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How can a government be made all-powerful? once the government is all-powerful, how can it
be made responsive to the will of the people?
The democratic system is to be carried out within the ranks of the people, giving them freedom
of speech, assembly and association. The right to vote is given only to the people and not to the
reactionaries. These two aspect, namely democracy among the people and dictatorship over the
reactionaries, combine to form the people's democratic dictatorship.
The contemporary era of the Far Eastern countries began under the stimulation provided by the
impact of Western explorers and merchants. By the middle of the twentieth century profound
changes had taken place not only within the Eastern countries but also in their relationship to the
West. No longer merely peripheral to the main fields of interest of the Western nations, they had
become in some measure the pivotal center of world affairs. Japan seized upon a large empire in
Asia and the Pacific, which she retained until defeated in a long struggle against the most
powerful of the Western states. China, after almost disintegrating and after passing through a
cycle of revolution, emerged with radically altered institutions but, once again, as the strongest
state of Asia. Moreover, China for the first time in her history was in a position to assume a
major role in world politics.
The second period , almost purely negative, was the natural result of the decadence that had
preceded the downfall of the Manchu Dynasty. The third and fourth stages had some objectives
in common and were combined for a time, although they finally came to be directly opposed to
each other.
Yüan Shih-k'ai, the first President of the Republic, who tried unsuccessfully to restore the
monarchy, maintained at least a semblance of unity in the state. After his death in 1916, much of
China passed under the rule of independent military commanders, although a group at Peking
preserved the fiction of a republican government. Some of these militarists had been officials
under the Manchus; others were ex-soldiers or ex-bandits who had collected an army and taken
over the administration of one or more provinces. Most of them were extortionate, and the
common people of China suffered deplorably from their tyranny. Realignments in the Peking
administration usually reflected a new combination among the war lords of the northern area.
China's participation in World War I at a time when the central government was unable even to
put its own house in order was a factor contributing to internal confusion. At the urging of the
Allied powers, the Peking government declared war on Germany in 1917, hoping to gain
advantages at the peace settlement. During the war, however, Japan seized the opportunity to
"assist" her weak ally, selling war materials and extending loans to China and securing economic
concessions within the country. At the Paris Peace Conference the requests of the Chinese
delegation were almost completely disregarded, and Japan refused to restore the Shantung
Peninsula, which she had taken over from Germany.
The third stage of the Revolution is associated with the personality and program of Sun
Yat-sen. Dr. Sun's part in the inauguration of the Republic in 1912 had been a brief one, but after
returning to Canton, where his following was strongest, he directed a barrage of criticism against
the Peking military government. The rise of war lords was not confined to the north, and Sun
actually was dependent for support upon militarists in control of the Kwangtung- Kwangsi area.
His party, the Kuomintang, was a small faction, and its professed principles of parliamentary
democracy seemed utterly unrealistic in a "phantom Republic" ravaged by irresponsible military
bands. But with remarkable swiftness the Kuomintang changed into a dynamic organization
capable of making a bid for control of the state. The initiative and organizing skill for
accomplishing this transformation were largely supplied from outside China, by agents
revolutionary Communist regime in Russia.
Understandably, the Bolshevik leaders, faced with the task of consolidating their power
in Russia and confronted by the hostility of the Great Power, were eager to win support in
revolutionary China. rebuffed by the Peking government, they turned to Dr. Sun in Canton. The
Third (Communist) International had organized a far eastern division and established at Moscow
a university named after Sun Yat-sen to train Chinese revolutionaries, some of whom joined the
Communist party. Although Dr. Sun rejected communism, he had hoped for the support of
Western nations and welcomed the offer of Russian co-operation. In 1923 Sun and the Russian
emissaries arrived at a working agreement which provided for Russian assistance and for the
admission of Chinese Communists to the Kuomintang but left Sun the undisputed head of the
Kuomintang party. Acknowledging that China's immediate task was to achieve national unity
and free herself from the yoke of foreign imperialism, the Russians promised to support these
objectives, while recognizing the fact that conditions in China were not suitable for establishing
communism. Accordingly the Soviet government sent military and political advisers to Canton.
By 1925 Canton had become the center of a small but effective government, which
collected taxes, regulated commerce, and was developing its own "new model" army, officered
by men trained at the Whampoa Academy (near Canton) under supervision of European military
experts, and indoctrinated with loyalty to Sun Yat-sen and to his party. This Canton government,
curiously enough, was actually a Soviet regime without being Communist. Controlled neither by
war lords nor by democratically elected representative but by the high command of the
Kuomintang, it provided the first example of a party dictatorship in China. Although the Canton
government showed vigor, it was not recognized by foreign powers, not even by Soviet Russia.
Soviet Russia's foreign policy was, as usual, devious. Russia maintained correct relations with
the Peking government (and restored some Russian concessions to its jurisdiction) after Peking
recognized the Soviet Union in 1924. At the same time, Russian agents were assisting Sun Yat-
sen's group in preparations to overthrow the Peking regime.
Dr. Sun did not live to see the phenomenal success of the organization which he had
founded, but he left a body of doctrines as a heritage of the Kuomintang party. His most
important recognized their value for propaganda purposes. The gist of Sun's program and
political philosophy is contained in the famous San Mi Chu I (“Three Principles of the People”),
which became a sort of Bible for the Kuomintang. The Three Principles, usually translated as
"Nationalism," "Democracy," and Livelihood," have been likened to Abraham Lincoln's
"government of the people, by the people, and for the people"; but there is considerable
difference between the American and the Chinese interpretations writings were put together
rather hastily during the period of Communist-Kuomintang collaboration and partly at the
urging of Borodin, who of the terms. By nationalism Sun meant, first, the freeing of China from
foreign interference and, second, the development of loyalty among the people to the state
instead of to the family or the province. The Chinese, he felt, had achieved a cultural unity but
had never taken sufficient interest in the political structure, thus making it easy for stronger states
to impose upon them. His concept of nationalism was tinged with racial theories (he asserted that
the Chinese were the only nation and China the only state coinciding with a distinct race), but
these were more naïve than truculent. In his second Principle, Sun was concerned with popular
sovereignty and the ideal of representative government. Recognizing that people are unequal in
capacity, he believed that the chief political problem (in both China and the West) was to
discover how popular sovereignty could be combined with direction by expert. Those "who see
and perceive first" should be allowed to guide the others until they have reached a point of
understanding and participation. The Principle of Livelihood referred to the necessity for
material progress and also to social reform, rejecting Marxism but failing to outline any specific
program. Sun's ideas as a whole were neither very original nor very radical nor even very clear.
Democracy appeared in his conception as a rather remote goal, to be attained at the end of the
revolutionary struggle. The three stage of revolution, according to Sun, would be: (1) the military
stage, necessary to establish order, (2) the “tutelage” stage, devoted to training the people and
with power restricted to the revolutionary leaders (the Kuomintang party), and (3) the
constitutional stage, embodying representative popular government.
In view of Dr. Sun's limitations both as a leader and as a thinker, it is remarkable that he
came to be revered as the "father of the Revolution." His life ended, characteristically on a note
of futility. He had gone north in the latter part of 1924 to arrange an alliance with two of the war
lords against a third, but arrived in Peking to find that a settlement had been made without his
knowledge. Already in poor health, he died the following March. But when finally removed from
the scene, Sun became a legendary figure to his followers, and "Sunyatsenism" proved to be a far
more potent force than Dr. Sun had ever been. He left behind him a legacy of hope, and he had
stirred the imagination of Chinese all over the world with the vision of a strong and free China
under a republican constitution which would combine the best thought of ancient sages with
modern scientific techniques. By the Kuomintang his writings and speeches were treasured as
unalloyed wisdom, while their vagueness made it possible to invoke the master's authority for
contradictory policies.
By 1926, when the Canton government had become strong enough to challenge the
northern militarists, the Nationalist revolution entered its active phase. Kuomintang forces under
command of the young general Chiang Kai-shek swept rapidly northward into the Yangtze
valley and in less than six months overran half the provinces of China. The success of this
"punitive expedition," however, brought to the surface a dissension which had been stirring for
some time within the party. A conservative faction distrusted the Communist connection and
wanted to oust Communists entirely. The radical wing, hoping to base the organization upon the
support of the peasant and working classes, stressed the desirability of a concrete reform
program and of continued association with the Russian advisers. Temporarily the radicals
seemed to have won. Chiang Kai-shek, whose sympathies were conservative and who had
suppressed radical demonstrations at Shanghai and executed Communists and suspected
Communists when Kuomintang troops occupied this important city, was temporarily deprived of
his command. But by midsummer of 1927 the picture had completely changed. Borodin and the
other Russian advisers were dismissed; trade unionists and radicals were disciplined or driven
out of the party, and some party members went into voluntary exile in Russia (including the
widow of Sun Yat-sen).
Although the reversal of direction in 1927 was startling and decisive, actually there had
been little likelihood that the radicals could maintain their ascendancy. The Chinese Communists
at this time numbered only about 50,000. While there were plenty of discontented peasants and a
Chinese Federation of Labor claimed two and a half million members, these groups were not
capable of carrying to successful conclusion the fight against the northern militarists. And the
Kuomintang army was far from being a radical body. Kuomintang leaders had welcomed and
benefited from Russian assistance, but now that they felt strong enough to stand alone they had
no desire to serve the interests of a foreign power. There were grounds for suspecting that the
Russians intended to convert the Chinese revolution into an outpost of Soviet Communism, and
the discovery of a Soviet plot at Peking prompted the northern government to break off relations
with Russia. In supporting the Moscow-Canton entente of 1923-1927, the Soviet leaders, hoping
for the speedy coming of world revolution, had gambled and lost—or so it seemed. But they had
provided the spark without which the Kuomintang might never have been fired into action.
After the purge of the radical wing, the Kuomintang leaders proceeded rapidly with their
plan to extend their authority throughout the country. From this time forward the dominant figure
of the party was Chiang Kai-shek, whose return to a position of influence was automatic with the
triumph of the conservatives. In addition to his ability as a military commander, Chiang enjoyed
the prestige of belonging to the “ruling family" of the Revolution, through his marriage to the
American-educated Soong Mei-ling, a sister of Madame Sun Yat-sen. Kuomintang forces pushed
on, without too much difficulty, through the territories of discredited military governors, and
occupied Peking in 1928. The Nationalists named the city Pei-p'ing ("Northern Peace") and
moved their capital to Nanking, in keeping with pledges made in the early period of the
Revolution.
The task of national reconstruction confronting the Kuomintang leaders was a far more
difficult undertaking than the seizure of power had been. Even the maintenance of power was not
easy, as remnants of the war-lord regimes lingered on in various parts of China. These, however,
did not seriously challenge the Nanking government, and Chiang defeated a coalition of two
powerful rivals in 1930. Although Kuomintang supremacy still depended upon military support,
the party claimed that it had completed the first, or military, stage of Dr. Sun's formula of
revolution and had inaugurated the second stage—that of political "tutelage." In spite of its anti-
Communist orientation, the structure both of the Kuomintang and of the government which it set
up at Nanking followed closely the Soviet pattern. The party was a hierarchy, reaching from the
smallest units, or cells, through district and provincial bodies up to the Central Executive
Committee at the top. Theoretically, ultimate authority rested with the National Party Congress, a
general session of party members representing the local divisions. Actually, the Party Congress
was seldom convoked, and effective control remained with the Central Executive Committee, of
which the key member was Chiang Kai-shek. A subcommittee of the C.E.C., the Central
Political Council (corresponding to the Politburo of the Russian Communist pary), served as
connecting link between the party and the state machinery which was created by a "Provisional
Constitution" in 1931. The President of the National Government and the members of his
Council of State were selected by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. At the
central, provincial, and local levels the government embodied, not democracy, but a party
dictatorship.
Internal developments, also, indicated that China was throwing off the lethargy that she
had displayed through most of the nineteenth century. There was considerable industrial growth,
although it by no means equaled that of Japan. Cotton manufacture increased so greatly between
1900 and 1930 that by the latter date cotton cloth was contributing about to per cent of China's
exports. While the factory system was expanding, the number of laborers which it affected was
relatively very small. The bulk of production was still carried on by the domestic system; labor
organizations were weak and the ancient guilds had largely been transformed into employer’s
organizations.
The rise of Chinese nationalism produced widespread repercussions in the social and
intellectual fields, although these were not necessarily related to the program of the Kuomintang
party and most of them had become manifest before the party came into power. Stimulated by
the lectures of such liberal Westerners as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, young intellectuals
demanded that China develop modern national culture, scientifically oriented. Newspapers
multiplied hopefully, despite the fact that the majority of the population was unable to read. A
so-called “Literary Renaissance" was inaugurated in 1917 by Dr. Hu Shih of the Peking National
University, who championed the use of the vernacular "plain speech” as a literary medium.
Mass-education movements to combat illiteracy were projected, incorporating attempts to
simplify the Chinese written characters. Efforts for educational reform accomplished little,
however, because they were not supported adequately with public funds.
