18. Teofisto Oño v. Vicente N. Lim, G.R. No.
154270, March 9, 2010
Cases:
1. Luis Marcos P. Laurel v. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, Jan.
13, 2009
2. Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 163072
3. Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc. V. Aproniano G. Castillo and Davao Light &
Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-40411, Aug. 7, 1935
4. Francisco I. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 133250, Nov. 11, 2003
5. Francisco U. Dacanay v. Mayor Macario Asistio Jr et. Al., G.R. No. 93654,
May 6, 1992
6. Pio Modesto & Cirila Rivera-Modesto v. Carlos Urbina, G.R. No. 189859,
Oct. 18, 2010
7. Spouses Elegio Cañezo and Dolia Cañezo v. Spouses Apolinario and
Consorcia L. Bautista, G.R. No. 170189, Sept. 1, 2010
8. Manotok Realty Inc. v. The Hon. Jose H. Tecson, G.R. No. L-47475,
Aug. 19, 1988
9. Mary McDonald Bachrach v. Sophie Seifert & Elisa Elianoff, G.R. No. L-
2659, Oct. 12, 1950
10. The Bachrach Motor Co. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co Et Al., G.R. No.
35223, Sept. 17, 1931
11. Filomena R. Benedicto v. Antonio Villaflores, G.R. No. 185020, October
6, 2010
12. Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones v. Jose Macabagdal, Fe D.
Macabagdal & Vergon Realty Investments Corp., G.R. No. 150666, Aug.
3, 2010
13. Alida Mores v. Shirley M. Yu-Go et al., G.R. No. 172292, July 23, 2010
14. Eulogio Agustin etc., v. IAC, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990
15. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque v. Mario D. Ebio and
Children/Heirs, G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010
16. Spouses Felix Baes and Rafaela Baes v. CA and Republic, G.R. No.
108065, July 6, 1993
17. Urbano Santos v. Jose C. Bernabe et al., G. R. No. 31163, Nov. 6, 1929
1. Luis Marcos P. Laurel v. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, Jan.
13, 2009
Facts: Laurel is one of the accused in a criminal case filed by PLDT.
PLDT filed a case of theft under Article 308 against accused for stealing
international calls belonging to PLDT, effectively stealing business from PLDT
while using its facilities. In the 2006 case, the SC has held that the
international long distance calls and the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone services are not personal properties (and
therefore subject to) under Article 308 of the RPC. PLDT has contended that
since Article 308 uses the words personal property without qualification, it
follows that all personal properties as understood in the context of the Civil
Code may be the subject of theft, and that international calls and business of
providing telecommunication/telephone service are personal properties capable
of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
Issue: Are international calls and the business of providing telephone
services personal properties and therefore can be objects of theft?
SC: Yes (though not owned by PLDT) and Yes
Re: International Calls
Though it may be conceded that international long distance calls take
the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that international long distance
calls are personal properties belonging to PLDT since PLDT could not have
acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications
infrastructure. PLDT was not the owner of those calls and therefore could not
validly claim that such calls were taken without its consent.
1
Re: Telecommunication/Telephone Service
In US v. Genato, US v. Carlos and US v. Tambunting, the SC has
consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal
or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. In these
cases the SC had ruled that ownership over electricity as well as telephone
service is protected by the provisions on theft of the Penal Code, as well
covering as any acts of subtraction - - tampering, tapping or fraudulently
enjoying the benefits of any device. In this case, the act of illegally connecting
various equipment to PLDT's facilities to re-sell or re-route international long
distance calls constitute all three acts of subtraction.
Re: Business of Telecommunication/Telephone Service
The business of providing the service is personal property that can be
the object of theft. Business may be appropriated as per under Sec. 2 of Act
No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could be the object of theft.
An interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal
property in the Civil Code yet it was declared to be personal property since it it
capable of appropriation. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things
which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real
property or personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personal
property, but it may appropriated. In Strochecker v. Ramirez, the Court held
that a "one-half interest in business is a personal property capable of
appropriation, not included in the enumeration of real properties in Article 335
of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage." Since it (business) is
not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it
is therefore personal property.
SC: therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone
service are personal property under Article 308 of the RPC, and the act of
accused is an act of subtraction penalized under said article. This case is
remanded to Makati City to amend the Amended information to show that the
property subject of the theft were Services and Business of PLDT.
2. Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No.
163072
Facts: MIAA operates and administers the NAIA Complex under Executive Order
No. 903 (EO 903), known as the Revised Charter of the Manila International
Airport Authority. EO 903 covers approximately 600 hectares of land including
the runways, airport tower and other airport buildings. MIAA received Final
Notices of Real Property Tax Delinquency from the City of Pasay for non-
payment of Real Property Tax for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA
appealed with the Court of Appeals that held that when the Local Government
Code (RA 7160) took effect in 1992, "it withdrew the exemption from payment
of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals
and educational institutions." Since MIAA is a government-owned corporation,
it was deemed included.
Issue: Are the properties of MIAA exempt from real property tax?
SC: Yes.
In MIAA v. CA (2006 MIAA case), the SC already resolved the issue of
whether the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from tax under
existing laws. In that case, the airport lands and buildings are located in
Paranaque City.
The SC held: MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under
Sec. 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it
is not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a
government-owned or controlled corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution because MIAA is not required to meet the test of economic
viability. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers
and performing essential public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of the
2
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government
instrumentality, MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local governments
under Section 133 (o) of the Local Gov't. Code. The exemption to the
exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA because MIAA is not a
taxable entity under the Local Gov't. Code. Such exception applies only if the
beneficial use of real property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable
entity. Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted
to public use and thus are properties of public dominion. Properties of public
dominion are owned by the State or Republic.
SC: NAIA Pasay properties are exempt from real property tax, (except for the
portions that the MIAA has leased to private parties).
3. Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc. V. Aproniano G. Castillo and Davao Light &
Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-40411, Aug. 7, 1935
Facts: Davao Saw Mill operates a sawmill in Davao, the land upon which the
business was conducted belongs to a lessor. In their contract of lease, upon
expiration of the contract all the improvements and buildings shall pass to the
ownership of the lessor without payment to the lessee, provided that
machineries and accessories are not included.
Davao Saw Mill has executed a chattel mortgage over the machinery in
favor of Davao Light & Power (DLP). DLP proceeded to take possession of the
machinery and other properties. A writ of execution was issued and the
properties were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff, and the highest bidder
was DLP. Davao Saw Mill protested the inclusion of the machinery in the sale,
contending that the machinery were adhered to the soil (the machinery placed
and mounted on foundations of cement), citing Article 334, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code that stated that real property consists of "Land, buildings, roads and
constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;".
Issue: Was the machinery personal or real property? (If personal property then
the properties may be levied by virtue of the forfeiture of the chattel mortgage.
If not, then it is considered as real property and shall be left with the
improvements and buildings to the lessee.)
SC: The machinery was personal property.
The SC focused on the ff:
A. Appellant should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale
of this property.
B. Machinery is immovable when placed in a plant by the owner of the property,
but becomes movable when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.
Being movable property, DLP had the right to levy on it under the execution
upon the judgment in their favor.
4. Francisco I. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
Bay Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 133250, Nov. 11, 2003
Facts: The Public Estates Authority under a Joint Venture Agreement,
conveyed title and possession over reclaimed property at Manila Bay to AMARI
Coastal Bay Dev't. Corp. The property consisted of 1,578,441 sqm for a total
consideration of Php1,894,129,200.00 or a price of Php1,200.00 Pesos per
square meter. Published reports place the market price of land at a high of
Php90K/sqm. It turned out that AMARI had paid out a total of Php1.7B in
commissions/professional fees for the negotiation and securing the contract.
The fatal flaw of this contract is that this contract violates provisions of the
Constitution expressly prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain.
Issue: May a single private corporation like Amari acquire hundreds of hectares
of submerged lands, as well as reclaimed submerged lands within Manila Bay
under a joint venture agreement?
SC: No.
