2103323

International Phenomenological Society
Ethics as an Empirical Science

Author(s): Tadeusz Czezowski and A. M. Galon
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Dec., 1953), pp. 163-171
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2103323
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ETHICS AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE*
1. Primary Singular Evaluations
We often come across the view that to judge a thing as good or beautiful
is merely to give expression to one's own personal attitude towards things in
general; or, in other words, that evaluations of moral and esthetic values are
conditioned only subjectively, as opposed to perceptional judgments, in
which the objective existence of things is conceived. Contrary to that
view, it is possible to show a far-reaching analogy between perceptional
judgments (Wahrnehmungsurteil), and axiological evaluations conceived as
cognitive measures; and consequently between existence, which is affirmed
in perceptional judgments', and goodness or beauty, which are affirmed in
evaluations. This analogy gives foundation to a conclusion that the value of
an object should, from an ontological point of view, be conceived in a way
analogous to that of conceiving the object's existence.
By a perceptional judgment we mean a judgment in which is affirmed the
existence of an object perceived. A perceptional judgment has for its
motive the perceptive representation (Wahrnehmungsvorstellung) of an
object. Not every perceptive representation, however, is connected with a
perceptional judgment: that one only is which happens to fall within the
field of attention. Attention as a cognitive attitude is both a necessary
condition for a perceptional judgment to arise, and a sufficient one in the
sense that a perceptive representation which enters the field of attention
acquires a motivating force that is sufficient for a perceptional judgment to
appear. This is similar to the manner in which analytic judgments come
into being; they (analytic judgments) are based immediately on concepts,
just as perceptional judgments are based immediately on perceptive
representations. E.g., the concept of a circle becomes the motive for an
analytic judgment affirming certain properties in the circle, when that
concept has entered the field of attention-attention being conceived as a
cognitive attitude thanks to which the essence of the concept is realized;
then, the existence in the circle of properties contained in the concept's
essence is affirmed.
One may legitimately suppose evaluations of moral and esthetic worth
* This paper appeared originally in "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny," Volume XVIII,

1949, in Cracow, and a summary was included in "Sprawozdania Polskiej Akademii
Umiejetnosci," Volume L, number, 4, 1949.
I The author's point of view is that of the so-called idiogenic (or, as some prefer
it, idiogenetic,) theory of judgments, supported by Franz Brentano, which assumes
every judgment to be existential, i.e., to affirm, or negate, the existence of its object.
163
164 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
to arise in an analogous manner. To wit, a representation of the object

evaluated becomes, then and only then, a motive for evaluation, when the
person doing the evaluating-has assumed 'a particular evaluating attitude,
either moral or esthetic. Those attitudes, well-known to moralists and
estheticians, are kindred to attention when that is conceived as a cognitive
attitude: like attention, they are characterized by an intensification of
focus at the expense -of its narrowing. They'differ from it however, by the
fact that representation with them is a motive for the affirmation of value,
and not of existence. For therein lies the very difference between the
essence of evaluation and that of perceptional 'or analytic' judgment.
'The evaluations thus arisen are' singular, similarly to perceptional or
analytic judgments, the subject' of which is taken in suppositions formali,
i.e., in relation to the 'concept's abstract object. That is so because 'their
object is either an empirical individual-when the object' of evaluation is
given in the representation (image); or it is an abstract object of a general
concept-as in the case, e.g., when an analysis of the concept of happiness
is taken as basis 'for evaluating happiness as having positive value. It
should at the same time be noted here that there' is a difference between
singular evaluations as mentioned above, and their generalizations which
will be dealt with further.
Like all judgments, evaluations may be affirmative or negative and true
or false. Namely, an evaluation affirming the value of an' object is true,
and only then, when the object is in fact valuable; an evaluation is false
in the opposite, case.
Passing to the next part of our comparison, we find that evaluations, like
perceptional judgments, have' immediate foundation. That is to say, in
asserting the value of an object, we base ourselves on our particular sense
of the obviousness of our evaluation,-evaluation being, again like percep-
tional judgments,''u''provable or, in other words, incapable of becoming
the conclusion of a deductive argument. An evaluation may, however, be
erroneous; and erroneous evaluations,, like erroneous perceptional judg-
ments, may be eliminated by verification or by means of repetition of the
same kind of evaluations -'under different conditions and their subsequent
comparison. Evaluating skill may be developed by practice, like skill in
observation (in particular, e.g., the skill for microscopy, or for detection
of disturbances, in heart functioning, in internistic examination). Practice
in evaluating facilitates the elimination 'of erroneous evaluations.2
In psychological considerations, evaluations are usually associated with
emotions, in view of their belonging to the group of esthetic emotions and
sentiments. But it would not be correct to' consider those emotions, as
2Cf. H. Elzenberg, "Aesthetics as an Evaluating Science," Pion., No. 10, War-
szawa,- 1936.
ETHICS AS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE 165
is sometimes done,-to be the motive for evaluation. That evaluations arise

