G.R. No.
L-6207 August 4, 1911
SIMON MALAHACAN, administrator of the goods, chattels and
credits of GUILLERMA MARTINEZ, deceased, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFA IGNACIO, MACARIO IGNACIO, PAULA IGNACIO and
AGUEDA BUÑAG, defendants-appellants.
M.P. Leuterio for appellants.
No appearance for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas, the Hon. J.S. Powell
presiding, awarding the possession of the lands described in the
complaint to the plaintiff, with costs.
The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods,
chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the
defendants, the only heirs at law of the said deceased, to recover
possession of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died
seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying for
some years before the commencement of this action.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate
passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma
Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the
defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs instantly
became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession
thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the
record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding
against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground
upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession
of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will
be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. In the case of
Ilustre, administrator of the estate of the deceased Calzado vs. Alaras
Frondosa (17 Phil. Rep., 321), this court said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights
to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of
the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to
the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them
a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts
existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the
administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to
administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it
among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they
also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition
in case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there
are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no
occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement
and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all
of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the
estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an
administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in
the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator
has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of
the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an undivided
estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the
same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to
show that the heirs requested the appointment of the
administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the
present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not
received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for
partition of the said estate.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed on
the merits, without special findings as to costs.
G.R. No. L-21725 November 29, 1968
AURELIO ARCILLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga, MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO ARCILLAS and
VICENTE ARCILLAS, respondents.
Antonio J. Calvento for petitioner.
T. de los Santos for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Filed before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on November 12
and 16, 1962, respectively, are two separate petitions having direct and
special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part of the estate of the
late Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate on March 8, 1958 in the City of
Zamboanga.
In the petition dated November 12 Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of
the deceased, sought the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of
the deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in
the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in the
petition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death of the
deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276 transpired,
prominent among which were the separate sales of their respective
shares and participation in Lot No. 276 executed by four (4) other
children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente Arcillas. Invoking
section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Geronimo Arcillas
argued that the proportion of each heir's participation in said lot should be
accurately reflected in a new certificate of title. But before any other
material pleading could be filed with respect to this petition, five (5) other
children of the deceased filed the November 16 petition aforementioned.
This later petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for
the issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein petitioner
preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's estate. Paragraphs 3
and 4 of this later petition, insofar as pertinent to this case, read:
3. That the deceased left an estate consisting of real property in
Zamboanga City with a probable value of not less than SIX
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine Currency;
4. That as far as petitioners know, the deceased left no debts
remaining unpaid;
In the meantime, on November 23, 1962 herein petitioner filed his
opposition to the November 12 petition on the ground that inasmuch as
Lot No. 276 — the subject matter thereof — was included in the estate of
the deceased for which a petition for administration had actually been
filed and was awaiting resolution, that petition (the one dated November
12) should be held in abeyance until after Special Proceeding No. 632
was closed and terminated. Recognizing then the merit of petitioner's
ground, respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963
temporarily holding in abeyance resolution of the November 12 petition
until the termination of the intestate proceedings.
Meanwhile, in his answer to the November 16 petition (Sp. Proc. No.
632) Geronimo Arcillas, this time joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow
Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration to
herein petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only
property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition
for administration was improper. However petitioner, in his reply on
January 18, 1963, insisted that there were still other properties of the
estate of the deceased besides Lot No. 276; he likewise took issue with
respondents' view that administration proceedings could be dispensed
with asserting, firstly, that there was no unanimity among the heirs for
extrajudicial partition and, secondly, that some of the heirs had been
unduly deprived of their participation in the estate.
On March 8, 1963 respondent court denied the November 16 petition for
the issuance of letters of administration and at the same time gave due
course to the November 12 petition. Reasoned the court: "... to obviate
the necessity of spending uselessly which would only deplete the funds
of the estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property
involved herein, and following the doctrines established by the Honorable
Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which is in
consonance with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, the court is of the opinion that the herein petition (should) be
denied and (holds that) the cadastral motion of the oppositor Geronimo
Arcillas covering the same property is the most expedient and proper
action."
Unable to have this order reconsidered petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari with mandamus and preliminary injunction. On December 2,
1963, upon filing by petitioner of the required bond, we issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with
the hearing of the "cadastral motion" dated November 12, 1962.
The issues to be determined are whether respondent Judge acted
properly (1) in dismissing the administration proceedings under the
authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon averments
that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its
distribution are all of age and (2) in maintaining that the "cadastral
motion" brought under the provision of section 112 of the Land
Registration Act was the more proper proceeding under the
circumstances.
Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the Register of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so
in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily anchored on the
proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum
requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the
appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate for the
reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary. In other words,
respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as mandatory upon the
heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any pending obligations to
be paid and his heirs are all of age.
We cannot entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention in
the past, we had occasion to explain in Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, et al., 92
Phil. 273:
... section I does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to
do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of
action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be
gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the
intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have
employed the word shall as was done in other provisions that are
mandatory in character. Note that the word may its used not only
once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to
leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the heirs.
Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of
resorting to the less expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e.
extrajudicial settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not
then be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under section
1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that the
expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the
funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred
thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been
voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in the
future be heard to complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or
veracity of petitioner's claim as to the alleged existence of other
properties of the deceased aside from the lot in question can be more
adequately ascertained in administration proceedings rather than in any
other action.
Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the "cadastral" motion,
supposedly brought under the authority of section 112 of Act 496, cannot
be sustained. While this section authorizes, among others, a person in
interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title "upon the ground that registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate have
terminated and ceased," and apparently the November 12 petition comes
within its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on
the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the
case where the incident properly belongs (see Puguid v. Reyes, L-21311,
August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein). In the instant case the
obvious lack of unanimity among the parties in interest, manifestly
demonstrated by petitioners' express objection to the cancellation of TCT
No. RT-244, sufficiently removes the November 12 petition from the
scope of section 112 of Act 496. Besides, the proceedings provided in
the Land Registration Act are summary in nature and hence inadequate
for the litigation of issues which properly pertain to the case where the
incident belongs.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered setting
aside the appealed orders and directing respondent Judge or whoever is
presiding the court below to reinstate Special Proceedings No. 632; the
writ of preliminary injunction previously issued enjoining respondent
Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the "cadastral" motion dated
November 12, 1962 is hereby made permanent. Costs against
respondents, except respondent Judge.
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA
NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the
surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the
deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions
which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines,
passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was
survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner
Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-
BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor
pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In
her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she
and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased;
that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased;
that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the
Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the
PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the
Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay
Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased
(herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and
as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss
the petition of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of
the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the
alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration
relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court,
appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the
intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her
in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of
all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an
inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated
December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the
following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2)
Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where
there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right
to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita
Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the
deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly,
the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong
exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim
she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the
exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings
deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the
PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by
several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has
been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private
respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner
to decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to
appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in
the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not
belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations
as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not
a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-
exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which
the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best
position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties
as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the
rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of
resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is
one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the
court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be
instituted by the parties.7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the
administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be
unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint
a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in
case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to
name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in
Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the
heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different
course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is
always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration
of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there
are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do
not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary
estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case
the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the
hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument
is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has
indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the
deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where
such property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as
administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir
seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain
transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action
for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a
reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary
forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in
order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate
proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce
proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are
only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age.
The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid.
What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms.
The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment
as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties
of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are
presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason
which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which
does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property
left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for
no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims
of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly
ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should
there be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of
administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of
the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of
an administration proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue
of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the
sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as
administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the
administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of
private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property
left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000]
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO
KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
The victory of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario
[1]
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in an ejectment
[2]
suit filed against them by private respondent Silverio Pada,
[3]
was foiled by its reversal by the Regional Trial Court on
[4] [5]
appeal. They elevated their cause to respondent Court of
[6]
Appeals which, however, promulgated a Decision on May
[7] [8]
20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The following facts are undisputed:
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano,
Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died
intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and
coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte,
denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of
1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano
Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the
northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano
died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together
with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of
Pastor's children, has been living in that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into
an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this purpose, they
executed a private document which they, however, never
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was
himself present while his other brothers were represented by
their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died
without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter,
Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia;
and Higino was represented by his son, Silverio who is the
private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and
Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When
Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as
co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes,
the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot
No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell
the co-ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private
respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner
spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581
so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a
series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for
the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts
toward that end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for
ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner
spouses.
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely,
Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and
Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation transferring to
[9]
petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-
owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer
averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581
had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador
Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the
estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and
ineffectual since no special power of attorney was executed by
either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective
children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition.
Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document
that was never registered in the office of the Registrar of
Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor
of petitioner spouses. It made the following findings:
"After a careful study of the evidence submitted
by both parties, the court finds that the evidence
adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his
ownership over x x x Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x
x while defendants has [sic] successfully proved
by preponderance of evidence that said property
is still under a community of ownership among
the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died
intestate. If there was some truth that Marciano
Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated
jointly of [sic] the above-described residential
property x x x as their share of the inheritance on
the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement,
how come that since 1951, the date of partition,
the share of the late Marciano Pada was not
transferred in the name of his heirs, one of them
Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the
name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the
part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was
easily transferred in the name of his heirs x x x.
