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RAMON L. LABO, JR., v. COMELEC EN BANC
AND LUIS LARDIZABAL
FACTS: Ramon Labo was proclaimed Mayor of
Baguio City in 1988. The petition for quo warranto
was filed by private respondent Luis Lardizabal 6
days after Labo’s proclamation but the filing fee was
paid 21 days after proclamation. Labo asserted that
the petition was deemed filed only upon the
payment of filing fee hence the petition filed was
beyond the reglementary period provided for under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides that petition shall be filed within 10 days
from such proclamation. Labo anchored his
contention upon Rule 36, Section 5, of the
Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that
no petition for quo warranto will be entertained until
payment of the filing fees amounting to 300 pesos
as well as jurisprudence. Lardizabal, on the other
hand, asserted that the petition was filed ahead of
time but it was the Comelec who refused the
payment of filing fees because they treated it as pre-
proclamation controversy and it was only on
February 08 that Comelec decided to treat it as plain
quo warranto and latter served him notice on
February 10 wherein he paid immediately.
Lardizabal argued that when Comelec accepted the
petition but treated it as pre-qualification
controversy, the prescriptive period was deemed
suspended. The SC held that the quo warranto
proceedings was filed on time because it was within
the 10-day period counted not from the date it was
treated as pre-proclamation but from the date it was
treated by Comelec as quo warranto. The present
petition was brought by Labo praying that the
Supreme Court retrain Comelec from inquiring his
citizenship and his qualification to hold elective
office. It was argued that he was a foreigner when
he became an Australian Citizen.
ISSUE: whether or not the public respondent has
jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter,
considering that the petition for quo warranto against
him was not filed on time.
HELD: YES
RATIO 1: On Petition Being Timely Filed and
Justiciability of the Case
The Court has considered the arguments of
the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the
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respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-
day period as extended by the pendency of the
petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a
pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require
the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this
conclusion only on the assumption that the
requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already effective. There
is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published;
and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on
March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in
the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila
Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after
the petition was filed. In any event, what is important
is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay
there may have been is not imputable to the private
respondent’s fault or neglect. It is true that in the
Manchester Case, we required the timely payment
of the filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness
of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however, this Court,
taking into account the special circumstances of that
case, declared: This Court reiterates the rule that
the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee.
However, the court may allow the payment of the
said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of
non-compliance therewith, the case shall be
dismissed. The same idea is expressed in Rule 42,
Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
adopted on June 20, 1988, thus: Sec. 18. Non-
payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above
prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse
to take action thereon until they are paid and may
dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Another reason why the Court has seen fit to
rule directly on the merits of this case. Going over
the record, we find that there are two administrative
decisions on the question of the petitioner’s
citizenship. The first was rendered by the
Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and
found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines.
10 The second was rendered by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation on September 13,
1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen
of the Philippines. The first decision was penned by
then COMELEC Chairman Vicente Santiago, Jr.,
with Commissioners Pabalate, Savellano and
Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner
Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition
"without prejudice to the issue of the respondent’s
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citizenship being raised a new in a proper case.
"Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while
Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until
representations shall have been made with the
Australian Embassy for official verification of the
petitioner’s alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by
Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and
Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is
important to observe that in the proceeding before
the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the
herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a
citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was
eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the
fact that he had married an Australian citizen,
obtained an Australian passport, and registered as
en alien with the CID upon his return to this country
in 1980. On the other hand, the decision of the CID
took into account the official statement of the
Australian Government dated August 12, 1984,
through its Consul in the Philippines, that the
petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that
date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. There is
also the claim that the decision can no longer be
reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but
this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not
apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has
ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does not appear
that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been
invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the
private respondent’s comment. Besides, one of the
requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is
not present in this case.
RATIO2: On Acquisition of Citizenship by
Naturalization
The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an
Australian national in 1976 did not automatically
divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant.
There is no claim or finding that he automatically
ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was
naturalized as such through a formal and positive
process, simplified in his case because he was
married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for
such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of
Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
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Queen of Australia. . . ., and to fulfill his duties as an
Australian citizen.” The petitioner now claims that his
naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a
dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand
against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which
enumerates the modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws
of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the
petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.” Even if it be assumed that, as the
petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship
does not concern us here. That is a matter between
him and his adopted country. What we must
consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely
rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and
knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims,
does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No.
725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor
does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He
does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization
as to any statute directly conferring Philippine
citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he
has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

. . . (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the
Special Committee on Naturalization created by
Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel
their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

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That is why the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation rejected his application for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration.
And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the
Philippines. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on
the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a
citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a
qualified voter under the Constitution itself because
of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio City under Section 42
of the Local Government Code providing in material
part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — (1) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-three years of age on election day, a
qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to
be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at
the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,
and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any
other local language or dialect.
 be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of
citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City who
elected him by a "resonant and thunderous
majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all
that, for his lead over the second-placer was only
about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that
locality could not have, even unanimously, changed
the requirements of the Local Government Code
and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to
permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual
owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their
city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen. The probability that
many of those who voted for the petitioner may have
done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the
election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office
now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and
voting requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on the
day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified
from running as mayor and, although elected, is not
now qualified to serve as such.
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ISSUE2: whether or not the private respondent, who
filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor
HELD: He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
RATIO3: The latest ruling of the Court on this issue
is Santos v. Commission on Elections, 22 decided in
1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
second was proclaimed elected after the votes for
his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat
and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was supported by
eight members of the Court then, 23 with three
dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote.
25 One was on official leave. Re-examining that
decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should
v. Ramos, 27 which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the
doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.
Paredes, 28 was supported by ten members of the
Court, 29 without any dissent, although one
reserved his vote, 30 another took no part, 31 and
two others were an leave. 32 There the Court held:
". . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.) The fact that the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of
the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid
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to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief
that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
FALLO: Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT
a citizen of the Philippines and therefore
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor
of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office
and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio
City once this decision becomes final and executory.
####
JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC & RAUL R. LEE
FACTS: Petitioner Juan Frivaldo ran and won three
times by garnering the highest number of votes for
gubernatorial position in the province of Sorsogon
but he was declared twice as disqualified. On his
third time running, after he filed his candidacy, Raul
Lee, another candidate for the same petition filed a
petition with Comelec to declare Frivaldo disqualified
because he was not yet a citizen of the Philippines.
Comelec 2nd division decided to grant Lee’s
petition. Frivaldo filed motion for reconsideration
which was left undecided thus his candidacy was
still effective. After the election canvassing, it turned
out that Frivaldo garnered the highest number of
votes but a few days after election Comelec en banc
sustained the second division’s resolution, so Lee
filed a petition praying that he be declared Governor
as he garnered the second highest number of votes.
Comelec proclaimed Lee as Governor. Frivaldo filed
a petition praying for the nullification of Lee’s
proclamation on the grounds that he already took his
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
to which the application for repatriation has been
filed months before the election.
ISSUE: The ultimate question posed before this
Court in these twin cases is: Who should be
declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon—
Frivaldo,who, though declared disqualified twice
now contends that he has re-assumed his lost
citizenship through repatriation;or Lee, who
garnered the second highest votes for the
gubernatorial position; or the duly-elected Vice
Governor Oscar Deri based on prevailing
jurisprudence that in case of permanent vacancy or
4 Session 11
ineligibility of the elected governor, elected vice
governor shall assumed the post
HELD: In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down
new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/
amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and
elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial
justice over pure legalisms.
RATIO1: On Frivaldo’s Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo’s repatriation
is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case.
All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly
requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for
elective local officials, including that of provincial
governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective
local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor,
vice governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or
member of the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election
day.
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this
Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent
upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship;
in fine, that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160). Under
Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No.
104654 and during the oral argument in this case
that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so
"failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of
Representatives" due, according to him, to the
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this
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Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
procedural defects. Despite his lack of Philippine
citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected
governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a
margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000
in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same
opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified
from holding and discharging his popular mandate.
Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote
from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable
decision from the Commission on Elections to boot.
Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully
passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D.
No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General
himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the
previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-
respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his
cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto
S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance
under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on
June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that
he — not Lee — should have been proclaimed as
the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the
Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on
the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he
garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.
The requirements of repatriation under P.D.
No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they
tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 itself
requires very little of an applicant, and even the
rules and regulations to implement the said decree
were left to the special committee to promulgate.
This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization
where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is
a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking
to reacquire his previous citizenship.
Syllabus: The steps to reacquire Philippine
Citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are:
(1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee;
and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the
application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING
THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath
taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the
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application, then it should not have explicitly
provided otherwise.
RATIO2: On Qualifications Prescribed by LGC
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government
Code," (a)n elective local official must be:

* a citizen of the Philippines;

* a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;

* a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the
election;

* able to read and write Filipino or any other
local language or dialect.”
In addition, "candidates for the position of
governor . . . must be at least twenty-three
(23) years of age on election day.”
From the above, it will be noted that the law does
not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one year’s
residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office, 31
and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is
none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall
govern our people and our country or a unit of
territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or
to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his
term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed
his citizenship on June 30, 1995 — the very day 32
the term of office of governor (and other elective
officials) began — he was therefore already qualified
to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
the purpose for which such law was enacted. So
too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of
the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of
candidates. Why then should such qualification be
required at the time of election or at the time of the
filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee
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insists? Literally, such qualifications — unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of
age and residence — should thus be possessed
when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to
govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of his term — in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court’s ruling in Vasquez v. Giap
and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people
and country do not end up being governed by aliens,
i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that
aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead
achieved by construing the citizenship qualification
as applying to the time of proclamation of the
elected official and at the start of his term.
RATIO3: On When Citizenship Qualification Should
Be Reckoned
Section 39, apart from requiring the official to
be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And,
under the law 35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the
Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have
been a voter — much less a validly registered one
— if he was not a citizen at the time of such
registration. The answer to this problem again lies in
discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be
possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it
would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It
therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from
being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes
being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the
voter requirement was included as another
qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to
reiterate the need for nationality but to require that
the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA
OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law
states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to
be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local
Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote
actually. Hence, registration — not the actual voting
— is the core of this "qualification." In other words,
the law’s purpose in this second requirement is to
ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not
anywhere else. Before this Court, Frivaldo has
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repeatedly emphasized — and Lee has not disputed
— that he "was and is a registered voter of
Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been
sustained as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact,
he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995." So
too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead
fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been
a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in
1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In
fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the
court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he
was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the
previous elections including on May 8, 1995. It is
thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the
province where he intended to be elected. There is
yet another reason why the prime issue of
citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any
voter, presumably including the defeated candidate,
the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision
of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to
contest before the Comelec an incumbent’s
ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the
Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo
Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after
proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is
only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be
taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since,
at the very moment of Lee’s proclamation (8:30
p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already
and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of
allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day,
then he should have been the candidate proclaimed
as he unquestionably garnered the highest number
of votes in the immediately preceding elections and
such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-
declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no
longer ineligible.