is -sufficiently explained by assuming the representation of an object,
supported by an evaluating attitude, to become the motive for evaluation.
When this attitude is adopted, the object is shown in such a perspective
that it acquires that motivating force. On the other hand, there can be no
esthetic enjoyment and no sentiment of value (Wertgefiihl) that is, no
emotion, (as Joy, sadness, anger) without a more or less distinct evaluation;
so that we have to admit evaluation to be a necessary condition for any
positive or negative emotion or sentiment to exist. As far as esthetic
sentiments are concerned, representation of the object of the sentiment
together with esthetic evaluation constitute at the same time a sufficient
condition for esthetic enjoyment or displeasure to arise. For the appearance
of a sentiment of value, on the other hand, there is the necessity for an
additional condition in the form of a judgment as to the existence of the
object of the sentiment aroused (Meinong); the judgment being in no way
tied in any relationship of dependence with evaluation of worth, as the
latter may. arise just as 'vell with respect to a nonexistent object. Thus,
sentiment is not a condition motivating evaluation. On the contrary,
evaluation is the basis of both kinds of sentiments associated with evalua-
tion, viz., sentiments of value, and sentiments with respect to esthetics:
enjoyment or displeasure appears as a result of evaluation.
The situation is not different in the domain of perceptional and other
judgments; a judgment arising, there follows the pleasure which char-
acterizes the so-called intellectual emotions. Thus, also as regards their
connection with the sphere of emotions, evaluations and perceptional
judgments do not display any essential difference.
-Evaluations being singular, just as perceptional judgments, are capable-
again like perceptional judgments- of generalization. This generalization
leads to establishing evaluation -criteria. By finding in a number of cases
that the objects of a -certain kind of evaluation possess a character in
common, we have a basis for a generalization stating every object possessing
that, common character to be subject to the same kind of evaluation-viz.,
as being- good, evil, beautiful, tragic, pathetic, etc. The criterion of evalua-
tion is always an empirical character, whilst the value predicated in
evaluation is not an empirical character of the object. In that way, actions
bearing the character of, say, theft, falsehood, etc., are evaluated as evil,
and actions sagacious, constructive, generous,-as good. The characters
of the former kind are criteria of evil, those of the latter-criteria of
goodness. Judgments are also generalized analogously, the generalizations
here determining the criteria of existence; thus, for example, an empirical
criterion of existence is affirmed in the proposition, 'Anything that is the
object of perception, exists,' or in the metaphysical principle, which is just
another proposition of the same type, 'Anything that acts, exists.' The
commonest,- however, are the cases where perceptional propositions are
generalized in yet another manner, leading to affirmation of dependence,
in the form, 'If A exists, then B exists.' This form of generalization is also
met in the sphere of evaluations, where it constitutes the point of issue for
distinction between relative and absolute values. Here the generalizations
have the form, 'If A is valuable, then B is valuable,' where B usually is to A
in the relation of a means to an end or of a part to the whole.
The above comparisons show the far-reaching similarity that exists
between goodness and beauty as affirmed in evaluations, and existence as
affirmed in judgments. These terms do not denote any objects, or characters
of objects. With regard to existence, it has already been distinctly asserted
by Hume and Kant that there is no difference whatsoever to mark off the
appearance of a nonexistent object from that of an existing one: the same
applies to an object evaluated as evil, beautiful, or ugly: the evaluation
there adds nothing to the object's description. The belief about the supposed
subjectivity of evaluations may possibly have its source in that "want of
content" (as it is sometimes termed) of evaluations, as well as in their
association with emotions. Existence, goodness, and beauty, are not
conceived in representations as are characters of objects, but are affirmed in
judgments or evaluations. They belong to the group of conceptions denoted
in metaphysics by the term transcendentalia, that is, such modifications of
being as are not grouped among categories, being incapable of determining
any category; their being added to, or taken away from, determining
characters, has no influence upon determination itself.
The terms 'goodness' and 'beauty' have two distinct meanings. Goodness
and beauty have been juxtaposed to truth, in the sense of their constituting
the three most general aims of all endeavor. Such juxtaposition, however,
presupposes a different meaning to those terms: 'goodness' here is a general
term, covering all objects evaluated as good; analogously, 'beauty' is a term
extending over all objects beautiful; they are objects satisfying the criteria
of goodness and beauty; and finally, 'truth' is a general term for judgments
that are true. And to hold that truth, goodness, and beauty, are the most
general aims of human endeavor is merely to state those aims to be the
unlimited increase of knowledge, and the greatest possible realization
in life of things good and beautiful.
2. Ethical Principles
The object of the conclusions which I mean to draw from the foregoing
analysis is to present the structure of ethical theories in a light different from
that usually given to it. By the term 'ethical theory' I mean a logically
connected group of propositions among which are to be found affirmations
of duties, or variously formulated ethical norms, or any other enunciations