 "The alleged extra judicial settlement was made
in private writing and the genuineness and due
execution of said document was assailed as
doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs
were not participants and signatories of said
settlement, and there was lack of special power of
attorney to [sic] those who claimed to have
represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic]
and signing of the said extra judicial
statement.
"Defendants were already occupying the northern
portion of the above-described property long
before the sale of said property on November 17,
1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as
vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in
possession of said portion of the above-described
property since the year 1960 with the consent of
some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the
[sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has
[sic] donated x x x their share of [sic] the above-
described property to them, virtually converting
defendants' standing as co-owners of the land
under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-
owners became the undivided owners of the
whole estate x x x. As co-owners of x x x
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 x x x their possession in
the northern portion is being [sic] lawful."[10]
From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to
the Regional Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it rendered a
judgment of reversal. It held:
"x x x [T]he said conveyances executed by
Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were never
questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more
than 40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic]
the fact that the two vendors were indeed legal
and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. x
x x At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of
Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some
interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano and
Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long
been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or
estoppel.
"It is true that an action for partition does not
prescribe, as a general rule, but this doctrine of
imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of
the heirs possessed the property as an owner and
for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription
because from the moment one of the co-heirs
claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and
denies the rest their share of the community
property, the question then involved is no longer
one for partition but of ownership. x x x Since
[sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of 42 long
years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-
heirs may have, was long extinguished by laches,
estoppel or prescription.
"x x x
"x x x [T]he deed of donation executed by the
Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother of Marciano
Pada, took place only during the inception of the
case or after the lapse of more than 40 years
reckoned from the time the extrajudicial partition
was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is
illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others,
 were absolutely bereft of any right in donating
the very property in question."[11]
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered,
reversing the judgment earlier promulgated by
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees
are hereby ordered:
"1. To vacate the premises in issue and return
peaceful possession to the appellant, being the
lawful possessor in concept of owner;
"2. To remove their house at their expense unless
appellant exercises the option of acquiring the
same, in which case the pertinent provisions of
the New Civil Code has to be applied;
"3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay
monthly rental for their occupancy and use of the
portion of the land in question in the sum of
P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the
case was filed and until the termination of the
present case;
"4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the
appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages
and the further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's
fees;
"5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit."
Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review
of the foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered
judgment dismissing said petition. It explained:
"Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit,
the only issue is possession de facto or physical
or material possession and not de jure. Hence,
even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, the court may pass upon such issue but
only to determine the question of possession,
specially if the former is inseparably linked with
the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue
of ownership, such issue being inutile in an
ejectment suit except to throw light on the
question of possession x x x.
"Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his
claim to the portion of the land possessed by
petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his
favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of
Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada who was the
registered owner of the subject lot. The right of
vendee Maria Pada to sell the property was
derived from the extra-judicial partition executed
in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada,
which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by
the heirs, wherein the subject land was
adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father, and
Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and
genuineness of the extra-judicial partition is now
being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada,
[12]
no action was ever previously filed in court to
question the validity of such partition.
"Notably, petitioners in their petition
admitted among the antecedent facts that Maria
Pavo is one of the co-owners of the property
originally owned by Jacinto Pada x x x and that
the disputed lot was adjudicated to Marciano
(father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the
death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs took
possession of said lot, i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor
for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias'
share x x x. Moreover, petitioners do not dispute
the findings of the respondent court that during
the cadastral survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share
of Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No.
5581, while the share of Juanita Pada was
denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both
Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were in possession
of their respective hereditary shares. Further,
petitioners in their Answer admitted that they
have been occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581,
now in dispute without paying any rental owing
to the liberality of the plaintiff x x x. Petitioners
cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial
partition executed by the heirs in 1951. As owner
and possessor of the disputed property, Maria
Pada, and her vendee, private respondent, is
entitled to possession. A voluntary division of the
estate of the deceased by the heirs among
themselves is conclusive and confers upon said
heirs exclusive ownership of the respective
portions assigned to them x x x.
"The equally belated donation of a portion of the
property in dispute made by the heirs of Amador
Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a
futile attempt to confer upon the latter the status
of co-owner, since the donors had no interest nor
right to transfer. x x x This gesture appears to be
a mere afterthought to help petitioners to prolong
their stay in the premises. Furthermore, the
respondent court correctly pointed out that the
equitable principle of laches and estoppel come
into play due to the donors' failure to assert their
claims and alleged ownership for more than forty
(40) years x x x. Accordingly, private respondent
was subrogated to the rights of the vendor over
Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion
occupied by petitioners." 
[13]
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
foregoing decision.
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution denying said motion.
Hence this petition raising the following issues:
"I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT
BE EJECTED FROM THE PREMISES
CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF
JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM
THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"II.
 WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT
MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED
SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
"III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE
BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH." [14]
There is no merit to the instant petition.
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit
executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires
partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in
order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the
[15]
Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public
document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The [16]
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined
when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into
[17]
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and
upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing
or other formality is essential for the partition to be
valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
[18]
embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards
the heirs that participated therein. The requirement of Article
[19]
1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the
creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real
rights over immovable property, must appear in a public
instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with
which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts
of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the
[20]
Statute of Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code
apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a
transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a
confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an
heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and
receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial partition of
[21]
Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his
heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their
ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes
and private respondent, respectively. 
[22]
Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto
Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951 has
produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on
[23]
the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that
they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such,
their division is conclusive, unless and until it is shown that
there were debts existing against the estate which had not been
paid. No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid
[24]
charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no
reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary
acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who
are the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property
to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having
disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that
allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias,
produced no legal effect. In the said partition, what was
allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which
was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte,
but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior
of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a
parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The
donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject
property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At
any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to
repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as
prescription and laches have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the
extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada
after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been
occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying
any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of
the Pada family. Their admissions are evidence of a high
[25]
order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession
of the subject property is concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject
property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their
occupation of the premises may be terminated any time.
Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance
or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate
the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. Thus, they
[26]
cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It
is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the
[27] [28]
New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the
owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty
[29]
is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good
faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the premises to
petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for at the
time the improvements were built on the premises, such
promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere expectancy of
ownership that may or may not be realized. More [30]
importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is
void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the
owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot
be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that
they built on the said lot.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY
DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6871 January 15, 1912
JOSE McMICKING, administrator of the estate of Margarita
Jose, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BENITO SY CONBIENG, administrator of the estate of Pio de la
Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco, defendant-appellee.
Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher for appellant.
D. R. Williams for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
On or about the 5th of February, 1902, one Margarita Jose, a native of
the Philippine Islands, died at Amoy, in the empire of China, leaving an
estate consisting of personal property partly in Hongkong and partly in
the Philippine Islands. On the 16th of April, 1902, one Engracio Palanca
was appointed administrator with the will annexed of the estate of the
said Margarita Jose, deceased, by the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao became
his sureties and qualified as such in the sum of P60,000. After the
execution of this bond the said Palanca, as such administrator, took
possession of all the property of the said Margarita Jose, amounting in all
to $58,820.29 Hongkong currency. On the 22d of April, 1904, the
Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in the city of Manila, testate. The fact
of his death was brought to the attention of the Court of First Instance of
said city on the 2nd of November, 1904, by an application made by one
of the legatees of said Margarita Jose, deceased, for an order directing
said administrator to furnish a new bond. Pursuant to this application the
court, on the 10th of November, 1904, made an order directing the said
Palanca to furnish a bond in the sum of P60,000 to take the place of the
undertaking upon which said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, and Dy
Cunyao were sureties. The bond thus required was duly filed on the 22nd
of November, 1904, the sureties thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis
Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro Palanca. On the 11th of May, 1904,
one Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator with the will annexed
of said Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, and on July 7 following
Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of
the said administrator in the sum of P30,000. Said Mariano Ocampo Lao
Sempco left him surviving as his heirs at law and devises and legatees
one daughter, to whom he devised two-thirds of his estate, and three
sons in China, to whom he devised the remaining one-third. On the 27th
of July, 1904, said Doroteo Velasco, as such administrator, filed with the
court a complete report and inventory of the property of the deceased,
together with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of this
report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of
the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo
agreeing to the partition of he estate among themselves without
proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all
obligations against the estate. This agreement of partition was drawn and
executed under sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
the purposes and to attain the ends therein mentioned. On the 28th of
July, 1904, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, upon the
request of the administrator with the will annexed and of all parties
interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, entered
an order in said agreement. Pursuant to such agreement and order of the
court approving the same, and after all the liabilities under which said
estate lay had been fully paid and satisfied, the said Doroteo Velasco, as
said administrator, delivered to the devisees and legatees of the said
Mariano Ocampo, deceased, all of the property of said decedent
pursuant to the terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands
of said administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging
to the said estate. From that time forward said administrator has not had
in his possession or control any of the assets of the said estate and has
not had any participation in the management thereof. At the time the
agreement for participation was made and signed and at the time of the
distribution of the property of the estate pursuant thereto, no committee
had been appointed to hear claims against the estate of the said Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, and no notice had been published to creditors of the
said deceased to present their claims against the said estate in the
manner prescribed by law.