While progress undeniably occurred during the era of Nationalist rule, the defects of the
regime became more and more serious. Radical elements had been expelled before the triumph
of the Kuomintang, and even moderate liberals were given scant encouragement. Originating as
a party of revolution, the Kuomintang when in power neglected to carry out the social reforms
which were necessary to relieve the suffering and win the allegiance of the common people.
Very little was done to improve the condition of poor tenants and farm laborers, even though Sun
Yat-sen had specified at assistance to these classes was a primary object of the” Principle of
Livelihood.” In command of a one-party government and eager to perpetuate its own authority,
the Kuomintang employed coercive measures against those who opposed it. It maintained secret
police, disguised under the title of “Bureau of Investigation and Statistics." To indoctrinate
potential party members it organized a tightly disciplined Youth Corps (ironically named the San
Min Chu I after Sun's "Three Principles"). One group within the party formed a terrorist
organization known as the “Blue Shirts," which Showed more than a superficial resemblance to
fascist groups in Western Europe. The Kuomintang dictatorship was never complete, nor was it a
one-man affair, and divergences appeared among various factions within the party. Nevertheless,
the Nationalist regime seemed to be preparing to be preparing the Chinese people less for
constitutional democracy than for a permanent condition of “tutelage."
The downfall of the Kuomintang in China after a rule of twenty years was caused by two
factors : (1) unrelenting opposition from Chinese Communists, who ultimately set up a rival
government, and (2) the long war beginning with the Japanese invasion of 1937, which drained
the country's resources, demoralized the people promoted the chaotic conditions so favorable to
the spread of communism. The struggle against the Communists began almost soon as the
Kuomintang had established its government at Nanking and was a continuous process even
during the most successful years of the Nationalist period. Following the rupture with the
Kuomintang in 1927, the Communist party had been driven underground but extended its
activities in both rural and urban areas of central and southern China. Almost annihilated by
Kuomintang forces in a series of military campaigns, the Communist leaders turned the desperate
struggle to their advantage by inciting revolutionary aspirations among the depressed peasantry
and by developing the technique of guerilla warfare into a fine art. Mao Tse-tung (b. 1893) was
the key personality behind both of these policies.
Although the son of a well-to-do farmer, Mao Tse-tung as a youth had rebelled against
landlordism and the tyranny of parental authority. One of a dozen men who founded the Chinese
Communist Party in 1921, he became a member of the Central Executive Committee of the
Kuomintang and was entrusted by the Communists with the task of peasant organization. A
report prepared for the Chinese Communist Party in 1927 on peasant revolutionary activity in
Hunan (south central China) provides the clue to Mao's strategy of revolution and is prophetic of
his ultimate program for China. Already he was instigating direct action among the lowliest
tenants: (1) forming village co-operative associations, (2) smashing temples and burning the
wooden idols for fuel, (3) intimidating and assaulting "bad gentry." "A revolution is not the same
as inviting people to dinner," he wrote. "A rural revolution is a revolution by which the peasantry
overthrows the authority of the feudal landlord class." "In a very short time… several hundred
million peasants will rise like a tornado or tempest, a force so extraordinarily swift and violent
that no power, however great, will be able to suppress it." In sharp disagreement with both the
Chinese and Russian Party leaders, Mao was convinced that whoever won the peasants would
win China.
For the time being, however, threatened with extinction by Chiang's superior troops, Mao
Tse-tung conceived and executed the famous "Long March" of October 1934 to October 1935—
a mass migration of more than 6000 miles and one of the most a military exploits in history. Of
the 90,000 men who slipped through Chiang's lines in southwestern China, only 7000 lived to
reach Yenan (in northern Shensi Province), which was to be the Communists' headquarters until
their final victory in the civil war. Decimating as the experience had been, it served to weld the
survivor into a solid group of tested loyalty and toughness and established Mao Tse-tung as
undisputed leader of the Party. He had demonstrated his tactics of "retreat in order to advance" and
his ability to sustain and renew his forces directly from the countryside while the cities and economic
apparatus of the state were in the hands of his enemies. Gradually the Communist region of the northwest
acquired attributes of a separate stage, with a fluid political structure and well-organized military units. In
expanding the area of their influence, the Communists chief asset was their introduction of reform which
the Nanking government promised never fulfilled. They tackled the land problem directly,
breaking up great estates, forcing rent reductions, establishing land banks and cooperative
societies, building irrigation works, and educating ignorant peasants in better methods of
cultivation and crop control. This does not mean that the Communists were simply agrarian
reformers. Their leaders thoroughly subscribed to Marxist-Leninist principle, and aimed at
sovietizing China's economy. But their immediate and practical assistance to farmers who had
been oppressed by high rents and high taxes and their success in eliminating graft in the region
under their administration enabled them to compete successfully with the Kuomintang regime for
popular favor. The Communists also strengthened their position by calling for national resistance
against Japanese aggression, to which Chiang Kai-shek, intent upon crushing Communism, had
offered only half-hearted opposition.
When, in line with the Soviet strategy of fostering antifascist “popular fronts," the
Chinese Communists appeared co-operative, pressure within the Kuomintang induced Chiang
Kai-shek to enter into an alliance with them to halt the common enemy, Japan. But this had the
unfortunate effect of encouraging the Japanese militarists to make war. Faced with the prospect
of a united China, they goaded their government into launching an attack in the Peiping area
(July 7, 1937). This was the beginning of a fateful conflict which soon expanded into World War
II.
The course of the war revealed that China was a far stronger nation than she had been
forty years earlier. Even though mighty Japanese military machine eventually occupied the
coastal cities and almost all of eastern China and forced the Nationalist government to move its
capital far inland to Chungking, it was never able to conquer the entire country. In spite of
staggering military reverses, the Nationalists even made progress toward laying the basis for a
sounder economy. They organized both rural and industrial cooperatives and improved
agricultural methods to increase farm production. They announced a program of land purchase to
provide additional holdings for small farmers and outlined a scheme for democratizing local
government. These forward-looking movements, however, were vitiated to some extent by
inefficiency and corruption within the Chungking administration and the Kuomintang party.
Hoarding, profiteering, and a runaway inflation added to the impoverishment of the very groups
which were most in need of help. Even more ominous for the future was the underlying hostility
between the Nationalists at Chungking and the "Border Region" government of the Communists
at Yenan in the north. Each group accused the other of failure to observe the terms of their
common alliance against Japan, and during the war the Nationalists diverted an army 500,000
men to police the frontier of the Communist Border Region. The conditions under which the war
ended, which Russian troops in Manchuria, provided an opportunity for the Communists to
extend their control in northern China. After the Japanese surrender, China's international war
gradually turned into a civil war.
Before the close of World War II the Nationalists had formulated plans for replacing the
"tutelage” stage of party dictatorship with representative constitutional government. As early as
1938 a People's Political Council was organized, which, although it was a purely consultative
body with no authority, contained representatives of non-Kuomintang elements, including the
Communists. A National Constituent Assembly (boycotted by the Communists) convened in
November 1946 and drafted a constitution of a democratic character, providing for an elective
bicameral national parliament and for popularly elected local assemblies as well. The new
constitution was promulgated on January I, 1947; elections were duly held, and the National
Assembly, which met the following March, named Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic.
But while the Nationalists were inaugurating a democratic constitution for China, they were
rapidly being dispossessed from the country by the advance of Communist armies. In 1949 the
southerly retreat of the Nationalist forces turned into a rout which ended with all the mainland in
the hands of the Communists. By 1950 the jurisdiction of President Chiang's government was
confined to the island of Taiwan (Formosa). After an eight-year war against a foreign enemy the
score for the Nationalists could be reckoned as the recovery of one island from Japan and the
loss of half a continent to Chinese rivals.
Although the conquest of China by the Communists represented a military victory, it was
greatly facilitated by the failure of the Nationalists to win the confidence of any substantial
segment of the Chinese population. The promise of democratic constitutionalism was too little
and too late, and the long anticipated social and economic benefits were not forthcoming at all. A
bold program of land reform, evidencing a sincere desire to assist the debt-ridden farmers, might
have competed successfully with the enticements offered by the Communist policy of direct
action. Not only did Nanking government fail to take any significant steps in this direction but in
the years following the war it seemed to be more bureaucratic and more honeycombed with
corruption than ever. The impression spread rapidly that many of the Kuomintang leaders were
primarily interested in feathering their own nests and were no better than the old war lords of the
1920's. So low had the prestige of the party fallen that it could summon very little assistance in
its hour of peril. From the purely military standpoint, the Nationalists committed the grave
mistake of attempting to recover the north and even to drive the Communists out of Manchuria
before the Nanking government had consolidated its hold upon central and southern China. By
extending their lines too far they weakened their position and made its collapse the more
catastrophic.
After their victory over the Nationalists, the Communist leaders moved rapidly to secure
their hold upon the vast territory of China. In October 1949 they proclaimed “The People’s
Republic of China," with its capital in Peking. An Organic Law, promulgated as a temporary
frame of government, was replaced by a formal constitution in 1954. The Constitution of “The
People's Republic," like that of Soviet Russia, combines the language and forms of parliamentary
democracy with the principle of domination by the communist party. Nominally, supreme
authority is vested in an All China People's Congress, which meets annually and which, in
addition to enacting laws, elects the major officials, including the President (Chairman of the
Republic). The Constitution contains a Bill of Rights which covers the whole field of individual
liberties, recognizes equality of the sexes, declares all persons over 18 years of age eligible to
vote and to hold office, and even guarantees the ownership of private property. However, it
leaves the application of these rights very tentative by giving the government power to punish
"traitors, counterrevolutionaries, and bureaucratic capitalists.”
The economic transformation of China since 1949 is one of the most impressive aspects
of the revolutionary regime. Industrialization was given high priority and a series of five-year
plans has been launched, the second running from 1957 to 1962. Although available statistics
cannot be accepted uncritically, there is ample evidence of progress, all the more remarkable
when viewed against the retarded condition of China earlier. Geological surveys have revealed
mineral resources far in excess of previous estimates: gigantic reserves of iron ore and coal, the
indispensable ingredients of heavy industrial growth, and adequate supplies of manganese,
tungsten, antimony, tin, copper, and aluminum. By 1960 China's furnaces were producing almost
as much steel as was made in France; her pig iron production exceeded West Germany's as well
as Great Britain's (not all high- grade iron). Also by 1960 the output of electric power had been
increased ten times, even though many hydro-electric projects were still in the planning stage.
1
Railroad mileage has doubled but is still far from adequate, especially since the objective is a
wide dispersion of industry hitherto concentrated in Manchuria and the eastern seaboard. With
Soviet technical assistance, the Chinese have trained their own engineers capable of designing
precision tools. Their manufactures now include such items as cars, trucks, and jet planes; also
electronic, surgical, and scientific equipment. Within a few year, at the very most, China will
presumably have “the bomb.”
More profound than the changes in the scope and tempo of industrialization has been the
agrarian revolution. First inaugurated among the peasants, Mao's brand of Communism-in
contrast to that of the Soviet Union-has remained largely peasant-based down to the present day.
However, the character of agriculture and of society engaged in it has been altered radically,
through successive stages. The first phase of land reform was simply expropriation of the
landlords, typically by killing them. Then, the newly created peasant proprietors were urged to
form co-operatives, pooling the resources of one or more villages. The next step was a drive for
collective farms, communally owned and directed by party members or supporters. This was
accomplished with remarkable swiftness, between 1955 and 1957, by which date more than 90
per cent of the family holdings had been collectivized. Although Chinese farmers undoubtedly
"volunteered" to join co-operatives because they were given little choice, the government relied
1
E. Snow, The Other Side of the River, pp. 169, 182-83. D. Warner, Hurricane from China, pp. 126-27. (These
estimates are still subject to dispute.)
primarily upon psychological and social pressure, employing what Mao has described as
"persuasive reasoning." and there was no liquidation of resisting peasants. But without waiting
for the collectives to prove themselves, the party leaders in 1958 announced a third stage of the
Communist agrarian pattern. It called for the merging of rural co-operatives and collective farms
into large communes, which, it was claimed, embodied the principle of ownership by the whole
people rather than by a single community. Accordingly 26.000 communes were created (later
reduced to 24.000). embracing about 99 per cent of the peasantry. Contrary to some reports, the
purpose of the communes was neither to eradicate the family nor to beat the people into
automatons. Their purpose was to provide a mobile labor force for rapid industrial development
(to implement an overly ambitious program advertised as the “Great Leap Forward") and to
increase food production. Owing to various factors, including reckless haste and the callousness
and ineptitude of local directors, the program failed to bring the desired results. A severe
agricultural crisis—intensified by a three-year drought in the Yellow River valley—Induced the
party leaders to modify their program again. In 1960 they commanded efforts to be concentrate
on building a sounder agricultural foundation for the national economy. The communes have not
been abandoned but they have been somewhat decentralized, with a degree of ownership and
management restored to the villages and co-operatives or "production teams”.
