medially downward, while
the second one is on the left side of the stomach with trajectory somewhat going upward; at the same time of
his examination he saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn
by the victim, he did not see or find any powder burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt
were believed by him to be powder burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the pocket of
the jacket of the victim.[9]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful in his attempts to
grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had been
locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went off; it was petitioner who released
the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body
of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of Balboa
resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,[10] the CA maintained that a revolver is not prone to accidental
firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of the nature of its mechanism,
unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it
over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either
way, the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional because pressure on the trigger was necessary to
make the gun fire.[11]
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:
[Petitioners] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim been shot only once. In this
case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice, thereby establishing [petitioners]
determined effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even assuming without admitting that the
first shot was accidental, then it should not have been followed by another shot on another vital part of the
body. The fact that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on two different and distant parts of
the body, inflicted from two different locations or angles, means that there was an intent to cause the victims
death, contrary to [petitioners] pretensions of the alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that
the location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what
actually happened during the incident. x x x.[12]
ART 11-13 CASES
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had miserably failed
to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion of the trial
court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the commission of the
crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate court in this manner:
x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must use his
influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have
perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position. (People vs.
Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan
to kill the victim when the former fetched the latter from the stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the
public position of the [petitioner] facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial courts finding that
the said aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his public position to commit the crime
cannot be sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum
of the penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime
of homicide. x x x.[13]
Hence, this Petition.[14]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming petitioners conviction despite the
insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast to petitioners overwhelming
evidence to support his theory/defense of accident.
II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the conviction of the petitioner on a
manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full control of the handle of the
gun, because what the testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was that the gun fired
while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor generals observation that the fact that petitioner
shot the victim twice establishes petitioners determined effort to kill the victim.
IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence presented when it ruled that the
trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that he and the victim were side-
by-side each other when the grappling ensued.
V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioners reaction to the incident when it stated
that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly argues against his claim of accidental
shooting.
VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of it in determining the
existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at the victim when the same was put in
serious doubt by the evidence presented.
VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and self-defense are inconsistent.
VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and damages.[15]
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the
result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
conclusive.[16] Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But where some facts are
misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn the erroneous conclusions drawn
by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or guilt
of the accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative.
111
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code: A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboas hand was also there. Both of them were
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability: holding the gun.
xxxxxxxxx Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault A. The handle.
or intent of causing it. Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the fault or A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled.[17] Thus, in Q. So later, they were facing each other?
determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into account the dual standards of A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were grappling for
lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the main the possession of the gun force against force.
question in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots COURT:
were fired? Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
of the Gun When It Fired Q. What was the distance?
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident firsthand. Her A. Very close to each other.
account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events of that fateful afternoon of January 4, 1990 as Q. How close?
follows: A. Very near each other.
ATTY. TEODOSIO: Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a commotion. That commotion which A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies would touch each other.
you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of that commotion which you heard? Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be understood. A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion? Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. No, sir. A. Yes, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while you were inside the COURT:
investigation room as part of that commotion? Proceed.
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were talking somewhat like Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?
murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks. A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was released from its holster
COURT: and then there was an explosion.
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation? Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. Yes, sir. A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were grappling for the
xxxxxxxxx possession of the gun.
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this case? Am I correct? Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Yes, sir. A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun? Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I saw both of them grappling A. Yes, sir.
for that gun. Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
Q. Where was the gun at that time? A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the gun was
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.) turning.
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy who xxxxxxxxx
was holding the gun with his right hand? Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy. A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the one holding the
COURT: gun.
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster? Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for the possession of the gun. A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many hands did you see? Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Two. A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other, it was then that I saw Sgt.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim? Pomoy holding the gun.
A. Yes, sir. COURT:
COURT: Proceed.
Proceed. ATTY. TEODOSIO:
ATTY TEODOSIO: Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the handle of the gun? Am I
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun? correct?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy. A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun? Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?

112
ART 11-13 CASES
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in front of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoys right and Balboas left sides [were] towards
each other. They were side by side at a closer distance towards each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that time?
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the gun and the right hand of Sgt.
Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being held by Tomas Balboa? The
rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near the trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the gun with his right hand with
the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the same hand holding the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly anymore whose hand was holding
the gun when I saw both their hands were holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, Daw duha na sila nagakapot, what you really mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have previously said when the
gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoys right hand was still on the handle of the
gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating by showing
his right hand with her left hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of the left hand is
somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form its holster and while the
accused was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the gun up to the time when the
gun was pulled out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand of Pomoy was used by him
in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab the handle of the gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim away from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using his left hand to protect the
victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.
COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
A. Yes, sir.[18]
ART 11-13 CASES
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle. The
deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those
attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon was categorically asserted
by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged -- his right
hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It would be
difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release the
safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the appellate
court: [Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the left hand of the
victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely lead us to the conclusion
that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the gun.[19]
Release of the Guns Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless released,
would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence showed that the weapon
fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this fact could only mean that
petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied grappling
for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious. The
eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed: that in the course of the
scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the claim that the
shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber
service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in question, explained how the disputed
second shot may have been brought about:
x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when fired,
immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a live bullet
in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and distance between the
wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the
first shot going downward from left to right thus pushing Balboas upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa
was still clutching petitioners hand over the gun; the second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet
going upward of Balboas body as he was falling down and releasing his hold on petitioners hand x x x.[20]
Thus, the appellate courts reliance on People v. Reyes[21] was misplaced. In that case, the Court disbelieved the
accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it over to the victim. Here, no
similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the gun accidentally fired in the course
of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the
mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used in Reyes.[22] Unlike a revolver, a semi-
automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof
becomes the object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all frontal, the
appellate court rejected petitioners claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held that if there was
indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x each other, the wounds thus
inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead to an inference that the victim was shot
frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta.[23]
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise moment
when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination of the existence of
variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes inconsequential.
Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of
its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires
becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle
113
shows that the parties positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor
pointed at any particular target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were grappling for the
possession of the gun.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the gun was
turning.[24]
xxxxxxxxx
Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were grappling for the
possession of the gun force against force.[25]
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First, because the position of the
gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the person or persons holding the gun when it fired. This is
especially true when two persons were grappling for the possession of the gun when it fired, as what exactly
transpired in this case. x x x.
[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the victim during the grappling
when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit Balboa, his upper
body was pushed downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45 pistol. But he did not let go of his
grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the gun down as he was going down. When the gun
went off the second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboas body was going upward because
his upper body was pushed downward twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-
examination, petitioner testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we separated from each
other. This sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were grappling over the gun and were moving
very fast. x x x. [26]
Presence of All the
Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due care; 2)
the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no
intent to cause the injury.[27] From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. At the time of the
incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the investigators -- of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his
duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters
cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the
law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a
detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim
persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his service
weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun
locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within the premises of his
working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased, much
less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to
any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim while being fetched
from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts committed in the course of
the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the
ART 11-13 CASES
release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the death of the victim -
- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances beyond the control of
petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latters culpability.
Petitioners Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident was
indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was dumbfounded, according to the
CA; was mum, pale and trembling, according to the trial court. These behavioral reactions supposedly point to
his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been calmly
escorting a person from the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in the next breath, he was looking at
his companions bloodied body. His reaction was to be expected of one in a state of shock at events that had
transpired so swiftly and ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa, he
claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to kill. On
the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself
from imminent danger.[28] Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any conscious or
premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against any
aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties attempts to
possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner -- an
exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further discussion of whether the
assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years
of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the
persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger,
because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial
of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to
having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the
murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only
eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he
was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the
Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard
the shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the
latter called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9,
art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against
him.
114
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the
execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as
well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not
take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the
burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of
information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be
considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the
defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another
witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through
the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which
do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can
not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one
of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not
punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the
defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1481. February 17, 1903. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. LIBERATO EXALTACION ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Alberto Barretto, for Appellants.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; DURESS. — The defendants were captured by brigands, who compelled them, by
threats of death, to take and subscribe an oath to support the Katipunan Society, an organization created for the
purpose of subverting the Government by force: Held, That the duress under which the defendants acted
relieves them from criminal liability.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
ART 11-13 CASES
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an information charging
Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the
4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in the rebellion against the
Government of the United States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of
which was to overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and
provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under oath that the two
defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days before having captured a number
of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, a so-called general of bandits, situated at a place called
Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the papers now in pages 2 and 3 of the
record, signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they were
exhibited to them; that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the documents under
compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that
this statement was made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casa and
Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same facts stating that the
defendants told Governor Tecson that they had signed the said documents under fear of death at the hands of
the thieves by whom they had been captured. The witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan,
testified that he held office as such in place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in
the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog,
and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry out the
superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother
country. The two accused under oath, testified to having signed the said documents and alleged that they did
not so under compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the thieves; that the defendant
Tanchinco was captured in the fields one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men,
unknown to him, who asked him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the
negative they compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a place called Kaibiga
in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having been unable to pay the $300
which was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato Exaltacion
under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen
and armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest and there compelled
him by threats of death to sign the document now on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to
go upon promise to return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the
road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released they presented
themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to
Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon — of whom the last
two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and reported to
him what had happened to him — all testified to the same fact and corroborated the statements of the accused
with respect to their capture and their subsequent report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed by the accused, is
not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them f the penalty inflicted by the
judgment of the curt below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the
Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them
from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the defendants in
115
presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales,
of the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the bandits is corroborative of their
testimony, and is the best demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling
discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact that
Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on which he appeared before
President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been established at the
trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below must be reversed and the
defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a copy of
the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his information and guidance. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
C.W. Ney for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention" of
the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of
the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness
which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which
the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal
president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without
warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses that
having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the
complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought before the proper
judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can
gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of
the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was
conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his
auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining
municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all
practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining
municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written
complaint, which was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not
appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof
we must assume that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the
weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats
safer and more commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
ART 11-13 CASES
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed
to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this
record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the
prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the
arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where
the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the
peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary,
or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a
neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were
supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby
acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa , Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence
alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown
away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua,
with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw
her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and
visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being
asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she
was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano
Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the
body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before.
116
Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked
whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president
of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed
still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing
his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in
her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was
not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to
her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was
not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the
appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the
appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he
maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of
man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at
least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are
committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the
full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to
expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis
Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol — she considers him her husband as
he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was
pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child
carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the
birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the
child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left
the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in
fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr.
Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant denied having made
any admission to said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This
illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had
upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and
therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event;
and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is
uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could
teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur
to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable
to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the
thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
ART 11-13 CASES
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to
respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by
doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person
who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was
aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having
been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors
attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of
which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection
with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is exempt from criminal
liability but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year of
marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover
knew that she was pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love
should be born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On January 31, at
about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and entered a thicket about four or five brazas
away, where the residents of said place responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the accused
emerged from the thicket staggering and apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar,
who saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to help her, supported her and aided her in going up
to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy.
Thinking that he alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby,
and requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely gone about
five brazas, when he saw the body of a newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the accused had
been a few moments before. Upon being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to
bring the child into the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child shown to her was hers, the
appellant answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy had been made of the body, it was found that the child
was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among young primiparæ who, by
reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not aware
that they are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de
Medicine Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual de
Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that the accused, in her feverish, weak
and dizzy condition when she went into the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no experience in
childbirth, was not aware that upon defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying in her womb.
Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature which brought her there, she
returned home staggering for lack of strength to support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she
117
was leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only knew that she had given birth when she was shown the
already dead child with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies, which may
be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been exposed to the rough
weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide
or that of abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when
the act punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from dizziness, the
appellant under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently, she could not
have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the
elements and of the animals. Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as already stated, not
knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological act, being
natural — she might expel the child she carried in her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a
psychological defect of a person who fails to use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of
his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving
the child in the thicket, it would die as a consequence of the rough weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither
can she be considered negligent because negligence is the omission to do what the law or morals obliges one to
do, which implies knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the compliance with the obligation.
Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate complying with her legal
and moral duty to protect the life of her child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked foresight because,
having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not foresee that by abandoning her child in a thicket it
would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of skill because she did not know that to
defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery, and as defecation is a natural physiological
function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without
fault or intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity
accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the
mercy of the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if the accused had
been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her accidental delivery would not
exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of said child no longer would have been accidental.
Neither can we consider the seventh exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting
in the failure to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because
this exempting circumstance implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with but is prevented
by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented
one to do what the law commands. In the present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with
respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she been aware of her delivery and of
the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting from the fever which consumed her,
being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and her illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her
from asking for help, would constitute the lawful or insuperable impediment required by law. Having been
ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the law to
impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its exposure to the
rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because she had neither
deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with regard to the child.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.
ART 11-13 CASES
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente
P. Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal
Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old former
detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June
9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he
intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided to
sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw
Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner,
Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped
on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on Napola's
recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for
help. Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before his
departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore
that night. From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in
a truck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim, whom she treated
twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including
the back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were not properly
treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns
would cause death", she said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt area, secondary
infection would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating "burn" as the
cause of death (Exh. B).
118