On the 30th of March, 1908, by virtue of an order made by the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, upon application of all parties
interested, the said Engracio Palanca was removed from office as
administrator of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased, and the
plaintiff herein, Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. The said
Palanca was removed from office by reason of the fact that he failed and
refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of
the said Margarita Jose, deceased, which has come to his possession as
such administrator, and failed and refused, on order of the court, to
deliver said property and funds or any portion thereof to the court or to
the said Jose McMicking, his successor. Instead of so doing, he retained
possession of said property and funds, absconded with the same, and
never returned to the Philippine Islands. At the time of his removal he
was indebted to the estate in the sum of P41,960.15, no part of which
has ever been received by the estate or by its representative.
On the 30th of June, 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an
application to the court for the appointment of commissioners of the
estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of hearing claims against
the estate. The commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim
was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said
Engracio Palanca, as administration with the will annexed of Margarita
Jose, deceased, which claim was allowed by said commission and later
approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by
Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No
part of the sum thus found to be due by the commission has been paid to
the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose, deceased.
On the 3rd of November, 1905, Pio de la Barretto, who, it will be
remembered, was one of the sureties on the undertaking of Doroteo
Velasco, as administrator with the will annexed of Mariano Ocampo,
deceased, died in the city of Manila, leaving an estate consisting of real
and personal property located in the city. Said deceased left a will which
was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila on the 3rd day of February, 1906, and letters of administration
with the will annexed were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng, the defendant
in this case. On the 4th of June, 1909, upon the application of the plaintiff
in this case, a committee was appointed by the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia
Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims presented against his estate.
Thereafter and within the time prescribed by law the plaintiff herein
presented to said committee a claim for the sum of P30,000 "based upon
the fact that the claim for the larger amount had been allowed in favor of
the estate of said Margarita Jose Sempco, deceased;" and based upon
the further fact "that the Court of First Instance had ordered the said
Doroteo Velasco, as administrator of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo
Lao Sempco, deceased, to pay the said claim if there were funds
sufficient to make such payment, but that it has not been paid by the said
Doroteo Velasco, or any part thereof," The claim so presented against
the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was disallowed by the
committee thereof. The plaintiff herein within the time allowed by law
appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila from the order
of the committee disallowing said claim.
It is disputed in the case that all of the claims against the estate of
Mariano Ocampo were fully paid and satisfied at the time of the partition
of said estate, with the exception of the alleged claim arising by virtue of
his having been a surety of the default Palanca. It nowhere appears in
the evidence or the record exactly when this claim arose it may be
inferred from the time of presentation in 1909, and we have no means of
determining whether the defalcation represented by the said claim
occurred before or after the substitution of sureties herefore referred to.
Upon these facts it was contended by counsel for plaintiff that the
judgment should be rendered in his favor for the sum of P30,000, with
costs, while counsel of defendant contended that upon said facts
judgment should be rendered in favor of defendant, dismissing the
complaint, with costs. The court having heard the evidence and the
arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs.
This appeal is from that judgment.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. We base our
affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the
deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been
liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the
principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be.
At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stands
sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as
follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal
proceedings, in certain cases. — Whatever all the heirs of a
deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and their
are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have
been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as
shown under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves,
duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among
themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it
shall appear, at any time within two years after such settlement
and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding
against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest;
and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the
assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the
purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the
deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for
the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding
any transfers thereof that may have been made.
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of
the decedent without proceedings in court. The provisions which they
contain are extremely important. The wisdom which underlies them is
apparent. It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the
principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall
not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and
imperative reason and then only so long as is necessary to make the
rights which underlie those reasons effective. It is a principle of universal
acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy and
use that which he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of the
strongest and most urgent nature that that principle is prevented from
accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave birth
to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which destroyed
the feudal despotism and created the democracy of private owners.
These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction
so that the intent of the framers may be fully carried out. They should not
be straitened or narrowed but should rather be given that wideness and
fullness of application without which they cannot produce their most
beneficial effects.
Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of administration of
these Islands, they are the first provisions to which our attention is
directed in seeking a legal method for the division and distribution of the
property of deceased persons. They are thus made prominent. And justly
so. The purpose which underlies them, as we have already intimated, is
to put into one's hands the property which belongs to him not only at the
earliest possible moment but also with the least possible expense. By
permitting the partition and division without proceedings in court no time
is lost and substantially all expense and waste are saved. This is as it
should be. The State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the
machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution of the property
of a decedent is no cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a
considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such
division. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished
quickly and at very small expense; and a system which consumes any
considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is
a failure. It being undoubted that the removal of property from the
possession of its owner and its deposit in the hands of another for
administration is a suspension of some of its most important rights of
property and is attended with an expense sometimes entirely useless and
unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided whenever and wherever
possible.
In the case at the bar we are of the opinion that, under the broad and
liberal policy which we must adopt in the interpretation and application of
the provisions referred to, the decision of the property of Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, in the form, in the manner and for the purposes
expressed, falls within the provisions of said sections and may be
termed, therefore, and we hold it to be, a partition of the property of a
decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections.
The fact of the prior appointment of an administrator and the filing of an
inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as the right of
the owners to partition is concerned. The only requisite for such petition
prescribed by the law is that "there are no debts . . . or all the debts have
been paid by the heirs." When the condition is fulfilled the partition can
take place, no matter what stage the administration may have reached.
By this it is, of course, not meant that the partition after the appointment
of an administrator will interfere with the rights acquired by third person
dealing with said administrator within the limits of his authority and prior
to the partition; nor that the administrator can be deprived of the property
of which he is legally in possession without proper proceedings and the
consent of the court.
As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an
administrators' bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of
the principal precedes that of the surety. If Velasco incurred no liability,
then his surety incurred none. The question that naturally suggests itself
is, then, In what was Velasco at fault or in what did he fail? When the
persons interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreed voluntarily
upon a partition and division of the property of said estate and the actual
partition followed, the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as
administrator. The parties to the partition stood invoking their rights under
section 596 and 597. Velasco was helpless. He was powerless to prevent
the parties from taking the property to which they were entitled under the
agreement, it being conceded that they were actually entitled thereto in
law. Those sections were applicable to the situation and there was
nothing that Velasco could do to prevent the estate from being divided
according to their provisions. In giving his consent to the partition and in
assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the court thereto he did no
wrong. He simply aided in carrying out the provisions of the sections
referred to. It is a universal principle that one who follows a law commits
no fault, incurs no failure and wounds no rights. If one obeys the law he is
free not only in person but in property. Observance of the law discharges
obligations; it does not create them; and an obligation once discharged
cannot be re-acted by the act of others in which the person as to whom it
was discharged takes no part. The proceedings under sections referred
to were, after the partition was actually made and the property duly
turned over the administrator under the proper proceedings, a complete
settlement of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, as it then stood,
so far as the administrator was concerned. Nothing further needed to be
done. Every duty which Velasco owed up to the time of the partition had
been met. All debts presented or known had been paid. The court had
given it approbation to the delivery of the property by the administrator to
the partitioning parties. Every obligation which lay upon him had been
removed. Nor could there arise against him any obligation in the future in
relation to the same property. The instant that the partition occurred, in
the form and manner stated, he stood stripped of all responsibility to the
estate, to its creditors, to the heirs and to the court. He stood divested o
every official duty and obligation, as fully as before his appointment — as
completely as if he had not been appointed at all. In law, therefore, he
was no longer administrator with the will annexed of the estate of
Mariano Ocampo, deceased. He was in effect, discharged. As to him the
estate had been wiped out as a legal entity. It had ceased to exist. And,
while at any time within two years after the partition the property, or a
portion thereof, then in the possession of the partitioning persons could
have been placed in administration upon the happening of certain events,
it would not have been the same estate that had been represented by
Velasco, nor would Velasco have been the administrator of the estate by
virtue of his appointment in the old. It would have been necessary for the
court, upon the proper application setting forth the conditions prescribed
by the sections, to appoint another administrator for the purposes
specified therein. It might have been Velasco, if he would have accepted
the appointment, or it might have been another. The point is that it would
have been necessary to appoint a new administrator just as if one had
not been named before. The new administrator would have had new
duties, some of which would have been quite different from those of the
administrator appointed originally. He would have had different sureties,
who would have found themselves to different obligations.
That on the partition under said section the estate was, in this case,
completely wiped out and the administrator as completely discharged
cannot be doubted for the following reasons:
1. The whole estate was, by virtue of these sections, taken from
the administrator and turned over to the partitioning persons. No
security was required or given for its safekeeping or return.
2. The persons to whom the estate was thus turned over became
absolute owners of the same, subject to be devastated, wholly or
only partly, on the happening of certain events and the taking of
certain proceedings thereon. But even such divestiture could not
have been avoided by the payment by the parties, or any of them,
of the debt which was the moving cause thereof.
From these premises it is the merest conclusion to say that the
decedent's estate was merged in their partitioning parties; and this no
matter whether the partition occurred before or after the appointment of
an administrator. When one has been named to perform certain acts in
relation to a given thing, and before said acts have been begun, or,
having been begun, are completed, the appointing power has placed the
thing upon which those acts were to operate wholly beyond the
possession, jurisdiction and control of the one so appointed, there is a
complete revocation of such appointment, so far as all subsequent acts
are concerned. An administrator cannot be held to any accountability for
property over which he has absolutely no power or jurisdiction and in
which he has not the slightest legal interest. The thing on which he was
appointed to operate having been withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by
the very power (the law) which appointed him, there is a complete
revocation of the appointment.