Syllabus: Justice Davide departs from the view in
the ponencia is that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time
when the citizenship requirement must be met, and
that being the case, then it suffices that citizenship
be possessed upon commencement of the term of
the office involved. Section 39 actually prescribes
the qualifications of elective local officials and not
those of an elected local official. These adjectives
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are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to
suggest, the first refers to the nature of the office,
which requires the process of voting by the
electorate involved; while the second refers to a
victorious candidate for an elective office. The
section unquestionably refers to elective — not
elected — local officials. It falls under Title Two
entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1
entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph
(a) thereof begins with the phrases "An elective local
official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of
candidates. It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers
to no other than the qualifications of candidates for
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no
way may the section be construed to mean that
possession of qualifications should be reckoned
from the commencement of the term of office of the
elected candidate. It is not at all true that Section 39
does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be possessed. I submit that the
requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine
citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but at an earlier time,
the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not
at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this to
be, as one basic qualification of an elective local
official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN
THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR
PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE."
This simply means that he possesses all the
qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The
fundamental qualification for the exercise of this
sovereign right is the possession of Philippine
citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it
the first qualification.
RATIO4: On Retroactivity of Repatriation
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes
the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens"
and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No.
63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the
death of their husbands or the termination of their
marital status" and who could neither be benefited
by the 1973 Constitution’s new provision allowing "a
Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her
Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision
of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino
women who had married aliens before said
7 Session 11
constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a
new right to these women — the right to re-acquire
Filipino citizenship even during their marital
coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725.
On the other hand, said statute also provided a new
remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural
born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of
P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
under the simplified procedure of repatriation. The
Solicitor General "By their very nature, curative
statutes are retroactive, (DBP v. CA, 96 SCRA 342),
since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119)
and curb certain evils (Santos v. Duata, 14 SCRA
1041).In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure
the defect in the existing naturalization law,
specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino
women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death
of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship by naturalization and other
causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid
procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization. Presidential Decree
No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned
legal aberrations and thus its provisions are
considered essentially remedial and curative. In light
of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording
of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative
intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive
operation." (A) retrospective operation is given to a
statute or amendment where the intent that it should
so operate clearly appears from a consideration of
the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." 45 It
is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to
"reach back" to events and transactions not
otherwise covered by prevailing law and
jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held
that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as
important as the freedom of speech, liberty of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill
of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give
retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given
the fullest effect possible." (I)t has been said that a
remedial statute must be so construed as to make it
effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted,
LocGov
so that if the reason of the statute extends to past
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it
will be so applied although the statute does not in
terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some
vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."
46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not
specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the
right of repatriation granted therein. And it is but right
and just that the mandate of the people, already
twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the
circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous
in treating Frivaldo’s repatriation as having become
effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on
August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about
his possession of the nationality qualification —
whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995)
or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing
his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would
become moot. Based on the foregoing, any question
regarding Frivaldo’s status as a registered voter
would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is
considered as having been repatriated — i.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored — as of August 17,
1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise
deemed validated as of said date. It is not disputed
that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation
not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?" 49 We answer this question in the
negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
said oath of allegiance and even before that, when
he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had
long abandoned his American citizenship — long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless
in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced
his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship."
RATIO5: On Statelessnes: Statelessness may be
either de jure, which is the status of individuals
stripped of their nationality by their former
government without having all opportunity to
acquired another; or de facto, which is the status of
individuals possessed of a nationality whose country
does not give them protection outside their own
country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely,
referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, Et Al.,
Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments,
8 Session 11
1995, ed., 290). Under Chapter I, Article 1 of the
United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of
Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series,
Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol.
III, 363), a stateless person is defined as "a person
who is not considered as a national by any State
under the operation of its law.



RATIO6: On Sovereignty of the People
The doctrine or people’s sovereignty is
founded on the principles of democracy and
republicanism and refers exclusively to the
sovereignty of the people of the Philippines. Section
1 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution is quite clear
on this. And the Preamble makes it clear when it
solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign
Filipino people. . ." Thus, the sovereignty is an
attribute of the Filipino people as one people, one
body. That sovereign power of the Filipino people
cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the
supreme authority of the people of any of the
political subdivisions to determine their own destiny;
neither can we convert and treat every fragment as
the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide
the formula for the division and destruction of the
State and render the Government ineffective and
inutile.

####
ERNESTO S. MERCADO v. EDUARDO MANZANO
AND COMELEC
FACTS: Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano
were candidates for the position of vice-mayor in
Makati for the 1998 elections. Manzano won but his
proclamation was suspended because earlier, a
certain Ernersto Mamaril filed a petition with
Comelec to disqualify Manzano on grounds that the
latter was a US Citizen. Prior to election, the Second
Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of
Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of
the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective position. On May 8, 1998, private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The
motion remained pending even until after the
election held on May 11, 1998. Petitioner Ernesto
Mercado sought to intervene in the petition for
disqualification but Manzano opposed. The motion
was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the
LocGov
COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4
to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its
Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The Comelec en banc
ruled in favor of Manzano on grounds that while he
was an American Citizen by principle of jus soli, by
virtue of the 1935 Constitution and principle of jus
sanguinis, he was also a Filipino Citizen because his
parents were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
Comelec en banc also considered the fact that upon
reaching the age of majority, Manzano elected
Filipino Citizenship by registering himself as voter
and participated in the earlier elections. Pursuant to
the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board
of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998,
proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the
City of Makati. Mercado filed petition for certiorari
seeking to set aside the resolution of Comelec
ISSUE1: whether petitioner Mercado has personality
to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner’s motion for
leave to intervene granted.
HELD1: Yes, Mercado has legal standing and right
to bring suit or to intervene.
RATIO1: Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC provides:
SECTION 1. When proper and when may be
permitted to intervene. — Any person allowed to
initiate an action or proceeding may, before or
during the trial of an action or proceeding, be
permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to
intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
SECTION 3. Discretion of Commission. — In
allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the
Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its
discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully
protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Manzano contended that Mercado as a defeated
candidate has no longer any right nor legal standing
9 Session 11
to intervene in cases even if former be adjudged
disqualified. The flaw in this argument is it assumes
that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had
already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only
second to private Respondent. The fact, however, is
that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in
ousting private respondent from the race at the time
he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies
to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be
declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner’s purpose
was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified "from running for [an] elective local
position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was
competent to bring the action, so was petitioner
since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor
of Makati City. Nor is petitioner’s interest in the
matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after
private respondent had been shown to have
garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right
to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear
from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
LocGov
election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered. The failure of the COMELEC en banc to
resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As
the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits
of the case, the present petition properly deals not
only with the denial of petitioner’s motion for
intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondent’s alleged
disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
ISSUE2: whether private respondent Manzano
possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is
disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
HELD2:
RATIO2: To begin with, dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary
act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen
of both states. Considering the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
 terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers’ country such children are
citizens of that country;
 the requirement that an applicant for naturalization
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of
the latter’s country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of
the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases
are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
 Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
10 Session 11
the situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual’s volition. With respect
to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution
provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship"
in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the
most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out:" [D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of
the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or
not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control.” By
electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at
the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and
of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. This is similar to
must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he
can be issued a Certificate of naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it
was held: [W]hen a person applying for citizenship
by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces
his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the
by law is satisfied and complied with. The
LocGov
determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an
exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should
apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If
the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality
were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we
would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what
a foreign government has thought or intended to
exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted
by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of
the people of this Republic. To recapitulate, by
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country
are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private
respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part
in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of
his election of Philippine citizenship.
####
ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN
and JACQUELINE M. SERINO v. COMELEC and
VICENTE Y. EMANO
FACTS: Vicente Emano ran for his third term as
governor of Misamis Oriental during the 1995
election. In his certificate of candidacy, he placed
therein that his residence was in Tagaloan, Misamis
Oriental. He won and was proclaimed governor of
the province. In 1997, while still governor, he
executed a Voter’s Registration Record in Cagayan
de Oro City (geographically located in the Province
of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in
which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March
25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence
for the preceding two years and five months was at
1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision,
11 Session 11
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Also vying for
mayoralty position was Erasmo Damasing.
Petitioners Torayno, Eligan and Serino, residents of
Cagayan De Oro City, filed a petition with Comelec
seeking the disqualification of Emano on the ground
that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year
residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of
their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private
respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on
May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition
before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto, 3 in
which they sought (1) the annulment of the election
of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of
Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next
highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor
of the city. Comelec First Division denied the petition
to disqualify. Petitioners sought Motion for
Reconsideration but Comelec en banc sustained the
conclusions of the First Division.
ISSUE1: whether private respondent had duly
established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at
least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to
qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof
HELD1: Similarly in the instant case, private
respondent was actually and physically residing in
Cagayan de Oro City while discharging his duties as
governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in
the city and resided there together with his family.
He even paid his 1998 community tax and
registered as a voter therein. To all intents and
purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a
resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run
for mayor thereof. 
RATIO1: The pertinent provision sought to be
enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991, 18 which provides for the
qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:
"SECTION 39. Qualifications. — (a) An
elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province . . .
where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect."
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a
minimum period of residence in the area in which
they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law
LocGov
intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the
latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that
community." Such provision is aimed at excluding
outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.” Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law
requirement defeats the purpose of representation:
to elect through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community. This purpose is "best met by individuals
who have either had actual residence in the area for
a given period or who have been domiciled in the
same area either by origin or by choice.” In the case
at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent
and his family had actually been residing in
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore,
during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was
governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in
that city, where the seat of the provincial
government was located In June 1997, he also
registered as voter of the same city. Based on our
ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove
that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de
Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him
to run for public office therein. Moreover, the
Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of
Emano in his choice of residence. Undeniably,
Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of
Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of
the province. Not only is it at the center of the
province; more important, it is itself the seat of the
provincial government. As a consequence, the
provincial officials who carry out their functions in
the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less,
getting acquainted with its concerns and interests.
Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of
Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently
residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period,
could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to
the city in the last year of his third term, when he
decided to adopt it as his permanent place of
residence.  department to file an information against Vicencio
We stress that the residence requirement is
rooted in the desire that officials of districts or
localities be acquainted not only with the metes and
bounds of their constituencies but, more important,
with the constituents themselves — their needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
12 Session 11
development, and all matters vital to their common
welfare. The requisite period would give candidates
the opportunity to be familiar with their desired
constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to
evaluate the former’s qualifications and fitness for
the offices they seek. In other words, the actual,
physical and personal presence of herein private
respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial
enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of
mayor and for the voters to evaluate his
qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners’ very
legalistic, academic and technical approach to the
residence requirement does not satisfy this simple,
practical and common-sense rationale for the
residence requirement.
####
NELSON T. LLUZ and CATALINO C. ALDEOSA
v. COMELEC and CAESAR O. VICENCIO
FACTS: Vicencio was a candidate for the post of
punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion,
Catubig, Samar in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. In
his certificate of candidacy, private respondent
stated his profession or occupation as a certified
public accountant (CPA). Private respondent won in
the elections. Sometime after he was proclaimed,
Lluz and Aldeosa filed before the Legal Department
of Comelec against him for alleged violation of
Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of BP 881 after
he misrepresented himself as CPA. Petitioners
presented a certification from PRC that Vicencio
was not among those listed in the records of names
of professionals allowed to practice accountancy in
the Philippines. Vicencio countered he was a duly
licensed CPA, passing with an average of 76% and
that he could not be held liable for his alleged
misrepresentation as it was immaterial for his
election. The Law Department obtained a
certification from PRC which showed that Vicencio
failed in the exam with an average of 40.71% but the
department recommended the dismissal of the case
as it was immaterial to his eligibility. Upon motion of
the petitioners, Comelec en banc directed the law
for violation of Section 262 in relation to Section 74
of BP 881. The COMELEC  En Banc  further ruled
that election offenses are  mala prohibita, in which
case no proof of criminal intent is required and good
faith, ignorance, or lack of malice are not valid
defenses. Vicencio filed motion for reconsideration
LocGov
which Comelec granted and eventually it overturned
its previous ruling on grounds that while Vicencio
failed to disclose true occupation, it is immaterial to
his eligibility and violation of Section 74 is a specie
of perjury and hence, it is necessary that it be with
regard to material matters. Petitioners filed MR but
was denied hence this petition.
ISSUE: whether an alleged misrepresentation of
profession or occupation on a certificate of
candidacy punishable as an election offense under
Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881
HELD: No.
RATIO: From a cursory reading of Sections 262 and
74 of B.P. 881, one may possibly conclude that an
act or omission in violation of any of the provisions
of Section 74  ipso facto  constitutes an election
offense. The listing of sections in Section 262 is
introduced by the clause: "Violation of the
provisions,  or pertinent portions, of the following
sections shall constitute election offenses: x x x."
The phraseology of this introductory clause alerts us
that Section 262 itself possibly limits its coverage to
only pertinent portions of Section 74. That such a
possibility exists must not be taken lightly for two
reasons. First, were the phrase not necessary, the
law's framers would have instead directly declared
that violation of "the provisions" or "any provision" of
the enumerated sections - without any qualification -
would constitute an election offense. It is a settled
principle in statutory construction that whenever
possible, a legal provision, phrase, or word must not
be so construed as to be meaningless and a useless
surplusage in the sense of adding nothing to the law
or having no effect on it.5  Second, equally well-
settled is the rule that a statute imposing criminal
liability should be construed narrowly in its coverage
such that only those offenses clearly included,
beyond reasonable doubt, will be considered within
the operation of the statute.6 A return to Section 74
is thus imperative. Section 74 enumerates all
information which a person running for public office
must supply the COMELEC in a sworn certificate of
candidacy. Section 74 specifies that a certificate of
candidacy shall contain, among others, a statement
that the person is announcing his or her candidacy
for the office and is eligible for such office, the unit of
government which the person seeks to represent,
his or her political party, civil status, date of birth,
residence, and profession or occupation. Section 74
13 Session 11
further requires that the person make several
declarations: "that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance" to it, "that he will obey the laws,
legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities," "that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country," "that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily," and "that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.” Section 74 does not expressly mention
which portion in its provisions is pertinent to Section
262, or which among its provisions when violated is
punishable as an election offense. Nothing in
Section 74 partakes unmistakably of a penal clause
or a positive prohibition comparable to those found
in other sections7  also mentioned in Section 262
that use the words "shall not." The Court is then left
to interpret the meaning of Section 74 to determine
which of its provisions are penalized under Section
262, and particularly if disclosure of profession or
occupation is among such provisions.
First, a misrepresentation in a certificate of
candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification
for elective office and affects the candidate's
eligibility. Second, when a candidate commits a
material misrepresentation, he or she may be
proceeded against through a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78, or through criminal prosecution under
Section 262 for violation of Section 74. Third, a
misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-
material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate's
certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or
canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented
must pertain to a qualification for the office sought
by the candidate.
Profession or occupation is not a
qualification for elective office, and therefore not a
material fact in a certificate of candidacy. No elective
office, not even the office of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, requires a certain
profession or occupation as a qualification. For local
elective offices including that of punong barangay,
Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local
Government Code of 1991 prescribes only
qualifications pertaining to citizenship, registration
as a voter, residence, and language. Section 39 of
R.A. 7160 states:
Section 39. Qualifications. -
LocGov
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
Profession or occupation not being a qualification for
elective office, misrepresentation of such does not
constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in
a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or
her profession or occupation in the certificate of
candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified
from running for office under Section 78 as his or
her certificate of candidacy cannot be denied due
course or canceled on such ground. In interpreting a
law, the Court must avoid an unreasonable or unjust
construction. The basis of the crime of perjury is the
willful assertion of a falsehood under oath upon a
material matter. Although the term "material matter"
under Article 183 takes on a fairly general meaning,
that is, it refers to the main fact which is the subject
of inquiry,12  in terms of being an element in the
execution of a statement under oath it must be
understood as referring to a fact which has an effect
on the outcome of the proceeding for which the
statement is being executed.13 Thus, in the case of
a certificate of candidacy, a material matter is a fact
relevant to the validity of the certificate and which
could serve as basis to grant or deny due course to
the certificate in case it is assailed under Section 78.
Of course, such material matter would then refer
only to the qualifications for elective office required
to be stated in the certificate of candidacy.
####
MAYORGAMAL S. HAYUDINI  v.  COMELEC AND
MUSTAPHA J. OMAR
FACTS: On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his
Certificate of Candidacy4  (CoC) for the position of
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi–Tawi in the
May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections held in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.  Ten
days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha  J.
Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or
C a n c e l H a y u d i n i ’s C o C f o r m a k i n g f a l s e
representation regarding his residence.  He claimed
14 Session 11
that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a
resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in
fact, he resides in Zamboanga City. Thereafter, on
November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for
Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
in  Barangay  Bintawlan, South Ubian before the
MCTC and despite oppositions, it was duly granted
by the said court on January 2013 and on the same
date, Comelec dismissed Omar’s petition for lack of
substantial evidence. Aguilar Baki, one of the
oppositors in the case lodged with the MCTC for
inclusion, elevated the said case to RTC, which
reversed the decision of MCTC and ordered the
cancellation of the name of Hayudini in the List of
Voters. Omar again filed a petition for cancellation of
candidacy of Hayudini based on that supervening
event. Hayudini appealed the RTC decision but it
was denied by the CA. On May 13, 2013, Hayudini
won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi–Tawi. 
He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath
of office. A month after election, Comelec decided
to cancel Hayudini’s CoC. Hayudini filed MR but it
was denied for lack of merit by Comelec en banc
and proclaimed Omar as winning candidate for
mayoralty. Thus, Hayudini filed instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: WON Comelec COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
R E S O LV E D T O C A N C E L P E T I T I O N E R
HAYUDINI’S CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY AND
DECLARE HIS PROCLAMATION AS NULL AND
VOID.
HELD: No, Comelec is correct to cancel Hayudini’s
COC and declare his proclamation as null and void
and sustain Omar’s proclamation
RATIO1: On Procedural and Technicalities;
Construction
Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due
Course or Cancel CoC must be filed within five days
from the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy,
but not later than twenty–five days from the time of
filing of the CoC subject of the petition.  Omar’s
petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period.
Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation
as to why his petition was not served personally to
Hayudini. Notwithstanding the aforementioned
procedural missteps, the Court sustains the
COMELEC’s liberal treatment of Omar’s petition.
LocGov
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction.  The
COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or
even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of
justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of
all matters pending before it.  This liberality is for the
purpose of promoting the effective and efficient
implementation of its objectives – ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections, as well as achieving just,
expeditious, and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the COMELEC.  Unlike an ordinary civil
action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest.  It involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates,
but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the
electorate.  And the tribunal has the corresponding
duty to ascertain, by all means within its command,
whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.
RATIO2: On Adequacy of Grounds to Sustain
Cancellation of Hayudini’s CoC
The nullification of his proclamation as a winning
candidate is also a legitimate outcome – a
necessary legal consequence – of the cancellation
of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC
cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the
nature of a disqualification case.35  The cancellation
of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the
candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled as stray votes.36  If the disqualification or
CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved
before the election day, the proceedings shall
continue even after the election and the
proclamation of the winner.  Meanwhile, the
candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed
as the winner, but the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to
deny due course and cancel his or her CoC
continues.  This rule likewise applies even if the
candidate facing disqualification has already taken
his oath of office.  The only exception to this rule is
in the case of congressional and senatorial
candidates where the COMELEC  ipso jure  loses
jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the
candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper
oath, and also assumed  office. It bears stressing
that one of the requirements for a mayoralty
candidate is that he must be a resident of the city or
municipality where he intends to be elected.  Thus,
15 Session 11
under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is
required that a candidate must certify under oath
that he is eligible for the public office he seeks
election.  In this case, when petitioner stated in his
CoC that he is a resident of Barangay Bintawlan,
South Ubian, Tawi Tawi and eligible for a public
office, but it turned out that he was declared to be a
non–resident thereof in a petition for his inclusion in
the list of registered voters, he therefore committed
a false representation in his CoC which pertained to
a material fact which is a ground for the cancellation
of his CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner’s ineligibility for not being a
resident of the place he sought election is not a
ground for a petition for disqualification, since the
grounds enumerated under Section 6839  of the
Omnibus Election Code specifically refer to the
commission of prohibited acts, and possession of a
permanent resident status in a foreign country.