The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque
and the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as
witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They
had executed a joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder.1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital witness who should have
been presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res
gestae.2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of credibility or the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the municipal jail on guard duty.
He heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the
assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor
because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a complete liar", testified that
she heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it
happened to be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of
July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Alberio. It observed that
Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed
by the consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility of Alberio, pointed out
that he was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It should be noted that the
accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no
police investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might explain why
it was not immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman Matugas are compatible with
the prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given
credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the advantage of seeing their demeanor
and behavior on the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole
record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended". The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c],
Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no
alteran la relacion de causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la
predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el
ART 11-13 CASES
tetanos, la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal,
12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause of the cause of death,
no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted
lamp, which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the course of the
scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there
was a sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of
homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person, which result in the death
of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper
medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona
case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been properly treated. The
victim died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be
attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted the wound was responsible for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440).3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised
Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his
position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under his custody. "The
policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency.
The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic
civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same
time just as effectively protect the individual from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven
facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his
drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful
consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official
position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the
penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125053. March 25, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
119
In the decision[1] of 22 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-212, the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
274, found accused-appellant Christopher Caa Leonor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as
death indemnity; P44,318 as actual damages; P2 million as moral damages; and P50,000 as attorneys fees.
CHRISTOPHER was charged in an information[2] whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of May 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and against the
will of complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the
person of said complainant did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest her cash money worth
P900.00 and Titus wrist watch valued at an undetermined amount, belonging to said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter, in the aforementioned amount; that on the occasion of the said
Robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, without justifiable reason, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious stab wounds which caused her death.
At his arraignment on 14 June 1995, CHRISTOPHER entered a plea of not guilty.[3]
It is undisputed that on 15 May 1995 at the Hermanos Building in General Santos Avenue, Bicutan Extension,
Paraaque City, at around 11:30 a.m., CHRISTOPHER stabbed dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, which wound
ultimately led to her death. That much is admitted by CHRISTOPHER. The prosecution and the defense differ,
however, in the circumstances surrounding the incident.
The prosecution had as witnesses Reynaldo Baquilod, SPO1 Luis F. Galeno, PO3 Mateo Interia, Dr. Ravell Ronald
Baluyot, Dr. Edgardo de Guzman, Dr. Paul Pepa, Beverly Vidanes, Dr. John Enrique Franco, Fernando Tarlengco,
Geraldine Tarlengco, Joseph Sumalbar, and Asst. Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray. The defense presented
CHRISTOPHER, Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, Dr. Alfredo Besa, Renato Leonor and Alexander Pagubasan.
The Office of the Solicitor General partly summarized the evidence for the prosecution as follows:
In the morning of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a dentist by profession, was at her clinic at the third
floor of the Hermanos Building, Bicutan, Paraaque, Metro Manila, when a man entered and inquired about the
cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee, the man, who was later on identified as
Christopher Leonor, said that he would come back and then left in a hurry. Minutes later, Leonor came back[,]
and Dr. Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco was preparing her dental instruments when
Leonor barged in and demanded money. Dr. Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was] on the table. On
hearing this, Leonor stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, grabbed her watch and ran away. Dr. Tarlengco struggled out of the
clinic and saw the man running out of the building, Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help.
Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr. Tarlengco shouting, Tulungan ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng
taong iyon. Baquilod noticed that Dr. Tarlengco was referring to the man running out of the building, coming
from upstairs. Baquilod chased Leonor up to Daang Hari Street where he was joined by traffic policeman Luis
Galeno who was alerted by people running after a person with bloodied shirt. When Galeno and Baquilod
caught up with Leonor, Baquilod grabbed Leonors hand and took therefrom a Titus wristwatch and P900 cash.
When queried, Leonor readily answered, Sir, hindi ko naman gusto po ito. Ginawa ko lang ito dahil kailangan ng
pamilya ko. Leonor was brought to the Paraaque Police Block Station, PO3 Interia who was instructed to
investigate proceeded to Dr. Tarlengcos clinic, where they saw, among other[ ] [things], a bloodied balisong (fan
knife) at the ground floor of the Hermanos building. Baquilod turned over the watch and money he took from
Leonor to Interia. Thereafter, Galeno and Interia returned to the police station where they were interrogated.
Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway Medical Center where she underwent an emergency
operation for a stab wound on her chest. After the operation, Dr. Tarlengcos father, with the doctors
ART 11-13 CASES
permission, was allowed to talk to his daughter inside the operating room. Although Dr. Tarlengco was gasping
for breath, she spoke to her father, viz:
Q: So were you able to talk with your daughter while in the Operating Room? What did she say, if any, Mr.
Tarlengco?
A: She said that this man pretended to be a patient.
Q: And what else did she say?
A: He asked her how much would it cost to pull a tooth and then she said, Dad, when I quoted my price, he said
that he would come back and left in a hurry.
Q: What else did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: After a minute, he came back, I told him to wait, to sit down first at my Waiting Area because I [had] to still
prepare the instruments needed.
Q: Then, what happened after that?
A: She said, while I was busy preparing my instrument, Dad, this man barged in. He demanded for my money. I
told him it [was] on my table. And after telling that, Dad, he stabbed me and then he grabbed my watch and he
[ran] away and she said, I struggled Dad, to come out of the clinic and when I was on the porch, I saw this man
coming [sic] out of the building. I shouted for help, I said Saklolo, saklolo, sinaksak ako ng taong iyan. Hulihin
ninyo.
Q: Then what else did she say after she narrated to you that incident, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: After that, in tears, she said that Dad, I dont know, why inspite of getting my money this man stabbed me and
I was numbed at that point of time, I [could not] talk anymore, I [could not] tell anything to her anymore, I just
combed her hair with my fingers.