of a similar type. With some additional- definitions all of them can be
reduced to general propositions stating such-and-such things to be good or
evil. For purposes of this essay let that kind of general propositions be
called ethical principles. Ethical theories may, in view of the manner in
which- ethical principles are conceived, be divided into two groups: in
objectivrist theories ethical principles are held to correspond to objective
goodness or evil; and according to subjectivist ones they are a reflection
of human desires and aims, individual or pertaining to communities.
Objectivist theories are also absolutistic, whilst subjectivist ones are
relativistic; the former defend the absoluteness of ethical principles-the
latter deny there being any absolutely valid ethical principles, all being
conditioned in their validity by sociologically or psychologically variable
circumstances. Moreover, ethical principles are a priori statements to the
absolutists. The position here seems to resemble that which had once
prevailed in natural sciences, when rationalist philosophers with Descartes,
and later Kant, at their head, defended the absoluteness of all knowledge
and sought for a priori principles to guarantee its infallibility.
For purposes of the present considerations, ethical evaluations of indi-
vidual cases will be divided into two kinds-(1) primary, and (2) secondary.
The evaluations discussed earlier are primary. A realization of the object
of evaluation, towards which the subject will have adopted an evaluatory
attitude, is in itself a sufficient motive for evaluations of this type to arise.
Hence they are considered as subjective psychological reactions to the
world around us, equally immediate as perceptual judgments. Secondary
evaluations on the other hand, are the result of applying to the case evalu-
ated a previously established criterion, the procedure here consisting
thus of subordinating the case evaluated to an ethical principle. Primary
evaluations arise spontaneously, whereas secondary ones are either the
result of deliberation, or, more commonly, having undergone a process of
automatization, they are subsequently applied in a stereotype way. Both
these kinds, however, have to be distinguished from the immediate,'
impulsive type of reaction to stimuli, as when there is no evaluation present,
only an agressive, or repulsive, behavior, governed by the so-called "blind"
passions, such as fear, anger, or desire.
Primary evaluations are, as we have said, subject to generalization; and it
is owing to the generalization that evaluational criteria are established.
General propositions in which criteria of ethical evaluation are established,
are not-other than our ethical principles. As all generalizations, they too are
uncertain and variable, i.e., it may happen that a criterion, established
with regard to a certain scope of moral experience, will prove insufficient
when the scope is enlarged and when new cases of primary evaluations are
incapable of being subordinated to that criterion. Another reason for the