Since Hayudini was never a valid candidate for the
position of the Municipal Mayor of South Ubian,
Tawi–Tawi, the votes cast for him should be
considered stray votes, Consequently, the
COMELEC properly proclaimed Salma Omar, who
garnered the highest number of votes in the
remaining qualified candidates for the mayoralty
post, as the duly–elected Mayor of South Ubian,
Tawi Tawi. Finally, the will of the electorate is still
actually respected even when the votes for the
ineligible candidate are disregarded. The votes cast
in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an
election for these do not constitute the sole and total
expression of  the sovereign voice. On the other
hand, those votes for the eligible and legitimate
candidates  form an integral part of said voice, which
must equally be given due respect , if not more.
####
RENATO U. REYES v. COMELEC and ROGELIO
DE CASTRO
FACTS: Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor
of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro,
having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992.
On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint
was filed against him with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged,
among other things, that petitioner exacted and
collected P50,000.00 from each market stall holder
in the Bongabong Public Market; certain checks
issued to him by National Reconciliation and
LocGov
Development Program of the Department of Interior
and Local government were never received by the
Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of
accounts of the same officer; and that he took
twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle from beneficiaries
of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had
reared and fattened the cattle for seven months.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of
the charges and ordered his removal from office. It
appears though that when Reyes learned that SP
terminated proceedings and was about to render
judgment, he filed petition for certiorari, prohibition
and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro
alleging that the proceedings had been terminated
without giving him a chance to be heard, so the
court issued a TRO enjoining SP from proceeding
with the case. As a result, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not served upon
Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the
expiration of the temporary restraining order and
without any injunction issued by the Regional Trial
Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision
upon petitioner’s counsel in Manila. However, the
latter refused to accept the decision. Subsequent
attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner
himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the
decision. So the Vice Governor Pedrito Reyes
issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position
of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the
incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon
petitioner was also refused. Meanwhile, on March
20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy
with the Office of the Election Officer of the
COMELEC in Bongabong. Rogelio de Castro, a
registered voter of Bongabong filed a petition for
cancellation of CoC of Renato Reyes invoking
Section 40(b) of LGC which provides for
disqualification from candidacy when such person
w a s r e m o v e d f r o m o f fi c e b e c a u s e o f a n
administrative case. Nonetheless, because of the
absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC,
petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held
on May 8, 1995. A day after election, Comelec 2nd
Division issued a resolution holding that petitioner
was disqualified from running for office. On May 10,
1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Bongabong, apparently unaware of the
disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC,
proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
ISSUE1: WON decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, ordering him removed from office, is
16 Session 11
not yet final because petitioner Reyes has not been
served a copy thereof
HELD1: Failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal
of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision.
As the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Mario Manzo, stated in his certification, repeated
attempts had been made to serve the decision on
Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes
refused to receive the decision. Rule 13, Sec. 3 and
7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of
final orders and judgments either personally or by
mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or
constructive delivery, which may be made by
delivering a copy personally to the party or his
attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person
having been charge thereof, or at his residence, if
his office is not known. 4 Hence service was
completed when the decision was served upon
petitioner’s counsel in his office in Manila on March
3, 1995. In addition, as the secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by
registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes.
Although the mail containing the decision was not
claimed by him, service, was deemed completed
five days after the least notice to him on March 27,
1995. If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a
party for reasons attributable to him, service is
deemed completed and the judgment or decision will
be considered validly as long as it can be shown
that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid
were it not for his counsel’s refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioner’s counsel knew that a decision
in the administrative case had been rendered is
evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the
decision served upon and his client while their
petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was
pending. 6 His refusal to receive the decision may,
therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to
have a copy of the decision. The purpose of the
rules on service is to make sure that the party being
served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly
informed of the same so that he can take steps to
protect his interests, i. e., enable a party to file an
appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before
the decision becomes final. In practice, service
means the delivery or communication of a pleading,
notice or other papers in a case to the opposite
party so as to charge him with receipt, of it, and
subject him to its legal effect. In the case at bar,
LocGov
petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision.
Prudence required that rather than resist the
service, he should have received the decision and
taken an appeal to the Office of the President in
accordance with R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 67. 8 But
petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision
became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first
service upon petitioner. The net result is that when
the elections were held 8, 1995, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become
final and executory. The filing of a petition
for certiorari with the Regional Court did not prevent
the administrative decision from attaining finality. An
original action ofcertiorari  is an independent action
and does not interrupt the course of the principal
action nor the running of the reglementary period
involved in the proceeding. In the case at bar,
although a temporary restraining order was issued
by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction
was subsequently issued. The temporary restraining
order issued expired after 20 days. From that
moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the
service of the decision upon petitioner.
ISSUE2: WON the decision can be served upon
Reyes because at the hearing held on February 15,
1995 of the case which he filed in the RTC, the
counsel of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, atty.
Nestor Atienza, agreed not to effect service of the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending
final resolution of the petition for certiorari
HELD2: The alleged agreement between the
counsels of Reyes and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan cannot bind the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. It was illegal. And it would have been
no less illegal for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
have carried it out because R.A. No. 7160, Sec.
66(a) makes it mandatory that" [c]opies of the
decision [of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall
immediately be furnished to respondent and/or
interested parties." It was the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan’s duty to serve it upon the parties
without unnecessary delay. To have delayed the
service of the decision would have resulted in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s failure to perform a
legal duty. It, therefore, properly acted in having its
decision served upon petitioner Reyes.
ISSUE3: WON the reelection of petitioner rendered
the administrative charges against him moot and
academic
17 Session 11
HELD3: Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
COMELEC, 11 in which it was held that a public
official could not be removed for misconduct
committed during a prior term and that his reelection
operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. But that was because in that
case, before the petition questioning the validity of
the administrative decision removing petitioner could
be decided, the term of office during which the
alleged misconduct was committed expired. 12
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during
which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a
public official is not removed before his term of office
expires, he for another term. This is the rationale for
the ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those
cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an
action to question the decision in the administrative
case, the temporary restraining order issued in the
action he brought lapsed, with the result that the
decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter
became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner
failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He
was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant
to Sec. 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he
was disqualified from running for reelection. It is
noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases
were decided there was no provision similar to Sec.
40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for
any elective position on the ground that he has been
removed as result of an administrative case. The
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
could not be given retroactive effect.
ISSUE4: WON Julius Garcia, as the candidate
getting the second highest number of votes should
be proclaimed in case of ineligibility of Renato
Reyes
HELD4: That he candidate who obtains the second
highest number of votes may not be proclaimed in
case winning candidate is disqualified is now settled.
14 The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing
rulings 15 has since been removed. In the latest
ruling 16 on the question, this Court said: To
simplistically assume that the second placer would
have received the other votes would be to substitute
our judgment for the mind, of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the
LocGov
first among qualified candidates because in a file
which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially, changed. We
are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.
 the felony complaint was allegedly filed, respondent
Garcia’s plea that the votes cast for Reyes
be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for
Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief
that Reyes was qualified and for reason can not be
treated as stray, void, or meaningless. 17
subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot
retroact to the date of the elections so as to
invalidate the votes cast for him.
####
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ v. COMELEC and
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private
respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. were
gubernatorial candidates for the province of Quezon
in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was
proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez
challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo
warranto before the COMELEC. Marquez revealed
that Rodriguez left the United States where a
charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending
against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal
Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft
and attempted grand theft of personal property.
Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which
is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A.
7160), so argued Marquez. Comelec dismissed
Marquez’s petition and denied his MR.
ISSUE ON OLDER CASE: whether Rodriguez is a
"fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section
40(e) of the Local Government Code based on the
alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him
HELD: A ’fugitive from justice’ includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to
avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support
from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded
as expressing the general and ordinary connotation
of the term. "The authenticated documents
submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show the
pendency of a criminal complaint against the
respondent (Rodriguez) in the Municipal Court of
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and the fact that
18 Session 11
there is an outstanding warrant against him amply
proves petitioner’s contention that the respondent is
a fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot look
with favor on respondent’s defense that long before
was already in the Philippines and he did not know
of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he
was being proceeded against criminally. In a sense,
thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that
he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice,
because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of
the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the
place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant
of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear
desire to avoid and evade the warrant. This
allegation in the Answer, however, was not even
fortified with any attached document to show when
he left the United States and when he returned to
this country, facts upon which the conclusion of
absence of knowledge about the criminal complaint
may be derived. On the contrary, the fact of arrest of
respondent’s wife on November 6, 1985 in the
United States by the Fraud Bureau investigators in
an apartment paid for respondent in that country can
hardly rebut whatever presumption of knowledge
there is against theRespondent.”
Rodriguez and Marquez faced off again in the 1995
election and Rodriquez emerged victorious. On May
10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to
suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation which the
COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial
Board of Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed
Rodriguez on May 12, 1995 so Marquez filed
Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation Of
Rodriguez To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The
Provincial Board of Canvassers in Contempt" before
the COMELEC. Comelec nullified Rodriguez’s
proclamation. Marquez filed an "Urgent Motion For
Temporary Restraining Order Or Preliminary
Injunction" which sought to restrain and enjoin
Rodriguez "from exercising the powers, functions
and prerogatives of Governor of Quezon . . ." Acting
favorably thereon, the Court in a Resolution dated
August 8, 1995 issued a temporary restraining order.
Rodriguez’ "Urgent Motion To Lift Temporary
Restraining Order And/Or For Reconsideration" was
denied by the Court in an August 15, 1995
Resolution. Another similar urgent motion was later
on filed by Rodriguez which the Court also denied.
The Court issued a Resolution ordering the Comelec
to receive and evaluate evidence that would such
LocGov
determine whether Rodriguez fall within concept of
fugitive from justice.
ISSUE ON PRESENT CASE: whether Rodriguez is
a "fugitive from justice", the determination of which,
as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2)
occasions (in the MARQUEZ Decision and in the
Court’s October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform
to how such term has been defined by the Court in
the MARQUEZ Decision.
RATIO: Based on US rulings, it can be gleaned that
the objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from
justice are: (a) a person committed a ‘crime’ or has
been charged for the commission thereof; and (b)
thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where
said crime was committed or his usual place of
abode.