3

The SC held that “submerged lands are owned by the State and are
inalienable”, Sec. 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Submerged lands, like
the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the State's inalienable natural
resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. This is why in another case,
Cebu City merely granted a company an “irrevocable option” to purchase the
foreshore lands after the reclamation and did not actually sell the reclaimed
foreshore lands. Clearly, in the Ponce cases the option to purchase referred to
reclaimed lands, and not to foreshore lands which are inalienable. Reclaimed
lands are no longer foreshore or submerged lands, and thus may qualify as
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain provided the requirements of
public land laws are met.
In the case at hand, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA
are still submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and
outside the commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended
JVA, 592.15 hectares of 78% of the total area are still submerged, permanently
under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the amended JV, the PEA conveyed to
Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the
documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title
would be made only after actual reclamation. The Amended JVA violates
glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. No more
pleadings shall be allowed.
5. Francisco U. Dacanay v. Mayor Macario Asistio Jr et. Al., G.R. No.
93654, May 6, 1992
Facts: In January 1979, the Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted MMC
Ordinance No. 79-02 designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and
open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant thereto, the Caloocan City
Mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in the city. Vendors applied for and
were issued licenses to conduct vending activities on the street. In 1987, the
OIC City Mayor of Caloocan City caused the demolition of the market stalls
which was opposed by the stall-owners, but the Trial Court found that the
streets were outside the commerce of man. These properties are for public use
and may not be leased to private individuals. When the city changed hands, the
new mayor did not pursue the policy of clearing and cleaning the streets.
Francisco Dacanay, citizen, taxpayer and resident of one of the affected streets
filed case against Mayor Asistio.
Issue: May streets and roads be opened as spaces for markets?
SC: No.
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the market stalls
are sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public
use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being
outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other
contract. As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to
occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has
been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null
and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets
may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should
not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose
health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city
officials are under legal obligation to protect.
6. Pio Modesto & Cirila Rivera-Modesto v. Carlos Urbina, G.R. No.
189859, Oct. 18, 2010
Facts: Urbina alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Taguig. He
contends that the Modestos, through stealth, scheme and machination were
able to occupy a portion of his property. The Modestos negotiated with Urbina
for the sale of this lot but before the parties could finalize the sale, the
Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and began claiming ownership
4
over the lot. When the Modestos refused to vacate, Urbina filed a complaint for
recovery of possession against them.
In their answer, the Modestos claimed that the property was still part of
government property, being a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation
and that they filed a sales application with the Land Management Bureau
(LMB), having stayed in the lot for over 33 years and their house is constructed
on the lot. Urbina's claim is based on his Miscellaneous Sales Application over
the lot.
Issue: Who has the better claim over the lot?
SC: The Modestos have a better claim over the land.
The land in question has not been titled. Therefore the land remains
part of the public domain and neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim
ownership over it. This does not mean however that neither of the parties have
the right to possess the property.
Re: Land
The area is part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation and is covered
by Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119. In Proclamation 172, the
areas covered by this became alienable and disposable to qualified applicants
after October 16, 1987. Qualified applicants may apply for and acquire a lot
under its implementing guidelines, Memorandum No. 119. The qualifications
are: (1) he must be a bonafide resident of the area – he must have constructed
a house in the area and actually residing therein, and must not own any other
residential or commercial lot in Metro Manila (among others, and (2) has filed
the proper application to purchase.
Based on the report of the Special Investigator, Pio Modesto and his
family are the actual occupants of the property. Carlos Urbina never
constructed a house and neither did he actually reside thereon. Hence, no
possessory rights could have been acquired over the subject lot.
Even if Carlos Urbina had been in possession of the property when he
filed his miscellaneous sales application, his occupation was unlawful and could
not be the basis of possessory rights. It is only after the property has been
declared alienable and disposable that private persons can legally claim
possessory rights over it.
7. Spouses Elegio Cañezo and Dolia Cañezo v. Spouses Apolinario and
Consorcia L. Bautista, G.R. No. 170189, Sept. 1, 2010
Facts: The Bautistas are the registered owners of a parcel of land, adjacent to
that of the Cañezos. When the Cañezos started the construction of their house,
they discovered that the Bautistas' improvements were encroached on their lot,
without their knowledge and consent. The Cañezos made oral and written
demands to their neighbors to remove the structures without success. They
filed a complaint at the RTC which found that the Bautistas were builders in bad
faith, such that the spouses Cañezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of
demolition and damages. The appellate court reversed the ruling since it found
that the encroachment was in good faith and therefore the market value of the
encroached portion should be proved to determine the appropriate indemnity.
Issue: Whether the Bautistas were builders in good faith and therefore entitled
to indemnity.
SC: No
The spouses Cañezo were able to establish their ownership of the
encroached property. Aside from testimonial evidence, they were also able to
present documentary and object evidence which consisted of photographs,
transfer certificate of titles, and a relocation survey plan. The testimony and
relocation survey plan both show that the spouses Bautista were aware of the
encroachment upon their lot by the owner of the adjacent lot and thus they
made a corresponding encroachment upon the lot of the spouses Cañezo. This
awareness of the two encroachments made the spouses Bautista builders in
bad faith. The spouses Cañezo are entitled to the issuance of a writ of
demolition in their favor and against the spouses Bautista, in accordance with
5
Article 450 of the Civil Code. The spouses Bautista were also ordered to pay
actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.
8.Manotok Realty Inc. v. The Hon. Jose H. Tecson, G.R. No. L-47475,
Aug. 19, 1988
Facts: Manotok Realty Inc. filed a complaint against Nilo Madlangawa for the
recovery of possession of a parcel of land. However, substantial repairs and
improvements have been made on the property. CFI Manila declared Nilo
Madlangawa as a builder or possessor in good faith and ordered Manotok to
recognize him to remain at the lot until he is reimbursed the sum of
Php7,500.00. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issues: Can Manotok Realty recover the property and pay for the
improvements? Yes and no
SC: The repairs and improvements introduced by Nilo Madlangawa after the
complaint was filed cannot be considered to have been built in good faith, much
less, justify the denial of the petitioner's exercise of option. Since the
improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore the basis for Nilo's right
to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the
petitioner, there is no other recourse for Nilo but to vacate the premises and
deliver the same to Manotok.
9. Mary McDonald Bachrach v. Sophie Seifert & Elisa Elianoff, G.R. No.
L-2659, Oct. 12, 1950
Facts: E.M. Bachrach, in his last will and testament made many various
legacies in cash and willed that his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach be given
“all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all my estate after payment of
the legacies, bequests, and gifts provided for above”. The will further provided
that after the death of Mary McDonald Bachrach, one-half of all his estate “shall
be divided share and share alike by and between my legal heirs, to the
exclusion of my brothers”. The estate received 54,000 shares from Atok-Big
Wedge Mining Co., which represented 50% stock dividend on 108,000 shares
that E.M. Bachrach owned. Mary McDonald Bachrach petitioned the lower court
to authorize the transfer of the 54,000 shares of stock to her. However Sophie
Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of Bachrach, opposed the petition on the
ground that the stock dividend is not income but form part of the capital and
therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman.
Issue: Are dividends income and should it go to Mary McDonald Bachrach?
SC: Yes, yes
There are two rules with regard to stock dividends: the Massachusetts
rule and the Pennsylvania rule. The Massachusetts rule regards cash dividends
as income and stock dividends as capital, as it takes nothing from the property
of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders. The
Pennsylvania rule declares that all earnings of the corporation made prior to the
death of the testator stockholder belong to the corpus of the estate, and that all
earnings, when declared as dividends in whatever form, made during the
lifetime of the usufructuary or life tenant are income, and belong to the
usufructuary or life tenant. Article 471 of the Civil Code provides that the
usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits
of the property in usufruct, and Articles 474 and 475 provide that civil fruits
belong to the usufructuary.
The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The
54,000 shares of stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They
represent profits, and the delivery of the certificate of stock covering said
dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold
independently of the original shares just as the offspring of a domestic animal
may be sold independently of its mother.
10. The Bachrach Motor Co. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co Et Al., G.R. No.
6
35223, Sept. 17, 1931
Facts: In December 1923, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co was indebted to Phil.