Moreover, the sureties of an administrator so appointed can not be held
liable for property which by force of law has been taken from the principal
and its ownership and control turned over to others. Their obligation is
that their principal shall obey the law in the handling and distribution of
the estate. Their obligation is discharged when the estate is legally turned
over to those entitled thereto. The law requires the principal to turn it over
to those who bring themselves within the provisions of section 596.
Having turned over the whole estate under the compelling power of the
law, his obligation ceased. The responsibility of the sureties ceased at
the same time. Without their consent another obligation could not be
imposed upon them in relation to the same principal, and the same
property, or apart thereof, especially after the lapse of two years. Their
undertaking was that their principal should discharge one obligation, not
two.
It requires no argument to demonstrate that the duties and obligations
imposed upon an administrator appointed under section 597 might and
probably would be different in many respects from those of an
administrator appointed in the first instance; and that, therefore, the
obligation of his sureties would not be the same as that of the sureties of
the administrator appointed originally. The administration contemplated
by section 597 is a new administration and one entirely apart from any
other administration theretofore had. This section requires the
appointment of a new administrator, with a new undertaking. The
administration under the section is distinct and separate from any
administration which may have been in progress at the time of the
partition and division under section 596. This is clear for the following
reasons:
After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have
been fully consummated, no further administration of the estate can be
had unless there occur the following requisites:
1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate
"within two years after such settlement and distribution of estate."
2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves
the court for the appointment of an administrator.
If those requisites are lacking, there can be no administration. When one
fails the right too such administration does not arise and any person
intersted in the estate may oppose any effort to administer under such
circumstances. These requisites combined are that and that alone which
give to the administrator when appointed the right to recover the assets
from the persons who received them on the a partition. Indeed, if these
requisites are lacking no administrator can lawfully be appointed, and, if
improperly appointed, he fails of legal power to maintain an action to
recover the assets in the hands of those among whom they have
partitioned; in other words, he is powerless to administer. If these
requisites fail, then the real estate in the hands either of the persons
among whom it has been partitioned or of their assignees is free from the
lien created by section 597 and any attempt to enforce such lien can be
successfully opposed by any person interested in such property. The
appointment of an administrator without the concurrence of these
requisites is without warrant of law and the appointee is powerless to
perform any act of administration. The statute must be strictly complied
with in every essential before it operates. Every essential requirements
must be fulfilled before it will be permitted that a partition which has the
clear sanction of the law and which is strictly in accord with the public
policy of the estate shall be set aside and destroyed with all the evil
consequences thereby entailed.
It is necessary deduction from the provisions of the sections mentioned
that the appointment of an administrator ought not to be permitted, even
when the requisites above mentioned occur, unless the heirs or the
persons among whom the property was partitioned have been given an
opportunity to be heard on that application. It would be extremely unusual
to proceed to the appointment of an administrator under section 597, by
virtue of a debt which had been discovered after the partition and
division, without giving the heirs an opportunity to avoid such
administration by the payment of the debt, it being kept in view that the
object of the law in originally giving the right to pay the debts and having
partition without proceedings in court was to avoid that every
administration. Such a proceeding would be unusual and irrational. Such
a course would be in direct opposition to the purposes which animated
the provisions authorizing the original partition.
(1) In the case at bar no debt was discovered during the
prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of
the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their
respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca
had been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own
use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years
before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo
was fixed.
(2) No creditor made his application.
The requirements of section 597 not having been met, there could be no
administration under section. Therefore, the appointment of
commissioners for the hearing of the claim against the estate of Mariano
Ocampo presented by the plaintiff in this case was an appointment
without warrant or authority of law. It was appointment in respect to an
estate that did not exist and in relation to an administration that had never
been inaugurated. Under section 597 the commencement of the
administration is the application of the creditor and the appointment of the
administrator pursuant to such application. Without such appointment
there is no administration. As we have before stated, when the property
was partitioned a described heretofore, the estate, as such, ceased to
exist and the administration thereof by Doroteo Velasco was wiped out.
There was no administrator to carry on the administration. By operation of
the law the estate had been passed on the heirs who had become the
absolute owners of it. They were subject to the orders of the old
administrator and they held rights inferior to no one. To be sure, as we
have already stated, those rights might be modified to a certain extent by
the happening of subsequent events; but until those events transpired
their rights were absolute. Those conditions never having been met, a
fact admitted by both parties in the case at bar, there was absolutely no
estate at all, much less one in the process of administration, at the time
the commissioners were appointed to her the claim for P30,000
presented against the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, by the
plaintiff herein. Add to this the fact that there was no administrator of said
estate in extense at the time, and we have before us the absurdity of the
appointment of the commissioners to report on a claim against an estate
which did not exist and under the direction of an administrator that had
never been appointed.
The necessary conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners to
hear the claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and
was without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force or
effect. It gave no right against the estate and none against the so-called
administrator.
It must be remembered that it is only debts discovered within the
prescribed period that can be made the reason for an administration of
the estate subsequent to its partition. The necessary result is t hat a debt
not discovered within that period cannot be made the reason for an
administration of the estate. The debt in the case at bar having first
discovered more than four years after the partition of the estate of
Mariano Ocampo, deceased, an administrator, even though appointed
under section 57, would not no authority in law, over the objection of one
interested, to pay the debt in question or to maintain an action or other
proceeding for the recovery of property for that purpose. This section
creates a statute of limitations which deprives all debts which are not
discovered within the prescribed time of the power of requiring an
administration of the estate. The administration of the estate after the
partition under the law has been accomplished depends upon the
discovery of the debt "at any time within two years after such settlement
and distribution of the estate." The law does not operate unless that
discovery is made within the time prescribed.
We have not overlooked the contention that at the time this partition took
place there was a contingent claim against the estate partitioned, namely,
the claim which would arise on the contingency that the administrator for
whom Mariano Ocampo was surety might default or otherwise fail to
perform his duties thus rendering Mariano Ocampo liable on his bond;
and that contingent claim, being one expressly recognized by sections
746 to 749 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a claim entirely proper to
present, no partition of this estate under section 596 and 597 was legally
possible until such claim was provided for by the petitioning parties. This
contention goes upon the assumption that a partition under the sections
of the Code of Civil Procedure so often referred to is void
unless every debt is paid or provided for by the petitioning parties, and
may therefore be entirely disregarded by the creditor holding a claim
either unpaid or provided for. We do not believe that this assumption is
warranted. In the first place, we must remember that the partition
proceedings in question are proceedings out of court. Consequently there
is no prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The
appointment of commissioners, the publication of notice to creditors, and
all the other proceedings necessary in cases of administration in
court are not required in partition out of court. The law is silent as to how
the claims are to be ascertained, presented and determined. We must
assume, therefore, that the method of ascertaining them and determining
their validity was left to the good sense and sound judgment of the
persons concerned. Usually no difficulty will be experienced in solving the
problem presented by this conclusion. It is obvious that creditors always
know who owes them and that debtors generally know whom they owe. It
is equally obvious that, generally speaking, a creditor is one of the first to
learn of the death of the debtor, and that heirs of the latter are the first to
begin to calculate how much of his property they are to receive. This
cannot be known until the debts are determined. The heirs know they
cannot escape payment of the debts. A surreptitious division behind the
backs of the creditors would not avail as the latter have two years
thereafter in which to throw at least a portion of the estate into
administration and thereby nullify the attempt to overreach them. Even
the transfer by the partitioning persons of the property received on the
partition to third persons would not profit them, inasmuch as the
consideration received on such transfer would, if necessary, be subject to
seizure to pay the debt presented and the real estate would go into the
hands of the vendees charged with the lien of said debt.
The method of ascertaining claims against the defendant's estate not
being prescribed, it is apparent that no objection to a partition can be
urged by a creditor whose claim has not been paid, due to the faulty
method adopted by the partitioning parties to ascertain claims, or, even,
the absence of any effort at all to ascertain them.
In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made
by sections 596 and 597 for the payment of a claim discovered by them
or presented after the partition. That is one of the main provisions. It is a
necessary deduction, therefore, that it was not the intention of the law to
pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not all of the
debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment
cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the
partition directly; that is, by asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all
the debts is a condition precedent to the right of partition, such partition
cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is outstanding. While a
partition manifestly fraudulent in inception and result might possibly be
attacked directly by an action to set aside, a question which we do not
discuss or decide, the manner of attacking the partition prescribed by the
law is the one, generally speaking, preferably to be followed; and that is
to throw into administration so much of the estate as is necessary to pay
the outstanding claim. The method, though indirect, accomplishes a
better result than a direct attack. The latter, by destroying the validity of
the partition, would throw the whole situation into confusion and
uncertainty, something always to be avoided. The former does not
produce that result. Where there is no fraud, and possibly where there is,
a direct attack on the partition is impossible under the provisions under
discussion. A claim discovered and presented within the two years serves
not to destroy, primarily, the partition. It does not even permit the whole
estate to be thrown into administration. Only such portion as is necessary
to pay the discovered debt can be administered. This is apparent when it
is observed that on such administration the administrator is authorized to
recover only the amount of property necessary to pay the debt presented,
leaving the partitioning parties in undisturbed possession of the
remainder. Moreover, the partitioning parties may still pay the debt and
preserve undisturbed the partition in all it parts and thus assure and
maintain the rights of the parties thereunder. The mere fact, therefore,
that a creditor was not paid before the partition took place furnishes no
ground for a revocation of the partition. It simply provides a fact which he
may urge as a reason for the appointment of an administrator and the
consequent administration of so much of the estate as may be necessary
to pay the debt discovered.