 E VA L U AT I O N . " T h e r e a r e , i n f a c t , o t h e r
Filing of charges prior to flight is not always
an antecedent requirement to label one a ‘fugitive
from justice’. Mere commission of a ‘crime’ without
charges having been filed for the same and flight
subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition.
Attention is directed at the use of the word ‘crime’
which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction
for the commission thereof. Justice Davide’s
separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889 elucidates that
the disqualification for being a fugitive does not
involve the issue of the presumption of innocence,
the reason for disqualification being that a person
‘was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court
because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he
was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and
was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded
service of sentence because he had jumped bail or
escaped. The disqualification then is based on his
‘flight from justice’.
A fugitive from justice ". . . includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.”
The definition thus indicates that the intent to
evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously,
there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez’
case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no
dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US
on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the
Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June
19 Session 11
26 of 1995, 4 preceded the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November
12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the
arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost
five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for
Rodriguez to have known about such felony
complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the
US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest
warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at
such time. What prosecution or punishment then
was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with
his departure from the US? The very essence of
being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ
Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in
the circumstances of Rodriguez. With that, the Court
gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made
the. same analysis in its." . . COMMISSION’S
observations consistent with such analysis made by
the poll body that are equally formidable so as to
merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit: "It
is acknowledged that there was an attempt by
private respondent to show Rodriguez’ intent to
evade the law. This was done by offering for
admission a voluminous copy of an investigation
report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to J-87 inclusive) on
the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing
of the charges against petitioner. It was offered for
the sole purpose of establishing the fact that it was
impossible for petitioner not to have known of said
investigation due to its magnitude. Unfortunately,
such conclusion misleads because investigations of
this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged,
are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law
enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the
arrest of those who would be charged. Otherwise,
the indiscreet conduct of the investigation would be
nothing short of a well-publicized announcement to
the perpetrators of the imminent filing of charges
against them. And having been forewarned, every
effort to sabotage the investigation may be resorted
to by its intended objects. But if private respondent’s
attempt to show Rodriguez’ intent to evade the law
at the time he left the United States has any legal
consequence at all, it will be nothing more than
proof that even private respondent accepts that
intent to evade the law is a material element in the
definition of a fugitive. "The circumstantial fact that it
was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez’ departure
that charges against him were filed cannot overturn
the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same
suggests nothing more than the sequence of events
LocGov
which transpired. A subjective fact as that of
petitioner’s purpose cannot be inferred from the
objective data at hand in the absence of further
proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the
evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves
that his compulsion to return to the Philippines was
due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in
the political campaigns against former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after
petitioner’s arrival in the country, the upheaval
wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of
events which occurred resulted in one of the more
colorful events in Philippine history. The EDSA
Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos
and precipitated changes in the political climate. And
being a figure in these developments, petitioner
Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-
Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng
Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor in
1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the
same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and
the disputed re-election in 1995. Altogether, these
landmark dates them in for petitioner a period of
relentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied
political campaigns — first against the Marcos
government, then for the governorship. And serving
the people of Quezon province as such, the position
entails absolute dedication of one’s time to the
demands of the office.
 from justice’ must perform acts in order not to be so
"Having established petitioner’s lack of
knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at
the time he left the United States, it becomes
immaterial under such construction to determine the
exact time when he was made aware thereof. While
the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does
not countenance flight from justice in the instance
that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state
after charges against him or a warrant for his arrest
was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and
issuance of the same, petitioner’s plight is altogether
a different situation. When, in good faith, a person
leaves the territory of a state not his own, homeward
bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed
against him while in the relative peace and service
of his own country, the fact that he does not subject
himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does
not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
 intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the
"The severity of the law construed in the
manner as to require of a person that he subject
himself to the jurisdiction of another state while
already in his country or else be disqualified from
office, is more apparent when applied in petitioner’s
20 Session 11
case. The criminal process of the United States
extends only within its territorial jurisdiction. That
petitioner has already left said country when the
latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is
hardly petitioner’s fault. In the absence of an intent
to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner
had every right to depart therefrom at the precise
time that he did and to return to the Philippines. No
justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter
petitioner’s exercise of his right to leave the United
State and return home. Hence, sustaining the
contrary proposition would be to unduly burden and
punish petitioner for exercising a right as he cannot
be faulted for the circumstances that brought him
within Philippine territory at the time he was sought
to be placed under arrest and to answer for charges
filed against him.

"Granting, as the evidence warrants, that
petitioner Rodriguez came to know of the charges
only later, and under his circumstances, is there a
law that requires petitioner to travel to the United
States and subject himself to the monetary burden
and tedious process of defending himself before the
country’s courts? "It must be noted that moral
uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to
demand of political candidate the performance of
duties and obligations that are supererogatory in
nature. We do not dispute that an alleged ‘fugitive
categorized. Clearly, a person who is aware of the
imminent filing of charges against him or of the
same already filed in connection with acts he
committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is
under an obligation not to flee said place of
commission. However, as in petitioner’s case, his
departure from the United States may not place him
under a similar obligation. His subsequent
knowledge while in the Philippines and non-
submission to the jurisdiction of the former country
does not operate to label petitioner automatically a
fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer
appointed and elected immediately after his return to
the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every reason
to devote utmost priority to the service of his office.
He could not have gone back to the United States in
the middle of his term nor could he have traveled
interest of the public he serves. To require that of
petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical
quandary where he is compelled to violate the very
functions of his office.”
LocGov
RATIO2: On Law of the CASE
 resolved the latter jointly with SPA No. 95-089
Suffice it to say that the "law of the case"
doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-
definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at
variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed
therefrom in resolving the instant petition. "‘Law of
the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court." (21 C.J.S. 330) "It may be stated
as a rule of general application that, where the
evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is
substantially the same as that on the first or
preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or
issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of
the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or readjudicated therein." (5 C.J.S. 1267)
 with the Office of the President and later docketed
"In accordance with the general rule stated in
Section 1821, where, after a definite determination,
the court has remanded the cause for further action
below, it will refuse to examine question other than
those arising subsequently to such determination
and remand, or other than the propriety of the
compliance with its mandate; and if the court below
has proceeded in substantial conformity to the
directions of the appellate court, its action will not be
questioned on a second appeal. "As a general rule a
decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held
to be the law of the case whether that decision is
right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming
himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing." (5
C.J.S. 1276-77). "Questions necessarily involved in
the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as
the law of the case on a subsequent appeal,
although the questions are not expressly treated in
the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that
all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided
have received due consideration whether all or none
of them are mentioned in the opinion." (5 C.J.S.
1286-87). To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez
and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez
is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the
MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The
MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No.
92-28 (the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the
COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal
from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC
21 Session 11
(Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of
Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule in the
MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant
petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of
"fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion
in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the
significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez
and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded
definition, seem to trivialize. Besides, to re-define
"fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in
our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in
the MARQUEZ Decision.
####
SALALIMA et al v. GUINGONA et al
FACTS: Sometime in 1993, several administrative
complaints against the petitioners, who were
elective officials of the Province of Albay, were filed
as O.P. Cases Nos. 5450, 5469, 5470, and 5471.
Acting thereon, the President issued Administrative
Order No. 94 creating an Ad Hoc Committee to
investigate the charges and to thereafter submit its
findings and recommendations. The Ad Hoc
Committee was composed of Undersecretary Victor
R. Sumulong of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), Assistant Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, and Presidential
Assistant Angel V. Saldivar. On 7 October 1994, the
President promulgated Administrative Order No. 153
quoting with approval the following pertinent findings
and recommendations of the Committee
In OP Case 5470, an administrative
complaint that charges the respondents for
malversation and consistent & habitual violation of
pars. (c) and (d) of Section 60 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code.": The issue is whether by act or
omission, denied the other beneficiaries of their
rightful shares in the tax delinquency payments
made by the NPC and caused the illegal forfeiture,
appropriation and disbursement of funds not
belonging to the Province, through the passage and
approval of Ordinance No. 09-92 and Resolution
Nos. 178-92 and 204-92. The foregoing factual
setting shows a wanton disregard of law on the part
of the respondents tantamount to abuse of authority.
Moreover, the illegal disbursements made can
qualify as technical malversation. This Committee,
LocGov
thus, finds all the respondents guilty of abuse of
authority, and accordingly, recommends the
imposition of the following penalties of suspension
without pay: a. Respondent Salalima — five (5)
months; and b. All the other respondents — four (4)
months each.  1994 by the President and by public respondent
In OP Case 5469, an administrative
complaint relative to retainer contract for legal
services entered into between the Province of Albay,
on the one hand, and Atty. Jesus R. Cornago and
the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, on the other, and the
disbursement of public fund in payment thereof: The
sole issue in this case is whether or not respondents
have incurred administrative liability in entering into
the retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments
pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case
filed by NPC with the Supreme Court against the
Province. In this case, petitioners were adjudged
guilty of having committed abuse of authority under
Sec. 60(e) of the Local Government Code for the
following: Hiring private lawyers, in violation of Sec.
481 of the Local Government Code, to handle the
case of the Province of Albay before the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 87479; Disbursing public money in
violation of COA rules and regulations; Paying the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm public money although it
was only Atty. Cornago who was the counsel of
record of the Province of Albay in the Supreme
Court case; Authorizing an unconscionable and
grossly disadvantageous attorney’s fees of P38.5
million; and entering into a retainer agreement not
only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with
Atty. Cornago. thus exceeding his authority under
Resolution No. 01-90 passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Petitioners were suspended as
follows: Salalima and Azaña — six (6) months each;
others-4 months each
OP Case 5471 charged petitioners "abuse of
authority and oppression" under Sec. 60(c) and (e)
of RA No. 7160, wherein it was adjudged that
charges against Vice Mayor Benibe are dismissed.
However, all the other respondents herein are found
guilty of oppression and abuse of authority under
Section 60(c) and (e) of RA No. 7160. Accordingly, it
is recommended that each of them be meted the
penalty of four (4) months suspension without pay;
while OP Case 5450 refers to the administrative
charges filed by Tabaco Mayor Antonio Demetriou
against Governor Romeo Salalima for violation of —
Section 60, pars. (c) and (d) of the Local
Government Code, Section 3, par. (g) of Republic
22 Session 11
Act No. 3019, and the provisions of PD No. 1594, as
amended; where Salalima was suspended for 5
months.
Petitioners now seek to annul and set aside
Administrative Order No. 153, signed on 7 October
Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,
approving the findings of fact and recommendations
of the Ad Hoc Committee and holding the petitioners
administratively liable for the following acts or
omissions: (a) wanton disregard of law amounting to
abuse of authority in O.P. Case No. 5470; (b) grave
abuse of authority under Section 60(e) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) in O.P.