National Bank. To secure payment of its debt, it succeeded in inducing its
planters, among whom was Mariano Lacson Ledesma, to mortgage their land to
the creditor bank. To compensate those planters for the risk they were running
with their property under that mortgage, the aforesaid central passed a
resolution to credit the owners of the plantations mortgaged every year with a
sum equal to two percent of the debt secured according to the yearly balance,
the payment of this bonus being made at once or in part from time to time as
soon as the central became free of its obligations to the said bank. Bachrach
Motor Co filed a complaint against Talisay-Silay for the delivery of the amount
of Php13,850 or promissory notes or other instruments of credit in favor of
Mariano Lacson Ledesma. PNB filed a third party claim alleging a preferential
right to receive any amount which Mariano Lacson Ledesma might be entitled
to. Talisay-Silay answered the complaint stating that Cesar Ledesma purchased
Php7,500 of credit in good faith (which was later on recognized by the parties).
The trial court held that Bachrach had a preferred right to receive a sum
over PNB.
Issue: Who has a preferential right to receive from Talisay-Silay, Bachrach
Motors or PNB?
SC: Bachrach Motors
PNB based its preferential rights upon the contention that the bonus in
question is civil fruits of the land which the owners had mortgaged for the
benefit of the central giving the bonus, and that, as civil fruits of said land, said
bonus was assigned by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the bank.
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First,
the rents of buildings; second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and third, the
income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue. As
the bonus in question is not the rent of a building or land, the only meaning of
“civil fruits” left to be examined is that of “income”. If the bonus is not derived
from the land mortgaged by Mariano to the bank for the benefit of the central
but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land and therefore the
bank's contention is untenable.
The SC has held that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a
remote and accidental relation to the land mentioned, having been granted as
compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in favor of the
bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus be income
or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from said risk, or if one chooses,
from Mariano's generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central,
but certainly it is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property.
11. Filomena R. Benedicto v. Antonio Villaflores, G.R. No. 185020,
October 6, 2010
Facts: Maria Villaflores was the owner of a parcel of land. In 1980 she sold a
portion to her nephew Antonio Villaflores. Antonio took possession of the
portion sold to him and constructed a house thereon. Twelve years later Maria
executed in favor of Antonio a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan covering the
entire lot. However Antonio did not register the sale or pay the real property
taxes for the lot.
Later on Maria sold the same lot to Filomena, evidenced by a Kasulatan
ng Bilihang Tuluyan which she registered at the Registry of Deeds.
Consequently the title was issued in the name of Filomena. Since then she paid
for the real property taxes. She filed a case against Antonio for Accion
Publiciana with Cancellation of Notice of Adverse Claim, Damages and
Attorney's fees. Initially Antonio offered to pay a monthly rental of Php2,000
which she granted, but later on he refused to vacate the property and claimed
absolute ownership over the lot.
Issue: Who has a better claim over the lot?
SC: Filomena
Filomena, having registered the sale in good faith, has a better right
7
over Antonio. However the SC affirmed the findings of the RTC and CA that
Antonio is a builder in good faith and the provisions of Art. 448 of the New Civil
Code applies. When Filomena bought the property from Maria, Antonio's house
had already been erected on the property. Under Art. 448, a landowner is given
the option to either appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of
the proper mount of indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good faith.
Relatedly, Art. 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives
him right of retention until full reimbursement is made. (Case is remanded to
RTC for determination of amount.)
12. Luciano Briones and Nelly Briones v. Jose Macabagdal, Fe D.
Macabagdal & Vergon Realty Investments Corp., G.R. No. 150666,
Aug. 3, 2010
Facts: The Macabagdal spouses purchased a lot from Vergon Realty. The
Briones spouses owned the lot next to theirs. Sometime in 1984 the Briones
spouses constructed their house, which was built on the land of the Macabagdal
spouses. The Macabagdal spouses filed an action to recover ownership and
possession of said parcel of land with the RTC of Makati City. The RTC ordered
the Briones spouses to demolish their house and vacate the premises, also to
pay the Macabagdal spouses moral damages.
Issue: Did the RTC and CA err in ordering the Briones spouses to vacate the
subject property or to pay the Macabagdal spouses the prevailing price of the
land as compensation?
SC: Yes.
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof
exists to show that the mistake was done by the Briones spouses in bad faith,
then they should be presumed to have built the house in good faith. When a
person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code
governs. It provides that the owner of the land shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the property rent.
The article covers cases in which the builders, sowers, or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.
The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the
builder to pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the lan,
a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e. that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way around. However, even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, is preclusive. He must choose
one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the
building from the land without first exercising either option. It is only if the
owner chooses to sell his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it
where its value is not more than the value of the improvements, that the owner
may remove the improvements from the land. The owner is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to
pay for the same. Moreover the Briones spouses have the right to be
indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the
subject property as per Articles 546 and 548.
Case is remanded to the RTC to conduct appropriate proceedings and
determine the values of the improvement and of the land.
13. Alida Mores v. Shirley M. Yu-Go et al., G.R. No. 172292, July 23,
2010
Facts: The Yus own a parcel of land where the Mores family lived. From here on
the facts of the case differ. What is material is that there is a building on the
property which was improved by the Mores, and when the Yus demanded that
the Mores vacate, the Moreses demolished the improvements on the subject
property. The Yus filed an action for injunction and prayed for the
reimbursement of the value of the residential building illegally demolished as
well as for payment of moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
8
costs of the suit. The Mores answered that what they removed was merely the
improvements made on the subject property, which removal had not caused
any substantial damage thereto. They demanded payment of actual damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The trial court rendered its decision in
favor of the spouses Mores, that they are builders in good faith, while the
appellate court partially granted the Yu siblings' appeal and found that the
relationship between the two parties are lessee and lessor, thereby giving the
right of appropriating the useful improvements to the lessor.
Issue: Were the Yu siblings entitled to reimbursement of the partially
demolished improvement?
SC: No
Full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e. one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does
not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to “improve” his
landlord out of his property. Article 1678 is applicable to the case, where it
provides that if the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are
suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease
shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He
shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than
is necessary. With regard to the ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be
entitled to any reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects,
provided no damage is caused to the principal thing, and the lessor does not
choose to retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is
extinguished.
14. Eulogio Agustin etc., v. IAC, G.R. Nos. 66075-76, July 5, 1990
Facts: Eulogio Agustin owned land east of the Cagayan River. As the years went
by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western
bank, to the properties of Pablo Binayug, Maria Melad and Geronimal Ubina.
The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968. In 1968 after a
big flood, the Cagayan River shifted its course and returned to its 1919 bed. To
cultivate their lots, Binayug, Melad and Ubina had to cross the river.
In 1969, while they were planting corn they were driven away by the
Agustins accompanied by the mayor and some policemen. Melad and Binayug
filed separate complaints against the Agustins.
The trial court found for Binayug et al., recognizing their ownership over
the accretions, and the IAC affirmed the judgment.
Issue: Who owns the accretions?
SC: Binayug, Melad et al.
The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to
the lots of Binayug et al who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even
after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of
course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That
finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides, “To the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the water.” Accretion
benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of a river (Rep. v. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
The sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a
strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands to be separated from the
estate by the current. Binayug et al have retained the ownership of the portion
that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
15. Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque v. Mario D. Ebio and
9
Children/Heirs, G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010
Facts: Respondents Ebio & children/heirs claim that they own a parcel of land at
the Vitalez Compound in Paranaque covered by two tax declarations. Said land
was an accretion of Cut-cut creek, originally owned by Jose Vitalez, given to
Pedro Vitalez and transferred to Mario Ebio. The Sangguniang Barangay of
Vitalez passed a resolution seeking assistance from the City Gov't. Of Paranaque
for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek that will traverse the
lot of respondents. Respondents registered their opposition thereto and the
road project was temporarily suspended. They were surprised though when
several officials from the barangay proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees
planted on the lot. They filed for a writ of preliminary injunction at the RTC.
The RTC denied the petition since the respondents were not able to prove
successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales
patent has not yet been granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found for
the respondents, that the accreted portion has been acquired by them by
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
Issue: Do the Ebios (children and heirs) own the accreted portion?
SC: Yes.
The subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law
that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the
Civil Code. It reads, “Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to
creeks, streams, rivers and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.” Article 457 provides that “To the
owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” it is therefore
explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been
added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the
adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons. In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot
be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the
properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State. Hence while it is true that a creek is a
property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of
the public domain by clear provision of law.