Thereafter, Dr. Tarlengco was brought to a private room where she subsequently died.
Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI Medico-legal Officer who conducted the post-mortem examination of the
deceased, testified that Tarlengcos stab wound on the chest could have been caused by single bladed fan knife.
Geraldine Tarlengco, who stayed with her sister Dr. Tarlengco while reviewing for the BAR Examination, owned a
Titus watch similar to that of her sister. Both watches were given to them by another sister Cecille. On the
morning of May 15, 1995, Geraldine saw Dr. Tarlengco strap the watch on her wrist. Geraldine, likewise, saw her
sister, Dr. Tarlengco, place in her wallet one 500-peso bill and four 100-peso bills, after showing the same to
Geraldine, who earlier was teasing her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, that the reason why she did not buy the dress she
wanted to buy at Cinderellas was because she had no money. If only to prove her sister Geraldine wrong, Dr.
Tarlengco showed her money which she took from her wallet.[4]
Additionally, Dr. John Enrique Franco, a friend of the victim, testified that he got to talk with Dr. Tarlengco at the
hospital. He asked Dr. Tarlengco what happened, and she answered that a man posing as a patient held her up
and stabbed her.[5]
Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengcos fiance, testified that when he learned about his fiancees killing, he
immediately went to the crime scene and, thereafter, to the Block 7 police station where he confronted the
suspected killer, Christopher. Sumalbar recalled his conversation with the latter, thus:
120
Q: And what happened after that, when you proceeded to the cell of this suspect?
A: I found this man who was half naked from the waist up. I found this man without any shirt on and he was
sitting at the corner and he was trying to avoid me and I asked him, Bakit mo ginawa iyon? Sabi niya, hindi ko po
naman gusto. Kailangan ko lamang ang pera.
Q: When you confronted the accused at Block 7, what else did he say, if any?
A: While I was shouting at him, Hinold-up mo na, sinaksak mo pa. Bakit mo ginawa iyon? Hindi ko po naman
gusto iyon, mahuhuli na po ako, sabi niya. Mahuhuli na po ako kaya ginawa ko iyon.
Q: Then what else did he say when you confronted him, if any?
A: And he told me that he needed the money.[6]
SPO3 Mateo Interia testified that on 16 May 1995, he took the statement of Dr. Tarlengcos father and executed
a Referral[7] to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal for CHRISTOPHERs inquest. Interia reported in the referral that
CHRISTOPHER was being held for robbery with homicide but forgot to state the property stolen from Dr.
Tarlengco. After Mr. Tarlengco reminded Interia of the stolen items, the latter intercalated into the referral a
reference to P900 and a Titus wristwatch forming part of the evidence against CHRISTOPHER.[8]
Fernando Tarlengco, father of the victim, described the impact of her daughters death, viz.:
Q: In connection with the death of your daughter, Mr. Tarlengco, did your family incur any expenses?
A: Not just expenses but more on the agony, the tribulations we are having up to this time. You know, up to this
time, we kept on weeping. My father, the grandfather of my daughter, was shocked and in anguish, he also
succumbed to death in less than two months, because of what this evil person [had] done to us. My work was
affected. My wifes work is affected. There are times when we are at home, we dont know what to do anymore.
We are in total misery. I dont know why this was done to us by the devil deeds of this person has done to us
[sic].[9]
In relation to Dr. Tarlengcos death, her family spent P8,718 for hospital expenses; about P2,500 to P3,500
charged by Funeraria Malaya where she was brought; P22,500 for her casket; P8,250 paid to Manila Memorial,
Inc.; P5,000 for the masses held for Dr. Tarlengco; and about P10,000 for the food served to the guests at Dr.
Tarlengcos wake.[10]
CHRISTOPHER, on the other hand, testified that on 15 May 1995, at about 6:00 a.m., he left his town Calauag,
Quezon, and boarded a Jam Transit bus bound for Manila, with P800 and a fan knife in his pocket. He was to
fetch his family for the town fiesta to be held on 25 May 1995. His head and two of his molar teeth were then
aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a bus bound for Bicutan Extension.[11]
Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have his aching teeth pulled. He found Dr.
Tarlengcos dental clinic at the third floor of a certain building in General Santos Avenue. He asked Dr. Tarlengco
how much an extraction cost, and was told that the fee was P150 per tooth. CHRISTOPHER negotiated a charge
of P100 per tooth, but Dr. Tarlengco rejected the offer. CHRISTOPHER then proceeded to look for another
dentist, but before he could make his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco stopped him and agreed to charge
P100 per extraction. CHRISTOPHER was made to sit on the dental chair as Dr.Tarlengco prepared the
instruments for the extraction. Just as she was about to inject anesthesia, she remarked that she changed her
mind and would charge P150 per tooth pulled. CHRISTOPHER pushed away Dr. Tarlengcos hand, which angered
her. She castigated and cursed CHRISTOPHER for asking for an extraction without being able to pay for it.[12]
ART 11-13 CASES
As CHRISTOPHER was making his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco cursed and pushed him, at which moment
he blacked out.[13] He then sensed that the dentist was in pain, and he saw blood spurting. He realized that he
had stabbed the dentist. In shock, CHRISTOPHER stepped back, lost the grip on his fan knife, and ran out of the
clinic and out of the building. When he looked back at the clinic, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help. A
security guard, with his shotgun aimed at CHRISTOPHER, ran after the latter.[14]
CHRISTOPHER ran to where there were many people. Then he came across Police Officer Galeno, who grabbed
him by the hand an asked what happened. He replied, Sir, nakadisgrasya ako.[15] Galeno warded off the
pursuing security guard who insisted on apprehending CHRISTOPHER. Galeno brought CHRISTOPHER to Block 7,
Paraaque Police Station, and later, to the Police Headquarters along the Coastal Road in Paraaque. Four
policemen, including PO3 Interia, took turns in mauling and kicking him, and one policeman even took money
from his wallet. Also, his clothes were confiscated.[16]
During the investigation, CHRISTOPHER admitted that he had stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, but denied that he had
taken P900 and a Titus wristwatch from the victim. He was surprised when later, he was informed by Assistant
Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray that he would be charged with Robbery with homicide, not homicide
only.[17]
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, CHRISTOPHERs uncle, revealed that at about noon of 15 May 1995, while he was at
home, he received a telephone call from CHRISTOPHER saying that he had stabbed someone. When he asked
CHRISTOPHER why he stabbed someone the latter answered, Aburido ako, Kuya Ding, aburido ako (I am
troubled, Kuya Ding, I am troubled).[18]
Renato Leonor, CHRISTOPHERs father, testified that he went to see his son at his detention cell but could hardly
recognize him because he was bloodied. He remembered that CHRISTOPHER complained of toothache before he
left for Manila.[19]
Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined CHRISTOPHER three hours before the former took the stand. Unassisted by
any dental aid or nurse, he determined that two of CHRISTOPHERs teeth were due for extraction[20] and, at the
condition they were in, were probably aching as early as a year before. Citing his experience, Dr. Besa claimed
that people complaining of tootache are usually irritable, although he admitted that none of his patients
complaining from a tootache has ever killed a person or even brought a fan knife to his clinic. In fact, he never
heard of any patient with a toothache who killed a dentist. He recalled one instance when a patient boxed him
after he unintentionally hurt the patient while pulling a tooth.
These were the evidence before the trial court which merited CHRISTOPHERs conviction. CHRISTOPHER urges us
to modify the judgment by (1) convicting him of the crime of homicide, and not of robbery with homicide, and
(2) appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, sufficient provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary confession.
CHRISTOPHER claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are fraught with inconsistencies and
contradictions, and are therefore obvious concoctions and manufactured evidence. He points out that Baquilod
failed to mention in his sworn statement, given to the police immediately after the incident, that he retrieved a
Titus wristwatch and P900 worth of peso bills from CHRISTOPHER. Baquilod likewise testified that Dr. Tarlengco
shouted for help because she was stabbed; she made no mention of having been robbed. Then, too, SPO1
Galeno stated in his sworn statement that Dr. Tarlengco was only stabbed.
CHRISTOPHER contends further that the testimonies of Baquilod, Galeno, Interia, Sumalbar, and Yu Guray that
he admitted to them on separate occasions his commission of the offense charged are inadmissible because the
admission was not in writing, was not made with the assistance of a counsel, and was not preceded by a warning
as to the consequences of the admission. In any event, their testimonies are hearsay evidence. Additionally, he
stresses the possible bias of Yu Guray considering that she caused the filing against him of the information for
robbery with homicide.
121