It is still difficult to assess the character of Chinese society and culture under the
Communist regime, At the least it can be said that tremendous energies have been set in motion
and that they are being channeled fairly effectively toward concrete goals. The “sleeping giant"
has awakened at last. Probably never before in history have so many people been changed so
much in so short a time. A source of concern, to outsiders at least, is the rapidly expanding
population of China. Increasing at the rate of 2 per cent a year, it is approaching the 700 million
mark and may total one billion by the year 1980. The Party's attitude toward the population
explosion has been ambivalent. It scoffs at Malthusian doctrines, insists that even more workers
are needed, and hails the human increment as proof of the vitality of a socialist society. At the
same time it cannot ignore the pressure of population on food supply in a country where, with a
great land mass, not more than 17 per cent of the total area has proved cultivable. The practice of
birth control may eventually relieve the pressure of numbers, though not in the immediate future.
Contraceptive methods have been publicized and made readily available by the government. An
active propaganda campaign in behalf of birth control was dropped in 1959 and then vigorously
resumed in the spring of 1962.
To list only the physical changes taking place in contemporary China would be arduous.
The acreage of irrigated land more than doubled between 1949 and 1960, and the same period
witnessed an extensive forestation program highly significant for soil and water conservation. A
complex system of dams and reservoirs in the Yellow River valley, when completed, may end
the danger of flood in the traditional area of "China's sorrow" and promises a bigger and surer
crop yield—of rice as well as wheat –in spite of the temporary setback during the great drought
of 1959-1962. One of the Yellow River projects(“Three Gate Gorge") produces 60 per cent as
much power as America's Grand Coulee Dam and its reservoir holds more water that Grand
Coulee and Boulder dams combined.2 Although the average life expectancy in China is still
under 4o years, the Chinese people now receive far more adequate medical care than ever before
in their long history. Smallpox, cholera, and other epidemic diseases have been brought under
control; dysentery has declined with the improvement of standards of sanitation in the cities and
villages. Opium addiction has been drastically curtailed, and an unrelenting campaign against
prostitution resulted in a significant drop in the incidence of venereal disease. An expanded
educational program, incorporating spare-time schooling for adults, has served both as a medium
of political indoctrination and as an effective instrument in combating illiteracy and providing
technicians and scientists.
Of course there is a darker side to the picture, and a high price human terms has been
paid for rapid material progress. The party chiefs used ruthless means to seize power and to keep
it. No one knows how many enemies and "counterrevolutionaries" were killed in the process but
sober estimates run into the hundreds of thousands. Still, in view of China's long tradition of civil
strife and brutal dictatorship, it is noteworthy that violence and terror have not been weapons
either of Party discipline or of popular coercion. There has been no mass liquidation of “kulaks”
or of bourgeoisie. There has been no Party purge even remotely comparable to those of the Stalin
era in Russia. On the other hand, psychological pressure, “thought control," and “reform through
labor" have been employed very extensively in the effort to remold recalcitrants.3 it is probable
that individual freedom , especially freedom of the mind, has been dealt a staggering blow; but
there is no reason to believe that the Chinese have been turned into soulless robots or that all
morality has been extinguished. Observers report, on the contrary, manifestations of puritanical
zeal, amounting almost to priggishness. The assertion that the government or the Party has
destroyed the family is not substantiated. They have overthrown the old patriarchal structure by
outlawing child marriage and parentally dictated unions. The marriage law of 1950 gave women
equal rights with men in respect to choice of spouse, conjugal privileges and obligations, and
divorce. Legal equality between the sexes and the elimination of prostitution and concubinage
have in creased the number of marriages and enhanced the status of the monogamous family.
2
E. Snow, The Other Side of the River, pp. 501-509.
3
A curious example of the “thought reform” process in Henry Pu Yi, the Manchu boy emperor deposed in 1911,
Japanese puppet ruler of Manchukuo, now, at this own request working in a botanical station. Another example is
the distinguished philosopher Fung Yu-lan.
socialist society and advocated "democratic methods of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion,
and of education"—even though he intended to encourage "purification" of the Party rather than
to permit open opposition to the regime. Communist intellectuals have at tempted to apply the
dialectical formula to a reinterpretation of Chinese history. They pay homage to Dr. Sun Yat-sen
and identity his principles—as restated by them—with their program. For substantiating
evidence they can point to Madame Sun Yat-sen (Chiang Kai-shek's sister-in-law), who holds
one of the vice chairmanships of the People's Republic.
The rapid unification and economic strengthening of China under a totalitarian regime
has drastically altered the power relationships in Asia and the Far East. Regardless of ideology,
the Peking government has acquired a more formidable international position than China enjoyed
for centuries. With a powerful army at their disposal, the Communists re-established Chinese
jurisdiction over important areas that had been lost during the decline of the Manchu Dynasty.
They took possession of Manchuria (even though Soviet forces were in occupation at the close of
the war), retained Sinkiang in the far west, and installed their force in Tibet. And while
augmenting China’s national prestige they have been able to pose as the champions of Asiatic
people against Western imperialism, assisting revolutionary movements against the British in
Malaya and against the French in Indo-China. Red China has tried assiduously to win friends
among the nations of Southeast Asia, counting on the sympathies of large numbers of "overseas
Chinese” in that area; and has also cultivated good relations with Japan in the Western bloc and
with unaligned states such as India and Burma. Her prospects of success appeared to be
jeopardized, at least temporarily, by her ruthless suppression of the Tibetan revolt in 1959 and,
recently, by aggressive action in the border dispute with India.
A basic principle of Communist China's foreign policy has been cordiality toward the
Soviet Union. In 1950 representatives of the two states signed a thirty-year treaty of “friendship,
alliance, and mutual assistance,” which invalidated the 1945 treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the
Chinese Nationalists. The preamble of China's 1954 Constitution reaffirms "indestructible
friendship" with the Soviet Union. China was aided by Soviet loans (not gifts) and for several
years relied heavily upon the Russians for technical assistance. Between 1950 and 1955 China's
exchange with the Soviet-bloc countries increased from 26 per cent to 75 per cent of her total
foreign trade. By 1959 China was accounting for 191/2 per cent of Russia's foreign trade. It is a
mistake, however, to regard China merely as an outpost of Soviet Communism. Far from being
the small wheel of the Moscow-Peking axis, China has acquired a voice of authority in the
Communist world. Mao Tse-tung's actions and pronouncements have sometimes been viewed
with misgivings in Moscow. Policy and ideological differences broke out into the open at the
Moscow international conference of Communist parties in 1960 and seemed to threaten a rupture
between the two Communist giants. Chinese spokesmen denounced the doctrine of co-existence
and accused the Russians of being revisionist Marxists and appeasers of "capitalist imperialists,"
while Khrushchev rebuked the Chinese for inflexible dogmatism and reckless aggressiveness. As
the Sino-Soviet dispute grew sharper and more unrestrained, it seemed to stem less from subtle
ideological differences than from conflicting national ambitions and the rivalries of power
politics. In the spring of 1963 the Chinese hinted at the eventual rectification of their frontiers at
Russia's expense and later (in September 963) made the startling accusation that Russia had
joined with the United States, Nehru’s India and Tito's Yugoslavia in a counterrevolutionary
"Holy Alliance.”
The counterpart of Red China's friendship with Russia has been her hostility toward the
United States. This is explained partly by the fact that the United States has replaced Great
Britain as the dominant Western power in the Far East and so has become a convenient target for
accusations of imperialism. In their attempt to regiment and energize the Chinese people the
Communists needed the spur of a tangible external enemy; “Hate America” campaigns have
been useful to stimulate more heroic labor efforts. While the official attitude toward the United
States is thus somewhat contrived, it must be admitted that American Far Eastern policy has
helped to make it seem plausible. United States financial support was extended to Chiang Kai-
shek throughout the war, even after he had stopped fighting the Japanese, and the United States
pays the greater part of the cost of his military establishment (600,000 troops) on the island of
Taiwan (which the Communists and the Nationalists both regard as an integral part of China).
Washington has withheld diplomatic recognition from Peking, blocked its admission to the U.N.,
discouraged U.S. citizens from visiting Red China, and urged allied nations not to trade with her.
American feeling toward China was naturally exacerbated during the Korean War of 1950-1953,
by the harsh treatment and "brainwashing" of American prisoners, fabricated charges that
Americans were using germ warfare, and tortuous negotiations for release of prisoners following
the hostilities. However, the chief obstacle in the way of better relations between China and the
United States is undoubtedly the issue of the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. In 1955, in 1958, and
again in the summer of 1962, the threat of war in the Far East became grave because of the
bellicose attitudes of the Nationalist and mainland Chinese armed forces. Although the situation
remains critical, and in spite of truculent talk, it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists will
deliberately precipitate a war. Thus far they have allowed Portugal to retain Macao and Britain to
retain Hong Kong. They seem to be persuaded that the sands of imperialism are running out and
that time is on their side.
The success of Japan's policy of exerting diplomatic and economic pressure was
demonstrated at the Peace Conference of 1919. The Chinese delegation naturally demanded the
restoration of Shantung, a request entirely consonant with Wilsonian principles The Japanese,
however, refused to comply, and Wilson did not press the matter vigorously, partly because
another Japanese objective of a less questionable character had been defeated. The Japanese had
asked for a declaration endorsing the principle of "the equality of nations and the just treatment
of their nationals." On this issue the Chinese and Japanese stood together, supported also by the
representatives of several European states. But the fear that such a declaration would conflict
with the policy of limiting Oriental immigration led the Americans and British to oppose it when
the matter was put to a vote in the League of Nations Commission. In this instance the Western
statesmen had rebuffed Japan when she was supporting a moral issue entirely consistent with the
ideals for which the war had been fought. And they yielded to her on the Shantung question
where her claims had no moral justification whatever. The North Pacific islands which Japan had
taken from Germany she was allowed to retain, in accord with the secret treaties of 1917,
although these possessions were to be held as Mandates under the League of Nations.
In spite of having plucked the fruits of imperialism, Japan after World War I seemed to
be moving in a liberal direction, both in domestic affairs and in her international relations. The
antiwar sentiment which became prevalent for a short time in much of the Western world was
manifest, to a lesser degree, in Japan and provoked a revulsion against military leadership. The
propaganda so widely disseminated during the great "crusade for democracy" had its effect upon
the Japanese people. Japan had been associated with the foremost Western democracies during
the war; she had been one of the "Big Five" at the Paris Peace Conference; and—in contrast to
Wilson's own United States—she had signed the Versailles Treaty and joined the League of
Nations. Twice before in their history the Japanese had revealed a capacity for adopting what
seemed to be the most effective and up-to-date institutions in the world as they knew it, and
many of their leaders were persuaded that democracy was essential for progress in the twentieth
century. Even purely from the standpoint of strengthening Japan as a state, there was much to be
said for the democratic thesis. Japanese statesmen were impressed by the fact that autocratic and
militaristic Germany had been defeated (and autocratic Russia had collapsed in revolution),
while the apparently weaker democratic nations had been victorious. And, although few of these
statesmen were convinced democrats in the full sense of the term, they were at least desirous of
retaining the good will of the democratic powers which seemed to be in command of the world's
destiny at the moment.
During much of the 1920's Japan's international policy was on the whole conciliatory,
amounting to a partial reversal of her earlier aggressiveness. This is illustrated by her part in the
Washington Conference of 1921-1922, which produced a Naval Arms Limitation Agreement, a
Nine-Power "Open Door” Treaty concerning China, and a Four-Power Pacific Pact. The
Conference had been summoned by the United States largely because of American fear that
Japan, with the increased industrial and military potential which she had acquired during the war,
was endangering the balance of power in the Far East. Obviously the Washington treaties did not
succeed in binding Japan permanently to a policy of nonaggression, but the Japanese delegates
accepted a limitation of Japan's battleship tonnage to a figure three-fifths that of the United
States and of Britain, at a time when naval spokesmen in Japan were loudly demanding parity
with the Western sea powers. With considerable reluctance the Japanese agreed (largely at the
insistence of the United States and Canada) to terminate their alliance of twenty years' standing
with Great Britain. The Four-Power Pact which replaced the alliance was based on nothing more
substantial than the promise of friendly consultation on problems of the Pacific and pledges to
maintain the status quo in regard to fortifications in this area. The Nine-Power Treaty affirmed
the principle of the Open Door in China, giving the term a somewhat broader definition than it
had had before, and assured China that the signatory powers would seek no further spheres of
interest in her dominions. The treaty actually restored nothing to China, but the Japanese
delegates, in private conferences with the Chinese, promised that their government would
withdraw its troops from Shantung and return the administration of the province to China,
leaving Japanese interests represented only in the form of private capital investments. This action
was carried out as promised before the close of 1922.
At the same time there were elements among the Japanese population genuinely
interested in promoting democratic progress for its own sake. The demand for responsible
ministries, dependent upon parties in the Diet rather than upon bureaucrats in the Privy Council,
was renewed after the emergency of the war had passed. In 1918, for the first time in Japan's
history, a commoner had been named premier. He was assassinated by a fanatical nationalist at
the time of the Washington Conference; but during the decade following the war most of the
cabinets reflected the trend toward party government as opposed to bureaucratic dictation In
1925 a major step in the direction of political democracy was taken when the government passed
a law establishing universal manhood suffrage. While the extension of the franchise did not
immediately produce active participation in public affairs on the part of the common people,
there was a growing and articulate group of intellectuals, professional men, and white-collar
workers in the cities who favored the extension of individual liberties and supported social and
economic as well as political reform. Along with this rising middle class, the laboring class was
increasing and was beginning to demand better conditions. Strikes, although dealt with severely
by the government, were frequent during the 1920’s.