But, as already seen, in order that it be a reason for such appointment
and administration, the claim must be presented within two years from
the date of the partition and distribution.
Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity, either by want of
notice or otherwise, and the consequent failure to present a claim before
partition, is, under the sections we are discussing, of no consequence
whatever in so far as the validity of the partition is concerned.
We have also seen that the fact that there were debts outstanding and
unpaid at the time the partition took place is of no importance so far as
the validity of the partition is concerned, leaving out account the question
of fraud to which we have already adverted and left undecided.
We have also seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and
subsistent against the estate is of no consequence whatever with respect
to the right of its holder to require an administration of the estate unless
such claim is discovered and presented within two years.
The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a certain period, a
contingent one is of no importance. The sections under discussion make
no distinction between claims.
The creditor himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five
years after the petition before the alleged creditor made any attempt
whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death of
Ocampo very soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among the
possibilities that Ocampo's estate might be called upon to respond for the
failure of Palanca to perform his duty as administrator. It was his duty to
see to it that he would be protected in that event. Nevertheless he
permitted the estate of Ocampo to be partitioned and distributed without
protest and without the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet
and passive for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very
probable that the property of the estate was being consumed,
incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it had been
distributed.
The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without special finding
as to costs.
G.R. No. L-47475 May 6, 1942
DONATO LAJOM, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and SILVIO VIOLA, defendants-
appellees.
Simeon P. Mangaliman for appellant.
Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.
BOCOBO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, sustaining the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's amended
complaint and dismissing the case. On March 17, 1939, the plaintiff-
appellant, Donato Lajom, filed a complaint, which amended on May 16,
1939, praying, among other things, that he be declared a natural child of
the late Dr. Maximo Viola and therefore a co-heir of the defendand-
appellees, Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola, and Silvio Viola, legitimate
children of said Dr. Maximo Viola; and that after collation, payment of
debts and accounting of fruits, a new partition be ordered, adjudicating
one-seventh of the estate to the plaintiff and two-sevenths to each of the
defendants. Among the allegations of the complaint are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and
tacitly acknowledged by his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola,
begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom and born in 1882
when both, Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and
could have contracted marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
4. That from early childhood until before the year 1889, and even
thereafter, the plaintiff had been living with his father, the late Dr.
Maximo Viola, and had been enjoying the status of a son, not
only within the family circle but also publicly, on account of the
acts of his said father;
xxx xxx xxx
6. That a testate proceeding was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, covering the estate left by the said Dr.
Maximo Viola, registered as civil case No. 4741 of said Court;
and this special proceedings was already closed on March 17,
1937, as can be seen in a copy of the order of said Court, hereto
attached, marked as Annex D, and is being made an integral part
hereof;
7. That the plaintiff did not intervene during the pendency of the
special proceeding above mentioned, as he expected that his
brothers, the herein defendants, would disclose and tell the truth
to the Court that they have a natural brother whom they knew to
be living, and whose address was well known to them; a brother
who should also participate in the estate of their deceased father;
and besides, the herein defendants promised to the herein
plaintiff that they would give him his lawful share in the estate of
their father;
8. That the herein defendants willfully, deliberately and
fraudulently concealed the truth from the Court that they have a
natural brother who should also participate in the estate of their
deceased father, with the single and avowed intention to deprive
deliberately and fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his lawful
participation in the estate in question;
9. That the herein defendants partitioned among themselves the
estate in question, as can be seen in their "Convenio de Patricion
y Adjudicacion," dated October 25, 1935, a copy of which is
hereto attached, marked as Annex E, and is made an intergral
part hereof, and since then up to the present time, each of the
herein defendants has been occupying, possessing and enjoying
his corresponding share, in accordance with the said "Convenio
de Particion y Adjudicacion"; while the properties alleged to be
paraphernal properties of the late Juana Roura in said "Convenio
de Particion y Adjudicacion" are not paraphernal but conjugal
properties of the late spouses, Dr. Maximo Viola and Doña Juana
Roura, acquired during their martial life;
xxx xxx xxx
18. That the plaintiff had demanded of the defendants that they
give to him his lawful participation of the estate in question, as
well as of the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with
their promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the
herein defendants have failed to give to the herein plaintiff his
lawful share of the estate in questions, nor of the products or
fruits therefrom; and the said defendants continue to fail to give to
him his legal portion of the said estate and the fruits or products
therefrom, of which the plaintiff is entitled to one-seventh (1/7)
while each of the three defendants is entitled to two-sevenths
(2/7) of the same.
By an order dated July 31, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the case. The
Court held that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action because its allegation called for the exercise of the
probate jurisdiction of the court and consequently did not constitute a
cause of action in an ordinary civil case like the present. It was further
held that the court had no jurisdiction because there was no allegation
that the late Dr. Maximo Viola was, at the time of his death, a resident of
Nueva Ecija; on the contrary, the complaint showed that the will of the
deceased had already been probated in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan and that court having first taken cognizance of the settlement of
the estate, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija could no longer
assume jurisdiction over the same case.
The two grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the complaint will now be
discussed.
First, as to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff and one of the defendants, Jose
P. Viola, are residents of Nueva Ecija; and from the complaint it appears
that 16 of the parcels of land belonging to the estate are situated in the
Province of Nueva Ecija, while 3 lots are in the Province of Isabela, 1 in
the City of Baguio, 6 in Manila, and the rest (46 parcels) are found in the
Province of Bulacan. Paragraphs 7, 8, and 18 of the complaint allege a
violation of contract, a breach of trust, and therefore the case may be
instituted in the Province of Nueva Ecija. Paragraph 7 alleges "the herein
defendants promised to the herein plaintiff that they would give him his
lawful share in the estate of their father." Paragraph 8 states that "the
herein defendants willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed from
the Court the truth that they have a natural brother who should participate
in the estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed
intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein plaintiff of his
lawful participation in the estate in question." And paragraph 18 asserts
that "the plaintiff herein had demanded of the defendants that they give to
him his lawful participation of the estate question, as of the products
therefrom, in order not only to comply with their promise but also in order
to comply with the law; but the herein defendants have failed to give the
herein plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in question." These
allegations clearly denounce a breach of trust which, if proved at the trial,
the courts could not for a moment countenance. Regardless of any legal
title to the plaintiff's share, declared by the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan in favor of the defendants in the testate proceedings, high
considerations of equity vehemently demand that the defendants shall
not take advantage of such legal title, obtained by them through a
betrayal of confidence placed in them by the plaintiff. So far as plaintiff's
share in the inheritance is concerned, the defendants are trustees for the
plaintiff, who may bring an action in Nueva Ecija for breach of trust. (Sec.
337, Act No. 190, and sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.) If this
promise should be shown by proper evidence, its enforcement would not
necessitate the revision or reconsideration of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan approving the partition, because leaving that
court order as it is the trust can and should be carried out through
conveyance to the plaintiff of his share, by the defendants out of their
respective participations in virtue of the partition.
The case of Severino vs. Severino (44 Phil. 343 [year 1923]) has
declared certain principles that may be applied in the case at bar. In that
case, the defendant Guillermo Severino, who was agent of Melecio
Severino, had obtained a Torrens title in his own name to four parcels of
land belonging to the principal. More than one year having elapsed since
the entry of the final decree adjudicating the lands to the defendant, the
question was whether the defendant could be compelled to convey the
lands to the estate of the deceased principal, Melecio Severino. This
Court maintained the affirmative holding in part:
In the case of Felix vs. Patrick (145 U. S. 317), the United States
Supreme Court, after examining the authorities, said:
"The substance of these authorities is that, wherever a
person obtains the legal title to land by any artifice or
concealment, or by making use of facilities intended for
the benefit of another a court of equity will impress upon
the land so held by him a trust in favor of the party who is
justly entitled to them and will order the trust executed by
decreeing their conveyance to the party in whose favor
the trust was created." (Citing Bank of
Metropolis vs. Guttschlick, 14 Pet. 19, 31;
Moses vs. Murgatroyd, 1 Johns, Ch. 119;
Cumberland vs. Codrington, 3 Johns, Ch. 229, 261;
Neilson vs. Blight, 1 Johns. Cas. 205; Weston vs. Barker,
12 Johns. 276.)
The same doctrine had also been adopted in the Philippines. In
the case of Uy Aloc vs. Cho Jan Ling (19 Phil. 202), the facts are
stated by the court as follows:
"From the facts proven at the trial it appears that a
number of Chinese merchants raised a fund by voluntary
subscription with which they purchased a valuable tract of
land and erected a large building to be used as a sort of
clubhouse for the mutual benefit of the subscribers to the
fund. The subscribers organized themselves into an
irregular association, which had no regular articles of
association, and was not incorporated or registered in the
commercial registry or elsewhere. The association not
having any existence as a legal entity, it was agreed to
have the title to the property placed in the name of one of
the members, the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, who on his
part accepted the trust, and agreed to hold the property
as the agent of the members of the association. After the
club building was completed with the funds of the
members of the association, Cho Jan Ling collected some
P25,000 in rents for which he failed and refused to
account, and upon proceedings being instituted to compel
him to do so, he set up title in himself to the club property
as well as to the rents accruing therefrom, falsely alleging
that he had bought the real estate and constructed the
building with his own funds, and denying the claims of the
members of the association that it was their fund which
had been used for that purposes."