In the Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General refutes CHRISTOPHERs claims, asserting that the robbery was duly
and satisfactorily established by the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her father, corroborated by the
testimonies of Baquilod and Galeno. That Dr. Tarlengco failed to exclaim that she was robbed when she shouted
for help from her clinics balcony is of no moment, since she later told Dr. Franco and her father of the complete
events that transpired. Galenos failure to mention in his sworn statement that money and a wristwatch were
retrieved from CHRISTOPHER does not negate his claim to that effect, because he later stated that fact in his
testimony. The settled rule is that testimonies in open court are superior to affidavits taken ex parte. That
Interia inserted the stolen items in the Police Referral does not diminish the truth of the allegation of robbery,
since it appears that the intercalation was intended to make the Referral accurate.
The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of the highly revered dicta in our jurisdiction is
that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing
witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence that have
been overlooked which, if considered, will affect the result of the case. The reason therefor is founded on
practical and empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to decide questions of credibility,
since he has personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.[21]
Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the charge and the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to meticulously
review the evidence to determine whether CHRISTOPHER had indeed committed the offense charged and the
prosecutions evidence proved it beyond reasonable doubt.
CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The burden of evidence, therefore, shifted to him; he
had to prove a justifying[22] or exempting[23]circumstance to avoid criminal liability. He miserably failed to do
so.
The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr. Tarlengco by reason or on the occasion of a
robbery[24] with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person. One could be convicted of robbery with
homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. The
taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person or by using force upon things, constitutes robbery.[25]
Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items recovered from CHRISTOPHER as belonging to Dr.
Tarlengco. These testimonies indicate that CHRISTOPHER stole personal property belonging to Dr. Tarlengco,
consistent with the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.[26] While CHRISTOPHER denied that Dr.
Tarlengcos watch and money were recovered from him, the independent and corroborative testimonies of
police officer Galeno and guard Baquilod prove otherwise. The trial court found the testimonies of these two
witnesses more credible, and we see no reason to depart from its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER also pointed out
that the intercalation of stolen items in Interias referral report to the Prosecutor indicated the fabrication of
robbery charges against him. But the intercalation was sufficiently explained as an honest mistake, especially
considering that Interia had specified in the report, in an entry appearing before the intercalation, that the
charge against CHRISTOPHER was robbery with homicide.
It is undisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengcos belongings. The unexplained possession of stolen
articles gives rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was deprived of her
possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the presumption becomes one of robbery.[27] The
prosecution proved in this case that there was violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr. Tarlengcos property.
Most crucial for the prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando Tarlengco, the victims father, because he
stated the most incriminating piece of evidence the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco. While, generally, a
witness can testify only to those facts which are derived from his own perception,[28] a recognized exception
thereto is the reportage in open court of the declaration of a dying person made under the consciousness of an
impending death where that persons death is the subject of inquiry in the case.[29] To be admissible, a dying
ART 11-13 CASES
declaration must (1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death; (2) be made under
the consciousness of an impending death; (3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of
improper influence; (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of inquiry;
and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify.
Dr. Tarlengcos dying declaration complied with the above requisites. She talked about the incident which led to
her condition. The declaration was a first-hand account of the incident, bereft of opinion or conjecture. The
account was made in a criminal case where her death was part of the subject of inquiry. And, most important,
she was convinced that she was about to die; thus:
Atty. Revilla:
Q Could you tell this Court what was her condition when you saw her inside the operating room?
Witness Tarlengco:
A I asked her how she was and she said, Dad, I have a feeling I can no longer endure this.
Atty. Revilla:
Q So, what else happened in the operating room while you were talking to her, Mr. Tarlengco?
A I told her to fight for her life. I asked her to open her eyes, keep herself awake, and in my desire to help her
awake, I asked her what happened.
Atty. Revilla:
Q Then what else happened while you were in the operating room, after that, Mr. Tarlengco?
Witness Tarlengco:
A On that condition, she was really very very cold and gasping and complaining of pain and gasping for
breath.[30]
Dr. Tarlengco narrated to her father that a man who pretended to be her patient demanded money from her.
After she surrendered her money to him, the latter stabbed her and took her watch as she lay injured.
The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery was committed, there being violence and
intimidation against Dr. Tarlengco, but that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of said robbery.
Lastly, we find no mitigating circumstance in this case. CHRISTOPHER claims that he did not intend to commit so
grave a wrong as the act committed; that there was sufficient provocation by the offended party immediately
preceding the offense; that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have produced in him passion and
obfuscation; that he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority; and that he voluntarily confessed having
committed homicide.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where the accused used a deadly
weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs of the victim,[31] as in this case.
The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the retaliatory act.[32]
The events which led to the stabbing were described by CHRISTOPHER as follows:
122
Q Mr. Leonor, you said, while she was about to inject anaesthesia, you said Dra. Tarlengco changed the price
from P100.00 to P150.00. Then you parried her hand. Is that correct?
A Opo. Tinabig ko po. [Yes, sir. I pushed it aside.]
Q What hand of Dra. Tarlengco did you parry?
A The one handling the rounded instrument. Right hand, Sir.
Q When you parried her right hand, you were already sitting at the dental chair? Right?
A Opo.
Q After you parried the hand of Dra. Tarlengco, she cursed you, right?
A No, sir. I just said why did you change the price? and I stood up. That was the time she cursed me.
Q When she cursed you, did Dra. Tarlengco hit you with an instrument?
A No, Sir. She just got mad.
Q Did she slap you on your face?
A No Sir. She just pushed me.
Q And she did not box you anywhere in any portion of your body?
A No, Sir.
Q And she likewise did not kick you in any part of your body?
A She just told me bad words.[33]
CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and bad words justify retaliation with a knife. Such claim is
undeserving of belief and does not entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance prior
provocation by the offended party.
CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or obfuscation as, according to him, he momentarily
blacked out and instantly found his fan knife embedded in Dr. Tarlengcos chest. To be blinded by passion and
obfuscation is to lose self-control,[34] not consciousness. Moreover, courts cannot appreciate passion and
obfuscation unless there is a clear showing that there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful
excitement as to deprive the accused of reason and self-control.[35] As we discussed earlier, the events leading
to the stabbing precluded any natural tendency to produce a powerful excitement in CHRISTOPHER.
CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in authority or to any other person. While he was
being pursued by Security Guard Baquilod, he intentionally went to where there were many people, presumably
to confuse Baquilod. Fortunately, Police Officer Galeno was able to grab him by the hand and prevented him
from further eluding justice. There is nothing in the record which can lead us to conclude that he surrendered to
anyone.
Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The mitigating circumstance contemplated by law is
a plea of guilty made spontaneously and unconditionally in open court before the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution.[36] CHRISTOPHER made no such plea.
ART 11-13 CASES
What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion
perpetua to death.[37] There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance against or in favor of
CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed,[38] without the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.[39] We likewise believe that the awards in favor of Dr. Tarlengcos family of moral
damages of P2 million and attorneys fees of P500,000 are excessive. We reduce them to P50,000 and P25,000,
respectively.
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque in Criminal Case No. 95-212 is
hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000 as indemnity for
death; P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as attorneys fees, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.
Filemon A. Cosio for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros.
Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and ten, proceeded to the
kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was; "There is no more. Come
here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on the accused as explained by him in his confession
was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the provocation, a little later while the said
Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the accused came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax,
causing death the following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course not interfere with the findings of
the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the court, naturally, took into consideration the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating circumstance which
on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating circumstance was that the act was
committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony.
The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to whether this circumstance was rightly
applied. That there was immediate vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of Patobo to the accused
is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave offense" is more uncertain. The
Supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que arañaba a todo el mundo," "landrones," and "era tonto,
como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating circumstance. (Decisions of January
4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.) But the same court has held the words "tan landron eres tu como tu
123
padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision of October 22, 1894.) We consider that these authorities hardly put the
facts of the present case in the proper light. The offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate
would to the average person be considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a
serious matter to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the
lower court very properly gave defendant the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him
to the minimum degree of the penalty provided for the crime of murder. lawph!1.net
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen years four months and one day
of cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
Street, J., did not sign.
G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch VIII, Manila dated October 25,
1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leandro Pajares y Florentino"
convicting herein appellant Pajares of the crime of Murder.
Herein appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely sought to insure and better accomplish
his criminal design, in the City of Manila. Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
with five (5) others whose true names, real Identities, and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
and treachery, attack, assault. and use personal violence upon one DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by then and
there mauling him and hitting him with a baseball bat at the back of the head, a vital part of the body, thereby
inflicting upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN a club wound on the head which was the direct and
immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law. (Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p. 1)
He was likewise charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide in an Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely sought to insure and better accomplish
his criminal design, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
with five (5) others whose true names, real identities, and present whereabouts are still unknown, and helping
one another, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by mauling and hitting him with a baseball bat at the
back, a vital part of the body, thereby inflicting upon him a club wound at the back which is necessarily mortal
and fatal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of homicide, as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
ART 11-13 CASES
that is, because of the timely and able medical attendance rendered upon the said RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA
which prevented his death.
Contrary to law (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 1)
Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 5;
Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 8). Upon the petition of herein appellant that the two (2)
cases be consolidated, a joint trial ensued.
The prosecution presented Renato R. Perez, Cpl. Benigno Dong, Salud Manguba, Pat. Conrado Bustillos, Dr.
Norman Torres, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Rosita Viojan and Arlene Viojan as witnesses while only appellant
Leandro Pajares took the witness stand for the defense.
Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila, is the same Renato Perez who is the victim in
Criminal Case No. 85-40580 for Frustrated Homicide. He testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985,
he and the deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy
something. They were walking abreast with each other, the deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead of
him, when appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the back of his
head. The latter ran a short distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to help
Viojan. he, too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting him at the back below the left shoulder. He
then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the baseball bat but the latter's companions, namely:
Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost consciousness. He was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was treated for the injuries he
sustained (TSN, Hearing of January 7, 1986, pp. 4-23). He identified in court the baseball bat used by Pajares
(TSN, Hearing of September 16, 1986, p. 36).
On cross examination, he averred that he has known appellant Pajares for less than a year and that although
they both live in Zone 89, he and the deceased belonged to a group which is an adversary of the group of the
accused (Ibid., pp. 39-41).
Cpl. Benigno Dong, of the Zamora Police Department Station No. 6, WPD, testified that he was on duty on
October 12, 1985 when one Napoleon Gabawa sought their assistance regarding a killing incident that happened
in Gomez Street, Paco, Manila. They went to the house of appellant Leandro Pajares at 1453 Gomez St., Paco,
Manila and invited the latter and his brother to the station for questioning regarding the aforementioned
incident. Pajares verbally admitted his participation in the incident (TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p. 26). The
incident was registered in the Police Blotter Entry (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No.
85-40579. pp. 30-33)
On cross examination, he admitted that he placed appellant Pajares under arrest after he verbally admitted that
he was responsible for the death of Diosdado Viojan, but the booking sheet and arrest report has not been
accomplished yet (TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p 27).
Salud Manguba, Forensic Chemist of the National, Bureau of Investigation, testified that she examined a baseball