Promising as were the liberal-democratic trends in Japan, they did not become vigorous
enough to extinguish the deeply entrenched reactionary forces which eventually led the country
to disaster. The failure of the liberal elements must be attributed in part to external factors. The
disillusionment and cynicism that became general postwar years throughout the West had their
counterpart in Japan. Contrary to the optimistic predictions of liberal statesmen in Japan and
other countries, the trends of international politics did not indicate a substantial gain for
democratic processes. The rise of fascism in Europe demonstrated a powerful movement in the
opposite direction. Almost everywhere, virulent nationalism seemed to be in the ascendancy,
obscuring the hope of a co-operative world order. With democracy on the defensive or in retreat
in the countries of the West, where it was indigenous, it could scarcely be expected to triumph
easily in such a nation as Japan, where it was a recent innovation with no cultural or institutional
roots.
Inimical to the growth of a vigorous liberalism was the fact that the sensibilities of the
Japanese were irritated by the discrimination which they encountered in the form of tariffs
against their goods and immigration laws against their persons. In 1924 the United States
Congress passed an Oriental Exclusion law, placing Asiatics in a category inferior to that of the
most backward Europeans. The United States was not alone in such a policy, but the Japanese
were particularly stunned by this act because in the preceding year Americans had contributed
generously to relieve the stricken inhabitants of Tokyo and Yokohama after a disastrous
earthquake. Many Japanese began to feel that the great white nations were determined never to
treat them as equals. The high tariff policies of the United States and other Western powers were
another disturbing factor. producing psychological as well as economic repercussions. By 1930
the larger share of Japan's foreign trade, both export and import, was with the United States, with
a trade balance decidedly favorable to the latter country. Protectionists in the United States
alleged that American standards were threatened by competition from "cheap” Japanese labor.
Yet the chief Japanese import was raw rotton and Japan’s leading export to the United States was
raw silk, an item hardly competitive with American industry.
In the last analysis, the defeat of liberal forces was due to deficiencies in the structure of
Japanese society and in the economic system. The fundamental problem of creating a stable
economy and satisfactory living standards for the majority of the people was never solved, and
the problem became steadily more acute as the population continued to increase at the rate of one
million a year. In spite of the expansion of commerce and manufacture, Japan's per capita
income by 1928 was equal only to about one-eighth of that of the United States. Japan's
prosperity, such as it was, depended upon participation in a world market that was subjected to
more and more intense competition. Her foreign trade received a severe blow when the price of
silk, her leading article of export, declined about 75 per cent between 1925 and 1934. To
compensate for the collapse of the silk market. Japanese manufacturers stepped up the
production of cotton cloth, but in this field they were bucking old and strongly established
competitors. The Great Depression truck Japan just when the country seemed to be pulling out of
a slump. Between 1929 and 1931 Japan's foreign commerce fell off by one-half, while rural and
industrial indebtedness swelled to a figure in excess of the national income. Viewed superficially,
Japanese economy appeared to have made a rapid recovery from the Depression, since by 1935
Japanese exports actually exceeded in value the total for 1925. However. this was accomplished
only by drastic price-cutting and by forcing down the wages of Japanese workers, so that the
increase in exports did not represent a net gain in national wealth.
The highly inequitable distribution of wealth within Japan made for an artificial
stratification of classes and interests that was unfavorable to the development of a democratic
society. The middle class was too small and insecure to be a very effective liberal force. The
great body of farmers and laborers had been ushered out of the discipline of Tokugawa feudalism
into the discipline of an efficient centralized bureaucracy, without ever being emancipated from
their traditions of docility and the acceptance of direction from above. Aspects of a feudal
mentality persisted within the nation after feudalism had been replaced by a modern capitalist
order. Industry, commerce, and finance were concentrated in the hands of a few huge trusts,
known collectively as the Zaibatsu, each controlled by a closely integrated family group and
almost beyond the reach of public supervision. The Zaibatsu not only dominated the economic
picture but also were affiliated with bureaucrats in the government and deeply influenced
political parties.
The flimsy foundations of Japanese liberalism are revealed in the history and character of
political and character of political parties during the 1920's and early 1930’s, by which time two
competing parties had risen to prominence. About 1900 the Seiyukai party had been organized
under the auspices of one of the most influential clan bureaucrats. The Seiyukai was a
descendant of the old Liberal party of Itagaki, but it exemplified a metamorphosis of liberalism
into something almost its opposite. Itagaki's party. largely agrarian from the beginning, had
passed under the domination of great landlords in place of the small tenants. To this conservative
agrarian element was added the leading representative of big business, the house of Mitsui. Thus
the Seiyukai constituted an alliance of landlords, monopoly capitalists, and bureaucrats, and it
had connections also with the armed services. While the party favored constitutional methods, it
was extremely conservative on domestic issues and rabidly expansionist on foreign policy,
advocating forceful measures to improve Japan's economy position.
In 1927 an opposition party to the Seiyukai was formed, incorporating remnants of the
old Progressive party of Count Okuma. This new party, the Minseito, was backed primarily by
industrial rather than agrarian interests, and favored policies conducive to the health of the
business community, including social welfare measures to relieve working-class discontent. The
Minseito frowned on a policy of territorial aggression and deplored the reckless braggadocio of
chauvinistic nationalists. But while it was progressive in comparison with the Seiyukai, it could
hardly be considered truly liberal in composition or principles. It was supported by one of the
great Zaibatsu houses (the Mitsubishi) and was as intensely nationalistic as the Seiyukai,
differing from the latter chiefly on the question of which methods would best advance the
country’s interests.
A hopeful interlude, of brief duration, began when a Minseito cabinet came into office in
1929 and attempted to reverse the “strong" policy of the previous ministry, which had thrown
troops into Shantung province as the Chinese Nationalist forces advanced toward Peking. The
impact of the world depression upon Japan's economy, however, jeopardized the position of the
moderate Minseito cabinet, and the assassination of the premier by a fanatic not only weakened
the cabinet but also gave ominous warning of the length to which intransigent nationalist groups
would go in promoting their own cause. Then, in September 1931, the Japanese army stationed
in Manchuria took matters into its own hands by attacking Chinese troops. By the following
February Manchuria had become the “independent” state of Manchukuo under Japanese auspices,
and in 1933 Japan, branded publicly as an aggressor, defiantly withdrew from the League of
Nations.
Throughout the 1930’s liberal elements in Japan never entirely abandoned their struggle
to hold back the tide of militant nationalism. But when the issues became international, as in the
struggle over Manchuria and, later, in the war against China, patriotic sentiments blunted the
edge of popular opposition. The only groups strong enough to challenge the militarists were the
financial and business interests, and these were easily seduced by the promise of profits in the
offing. Most of the business leaders had come to regard expansion as essential to Japan's
economy. They had hoped that it could be carried out peacefully and painlessly, but they had
helped to build (and had profited from building) a war machine which would be extremely
difficult to hold within bounds.
Of course, the primary center of aggressive truculence lay in the military services
themselves, particularly the army. As was previously pointed out, the Japanese army was
composed largely of peasants, an unfortunate class, whose legitimate discontents were, under
skillful direction, sublimated into an unreasoned and frenzied patriotism. After the Meiji period
the army officers also were drawn chiefly from small towns and rural communities, and they
lacked the temperate and relatively broad-minded attitude that had distinguished the samurai
leaders. Gradually a "young officer" group developed an ideology of its own, which began to
permeate the rank and file. Idealists in the worst sense of the term, these soldier fanatics
preached absolute loyalty to the emperor and affirmed that Japan, of divine origin and superior to
other nations, had the right to extend her rule over other parts of the world. At the same time,
reflecting their peasant affinities, they demanded agrarian reforms or even nationalization of the
land and castigated both capitalists and politicians as selfish and corrupt. Their program, a
medley of radical and reactionary principles, aimed to make Japan an invincible stare, solidly
unified under thel imperial will, which they claimed to represent most faithfully. Although it has
been likened to fascism, the “Imperial Way" proclaimed by the ultranationalists undoubtedly had
more in common with the ancient Japanese concepts of the state a patriarchal society and of the
superiority of government by men to government by law.
The creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932 and its development under
Japanese management did not yield the substantial benefits to Japan's economy which had been
anticipated. To exploit the coal, iron, and oil resources of Manchuria required an extensive
outlay of capital, and Japanese capital was not readily forthcoming, partly because of the fear
that industry in Manchukuo would compete with Japan's and partly because of the rigid
governmental controls imposed upon capital and industry in the puppet state. Reflecting the
antifree-enterprise bias of the army nationalists, the government attempted to create in
Manchukuo a type of state directed economy; and, when the Zaibatsu houses seemed reluctant to
participate, an independent group of Japanese investors was recruited to support the new
"capitalism of the people." As plans matured for making Manchuria not simply a source of raw
materials for Japan but a center of heavy industry for Asia, it became apparent that the assurance
of access to a wide market area was imperative. Hence, Japanese expansionists attempted to
convert China's northeastern provinces into an “autonomous” region, linked economically with
Manchukuo. Finally they enlarged their objectives to encompass the creation of a "Greater East
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Instead of alleviating Japan's economy. her leaders had saddled it
with additional burdens, entailing larger and larger expenditures for armaments in support of a
program which had no foreseeable limits and which was bound to meet with resistance at every
point.
The role of Japan in World War II, into which her conflict with China was merged, is
discussed elsewhere in this volume. Japan’s surrender in 1945 was the prelude to a new phase of
her history, in many ways different from anything she had experienced in the past. Never before
had the Japanese nation been defeated in war and never before had the country been occupied by
a foreign power. The occupation of a conquered country was also a new experience for the
United States. At the very least it can be said that both the Japanese and the Americans
conducted themselves in such a way as to produce a minimum of friction in relationships which
were necessarily difficult.
For six and a half years the real authority in Japan was nominally held by the Far Eastern
Commission in Washington and the advisory Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo, with General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; actually it was
held by General MacArthur, under orders from Washington, and by the Japanese government.
From beginning to end the Japanese Occupation was an undertaking and a responsibility of the
United States. Military rule was indirect, however, and was exercised through the regular
Japanese government, which had not disintegrated with Japan's military defeat. The emperor
accepted the surrender terms, called upon his subjects to co-operate with the occupying forces,
and served as the connecting link between the old order and the new. In spite of the relative
unimportance of the emperor politically in modern times, his role was of great value
psychologically in providing a symbol of continuity when so much of the past seemed to have
been destroyed forever.
One of the first major tasks of the Occupation authorities was to furnish Japan with a new
constitution grounded in democratic principles. A draft prepared by a group of Japanese
consultants was replaced by an American document, which was approved by the emperor and
formally promulgated by him in the Diet in November 1946. It went into effect in May of the
following year. The Japanese Constitution of 1946 is one of the most remarkable documents of
its kind ever issued. It has been aptly described as "the world's outstanding model of the
conveying of political rights by constitutional fiat.”4 Breaking cleanly with tradition and with the
Constitution of 1889, it declared that sovereignty lay with the Japanese people and left the
emperor with only formal powers like those of the British monarch. (The emperor himself had
previously issued a rescript repudiating the myth of his divine origin.) The new Constitution
contained an elaborate Bill of Rights, in which to the normal civil liberties were added such
benefits as the right to work and to bargain collectively, social equality, and equality of the sexes.
Universal adult suffrage was established, with a bicameral Diet, and a cabinet responsible to the
House of Representatives. The Constitution also incorporated the American principles of
separation of church and state and judicial review of acts of the legislature. Particularly arresting
was Article 9, which declared that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation" and that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never
be maintained." Altogether, the new Constitution had a highly utopian flavor. If its principles
could have been carried into active and complete realization, hey would have made Japan a more
advanced democratic nation than the United States.
4
Linebarger, Djang, and Burks, Far Eastern Government and Politics: China and Japan, p. 479.
adherence to the ideals which were boldly announced in the new Constitution. Labor was
prodded into organizing and collective bargaining, but strikes were restricted by the Occupation
government. Also, beginning in 1947. Occupation policy, reflecting the pressures of global
power politics, shifted from reform to retrenchment and recovery. The program of decentralizing
industry, which perhaps would have proved temporary in any case, halted with the realization
that if Japan's industrial strength were preserved it could be an asset to the West in the cold war
with the Communist powers.
A peace treaty between the United States and Japan was negotiated at San Francisco in
September 1951, and ratified the following April. It was also signed by 48 other states, not
including the Soviet Union, however, which remained technically in a state of war with Japan
until 1956. The peace settlement, although it ended the Occupation and restored formal
independence to Japan, was very drastic territorially. Depriving the nation of all its empire, the
treaty reduced Japan to the four main islands—the same area had held the time of Commodore
Perry's visit in 1853, although its population was now three times as great. The peace treaty
(supplemented by a security treaty) acknowledged Japan's right to arm for "self-defense" and
authorized the stationing of foreign troops (meaning American) in Japan for the defense of the
country.
