VILLAROEL vs ESTRADA G.R. No. 47362 December 19, 1940 ANSAY VS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY G.R No.

NAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY G.R No. L-13667 April 29,

1960
FACTS:

On May 9, 1912, Alejandro Callao, mother of Juan Villaroel, obtained a loan

of P1,000 from spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina payable after seven FACTS:
years. Alejandra died, leaving Juan Villaroel as sole heir, Spouses Mariano
On July 25, 1956, Primitivo Ansay et al filed against the Board of Directors of
Estrada and Severina also died, leaving Bernardino Estrada as sole heir. On
the National Development Company in the Court of First Instance of Manila
August 9, 1930, Juan Villaroel signed a document in which he declared to
a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955.
pay the debt of his deceased mother in the amount of P1,000 with legal
interest of 12% per annum. The Court of First Instance of Laguna ordered Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint
Juan Villaroel to pay the amount of P1,000 with an interest of 12% per because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law
annum since August 9, 1930 until full payment. Villaroel appealed. as a natural obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to prescription may be waived or Ansay et al. filed against NDC a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus
renounced. for the years 1954 and 1955. The trial court dismissed the complaint
ratiocinating that a bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it
HELD: Yes, right to prescription may be waived or renounced. As a general
is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal and
rule, when a debt has already prescribed, it cannot be imposed by the
that Ansay et al. admitted that NDC is not under legal duty to give such
creditor. However, a new contract which recognizes and assumes the
bonus and that the court has no power to compel a party to comply with a
prescribed debt is an exception, for it would be valid and enforceable.
moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil Code.). Ansay et al. appealed and
Hence, a person who acknowledges the correctness of the debt and
argued that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their
promises to pay it despite knowing that the debt has already prescribed,
claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural
such as the case at bar, waived the benefit of the prescription.
obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present action may prosper notwithstanding the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Christmas bonus is demandable.
prescription of the action to recover the original debt?
HELD: No, it is not demandable. Appellants admit that appellees are not
HELD: Yes. The present action is not based on the original debt contracted
under legal obligation to give such claimed bonus and such grant only arises
by petitioner’s mother – which has already prescribed – but on petitioner’s
from a moral obligation or natural obligation. However, natural obligation is
undertaking on Aug 9 1930 to assume the original obligation. For the
only enforceable with the presence of the element of voluntary fulfillment
petitioner who is the sole heir of the original debtor with rights to the latter’s
by the obligor. In the case at bar, there has been no voluntary performance
inheritance, the debt legally contracted by his mother even if it has already
on the part of the appellees. Hence, the bonus is not demandable.
lost enforceability due to prescription, has become a moral obligation which
is a sufficient consideration to make the obligation he voluntarily assumed
on Aug 9 1930 enforceable and legally demandable.
DBP VS CONFESOR G.R. No. 48889 May 11, 1988
FACTS:
On February 10, 1940, spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan from Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, in the sum of P2,000, as evidenced by
a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay the amount in ten equal yearly amortizations.
The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. A
new express promise to pay a debt barred ... will take the case from the
operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds upon the ground that
as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not discharge the
debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a
promise, to wit a – pre-existing debt which is a sufficient consideration for
the new the new promise; upon this sufficient consideration constitutes, in
fact, a new cause of action.

As the obligation remained unpaid even after the lapse if the ten-year
period, Confesor, who was then a member of the Congress of the
Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961, expressly
acknowledging the said loan and promising to pay the same on or before
June 15, 1961.

The spouses still failed to pay the obligation on the specified date. As a
result, the DBP filed a complaint on September 11, 1970 in the City Court of
Iloilo City. The city court ordered payment from spouses. The CFI of Iloilo
reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a promissory which was executed in consideration of

a previous promissory note which has already been barred by prescription
is valid.

HELD: Yes, the second promissory note is valid because the said promissory
note is not a mere acknowledgement of the debt that has prescribed
already. Rather, it is a new promise to pay the debt. A new promise is a new
cause of action. Although a debt barred by prescription is enforceable, a new
contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and
enforceable. Prescription was renounced when Confessor signed the second
promissory note.

The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Prescription is

deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from
acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired.