Despite the fact that the Ebios have yet to register their title over the
said lot, it must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the
acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already
possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of
acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not
confer, ownership.
16. Spouses Felix Baes and Rafaela Baes v. CA and Republic, G.R. No.
108065, July 6, 1993
Facts: The government dug a canal on a private parcel of land to streamline
the Tripa de Gallina creek. This parcel of land was later acquired by Felix Baes.
In exchange for the area that was occupied by the canal, the government gave
Baes a lot with exactly the same area. Later on, Baes erected an apartment
building on the lot (unlawfully enlarged) that was a filled up portion of the Tripa
de Gallna creek. The spouses Baes claimed this as their own, but the
government rejects this claim and avers that the spouses had been fully
compensated for it when they agreed to exchange their lots.
Issue: Whether the spouses Baes are entitled to compensation.
10
SC: No.
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or
loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to
compensate him when the change in the course of the river is effected through
artificial meas. The loss to the petitions of the land covered by the canal was
the result of a deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to
improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to
compensate the Baeses for their loss.
The spouses were already compensated. They were given a lot with the
same value and size and the agreement was freely entered into by the parties.
The Baeses cannot now claim additional compensation because, “to allow them
to acquire ownership of the dried up portion of the creek would b a clear case
of double compensation and unjust enrichment at the expense of the state.”
The exchange of lots between the spouses and the government was the result
of voluntary negotiations. If these had failed, the government could still have
taken the lot under the power of eminent domain, upon payment of just
compensation, as the land was needed for a public purpose.
17. Urbano Santos v. Jose C. Bernabe et al., G. R. No. 31163, Nov. 6,
1929
Facts: Urbano Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay at Jose
Bernabe's warehouse. At the same time Pablo Tiongson deposited 1,026 cavans
and 9 kilos of the same grain. Tiongson filed a complaint against Jose Bernabe
to recover the palay that was deposited. A writ of attachment was granted and
the attachable property of Jose Bernabe, including the palay found in the
warehouse were attached, sold and the proceeds delivered to Pablo Tiongson.
It appeared however that the sacks of palay of Urbano Santos and those of
Pablo Tiongson were indistinguishable from each other. Santos filed a
complaint saying that Tiongson cannot claim all 924 cavans.
Issue: Can Pablo Tiongson claim all 924 cavans?
SC: No.
Since the cavans of palay by Urbano Santos had been mixed with the
palay of Pablo Tiongson, the following provision in Art. 381 of the Civil Code will
apply, “If by the will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature
are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things
cannot be separated without injury, each other shall acquire a right in the
mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of
the things mixed or commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the SC will
take the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached and
sold, thereby giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, P398.49 thereof
and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, P525.51 or the value thereof
at the rate of P3 per cavan.
18. Teofisto Oño v. Vicente N. Lim, G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010
Facts: Lim filed in the RTC a petition for the reconstitution of the owner's
duplicate copy of a title that his mother lost, by virtue of a notarized document
denominated as confirmation of sale. It had been sold to his mother by Spouses
Diego Oño and Estefania Apas; Antonio Oño the only legitimate heir and he was
the one who executed the notarized document, a confirmation of sale which
was duly filed in the Provisincial Assessor's Office. Zosimo Oño and petitioner
Teofisto Oño opposed it, contending that they had the certificate of title in their
possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oño. Upon order of the
RTC, Lim converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint for quieting
of title, averring additionally that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in actual possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it.
The Oños claim that their predecessors-in-interest never sold the lot and that
the confirmation of sale purportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his
signature thereon not being authentic. The RTC found that the Lims had been
in peaceful possession of the land, that the signature of Antonio on the
confirmation of sale was genuine and ordered the issuance of a new title in the
name of Lim's mother. The CA affirmed the RTC.
11

Issue: Who are the true owners of the lot?
SC: The Lims.
The SC affirmed the findings fo the RTC that the Lims had been in
peaceful possession of the land since 1937; that their possession had never
been disturbed by the Oños except on two occasions when the Oños seized the
harvested copra from the Lims' caretaker; that the Lims had since declared the
lot in their name for taxation purposes, and had paid the taxes corresponding to
the lot; that the signature of Antonio on the confirmation of sale was genuine,
thereby giving more weight to the testimony of the notary public who had
notarized the document and affirmatively testified that Antonio and Luisa had
both appeared before him. Lim had successfully discharged his burden of proof,
that he was able to establish by preponderance of evidence that he had a
superior right and title to the property. In contrast, the petitioners did not
present any proof of their better title other than their copy of the reconstituted
certificate of title. Such proof was not enough, because the registration of a
piece of land under the Torrens system dd not create or vest title, such
registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to
be reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a
particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in
trust for another person by the registered owner.
Cases:
19. Rosalina Clado-Reyes et. al. v. Spouses Julius & Lily Limpe, G.R. No.
163876, July 9, 2008
20. Spouses Edesito & Consorcia Ragasa v. Spouses Gerardo & Rodrigo Roa,
G.R. No. 141964, June 30, 2006
21. Heirs of Jose Olviga v. CA et. al., G.R. No. 104813, Oct. 21, 1993
22. Vicente Sapto v. Apolonia Fabiana, G.R. No. L-11285, May 16, 1958
23. Lucia Tan v. Arador & Rediculo Valdehueza, G.R. No. L-38745, Aug. 6, 1975
24. Jose S. Dailisan v. CA, G.R. No. 176448, July 28, 2008
25. Siari Valley Estates Inc., v. Filemon Lucasan, G. R. No. L-7046, Aug. 31,
1995
26. Leonor B. Cruz v. Teofila M. Catapang, G.R. No. 164110, Feb. 12, 2008
27. Republic v. Heirs of Francisca Dignos-Sorono, G.R. No. 171571, March 24,
2008
28. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Nicholson Pascual, G.R. No. 163744,
Feb. 29, 2008
29. Joaquin Quimpo Sr., v. Consuelo Abad Vda. De Beltran, G.R. No. 160956,
Feb. 13, 2008
30. Consolacion Q. Austria v. Constancia Q. Lichauco et al., G.R. No. 170080,
April 4, 2007
31. Heirs of Juanita Padilla v. Dominador Magdua, G.R. No. 176858, Sept. 15,
2010
32. Sulpicio Carvajal v. CA and Eutiquiano Camarillo & Liberata Cacabelos, No.
L-44426, Feb. 25, 1982
33. Phil. National Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 105760, July 7, 1997
34. Eugenio Feliciano et al v. Pedro Canoza et al., G.R. No. 161746, Sept. 1,
2010
35. Danilo L. Parel v. Simeon B. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19, 2006
36. Leonora Estoque v. Elena M. Pajimula, G.R. No. L-24419, July 15, 1968
37. Salvador Laurel v. Ramon Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990
19. Rosalina Clado-Reyes et. al. v. Spouses Julius & Lily Limpe, G.R.
No. 163876, July 9, 2008
Facts: Petitioner Rosalina filed an action to quiet title, reconveyance and
damages against the spouses Limpe, alleging that petitioners have been
occupying the lot in dispute (a portion of a 20,431 sqm lot in Bulacan) since
1945 through their predecessor-in-interest, Mamerto B. Reyes. They claimed
that in his lifetime, Mamerto had accepted a verbal promise of the former lot
owner, Felipe Garcia to give the disputed lot to him in exchange for the
surrender of his tenancy rights as a tiller thereof. The petitioners presented two
12
documents, a Certification and Pagpapatunay executed by Simeon Garcia,
eldest son of Felipe Garcia, that attested that Mamerto was a former tenant of
Felipe, that during his lifetime he had worked on the lot and that he owned and
possessed the same. The spouses Limpe answered that they are the legal
owners of the lot by virtue of a Deed of Exchange of Real Estate and Deed of
Absolute Sale between them and Farm-Tech Industries, Inc. They presented a
TCT, Tax dec and realty tax receipts, all registered and declared in their names.
The trial court and CA affirmed that the spouses Limpe established their
ownership over the lot.