Democracy has undoubtedly made progress in Japan, but its extent and character are still
somewhat ambiguous. The press is free and often criticizes the government sharply and with
impunity. Japan's Constitution is one of the most democratic in the world, but, while it operates
and is accepted by a majority of the people, it does not seem to have related itself vitally to the
currents of social and cultural change. In line with the new democratic machinery the role of
parties has become paramount. However, as in prewar Japan, parties have been hampered by the
persistent tradition of n loyalty to personalities, kinship groups, or local interests, in contrast to
association for common objectives on an impersonal basis. A multitude of parties soon appeared
(363 participated in the 1946 elections), but nation-wide coalitions have achieved considerable
stability. The electorate has shown a consistently conservative bias, as illustrated by the fact that
Shigeru Yoshida, a career diplomat of the prewar era, held the premiership five times between
1946 and 1954. Two major parties, successors respectively of the old Seiyukai and Minseito,
merged in 1955 to form the “Liberal Democratic” party, which has held a preponderant position
ever since. In spite of name the party is conservative, deriving its support from business (big and
medium-sized), some old-line bureaucrats, and—because it has held office so long—officials of
the civil service, Its program calls for continued expansion of the economy, an “independent
foreign policy” within the framework of the American alliance, the rejection of neutralism but
friendly relations with all nations, and the strengthening of Japan's defenses. The head of the
party and premier from 1957 to 1960 was Nobusuke Kishi, once a member of Tojo's war cabinet
and imprisoned as a suspected war criminal during the Occupation, but who affirmed his
devotion to “a new progressive conservatism."
The principal, though not very effective, opposition has been supplied by the Socialists,
weakened by a wide range of ideological differences and internal disputes. The party attracts
some intellectuals, but its main backing comes from one of the two main sections of organized
labor (composed chiefly of government employees). The party's avowed objectives include
protection of civil liberties, extension of workers' benefits and eventual realization of a socialist
economy; and, more emphatically, the abrogation of the security treaty with the United States
and the removal of all American military bases from Japan. While some of these points elicit
broad popular sympathy, the Socialists have never been able to win more than a third of the vote
national elections, largely because unprecedented material prosperity has come about under a
succession of conservative administrations and the average voter is not convinced that he would
be better off under different and untried leadership. The farming sector, still about 4o per cent of
the citizenry is effectively organized in Agricultural Cooperative Associations, and, while
apathetic toward political issues, has solidly backed the Liberal Democratic (conservative) party.
All of the parties are largely coalitions of divergent factions. None has appealed sufficiently to
the emerging middle class and none has real mass support—least of all the Communists, whose
voting strength, after reaching to per cent of the total in 1949, declined to almost insignificant
proportions.
The economic difficulties confronting Japan immediately after her surrender seemed
practically insurmountable. Before the close of hostilities almost one-third of the homes in
Japan's urban area were destroyed by air attacks, and the direct economic loss caused by the war
was tremendous. Japan was shorn of her empire, her industrial production had fallen 8o per cent
below the 1937 level, her foreign trade stood at zero, and she was dependent upon imports even
for foodstuffs. Viewed against this dismal background, Japan's economic recovery and advance
have been spectacular. By 1953 the index of production was 50 per cent above the level of the
mid-1930's, and it continued upward, with textiles, metal goods, and machinery leading the way.
Japan's shipbuilding industry grew so rapidly that by 1957 it exceeded that of every other
country, including Great Britain. Tokyo, where International Trade Fairs were held in 1955 and
1957. became a boom town with all the symptoms of prosperity. Its population rose from 3
million to 91/2 million by 1960, making it the world's largest city. Expansion has been evident in
practically every branch of the economy, and the Japanese have won distinction in such
specialized fields as electronics and optical and scientific instruments. During the period 1950-
1960 agricultural output increased 50 per cent, while capital investment and industrial production
tripled. Throughout this decade Japan's gross national product was expanding at an average rate
of 9 per cent a year, the highest growth rate of any country in the world (with the possible
exception of Communist China).
Recovery and a high level of prosperity do not mean that Japan has no serious economic
problems. She imports 20 per cent of her foodstuffs and 80 per cent of her raw materials for
manufacture and consequently must reach a wide export market in the face of severe competition.
One-third of her foreign trade is with the United and Canada (with a dollar balance favorable to
the United States). A serious disadvantage—reflecting the logic of international politics rather
than economics—is the loss of the Chinese mainland market. China absorbed 26 per cent of
Japan's exports in 1928; in 1961, 4 of 1 per cent. Not surprisingly, both major political parties
have called for the re-opening of China market even though Japan has not granted diplomatic
recognition to Peking. A rapidly growing population has posed another problem, which may be
approaching solution. By 960 the total number of inhabitants had reached 94 million, but the
birthrate dropped from one of the highest in the world to one of the lowest (from 33 births per
thousand in 1950 to 17 per thousand in 1957). Population has been shifting to the cities, with 4o
per cent now living in urban areas and 25 per cent in cities of 100,000 or over. Accumulating
wealth is very unevenly distributed and wages have remained relatively low in the small shops
and home factories which still employ a majority working force.
In spite of flaws in the picture, the zooming prosperity of Japan is one of the impressive
facts of the mid-twentieth century. Per capita income—still low by American standards—is
twice what it was in 1940, and the government aims to double the economy again by 1970.
Already the Japanese standard of living is by far the highest in Asia (even in rural areas one
family in ten owns a television set), and wages are approaching the level of Western Europe.
Several factors provide the explanation of this seemingly fantastic material success story. First,
in spite of staggering losses from the war, the Japanese retained their technical proficiency, labor
force, and traditions of hard work. A second factor helping to initiate recovery was American
fiancial aid, not only during the Occupation but also by the purchase of good and services during
the Korean conflict. But the most important asset of all was—paradoxically—the defeat and
elimination of Japan’s military complex, which had systematically drained the country of its
resource. Contemporary Japan enjoys the distinction of being the only great industrial nation in
the world operating on a peace economy instead of a war economy. Supporting armed forces
totaling only 230,000 men, the “Defense Agency" consumes not quite 10 per cent of the annual
budget and less than 11/2 per cent of the national income.
The Japanese, in common with most other nations, have found the course of foreign
policy strewn with trouble. Edging her way precariously between two worlds, the new Japan has
made gradual progress toward rehabilitating her relations with other states. The hostility and
distrust that was the heritage of Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia has slowly receded. Japan
signed reparations agreements with Burma and the Philippines, promising to supply goods,
technical assistance, and investments over a long period. To reach an understanding with the
Soviet Union proved more difficult, but in October 1956 Russia and Japan signed a peace
declaration, formally ending the state of war between the two countries. The negotiations left
undetermined the future of the Kurile Islands—claimed by Japan and held by Russia—but it
provided for restoring diplomatic intercourse, repatriating Japanese prisoners of war, and the
relinquishing of Russian demands for reparations. Also, because Russia now withdrew her
opposition, Japan was enabled to become a member of the United Nations, in December 1956.
Through the Colombo Plan of assistance to underdeveloped countries in Southeast Asia, Japan
has contributed more than $6 billion for projects in Ceylon. India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand,
Cambodia, and Vietnam.
The scope and objectives of Japan's foreign policy hinge on the delicate subject of
relations with the United States. Public opinion in Japan strongly disapproves of the continued
testing of nuclear weapons by the great powers. This is understandable in view of the fact that
230,000 Japanese still suffer from radioactive diseases caused by the two bombs dropped on
Japan in 1945, and because the location of the Islands exposes them to the hazards of radioactive
fallout from thermonuclear explosions both in the Pacific and in Siberia. Another issue
confronting the government involved the status of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands, occupied by
the United States as security bases under terms which recognized Japan's "residual sovereignty”
and her right eventually to recover jurisdiction over the Islands. Opposition to renewal of the
United States security treaty was behind Tokyo riots that led to the cancelling of President
Eisenhower's projected visit to Japan in the early summer of 1960. Both Premier Kishi's
conservative bloc and the Socialist opposition violated parliamentary decorum in the controversy
over the treaty. The Socialists resorted to a sit-down strike in the aisles of the House of
Representatives and tried to block the Speaker from reaching the chair. After having the Socialist
members forcibly ejected by police, Kishi pushed ratification of the treaty through a rump
parliament in midnight session (May 19-20). Public reaction to these maneuvers was explosive.
Mass petitions were submitted demanding dissolution of the Diet; five million workers went on
strike; university students and professors joined in demonstrations of protest. However, agitation
subsided as soon as the treaty automatically became effective one month after the Diet vote of
ratification (in accordance with a Constitutional provision). Moreover, the critics' attack on the
Kishi cabinet for its "anti-democratic” conduct produced no measurable political change.
Premier Kishi resigned, to be replaced by Hayato Ikeda, another conservative, and in the tranquil
November election of 196o the Liberal Democratic party retained its majority almost
undiminished. The 1960 political crisis was neither Communist-inspired, nor profoundly anti-
American, nor proof—as some feared—of the collapse of democratic government in Japan. It did
reflect a growing demand for a fully independent status in foreign affairs and, perhaps even more,
the lack of rapport between the people and their party leaders in or out of parliament.
BAB 16 Letusan di Timur Jauh.
Bagaimana bisa pemerintah dibuat mahakuasa? begitu pemerintah berkuasa, bagaimana bisa
dibuat responsif terhadap kehendak rakyat?
Sistem demokrasi harus dijalankan di dalam jajaran rakyat, memberi mereka kebebasan
berbicara, berkumpul dan berserikat. Hak untuk memilih hanya diberikan kepada orang-orang
dan bukan kepada kaum reaksioner. Kedua aspek ini, yaitu demokrasi di antara rakyat dan
kediktatoran atas kaum reaksioner, bergabung membentuk kediktatoran demokratik rakyat.
Era kontemporer negara-negara Timur Jauh mulai di bawah stimulasi yang diberikan oleh
pengaruh para penjelajah dan pedagang Barat. Pada pertengahan abad ke-20 perubahan besar
telah terjadi tidak hanya di negara-negara Timur tetapi juga dalam hubungan mereka dengan
Barat. Tidak lagi hanya mencakup bidang-bidang utama yang diminati oleh negara-negara Barat,
mereka telah menjadi bagian penting dari urusan dunia. Jepang merebut sebuah kerajaan besar di
Asia dan Pasifik, yang ia pertahankan sampai dikalahkan dalam perjuangan panjang melawan
negara-negara Barat yang paling kuat. Cina, setelah hampir hancur dan setelah melewati
lingkaran revolusi, muncul dengan lembaga-lembaga yang diubah secara radikal, tetapi sekali
lagi, sebagai negara terkuat di Asia. Selain itu, Cina untuk pertama kalinya dalam sejarahnya
berada dalam posisi untuk mengambil peran utama dalam politik dunia.
Jepang partisipasi pada Perang Dunia I mempunyai efek penasaran yang merangsang
kedua lawannya dan liberal kecenderungan dalam negeri. Pemerintah Jepang memasuki perang
terhadap Jerman pada 1914, nominal out of regard for Inggris-Jepang aliansi tetapi sebenarnya
dari keinginan untuk mengamankan Kiaochow Bay dan konsesi Jerman di Semenanjung
Shantung. Lingkup Jerman bunga diduduki dengan sedikit kesulitan, dan selama perang Jepang
juga menyita pos-pos Jerman di Pasifik Utara khatulistiwa — Marshall, Caroline, dan Kepulauan
Mariana. Jepang menunjukkan sedikit minat dalam fase Barat perang, tapi digunakan untuk
sepenuhnya kesempatan yang diberikan oleh Cina kelemahan dan keterlibatan kekuatan Barat
dalam perjuangan titanic di Eropa. Tahun 1915 Jepang disajikan kepada pemerintah Peking (dari
Yuan Shih-k'ai) seperangkat permintaan yang dikenal sebagai tuntutan dua puluh satu, begitu
jauh jangkauannya bahwa konten mereka pada pertama dirahasiakan oleh pemerintah Jepang.
Jika diterima tanpa syarat, permintaan akan diizinkan Jepang untuk berbagi dalam administrasi
dan kedaulatan Cina. Ketika berita tentang urusan bocor, opini publik sangat terkejut, bahkan di
Jepang; dan gelombang kemarahan dilawat Cina. Akibatnya pemerintah Jepang mundur tuntutan
paling ekstrim, tetapi aman dari Peking izin untuk memperpanjang kepentingan ekonomi Jepang
di Manchuria dan Mongolia dalam serta menyediakan modal untuk pengembangan industri di
lembah Sungai Yangtze. Jepang dijamin lebih lanjut guaranties kepentingan nya oleh rahasia
perjanjian dengan sekutu barat nya dan perjanjian Lansing-Ishii 1917 dengan Amerika Serikat,
pernyataan bersama yang ambigu yang diakui, tanpa mendefinisikan, Jepang "minat khusus" di
Cina.