Case No. 5469; (c) oppression and abuse of
authority under Section 60(c) and (e) of R.A. No.
7160 in O.P. Case No. 5471; and (d) abuse of
authority and negligence in O.P. Case No. 5450. The
said order meted out on each of the petitioners
penalties of suspension of different durations, to be
served successively but not to go beyond their
respective unexpired terms in accordance with
Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160. It was alleged that
challenged AO is "an oppressive and capricious
exercise of executive power” and premature
because of pending appeal before the COA on OP
5471
ISSUE1: Did the Office of the President act with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in suspending the petitioners
for periods ranging from twelve to twenty months?
HELD1: Yes
RATIO1: On Local Elective Officials
An administrative offense means every act or
conduct or omission which amounts to, or
constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary
action.
RATIO1.2: PENALTY OF SUSPENSION SHALL
NOT EXCEED SIX MONTHS FOR EACH
OFFENSE OR THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF
THE TERM OF OFFICE
Section 66(b, of R.A. No. 7160 expressly provides:
Sec. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. — . . .
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six
(6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall
said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the
LocGov
respondent so suspended as long as he meet the
qualifications for the office.
This provision sets the limits to the penalty of
suspension , viz., it should not exceed six months or
the unexpired portion of the term of office of the
respondent for every administrative offense. The
offenses for which suspension may be imposed are
enumerated in Section 60 of the Code, which reads:
Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. — An
elective local official may be disciplined, suspended,
or removed from office on any of the following
grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral
turpitude or an offense punishable by at Least
prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang
barangay;
g) Acquisition for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status ,e an
immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this
Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office
on the grounds enumerated above by order of the
proper court. Assuming then that the findings and
conclusions of the Office of the President in each of
the subject four administrative cases are correct, it
committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing
the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate
thereof exceeded six months and the unexpired
portion of the petitioners’ term of office.
The fact remains that the suspension imposed for
each administrative offense did not exceed six
months and there was an express provision that the
successive service of the suspension should not
exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of
the petitioners. Their term of office expired at noon
of 30 June 1995. And this Court is not prepared to
rule that the suspension amounted to the petitioners’
removal from office.
ISSUE2: Did the Office of the President commit
grave abuse of discretion in deciding O.P. Cases
Nos. 5450, 5469, and 5470 despite the pendency of
23 Session 11
the petitioners’ appeal to the COA en banc from
Special Audit Office (SAO) Report No. 93-11 and the
Certificate of Settlement and Balances (CSB)?
HELD2: Yes
RATIO2: Respondents’ contention that COA’s factual
findings, as contained in SAO Report No. 93-11
cannot be considered in this investigation is
untenable. For no administrative and criminal
investigation can proceed, if a respondent is allowed
to argue that a particular COA finding is still the
subject of an appeal and move that the resolution of
such administrative or criminal case be held in
abeyance. This will inevitably cause unnecessary
delays in the investigation of administrative and
criminal cases since an appeal from a COA finding
may be brought all the way up to the Supreme
Court. Besides, the matters raised by the
respondents on appeal involve only conclusions/
interpretation of law. Surely, investigative bodies,
such as COA, the Ombudsman and even this
Committee, are empowered to make their own
conclusions of law based on a given set of facts.
Finally, sufficient evidence has been adduced in this
case apart from the factual findings contained in
SAO Report No. 93-11 to enable this Committee to
evaluate the merits of the instant complaint.
ISSUE3: Did the Office of the President commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioners
guilty of abuse of authority in denying the
Municipality of Tiwi of its rightful share in the
P40,724,471.74 which the Province of Albay had
received from the NPC under the Memorandum of
Agreement?
HELD3: Yes
RATIO3: When the Province sold at public auction
the delinquent properties consisting of buildings,
machines, and similar improvements, it was acting
not only in its own behalf but also in behalf of the
municipalities concerned. And rightly so, because
under Section 60 of P.D. No. 477, the Province, thru
the Provincial Treasurer, is duty bound to collect
taxes throughout the province, including the
national, provincial, and municipal taxes and other
revenues authorized by law. Moreover, under
Section 73 of the Real Property Tax Code, the
provincial or city treasurer is the one authorized to
advertise the sale at public auction of the entire
LocGov
delinquent real property, except real property
mentioned in Subsection (a) of Section 40, to satisfy
all the taxes and penalties due and costs of sale. He
is also authorized to buy the delinquent real property
in the name of the province if there is no bidder or if
the highest bid is for an amount not sufficient to pay
the taxes, penalties, and costs of sale. Since in this
case, there was no bidder, the provincial treasurer
could buy, as he did, the delinquent properties in the
name of the province for the amount of taxes,
penalties due thereon, and the costs of sale, which
included the amounts of taxes due the municipalities
concerned. It is therefore wrong for the petitioners to
say that the subject NPC properties are exclusively
owned by the Province. The Municipalities of Tiwi
and Daraga may be considered co-owners thereof
to the extent of their respective shares in the real
property taxes and the penalties thereon. It must
further be noted that it is the provincial treasurer
who has charge of the delinquent real property
acquired by the province. 10 He is the one whom
the delinquent taxpayer or any person holding a lien
or claim to the property deal with in case the latter
wishes to redeem the property. 11 He is also the one
authorized to effect the resale at public auction of
the delinquent property. 12 Thus, the municipalities
concerned had to depend on him for the effective
collection of real property taxes payable to them.
Accordingly, when the Province entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement with the NPC, it was
also acting in behalf of the municipalities concerned.
And whatever benefits that might spring from that
agreement should also be shared with the latter. The
MOA, contrary to the position of the petitioners, is
not an ordinary contract of sale.
ISSUE4: Did the Office of the President commit
grave abuse of discretion in suspending in O.P.
Cases Nos. 5469 and 5450 petitioner Salalima, who
was reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged
administrative offense committed during his first
term; and in suspending in O.P. Case No. 5469 the
other petitioners, some of whom were elected and
others reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged
administrative offense committed in 1989?
HELD4: Yes
RATIO4: We agree with the petitioners that
Governor Salalima could no longer be held
administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5450 in
connection with the negotiated contract entered into
24 Session 11
on 6 March 1992 with RYU Construction for
additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public
Market. Nor could the petitioners be held
administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469 for the
execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract
with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna
Law Firm. This is so because public officials cannot
be subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in
Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija 17 and
Aguinaldo v. Santos. Offenses committed, or acts
done, during previous term are generally held not to
furnish cause for removal and this is especially true
where the constitution provides that the penalty in
proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from
holding office for the term for which the officer was
elected or appointed. The underlying theory is that
each term is separate from other terms, and that the
reelection to office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. The Court
should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people have elected a man
to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregard or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by
reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people. Clearly then, the rule
is that a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior
term, since his re-election to office operates a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending.
FALLO: part of the challenged Administrative Order
No. 153 imposing the penalty of suspension on
petitioner Governor Romeo Salalima in O.P. Cases
Nos. 5450 and 5469 and on other petitioners Vice
Governor Danilo Azaña and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members in O.P. Case No. 5469 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil or criminal
actions against them if warranted by the attendant
circumstances.
####
LocGov
URBANO M. MORENO v. COMELEC and NORMA
L. MEJES
FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to
disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was
convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to
Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on
August 27, 1998. Moreno argued that petition filed
by Mejes has no cause of action as he was granted
probation. Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Samar Investigator, after investigation,
recommended disqualification of Moreno. Comelec
First Division adopted it. On motion for
reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the
Resolution of the First Division was affirmed on
grounds that Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code provides that those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.5Since Moreno was released
from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and
end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to
Moreno merely suspended the execution of his
sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
ISSUE: WON on the application of the phrase
"within two (2) years after serving sentence" found in
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it should
be construed to mean that Moreno is disqualified to
run for any elective office.
HELD: No, he is not disqualified. In construing Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that
broadens the scope of the disqualification to include
Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error
which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was not
disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay
Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections.
RATIO: Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
appears innocuous enough at first glance. The
phrase "service of sentence," understood in its
25 Session 11
general and common sense, means the confinement
of a convicted person in a penal facility for the
period adjudged by the court.10  This seemingly
clear and unambiguous provision, however, has
spawned a controversy worthy of this Court's
attention because the Comelec, in the assailed
resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the
coverage of the law to include even those who did
not serve a day of their sentence because they were
granted probation. In  Baclayon v. Mutia,  the Court
declared that an order placing defendant on
probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held
that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended
the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We
thus deleted from the order granting probation the
paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession. Applying
this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to  prision correccional  in its
minimum period  11  imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. It
appears then that during the period of probation, the
probationer is not even disqualified from running for
a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the
duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within
which a person is under probation cannot be
equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec.
4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the
grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of probation,  12  the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
upon him by the court but is merely required to
comply with all the conditions prescribed in the
probation order. It is unfortunate that the
deliberations on the Local Government Code afford
us no clue as to the intended meaning of the phrase
"service of sentence,"  i.e.,  whether the legislature
also meant to disqualify those who have been
granted probation. The Court's function, in the face
of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and
harmonize the Probation Law and the Local
Government Code.Interpretare et concordare legis
LocGov
legibus est optimus interpretandi. Probation is not a
right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of
grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the
state, which is granted to a deserving defendant
who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he
was convicted.15  Thus, the Probation Law lays out
rather stringent standards regarding who are
qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that
the benefits of probation shall not be extended to
those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted
of any offense against the security of the State;
those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or
a fine of not less than  P200.00; those who have
been once on probation; and those who are already
serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of the Probation Law became applicable.
It is important to note that the disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers
offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision
does not specifically disqualify probationers from
running for a local elective office. This omission is
significant because it offers a glimpse into the
legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct
class of offenders not covered by the
disqualification. Further, it should be mentioned that
the present Local Government Code was enacted in
1991, some seven (7) years after  Baclayon v.
Mutia  was decided. When the legislature approved
the enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have
knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the
effect of probation on the disqualification from
holding public office. That it chose not to include
probationers within the purview of the provision is a
clear expression of the legislative will not to
disqualify probationers.
####
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. v. COMELEC and
AGAPITO J. CARDINO
FACTS: Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates
for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in
the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his
third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
26 Session 11
Code to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino
asserted that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when
he declared under oath that he was eligible for the
Office of Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before
Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos
had already been convicted by final judgment for
robbery and sentenced to prisi mayor by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City.
Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served
his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but
stated that he had already been granted probation.
Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos
probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987.
Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC
issued an Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring
that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of
probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the
2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for
disqualification filed against him on the same
grounds. It turned out that Jalosjos emerged
victorious and after his proclamation the Comelec
rendered a decision disqualifying him and ousting
him from office.
ISSUE1: COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos probation was
revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to
run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy without making a finding that
Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation
as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good
faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring
him eligible for the same position from which he is
now being ousted
HELD1: No
RATIO1: The perpetual special disqualification
against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
by final judgment is a material fact involving
eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was void from the
start since he was not eligible to run for any public
office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all
votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy being void ab initio,
LocGov
Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor. A false statement in a certificate of
candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for
public office is a false material representation which
is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
same Code. Section 74 requires the candidate to
state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that
he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if
he has a right to run for the public office. If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is
barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
running for public office, and he still states under
oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to run for public office, then the candidate clearly
makes a false material representation that is a
ground for a petition under Section 78. A sentence of
prision mayor by final judgment is a ground for
disqualification under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code and under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact
involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections
74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a
person can file a petition under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code or under either Section 12
or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The penalty of prision mayor automatically
carries with it, by operation of law,15Ï‚rνll  the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute
d i s q u a l i fi c a t i o n a n d p e r p e t u a l s p e c i a l
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised
Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification
produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to
vote in any election for any popular elective office or
to be elected to such office." The duration of the
temporary absolute disqualification is the same as
that of the principal penalty. On the other hand,
under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code
perpetual special disqualification means that "the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification," which
i s p e r p e t u a l l y. B o t h t e m p o r a r y a b s o l u t e
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is
ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so
run. The accessory penalty of temporary absolute
disqualification disqualifies the convict for public
office and for the right to vote, such disqualification
to last only during the term of the sentence (Article
27 Session 11
27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code)
that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961. But this does not hold true with
respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold
public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during
the term of the sentence. The word "perpetually" and
the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should
be applied distributively to their respective
antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to
the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while
the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers
to the temporary special disqualification. The
duration between the perpetual and the temporary
(both special) are necessarily different because the
provision, instead of merging their durations into one
period, states that such duration is "according to the
nature of said penalty" which means according to
whether the penalty is the perpetual or the
temporary special disqualification. Perpetual special
disqualification is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because
this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public
office, contrary to the statement that Section 74
requires him to state under oath. As used in Section
74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run
for elective public office, that is, having all the
qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for
public office. As this Court held in Fermin v.
Commission on Elections,17Ï‚rνll the false material
representation may refer to "qualifications or
eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special
disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If
a person suffering from perpetual special
disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating
under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public)
office," as expressly required under Section 74, then
he clearly makes a false material representation that
is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
What is indisputably clear is that the false
material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. However, since the false
material representation arises from a crime
penalized by prisi mayor, a petition under Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the
Local Government Code can also be properly filed.
The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his
petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
LocGov
Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. The law expressly provides
multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to
adopt belongs to the petitioner. The COMELEC
properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy.
A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of
ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
21Ï‚rνll  Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was
cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to
run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he
was never a valid candidate from the very
beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio. Jalosjos ineligibility existed on the day he filed
his certificate of candidacy, and the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he
filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was
only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May
2010 elections Cardino who received the highest
number of votes.
RATIO2: On Succession
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-
placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer
is disqualified or declared ineligible22Ï‚rνll  should
be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of
filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because
of a violation of law that took place, or a legal
impediment that took effect, after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of
candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person
who filed such void certificate of candidacy was
never a candidate in the elections at any time. All
votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate
can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on
the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate
are stray votes.23Ï‚rνll  If a certificate of candidacy
void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also
be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy
is void from the very beginning. This is the more
equitable and logical approach on the effect of the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void
ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void
28 Session 11
ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid
certificates of candidacy for the same position.
####
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMELEC and
ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA
FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born
Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his
subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United
States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10
July 2008.4On the same day an Order of Approval
of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor. On 28 April 2010, respondent
Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection
with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a
resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he
is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued
by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado's
US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum
a computer-generated travel record11  dated 03
December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering
and departing the Philippines. The said record
shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009
and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed
on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on
24 November 2009. Arnado won. Comelec First
Division ruled: Rommel C. Arnado's proclamation as
the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED.
Comelec en banc: reversed and set aside the ruling
of the First Division and granted Arnado's Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE1: whether or not intervention is allowed in a
disqualification case
HELD1: Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when there has not
yet been any proclamation of the winner
LocGov
RATIO1: It must be emphasized that while the
original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or
disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and
the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition
as one for disqualification. The effect of a
disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646: “Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong” Mercado v. Manzano
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification
case. In that case, the Court said: That petitioner
had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered. Clearly then,
Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The
fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled
that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for
the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in
Sinsuat v. COMELEC30  are present and therefore
would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case,
does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court.
29 Session 11
ISSUE2: whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
one's qualifications to run for public office.
HELD2: Yes, The use of foreign passport after
renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one's nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position. Arnado, by using his US passport
after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies
to his situation. He is disqualified not only from
holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.
RATIO2: Rommel Arnado took all the necessary
steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the
Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after
performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he
became eligible to run for public office. Indeed,
Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only
once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he
applied for repatriation before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the
execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time,
however, he likewise possessed American
citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen. After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship,
Arnado renounced his American citizenship by
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for
public office. By renouncing his foreign citizenship,
he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under
the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal
presumption does not operate permanently and is
open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is
not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at
any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires
an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
LocGov
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil
and political rights granted by the foreign country
which granted the citizenship. While the act of using
a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated
in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath
of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen
who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. Such act
of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a
foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado's bid for public office, as
it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run
for an elective local position. Arnado's category of
dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered
dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required
by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere
filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.
39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand,
are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines but also to
personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to
qualify as a candidate for public office. By the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November
2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for
a local elective position. In effect, Arnado was solely
and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of
eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009,
on which date he first used his American passport
after renouncing his American citizenship. The
citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the
time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in
disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
30 Session 11
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to
allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents
himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
ISSUE3: whether or not the rule on succession in
the Local Government Code is applicable to this
case.
HELD3: There actually is no succession to speak of.
Maquiling garnered the highest number of votes
among qualified candidates. The settled rule that the
second highest candidate does not succeed in case
of ineligibility of the winning candidate only applies
to cases where the winning candidate was qualified
to run at first but was subsequently disqualified,
whereas in this case, Arnado was disqualified to run
for elective local office. The ballot cannot override
the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective
public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate. When a
person who is not qualified is voted for and
eventually garners the highest number of votes,
even the will of the electorate expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of
the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon
and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.
We might as well write off our election laws if the
voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of
who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective
positions in our republic. With Arnado's
disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner
in the election as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates.
Jurisprudence reiterates that the votes cast in favor
of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election. Even when
the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in
favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice.
The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected. The disqualifying circumstance
surrounding Arnado's candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
LocGov
election offenses as provided for in the first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the
individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following
persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a
bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the
election. With Arnado being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is
thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he
filed his answer to the petition when the elections
were conducted already and he was already
proclaimed the winner. To hold that such
proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory
character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
c a n d i d a c y. T h e a f fi r m a t i o n o f A r n a d o ' s
disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate
of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
####
OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v.
CA and JEJOMAR BINAY JR.
FA C T S : O n J u l y 2 2 , 2 0 1 4 , a c o m p l a i n t /
affidavit10  was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr.,  et al), accusing them of
Plunder11  and violation of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019,12  otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5)
phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).13
 subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of


On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted
a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-
finding investigation, submit an investigation report,
and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st
Special Panel).15  Pursuant to the Ombudsman's
directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel
filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay,
31 Session 11
Jr.,  et al, charging them with six (6) administrative
cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB
Cases).
ISSUE1: Whether the Petition filed before the SC,
without resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was the Ombudsman’s plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy
HELD/RATIO1: Ombudsman’s petition falls under
the exceptions that a prior motion for
reconsideration must be filed, citing the case of
Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013,
which held as follows: (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where
the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved. (Emphasis supplied on the
grounds relied on by the SC in this case, in ruling
that no motion for reconsideration was needed.)
ISSUE2: Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has
the petition;
HELD/RATIO2: As to the Second Issue, the
discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act
No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act
(RA 6770), more particularly its 2nd Paragraph
states:
LocGov
“Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation
is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.No court shall hear any appeal
orapplication for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.”
Now the SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec.
14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional and invalid.
The SC relied on its ruling in the landmark case of
Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in
turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA
6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing
theappellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice
and concurrence, inviolation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution. This tells us that lawyers should
always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law
has affected itso much – maybe it’s time to update it.
Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate
deliberations cited by the Ombudsman, in the
crafting of RA 6770. It quoted the exchanges
between Senators Jovito Salonga, Edgardo Angara,
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and Neptali Gonzales, which
merely led the SC to be suspicious on whether said
Senators were talking about Sec. 14, RA 6670, or
some other provision. In other words, while the
throwback was appreciatedby the SC, the
discussions were not really useful in this case.
Regardless, the SC still ruled thatthe remedy of
Binay, Jr. – the filing of petition for certiorari pursuant
to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to assail the
Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order – was
valid, citing the cases of Office of the Ombudsman v.
Capulong, G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and
Dagan v.Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
184083, 19 November 2013. It’s just sad that the
sorry end of Second Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770
came as collateral damage in this case. The SC
justified its taking up this issue on its own motion, or
ex mero motu, which it canrightfully do, since it is,
after all, the SC.
ISSUE3: Whether the CA has subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman
against Binay, Jr.;
32 Session 11
HELD/RATIO3: -Ombudsman’s history
-Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No.
196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014— Office of the
Ombudsman’s independence covers thefollowing:
(1) it is the creation of the Constitution; (2) it enjoys
fiscalautonomy; and (3) it is insulated from executive
supervision and control. On this basis, the SC held
that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected
frompolitical harassment and pressure, to free it
from the “insidious tentacles of politics.” Since the
SC is apolitical, then Gonzales case should not be
interpreted to shield the Ombudsman from the
judicial review power of the courts.