bat for the presence of blood upon the written request of Pat. Conrado Bustillos (Exhibit "C-1", Original Records
of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 69). In connection with the study she made, she submitted Biology Report No.
B-85-1342 (Exhibit "C". Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 68) that shows the absence of blood
on the baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of June 23, 1986, pp. 30-32).
Pat. Conrado G. Bustillos, testified that relative to a telephone call he received from the Philippine General
Hospital on October 12 1985 he went to the morgue of the said hospital to investigate a dead on arrival case of
one Diosdado Viojan. A close examination of the body of the latter showed that he suffered a fracture at the
back of the skull. Thereafter, he proceeded to the scene of the crime to make an ocular inspection where he was
informed that there was another victim by the name Renato Perez. Pat. Bustillos further testified that Renato
124
Perez was investigated at the Homicide Section and that the latter executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F"
Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p 208) in relation to the incident. In the same manner, Roberto
Pajares. brother of herein appellant was also investigated and who also executed a sworn statement (Exhibit
"G", Ibid., p. 219) The alleged murder weapon, a baseball bat, was turned over to him by Cpl. Ben Macalindog
(TSN, November 18, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician at the Philippine General Hospital, testified that on October 12, 1985, a
certain Diosdado Viojan was brought to the emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital for head injury,
left occipital region. The victim was in critical condition necessitating immediate surgery. He did not personally
attend the operation but learned that the victim died while undergoing the surgery. Witness further averred
that the injury could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of December 2,
1986, p. 46).
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that he conducted an
autopsy on the body of Diosdado Viojan and in connection therewith submitted Autopsy Report No. N-85-2161
(Exhibit "L", Original Records on Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 224) indicating that the cause of death was
"Hemorrhage, meningeal, severe, traumatic". He further testified that a single forceful blow against the head
using a blunt instrument like a baseball bat could have caused the injury (TSN, Hearing of June 15, 1987, pp. 58-
60).
Rosita S. Viojan, mother of the deceased Diosdado Viojan, testified that when her son died, she hired the
services of Tree Amigos Funeral Parlor for P12,000.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 10511 (Exhibits "P"
and "Q", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, pp. 228-229) (TSN, Hearing of February 23. 1988, p.
66).
Arlene Viojan, widow of Diosdado Viojan. testified that prior to the incident her husband was working with
PEMCO earning about P500.00 a week. At the time of the incident, she was three (3) months on the family way.
She gave birth to a baby girl and it was her parents-in-law who paid for the expenses during her delivery. At the
moment, she is living with her parents (TSN, Hearing of April 4, 1988, p. 67).
Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the prosecution. He asserts that he knew the
deceased Diosdado Viojan by the name Dado, having met him once at the store, and Renato Perez by the name
Balat. At the time of the incident, he was inside the store of Alex Blas with about eight (8) other People watching
television. Hence, he did not see who hit Diosdado Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the
advise of Alex Blas, he went home and slept. At about 3:30 in the morning of October 12, 1985, he was arrested
inside their house. Without asking any question, he went with the arresting officers to the police station (TSN,
Hearing of August 1, 1988, pp. 72-76).
At the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his participation in the crime since a gun was poked at him.
He identified his signature at the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibit "J", Original Records of Criminal Case
No 85-40579, p. 222) but alleged that he signed the same without being allowed to read the contents thereof
without the assistance of counsel and while being held at the collar at the back of his shirt. He likewise averred
that during investigation the investigating policemen molested him like "pinipitik-pitik" his ears with rubber
band or chopping his neck with karate chops (Ibid., pp. .77-78). He, however, admitted that even after several
days he did not complain about what were done to him (Ibid., p. 128).
On cross examination, he testified that his house is about five (5) houses away from the store of Alex Blas, the
scene of the crime (TSN, Hearing of August 22, 1983, pp. 90-91). He likewise denied any knowledge about any
quarrel between his brother, Roberto Pajares and the deceased Diosdado Viojan (TSN, Hearing of September 19,
1988, p. 108).
As aforementioned, the trial court rendered a decision on October 25, 1990, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ART 11-13 CASES
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein accused
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO of 1433-B, Gomez St., Paco, Manila, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges against him, as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized by
Art. 248, par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him
to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of the law; to pay Arlene Viojan
and her child the sum of: P30,000,00; P12,000.00 as funeral expenses; P15,000.00 as moral damages; and
P10,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees; and finally the costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries as defined in
par. 1, Art. 266 and penalized by Art. 27, both of the Rev. Penal Code, hereby sentencing him to an
imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit.
Done in Manila, this 25th day of October, 1990.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 38)
Hence this appeal.
Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon
him. He avers that such a penalty is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment which is
prohibited by the Constitution. Appellant points out that hours before the clubbing incident, Roberto Pajares,
appellant's younger brother, was mauled by the group of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court referring
to the entry in the Police Blotter and the sworn statement of Roberto Pajares. The mauling of the latter is a big
insult and truly offending to the appellant and his family. Hence, the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein
appellant was a vindication of the grave offense committed against his family. a mitigating circumstance under
paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering further that the appellant was just nineteen
(19) years old at the time he committed the offense the penalty imposed by the court a quo should have been
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day (Brief for the Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).
The appeal is devoid of merit.
In convicting herein appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, the trial court relied heavily on the
testimony of prosecution witness Renato Perez which it found to be credible. According to the lower court, the
latter "gave his account on what was done to them by the accused and his companions in a simple, candid,
straightforward manner" (RTC Decision. Rollo, p. 36).
It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of witnesses by the trial court is received on
appeal with the highest respect because it is the trial court that has the opportunity to observe them on the
stand and detect if they are telling the truth or lying in their teeth (People v. Santito, Jr., G.R. No. 91628, August
22, 1991 [201 SCRA 87]). The appellate court can only read in cold print the testimony of the witnesses which
commonly is translated from the local dialect into English. In the process of converting into written form the
statement of living human beings, not only fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the judge present,
watching and listening, may escape the reader of the written translated words (People v. Arroyo, G.R. No.
99258, September 13, 1991 [201 SCRA 616]).
125
Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store of Alex Blas, watching television, when
the incident occurred, Alex Blas even advised him to go home so as not to be involved in the incident. However,
the latter was not presented to corroborate appellant's testimony. Alibi is the weakest defense an accused can
concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission (People v. Lacao,
Sr., G.R. No. 94320, September 4. 1991 (201 SCRA 317]). In the case at bar, appellant was within the vicinity of
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the perpetrator of the crime. In the face of
the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the participation of the accused in the
crime, the accused's alibi dwindles into nothingness. The Positive identification of the accused by the witness as
the perpetrator of the crime cannot be overcome by the mere denial of the accused. Such positive identification
of the accused that he killed the victim establishes the guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty (People v
Arroyo, supra).
The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. There is treachery, the law says, when
the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the execution of the felony which ensure its commission
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (People v. Cuyo, G.R. No.
76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]). As found by the trial court, appellant Pajares hit Diosdado Viojan with a
baseball bat from behind without any warning thereby precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.
Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether or not the mitigating circumstance
of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated in his favor. While it may be true that appellant's
brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11,
1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be
emphasized that there is a lapse of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado
Viojan. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People v.
Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification that the indemnity is
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy of this Court on the matter.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American, and
Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro
Province, until trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina quitted Hick's
house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she
ART 11-13 CASES
contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army who then went to
live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd
Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room with Corporal
Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the corporal to come out of
said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and after a short conversation,
Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following question: "Did I not tell
you to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want
to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then
replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was
drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand
roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself behind the
partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in the sala of the house. The
bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and wrested the
weapon from the hand of the accused. The latter immediately fled from the house and gave himself up to the
chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a few minutes later a
policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused
Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges out of the window; these were
picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of said province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder. Proceedings were instituted,
the trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment on the 10th of September of the same
year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the crime of murder,
defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met a violent death,
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and roughly attacked and
unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while the injured woman
was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a conversation, in which she was
concerned, between her aggressor and third person, and after usual and customary words had passed between
her and her aggressor. From all of the foregoing it is logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were
employed in attack that directly and specially insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to the
author thereof as might have been offered by the victim who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was
doubtless unable to flee from the place where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his exculpatory allegations which were
certainly not borne out at the trial, the evidence in the case is absolutely at variance therewith and conclusively
establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully convicted author of the violent and
treacherous death of his former mistress, Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had seized him, he fell
backward but managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again the said corporal
threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as Edward
Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses Wallace Current, Edward Robinson,
Luis Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their respective declaration, especially with that of the second and third, who
witnessed the actual firing of the shot by the aggressor at the deceased, as shown by the fact that Robinson
126
immediately approached the accused in order to take his weapon away from him which he succeeded in doing
after a brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the house. Thus, the shot that struck the deceased in
the breast and caused her death was not due to an accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of
the aggressor with intent to deprive the victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the presence of other aggravating
circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the
deceased should be taken into consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances appears proven from the
testimony of several witnesses who were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed with treachery, the
circumstance of premeditation should only be considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is, however,
manifest and evident by reason of the open acts executed by the accused. According to the testimony of Charles
Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from the former to be absent from the canteen where he
was working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging that his mind was unsettled and that
he feared getting into trouble. It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon
upon the latter's invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the
crime, was lying on the table on which were also several loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say,
referring to the deceased, that her time had come, adding that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of
another man, and when the accused went to bed apparently very much worried, and refusing to answer when
called, the witness left him. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in the cuprit's house several
loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection had
resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention
with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and
carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone
courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner, disguising his intention and
claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal
design, behaving himself properly as he had planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is present, not even that
mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by
jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the
loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy,
and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is our
opinion that the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided, however, that the
death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the event of a pardon being granted,
the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly
remitted in the pardon. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
F.C. Fisher for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
ART 11-13 CASES
CARSON, J.:
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he was convicted in the court below
is conclusively established by the evidenced of record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either aggravating or extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced the convict to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal,
the medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the extenuating
circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been taken into consideration, and that the
prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore
been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict was entitled to have this fact taken into
consideration in extenuation of his offense under the provisions of the above-cited article.
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as set forth in its sentence of July 4,
1892, which is summarized by Viada (p. 69, in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for having caught her in her underclothes with
another party and afterwards shoots himself, inflicting a serious wound, be responsible for that crime with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted with violent passion and obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de
Cuba did not so hold and its judgment was reversed by the supreme court for the improper disregard of article
9, number 8, of the Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts held to be true by the trial court, and which
were the immediate cause of the crime by producing in the accused strong emotion which impelled him to the
criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to
produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation, and as
the judgment did not take into consideration the 8th circumstance of article 9 of the code, the Audiencia
rendering it seems to have violated this legal provision."
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the "causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which
arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the provisions of this
article to the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged causes for his loss of self-control did not
"originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection had
resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention
with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and
carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone
courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his intention
and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his
criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's vexation,
disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit
127
relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had
elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another man. In the present case however,
the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that
the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and
his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited
decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the passion and
obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by
the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating circumstance set out
in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment of conviction and the
sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126096. July 26, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO SANDRIAS JAVIER, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Once again, we are given the heavy task of reviewing a judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty in a
crime so dastardly and repulsive incestuous rape. Considering that a persons life is at stake, we are burdened to
come up with an error-free judgment amidst our frailties and imperfections, lest our conscience be bothered for
rendering an irrevocable and irreversible error.
In the case under review, three separate complaints were filed against accused-appellant charging him with rape
committed on October 20, 1994 and sometime on November, 1994 and December, 1994, against his daughter,
Julia Ratunil Javier. The first complaint charged:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 95-136
The undersigned complainant, who is a minor of 16 years of age, single, herein assisted by her grandmother,
Mrs. Librada Ratunil, after being duly sworn to law, hereby accuses her father AMADO SANDRIAS JAVIER, who is
detained under Illegal Possession of Firearm charge, of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That in or about October 20, 1994, at more or less 1 oclock in the afternoon, at Zone 5, Baikingon, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, as father of
herein complainant, by means of force, violence, and intimidation, while inside our dwelling house at the afore-
mentioned place, and when said accused and herein aggrieved party were alone in their said dwelling house as
the undersigned aggrieved-party-complainants mother was out doing laundry work as a laundry woman, held
and pulled undersigned complainant to accuseds bedroom in said dwelling house and as the undersigned
refused, wrestled and shouted for help, accused boxed and hit undersigneds stomach to unconsciousness and
did then and there, against complainants will and consent, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned who noticed upon regaining consciousness that she was already stripped of her
pairs of panty and pants and feeling extreme pain of her private parts, and then and there accused threatened
the undersigned of death if undersigned complainant would reveal the incident to undersigneds mother or to
ART 11-13 CASES
anybody else, thus, resulting to undersigneds pregnancy as examined and found out by the doctor, all against
the will and consent of the undersigned, to her great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to and in Violation of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659.
(p. 7, Rollo.)
The two other complaints were identically worded as the above complaint except that they respectively charged
that the rape therein alleged occurred in November and December 1994.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
As principal witness for the prosecution, Julia recounted her harrowing experience at the hands of her father.
Her testimony was capsulized by the trial court in this wise:
At about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of October 20, 1994, while her mother was out doing some laundry for
neighbors, thus she and the accused were left alone in their house at Zone 5, Baikingon, Cagayan de Oro City,
and while she was at the porch of their house, accused called for her to the conjugal room and while thereat
grabbed her right hand. She shouted for help but nobody came to her rescue from neighbors, the nearest of
whom was about 60 meters away. Accused continued his sexual assault on her by boxing her abdomen resulting
to her unconsciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her vagina which was bleeding and
wet with some sticky fluids. She cried but was warned by the accused that should she make an outcry and report
the incident to her mother, he will kill her. Out of fear, and knowing that accused has a handgun, she held her
outcry.
Parenthetically, the accused was also charged of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 95-141
committed on March 20, 1995 also raffled to this branch, to which he pleaded guilty and was sentenced
accordingly on May 8, 1996.
Complainant further declared that applying practically the same force and intimidation and about the same time
(1:00 P.M.) and again while complainants mother was out doing some laundry for neighbors, accused repeated
the sexual assault on her on November 18, 1994 and December 19, 1994.
Complainant testifying further declared that she has three older brothers and a sister. That she is the youngest
and the only one who lived with her parents. Her three older brothers lived in Manila, Cotabato and the last one
with her grandmother, Vda. De Librada Ratunil.
Out of fear, she kept the incident to herself until she felt some unusual pain in her body and when she can no
longer manage said situation, she finally broke her silence by going to her grandmother, Librada Vda. De Ratunil
at 165 Capistrano Street, Cagayan de Oro City in the evening of March 15, 1995. She was asked by her
grandmother about the author of her pregnancy, she answered that it was her father, the herein accused.
Complainant on cross examination, admitted having a sweetheart and were engaged for one year already prior
to the incident. Her sweetheart, whom she identified as Michael Apduhan pays her a visit at times but on
Saturday afternoon only with her mother around. Consequently, there was no occasion that she met her
sweetheart alone for either her mother is around in the house or went out with her sweetheart with her
barkada during disco dances on the eve of fiestas.
(pp. 24-26, Rollo.)
Julias grandmother, Librada Vda. De Ratunil, corroborated Julias story and narrated that on March 15, 1995,
Julia arrived at her house and upon knowing the things that happened to her granddaughter, she wrote Julias
128
mother, Emma, her daughter, and informed her of the matter. They decided to report the matter to the police
authorities at the Bulua Police Station in Cagayan de Oro City where they executed the complaints (tsn, October
11, 1995, pp. 19-20).
Dr. Tammy Uy of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region 10, examined the victim and made the following
findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION
Pubic hairs, fully grown, abundant. Labiae mejora and minor, both gaping. Fourchete, moderately lax. Vestibular
mucusae, violaceous and with engorded veins. Hymen, tall, thick, fleshy, with old healed complete laceration at
9:00 oclock position, and an old healed deep incomplete lacerations at 6:00 non-coaptable. Hymenal orifice,
originally annular, admits a glass tube of 2.5 cms. Diameter with slight resistance. Vaginal walls, lax; rugosities
obliterated. Uterus, enlarged with palpable fundus and with a fundic height of 12 cms. (between the umbilicus
and sumphysis pubs). Cervix, soft, non-tender, enlarged, bluish-purpole. Light yellow muccoid cervical discharge
is noted.
CONCLUSION
1. Genital findings present, compatible with sexual intercourse with man on or about 20 October 1994 as alleged
and subsequently thereafter.
2. Probable signs of pregnancy present, consistent with the early part of the second trimester of pregnancy,
REMARKS:
Pregnancy Test gave + sign.
(pp. 23-24, Rollo.)
Meanwhile, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) took custody of Julia who gave birth to
a baby boy on August 22, 1995 but whom she would like to put up for adoption because he is a reminder of
what her father did to her (tsn, Oct. 11, 1995, pp. 14-15).
Likewise, Julia was examined by DSWD Psychologist Ma. Lavern Labitad Jabien who found her to be suffering
from inferiority complex and exhibiting feelings of inadequacy and insecurity. Julia was also said to lack security
in human relations because of her experience and the brutal treatment she received from her father, and
mentally deficient as a result of poor parenting or parental deprivation (tsn, October 18, 1995, pp. 7-9).
Accused-appellant vehemently disputed the charges against him, alleging that the same were engineered by his
mother-in-law, Librada Vda. De Ratunil, who despises him for being a drunkard. He further declared that Julia is
an errant daughter, who after reaching the age of 14, started attending dances and acquired several
sweethearts but only one of them paid visits at their house. Thus, he beat her, especially when he discovered
her to be pregnant (tsn, December 6, 1995, pp. 14-18, 26).
Accused-appellant claimed that from October to November, 1994, he was working as a mason in the house of
Bernabe Granada which is about 200 meters from his house. Among his co-workers were a certain Bermon,
Dayata, and Dudong Granada, the son of Bernabe Granada. His working hours were from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M.
Likewise, from December 1994 to February 1995, he said he was working at Carlito Caudors house, also
spending the same working hours therein. At the same time, he was also a member of the Barangay Tanod of
Baikingon (tsn, supra, pp. 9-13).
ART 11-13 CASES
To bolster accused-appellants contention that he was working at the time the rape incidents happened, the
defense presented his employers, Bernabe Granada and Carlito Caudor. Granada testified that in October 1994,
he engaged accused-appellant for masonry work in the lay-outing of his house. Accused-appellant worked from
8 to 11:30 oclock in the morning and from 1 to 4 oclock in the afternoon and oftentimes took his lunch at the
workplace. His house is located in Zone 6 while that of accused-appellant is in Zone 5. Accused-appellant
stopped working for Granada on January 20, 1995 (tsn, March 13, 1996, pp. 4-5). On the other hand, Caudor
testified that he had known accused-appellant for 15 years and that for the months of October and November,
accused-appellant worked in Caudors house from 8 to 11:30 oclock in the morning and from 1 to 4:30 oclock in
the afternoon. Among his co-workers were Matias Remerane, Julieto Dayata, and Danilo Caudor (tsn, January
31, 1996, pp. 3-6).
After trial, on June 8, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of the 10th Judicial Region, Branch 21, in Cagayan de Oro
City, presided over by the Honorable Arcadio D. Fabria rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Amado
Sandrias Javier guilty of Rape under Criminal Case No. 95-136 and of Qualified Seduction in Criminal Cases No.
95-147 and 95-148, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in
Criminal Case No. 95-136 defined and penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.
7659, and hereby sentences him to death and in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-147 and 95-148 finds him guilty of
Qualified Seduction under Article 337 of Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him to an
indeterminate penalty in each case of (5) years, (5) months and (11) days of Prision Correccional as minimum to
(6) years, (8) Months and 20 days of Prision Mayor as maximum and to indemnify the offended party the sum of
P50,000 as moral and exemplary damages, to support the child until he shall have reached the age of majority
and to pay the costs.
The accused is further ordered to recognize and acknowledge the said child as his son.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 35, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant assails said judgment and anchors his appeal on the general and catch-all argument that the
trial court erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Accused-appellant questions the credibility of complainant mainly because she has a sweetheart and used to
attend discos and benefit dances which lasted until midnight. He vainly tries to portray a picture of complainant
as an unchaste and impure woman who was impregnated by her sweetheart at the tender age of 16. However,
this Court believes that vilifying aspersion need not necessarily cast doubt on complainants credibility nor would
it negate conclusively the existence of rape. It should be pointed out that the moral character of the victim is
immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that even a prostitute can be
the victim of rape (People vs. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189 [1997]) for she can still refuse a mans lustful advances
(People vs. Iglanes, 272 SCRA 113 [1997]). In the case at bench, complainant is certainly not a prostitute. She
even clarified on cross-examination that she was always in the company of friends whenever she attended
discos and fiesta celebrations and that she never went out alone with her sweetheart. She likewise stressed that
whenever her sweetheart visited her at their house on Saturdays, her mother and father were always present
(tsn, October 4, 1995, pp. 5-11). Indeed, accused-appellants self-serving and unsubstantiated slur that his
daughter is a woman of loose morals betrays his desperation to exculpate himself from liability. Against
complainants positive testimony, accused-appellants self-exculpatory aspersion that complainant may have had
sexual intercourse with other males simply cannot prevail.
Likewise, accused-appellants contention that the filing of the case was instigated by complainants grandmother
fails to sway the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of complainant who remained steadfast
129
throughout her direct and cross-examination. Even in these trying times of poverty and greed, it is difficult to
believe that the grandparents of a child would allow her to be subjected to the ordeal and embarrassment of a
public trial and to expose her private parts to examination just because they do not approve of accused-
appellant as their daughters husband (People vs. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 [1997]). On the contrary, accused-
appellant admitted that his relationship with complainants grandmother is not strained, as in fact, his mother-in-
law used to extend assistance to his family (tsn, December 6, 1995, pp. 23-24).
Accused-appellant also claims that complainant was merely impelled by revenge in filing the case as he used to
scold and beat her for her disobedience, especially after coming to know of her pregnancy. It is highly
inconceivable that complainant would impute a crime so serious as rape against her own father, if this were not
the plain truth. The Court has oft repeated that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the
rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame (People vs. Sangil, Sr., 276 SCRA 532 [1997]; People vs.
Fuensalida, 281 SCRA 452 [1997]).
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission, as in this case, the defense of alibi must be rejected.
The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 95-136. However,
we cannot agree with its judgment insofar as Criminal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-148 are concerned.
The trial court concluded:
While the court is convinced that there was sufficient force and intimidation employed by the accused in
committing sexual intercourse on complainant in the October 20, 1994 incident, it entertains some doubts about
the degree of force and intimidation as would warrant a finding of rape for the sexual intercourses committed
on November 18 and December 19, 1994.
(p. 34, Rollo.)