Meskipun memiliki memetik buah dari imperialisme, Jepang setelah perang dunia aku
tampaknya akan bergerak dalam arah yang liberal, baik dalam urusan domestik dan dalam
hubungan internasional Nya. Sentimen antiperang yang menjadi lazim untuk waktu yang singkat
di sebagian besar dunia Barat adalah nyata, ke tingkat yang lebih rendah, di Jepang dan memicu
sebuah jijik terhadap kepemimpinan militer. Propaganda jadi disebar-luaskan selama yang
Agung "Perang Salib untuk demokrasi" memiliki efek pada Japanese people. Jepang telah
berhubungan dengan negara-negara demokrasi yang terutama Barat selama perang; Dia telah
menjadi salah satu "Lima besar" pada Konferensi Perdamaian Paris; dan — berbeda dengan
Wilson sendiri Amerika Serikat — ia menandatangani Perjanjian Versailles dan bergabung
dengan Liga Bangsa-bangsa. Dua kali sebelum dalam sejarah mereka Jepang telah menyatakan
kapasitas untuk mengadopsi apa yang tampaknya menjadi lembaga yang paling efektif dan
terkini di dunia seperti mereka tahu itu, dan banyak dari para pemimpin mereka dibujuk bahwa
demokrasi adalah penting untuk kemajuan dalam abad kedua puluh. Bahkan murni dari sudut
pandang penguatan Jepang sebagai sebuah negara, ada banyak yang bisa dikatakan untuk Tesis
demokratis. Jepang negarawan yang terkesan oleh kenyataan bahwa otokratis dan militer Jerman
telah dikalahkan (dan otokratis Rusia telah runtuh dalam revolusi), sementara yang tampaknya
lemah Demokrat bangsa telah menang. Dan, meskipun beberapa negarawan ini yakin Demokrat
dalam arti istilah penuh, mereka setidaknya berkeinginan mempertahankan akan baik kekuatan
Partai Demokrat yang tampaknya berada di perintah dari takdir di dunia saat ini.
Selama banyak tahun 1920-an kebijakan Internasional Jepang adalah pada seluruh
berdamai, sebesar pembalikan parsial agresivitas nya sebelumnya. Ini diilustrasikan oleh bagian
dalam konferensi Washington dari 1921-1922, yang menghasilkan kesepakatan pembatasan
lengan yang angkatan laut, sembilan-Power "Membuka pintu" perjanjian mengenai Cina dan
empat Pacific Pakta. Konferensi telah dipanggil oleh Amerika Serikat terutama karena Amerika
takut bahwa Jepang, di dengan peningkatan potensi industri dan militer yang telah diperoleh
selama perang, adalah membahayakan keseimbangan kekuasaan di timur jauh. Jelas perjanjian
Washington tidak berhasil dalam mengikat Jepang secara permanen untuk kebijakan non-agresi,
tapi para delegasi Jepang menerima Pembatasan Tonase kapal perang Jepang ke angka tiga-
perlima dari Amerika Serikat dan Britania, pada waktu Kapan jurubicara angkatan laut Jepang
keras menuntut paritas dengan kekuatan laut Barat. Dengan keengganan cukup Jepang setuju
(sebagian besar di atas desakan Amerika Serikat dan Kanada) untuk mengakhiri aliansi mereka
dua puluh tahun berdiri dengan Britania Raya. Empat Pakta yang menggantikan aliansi
didasarkan pada tidak lebih besar daripada janji ramah konsultasi pada masalah Pasifik dan janji
untuk mempertahankan status quo dalam benteng di daerah ini. Perjanjian sembilan-Power
menegaskan prinsip pintu terbuka di Cina, memberikan istilah definisi yang agak lebih luas
daripada sebelumnya, dan meyakinkan Cina bahwa kekuatan penandatangan akan mencari bola
tidak lagi menarik di Dominion nya. Perjanjian benar-benar dipulihkan tidak ke Cina, tapi para
delegasi Jepang, pribadi konferensi dengan Cina, berjanji bahwa pemerintah akan menarik
pasukannya dari Shantung dan kembali pemerintahan provinsi ke Cina, meninggalkan Jepang
kepentingan yang mewakili hanya dalam bentuk investasi modal swasta. Tindakan ini dilakukan
seperti yang dijanjikan sebelumnya penutupan 1922.
Sikap masuk akal yang ditampilkan oleh Jepang pada konferensi Washington, terutama
dalam upaya untuk mendamaikan Cina pada pertanyaan Shantung, didasarkan sampai batas
tertentu pertimbangan ekonomi. Cina, hanya sedikit mengembangkan industri, mewakili pasar
potensial yang besar untuk barang-barang Jepang dan sumber bahan baku yang berharga. Banyak
pengusaha Jepang yakin bahwa budidaya hubungan persahabatan dengan luas daratan negara
akan membayar dividen yang jauh lebih besar daripada akan perebutan wilayah dengan
kekerasan dan risiko mengundang boikot terhadap Jepang perdagangan.
Pada saat yang sama ada unsur-unsur masyarakat Jepang benar-benar tertarik untuk
mempromosikan kemajuan demokrasi untuk kepentingan sendiri. Permintaan untuk Kementerian
bertanggung jawab, tergantung pada pihak dalam Diet daripada para birokrat di Privy Council,
diperbarui setelah darurat perang telah berlalu. Pada tahun 1918, untuk pertama kalinya dalam
sejarah Jepang, rakyat biasa telah diberi premier. Dia dibunuh oleh seorang fanatik nasionalis
pada saat Konferensi Washington; tetapi selama dekade setelah perang sebagian besar lemari
tercermin dengan kecenderungan menuju pemerintahan Partai sebagai lawan birokrasi dikte pada
tahun 1925 a Mayor langkah ke arah demokrasi politik yang diambil ketika pemerintah
mendirikan hukum hak pilih universal kedewasaan. Sementara ekstensi waralaba tidak segera
menghasilkan partisipasi aktif dalam urusan publik dari rakyat umum, ada tumbuh dan
mengartikulasikan sekelompok intelektual, orang-orang profesional dan pekerja kerah putih di
kota yang disukai perluasan kebebasan individu dan reformasi ekonomi dan sosial serta politik
yang didukung. Seiring dengan meningkatnya kelas menengah, dimana sang kelas meningkat
dan mulai menuntut lebih baik kondisi. Pemogokan, meskipun berurusan dengan parah oleh
pemerintah, yang sering selama tahun 1920-an.
Menjanjikan sebagai yang liberal Demokrat tren di Jepang, mereka tidak menjadi cukup
kuat untuk memadamkan pasukan reaksioner sangat berurat yang akhirnya memimpin negara itu
kepada bencana. Kegagalan liberal elemen harus dihubungkan sebagian faktor eksternal.
Kekecewaan dan sinisme yang menjadi umum tahun-tahun pasca seluruh Barat telah counterpart
mereka di Jepang. Bertentangan dengan prediksi optimis liberal negarawan di Jepang dan
negara-negara lain, kecenderungan politik internasional tidak menunjukkan keuntungan
substansial untuk proses yang demokratis. Bangkitnya fasisme di Eropa menunjukkan gerakan
kuat dalam arah yang berlawanan. Hampir di mana-mana, nasionalisme virulen tampaknya di
pengaruh, menutupi dengan harapan dari Orde Dunia koperasi. Dengan demokrasi pada defensif
atau mundur di negara-negara Barat, tempat itu adalah masyarakat adat, itu bisa hampir tidak
diharapkan untuk menang dengan mudah di sebuah negara seperti Jepang, di mana itu adalah
inovasi baru dengan akar tidak ada budaya atau institusional.
Lalu bermusuhan untuk pertumbuhan liberalisme kuat adalah fakta yang kepekaan
Jepang itu jengkel oleh diskriminasi yang mereka temui dalam bentuk TARIF terhadap barang-
barang mereka dan undang-undang imigrasi terhadap orang-orang mereka. Pada tahun 1924
Kongres Amerika Serikat mengesahkan Undang-undang pengecualian Oriental, menempatkan
mencontohi dalam kategori yang lebih rendah daripada orang Eropa paling terbelakang. Amerika
Serikat tidak sendirian dalam kebijakan seperti itu, tapi Jepang terutama tertegun oleh undang-
undang ini karena di tahun sebelumnya Amerika telah disumbangkan bermurah hati untuk
meringankan penduduk terserang Tokyo dan Yokohama setelah bencana gempa. Banyak orang
Jepang mulai merasa bahwa negara-negara putih besar bertekad untuk tidak memperlakukan
mereka sama. Kebijakan TARIF tinggi Amerika Serikat dan kekuatan Barat lainnya adalah
faktor lain yang mengganggu. menghasilkan dampak psikologis serta ekonomi. Oleh 1930 porsi
perdagangan luar negeri Jepang, baik ekspor dan impor, dengan Amerika Serikat, dengan neraca
perdagangan yang jelas menguntungkan bagi kedua negara. Protectionists di Amerika Serikat
menyatakan bahwa standar Amerika sedang terancam oleh persaingan dari buruh Jepang
"murah". Namun Impor Jepang kepala rotton mentah dan Jepang terkemuka ekspor ke Amerika
Serikat adalah sutra mentah, tidak bersaing dengan industri Amerika item.
Dalam analisa terakhir, kekalahan pasukan liberal adalah karena kekurangan dalam
struktur masyarakat Jepang dan sistem ekonomi. Masalah mendasar untuk menciptakan ekonomi
yang stabil dan standar hidup yang memuaskan bagi mayoritas orang-orang ini tidak pernah
diselesaikan, dan masalah menjadi terus lebih akut sebagai penduduk terus meningkat pada
tingkat satu juta per tahun. Meskipun perluasan perdagangan dan pembuatan, Jepang pendapatan
per kapita oleh 1928 adalah sama hanya sekitar satu-delapan dari Amerika Serikat. Kemakmuran
Jepang, seperti itu, bergantung pada partisipasi dalam pasar dunia yang telah ditaklukkan kepada
persaingan yang semakin ketat. Perdagangan luar negeri dia menerima pukulan yang parah
ketika harga sutra, artikelnya terkemuka ekspor, menurun sekitar 75 persen antara 1925 dan 1934.
Untuk mengkompensasi runtuhnya pasar sutra. Produsen Jepang melangkah produksi kain katun,
tetapi bidang ini mereka yang melawan tua dan sangat didirikan pesaing. Depresi besar truk
Jepang hanya ketika negara tampaknya akan menarik diri dari kemerosotan. Dari 1929 hingga
1931 perdagangan asing Jepang jatuh oleh setengah, sementara pedesaan dan industri utang
membengkak ke angka lebih dari pendapatan nasional. Melihat dangkal, ekonomi Jepang
tampaknya telah membuat pemulihan yang cepat dari depresi, karena oleh 1935 ekspor Jepang
benar-benar melebihi nilai total untuk tahun 1925. Namun. Hal ini dicapai hanya dengan harga
yang drastis dan memaksa menurunkan upah pekerja Jepang, sehingga peningkatan ekspor
Apakah tidak mewakili keuntungan bersih dalam kekayaan nasional.
Sangat adil distribusi kekayaan Jepang dibuat untuk stratifikasi buatan kelas dan
kepentingan yang tidak menguntungkan untuk pengembangan suatu masyarakat yang demokratis.
Kelas menengah adalah terlalu kecil dan tidak aman untuk menjadi kekuatan liberal sangat
efektif. Tubuh besar petani dan buruh telah diantar dari disiplin Tokugawa feodalisme menjadi
disiplin birokrasi terpusat yang efisien, tanpa pernah membebaskan dari tradisi-tradisi mereka
dari kepatuhan dan penerimaan arah dari di atas. Aspek mentalitas feodal bertahan dalam bangsa
setelah feodalisme digantikan oleh Orde kapitalis modern. Industri, perdagangan, dan keuangan
yang terkonsentrasi di tangan beberapa percaya besar, disebut sebagai Zaibatsu, masing-masing
dikontrol oleh kelompok keluarga yang erat terintegrasi dan hampir jangkauan pengawasan
publik. Zaibatsu tidak hanya didominasi gambar ekonomi tetapi juga berafiliasi dengan birokrat
di pemerintah dan sangat dipengaruhi partai politik.
Dasar-dasar tipis liberalisme Jepang yang terungkap dalam sejarah dan karakter politik
dan karakter partai politik selama tahun 1920-an dan awal tahun 1930-an, dimana kedua belah
pihak bersaing telah meningkat menjadi menonjol. Sekitar tahun 1900 Partai Seiyukai telah
diselenggarakan di bawah naungan salah satu paling berpengaruh klan birokrat. Seiyukai adalah
keturunan Partai Liberal tua Itagaki, tapi itu dicontohkan metamorfosis liberalisme menjadi
sesuatu yang hampir sebaliknya. Itagaki's partai. alang dari awal, telah berlalu di bawah
dominasi tuan-tanah besar tempat penyewa kecil. Dengan elemen agraria konservatif ini
ditambahkan wakil terkemuka dari bisnis besar, rumah Mitsui. Dengan demikian Seiyukai
membentuk aliansi tuan tanah, monopoli kapitalis dan birokrat, dan ia memiliki hubungan
dengan angkatan bersenjata. Sementara Partai disukai konstitusional metode, itu sangat
konservatif pada isu-isu domestik dan teramat sangat ekspansinya pada kebijakan luar negeri,
mendukung upaya paksa untuk meningkatkan posisi ekonomi Jepang.
