ANNA LERIMA PATULA, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner, a sales representative at
Footlocker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa
for failure to account for the proceeds of the sales and
deliver the collection to the said company.
During the trial, prosecution, in order to prove that
collectibles lawfully belonging to the company where
misappropriated by the accused, submitted the
following documentary evidence: (a) the receipts
allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers
upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts
pertaining to each customer with the corresponding
notations of the receipt numbers for each of the
payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets
accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and
receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits
B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution
also presented Guivencan to testify on the entries in
the documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that
the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not
themselves presented in court.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness
pertaining to entries in a document made by another
person constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted
as evidence.
HELD: Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule
that states that a witness can testify only to those facts
that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal
knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the
truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon
for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is
that the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a
human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of
the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes
the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross- examination.
an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without
reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the
hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander
case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the
accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that
the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance
is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The
distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does
not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an
asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the part of the
accused through documentary evidence of which the
witness has no personal knowledge, the same is
inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.
People vs Calinawan
Facts: Calinawan was charged with murder for killing
Janice Nevado Silan (Janice). Janice's seven (7)-year
old daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in
their kitchen. Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the
scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan
Nevado (Jonathan), Janice's brother and neighbor,
was awakened by shouts coming from his sister's
house. He rushed to her house and saw her children
crying. He brought Janice to the hospital but was
declared dead after 3 days of medical treatment.
Calinawan denied the allegations and alleged that he
was having a drinking session with his older brother. .
At the police station, Calinawan was asked if he had
with him the dress worn by Janice which .was soaked
in blood. He presented the dress to the police but it had
no bloodstain. Thereafter, he was released by the
police and he went directly to his mother's house.5
During trial, the trial court pointed out that the dying
declaration of Janice to Jonathan corroborated
Marigor's statement that Calinawan killed her mother.
Hence, ruled to convict appellant. Appellant argued the
admissibility of Janice’s dying declaration to her brother
that it must be considered as hearsay.
Issue: Whether the dying declaration of Janice is
admissible
Held: The courts a quo considered the said statement
as an admissible dying declaration.
Janice's statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res
gestae. In order for a statement to be considered part
of res gestae, the following elements must concur: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statement was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statement concerns the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.13 All the
foregoing elements are present in the case at bench.
First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling
occurrence. Second, Janice never had the opportunity
to fabricate a statement implicating Calinawan
because she immediately identified him as her attacker
when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took
place. Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the
circumstances surrounding her stabbing.
Thus, Calinawan's denial and alibi have no leg to stand.
They are inherently weak as defenses, especially when
faced with the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witnesses identifying the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SONNY
GATARIN Y CABALLERO "JAY-R" AND EDUARDO
QUISAYAS
G.R. NO. 198022; APRIL 7, 2014
FACTS: On November 3, 2004, at 8 o’clock in the
evening, Umali was riding a bicycle on his way home
when he saw Januario being mauled by two persons
opposite Dom’s Studio in Poblacion, Mabini, Batangas.
Upon seeing the incident, he stayed in front of the
church until such time that the accused ran away and
were chased by policemen who alighted from the police
patrol vehicle.
On the same night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel
were on board their patrol vehicle performing their
routine patrol duty when they met two men, later
identified as the accused, who were running at a fast
speed. When asked why they were running, the
accused did not answer prompting the policemen to
chase them. The policemen, however, were
unsuccessful in catching them and when it became
evident that they could no longer find them, they
continued patrolling the area. There they saw Januario
lying on the street in front of Dom’s studio. As he was
severely injured, the policemen immediately boarded
Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the
Zigzag Hospital. While inside the vehicle, SPO3
Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered
that it was "Jay-R and his uncle" who stabbed him. The
uncle turned out to be the appellant herein, while Jay-
R is his co-accused who remains at-large. At the
Zigzag Hospital, Januario was attended to by Dr. Rasa
who found him in critical condition. Three fatal wounds
caused by a bladed weapon were found in Januario’s
body which eventually caused his death. CA affirmed
RTC decision hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether Dying Declaration by the victim on this case
is admissible evidence.