The Court ruled that when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot
be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract recognizing and assuming
the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable.
GUTIERREZ HERMANOS vs ORENSE G.R. No. 9188 December 4, 1914 Yes, but only upon proper accounting of the expenses for the shipment of
rice and petroleum which were claimed to be overpriced.
FACTS:
When an agent in executing the orders and commissions of his principal
On and before Februaru 14, 1907, Engracio Orense had been the owner of
carries out the instructions he has received from his principal, and does not
a parcel of land in Guinobatan, Albay.
appear to have exceeded his authority or to have acted with negligence,
On February 14, 1907, Jose Duran, a nephew of Orense, sold the property deceit, or fraud, he cannot be held responsible for the failure of his principal
for P1,500 to Gutierrez Hermanos, with Orense’s knowledge and consent, to accomplish the object of the agency.
executed before a notary a public instrument. The said public instrument
Since it was not proven that the price of the goods were overstated, thereby
contained a provision giving Duran the right to repurchase it for the same
defrauding OH, OH cannot escape the liability of paying GH for performing
price within a period of four years from the date of the said instrument.
the task given to him by OH as his principal.
Orense continued occupying the land by virtue of a contract of lease.

After the lapse of four years, Gutierrez asked Orense to deliver the property
to the company and to pay rentals for the use of the property.

Orense refused to do so. He claimed that the sale was void because it was
done without his authority and that he did not authorize his nephew to
enter into such contract.

During trial, Orense was presented as witness of the defense. He states that
the sale was done with his knowledge and consent. Because of such
testimony, it was ascertained that he did give his nephew, Duran, authority
to convey the land. Duran was acquitted of criminal charges and the
company demanded that Orense execute the proper deed of conveyance of
the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orense is bound by Duran’s act of selling the former’s
property

HELD: Yes. It was proven during trial that he gave his consent to the sale.
Such act of Orense impliedly conferred to Duran the power of agency. The
principal must therefore fulfill all the obligations contracted by the agent,
who acted within the scope of his jurisdiction.

Issue: whether or not OH is liable to GH for its unsettled account?

Held:
CRUZ vs JM TUASON & CO., INC
Nature: Defendant-appellees appeal to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint to
recover expenses on the improvements from the appellee’s land and
compel them to convey to him the 3,000 sq m of land.
Facts
Plaintiff Cruz made permanent improvements on the 20 quinones land
claimed by the Deudors. These amounted to Php30,400 and he also incurred
expenses of Php7,781.74
1952- Defendants JM Tuason and Araneta availed Cruz’s services to be their
intermediary to make amicable settlements (compromise agreement) for
them with the Deudors of Civil Case Q-135. This civil case involved 50
quinones of land where the 20 quinones was part of. He did so on the
defendants’ promise that they will convey to him 3000sq m of the given
land.
Mar 16, 1963- The compromise agreement between the Duedors and the
defendants was approved but the defendants refused to convey to Cruz the
3000sq m of land that he now occupies. Cruz filed a petition against
defendants
Defendants filed motion to dismiss saying:
- They do not owe Cruz for the cost of the improvements he made because
that transaction was between him and the Deudors. (reimbursement)
- They do not need to convey to him 3000sq m of land based on their
“alleged” agreement because it is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds which covers the sale of real property or of an interest therein.
(statute of frauds)
- The plaintiff’s action to compel such conveyance if it were true already
prescribed because the contract started in 1952 but he filed for acquisition
only in 1963. It is stated in the law that he may only file action within 10
years. Thus his action already prescribed. (statute of limitations)
- Cruz commented that:
O They should reimburse him for the improvements because they
benefitted from it and it would be unjust enrichment on their part not to do
so given he fulfilled his part. He bases it on Art2142 NCC that “certain lawful
voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to quasi-contracts so that no one shall
be unjustly enriched or benefitted at the expense of another.” He furthers
that while there was no written agreement between him and the
defendants, it was an agreement nonetheless thus is a form of quasi-
contract and extra contractual obligations arise from it.
O As to the 3000sq m of land, the Statute of Frauds does not apply
because it applies only to executory contracts but not where the contract
has already been partly executed. Thus performance of the contract takes it
out of this statute.
O The period for filing action has not prescribed because under the
terms of their agreement, he shall own the land as of the date of signing the
agreement but the title to the 3000sq m land shall be delivered within 10
years after this signing. Now as long as this 10-year period had not elapsed
yet, he shall not have any right to compel the defendants to execute or
deliver the document because they had no obligation to do so. After this 10-
year period elapsed can he only file action. Thus when the 10-year period
ended on Mar 16, 1963, the period of prescription began only on Mar 17,
1963.
O Since the contract was not in writing, he had 6 years before his
cause of action prescribes.
Issue
• Does the statute of frauds bar his cause of action?
• Can the defendants be compelled to convey the 3000sq m of land
and to reimburse him for the developments there based on the obligation
arising from the quasi-contract with Cruz?
Held
NO.
The Statute of Frauds does not apply to this case because though there is no
evidence of the agreement between Cruz and the defendants, the contract
is not considered as “a sale of real property or any interest therein” where
there was no transaction that occurred.

NO.