Pada tahun 1927 sebuah oposisi Partai untuk Seiyukai dibentuk, menggabungkan sisa-
sisa Partai progresif tua Count Okuma. Partai baru ini, Minseito, adalah terutama didukung oleh
kepentingan industri daripada agraria, dan disukai kebijakan kondusif untuk kesehatan
masyarakat bisnis, termasuk langkah-langkah kesejahteraan sosial untuk meredakan
ketidakpuasan kelas buruh. Minseito kening kebijakan teritorial agresi dan menyesalkan
braggadocio yang sembrono dari chauvinistik nasionalis. Tetapi sementara itu progresif
dibandingkan dengan Seiyukai, bisa tidak dianggap benar-benar liberal dalam komposisi atau
prinsip-prinsip. Itu didukung oleh salah satu rumah Zaibatsu besar (Mitsubishi) dan sebagai
intens nasionalis sebagai Seiyukai, berbeda dari yang terakhir terutama pada pertanyaan yang
metode terbaik akan memajukan kepentingan negara.
Selingan penuh harapan, durasi singkat, dimulai ketika kabinet Minseito datang ke kantor
pada tahun 1929 dan berusaha untuk membalikkan "kuat" kebijakan Kementerian sebelumnya,
yang telah dilemparkan tentara ke Provinsi Shantung sebagai pasukan nasionalis Cina maju
menuju Peking. Dampak dari depresi dunia atas ekonomi Jepang, namun, membahayakan posisi
kabinet Minseito moderat, dan pembunuhan premier oleh seorang fanatik tidak hanya melemah
kabinet tetapi juga memberikan peringatan menakutkan panjang yang kelompok-kelompok
nasionalis degil akan pergi dalam mempromosikan penyebab mereka sendiri. Kemudian, dalam
September 1931, tentara Jepang yang ditempatkan di Manchuria mengambil masalah ke
tangannya sendiri dengan menyerang tentara Cina. Berikut Februari Manchuria telah menjadi
negara "independen" Manchukuo di bawah naungan Jepang, dan pada tahun 1933 Jepang,
bermerek publik sebagai agresor, menantang mengundurkan diri dari Liga Bangsa-bangsa.
Sepanjang tahun 1930-an unsur-unsur yang liberal di Jepang tidak pernah sepenuhnya
ditinggalkan perjuangan mereka untuk menahan gelombang nasionalisme militan. Tapi ketika
masalah menjadi internasional, dalam perjuangan selama Manchuria dan, kemudian, dalam
perang melawan Cina, sentimen patriotik menumpulkan tepi perlawanan. Hanya kelompok kuat
cukup untuk menantang militarists adalah kepentingan keuangan dan bisnis, dan ini adalah
mudah tergoda oleh janji keuntungan di sebentar lagi. Kebanyakan pemimpin bisnis telah datang
untuk menganggap ekspansi sebagai penting untuk ekonomi Jepang. Mereka berharap bahwa hal
itu dapat dilakukan secara damai dan tanpa rasa sakit, tapi mereka telah membantu untuk
membangun (dan telah diuntungkan dari bangunan) mesin perang yang akan sangat sulit untuk
memegang dalam batas.
Tentu saja, pusat utama agresif truculence berbaring di layanan militer sendiri, terutama
Angkatan Darat. Sebagai sebelumnya menunjuk, tentara Jepang itu terdiri terutama dari petani,
kelas Malang, sanggahan yang sah yang, di bawah arahan terampil, disublimasikan ke
patriotisme unreasoned dan hiruk pikuk. Setelah periode Meiji para perwira angkatan darat juga
dibuat terutama dari kota-kota kecil dan masyarakat pedesaan, dan mereka tidak memiliki iklim
dan relatif berwawasan luas sikap yang telah dibedakan para samurai pemimpin. Grup "perwira
muda" laun sebuah ideologi sendiri, yang mulai menyerap pangkat dan file. Idealis dalam arti
terburuk istilah, ini fanatik prajurit memberitakan mutlak kesetiaan kepada Kaisar dan
menegaskan bahwa Jepang, asal-usul ilahi dan superior bangsa-bangsa lain, memiliki hak untuk
memperpanjang aturan Nya atas bagian-bagian lain dunia. Pada saat yang sama, mencerminkan
afinitas petani mereka, mereka menuntut reformasi agraria atau bahkan nasionalisasi tanah dan
mengecam kapitalis dan politisi sebagai korup dan egois. Program mereka, sebuah medley dari
prinsip-prinsip yang radikal dan reaksioner, yang bertujuan untuk membuat Jepang menatap tak
terkalahkan, kokoh bersatu di bawah thel imperial akan, yang mereka mengklaim untuk
mewakili paling setia. Meskipun ini telah disamakan fasisme, "Cara Imperial" yang dicanangkan
oleh ultranasionalis pasti memiliki lebih sama dengan konsep Jepang kuno negara masyarakat
patriarkal dan keunggulan pemerintah oleh laki-laki kepada pemerintah oleh hukum.
Sementara mensponsori kebijakan agresif di luar negeri, para ekstrimis militer (dibantu
oleh terroristic rahsia) berusaha untuk merebut kendali pemerintah sendiri di rumah. Mereka
terintimidasi jurubicara moderat, terganggu lemari, dan, ketika semua yang lain gagal, terpaksa
pembunuhan. Selama bertahun-tahun penting yang mengikuti Manchuria "insiden", Pemerintah
memberlakukan pembatasan parah berdasarkan ekspresi dari ide-ide yang tidak patriotik atau
Ortodoks. Pemimpin buruh, dosen, dan wartawan yang diduga radikalisme dipenjara atau
dituntut atas dasar bahwa setiap "pikir berbahaya" harus ditekan. Mencekik liberal pendapat
membuat semuanya lebih mudah untuk kaum nasionalis fanatik (beberapa di antaranya
memendam ide-ide yang jelas radikal) untuk menyebarkan propaganda mereka dengan impunitas.
Bahwa tentara mampu menentang populer akan diilustrasikan oleh insiden muram pada Februari
1936. Setelah pemilihan umum telah menghasilkan kemenangan untuk moderat dan kekalahan
ultranasionalis, sekelompok perwira muda memberontak, diadakan kota Tokyo selama tiga hari,
dan membunuh tiga anggota pemerintah. Walaupun tentara disavowed tindakan ini, itu diblokir
penunjukan kabinet liberal melalui kontrol Menteri Perang ditempatkan secara strategis.
Akhirnya, tentara diadakan kartu truf pada kenyataan bahwa pasukan Jepang sudah ditempatkan
di China Utara dan setiap saat bisa memancing insiden yang akan mentransfer inisiatif kepada
penguasa militer.
Peran Jepang di Perang Dunia II, di mana dia konflik dengan Cina digabung, dibahas di
tempat lain dalam buku ini. Jepang menyerah pada 1945 adalah prelude babak baru dalam
sejarah mereka, dalam banyak cara berbeda dari apa yang ia telah alami di masa lalu. Belum
pernah terjadi sebelumnya bangsa Jepang telah dikalahkan dalam perang dan tidak pernah
sebelum negara telah diduduki oleh kekuatan asing. Pendudukan negara taklukan ini juga
pengalaman baru bagi Amerika Serikat. Setidaknya dapat dikatakan bahwa Jepang dan Amerika
dilakukan sendiri sedemikian rupa untuk menghasilkan minimal gesekan dalam hubungan yang
selalu sulit.
Selama enam setengah tahun otoritas yang nyata di Jepang nominal diadakan oleh
Komisi Far Eastern di Washington dan Dewan Penasehat sekutu untuk Jepang di Tokyo, dengan
Jenderal Angkatan Darat Douglas MacArthur sebagai komandan tertinggi kekuatan sekutu;
sebenarnya ini diadakan oleh General MacArthur, dibawah perintah dari Washington, dan oleh
pemerintah Jepang. Dari awal sampai akhir pendudukan Jepang adalah sebuah usaha dan
tanggung jawab Amerika Serikat. Pemerintahan militer tidak langsung, namun, dan dilakukan di
pemerintah Jepang biasa, yang telah tidak memisahkan dengan kekalahan militer Jepang. Kaisar
menerima syarat-syarat penyerahan, dipanggil rakyatnya untuk bekerja sama dengan pasukan
pendudukan, dan menjabat sebagai penghubung antara Orde Lama dan baru. Meskipun yang
relatif ketat unimportance Kaisar politik di zaman modern, perannya adalah nilai yang besar
psikologis dalam menyediakan simbol kontinuitas ketika begitu banyak dari masa lalu sepertinya
telah dihancurkan selamanya.
Salah satu tugas utama pertama dari otoritas pendudukan adalah untuk memberikan
Jepang dengan Konstitusi baru didasarkan pada prinsip-prinsip demokrasi. Sebuah rancangan
yang disiapkan oleh sekelompok Jepang konsultan digantikan oleh dokumen Amerika, yang
disetujui oleh Kaisar dan secara resmi diumumkan oleh dia dalam Diet pada bulan Nopember
1946. Ini mulai berlaku pada bulan Mei tahun berikutnya. Konstitusi Jepang tahun 1946 adalah
salah satu dokumen yang paling luar biasa dari jenisnya yang pernah dikeluarkan. Sudah tepat
digambarkan sebagai "dunia model luar biasa untuk menyampaikan hak-hak politik oleh fiat
konstitusional." [4] Melanggar bersih dengan tradisi dan Konstitusi 1889, itu menyatakan bahwa
kedaulatan berbaring dengan Japanese people dan meninggalkan Kaisar dengan hanya kekuasaan
formal seperti monarki Britania Raya. (Kaisar dirinya sebelumnya telah dikeluarkan variasi baru
yang menyangkal mitos asal-usul ilahi Nya.) Konstitusi baru berisi rumit Bill of Rights, di mana
untuk kebebasan sipil normal ditambahkan manfaat tersebut sebagai hak untuk bekerja dan untuk
tawar-menawar kolektif, kesetaraan sosial, dan kesetaraan jenis kelamin. Hak pilih universal
orang dewasa didirikan, dengan Diet bikameral, dan Kabinet bertanggung jawab kepada DPR.
Konstitusi juga memasukkan prinsip-prinsip Amerika pemisahan gereja dan negara dan judicial
review tindakan legislatif. Terutama menangkap adalah Pasal 9, yang menyatakan bahwa
"Japanese people selamanya meninggalkan perang sebagai berdaulat tepat bangsa" dan bahwa
"tanah, laut, dan angkatan udara, serta perang lain potensi, akan pernah dipertahankan." Secara
keseluruhan, Konstitusi baru memiliki rasa sangat utopis. Jika prinsip-prinsip dapat dilakukan ke
aktif dan lengkap realisasi, Hei akan membuat Jepang bangsa yang lebih maju daripada Amerika
Serikat.
Perjanjian damai antara Amerika Serikat dan Jepang dinegosiasikan di San Francisco
pada September 1951, dan disahkan berikut April. Juga ditandatangani oleh 48 negara-negara
lain, tidak termasuk Uni Soviet, namun, yang tetap secara teknis dalam keadaan perang dengan
Jepang sampai 1956. Penyelesaian perdamaian, meskipun itu mengakhiri pendudukan dan
dipulihkan kemerdekaan resmi ke Jepang, adalah sangat drastis teritorial. Merampas bangsa
kerajaan semua, perjanjian berkurang Jepang ke empat pulau utama-daerah yang sama telah
mengadakan waktu kunjungan Komodor Perry pada tahun 1853, meskipun penduduknya
sekarang tiga kali lebih besar. Perjanjian damai (dilengkapi dengan perjanjian keamanan) diakui
Jepang hak untuk lengan untuk "bela diri" dan berwenang menempatkan pasukan asing (berarti
Amerika) di Jepang untuk pertahanan negara.
Demokrasi tidak diragukan lagi telah membuat kemajuan di Jepang, tetapi tingkat dan
karakter yang masih agak ambigu. Pers bebas dan sering mengkritik pemerintah tajam dan
dengan impunitas. Konstitusi Jepang adalah salah satu paling demokratis di seluruh dunia, tetapi,
sementara itu beroperasi dan diterima oleh sebagian besar orang, itu tampaknya tidak memiliki
berhubungan itu sendiri sangat dengan arus perubahan sosial dan budaya. Sejalan dengan mesin
demokrasi baru peran partai telah menjadi penting. Namun, seperti di Jepang sebelum perang,
pihak telah terhambat oleh tradisi gigih n kesetiaan kepada kepribadian, kelompok-kelompok
kekerabatan atau kepentingan-kepentingan daerah, berbeda dengan Asosiasi untuk tujuan umum
secara impersonal. Banyak pihak segera muncul (363 berpartisipasi dalam pemilihan umum
tahun 1946), tapi Koalisi Nasional telah mencapai stabilitas cukup. Pemilih telah menunjukkan
secara konsisten konservatif bias, seperti yang digambarkan oleh kenyataan bahwa Shigeru
Yoshida, seorang diplomat karir zaman sebelum perang, diadakan menjadi Perdana Menteri lima
kali antara 1946 dan 1954. Dua partai besar, penerus masing-masing yang lama Seiyukai dan
Minseito, bergabung pada tahun 1955 untuk membentuk Partai "Liberal Demokrat", yang telah
memegang posisi yang preponderant sejak. Meskipun nama partai konservatif, berasal dukungan
dari bisnis (besar dan menengah), birokrat beberapa baris tua, dan — karena ia telah mengadakan
kantor begitu lama — pejabat sipil, program panggilan untuk perluasan ekonomi, " Pertahanan
independen kebijakan luar negeri"dalam rangka aliansi Amerika, penolakan terhadap neutralism
tapi hubungan persahabatan dengan semua bangsa, dan penguatan Jepang. Ketua Partai dan
premier dari tahun 1957-1960 adalah Nobusuke Kishi, sekali anggota Tojo di perang kabinet dan
dipenjarakan sebagai penjahat perang dicurigai selama pendudukan, tetapi yang menegaskan
pengabdian untuk "baru progresif konservatisme."