variability of ethical principles lies in the fact that general terms, used for
their formulation, are themselves subject to change: terms such as fidelity,
courage, heroism, falsehood,. and treason, vary their meanings unceasingly,
along with changing customs and standards of morality. As a result, the
meaning of propositions expressing ethical principles undergoes changes,
and the ethical principles require' new formulations. And finally, changing
social relations also demand that evaluational criteria be adapted to them,
if the latter are not sufficiently differentiated to embrace the increasing
variety of situations.
In this light, ethical principles appear as a variety of empirical hypo-
thetical laws and, as all laws of that type, they can only be founded on
inverse reasoning, with primary evaluations as'the premises. The role of
foundations in ethics is played not by a priori ethical principles but by
empirical primary evaluations. The moral laws engraved upon human
hearts, spoken of by the apriorists, assume, in this interpretation, a char-
acter of dispositions: dispositions not to apprehend' general ethical princi-
ples, but to makeoindividu'al evaluations: the "moral sense" is a disposition
to make singular moral evaluations, just as the sense of sight is a disposition
to make singular perceptions of colors and shapes.
The discussions which have been carried on on the subject of evaluations
could not come to an issue owing to a lack of distinction between singular
evaluations of primary character and their generalizations which establish
the criteria of goodness; that has been so either because the intuitive
character of singular evaluations had been extended over to the generaliza-
tions, and an obviousness to which they are not in fact entitled, was
demanded for them, or on the contrary, the uncertainty and variability of
the generalizations had been extended over to primary singular evaluations.
After due distinction, a' question which asks whether such-and-such a
thing is, objectively, good or evil, should be understood as analogous to one
asking whether the object which we see as red is, objectively, red. Such a
question will be differently answered by an idealist and by a realist; but the
structure of the physical theory representing the world of colors does not
depend on the adoption of one or' the other answer, but on whether the
empirical material of perceptions in the given domain be adequately
established and adapted to -suit the structure of the theory. The position
respecting the structure of ethical theories seems to be analogous. A
theory of this sort will have adequate grounds, irrespective of interpretation,
whether epistemological or 'metaphysical, of evaluations-provided the
evaluations constitute sufficient material for making and verifying
generalizations.
The same can be said regarding the question about the absoluteness
of evaluations:o- all-,men evaluate in the same way, irrespective of
differences of conditions under which the evaluating is done? And what,
if any, conditions, determine the coming to being of evaluations? If, in a
similar way, the question be asked, whether all men perceive the same
colors in objects, then the -answer will surely be negative: it will be enough
to cite as instances cases of daltonism and jaundice. Yet that does not
prevent us from building a theory of the visual world-and, similarly,
it -would not be an obstacle in the building of ethical theories, should we
find that evaluations are not uniform under varying conditions. It is
enough, in this situation, to include in the theory certain suitable provisos,
in order to retain the theory's validity.
So it is not an assumption of the objectivity or of the absoluteness
of evaluations that is a necessary condition for the constructing of an
ethical theory: it is something else-and that is, that evaluations should be
intersubjectively communicable and verifiable or, to speak more plainly,
that different researchers should be in a position to communicate to one
another their respective evaluations and to ascertain among themselves
whether those evaluations are in agreement. Undoubtedly in this respect
the methods of evaluation are not as well elaborated as those of sense
perception. Nevertheless, it does not seem that current experience in the
sphere of evaluation is- so far different from current experience in the
domain of sense cognition as to suppose any unsurmountable difficulties
in working out methods of establishing and verifying ethical evaluations
precise enough for the purposes of constructing a theory. Generally, even
men of strongly differing cultures, when they forget about the struggles
and diverging interests that separate the ones from the others, and when
they deal with one another in a simple human fashion, can find a common
idiom when it comes to- conceptions of good and evil. There exists some
simple ethical principles the great durability and wide acceptance of
which indicate an infallibility of the evaluations on which they are founded
that is close to complete certainty. We are capable of correcting errors
committed in evaluating one or another thing; we are able to cultivate in
ourselves an ethical sensibility, i.e., to improve unto perfection our evalu-
ating capacity. Verification of evaluations is done in a manner analogous
to that of verifying perceptional judgments, i.e., by way of their frequent
repetition by the same or different persons,. under analogous or modified
conditions. In more -complicated cases, evaluations can be analyzed, the
different component parts isolated, and evaluated separately. And lastly,
just as experience in the realm of physics is ever enriched by observation
touching upon phenomena formerly unknown and unattainable, so is the
-170 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
experience in the domain of ethical evaluations enriched by the fact that