Issue:. Do the petitioners have an interest over the disputed lot and have
therefore a cause of action?
SC: No
The SC held that there are two indispensable requisites in order that an
action to quiet title could prosper: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action (under Articles 476 and 477 of the New Civil Code); and
(2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Petitioners were not able to show positive evidence that (1) their
predecessor had legal title,i.e. certificate of land transfer, (2) that the lot
was an agricultural lot and not a commercial one, and (3) that they are
qualified beneficiaries under the Agrarian Reform Law. Time and again
the SC has held that a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who
alleges has the burden of proving the allegation with the requisite
quantum of evidence. Next, the documentary evidence did not confirm
title over the disputed lot. First, original copies of those documents were
not presented in court. Second, Simeon Garcia was not presented in
court to prove the veracity of the documents' contents.
In contrast, the spouses Limpe presented evidence which clearly
preponderates in their favor, i.e. TCT, tax dec and tax receipts in their
names. Pursuant to the Torrens System, TCT enjoys the conclusive
presumption of validity and is the best proof of ownership of the lot.
Although tax decs or tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. As the SC previously held, such realty tax payments
constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Petition denied. Decision and Resolution of CA affirmed.
20. Spouses Edesito & Consorcia Ragasa v. Spouses Gerardo &
Rodrigo Roa, G.R. No. 141964, June 30, 2006
Facts: Spouses Ragasa entered into a contract with Oakland Development
Resources Corp for the purchase of a piece of property. From 1989 they resided
in the property with their relatives who would occupy the same when both
spouses would leave for Italy where they both worked. In 1992 the property
was fully paid for, and accordingly a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
between the parties. However Oakland failed to cause the transfer of title to the
spouses Ragasa. In 1999 when Consorcia Ragasa was about to cause the
transfer of registration of title in their names, she learned from the Registry of
Deeds that the property in question was sold in 1995 to Spouses Roa as the
highest bidder for the price of Php511K. Ragasa filed a complaint at the QC RTC
(Annulment of Execution Sale and Damages) but it was dismissed because the
action was barred by prescription. Ragasa filed a petition for review on
certiorari at the SC.
Issue: Do the spouses Ragasa have a cause of action against the spouses Roa?
SC: Yes.
The spouses Ragasa were able to show that (1) they have a title to real
13
 property or any interest therein, and that the spouses Roa (2) claims an
interest adverse to the plaintiff's, arising from an "instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance3, or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but it in truth and in fact invalid, voidable or unenforceable".
Thus, the averments in the spouses Ragasas' complaint that (1) they
acquired ownership of a piece of land by tradition or delivery as a
consequence of sale and (2) spouses Roas' subsequent purchase of the
same piece of land at an allegedly void execution sale were sufficient to
make out an action to quiet title under Article 476.
That being the case, actions to quiet title to property in the possession
of the plaintiff (since the plaintiffs had been in continuous and notorious
possession of the property to the exclusion of others and in the concept
of owners) are imprescriptible.
Petition granted, this case is remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
21. Heirs of Jose Olviga v. CA et. al., G.R. No. 104813, Oct. 21, 1993
Facts: Eutiquio Pureza's father cleared and cultivated a piece of land since
1950. When the area was released for disposition, the Bureau of Lands
surveyed the same in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Since then, the land had
been known as Lot 13 and owned by Pureza. Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose
Olviga, protested the survey but without respect to a one-half hectare portion.
This protest or tutol is of public record and in this document, Godofredo Olviga
expressly admitted that the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the 1/2
hectare portion claimed by him, which was included in the survey of Pureza's
Lot 13.
In 1960, Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Without his
application having been acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to
Cornelio Glor. Neither the homestead application nor the transfer was acted
upon by the Director of Lands.
In 1967 Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral
proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee Cornelio Glor.
Jose falsely omitted in his answer in the cadastral proceedings that there are
other persons in possession of, and claiming adverse interest in Lot 13. As a
result, Lot 13 was declared as uncontested and were registered in his name,
and then later transferred to his son-in-law and daughter.
Angelita Glor and her children filed an action in the RTC for reconveyance. The
RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the Glors, the CA affirmed it.
Issues: Who are the real owners of the lot? Will the action prescribe?
SC: The Glors. No.
There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a
piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one
who is in possession. The SC holds that in such situation the right to
quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annual any
certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time in possession
was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that
the statutory period of prescription commences to run against
possessor.
Petition for review denied.
22. Vicente Sapto v. Apolonia Fabiana, G.R. No. L-11285, May 16, 1958
Facts: Sapto owned a piece of land which was left to his children Samuel,
Constancio & Ramon. Ramon pre-deceased his brothers, leaving no heirs.
14
Samuel & Constancio executed a Deed of Sale of a portion of 4 hectares of the his heirs, who would then be able to reconvey the same property to
land in favor of Apolonia Fabiana, in consideration of P245. The sale was duly other persons.
approved by the Provincial Governor but was never registered. Possession was
Judgment appealed from is affirmed.
however transferred to Fabiana and has been in possession since.
Constancio died without any issue. Samuel married and upon his death was
23. Lucia Tan v. Arador & Rediculo Valdehueza, G.R. No. L-38745, Aug.
survived by his widow and children. In. 1954 his widow and children filed an
6, 1975
action at CFI for the recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors in
1931. CFI held that although the sale was never registered, it was valid and
Facts: A parcel of land is the subject matter of a public auction sale where Lucia
binding and ordered the Saptos to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in
Tan was the highest bidder and as such a Certificate of Sale was executed by
Fabiana's favor.
the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff in favor of Lucia Tan. Due to the failure of the
Issue: Is the sale valid and binding although it was never registered? seller Arador Valdehueza to redeem the said land within the period of one year
as being provided by law, the Sheriff executed an Absolute Deed of Sale in
SC: Yes.
favor of Lucia. Arador and Rediculo executed two documents of Deed of Pacto
In a long line of cases already decided by the Court, the SC have de Retro Sale in favor of Lucia for the total amount of Php1,500.00. The land in
consistently interpreted Sec. 50 of the Land Registration Act providing question remained in the possession of the Valdehuezas and that land taxes
that "no need... shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but were paid by them.
shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
Lucia filed a complaint against the Valdehuezas for declaration of ownership
authority to the clerk or register of deed to make registration" in the
and recovery of possession as well as consolidation of ownership of the two
sense that as between the parties to a sale registration is not necessary
parcels of land that were sold to her. Later on she filed a complaint to enjoin
to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to
them from entering the land and gathering the nuts therein. The trial court
registration. "The peculiar force of a title under Act. No. 492 is
rendered a decision in favor of Lucia, declaring her to be the absolute owner of
exhibited only when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the
the property and ordering the Valdehuezas not to encroach and molest her in
land described in the conveyance. Generally speaking, as between
the exercise of her proprietary rights; and from which property they must be
vendor and vendee, the same rights and remedies exist in relation to
dispossessed. It also ordered that Valdehuezas to pay Lucia Php1,200.00 and
land not so registered." No right of innocent third persons or
Php300.00 with legal interest. Non-payment will result to the property being
subsequent transferees of the property in question in involved herein.
sold to pay off the mortgage debt.
The property has remained and still is in the possession of the vendee of
appellants' predecessors, herein appellee. It is therefore clear that the Issue: Can Lucia recover the property?
conveyance between appellee and his vendors is valid and binding upon
SC: No, but the Court has ordered the Valdehuezas to pay Lucia for the
the latter, and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the
amounts owed. Should they fail to pay the amounts, the properties will be sold
vendors herein appellants. To hold otherwise would make of the
to pay off the debt. The Court has ruled that the contracts which purported to
Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or
be pacto de retro transactions are presumed to be equitable mortgages.

15

24. Jose S. Dailisan v. CA, G.R. No. 176448, July 28, 2008
Facts: Jose Dailisan filed a complaint for partition alleging that he purchased
1/4 of the land of Federico Pugao. He and Federico had initially agreed to the
sale of 1/2 portion of the same land for P12,000 and that he had paid Federico
several installments amounting to P6,000, but he was told to stop further
payments because per Federico's representation he could only sell 1/4 of the
lot. Federico could not deliver the title to him because the property was still
mortgaged to a bank. When the mortgage was released, Jose demanded the
execution of a deed of absolute sale. Instead of acceding, Federico proposed to
mortgage the property to Jose as security for a P10K loan payable in 3 months,
and upon payment of the loan the deed of absolute sale would be executed.