Kepala sekolah, meskipun tidak sangat efektif, oposisi selama ini dipasok oleh sosialis,
dilemahkan oleh berbagai perbedaan-perbedaan ideologis dan perselisihan internal. Partai
menarik beberapa intelektual, tapi dukungan utama yang berasal dari salah satu dari dua bagian
utama tenaga kerja terorganisir (terdiri terutama dari pegawai pemerintah). Partai diakui tujuan
termasuk perlindungan kebebasan sipil, ekstensi manfaat pekerja dan akhirnya realisasi ekonomi
Sosialis; dan, lebih tegas, membatalkan perjanjian keamanan dengan Amerika Serikat dan
penghapusan semua pangkalan militer Amerika dari Jepang. Sementara beberapa poin ini
memperoleh simpati populer yang luas, Sosialis tidak pernah mampu memenangkan lebih dari
sepertiga suara pemilu nasional, terutama karena kemakmuran materi yang belum pernah terjadi
sebelumnya telah terjadi di bawah serangkaian konservatif Administrasi dan pemilih rata-rata
tidak yakin bahwa dia akan lebih baik di bawah kepemimpinan yang berbeda dan belum dicoba.
Sektor pertanian, masih tentang 40 persen warga efektif diatur dalam Asosiasi Koperasi
Pertanian, dan, sementara apatis terhadap isu-isu politik, telah kokoh didukung Partai
(konservatif) Demokrat Liberal. Semua pihak yang sebagian besar koalisi dari faksi-faksi yang
berbeda. Tak satu pun telah menghimbau cukup berkembang kelas menengah dan tidak memiliki
dukungan nyata massa — paling tidak dari semua Komunis, kekuatan suara yang, setelah
mencapai ke persen dari total pada tahun 1949, menolak untuk proporsi yang hampir tidak
signifikan.
Kesulitan ekonomi yang dihadapi Jepang segera setelah dia menyerah tampak praktis
dapat diatasi. Sebelum menutup permusuhan hampir satu-ketiga rumah-rumah di daerah
perkotaan di Jepang telah dimusnahkan oleh serangan udara, dan kerugian ekonomi langsung
disebabkan oleh perang adalah luar biasa. Jepang adalah dicukur nya Kekaisaran, produksi
industri nya telah jatuh 8o persen di bawah tingkat tahun 1937, nya perdagangan luar negeri yang
berdiri di nol, dan ia bergantung pada impor bahkan untuk bahan makanan. Melihat latar
belakang ini suram, pemulihan ekonomi dan kemajuan Jepang telah spektakuler. Pada 1953
indeks produksi itu 50 persen di atas tingkat pertengahan-1930, dan terus ke atas, tekstil, barang-
barang logam dan mesin memimpin jalan. Industri galangan kapal Jepang tumbuh begitu cepat
bahwa oleh 1957 itu melebihi dari setiap negara lain, termasuk Britania Raya. Tokyo, mana
International Trade Fairs diadakan pada 1955 dan 1957. menjadi kota yang berkembang dengan
semua gejala kemakmuran. Populasinya meningkat dari 3 juta sampai 91/2 juta oleh 1960,
sehingga dunia terbesar di kota. Ekspansi telah terbukti di hampir setiap cabang ekonomi, dan
Jepang telah memenangkan perbedaan dalam berbagai bidang yang khusus seperti elektronik dan
instrumen optik dan ilmiah. Selama periode 1950-1960 hasil pertanian meningkat 50 persen,
sementara investasi modal dan produksi industri tiga kali lipat. Sepanjang dekade ini Produk
Nasional Bruto Jepang berkembang pada tingkat rata-rata dari 9 persen per tahun, tingkat
pertumbuhan tertinggi dari negara manapun di dunia (dengan kemungkinan pengecualian dari
Komunis Cina).
Pemulihan dan tingkat tinggi kemakmuran tidak berarti bahwa Jepang telah ada masalah
ekonomi yang serius. Dia impor 20 persen dari bahan makanan nya dan 80 persen dari bahan-
bahan baku untuk pembuatan dan akibatnya harus mencapai pasar ekspor berbagai dalam
menghadapi persaingan parah. Satu-sepertiga dari perdagangan luar negeri nya adalah dengan
Inggris dan Kanada (dengan keseimbangan dolar yang menguntungkan ke Amerika Serikat).
Kerugian serius — mencerminkan logika politik internasional daripada ekonomi-adalah
hilangnya pasar daratan Cina. Cina diserap 26 persen dari ekspor Jepang pada tahun 1928; pada
tahun 1961, 4 dari 1 persen. Tidak mengherankan, partai politik besar kedua telah menyerukan
pembukaan kembali pasar Cina meskipun Jepang tidak diberikan diplomatik pengakuan kepada
Peking. Populasi yang berkembang pesat telah mengajukan masalah lain, yang mungkin
mendekati solusi. 960 jumlah penduduk telah mencapai 94 juta, tetapi kelahiran dijatuhkan dari
salah satu yang tertinggi di dunia untuk salah satu yang terendah (dari kelahiran 33 per seribu di
1950-17 per seribu tahun 1957). Populasi telah bergeser ke kota, dengan 4o persen sekarang
tinggal di daerah perkotaan dan 25 persen di kota 100.000 atau lebih. Mengumpulkan kekayaan
sangat tidak merata didistribusikan dan upah tetap relatif rendah di toko-toko kecil dan pabrik-
pabrik rumah yang masih menggunakan kekuatan kerja mayoritas.
Meskipun kekurangan dalam gambar, pembesaran kemakmuran Jepang adalah salah satu
fakta-fakta yang mengesankan di pertengahan abad keduapuluh. Pendapatan per kapita — masih
rendah dengan standar Amerika — adalah dua kali apa itu di tahun 1940, dan pemerintah
tersebut bertujuan untuk melipatgandakan ekonomi lagi tahun 1970. Sudah standar hidup Jepang
adalah jauh yang tertinggi di Asia (bahkan di daerah pedesaan satu keluarga dalam sepuluh
memiliki set TV), dan upah sedang mendekati tingkat Eropa Barat. Beberapa faktor memberikan
penjelasan tentang cerita tampaknya kesuksesan bahan ini. Pertama, meskipun mengejutkan
kerugian dari perang, Jepang mempertahankan kemampuan teknis mereka, tenaga, dan tradisi
kerja keras. Kedua faktor membantu untuk memulai pemulihan adalah bantuan keuangan
Amerika, tidak hanya selama pendudukan tetapi juga oleh pembelian yang baik dan layanan
selama konflik Korea. Tapi aset yang paling penting dari semua-secara paradoks-kekalahan dan
penghapusan kompleks militer Jepang, yang telah secara sistematis dikeringkan negara sumber
dayanya. Kontemporer Jepang memiliki perbedaan menjadi bangsa industri hanya besar di dunia
yang beroperasi pada ekonomi perdamaian yang bukan perang ekonomi. Mendukung Angkatan
bersenjata sebesar 230.000 hanya pria, "Pertahanan badan" mengkonsumsi tidak cukup 10 persen
dari anggaran tahunan dan kurang dari 11/2 persen dari pendapatan nasional.
Jepang, sama dengan bangsa-bangsa lain, telah menemukan kursus kebijakan luar negeri
yang penuh dengan kesulitan. Merayap caranya huyung antara dua dunia, new Jepang telah
membuat kemajuan bertahap merehabilitasi dirinya hubungan dengan negara-negara lain.
Permusuhan dan ketidakpercayaan yang warisan Jepang agresi di Asia Tenggara perlahan-lahan
telah surut. Jepang reparasi menandatangani perjanjian dengan Burma dan Filipina, menjanjikan
untuk memasok barang, bantuan teknis dan investasi jangka panjang. Untuk mencapai
pemahaman dengan Uni Soviet terbukti lebih sulit, tetapi pada bulan Oktober 1956 Rusia dan
Jepang menandatangani deklarasi perdamaian, secara resmi mengakhiri keadaan perang antara
kedua negara. Negosiasi meninggalkan belum ditentukan masa depan Kepulauan Kurile —
diklaim oleh Jepang dan dipegang oleh Rusia — tapi itu diberikan untuk memulihkan hubungan
diplomatik, repatriating tawanan perang Jepang, dan melepaskan Rusia menuntut untuk reparasi.
Juga, karena Rusia sekarang diri oposisi nya, Jepang telah diaktifkan untuk menjadi anggota
Perserikatan Bangsa-bangsa, di Desember 1956. Melalui Colombo Plan bantuan untuk negara-
negara terbelakang di Asia Tenggara, Jepang telah memberikan kontribusi lebih dari $6 miliar
untuk proyek-proyek di Ceylon. India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Kamboja, dan Vietnam.
Ruang lingkup dan tujuan kebijakan luar negeri Jepang bergantung pada topik yang
sensitif hubungan dengan Amerika Serikat. Opini publik di Jepang sangat tidak setuju dari terus
pengujian senjata nuklir oleh kekuatan besar. Hal ini dapat dimengerti mengingat fakta bahwa
230.000 Jepang masih menderita penyakit radioaktif yang disebabkan oleh dua bom dijatuhkan
di Jepang pada tahun 1945, dan karena lokasi Kepulauan mengekspos mereka ke bahaya
kejatuhan radioaktif dari termonuklir ledakan di Pasifik maupun di Siberia. Masalah lain yang
dihadapi pemerintah terlibat status dan Bonin Kepulauan Ryukyu, diduduki oleh Amerika
Serikat sebagai keamanan basis syarat yang diakui Jepang "sisa kedaulatan" dan hak akhirnya
memulihkan yurisdiksi atas Kepulauan. Oposisi terhadap pembaharuan Amerika Serikat
perjanjian keamanan adalah di belakang Tokyo kerusuhan yang mengarah ke membatalkan
Presiden Eisenhower diproyeksikan kunjungan ke Jepang di awal musim panas tahun 1960.
Premier Kishi konservatif blok dan oposisi sosialis melanggar Parlemen kesopanan dalam
kontroversi atas perjanjian. Sosialis terpaksa pemogokan duduk-duduk di gang-gang DPR dan
mencoba untuk memblokir pembicara dari mencapai kursi. Setelah anggota Sosialis secara paksa
diusir oleh polisi, Kishi mendorong ratifikasi Perjanjian melalui Parlemen pantat di tengah
malam sesi (Mei 19-20). Reaksi umum untuk manuver ini adalah ledakan. Massa petisi diajukan
menuntut pembubaran Diet; lima juta pekerja pergi pada mogok; mahasiswa dan dosen
bergabung dalam demonstrasi protes. Namun, agitasi surut segera setelah perjanjian secara
otomatis menjadi efektif satu bulan setelah pemungutan suara Diet ratifikasi (sesuai dengan
ketentuan konstitusional). Selain itu, serangan kritik Kishi kabinet untuk melakukan "anti-
demokratis" menghasilkan perubahan politik tidak dapat diukur. Premier Kishi mengundurkan
diri, akan digantikan oleh Hayato Ikeda, lain yang konservatif, dan dalam pemilihan November
tenang 196o Partai Demokrat Liberal mempertahankan mayoritas hampir tak berkurang. Krisis
politik 1960 adalah tidak komunis yang terinspirasi, atau sangat anti-Amerika, atau bukti —
seperti beberapa takut — runtuhnya pemerintahan demokratis di Jepang. Ini menurut
mencerminkan meningkatnya permintaan status sepenuhnya independen di luar negeri dan,
mungkin bahkan lebih, kurangnya hubungan baik antara orang-orang dan pemimpin partai
mereka dalam atau di luar Parlemen.
[1]
E. Snow, The Other Side of the River, pp. 169, 182-83. D. Warner, Hurricane from China, pp. 126-27. (These
estimates are still subject to dispute.)
[2]
E. Snow, The Other Side of the River, pp. 501-509.
[3]
A curious example of the “thought reform” process in Henry Pu Yi, the Manchu boy emperor deposed in 1911,
Japanese puppet ruler of Manchukuo, now, at this own request working in a botanical station. Another example is
the distinguished philosopher Fung Yu-lan.
[4]
Linebarger, Djang, and Burks, Far Eastern Government and Politics: China and Japan, p. 479.