Vitug v.

CA to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do

G.R. No. 82027, March 29, 1990
Spouses Dolores and Romarico Vitug entered into a survivorship agreement with
the Bank of American National Trust and Savings Association. The
said agreementcontained the following stipulations:
(1) All money deposited and to be deposited with the Bank in their joint savings
current account shall be both their property and shall be payable to
and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of them during their lifetime;
and
(2) After the death of one of them, the same shall belong to and be the sole
property of the surviving spouse and payable to and collectible or withdrawable
by such survivor
upon the happening of an event which is to occur at an indeterminate time or is
uncertain, such as death. The Court further ruled that a survivorship agreement is
per se not contrary to law and thus is valid unless its operation or effect may be
violative of a law such as in the following instances: (1) it is used as a mere cloak
to hide an inofficious donation; (2) it is used to transfer property in fraud
of creditors; or (3) it is used to defeat the legitime of a compulsory heir. In the
instant case, none of the foregoing instances were present. Consequently, the
Court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement entered into by the
spouses Vitug. As such, Romarico, being the surviving spouse, acquired a vested
right over the amounts under the savings account, which became his exclusive
property upon the death of his wife pursuant to the survivorship agreement.
Thus, the funds of the savings account are not conjugal partnership properties
and not part of the estate of the deceased Dolores.

Dolores died naming Rowena Corona in her wills as executrix. Romarico later filed
a motion asking authority to sell certain shares of stock and real property
belonging to the estate to cover his advances to the estate which he claimed
were personal funds withdrawn from their savings account. Rowena opposed on
the ground that the same funds withdrawn from the
savings account were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate.
Hence, there should be no reimbursement. On the other hand, Romarico insists
that the same are his exclusive property acquired through the
survivorship agreement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of the savings account subject of the
survivorship agreement were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate

No. The Court ruled that a Survivorship Agreement is neither

a donation mortis causanor a donation inter vivos. It is in the nature of an
aleatory contract whereby one or both of the parties reciprocally bind themselves

1

VITUG vs CA
188 SCRA 755
FACTS: This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New
York, U. S.A. naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In
said decision, the court upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug’s estate with her (Mrs. Vitug’s) widower, petitioner
Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to
sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover
allegedly his advances to the estate, plus interests, which he claimed were
personal funds. As found by the CA the alleged advances were spent for the
payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and “increment thereto.”
Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and
hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his
ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for
“concealment of funds belonging to the estate.”
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the
same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.
The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement.
On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a
conveyance mortis causa which “did not comply with the formalities of a valid will
as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,” and secondly, assuming that it is a
mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of
Article 133 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a
donation?
HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa,
which should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as “a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his
property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his
death.” In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this
case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of
conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., we
rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party’s
separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence
it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of
the marital relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a
donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s
own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the
conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by “mere stipulation” and
that it is no “cloak” to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations.
Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say,
by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in
banking parlance as an “and/or” account. In the case at bar, when the spouses
Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully
belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor
of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited
donation.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased
her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the
amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as
the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by
Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of
petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.Republic of the
2
 Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-
CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New
York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of
Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs.
Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from
the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to
the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of
P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by
the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for
the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99
as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of
P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that
the same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no
ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the
sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the
same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank
on June 19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF
AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION
(hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now or
hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK
in our joint savings current account shall be the property of all
or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime, and
after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the
sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable
to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the
receipt or check of either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or
the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any
payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account
shall be valid and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK
for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion
to sell some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used
to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of
P667,731.66 ... ." 7
3
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the
herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities
of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and secondly,
assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under
the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November
26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it
granted private respondent's motion to sell certain properties
of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his
alleged advances to the estate, but the same order is sustained
in all other respects. In addition, respondent Judge is directed
to include provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No.
35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory
of actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the
decedent's death. With costs against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on
the strength of our decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust
Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained the validity of
"survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should
be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable
and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights
and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." 14 In other
words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the
monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal
funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected
claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate
properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption
that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the funds-
deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based on
the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name
of Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as
housemaid of the deceased." But it not infrequently happens
that a person deposits money in the bank in the name of
another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera
served her master for about nineteen years without actually
receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently
Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself
and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship
agreement in question although there was no relation of
kinship between them but only that of master and servant,
nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear proof
to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the
certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in
question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that
they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of
them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account
during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the
death of either, belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract
whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the
parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do
something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to
4
 give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is
uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time. As already
stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the
Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit
C, Juana would become the owner of the house in case
Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of
the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In
this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their
respective property to one another conditioned upon who
might die first, the time of death determining the event upon
which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other
depended. This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon
the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before
Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the
house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired
the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana
had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence
it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of
the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a
donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's
own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the
conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere
stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal
property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest
conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more
commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case
at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they
merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They
did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been
sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can
not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her
deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all"
feature, but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the
term being death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both
reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in
consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the
happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur
at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends
on either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to
occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the sale of a
sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and
insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life
annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under
the second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the
risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary
to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law. For
instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a
mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property
5
 in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it 2 Kapunan, Santiago, M., J., ponente; Puno Reynato S. and
may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice Marigomen Alfredo, JJ., concurring.
has been imputed and established against the agreement
involved in this case. 26 3 Rollo, 21.

xxx xxx xxx 4 Id., 22.