-History of SC
-Judicial review concept including expanded judicial
review doctrine (Oposa Case)
-Congress, in relation to RA 6770, has no authority
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and rules
allowing the issuance of an injunction form part of
the court’s inherent power, which enable the
judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated
functions. Congress’ passing of the First Paragraph
of Sec. 14, RA 6770, which prohibits the issuance of
an injunction, is an encroachment of the SC’s rule-
making authority. An injunction is merely a
provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve rights in
esse. However, the SC noted that it has not
consented to this as it has not issued rules of
procedure through an administrative circular. Thus,
pending deliberation, the SC declared the First
Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, “until
it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor.” The Second Paragraph was declared
unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now
deemed ineffective. As such,the CA was held to
have correctly issued the injunctive relief in enjoining
the preventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
ISSUE4: Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI;
H E L D / R AT I O 4 : T h e c o n d o n a t i o n d o c t r i n e
i s  A B A N D O N E D , b u t t h e a b a n d o n m e n t
is PROSPECTIVE in effect; hence CA did not act in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so
based on good case law, considering that the
abandonment is prospective in nature. In
abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC
emphasized that this was a jurisprudential creation
that originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was
LocGov
decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable
that there was no legal precedent on the issue at
that time, and the SC resorted to American
authorities. The SC stated what appears the sole
basis forthe condonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline
toward the rule denying the right to remove one from
office because of misconduct during a prior term, to
which we fully subscribe. As can be read above, it is
clear that no real justification was given for the
condonation doctrine, except that “it seems to
incline” towards American authorities. On this
regard, the SC made its own investigation, and
found that there was really no established weight
ofauthorities in the United States (“US”). In fact, 17
States in the US have already abandoned the
condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the
Ombudsman. The SC went on to adopt the findings
of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the
caveat that said cases are merely “guides of
interpretation.” Perhaps the greatest victory in this
case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to
convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis,
thereby enriching Philippine jurisprudence on this
matter. This is important, as its effects are far-
reaching, since we now have additional basis to
petition the abandonment of old ineffective case
laws. For this moment of glory, allow us to quote
directly from the case, viz: Therefore, the ultimate
analysis is on whether or not the condonation
doctrine, as espoused in Pascual,and carried over in
numerous cases after, can be held up against
prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of
stare decisis does not preclude this Court from
revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case
of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate
when there are powerful countervailing
considerations against its application. In other
words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule
only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal
of standing precedent. As the Ombudsman correctly
points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid,
atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that
develops and devolves along with the society within
which it thrives. In the words of a recent US
Supreme Court Decision, ‘[w]hat we can decide, we
can undecide.’ In this case, the Court agrees with
the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the
1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not
reflect the experience of the Filipino People under
33 Session 11
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the
plain difference in setting, including, of course, the
sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public
accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re-
examination.” The SC then proceeded to dissect
Pascual, and went on to enumerate the notable
cases that applied Pascual, which included cases
issued under the 1987 Constitution. Pascual was
tested under existing laws, to see if there exists
legislation to support Pascual, e.g. 1987
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code, Code of
Conductand Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, Local Government Code of 1991,
and Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil
Service. The SC ruled: "Reading the 1987
Constitution together with the above-cite legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion
that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
legal bases. To begin with, the concept of public
office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by
the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not
a mode of condoning an administrative offense,and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
our jurisdiction tosupport the notion that an official
elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from administrative offenses may be condoned by
the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos to apply to administrative offenses: xxx …"
The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory
basis at all. By abandoning the condonation
doctrine, the SC would remove this defense oft-
times used by elected officials, of which the SC was
aware of, as it made mention of the databrought
forward by the Ombudsman, to wit: “To provide a
sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the
Court that ‘for the period of July 2013 to December
2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24
cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the
ground on condonation. Thus, in just one and a half
years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct
– involving infractions such as dishonesty,
oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct – were placed beyond the reach of the
LocGov 34 Session 11
Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial office as a result of an administrative case  shall
powers.’ Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the be  disqualified from running for any elective local
case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not position:
evade review.” Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following
persons are disqualified from running for any
ISSUE5: Whether the CA’s directive for the elective local position:

Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
contempt was improper or illegal. administrative case; (Emphasis supplied)

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the
HELD/RATIO5: The Fifth and Final Issue on whether RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from
the order to comment directed to the Ombudsman service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
was illegal, was refused to be resolved on the disqualification from holding public office: Section
ground there are no contempt proceedings yet. It is 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain
the claim of the Ombudsman that since she was an Penalties. -The penalty of dismissal shall carry with
impeachable officer, she could be subjected to it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
contempt. However, no due course has been given benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding
to the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsman’s public office, and bar from taking the civil service
claim was premature. examinations. In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC
states that the  penalty of suspension  shall not
SUMMARY RELATED TO LOCGOV: For local exceed the unexpired term of the elective local
elective officials like Binay, Jr., the  grounds to official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as
discipline, suspend or remove an elective local long as he meets the qualifications required for the
official from office  are stated in  Section 60 of office. Note, however, that the provision only
Republic Act No. 7160,292  otherwise known as the pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect
"Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which on the official's candidacy.  Nothing therein states
was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect that the administrative liability therefor is
on January 1, 1992: Section 60.  Grounds for extinguished by the fact of re-election: Section
Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - (b) The penalty of
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of
any of the following grounds: the respondent or a period of six (6) months for
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
 every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
 be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, suspended as long as he meets the qualifications
gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
 required for the office. Reading the 1987
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral Constitution together with the above-cited legal
turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion
mayor;
 that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
(e) Abuse of authority;
 legal bases. To begin with, the concept of  public
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
working days, except in the case of members of of accountability to the people at all times, as
the  sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is  plainly
panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and  sangguniang inconsistent  with the idea that an elective local
barangay;
 official's administrative liability for a misconduct
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign committed during a prior term can be wiped off by
citizenship or residence or the status of an the fact that he was elected to a second term of
immigrant of another country; and
 office, or even another elective post. Election is not
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
Code and other laws. there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in
An elective local official may be removed from office our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official
on the grounds enumerated above by order of the elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
proper court. Related to this provision is Section 40 administrative liability arising from an offense done
(b) of the LGC which states that those removed from during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
LocGov
from administrative offenses may be condoned bv
the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which
cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment
cases. By the same token, if executive clemency
may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion
of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article
VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following
petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch
as the same do not necessarily involve criminal
offenses. In the same vein, We do not clearly see
any valid and convincing , reason why the President
cannot grant executive clemency in administrative
cases. It is Our considered view that if the President
can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with
much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly
less serious than criminal offenses. Also, it cannot
be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the
grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot
anymore be invoked against an elective local official
to hold him administratively liable once he is re-
elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC
precludes condonation since in the first place, an
elective local official who is meted with the penalty
of removal could not be re-elected to an elective
local position due to a direct disqualification from
running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52
(a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office as an
accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted
in  Pascual  were decided by US State jurisdictions
wherein the doctrine of condonation of
administrative liability was supported by either a
constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect,
that an officer cannot be  removed  by a misconduct
committed during a previous term,294  or that
the disqualification to hold the office does not extend
beyond the term in which the official's delinquency
occurred.295  In one case,296  the absence of a
provision against the re-election of an officer
removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the
justification behind condonation. In another case,
297  it was deemed that condonation through re-
election was a policy under their constitution - which
35 Session 11
adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our
present Constitution's requirements on public
accountability. There was even one case where the
doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon
but only invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in
another case, which was not reported in full in the
official series, the crux of the disposition was that
the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way
pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was
deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to
either their variance or inapplicability, none of these
cases can be used as basis for the continued
adoption of the condonation doctrine under
our existing laws. At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC
prohibits  the enforcement of the penalty of
suspension  beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows
said official to still run for re-election This treatment
i s s i m i l a r t o  P e o p l e e x r e l B a g s h a w v.
Thompson300  and  Montgomery v. Novell301  both
cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer
cannot be  suspended  for a misconduct committed
during a prior term. However, as previously stated,
nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective
local official's administrative liability is extinguished
by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no
legal provision actually supports the theory that the
liability is condoned. Relatedly it should be clarified
that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the
courts would be depriving the electorate of their right
to elect their officers if condonation were not to be
sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the
process by which a particular constituency chooses
an individual to hold a public office. In this
jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to
conclude that election automatically implies
condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say
that every democratic and republican state has an
inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an
elective official's administrative liability would
perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the
same should have been provided by law under our
governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time
of  Pascual  or at present, by no means has it been
shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or
statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from
this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate's will has been abdicated. Equally infirm
is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-
electing a local official, are assumed to have done
so with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct,
LocGov
if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no
such presumption exists in any statute or procedural
rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience
that the electorate would have full knowledge of a
public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly
points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public
officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed
from the public.Misconduct committed by an elective
official is easily covered up, and is almost always
unknown to the electorate when they cast their
votes.303  At a conceptual level, condonation
presupposes that the condoner has actual
knowledge of what is to be condoned.  Thus, there
could be no condonation of an act that is
unknown.  As observed in  Walsh v. City Council of
Trenton304decided by the New Jersey Supreme
Court:Many of the cases holding that re-election of a
public official prevents his removal for acts done in a
preceding term of office are reasoned out on the
theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that
theory because condonation, implying as it does
forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the
absence of knowledge there can be no condonation.
One cannot forgive something of which one has no
knowledge. That being said, this Court simply finds
no legal authority to sustain the condonation
doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this
discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class
of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of
touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the
current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time
for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine
that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the
cases following the same, such as  Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia,  and  Governor Garcia,
Jr.  which were all relied upon by the CA. It should,
however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment
of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution,
until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines.305  Unto this Court devolves the
sole authority to interpret what the Constitution
means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. As explained in  De Castro v. Judicial
Bar Council. Judicial decisions assume the same
authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria that must control the
actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by
them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them. Hence, while the future may
36 Session 11
ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be,
as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to
its abandonment. Consequently, the people's
reliance thereupon should be respected. The
landmark case on this matter is  People v. Jabinal,
308  wherein it was ruled:[W]hen a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Later,
in  Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309  it was further
elaborated: [Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code
"judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines." But while our decisions
form part of the law of the land, they are also subject
to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that
"laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the
familiar legal maxim  lex prospicit, non respicit, the
law looks forward not backward. The rationale
against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights
that have already become vested or impairs the
obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional. Indeed, the lessons of history teach
us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight
and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly
perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of
legal anchorage was able to endure in our
jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this
Court, under a new membership, takes up the
cudgels and now abandons the condonation
doctrine.
FALLO: - the second paragraph of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770 is
declared  UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy
against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs
by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said
provision is  DECLARED  ineffective until the Court
adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued
therefor
-condonation doctrine abandoned
-