HELD:
No. A dying declaration, although generally
inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
may nonetheless be admitted when the following
requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns
the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to
be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant
would have been competent to testify had he or she
survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a
case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death. In the case at bar, it appears that not
all the requisites of a dying declaration are present.
From the records, no questions relative to the second
requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not
appear that the declarant was under the consciousness
of his impending death when he made the statements.
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent
death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief
in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration
admissible. The test is whether the declarant has
abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death
as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances made by
Januario could not be considered as a dying
declaration. However, even if Januario’s utterances
could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his
statements may still be appreciated as part of the res
gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts,
and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous
and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation,
is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part
of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
People vs Palanas
Facts: Accused was charged for the crime of murder
for killing SPO2 Ramon Borre. PO2 Zapanta saw that
2 armed men shot the victim. Thereafter, PO3 Zapanta,
together with Ramil the stepson of the victim, brought
Borre to the Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2
Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was “abe”,
“Aspog,” or “Abe Palanas” who shot him. This
statement was repeated to his wife who followed him
at the hospital. Borre died due to gunshot wounds.
Palanas denied the allegations. RTC ruled to convict
Palanas.
Issue: Whether the dying declaration of Borre is
admissible
Held: Yes, the dying declaration of Borre is admissible
and as part of res gestae.

SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and
circumstances of his death and taking into
consideration the number and severity of his wounds,
it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the
same under a fixed belief that his own death was
already imminent.29 This declaration is considered
evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation.30
Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity,
when the party is at the point of death and when every
motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth,
the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful
as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by an oath administered in court.
People of the Philippines vs Bernal 274 SCRA 197
FACTS: Accused – appellant Theodore Bernal
together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged of the
crime of kidnapping of one Openda Jr. The trial court
convicted accused-appellant Bernal. In convicting the
accused-appellant, the court considered the testimony
of Enriquez. He testified that sometime in January 1991
Openda Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal’s wife
Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave
Openda Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel
room. He advised Naty not to do it again because she
was a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife’s infidelity
was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate for
revenge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Enriquez id
admissible evidence
HELD: Yes. Openda Jr’s revelation to Enriquez
regarding his illicit relationship to Bernal’s wife is
admissible in evidence pursuant to section 38, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.,
Section 38. Declaration against Interest – The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made
so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a
reasonable man at his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true, maybe
received in evidence against himself or his successors
in interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral
interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume
that the declaration against interest has been
expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is,
pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible if it complies with the
following requisites, to wit; 1) that the declarant is dead
or unable to testify; 2) that it relates to a fact against
the interest of the declarant; 3) that at the time he made
said declaration, the declarant was aware that the
same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and 4) the
declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such
declaration to be true.
Openda Jr., having missing since his abduction, cannot
be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez,
definitely a declaration against his own interest, since
his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in
evidence because no sane person will be presumed to
tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON VS COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. NO. 121027 JULY 31, 1997
FACTS: This is a case of an action for reconveyance
of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero
died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her
husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to
him and consequently sold to Teodora Dominga. The
nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right
of representation from the property disputed presenting
documentary evidence to prove filial relation. Corazon
Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with
the following documentary evidence offered to prove
petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit:
a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and
Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed
records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes
Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of
destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene
Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton
Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana
Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of
marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and
Teodora Guerrero. Petitioners thereafter rested their
case and submitted a written offer of these exhibits to
which a Comment was filed by herein private
respondent. The respondent contended that the
documents/ evidence presented is inadmissible for
being hearsay since the affiants were never presented
for cross-examination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is
hearsay evidence and is inadmissible?
HELD: The evidence submitted does not conform to
the rules on their admissibility; however the same may
be admitted by reason of private respondent’s failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they
were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an
objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence;
otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege, which the
party may waive.

The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining
the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s
niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration
about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to
the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: 1.
That the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2. That
the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree
is the subject of inquiry; 3. That such relationship be
shown by evidence other than the declaration; and 4.
That the declaration was made ante litem motam, that
is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has risen thereon.
FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MONINA JISON
G.R. No. 124853
February 24, 1998
MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married
to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of
1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then
employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter,
Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born and since
childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by
his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged
that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her
education, such that she obtained a Master's degree,
became a certified public accountant (CPA) and
eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of
FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her,
MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her
illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and
treat her as such. FRANCISCO alleged that he never
recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his
illegitimate child. One of the pieces of evidence
presented by Monina to support her claim are various
notes and letters written by his relatives attesting to
MONINA's filiation with Francisco. Francisco assails
the various notes and letters written by his relatives as
they were not identified by the authors.
ISSUE: W/N notes and letters written by
FRANCISCO's relatives allegedly attesting to
MONINA's filiation be admissible in evidence
RULING: NO
As to the various notes and letters written by
FRANCISCO's relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio
Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez,
respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINA's filiation,
while their due execution and authenticity are not in
issue, as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the
documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39,
the contents of these documents may not be admitted,
there being no showing that the declarants-authors
were dead or unable to testify, neither was the
relationship between the declarants and MONINA
shown by evidence other than the documents in
question. As to the admissibility of these documents
under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires
further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any
one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be
also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
bibles or other family books or charts,
engravings on rings, family portraits and the
like may be received as evidence of pedigree.
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two
(2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored
clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under
which the documents in question may not be admitted
as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand;
and the section containing the second underscored
phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether
Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the
scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the
preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engravings on rights [and]
family portraits,"
We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained
in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule
of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are
commonly known as "family possessions," or those
articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint
statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.
These have been described as objects "openly
exhibited and well known to the family," or those
"which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as
giving a family tradition." Other examples of these
objects which are regarded as reflective of a family's
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are
inscriptions on tombstones, monuments or coffin
plates.
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not
constituting "family possessions" as discussed above,
may not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section
40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis
of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation, it having been observed that: The weight of
authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is
the general repute, the common reputation in the
family, and not the common reputation in community,
that is a material element of evidence going to establish
pedigree. . . . [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved
by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the
neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in
question is marriage which may be proved by common
reputation in the community.
Nevertheless, not just preponderant but overwhelming
evidence on record to prove that MONINA is the
illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] and that she had
continuously enjoyed such status by direct acts of
FRANCISCO and/or his relatives. The testimonial
evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration
of circumstances and events that occurred through the
years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO,
coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established the filiation of Francisco
and Monina.
People vs. Feliciano et al. May 5, 2014
Facts: Feliciano et al. are members of Scintilla Juris
fraternity who were found guilty by the Quezon City
RTC of frustrated murder of several members of Sigma
Rho fraternity and murder of Dennis Venturina, also a
member of Sigma Rho. The members of SJ, who were
wearing masks, attacked the members of SR using
baseball bats and lead pipes while the latter are eating
lunch at Beach House, in UP Diliman.
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-
appellants were found guilty of the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin
Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica,
Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. (all members of
Sigma Rho). The CA, however, modified their liabilities
and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of
attempted murder only against Natalicio and Fortes,
and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because
Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by
the attackers," it concluded that accused-appellants
"voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from
inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not
have the intent to do more than to make them suffer
pain by slightly injuring them." It also pointed out that
the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to have
been done with an intent to kill.”
The SC reinstated the decision of the RTC and set
aside that of the CA because of the presence of
conspiracy. Thus, all accused are guilty of frustrated
murder and murder.
As to the evidence, the prosecution presented
testimonies of the members of SR, who were able to
identify some of their assailants because their masks
fell off. Also presented was the testimony of U.P. Police
Officer Salvador who interviewed the bystanders who
all told him that they could not recognize the attackers
since they were all masked.
The accused-appellants, on the basis of the evidence,
assailed the findings of the RTC and CA that they were
sufficiently identified. They argued that the testimonies
of the witnesses were inconsistent.
Issues: 1. W/N the testimony of the bystanders, as
relayed by the police officer, may be admitted as
evidence, and 2. if yes, W/N it should be given
consideration
Held: 1. Yes and 2. No
I. The testimony could be evidence that
could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the
facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, x x x." All
other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are
inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court,
however, provide several exceptions to the general
rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of
res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by
a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected
with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as
to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and
also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group
peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements
of the bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as
evidence given in res gestae.