The decree of the court provided, among other things, for the
conveyance of the clubhouse and the land on which it stood from
the defendant, Cho Jan Ling, in whose name it was registered, to
the members of the association. In affirming the decree this court
said:
 "In the case at bar the legal title of the holder of the
registered title is not questioned; it is admitted that the
members of the association voluntarily obtained the
inscription in the name of Cho Jan Ling, and that they had
no right to have that inscription cancelled; they do not
seek such cancellation, and on the contrary they allege
and prove that the duly registered legal title to the
property is in Cho Jan Ling, but they maitain, and we think
that they rightly maintain, that he holds it under an
obligation, both express an implied, to deal with it
exclusively for the benefit of the members of the
association, and subject to their will."
Torrens titles being based on judicial decrees there is, of course,
a strong presumption in favor of their regularity or validity, and in
order to maintain an action such as the present the proof as to
the fiduciary relation of the parties and of the breach of trust must
be clear and convincing. Such proof is, as we have seen, not
lacking in his case.
But once the relation and the breach of trust on the part of the
fiduciary is thus established, there is no reason, neither practical
nor legal, why he should not be compelled to make such
reparation as may lie within his power for the injury caused by his
wrong, and as long as the land stands registered in the name of
the party who is guilty of the breach of trust and no rights of
innocent third parties are adversely affected, there can be no
reason why such reparation should not, in the proper case, take
the form of a conveyance or transfer of the title to the cestui que
trust. No reasons of public policy demand that a person guilty of
fraud or breach of trust be permitted to use his certificate of title
as a shield against the consequences of his own wrong.
In the present case, the defendants partitioned the estate among
themselves in the administration proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Even granting that the partition was binding against
the whole world (though it will be shown later that it was not),
nevertheless it could not have a more puissant finality than a decree of
title under the Torrens system. Upon the authority of the Severino vs.
Severino, the legal title obtained by the defendants to the plaintiff's share
in the estate, in the partition approved by the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, must yield to the superior and inviolate rights equity of the
plaintiff, who abstained from taking part in that partition because of the
promise made to him by the defendants that they would deliver to him
lawful share as an acknowledged natural child.
A posssible objection to the promise of the defendants to give the plaintiff
his share in the estate as an acknowledged natural child is that such
agreement may run counter to article 1814, Civil Code, which reads: "No
se puede transigir sobre el estado civil de las personas, ni sobre las
cuestiones matrimoniales, ni sobre alimentos futuros" (There can be no
compromise over the civil status of persons, or over matrimonial
questions, or over future support). However, it does not appear from the
complaint that the defendants ever impugned or denied the plaintiff's
status as an acknowledged natural child; on the contrary, according to
the complaint, the defendants admitted such status by promising to give
the plaintiff his lawful share in the estate of the father. There having been,
in accordance with the allegations in the complaint, no controversy over
the condition of the plaintiff as acknowledged natural child, the
agreement between the plaintiff and defendants alleged in par. 7 of the
complaint, if shown at the trial, is not a compromise at all, and is not
frowned upon by the legislator in article 1814 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, article 1965 of the Civil Code, which has been held by this
court to be still in force, in spite of secs. 43 et seq. of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857 872-3) provides as
follows: "No prescribe, entre coheredores, condueños o propietarios de
fincas colindantes la accion para pedir la particion de la herencia, la
division de la cosa cumon o el deslinde de las propiedades contiguas."
(Among coheirs, co-owners or proprietors of adjoining lands, the action to
ask for the partition of the inheritance, the division of the thing owned in
common or the fixing of boundaries of adjoining lands, does not
prescribe.) The defendants having, according to the complaint, promised
to give the plaintiff his share in the inheritance, his right to demand
partition of the inheritance does not prescribe, in view of said article
1965.
In the case of Bargayo vs. Camumot, just cited, the defendant, Jorge
Camumot, an uncle of the plaintiffs, had been in possession for many
years, of the whole estate in question, which had belonged to the
deceased grandfather of the plaintiffs and father of the defendant. This
court held that the defendant had not acquired the property by
prescription under section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure because his
possession had not been hostile and adverse, and that therefore, the
plaintiffs should be awarded one half of the estate This court said:
 Taking the evidence together, it does not appear that the
defendant's act upon the land had been of real ouster, i e., that if
among strangers said acts may be sufficient to characterize his
possession as adverse, such is not the case in the present suit
wherein we are dealing with prescription among coheirs. For it
appears that when called upon by the plaintiffs to bring about the
partition, the defendant did not deny that the plaintiffs had any
right to share in the inheritance. When Basilio Bargayo was asked
why they did not institute this action before, he replied that it was
because they considered the defendant as their father, since he
was their uncle, and they expected him to give them their
respective shares of the inheritance, and that when they first
asked him to make the partition, he (defendant) asked them a
postponement, saying that they should leave him the in the
possession of the land in order to compensate himself from what
he has spent for their grandfather when the latter was, and died,
under his (defendant's) care. All of these show in some way that
defendant's possession was not adverse, i. e., hostile or
repugnant to the plaintiff's right. The same witness, who is once
of the plaintiffs, only says that whenever they would ask him for
the partition, the defendant did not pay any attention to them, i. e.,
he limited himself in laying aside the fullfiment of the partition, a
conduct which can be explained in various ways. And it is
probable that said conduct was simply tolerated by the plaintiffs
on account of his being their uncle, and they never thought that
by said conduct the defendant inheritance, not that the defendant
would have so intended. In any way dealing as we do here with
the acquisition of a thing by prescription, the evidence must be so
clear and conclusive as to established said prescription without
any shadow of doubt. This does not happen in the instant case,
for the defendant did not even try to proven that he has expressly
or impliedly refused plaintiff's right over an aliquot part of the
inheritance.
But regardless of the defendants' under taking referred to, the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint contains allegations which, if shown at the trial, would be
sufficient to support and warrant an action for reivindiction of his right as
a co-owner of the sixteen parcels of land situated in the Province of
Nueva Ecija. From the moment of the death of the late Dr. Maximo Viola
on September 3, 1933, succession was opened (art. 657, Civil Code.)
The possession of his whole estate was transmitted to all his heirs
(including the plaintiff) without interruption and from the moment of his
death. (Article 440, Civil Code.) The plaintiff's dominion over his share of
the estate was therefore automically and by operation of law vested in
him upon the death of his natural father, subject of course to the lien of
the creditors of the decedent. This being true it is difficult to ignore the
right of the plaintiff to recover his charge in the lands in Nueva Ecija, (the
debts of the estate having been adjusted before the partition approved by
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan) by an action of reivindication
because of the defendant's refusal to deliver said share to him.
In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil. 855, 869), this court held:
The law in force in the Philippine Islands regarding the distribution
of estates of deceased persons is to be found in section 753 et
seq., of the Code of Civil Procedure. In general terms the law is
that after the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration the court shall distribute the residue of the estate
among the persons who are entitled to receive it, whether by the
terms of the will or by operation of law. It will be noted that while
the law (sec. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be
had upon the application of the executor or administrator, or of a
person interested in the estate, no provision is made for notice,
by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding,
therefore, is to all intents and purposes ex parte. As will be seen
our law is every vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be
held that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by
personal service or by publication, by which the court undertake
to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive
upon minor heirs who are not represented therein.
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years
actual adverse possession by "occupancy grant, descent, or
otherwise" shall vest title in the possessor. This would indicate
that a decree of distribution under which one may be placed in
possession of land acquired by descent, is not in itself conclusive,
and that, as held in Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob [La.], 9), the action of
revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put
in possession by decree of the probate court at any time within a
period allowed by the general statute of limitations.
In the case just cited, this court upheld two propositions: (1) that a judicial
partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not
parties thereto; and (2) that in such cases, the heir who has been
deprived of his share in the estate may bring an action for reivindication
with the prescriptive period against the persons put in possession by the
probate court.
Upon the first point, the following quotation from Corpus Juris (vol. 47,
pp. 434 and 435) would seem to be pertinent:
Sec. 417. Persons concluded — A judgment in partition is
conclusive upon all persons having any interest who were made
parties to the proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Persons not parties — The general rule is that persons not
parties to the action or suit are not bound by the decree or
judgment for partition and their rights cannot be adjudicated; but
such a decree is not invalid as between the parties thereto,
although it has been considered as erroneous. Among the
persons held not to have been concluded by the decree or
judgment, by reason of not having been made parties, are,
besides owners of an undivided in the property, persons having a
contigent remainder therein, a widow with a dower right, creditors
having a lien on the property, and a person who had attached, on
mesne process, the interest of one of the tenants in common.
In Rodriguez vs. De la Cruz (8 Phil., 665, 667), this court said:
With reference to the first assignment of error above noted, we
are of the opinion, and so hold, that for the reason that the said
Matea E. Rodriguez had not been made a party in the action for
partition between the present defendants and the said Hilarion de
la Cruz, interest in said lands was in no way prejudiced by the
decision of the court in that cause.