Complainant cannot be faulted for her delay in reporting the three instances of rape. Delay in reporting rape
does not undermine the charge where it is grounded on the accuseds death threats (People vs. Talabac, 256
SCRA 441 [1996]; People vs. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 [1996]).
Complainant satisfactorily explained her hesitation in reporting the incidents, thus:
Prosecutor Tagarda
The trial court proceeded to convict accused-appellant merely of qualified seduction under Article 337 of the
Revised Penal Code in the aforementioned cases.
A careful perusal of the record would disclose that accused-appellant employed practically the same force and
intimidation in committing the crime on October 20, 1994, November 18, 1994 and December 19, 1994. The
commission of rape with force and intimidation under Article 335 (par. 2) of the Revised Penal Code is clearly
established by the testimony of complainant herself, thus:

xxxx Prosecutor Tagada

Q: And you said you cried, what happened? Q: After you shouted, what happened?

A: I kept on crying and he came to me and admonished me that he will kill me if I will report the matter to my A: My father boxed my stomach or abdomen kuto-kuto.
mother.
Q: After your stomach or abdomen was boxed by your father the accused in this case, what happened to you?
Q: And when he warned you that he will kill you if you report the matter to your mother, what did you feel?
A: I lost consciousness.
A: I was not able to reveal to my mother because I know that he has pistola in his possession.
Q: Now when you regain(ed) consciousness what happened?
xxxx
A: I noticed that I have no more short pants and panty.
(tsn, September 27, 1995, p. 10)
Q: What else did you notice?
More importantly, the aggressor was none other than her father with whom she lived. Thus, not much
explanation is needed to understand the prolonged silence of the victim. A: I felt pain at my vagina.

Accused-appellants defense of alibi was properly rejected by the trial court. He insisted that at the time the rape Q: What else?
incidents happened, he was in his working place. However, considering that the place where he supposedly was
is merely 200 meters from his own house (tsn, December 6, 1995; p. 10; January 31, 1996, p. 8), a distance A: And my vagina was bleeding.
which could be covered by a 5-minute leisurely walk, this defense cannot prevail over complainants positive
identification of accused-appellant (People vs. Escober, 281 SCRA 498 [1997]; People vs. Parrazo, 272 SCRA 512 Q: What else did you observe?
[1997]).
A: I cried.
Courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have invariably received it with caution
not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated. For alibi to serve as Q: Aside from the bleeding oozing from your vagina, what else did you observe?
basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place
must be strictly met (People vs. Caada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]). Where the accused fails to convincingly A: I noticed that there was something when I touched there is sticky fluids.

130
ART 11-13 CASES
Q: And you said you cried, what happened? Q: Will you please narrate to the Honorable Court how did your father rape you on November 18, 1994?

A: I kept on crying and he came to me and admonished me that he will kill me if I will report the matter to my A: He again called me at their conjugal bedroom of my mother.
mother.
Q: What happened when he called you?
Q: And when he warned you that he will kill you if you report the matter to your mother, what did you feel?
A: I refused to do so but there is nothing I could do because nobody heard my shout.
A: I was not able to reveal to my mother because I know that he has pistol in his possession.
Q: After you shouted?
Q: Did you report when your mother came, did you report the incident?
A: He again boxed my abdomen.
A: I did not.
Q: What happened when you were boxed by your father?
Q: Now that happened on October 20, 1994 after same date, what happened next?
A: I was unconscious.
A: There was something that happened to me after October 20, 1994 to December.
Q: When you regained consciousness, what did you observe?
Q: December of 19?
A: I dont have panty anymore and no short pants.
A: 1994.
Q: What else did you discover?
Q: What did your father do to you after that incident of October 20, 1994 to December 19, 1994?
A: I felt pain in my vagina.
A: He again raped me.
Q: And what else happened?
Q: And what time your father raped you again?
A: Blood was oozing with my vagina.
A: At 1:00 oclock in the afternoon more or less.
Q: What happened after that?
Q: Why, do you know the reason?
A: When I touched my vagina, there was a sticky fluid.
A: Because that was the schedule when my mother wash(es) clothes.
Q: What did you feel, tell us if any?
Q: How about in the month of November 1994?
A: He frightened me that if I will tell everything to (an)other person I will be killed.
A: He again raped me.
Q: And when your father frightened you, what did you feel?
Q: What date in November?
A: I was afraid because I was not able to reveal to my mother, I know that he has a pistola.
A: November 18.
Q: Now, in the month of December what happened in December 1994?
Q: The time is?
A: About the end of December.
A: 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Q: What about in December 1994?
Q: And the place is ?
A: He again raped me.
A: At Baikingon.
Q: Where did he rape you?
Q: Where at Baikingon?
A: In the same place in his bedroom.
A: At Zone 5 in our house.
Q: Will you please narrate before the Honorable Court what happened before, what time was that?

131
ART 11-13 CASES
 A: He will kill me if I will report to anybody.
A: At 1:00 oclock In the afternoon.
(tsn, September 27, 1995, pp. 9-12)
Q: And who were in the house when that incident happened at the end of December 1994, who were the
persons in the house? The above testimony plainly shows how accused-appellant took advantage of his moral ascendancy over
complainant despite her struggle and resistance.
A: We were only two.
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible when
Q: Where was your mother then? applied (People vs. vs. Errojo, 229 SCRA 49 [1994]). For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or
A: She was washing clothes. intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind (People vs. Caada (253
SCRA 277 [1996]; People vs. Antonio, 233 SCRA 283 [1994]). Accused-appellant, being the father, undoubtedly
Q: Will you narrate before the Honorable court the incident leading to the rape that occurred to you the last exerted a strong moral influence over complainant. In rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the
portion of December 1994? formers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and
intimidation (People vs. Casil, 241 SCRA 285 [1995]; People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 2293 [1997]).
A: Almost at the end of December 1994, I was, at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, again I was raped by my
father. Well-settled is the rule that physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised
upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the rapists embrace because of fear for life and
Q: What happened at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon at the end of the last portion of December 1994? personal safety (People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]; People vs. Ramos, 245 SCRA 405 [1996]). Obviously, the
use of threat of death by accused-appellant against complainant constituted sufficient intimidation to cow her
A: At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon at the end of December 1994, I was again called by my father to enter into obedience. Finally, this Court has also ruled that if resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a
his bedroom. continuing intimidation, then offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victims
participation in the sexual act voluntary (People vs. Pamor, 237 SCRA 462 [1994]).
Q: And did you enter his bedroom when you were called by your father?
Moreover, assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by accused-appellant, the latter cannot
A: I did not. be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape contains allegations for qualified
seduction that the accused may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force
Q: What happened? by the accused (People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425 [1997]). To do otherwise would be violating the constitutional
rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged with
A: He pulled my right hand. rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information (People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144
[1976]). Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one
Q: And then after that? common element which is carnal knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects (Gonzales
vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 667 [1994]).
A: I shouted but nobody answered.
What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape in Criminal Cases No. 95-147 and 95-
Q: After that? 148, if indeed, in its opinion, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the existence of force and
intimidation, and order instead the filing of the appropriate information. Be that as it may, this Court believes
A: My panty and my short pant were no longer in my body. otherwise and is fully convinced that accused-appellant is guilty as well of these two other counts of rape.

Q: What did you observe? The trial court ordered accused-appellant to recognize the child born to complainant despite the fact that said
accused-appellant is a married man. The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to
A: I felt the pain in my vagina. recognize the offspring of the crime as his child, as the character of its origin legally prevents him from doing so
(People vs. Guerrero, 242 SCRA 606 [1995], citing People vs. De Guzman, 217 SCRA 395 [1993] and People vs.
Q: What else did you observe? Rizo, 189 SCRA 265 [1990]). Thus, the order of the court a quo pertaining thereto must be deleted.

A: My whole body feel the pain. Critical and more substantial, however, are certain misgivings we entertain with respect to the propriety of
imposition of death penalty as there is one facet of the case which necessitates elucidation. Accused-appellant is
Q: After that, what else happened. Where was your father when you felt that your whole body was aching? being charged under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code
and which reads:
A: My father was already outside the bedroom.
SEC. 11. Article 335 of the same Code (Revised Penal Code, as amended) is hereby amended to read as follows:
Q: What did he tell you if any?