II. The statements made by the bystanders, although
admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at
different vantage points and at different points in time.
Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time
of the attack, testified that the attackers had their
masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked
and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against
those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the
incident from beginning to end at close range, the
former become merely corroborative of the fact that an
attack occurred. Their account of the incident,
therefore, must be given considerably less weight than
that of the victims.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GILBERTO
VILLARICO et al.
G.R. No. 158362, April 04, 2011
FACTS: Accused were charged of murder for the death
of Haide Cagatan. During the trial, prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (1) Remedios,
sister-in-law of the victim, who testified that she saw
accused pointing their gun at the victim; (2) Lolita
Cagatan, mother of the victim, who testified that she
was at the sala when she heard gunshots followed by
seeing the victim wounded and asking for help stating
that he was shot by Berting (accused); (3) Francisco,
father of the victim; who testified that he also heard
gunshots and saw accused aiming their guns upward
and were about to leave.
RTC convicted the four accused of homicide
aggravated by dwelling. The RTC accorded faith to the
positive identification of the accused by the
Prosecution's witnesses. On intermediate review, the
CA modified the RTC's decision and convicted the
accused with murder. The accused contend that the
Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had
shot Haide and that Lolita’s testimony is a hearsay.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony relating the last
statement of the victim immediately after the shooting
incident is admissible in evidence.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The statement
was admissible against the accused as an exception to
the hearsay rule under Section 42, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: “Statements made by
a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.”
The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances
which are the undersigned incidents of a particular
litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative
of such act." In a general way, res gestae includes the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character, and
which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations
and statements made by either the participants,
victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the
crime when the circumstances are such that the
statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is whether the act, declaration, or exclamation
is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and
also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an
utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that
is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances.
We find that the requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the
principal act – the shooting of Haide - was a startling
occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother
about being shot by the group of Berting was made
before Haide had time to contrive or to devise
considering that it was uttered immediately after the
shooting. And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned
the startling occurrence itself and its attending
circumstance (that is, the identities of the assailants).
Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res
gestae for being uttered in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JAIME
M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO,
MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA
JAVALERA, respondents.
G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992
FACTS: Plaintiffs complained that they were not
allowed to board their PAL (Philippines Air Lines) flight,
despite the fact that they went to the check-in counter
one hour before departure. They alleged that when
they arrived there no one was at the counter. They
testified that the PAL clerk arrived 30 minutes before
departure. PAL however, presented as evidence the
plaintiffs’ tickets with notation “late 4:04” and the
passenger manifest which showed that two other
passengers who arrived earlier than plaintiffs, were not
accommodated.
ISSUE: Whether the documents presented by PAL
admissible? Which should prevail the oral testimony of
plaintiffs or the documentary evidence presented by
PAL?
HELD: Yes. The documentary evidence presented by
PAL to corroborate the testimonies of its witnesses are
entries made in the regular course of business which
plaintiffs failed to overcome with substantial and
convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently, they carry more weight and credit. A
writing or document made contemporaneously with a
transaction which are evidence of facts pertinent to an
issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is
ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of
greater probative force than the oral testimony of a
witness as to such fact based upon memory and
recollection. Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable as against a written document that speaks a
uniform language.
RUDY LAO vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 140023, August 14, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Lao, owner of a Fuso truck insured
by respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc., filed a
claim with the latter. However, the claim was denied by
the insurance company on the ground that the driver of
the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, as stated in the Police
Blotter, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the
time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anit’s
driver’s license provided that he can only drive four-
wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs.
Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more
than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the "authorized
driver" clause of the insurance policy.
Thus, petitioner filed an action for breach of contract
and damages. During trial, Respondent offered as
evidence the police blotter and presented the
investigating police officer who made the entries on the
said blotter report. On the other hand, petitioner offered
in evidence the Motor Vehicle Accident Report stating
that the driver at the time of the accident is not Anit but
Giddie Boy. The said report was made three days after
the accident or on April 27, 1985.
RTC dismissed the complaint and this was affirmed by
CA on appeal. Petitioner assails the admissibility and
evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis
for the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. He
contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor
Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the
investigating policeman himself.