But, it may be said, the plaintiff knew of the probate proceedings in the
Province of Bulacan, and is therefore bound thereby. However, it is
alleged in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer, that he did not
appear in those proceedings because of the defendant's promise to give
him his share.
On the second point, that is to say, that the aggrieved coheir may bring
an action for reivindication within the prescriptive period, this court in the
case of Ramirez vs. Gmur properly applied section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure regarding acquisitive prescription after ten years of adverse
possession by "occupancy, grant, descent or otherwise." In order words,
that even after a decree of distribution, an action for recovery may be
brought by the excluded heir within ten years.
In Layre vs. Pasco (5 Rob. [La.] 9), cited by this court in Ramirez vs.
Gmur, it was held:
II. This action may be considered as petitory one, brought against
a third possessor. The plaintiff must recover upon the strength of
her title to the succession of her sister; and for that purpose, she
must show that she is the natural sister of the deceased, and that
the deceased left no lawful heir entitled to her inheritance. This
has been done satisfactorily. The evidence establishes. that the
defendant was put in possession of the estate, as testamentary
heir, by a decree of the Court of Probates. It was, therefore,
useless for the plaintiff to attempt to demand the possession of
the property of the succession, since it had been delivered to the
defendant, and the estate had ceased to be under the control and
supervision of the Probate Court. Her application to the Court of
Probates Court would have had no object, as that court was no
longer possessed of any power over the succession, and,
consequently, no order could have been rendered to take it out of
the defendant's hands. The action of reivindication was left to the
plaintiff, and we are not prepared to say, that previous to her
instituting it, it was necessary that she should have been
recognized as heir by the Probate Court. This requisite is only to
be complied with, as long as the succession is under the
supervision of the court by which the administrator, curator, or
executor has been appointed, as it seems to us, that after
delivery to the heir who is apparently entitled thereto, it would be
requiring a vain thing. Lex neminen cogit ad vana.
xxx xxx xxx
With regard to the exception of jurisdiction: it was not insisted on
by the defendant's counsel, and was properly overruled by the
Judge, a quo. The rule is well established, that "when an action of
reivindication is instituted by an heir at law, against the
testamentary heir or universal legatee, who has been put in
possession of the estate, and who sets up the will as his title to
the property, District Courts are the proper tribunals in which such
suits must be brought." (Roberts vs. Allier, 17 La. 15.)
It would not be amiss, at this juncture, to bring into view section 196 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (similar to sec. 12 of Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court) and article 405 of the Civil Code.
Section 196 of Act No. 190 provides:
Section 196. Paramount rights and amicable partition not
affected. — Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to
injure, prejudice, defeat, or destroy the estate, right or title of any
person claiming a tract of land, or any part thereof, by title under
any other person, or by title paramount to the title of the joint
tenants, tenants in common, or co-parceners by whom partition
may have been made. (emphasis supplied.)
The plaintiff has a paramount title to his share in the estate.
Article 405 of the Civil Code reads:
La division de una cosa comun no prejudicara a tercero, el cual
conservara los derechos de hipoteca, servidumbre u otros
derechos reales que la pertenecieran antes de hacer la particion.
(Emphasis supplied.) (The division of a thing owned in common
shall not prejudice any third person, who shall preserve the rights
of mortgage, easement or other real rights which might belong to
him before the partition.)
It is to be observed that ownership is the real right par excellence. If, as
alleged in the complaint, the plaintiff is the owner of a share in the estate,
then rights are shielded by article 405 of the Civil Code against any
adverse or inimical effect of the partition already mentioned.
These safeguards established both by the Code of Civil Procedure and
the Civil Code are sound in principle and farsighted in the protection of
property rights. They are morally and juridically right because no partition,
either by decree of court or by extrajudicial agreement, could add one
iota or particle to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint
possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership
(Manresa's comment on article 400-406, Civil Code), and certainly none
of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right.
Section 196 of Act No. 190 and article 405 of the Civil Code are also an
effective guarranty of ownership because otherwise, it would be possible
for usurpers to carry out their covetous designs either by deceiving the
court or through the egregious mockey of a contract solemnized by the
signature and seal of a notary public.
Moreover, a judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and
conclusive, as shown by articles 1073, 1074, 1080 and 1081 of the Civil
Code.
1073. Las particiones pueden rescindirse por las mismas causas
que las obligaciones.
1074. Pordan tambien ser rescindidas las particiones por causa
de lesion en mas de la cuarta parte, atendido el valor de las
cosas cuando fueron adjudicadas.
1080. La particion hecha con pretericion de alguno de los
herederos no se rescindira, a no ser que se pruebe que hubo
mala fe o dolo por parte de los otros interesados; pero estos
tendran la obligacion de pagar al preterido la parte que
proporcionalmente le corresponda.
1081. La particion hecha con uno a quien se creyo heredero sin
serio, sera nula.
The above legal provisions — section 196 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
and articles 405, 1073, 1074, 1080 and 1081 of the Civil Code — are
material in this aspect of the present case, not because we believe the
partition in the probate proceedings in Bulacan should be annulled or
rescinded but because said partition not being of such definitive
character as to stop all means of redress for a coheir who has been
deprived of his lawful share, such coheir may still, within the prescriptive
period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the
real property of the deceased may be situated. In this case, 16 of the lots
belonging to the estate of the deceased Dr. Viola are located in the
Province of Nueva Ecija where the present action was brought.
Broad perspectives of which policy, which the lawmaker must have
contemplated, would seem to reveal the wisdom of allowing a coheir the
benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition, judicial or
extrajudicial, has been had. Not infrequently, the heirs are living in
different provinces, far from one another and far from the residence of the
decedent. Some of them may not hear of the probate proceedings, or if
they do, they may not have at the time either the means or the inclination
to participate therein. Sometimes, one of the heirs, by cajolery, bluster or
truculence succeeds in preventing a number of the coheirs from laying
their just claims before the probate court. There are also instances where
an heir, cut of a sense of self-reliance, does not care to show keen and
active interest in the partition. In some cases, as it might have happened
in the present one, a cohier, from delicacy or fitting pride does not want,
at the time of the settlement of the estate, to appear in court as a natural
child, and thus make himself the object of public pity or disdain and
inconsiderately lift the veil which time has benignantly placed over the
father's past social deviation. Why should it be presumed that the
lawmaker did not respect this attitude of the child? It often occurs,
likewise, that a child, out of reverence for the memory of the deceased, is
loath to show eagerness to secure his share of the inheritance. Why
should it be assumed that the legislator wanted to compel such a child to
haggle and argue over sordid and material things when the heart-wounds
from the death of the beloved father or mother still smart? To such a
child, zealous alacrity to get one's share in the inheritance so soon after
the death of the father or mother is akin to the sacrilegious avarice of
those who, after the Crucifixion, parted and divided the garments. It is
reasonable to suppose that the lawmaker did not deem such child's
feelings worthy of deferential regard?
The second main question is, Does the complaint state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action?
Paragraph 2 of the complaint reads thus:
2. That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and
tacitly acknowledge by his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola,
begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom, and born in 1882
when both, Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and
could have contracted marriage;
Law 11 of Toro, promulgated in 1505, provides:
Ordenamos y mandamos que entonces se digan ser los hijos
naturales, cuando al tiempo que nacieren, o fueren concebidos,
sus padres podian casar con sus madres justamente sin
dispensacion. (We order and command that children shall be said
to be natural when at the time they are born, or conceived, their
fathers could marry their mothers justly without dispensation.)
The complaint does not allege that the parents were free to marry "each
other" and "without dispensation." One who is prone to search for the
"nice sharp quillets of the law" would consider these omissions in the
complaint fatal because Law 11 of Toro requires that the children's
"fathers could marry their mothers justly without dispensation" ("sus
padres podian casar con sus madres justamente sin dispensacion"). In
other words, a strict interpretation of the complaint would hold (1) that the
parents might be free to marry others but not each other; and (2) that by
omitting the words "without dispensation," the complaint contains no
allegation that the parents were not so related as to require dispensation
to get married to each other. For example, under Law 11 of Toro, if the
parents are uncle and niece, the child is not natural because they need
dispensation to marry each other. Law 11 of Toro is on this point different
from the Civil Code in that under the latter (article 119) it is sufficient if the
parents can marry each other "without dispensation," that is to say,
according to the Civil Code, even if the parents are, for instance, uncle
and niece, the child is natural if said parents have obtained dispensation
to marry each other.
But pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial
justice between the parties (sec. 106, Code of Civil Procedure and sec.
17, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court). Upon this principle the complaint is
sufficient because the allegation that the parents "were free and could
have contracted marriage" signifies that neither was married and that
there was no impediment on account of relationship which would have
required dispensation. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855,
861-862), this court held:
Relative to this presumption of the capacity of the parents to
marry, the author Sanchez Roman makes the following comment:
"Furthermore, viewing the conception of natural child in
connection with two mutually interrelated circumstances,
to wit, the freedom of the parents to inter-marry, with or
without dispensation, at the time of the conception of the
offspring stigmatized as natural, the first of those, or
freedom to marry, is a point upon which there is,
according to the jurisprudence of our former law, whose
spirit is maintained in the Code, an affirmative
presumption which places the burden of proving the
contrary upon those who are interested in impugning the
natural filiation." (Vol. 5, Derecho Civil, pp. 1018, 1019.)