evaluations are being done under ever new conditions of life and interhuman
relations.
The objection may here be raised which is usually directed at authors
who try to formulate ethical principles by means of examining what is
judged good by men. The objection blames those authors of confusing two
different things: that which is judged good by men, with that which is in
fact good: to state that one judges a thing good is no foundation for
asserting that thing to be good. So that our stating here that primary
evaluations are to serve as premises in constructing ethical principles
might be considered equivalent to founding those principles on the basis of
human beliefs. However, in the present case, such an objection would be an
evident misunderstanding. When properly formulated the objection is
directed against a reasoning in which a statement 'P' is founded on the
argument that 'P' is the essence of a judgment more or less widely accepted
among men. Between the statement 'P' and the statement, 'P is the
essence of someone's judgment,' there is no logical relationship that
might justify founding the one on the other. In the present argument,
on the other hand, in order that foundation may be supplied for 'P' in the
form of a general proposition, singular evaluations 'p' which are in a
subaltern relation to 'P' are premised, and it is not the proposition, 'p is
the essence of someone's judgment,' that is assumed as true, but simply
'p,' just as it is done in all cases of founding any general laws.
The character of truth has been here assigned to evaluations, and
therefore evaluations constitute knowledge. It has been stated that singular
objects are predicated in evaluations, in the same way as singular objects
are predicated in perceptional judgments; that evaluations arise in a
manner analogous to that of perceptional judgments and that, analo-
gously also, they are immediately founded and verifiable. Hence, it seems
right to call the knowledge included in evaluations empirical, and to
speak of axiological empiry, just as we speak of empiry in natural science or
psychology. At the same time, however, it is realized that empiry as used
in this sense is of a peculiar kind, and that to speak of axiological empiry
the conception of empiry is extended beyond the sense accepted in natural
sciences and psychology. Generalizations of singular evaluations give
hypothetical axiological laws, to which in turn an analogous cognitive
value has to be assigned, just as it is assigned to generalizations of empirical
sciences in general. Just as the theories of empirical sciences founded on the
laws and hypotheses of those sciences, undergo constant evolution-in the
same way also, evolution governs ethical and esthetical systems founded
on evaluational criteria supplied by axiological generalizations. Whilst,
besides singular evaluations and axiological laws, the structure of axio-

logical, just like that of any other, theories, includes axioms and definitions
which are to lead to an establishment of term-meanings, distinctions,
and analytical connections. Thus, in this respect too it is possible to draw
an analogy between the structure of theories founded on evaluations and
the structure of theories founded on the results of scientific observation.
TADEUSZ CZEZOWSKI.
Translated by A. M. GALON.
UNIVERSITY OF TORUIN, POLAND.

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International Phenomenological Society

Ethics as an Empirical Science

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

1. Primary Singular Evaluations

* This paper appeared originally in "Kwartalnik Filozoficzny," Volume XVIII,

to arise in an analogous manner. To wit, a representation of the object

is sometimes done,-to be the motive for evaluation. That evaluations arise

of duties, or variously formulated ethical norms, or any other enunciations

incapable of being subordinated to that criterion. Another reason for the

experience in the domain of ethical evaluations enriched by the fact that

besides singular evaluations and axiological laws, the structure of axio-

UNIVERSITY OF TORUIN, POLAND.

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