ISSUE: Whether admissibility of a police blotter may be
assailed on the ground that it contains entries that is
contrary to another police report made by the same
investigating officer who made the blotter.
HELD: Entries in police records made by a police
officer in the performance of the duty especially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact
therein stated, and their probative value may be either
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
Although police blotters are of little probative value,
they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the
absence of competent evidence to refute the facts
stated therein.
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130,
Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule,
the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a)
that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b)
that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
In this case the police blotter was identified and
formally offered as evidence. The person who made
the entries was likewise presented in court; he
identified and certified as correct the entries he made
on the blotter. The information was supplied to the
entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest
about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented
to him in comparison to the accident report he made
three (3) days after the accident. No explanation was
likewise given by the investigating officer for the
alleged interchange of names.
MEYNARDO SABILI vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA
G.R. No. 193261
April 24, 2012
FACTS: COMELEC denied due course to and
canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) Sabili for
the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010
elections for allegedly not complying with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials. When
petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the
2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a
resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8)
months. One of the pieces of evidence presented by
the petitioner is the Certification from the Barangay
Captain of Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC did not
consider in the first instance the Certification issued by
Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade
that petitioner had been residing in Brgy Pinagtong-
ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an
issue in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the
COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said
Certification was not sworn to before a notary public
and, hence, "cannot be relied on." Subsequently,
petitioner presented another, substantially identical,
Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay
Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn
to before a notary public.
ISSUE: W/N the Certification from the Barangay
Captain shall be admissible in evidence
RULING: YES The SC disagrees with the COMELEC’s
treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification and
find the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public,
Honrade’s Certification would not only be admissible in
evidence, but would also be entitled to due
consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of
Court provides: SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—
Entries in official records made in the performance of
his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.
The following three (3) requisites must concur for
entries in official records to be admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by
another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance
of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must
have been acquired by him personally or through
official information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is
required by the Local Government Code to "keep an
updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay."
Regarding the second requisite, we have explicitly that
"it is the business of a punong barangay to know who
the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third
requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers
and duties concomitant to his position requires him to
be privy to these records kept by the Barangay
Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the
COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrade’s
Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not
notarized.
Cercado-Siga v. Cercado, Jr.
G.R. No. 185375, March 11, 2015
FACTS: Petitioners, in their complaint against
respondent, alleged that they are the legitimate
children of the late Vicente Cercado and Benita
Castillo. Petitioners alleged that their parents left them,
through intestate succession, properties located in
Rizal. Sometime later, petitioners read from the
newspaper a notice that the estate of Vicente, and a
certain Leonora Ditablan have been extrajudicially
settled by their heirs(respondents). Petitioners now
insist that Vicente and Leonora’s marriage was null and
void by the reason of the subsisting marriage of their
parents, Vicente and Benita. To prove the marriage
between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented
several documents including the Contrato Matrimonial
or the marriage contract. Respondents on the other
hand, averred that the marriage between Vicente and
Benita was not valid; that the marriage contract was not
a certified true copy.
ISSUE: WON the Contrato Matrimonial, issued by
Iglesia Filipina Independiente church, presented by the
petitioners should be given probative value.
HELD: NO. In the case of U.S. v. Evangelista, it has
been settled that church registries of births, marriages,
and deaths, made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act. No. 190
is no longer public writings nor do duly authorized
public officials keep them. They are private writings and
their authenticity must therefore be proved, as all are
other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence. The marriage contract is a private document
for it was an unsigned and uncertified document
purporting to be carbon copy because no public officer
acknowledged the accuracy of such copy.
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND LORNA QUISUMBING
VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. NO. 142943; APRIL 3, 2002
FACTS:
Meralco team conducted their inspection at petitioner’s
meter and found alleged meter tampering, they
immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply.
During the inspection the following persons were
present, four (4) MERALCO inspection personnel and
the secretary of appellees. Plaintiffs-appellees filed a
complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On the other
hand, MERALCO filed a counterclaim with respect to
the unpaid bills of herein plaintiff. During the trial,
MERALCO presented as witness its Senior Billing
Computer Officer to testify as to the unpaid bills of the
plaintiff. The said testimony as corroborated with the
documentary evidence showing unpaid bills as well as
the laboratory test results proving the tampering. Trial
court ruled that immediate disconnection was illegal
due to lack of due process. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint.