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been 5 Id.
executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in
order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership. 6 Judge (now Justice of the Court of Appeals) Asaali S. Isnani
presiding.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased
her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the 7 Rollo, 23.
amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as
the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by
8 Id., 26.
Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of
petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
9 Now, Article 87 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29,
10 Rollo, 28-29.
1987, and its resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.

11 73 Phil. 546 (1942).

No costs.

12 64 Phil. 187 (1937).

SO ORDERED.

13 CIVIL CODE, Art. 2010.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado JJ., concur.

14 III TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 26 (1973

ed.), citing 1 GOMEZ 53.
Footnotes
15 See CIVIL CODE, supra., arts. 793, 794, 930.
1 Corona v. Court of Appeals, No. 59821, August 30, 1982, 116
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:
SCRA 316.

6
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and
testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the
house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her
last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as
her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In
the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a
petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will
belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie
Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful
making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia
signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength
of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision
of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a
petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.
HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same
as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with
the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the
NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient
if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act.”
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
7
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL
TITCO, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAXA, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish
that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the
wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so
long as it is legally tenable.1
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the June 15, 2006 Decision3 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September
30, 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua,
Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted
the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with
merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the
will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.5
Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution 6 which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CA’s assailed Decision and instead affirm the
Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
Factual Antecedents
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament
entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala" 7 (Will) in the
Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of
retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice.
After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses
that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her
signature at the end of the said document on page 3 8 and then on the left margin
of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco
Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the
Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause 10 and
on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,11 in the presence of Paciencia and
of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa
and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the
present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby
BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5
unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children,
LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and
Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta.
Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE
ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would
decide to bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
8
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the
properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and
giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two
children and I also command them to offer masses yearly for the repose of my
soul and that of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and
with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill
the wishes of D[ñ]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated
in my testament. x x x12
The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is
Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came
to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.13 Paciencia lived with Lorenzo’s
family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo
since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981,
Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with
Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo
filed a petition14 with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed
as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued
an Order on June 13, 200015allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22,
2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental
witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on
September 13, 1981.16 The Will was executed in her father’s (Judge Limpin) home
office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and Faustino. 17 Dra.
Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four pages. 18 She
likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing
thereon.19 Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpin’s present mental
fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to
undergo brain surgery.20 The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember
her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify
in court.21
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed
an opposition22 to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject
of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-
interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. 23
Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners
Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael
Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental
Opposition24 contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because
ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia
before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code.25 Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he
being a citizen and resident of the USA.26 Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio. 27
Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended
Opposition28 asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the
following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with
the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a
Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under
duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some
other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was
forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud
or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation 29 reiterating
their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties
and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.
On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30 denying the requests of both
Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen
9
and resident of the USA while the latter’s claim as a co-owner of the properties
subject of the Will has not yet been established.
Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued.
Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as
to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the
living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the
lack of photographs when the event took place. 31
Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the
witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his father’s condition.
According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain
damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this
allegation. 32
For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in
April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt,
Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family
until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was
like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and
took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and
without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencia’s death, she did not suffer
from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute;
the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after
Paciencia’s death through Faustino; and he was already residing in the USA when
the Will was executed.33 Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in
three different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar
with Paciencia’s signature because he accompanied her in her
transactions.34 Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation,
violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in
the Philippines when the same was executed.35 On cross-examination, Lorenzo
clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the
USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death. 36
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on
May 21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first
cousins.37 She claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of
Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and
that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzo’s wife and his
children were staying in the same house.38 She served in the said household from
1980 until Paciencia’s departure for the USA on September 19, 1981. 39
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something"
for Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house. 40 Rosie admitted, though, that she did
not see what that "something" was as same was placed inside an
envelope.41 However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look
for money before she signs them.42 A few days after or on September 16, 1981,
Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said
envelope.43 Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with
Paciencia.44 Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or
"forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then
start looking for it moments later.45 On cross examination, it was established that
Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia
was "magulyan" was based on her personal assessment,46 and that it was Antonio
who requested her to testify in court.47
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. 48 He
identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before
because Paciencia brought the same to his mother’s house and showed it to him
along with another document on September 16, 1981.49 Antonio alleged that
when the documents were shown to him, the same were still
unsigned.50 According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to
a lease of one of her rice lands,51 and it was he who explained that the documents
were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other
properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her
properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death.52 Upon hearing this,
Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never [return], why
will I sell all my properties?" Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have
other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die
already?"53 Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she
does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about
10
those, throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them." 54 After
which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned
documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981. 55
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision 56 denying the petition
thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and
(b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.57
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded
that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of
sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity. 58
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will
of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTC’s conclusion that
Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that
"the state of being ‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as]
to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."59 Moreover, the oppositors in the
probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that every
person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given
to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will. 60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration61 but the motion was denied by the CA in
its Resolution62 dated August 31, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari
ascribing upon the CA the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIA’S WILL DESPITE RESPONDENT’S
UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES
OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING
CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND
MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial
Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the
face of the Will.
11
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will
in probate proceedings.64 This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
Rule 75
Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. – No will shall pass
either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court.
Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to
its due execution.
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator,
being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.65 These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with
the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the
Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that
the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of
one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded
that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they
question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary
nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or
forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They
likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration 66 filed with the CA that
Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia. 67
We are not convinced.
We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute
a Will.68 Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article
799 of the New Civil Code states:
12
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and
the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would
show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the
Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpin’s
testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to
Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of
subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s mental condition is
entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." 69 More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.
Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but
if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to
be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one
month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove
that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners.
However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by
them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CA’s finding that petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of
the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be
observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties
from her parents and the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife
CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution
of the will and was not included therein as devisee.70
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper
influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the
probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or
testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions
upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the
Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will
had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or
by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencia’s signature to
be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the
alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981
wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated
Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzo’s wife and
children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our
culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces
and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural
practice that has resulted in many family discords between those favored by the
testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of
intestacy.
13
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship
with Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The
very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and
abroad, even if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights
the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between
Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the said
document as against petitioners’ allegations of duress, influence of fear or
threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside
from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and
credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter
how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to
move the Court to uphold said allegations. 71Furthermore, "a purported will is not
[to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has
been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to
depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the
deceased]."72
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was
duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section
11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
Allowance or Disallowance of Will
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will
contested. – If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary
in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in
the Philippines and not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death,
absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If
all or some of such witnesses are present in the Philippines but outside the
province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or
all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember
having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may
nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and
attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3)
witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of
any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been
presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify
before the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As
testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and
could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said
witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra.
Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had
to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and
could not even remember his daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that
given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at
that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any
objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross
examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to
satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness
and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of
Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving
her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her
handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed
just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither
does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses
declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced
14
by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they
must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by
law."73 1âwphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the

parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question,
it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or
[evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling."74 "The very existence of
[the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that
[her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent
upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent
of the attitude of the parties affected thereby." 75 This, coupled with Lorenzo’s
established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by
petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the
balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the
Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80979 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SUROZA V. HONRADO(110 SCRA 388 )

FACTS:

15
Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who were childless, reared a boy which to vacate the house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a
named Agapito. Agapito and his wife Nenita de Vera had a daughter named Lilia. petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she prayed
Nenita became Agapito’s guardian when he became disabled. A certain that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be
Arsenia de la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it declared void. The CA dismissed the petition because Nenita’s remedy was an
was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy to Marcelina appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil
who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito. Marilyn used the action of certiorari. Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the
surname Suroza although not legally adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
was an illiterate) was 73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which
was in English and thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly bequeathed all ISSUE:
her properties to Marilyn. She also named as executrix her laundrywoman,
Marina Paje. Paje filed a petition for probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to
appointed Paje as administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language
withdraw money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because
instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house, among whom she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by
was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order the notary himself.
ejecting them, alleging that Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, and that
Marilyn was not the decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado
HELD:
issued an order probating Marcelina’s will.
YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in
Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with
English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have
counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction, and an opposition
readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was
to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration,
stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But
which were dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case
in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix
to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed it. The judge then
“and translated into Filipino language”. That could only mean that the will was
closed the testamentary proceeding after noting that the executrix had delivered
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void
the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid.
because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will
must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging Judge Honrado
with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. She reiterated
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
her contentionthat the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as
affixed her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the
the “testator” instead of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been careful and
language in which the will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado
observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the
did not take into account the consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s son,
will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal specifically with the
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father
allegations but merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the
who was still alive. Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk
decree of probate and that in a motion, she asked for a thirty day period within
of court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented

16
as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should
have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could
have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981

NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,

vs.