Jose agreed and they executed a deed of real estate mortgage. The loan was
paid after 3 months, after which Jose and Federico executed a deed of absolute
sale. Jose asked for the partition of the lot and caused a resurvey to expedite
the partition. However Federico still refused to effect the partition and even
sent a notice of eviction against Jose. Federico maintains that he denied having
voluntarily executed the deed of absolute sale and alleged that when he was
seriously ill, Jose, with a lawyer, made him sign pages of what he was told was
a real estate mortgage. Federico filed a complaint for falsification and ejectment
against Jose before the barangay but attempts at conciliation failed. Federico
passed away while the case was pending. He was substituted by his heirs. The
trial court ruled in favor of Jose, finding that the heirs failed to disprove the
validity of the deed of absolute sale, and ordered the partition of the property.
CA ruled against Jose, finding that Jose should have filed an action for specific
performance yet the right to file such action had already expired. It ruled
against the validity of the sale between the two parties, finding that there's no
consent on Federico's part and that there was no proof of payment of the price
or consideration on the part of Jose. It concluded that the deed of sale is
fictitious and invalid and could not serve as basis of any claim of ownership.
Issue: Was the sale valid?
SC: Yes.
The notarized deed of absolute sale is a public document, and has in its favor
the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear,
strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the
certificate. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution
of a notarized document lies on Federico and heirs.
The SC distinguished between void and voidable contracts. A contract is
inexistent and void from the very beginning when (i) its cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
(ii) it is absolutely simulated or fictitious; (iii) its cause or object did not exist at
the time of the transaction; (iv) its object is outside the commerce of men; (v)
it contemplates an impossible service; (vi) the intention of the parties relative to
the principal object of the contract cannot be ascertained; or (vii) it is expressly
prohibited or declared void by law. The action or defense for the declaration of
the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. On the other hand, a voidable
or annullable contract is one where (i) one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent to a contract; or (ii) the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. The action for annulment must be
brought within 4 years from the time the intimidation, violence or undue
influence ceases, or 4 years from the time of the discovery of the mistake or
fraud.
The heirs claim that the deed of sale is voidable because Federico was led to
believe that what he was signing was still part of the earlier deed of real estate
mortgage. Nevertheless, one of the heirs testified that she became aware of the
existence of the deed of sale way back in 1984. Despite this knowledge, none
of the heirs took any action to annul the deed within the prescribed 4-year
period. They were unable to overcome the presumption of validity of the deed
of absolute sale as well as the regularity in its execution.
With regard to the partition, the regime of co-ownership exists when ownership
of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. By the nature of a
co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to a specific portion of the property
16
owned in common as his own because his share therein remains intangible. As
co-owner, Jose has the right to demand partition, a right which does not
prescribe. All that's needed is Jose's portion that is segregated from the rest of
the property.
25. Siari Valley Estates Inc., v. Filemon Lucasan, G. R. No. L-7046, Aug.
31, 1995
Facts: Siari Valley filed an action to recover about 200 head of cattle that were
driven or wandered from its pasture lands into the adjoining ranch of Filemon
Lucasan. Siari asked for the return of its animals with their offspring, or for
payment of those disposed of by Lucasan, with damages. Lucasan denied
having appropriated or retained any cattle belonging to Siari. On the contrary,
he demanded suitable compensation from Siari. The trial court found for Siari
Valley, ordering Lucasan to deliver all cattle or their value, especially the 321
heads that had been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of the Court.
Lucasan admitted that there was commixtion although Siari Valley had already
retrieved its animals.
Issue: Is Siari Valley entitled to get all the cattle that are found on Lucasan's
ranch?
SC: Yes.
Under the Civil Code, if the commingling of two things is made in bad faith, the
one responsible for it will lose his share. The SC held that the same principle
obtains in the US where parallel situations have arisen. "Where the goods are
so mingled that they cannot thereafter properly be identified or divided, all the
inconvenience or loss resulting from the confusion is thrown on the party who
occasioned it; and generally, it is for him to distinguish his own property or lose
it, it being held, that the rule of confusion of goods is merely a rule of evidence.
"Where one fraudulently, willfully, or wrongly intermingles his goods with those
of another, so that there is no evidence to distinguish the goods of the one
from those of the other, the wrongdoer forfeits all his interest in the mixture to
the other part. In other words, he cannot recover for his own proportion, or for
any part of the intermixture, but the entire property vests in him whose right is
invaded."
"Thus where one willfully places his brand on another's cattle, intermingling
them with his own and on account of the change or destruction of the identity
of the goods he is unable to distinguish and separate his own goods from the
others, he will be held to forfeit his own."
The circumstances show that Lucasan acted in bad faith. His sons rounded up
and drove Siari Valley's cattle into his pasture; he knew he had their cattle and
refused to return them; he disposed cattle without registering the sales, he
harassed the plaintiff's men, etc.
Trial court decision affirmed.
26. Leonor B. Cruz v. Teofila M. Catapang, G.R. No. 164110, Feb. 12,
2008
Facts: Leonor, Luz and Norma are co-owners of a parcel of land. With the
consent of Norma, Teofila Catapang built a house on a lot adjacent to the lot,
which intruded on a portion of the co-owned property. When Leonor visited the
property and saw the encroachment into the portion of her co-owned lot, she
made several demands upon Teofila to demolish the intruding structure and
vacate the portion. Teofila refused and disregarded her demands. Leonor then
filed a complaint for forcible entry against Teofila at the MTC which decided or
her, ruling that the consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to
justify the construction of the house and possession of the lot in question. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC ruling. CA reversed the RTC decision. There
is no cause of action for forcible entry because Teofila's entry into the property
was given consent by co-owner Norma, and it cannot be characterized as one
made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for
forcible entry.
17
Issue: Does Teofila have ownership of the subject lot because of the consent of
one of the co-owners?
SC: No. The SC has held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to
his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of co-ownership. A co-owner cannot
give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property, which
is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he
does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a
way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership
may be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make
alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for all would
result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or more of
the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.
Based on the articles, none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the
owner co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another
person, such as Teofila, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include any
act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has
been held implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on
the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore it is an alteration falling
under Art. 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners,
Teofila had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.
With regard to forcible entry, entry into the land effected clandestinely without
the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by
stealth. Moreover, the act of getting the consent of only one co-owner and
allowing her to stay in the constructed house can in fact be considered a
strategy which Teofila utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. Her
acts constitute forcible entry.
Petition granted, RTC decision reinstated.
27. Republic v. Heirs of Francisca Dignos-Sorono, G.R. No. 171571,
March 24, 2008
Facts: Two lots were sold to the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) by the
heirs of Tito Dignos, via a public instrument entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement
and Sale”. The two lots were not partitioned and co-owned by Francisca, Tito,
Isabel all surnamed Dignos, and Silveria Amistuoso. All had only ¼ shares in
the two lots. The CAA's successor-in-interest, the Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA) erected a fence and relocated a number of families.
MCIAA later caused the issuance of tax declarations of the two lots. The Heirs
of Francisca Dignos-Sorono filed a complaint, stating that neither they nor their
predecessors-in-interest sold, alienated or disposed of their shares in the lots
which they have been in continuous peaceful possession of the subject lots.
MCIAA maintained that from the time the lots were sold to its predecessor-in-
interest CAA, it has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession thereof; through acquisitive prescription, it had acquired valid title to
the lots since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value, and assuming that
it did not have just title, it had, by possession for over 30 years, acquired
ownership thereof by extraordinary prescription. The trial court found for the
Heirs. It held that the questioned sale was valid only with respect to Tito
Dignos's ¼ share of the lots and that the sale thereof was subject to the right
of legal redemption. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Was the sale of the whole lot binding to the Heirs?
SC: No. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides: “Each co-owner shall have the
full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
18
termination of the co-ownership.
Petitioner is not without remedy. Petitioners have the right to seek redress
against the vendors-heirs of Tito Dignos and their successor-in-interest.
28. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Nicholson Pascual, G.R. No.
163744, Feb. 29, 2008
Facts: Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married. During the union,
Florencia bought a 3-door apartment on a 250sqm lot. The TCT was issued in
the name of Florencia, married to Nelson Pascual. Florencia later in filed a suit
for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which the RTC granted. The RTC
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses' conjugal partnership
of gains, but the couple did not liquidate their conjugal partnership.
Florencia later on obtained a loan from Metrobank and to secure the obligation,
she and her co-borrowers executed several real estate mortgages on their
properties which included the property she bought in her name. Among the
documents she submitted were a copy of the TCT, a photocopy of the
marriage-nullifying RTC decision and a waiver Nicholson/Nelson executed in
favor of Florencia. Due to the failure of Florencia and her co-borrowers to pay
their loan obligation, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings. Metrobank
caused the publication of the notice sale and at the auction, it emerged as the
highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson/Nelson filed a complaint
to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. He alleged that
the property which is still conjugal property was mortgaged without his
consent. Metrobank claimed that the lot was paraphernal and having approved
the mortgage in good faith. The RTC found for Nicholson and ordered
Metrobank and Florencia to pay Nicholson moral damages and attorney's fees.
It found that the property being conjugal may not be validly encumbered by
Florencia without Nicholson's consent. The waiver was also found to be fatally
defective, Nicholson denied executing it and the signature of the notarizing
officer was a forgery. It was also executed before the issuance of the nully of
marriage. CA affirmed the decision except it deleted the award of moral
damages and attorney's fees.
Issue: Did Nicholson have a right over the property in dispute, it being in the
name of Florencia?
SC: Yes.
1. Re: lot is conjugal property.
Article 160 is the applicable legal provision since the property was
acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code. It provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless
it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife."
When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the
spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication
that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
2. Re: Termination of conjugal property regime does not ipso facto end the
nature of conjugal ownership.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character
of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership's assets and liabilities. The mortgage is valid limited only to the 1/2
portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is null and
void with respect to Nicholson's half, he not having consented to the mortgage.
Real Estate Mortgage over the lot is valid only insofar as Florencia's share is
concerned.
29. Joaquin Quimpo Sr., v. Consuelo Abad Vda. De Beltran, G.R. No.
160956, Feb. 13, 2008
19
Facts: Eustaquia was the owner of several parcels of land. She died intestate
and left these parcels of land to her grandchild and great grandchildren,
namely, Joaquin Quimpo and respondents Consuelo, Ireneo, Danilo, Marites,
Anita and Helen, all surnamed Abad. Joaquin and the Abads undertook an oral
partition of properties. No document of partition was executed because Joaquin
refused to execute a deed. Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their respective
shares. Joaquin became the administrator of the remaining undivided
properties, the rest of the Abads were minors at that time. When Danilo,
Marites, Anita and Helen wanted to take possession of the portions allotted to
them, Joaquin prevented them from occupying the same. They filed a complaint
for judicial partition and/or recovery of possession with accounting and
damages with the RTC.
Joaquin denied all material allegations in the complaint, claiming that he
purchased these lands from Eustaquia and that Consuelo's occupation was by
mere tolerance. When he died, he was substituted by his wife and children.
The RTC favored the Abads and declared them as co-owners of the
properties left by Eustaquia. It declared void the purported deeds of absolute
sale for lack of consideration and consent, and ordered the partition of the
property. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issue: Does Joaquin have claim of title over the properties based on the
notarized deeds of absolute sale and the tax declarations of property?
SC: No.
At the time of the purported sale, Joaquin was not gainfully employed.
He was studying in Manila, being supported by Eustaquia and when Eustaquia
died, Joaquin was not able to continue his studies. Eustaquia was 91 years old,
weak and senile, at the time the deeds of sale were executed. She was already
mentally incapacitated and could no longer be expected to give her consent to
the sale. The tax declarations are all in the name of Eustaquia. A tax declaration
does not necessarily prove ownership for it is well settled that a tax declaration
or tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
Decision of CA affirmed.
30. Consolacion Q. Austria v. Constancia Q. Lichauco et al., G.R. No.
170080, April 4, 2007
Facts: Constancia, Consuelo, Benedicto, Antonio and Consolacion are siblings.
Together with their nephews and nieces Jose, Ricardo, Aileen & Tyrone
Quintos, they owned 2 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 661sqm. The
siblings and the Quintoses desired to have the subject property partitioned but
Consolacion refused to give her consent. A complaint was filed with the RTC
against Consolacion, Benedicto and Antonio for the partition of the property.
Issue: May a property be partitioned even without the consent of the co-
owners?
SC: Yes. There are two stages in every action for partition. The first phase is
the determination of whether a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is
proper, i.e. not otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end
either: (a) with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or a partition is legally
prohibited; or (b) with a determination that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the
latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm
the partition so agreed upon. The second phase commences when it appears
that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In
that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the
assistance of not more than 3 commissioners. The second stage may well also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court
after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
20
 There is no question that a co-ownership exists between the parties. To
this extent, the trial court was correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil
Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership
(Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.)
SC affirms decision of trial court in directing the partition (physical
division) of the subject properties and all improvements thereon among the co-
owners in accordance with their respective shares.
31. Heirs of Juanita Padilla v. Dominador Magdua, G.R. No. 176858,
Sept. 15, 2010
Facts: Juanita Padilla owned a piece of land. After her death the petitioners as
legal heirs, sought to have the land partitioned. They sent word to their eldest
brother Ricardo regarding their plans for the partition. In a letter that Ricardo
sent to them, they were surprised that Ricardo had declared the land for
himself, that Juanita had allegedly executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of
Real Property in favor of Ricardo. The heirs filed an action with the RTC for
recovery of ownership, possession, partition and damages. The land has been
sold to Dominador Magdua, therefore the heirs sought to declare void the sale
by Ricardo's daughters.
The Affidavit was executed in 1966. The case was filed in 2001.
Issue: May the heirs have the sale annulled?
SC: The SC directs the RTC to try the case on the merits to determine who
among the parties are legally entitled to the land.
Re: jurisdiction of the MTC
Sec. 33 of RA 7691 - Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest does not exceed
Php20,000.
However, since the petitioners are seeking an annulment of contracts,
which are actions that are incapable of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case.
Re: Co-ownership of the heirs
Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners of the land. Co-heirs
or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of other co-
heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, as expressed
in Art. 494 of the Civil Code.
Re: Validity of the sale
The alleged deed of sale was not presented as evidence and neither was
it shown that Ricardo's daughters had any authority from Ricardo to dispose of
the land. No cogent evidence was ever presented that Ricardo gave his
consent to, acquiesced in, or ratified the sale made by his daughters to
Dominador.
32. Sulpicio Carvajal v. CA and Eutiquiano Camarillo & Liberata
Cacabelos, G.R. No. L-44426, Feb. 25, 1982
Facts: The Espique spouses own a 754 lot, left to their 5 children Maria,
Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio & Tropinia. Carvajal claims that he bought a
portion of the lot from Estefanio and leasing a portion from Tropinia. The
Camarillo spouses claim that they bought a portion of the land from Evaristo.
They filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance against Carvajal for
ejectment and recovery of possession. Both sales were made while the petition
for partition filed by Evaristo was still pending.
Issue: Who between the parties has a better claim to the lot?
SC: Neither petitioner nor respondents can rightfully claim the lot.
Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance
21
in the pending partition proceedings and the share of each co-heir is
determined by metes and bounds, neither can claim that what they bought is
the part in dispute.
Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For
where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate (acknowledges) such
heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided
owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part of portion which might
be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the
co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.
Before partition, a co-heir can only sell his successional rights.
33. Phil. National Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 105760, July 7, 1997
Facts: Spouses de la Cruz mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB. When the
loan became due and unpaid, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and
was the only bidder at the public auction sale. On the same day, a Certificate
of Sale was issued in favor of PNB. Upon failure of the spouses to redeem the
property within one year, PNB deemed itself to be the absolute of the property
and filed a petition at the RTC. Before the implementation of the writ, private
respondent Nildefonso Montano filed a motion for the dissolution of the writ,
alleging that he was instituted as tenant on the subject property even before
the spouses acquired the land. He was issued a certification that he is an
agricultural lessee in the subject landholding and the lots are the subject
matters of CAR case which he filed against the spouses de la Cruz. The RTC
granted the motion to dissolve the writ of possession. The CA rendered
judgment in favor of PNB but reversed itself upon motion by Montano.