132
ART 11-13 CASES
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed.- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim.
In the case at hand, the complaints stated that the rape victim is 16 years old which therefore qualified her
under the aforequoted provision. However, it is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present the
birth certificate of the complainant. Although the victims age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of
the victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victims age which was then 16 years old is
just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between
a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically
developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the same manner that a frail
and young looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent
proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the
victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act
No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must
be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld. We have meticulously examined the
records of the case and we are convinced that the evidence for the prosecution falls short of the required
quantum of proof for the proper imposition and carrying out of the death penalty. Verily, the minority of the
victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Otherwise, failure to sufficiently
establish the victims age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.
In view of the foregoing consideration, we are constrained to hold accused-appellant liable only of simple rape,
and to reduce the penalty to the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Inasmuch as the rape in this case is not qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is to
be imposed, the civil indemnity to be awarded to the offended party should remain to be P50,000.00 for each
count. In line with the case of People of the Philippines vs. Senen Prades (293 SCRA 411 [1998]), accused-
appellant should indemnify the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages without need for proof of the
basis thereof. Lastly, accused-appellant is liable to pay complainant the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters (People vs. Lao, 249 SCRA 137 [1995]; People vs. Sangil, Sr., 276 SCRA 532 [1997]).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, to wit:
1. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of crime of simple rape, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
2. Accused-appellant shall indemnify the victim for each count of rape the following: (1) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
ART 11-13 CASES
3. The portion of the judgment of the trial court ordering accused-appellant to recognize and acknowledge the
child as his son, is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 140937. February 28, 2001]
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated August 31, 1999, and resolution, dated November
22, 1999, of the Court of Appeals,[1] which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin,
Southern Leyte,[2] finding petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, and sentencing him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay the costs.
The information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away one (1) black female cow belonging to
Narciso Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) without the knowledge and consent of the
aforesaid owner, to his damage and prejudice in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution established the following facts:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case, upon its birth on March
10, 1984. The cow remained under the care of Erlinda Monter for sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave the
care and custody of the animal, first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October 24, 1984 to March 17, 1985; then to
Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March 2, 1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until
March 14, 1986 when it was lost.[4] It appears that at 5 oclock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took
the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However,
when he came back for it at past 9 oclock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the cow gone. He
found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta
had taken the animal.[5]
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the animal from petitioners wife, but
they were informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta, who was at that time
barangay captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly, the two went to Florentinos house. On
their way, they met petitioner who told them that if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow himself.
Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his fathers house, where Maria recognized the cow. As
petitioners father was not in the house, petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so
that they could talk the matter over with his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of Malitbog,
Southern Leyte.[6] As a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner
admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two
133
certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim
(Exh. B).[7]
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal treasurer, in
which the cow was described as two years old and female. On the reverse side of the certificate is the drawing
of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of the forehead, between the ears, on the right and left back, and at the
base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to 4).[8] All four caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the
same one they had taken care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its color. Gardenio described
the cow as black in color, with a small portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the
middle of the forehead, another at the back portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks located near the
base of its forelegs and the hindlegs.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an agreement which he had with Pat.
Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in consideration for which
petitioner would get a calf if the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the cow in question was
his share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This cow, however, was lost on December 2, 1985.
Petitioner said he reported the loss to the police of Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3,
1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1).[10]
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he had seen the cow at Pilipogan, under
the care of Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore, went to Pilipogan with the mother cow on March 14, 1986 to see
whether the cow would suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took it with him and brought it,
together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino Canta.[11] Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but
Florentino refused to give it to her and instead told her to call Narciso so that they could determine the
ownership of the cow.[12] As Narciso did not come the following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he
told his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told. Three days
later, Florentino and Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation.[13]
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985[14] and a statement
executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurers office of the municipality of Padre Burgos, to the effect that
he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of petitioner Exuperancio Canta on February 27,
1985 (Exh. 5).[15] The statement was executed at the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by
petitioner against Narciso.[16]
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal treasurer, who stated that
petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos
(Exhs. E, E-1 and 2).[17] On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the instance of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27,
1985.[18]
On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged. In
giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is indubitable that it was accused
Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow away without the knowledge and consent of either the
owner/raiser/caretaker Gardenio Agapay.
That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth considering that it was made at
the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his shelter-hut forty (40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but
separated by a hill.
The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by claiming ownership. He, however, failed
to prove such ownership. Accused alleged that on February 27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate of Ownership of
ART 11-13 CASES
Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre
Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal Franklin Telen denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even
categorically declared that it was only on March 24, 1986 that the accused brought the cow to the Municipal
Hall of Padre Burgos, when he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on February
27, 1985. Franklin Telen testified thus:
Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle was issued by you on February 27,
1985. Is that correct?
A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I antedated this.
(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)
The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open court by no less than the Municipal Treasurer of Padre
Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN, September 29, 1992, pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow in question, why would he lie on its registration? And
why would he have to ask Mr. Franklin Telen to antedate its registry? It is clear that accused secured a
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) by feigning and manipulation (Exhs. A & B) only after the act
complained of in the instant case was committed on March 14, 1986. His claim of ownership upon which he
justifies his taking away of the cow has no leg to stand on. Upon the other hand, the complainant has shown all
the regular and necessary proofs of ownership of the cow in question.[19]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition. It is contended that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his criminal
intent in taking the disputed cow.
First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He cites the following circumstances to
prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question would suckle to the mother cow, thus
proving his ownership of it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
issued on February 27, 1985 in his name, and found that they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after taking it, and later to the police
authorities, after a dispute arose as to its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P. D. No. 533.
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the
abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence
against or intimidation of any person or force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3)
the taking is done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme;
(5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with or without violence or
intimidation against person or force upon things.[20]
134

These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioners only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was
the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow from the custody
of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal
for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to
antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted
means, methods, or schemes to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain.
Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle which petitioner presented to
prove his ownership was falsified. Franklin Telen, the janitor in the municipal treasurers office, admitted that he
issued the certificate to petitioner 10 days after Narcisos cow had been stolen. Although Telen has previously
executed a sworn statement claiming that he issued the certificate on February 27, 1985, he later admitted that
he antedated it at the instance of petitioner Exuperancio Canta, his friend, who assured him that the cow was
his.[21]
Telens testimony was corroborated by the certification of the municipal treasurer of Padre Burgos that no
registration in the name of petitioner was recorded in the municipal records. Thus, petitioners claim that the
cowlicks found on the cow tally with that indicated on the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle has no value,
as this same certificate was issued after the cow had been taken by petitioner from Gardenio Agapay. Obviously,
he had every opportunity to make sure that the drawings on the certificate would tally with that existing on the
cow in question.
The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to the police authorities does not prove
his good faith. He had already committed the crime, and the barangay captain to whom he delivered the cow
after taking it from its owner is his own father. While the records show that he filed on April 30, 1986 a criminal
complaint against Narciso Gabriel, the complaint was dismissed after it was shown that it was filed as a
countercharge to a complaint earlier filed on April 16, 1986 against him by Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question would suckle to the mother cow. But
cows frequently attempt to suckle to alien cows.[22] Hence, the fact that the cow suckled to the mother cow
brought by petitioner is not conclusive proof that it was the offspring of the mother cow.
Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of Ownership is not in order, it does not
necessarily follow that he did not believe in good faith that the cow was his. If it turned out later that he was
mistaken, he argues that he committed only a mistake of fact but he is not criminally liable.
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership is not only not in order. It is fraudulent, having been antedated to make it
appear it had been issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in question. That he obtained such fraudulent
certificate and made use of it negates his claim of good faith and honest mistake. That he took the cow despite
the fact that he knew it was in the custody of its caretaker cannot save him from the consequences of his
act.[23] As the Solicitor General states in his Comment:
If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would have first verified the identity and/or ownership of the
cow from either Narciso Gabriel or Gardenio Agapay, who is petitioners cousin (TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26). Petitioner,
however, did not do so despite the opportunity and instead rushed to take the cow. Thus, even if petitioner had
committed a mistake of fact he is not exempted from criminal liability due to his negligence.[24]
In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge and permission of its owner.
If he thought it was the cow he had allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his
claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
ART 11-13 CASES
the property. What petitioner did in this case was to take the law in his own hands.[25] He surreptitiously took
the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, which act belies his claim of good faith.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the finding of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. There is therefore no reason to disturb their
findings.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two respects.
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary
surrender. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements: (1) the offender has not actually
been arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender
is voluntary.[26] In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no
complaint had yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been
repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to
the authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require.[27] In petitioners case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos
to place it unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to recover
the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and should be
considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of 2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The trial
court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and applied 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which provides that if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. However, as held in People v.
Macatanda,[28] P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the classification and
duration of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was
to amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of the law
provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders,
instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the
penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e., prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision mayor in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioner
Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
August 15, 2017
135

G.R. No. 226679
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the
imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any
regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when
examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5
praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of
the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three
equal branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for
being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose
which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it
manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of
the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section
23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the
accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City,
Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:
ART 11-13 CASES
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on
the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea
bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot
be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in
effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the
mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to
rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs
because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for
accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of
an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the
law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of
Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the
provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted,
constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts
must observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not
for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that
such declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this
petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF
THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE
POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
136
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the petition
should be dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have
been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be
attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this
Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the
requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2)
there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis
mota of the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much
further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court.
Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and
positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its
solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and
transcendental importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs
has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social,
economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of
thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the
campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection
of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of
the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that
has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist
in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter
Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment
and guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a
constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary
complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this
tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle.
The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself has already declared to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court
has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
ART 11-13 CASES
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate
Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted
its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted
by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to
the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan
Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice
of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do
so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with
the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is
of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its
ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
137

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving
to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the
rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional
design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5
(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority,
which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent
power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with
the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated on
whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion
ART 11-13 CASES
to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice
and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers
of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and,
instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the
Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b)
in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that
"both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable
wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of
this Court.25 The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively
repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective,
We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to
amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative
disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code
provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market
Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et
al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of
legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770,
which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend,
repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is
exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940
Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:
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SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead
guilty of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
complaint or information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule 118
(Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of
guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule
118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116
was modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be
equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters36 that will promote
a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
ART 11-13 CASES
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of
the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 &
3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation
of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which
give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or
procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence
within the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule
may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is
substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a
rational and pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example,
in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as
an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused.43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for
the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori
notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the
societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with
minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State
and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to
139
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The
time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or
insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en
banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the
State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal
cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival
thereof or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when
such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor
or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the
State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially
if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by
which dominant cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to
prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost.
Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more
difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal
case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of
the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and
his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues
to suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his
witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to
defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of
the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that
an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies
available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through
which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail
of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the
scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the
remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive
rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the
speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused
on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46
ART 11-13 CASES
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing
criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential,"
"highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects
include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the
probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and
the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly
imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and
with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which
there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can
sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal
cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are
denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue
criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it
enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
(Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a
speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever
potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public
is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting
completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the
offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor
take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case
against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted.54
In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering
occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather
than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the
offended party57 and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense
that is necessarily included in the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of
140
the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver
one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial
deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the
strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as
government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a
criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because
these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we
have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise
of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.61 Trial courts are
exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to
be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution
already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution
rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully
act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence
on record. As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves
the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The
ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any
finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is
improper and irregular.69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on
the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt
the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

141
ART 11-13 CASES