17
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch 25 and EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted
to probate a will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a
language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged
will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as
admitted by the notary himself?
That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the
certiorari case in the Court of Appeals which reveal the following tangled strands
of human relationship:
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts),
Fort McKinley, married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No. 7816).
They were childless. They reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname
Suroza and who considered them as his parents as shown in his 1945 marriage
contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of
Testate Case showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married
Marcelina in 1923).
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the
Federal Government. That explains why on her death she had accumulated some
cash in two banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist
and went abroad. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife
Nenita was appointed as his guardian in 1953 when he was declared an
incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).
In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz
wanted also to be his guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia tried to prove that
Nenita was living separately from Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted to
Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of testate case).
Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and
confirmed Nenita's appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case).
Agapito has been staying in a veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto,
California (p. 87, Record).
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena
Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted
to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl friend of Agapito) and who was later
delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed
daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.SP-
08654-R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was
not legally adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at
7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati, apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident
of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when
she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She
was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans Administration were also
thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig, Marcelina bequeathed all
her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At
the time of her death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia,
Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-square meter lot and house in that place. She
acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record of testate case).
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P.
97, CA Rollo) and the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita
Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition for the probate of Marcelina's
alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
18
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of
court, Evangeline S. Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of the
stenographic notes taken at the hearing before the deputy clerk of court are not
in the record.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as
administratrix. On the following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders
directing the Merchants Banking Corporation and the Bank of America to allow
Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the savings accounts of Marcelina
S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the custodian of the
passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11,
1975, instructing a deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house,
among whom was Nenita V. Suroza, and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the
settlement of Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's
house filed on April 18 in the said proceeding a motion to set aside the order of
April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the decedent's son Agapito was the sole
heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that Nenita was
Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the
decedent's granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case). Later, they
questioned the probate court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other
than Marilyn, were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order
probating her supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-
77, Record).
On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside
proceedings, admit opposition with counter-petition for administration and
preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion reiterated her allegation that
Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed and
attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina
and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or
trick.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of
the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix
(pp. 83-91, Record).
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of
Marcelina, who swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18)
and her omnibus motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita
filed the next day, April 25, an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-
petition for letters of administration. In that opposition, Nenita assailed the due
execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of Marcelina's intestate
heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware of
the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio,
Marcelina's niece, who swore that Marcelina never executed a win (pp. 124-125,
Record).
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted
that Marilyn was not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito
and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito was not Marcelina's sonbut merely
an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition
for the issuance of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of
her counsel at the hearing. She moved for the reconsideration of that order.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending
incidents, Nenita V. Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void
because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in
English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).
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Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents
"raised" by Nenita (p. 284, Record).
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita
"filed a case to annul" the probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil
Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned
to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402,
Record).
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the
executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been
paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in
this Court, Nenita charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent
will of Marcelina. The complainant reiterated her contention that the testatrix
was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the will and
that she did not know English, the language in which the win was written. (In the
decree of probate Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the will was
written in a language known to the testatrix.)
Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the
testatrix had a son named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory and
legal heir), who was preterited in the will, did not take into account the
consequences of such a preterition.
Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed
him that the testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that the
beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy and that she was not the next of kin of the
testatrix.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina
and her cohorts to withdraw from various banks the deposits Marcelina.
She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving
her access to the record of the probate case by alleging that it was useless for
Nenita to oppose the probate since Judge Honrado would not change his
decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated that if she (Nenita) had ten
thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly
advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the testatrix because she
(Nenita) had no rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her pension
from the Federal Government.
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations
of the complaint. He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from
the decree of probate and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a
thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the testatrix.
Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and
that the latter did not mention Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978
to President Marcos.
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented
Nenita from having access to the record of the testamentary proceeding.
Evangeline was not the custodian of the record. Evangeline " strongly,
vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge that she (Evangeline) said that the
sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable
decision. Evangeline also denied that she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension
from the Federal Government.
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this
Court in the Court Administrator's memorandum of September 25, 1980. The
case was referred to Justice Juan A. Sison of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted a report dated October
7, 1981.
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge
Honrado a petition for certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will,
the decree of probate and all the proceedings in the probate case be declared
void.
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Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized
the will. He swore that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not
appear before him and that he notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother
lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to the notary the testatrix
and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an
appeal and her failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil
action of certiorari (Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to
dismiss the administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his
improper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a
miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted
heiress in the void win should have inherited the decedent's estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory
order by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised
Penal Code).
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance
for serious misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct
implies malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. "For serious
misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial
acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or
were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules" (In relmpeachment of
Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A
judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance
of his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires
in the rendition of any public service (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21,
1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written
in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have
readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was
stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino
language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void
because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will
must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will
written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was
disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as
the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only
the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something
wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving
nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court,
respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a
witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have
personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have
ascertained whether the will was validly executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be
inexcusable.
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WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a
fine equivalent to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his
compulsory retirement falls on December 25, 1981).

The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she
is no longer employed in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been
assistant city fiscal of Surigao City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary
jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI November 21, 1980, 101
SCRA 225).

SO ORDERED.

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