CA likewise upheld respondent's counterclaim for the
billing differential representing the value of petitioners'
used but unregistered electrical consumption, which of
had been established without being controverted.
Petitioner elevated the case before the SC by way of
petition for review on certiorari. In their memorandum,
petitioner assailed ruling upholding the validity of the
disconnection and denying their claim for damages.
The petitioner did not question the computation of the
differential billing both during the trial as well as in their
memorandum submitted before the SC. The only
defense presented by petitioner is that they cannot be
held liable thereof because the bills are already
outstanding when they transferred to their residence.
ISSUE: Whether or not a party may be held liable for
unpaid bills based on the uncontroverted documentary
and testimonial evidence.
HELD: Yes. The mere presentation by petitioners of a
Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage does not
necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the
billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence to
show that they had not been actually residing in the
house before the date of the said document. Lorna
Quisumbing herself admitted that they did not have any
contract for electrical service in their own name. Hence,
petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former
occupants of the premises. The evidence it presented,
both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved
the amount of the differential. Not only did respondent
show how the meter examination had been conducted
by its experts, but it also established the amount of
P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The
procedure through which this amount was arrived at
was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer
Officer. His testimony was corroborated by
documentary evidence showing the account's billing
history and the corresponding computations. Neither
do we doubt the documents of inspections and
examinations presented by respondent to prove that,
indeed there had been meter tampering that resulted in
unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LANIE ORTIZ-
MIYAKE G.R. Nos. 115338-39, September 16, 1997
FACTS: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was
charged with illegal recruitment in large scale on a
complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda
Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In convicting
appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower
court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the
judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for
estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant
case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario
charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This
decision was not appealed and had become final and
executory.
On appeal, the OSG argued that the Makati court could
not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of
the Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment
was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as
well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have
been committed against only one person, particularly,
Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be
held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such
offense in large scale.
ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court may adopt the
findings of fact and decision of another court involving
the same parties and incidents.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Trial court’s
utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of
the Parañaque court must be rejected. Every
conviction must be based on the findings of fact made
by a trial court according to its appreciation of the
evidence before it. A conviction may not be based
merely on the findings of fact of another court,
especially where what is presented is only its decision
sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses
who testified therein and upon which the decision is
based.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in
evidence may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. 30 It may not be used
to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged
in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence
proving the commission of the crime, as said previous
decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a
basis for conviction in a subsequent case would
constitute a violation of the right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him.
Go vs. Philippines G.R. No. 185527. July 18, 2012
FACTS Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go
were charged before the MeTC of Manila for Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC. It was alleged
that sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, the
said accused, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Highdone Company
Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which
they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they
have chattels such as machinery, spare parts,
equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in the
premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located
in the Bataan Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in
Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a
consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso
equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of
ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd.
Representing that the said deed is a FIRST
MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the accused well
knew that the same had been previously encumbered,
mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby
causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE
COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of $464,266.90 or
its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less.”
The prosecution’s complaining witness, Li Luen Ping,
a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled
from his home country back to the Philippines in order
to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004.
However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due
to his unavailability.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to
Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he
was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia
Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor’s advice, he could not make the long travel to
the Philippines by reason of ill health.
The MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution
complied with the directive to submit a Medical
Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its
reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting
petitioners to file a Petition for Certiorari before the
RTC.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC
Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17,
Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil
cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there
is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect
to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in
criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard
the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the
witness against him face to face.
The CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held
that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon
the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the
complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of
procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions
in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners
would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the
complaining witness and make timely objections during
the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel
or through the consular officer who would be taking the
deposition of the witness.
ISSUE Whether the deposition-taking of Li Luen Ping
should be allowed
HELD Yes. The examination of witnesses must be
done orally before a judge in open court; It is not
without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses
and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence
in lieu of direct court testimony.—The examination of
witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. This is true especially in criminal cases where
the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face
to face. The requirement is the “safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables
the judge to test the witness’ credibility through his
manner and deportment while testifying. It is not
without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses
and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence
in lieu of direct court testimony.