Issue: Does Montano have a right over the property?
SC: Yes.
PNB my not argue that its right over the land is superior to Montano's
claim on the subject properties since the agricultural lease was not annotated
on the TCT and therefore it dealt with the properties in good faith. Even if the
fact of tenancy had not been reflected on the title, PNB admitted that before
they consented to the mortgage, an ocular inspection was conducted on the
landholding on the occasion of which, petitioner PNB's Credit Investigator
already found Montana staying on the land and even interviewed the latter. In
answer to the questions propounded by said investigator, Montano allegedly
said that he had been allowed to stay on the property in question because he
was ejected from the adjacent parcel of land which he used to till. The land
being an agriculture one, and considering the ocular inspection conducted when
PD27 had been in effect for some time, PNB's suspicion that the land was
tenanted should have been aroused by the existence of a farmer on the land
other than the mortgagors themselves. It cannot be denied therefore that PNB
had been put on notice by its actual knowledge of another person possessing
the land, no matter what the given reason may have been for Montano's
occupancy of the properties in question.
Furthermore, as purchaser at a public auction, PNB was only substituted
to and acquired the right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor or
mortgagor to the property as of the time of the levy. In this case, the only
remaining right of the spouses De La Cruz is the right to be paid a reasonable
price for the land they owned as mandated by PD27. That is the only right
which PNB acquired as the new absolute owner of the land.
34. Eugenio Feliciano et al v. Pedro Canoza et al., G.R. No. 161746,
Sept. 1, 2010
Facts: When Antonio Feliciano passed away, he left behind his only property.
Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina, all surnamed Feliciano, declared themselves to
be the only surviving heirs of Antonio, with the exception of Salina. They
executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate and appropriated among
themselves the said parcel of land, to the exclusion of the heirs of Esteban
Feliciano and Doroteo Feliciano, deceased children of Antonio. Leona, Maria,
Pedro and Salina executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of
22
the late Jacinto Feliciano (Pedro's portion), Felisa Feliciano (Salina's portion) &
Pedro Canoza (Leona & Maria's portions).
During his lifetime Jacinto applied for a free patent over the portion of
land he bought, declaring that the same was a public land, first occupied and
cultivated by Pedro. He was issued a Free Patent but unfortunately it was
burned. Pedro Canoza also applied for a Free Patent claiming that the same
was public land, first occupied and cultivated by Leona & Maria. He was issued
a Free Patent, now covered by an Original Certificate of Title.
The heirs of Esteban & Doroteo filed a complaint against Salina, Felisa,
Pedro and the heirs of the late Jacinto for the Declaration of Nullity of
Documents and Title, Recovery of Real Property and Damages. They alleged
that the settlement of the estate and sale were done without their participation
and consent as heirs of Esteban & Doroteo. Likewise, they averred that the
ancestral home of the Felicianos is erected on the subject property and that
they have occupied the same since birth. Canoza & Jacinto falsely declared that
the property was not occupied, so their titles to the property should be declared
null and void on the ground that they have made false statements in their
respective applications for free patent. In their answer, both Pedro & the heirs
of Jacinto allege that they were buyers in good faith and for value. The RTC
favored the plaintiffs, declaring the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Antonio Feliciano null & void, declaring the sale to Pedro, Felisa & Jacinto void,
declared the OCT of Pedro and the certificates of titles in the names of
defendants null and void, to reconvey ownership and possession of said
property to plaintiffs subject to a just and equitable partition thereof by and
between all interested parties. The CA reversed the RTC's decision and
dismissed the complaint for being time-barred. Prescription had set in, the
applicable prescriptive period to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement is 4
years from the discovery of the fraud.
Issue: Can the heirs of Esteban and Doroteo recover their portions of the
property?
SC: No.
As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not
participate in the extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the other
compulsory heirs Leona, Maria & Pedro. Undeniably, the said deed was
fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo & Esteban of
their shares in the estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs who had no knowledge of an consent to the same,
is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of
fraud could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition
however, must be brought within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. The
discovery is deemed to have taken place, when said instrument was filed with
the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world. Evidently, the
applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed was 4
years counted from the discovery and they clearly failed to institute the present
civil action within the allowable period.
35. Danilo L. Parel v. Simeon B. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556, April 19,
2006
Facts: Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages against Parel with the RTC Baguio alleging that he is the owner of a
two-storey residential house, that the property was constructed solely from his
own funds and declared in his name. He allowed Parel's parents Florentino &
Susan and family to occupy the second floor. Without his knowledge, Parel &
family took possession of the ground floor despite repeated demands to vacate.
Simen asked for a monthly rental, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and costs of suit. Parel's contention is that his parents are the co-owners
of the said residential house. He is occupying the ground floor upon instruction
of his father Florentino, with full knowledge of Simeon. He asked for the
dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and attorney's fees. The
RTC declared that the house is owned in common by Simeon and Florentino
and as such the heirs cannot be evicted. The CA reversed the decision of the
23
trial court and found Simeon as the sole owner of the subject house and
ordered petitioner to surrender possession of the ground floor. It also ordered
Parel to pay a monthly rental.
Issue: Was the house co-owned or solely owned by Simeon?
SC: The house is solely owned by Simeon.
The SC agreed with the CA that Simeon had shown sufficient evidence
to support his complaint for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the
subject house as the exclusive owner thereof. Simeon presented an affidavit
executed by Florentino which reads that he is not the owner of the building in
question. Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successor-in-
interest and against third persons. Florentino categorically declared that while
he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same
as it is owned by respondent who is residing in QC. It is safe to presume that
he would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it
is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children's interests as his heirs. A
declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably, during his lifetime, he did not revoke
the affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been
filed by Simeon against him.
36. Leonora Estoque v. Elena M. Pajimula, G.R. No. L-24419, July 15,
1968
Facts: Estoque filed a complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is co-
owner of Lot 802, having purchased 1/3 portion therefore containing an area of
640 sqm evidenced by a deed of sale by Crispina in her favor. Pajimula
acquired the other 2/3 portion from Crispina. Estoque claimed that when
Crispina sold the rest of the property to Pajimula, she was selling an undivided
2/3 that Estoque as co-owner was entitled to redeem pursuant to Art. 1620 of
the New Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the complaint, holding that the
deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by Estoque was different from that of
Pajimula, hence they never became co-owners and the alleged right of legal
redemption was not proper.
Issue: Was Estoque a co-owner and have the legal right of redemption?
SC: No.
The deed of sale to Estoque clearly specifies the object lot sold as the
southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of
840 sqm. While on date of the sale to Estoque said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described
in the deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the
next day, Crispina acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners and
thereby became the sole owner of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastral survey.
Estoque became the actual owner of the southeastern third of Lot 802. She
never acquired an undivided interest in Lot 802. When Crispina sold the western
2/3 of the same lot, Estoque did not acquire a right to redeem the property
thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct and separate.
37. Salvador Laurel v. Ramon Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990
Facts: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan. The Roppongi property was acquired from the
Japanese government; it consists of the land and building which became the
site of the Philippine Embassy until it transferred since the Roppongi property
needed major repairs. Due to the failure of the government to provide the
necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that
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time. of the recommendation by the Investigating committee to sell the Roppongi
The Executive branch of the government has been pushing for the sale property does not have the force and effect of law since the President already
of the Roppongi lot. lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than
a year. There is also no law authorizing its conveyance. It is not for the
Issue: Can the Roppongi property be alienated by the Philippine government, President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
and does the Chief Executive have the authority and jurisdiction to sell it? sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
SC: No. No.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly
spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the
corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine
government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of
public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become
patrimonial.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve
the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. The fact that the
Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such. An abandonment of the intention
to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Art. 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment
cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a
lack of financial support to repair and improve the property. Abandonment
must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
The Chief Executive has no authority to sell the property. The approval

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