Cruz misinterpreted Art2124. This provision states that a quasi-contract

cannot emerge against one of the parties if the subject matter is already
covered by another contract with another party. In this case, the defendants
were correct that Cruz should have filed the motion against the Deudors on
the reimbursements and they in turn would seek relief from the defendant
companies for these. Because this land was already subject to the contract
between Cruz and the Deudors as to the improvements, it cannot be
subjected to a quasi-contract between Cruz and the defendant companies
where these companies had a prior contract with the Deudors on the land
as well.
Adille vs CA G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The property in dispute was originally owned by Felisa Alzul who got married
twice. Her child in the first marriage was petitioner Rustico Adile and her
children in the second marriage were respondents Emetria Asejo et al.
During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul sodl the property in pacto de retro with a
three-year repurchase period.
Felisa died before she could repurchase the property.
During the redemption period, Rustico Adille repurchased the property by
himself alone at his own expense, and after that, he executed a deed of
extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of
his mother Felisa. Consequently, he was able to secure title in his name
alone.
His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed a case for partition and
accounting claiming that Rustico was only a trustee on an implied trust when
he redeemed the property, and thus, he cannot claim exclusive ownership
of the entire property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive ownership over the
property held in common.
Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor
HELD: No. The right to repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with
respect to his share alone. Although Rustico Adille redeemed the property
in its entirety, shouldering the expenses did not make him the owner of all
of it.
Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on behalf of his co-
heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under
Art 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is
guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the respondents being the
beneficiaries, pursuant to Art 1456.
ANDRES VS MANTRUST G.R. NO. 82670 SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
FACTS:
Andres, using the business name “Irene’s Wearing Apparel” was engaged in
the manufacture of ladies garments, children’s wear, men’s apparel and
linens for local and foreign buyers. Among its foreign buyers was Facts of
the United States.
Sometime in August 1980, Facts instructed the First National State Bank
(FNSB) of New Jersey to transfer $10,000 to Irene’s Wearing Apparel via
Philippine National Bank (PNB) Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. FNSB instructed
Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corporation (Mantrust) to effect the
transfer by charging the amount to the account of FNSB with private
respondent.
After Mantrust effected the transfer, the payment was not effected
immediately because the payee designated in the telex was only “Wearing
Apparel.” Private respondent sent PNB another telex stating that the
payment was to be made to “Irene’s Wearing Apparel.”
On August 28, 1980, petitioner received the remittance of $10,000.
After learning about the delay, Facets informed FNSB about the situation.
Facts, unaware that petitioner had already received the remittance,
informed private respondent and amended its instruction y asking it to
effect the payment to Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB)
instead of PNB.
Private respondent, also unaware that petitioner had already received the
remittance, instructed PCIB to pay $10,000 to petitioner. Hence, petitioner
received another $10,000 which was charged again to the account of Facets
with FNSB.
FNSB discovered that private respondent had made a duplication of
remittance. Private respondent asked petitioner to return the second
remittance of $10,000 but the latter refused to do so contending that the
doctrine of solution indebiti does not apply because there was negligence
on the part of the respondents and that they were not unjustly enriched
since Facets still has a balance of $49,324.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent has the right to recover the there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake,
second $10,000 remittance it had delivered to petitioner the obligation to return it arises.

HELD: Yes. Art 2154 of the New Civil Code is applicable. For this article to
apply, the following requisites must concur: 1) that he who paid was not
under obligation to do so; and 2) that payment was made by reason of an
essential mistake of fact.
There was a mistake, not negligence, in the second remittance. It was
evident by the fact that both remittances have the same reference invoice
number.
Alongside with this, Art 2156 is also applicable which states that if the payer
was in doubt whether the debt was due, he may recover if he proves that it
was not due. Plaintiff had duly proved that taxes were not lawfully due.
Therefore, there is no doubt that the provisions of solution indebiti apply in
this case.

PUYAT & SONS INC vs CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. L-17447 April 30, 1963

FACTS:

Plaintiff Gonzalo Puyat & Sons Inc is engaged in the business of

manufacturing and selling all kinds of furniture.

Acting pursuant to an ordinance, the defendant City Treasurer of Manila

assessed from plaintiff retail dealer’s tax the sales of furniture manufactured
and sold by it and its factory site.

All assessments were paid by plaintiff without protest in the erroneous

belief that it was liable thereof not knowing that pursuant to an ordinance,
it is exempt from the payment of taxes being a manufacturer of various
kinds of furniture.

After learning about the ordinance, plaintiff filed with defendant City
Treasurer of Manila a formal request for refund of the retail dealer’s taxes
unduly paid.

The City Treasurer, however, denied the said request for refund.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is obliged to refund the amount which
the plaintiff paid

HELD: Yes. The plaintiff was actually exempted from paying the tax assessed,
hence, it was clearly an error or mistake which makes it fall under Art 2154
of solution indebiti. Art 2154 provides that if something is received when