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases,
more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending.—
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases,
more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge, where the case is pending as
required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus: SEC. 15. Examination
of witness for the prosecution.—When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at
the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the
examination after notice shall be considered a waiver.
The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
To take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where
the case is pending would not only deprive a detained
accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness’ deportment and properly assess
his credibility.—Certainly, to take the deposition of the
prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only
deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness’
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is
especially intolerable when the witness’ testimony is
crucial to the prosecution’s case against the accused.
PEOPLE V. IBAÑEZ
FACTS:
Appellants Edwin and Alfredo, with Jesus Monsillo y
Taniares (Jesus), were all charged in an Information for
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2004, in the
municipality of Bocaue, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a
soil digger (bareta) and with intent to kill one Wilfredo
Atendido y Dohenog, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation,
abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack,
assault and hit with the said soildigger (bareta) the said
Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog, hitting the latter on his
head, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical
injuries which directly caused his death.
The prosecution’s version was testified to by the
victim’s wife and daughter, in succession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in giving
full weight and credence to the testimony of the alleged
prosecution eyewitness
HELD:
This Court finds the testimony of Rachel clear and
convincing. The testimony flows from a person who
was present in the place where the killing occurred.
They are replete with details sufficient to shift the
burden of evidence to appellants. We have no reason
to doubt Rachel’s credibility. Her candid account of the
incident, standing alone, clearly established the
components of the crime of murder. Appellants’
defense of denial, not sufficiently proven, cannot
overcome the conclusions drawn from said evidence.
We find no cogent reason to deviate from the findings
and conclusions of the trial court. Rachel’s testimony
was delivered in a firm, candid, and straightforward
manner. There is no showing that Rachel wavered from
the basic facts of her testimony, even when she was
subjected to a rigorous examination.
We cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly simply
because she was a mere child when she witnessed the
incident and when she gave her testimony in court.
There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered
her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident
truthfully.
With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of
a Child Witness which specifies that every child is
presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
challenging the child's competence. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child
to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth
from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a
party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of
education and inability to read and tell time carry no
weight and cannot overcome the clear and convincing
testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
People vs Esugon
FACTS: The 5-year old son of the victim, testified that
on the night of the incident, he saw appellant, whom he
calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother
with a knife, while he peeped through a chair. After his
mother got stabbed, his father chased the appellant.
The child positively identified the appellant, a neighbor
who often goes to their house, as the one who stabbed
his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the
assailant took money from his father’s pocket. After the
RTC declared Esugon guilty for the crime, he argued
that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery
with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a
5-year old witness whose recollections could only be
the product of his imagination.
ISSUE: W/N the RTC erred in basing its ruling from the
testimony of a child.
HELD: No.
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason
for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past
has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness, every child is now presumed
qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the
burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s
competency. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive ,remember,
communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or
appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court,
motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a
competency examination of a child.
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a
witness. He did not attempt to adduce evidence to
challenge such competency by showing that the child
was incapable of perceiving events and of
communicating his perceptions, or that he did not
possess the basic qualifications of a competent
witness. After the Prosecution terminated its direct
examination of Carl, the appellant extensively tested
his direct testimony on cross-examination. All that the
Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony
of Carl, but not for once did the Defense challenge his
capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive,
or to communicate his perception to the trial court.
Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined the
competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
The appellant points to inconsistencies supposedly
incurred by Carl. That is apparently not disputed.
However, it seems clear that whatever inconsistencies
the child incurred in his testimony did not concern the
principal occurrence or the elements of the composite
crime charged but related only to minor and peripheral
matters. As such, their effect on his testimony was
negligible, if not nil, because the inconsistencies did not
negate the positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator. Also, that Carl did not shout to seek help
upon witnessing how the appellant had stabbed his
mother to death did not destroy his credibility. For sure,
he could not be expected to act and to react to what
happened like an adult. Although children have
different levels of intelligence and different degrees of
perception, the determination of their capacity to
perceive and of their ability to communicate their
perception to the courts still pertained to the trial court,
because it concerned a factual issue and should not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing
of mistake or misappreciation on the part of the trial
court.