The Supreme Tribunal of Spain in its Sentence of October 11, 1882,
declared that paternity having been proved, it is presumed that the
parents were not disqualified to marry each other.
This liberal interpretation of the complaint is the more compelling in this
case because the status of the plaintiff as a natural child is to be
determined in harmony with Law 11 of Toro, which was the least serve
toward natural children in the history of Spanish legislation. The
development of the law on this subject has had three periods; first, the
Roman law viewpoint which was the most strict; second, the Laws of
Toro which gave the largest measure of concessions to the natural child;
and third, the Civil Code, which places greater limitations on the concept
of natural children. (See "Hijos Naturales" by Victor Covian, Vol. XVII,
Enciclopedia Juridica, p. 809; and "Comentario Historico, Critico y
Juridico a las Leyes de Toro," by Joaquin Francisco Pacheco, pp. 136-
141.) The Laws of Toro having been promulgated in 1505, their relatively
liberal concept of natural children was the one which prevailed in the
Philippines during practically the entire period of the Spanish regime.
The complaint states that the plaintiff was born in 1882 when his parents
were free to marry. This is sufficient because Law 11 of Toro requires the
freedom of the parents at the time either of the conception or of the birth
of the child, although according to the Civil Code this freedom to marry
must exist at the time of the Child's conception (article 119).
The complaint alleges that "the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly
recognized and tacitly acknowledged by his father." Under Law 11 of
Toro, voluntary recognition of a natural child may be tacit while under the
Civil Code (article 131) it must be in a record of birth, in a will or in any
other public document.
Finally, it is proper and pertinent to invoke the case of Larena and Larena
vs. Rubio (43 Phil. 1017). Asuncion Larena, Maximiana Larena and
Eustaquio Larena appeared in the proceedings for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Demetrio Larena, alleging that they were his
natural children and claimed the right to participate in the inheritance.
The widow, Josefina Rubio viuda de Larena, by whom the deceased had
had four legitimate children, opposed the petition. The lower court
dismissed the petition, and Asuncion Larena appealed. The appellant
was Demetrio Larena's natural daughter, born in 1880 when he and the
mother were free and could have been married to each other. From early
childhood she had been living with her father and enjoying the status of a
daughter, not only within a family but also publicly on account of the acts
of her father. This court reversed the order of the lower court and
declared the appellant as the natural daughter of the deceased with a
right to a share in the estate, holding in part as follows;
The lower court based its decision upon the fact that since the
appellant had attained the age of majority in the year 1901, and
her father having died in 1916, without any effort on her part
previous to that time looking to her acknowledgment as a natural
child, she had lost such right in view of article 137 of the Civil
Code which requires that action for acknowledgment should be
commenced during the lifetime of the father. This is an error. The
Civil Code is not applicable to this case. The appellant was born
and had enjoyed the status of a natural child by acts of
acknowledgment of her father even before the said Code was put
in force here. Under the law at that time (Law 11 of Toro), this
tacit acknowledgment on the part of her father was itself sufficient
to give the appellant the status of a natural child, and such
acknowledgment could be established by the ordinary means of
evidence without any limitations as to time. This civil status
granted to the appellant by the former law, derived from the fact
of her birth and from the acts of implied acknowledgment of her
father, having taken place under the former legislation, gives
appellant a vested interest inherent to her status which cannot in
any way be impaired by the provisions of the civil Code. The
transitory provisions of this Code declare that the changes
introduced by it, when prejudicial to the rights acquired under the
former civil legislation, shall not have retroactive effect, and such
former legislation shall regulate all the rights arising under it
although the Civil Code may provide differently or may not
recognize them. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
January 16, 1900; of April 11 and December 28, 1907; and
decisions of this court in the cases of Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil.
195. and of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 3 Phil. 697.)
Upon the authority of the decision just cited, the plaintiff in the present
case is entitled to be considered and declared a natural son of Dr.
Maximo Viola, voluntarily acknowledged by him through his own acts.
There is, however, a statement in the decision in the Larena case which
needs some revision, and it is this: "Such acknowledgment could be
established by the ordinary means of evidence without any limitations as
to time." These italicized words seemed to have been based on the
sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain of December 28, 1906 cited
by Manresa in his comment on the 1st rule of the transitory provisions.
But later decisions of that Tribunal, such as that of January 10, 1919,
have held that the action by a natural child under Law 11 of Toro is
limited by the period for personal actions, which under article 1964 of the
civil Code is fifteen years from the death of the natural father. (See
also Sentence of December 29, 1927.) It should also be noted that
personal actions under Law LXIII of Toro should be brought within twenty
years; and that under section 44 of the code of Civil Procedure all action
not otherwise provided for should be brought within ten years after the
cause of action accrues. It will thus be seen that whether Law LXIII of
Toro, or the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure is applied, there is
a period for the bringing of an action by a natural child whose status is
governed by Law 11 of Toro. In view of the repealing provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure in section 795 thereof, the period for bringing an
action by a natural child voluntarily recognized by the father under Law
11 of Toro, for declaration of the status of a natural child, should be 10
years from the death of a natural father. In this case, less than six years
have elapsed from the death of Dr. Maximo Viola to the filing of the
complaint. In any event this matter of prescription of the action has not
been set up as a defense.
Wherefore, the order of the lower court sustaining the demurrer to the
plaintiff's amended complaint and dismissing the case, should be and is
hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. Let record of the
case be returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-26876 December 27, 1969
LUCRECIA JEREZ, JULIA JALANDONI, JULIETA JALANDONI, EVA
JALANDONI, CARMELO JALANDONI, JOSE JALANDONI and
ELISEO JALANDONI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EMIGDIO V. NIETES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, LUCILO JALANDONI and VICTORIA JALANDONI DE
GORRICETA, respondents.
Tomas Concepcion, Lorenzo F. Miravite and Corazon Miraflor for
petitioners.
No appearance for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court has not had previously the opportunity to pass squarely on the
question raised in this petition for the review of a resolution of the Court
of Appeals sustaining an order of respondent Judge Emigdio V. Nietes of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, reopening the proceedings in the
intestate estate of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, after having approved a
project of partition and final accounting, and allowing a plea of
intervention filed within the reglementary period by the other
respondents, Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta,
allegedly children of the deceased with an illegitimate status. The
petitioners are the widow and the legitimate children of the late Nicolas
Jalandoni.1
The Court of Appeals cannot be reversed for recognizing the existence of
such a power possessed by the respondent Judge to thus act favorably
on a motion to intervene even if submitted at such a stage. That is the
answer we give to the main issue thus posed. Our approval of the action
taken, however, is not unqualified. For respondent Judge apparently was
much too generous in his appraisal of the right of the private respondents
to intervene, accepting as established what ought to have been proved. A
modification of the appealed resolution is thus called for.
The facts are undisputed. Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960.
Before the end of that month, on October 27, a special proceeding2 for
the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala of respondent
Judge, petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, being appointed as
administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted
on June 14, 1966, resulting in an order from respondent Judge dated
June 15, 1966, approving the same. On June 29, 1966, respondent
Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
late Nicolas Jalandoni, and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta,
alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to
intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of
partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being
contrary to law. Then came on July 80, 1966 an order of respondent
Judge allowing intervention and reopening the proceedings to permit the
movants, now private respondents, "to present whatever evidence they
may have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased."
After a motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioners, was denied, the
matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed on
September 3, 1966.
As set forth at the opening of this decision, the Court of Appeals in a
resolution of September 21, 1966 denied such petition to annul and set
aside the order of respondent Judge. The basis for such resolution,
penned by Justice Martin with the concurrence of Justice Rodriguez,
Justice Esguerra concurring in the result with a separate opinion, was
explained in this wise: ". . . that the determination of a prima facie interest
in an estate to justify reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is
primarily addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate
court; that, while no supporting documents are appended to the motion to
reopen tending to show the personality to intervene, the said motion is
nevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the
probate court has authority to require the submission of at least a prima
facie showing of said interest; that the motion to reopen was filed on June
29, 1966 before the order closing the proceedings of June 15, 1966 had
achieved finality and during the reglementary period within which the
court still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend
and control its process and orders so as to make them comfortable to law
and justice; that, because the closure order aforesaid had not yet
become final, the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from
judgment do not apply and, hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to
allege any of the grounds therein stated is not fatal; that the better
practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited heirs is to secure
relief by reopening the proceedings by a proper motion within the
reglementary period (Ramos, et al. vs. Ortuzar, et al., G.R. No. L-3299,
August 20, 1951), it being desirable that all aspects of a controversy be
ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity of suits; . . .
."3
Evidently, an ordinary division of three Justices did not suffice for a
decision on such petition for certiorari and prohibition resulting in a
creation of a division of five. Two Justices dissented from the aforesaid
resolution, the dissenting opinion being penned by Justice Lucero with
whom Justice Villamor concurred. The dissent is premised on the
following considerations: "We should not let Lucilo Jalandoni (alleged
acknowledged natural son) and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta (alleged
illegitimate daughter) to come in first and identify themselves later,
because the better policy according to jurisprudence (Asinas vs. Court,
51 Phil. 665) is to require them first to produce prima facie evidence of
such a civil status before opening the door and letting them in. Under
Section 2, Rule 12, Revised, 'a person may, before or during a trial, be
permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has
legal interest in the matter in litigation.' The possibility of interlopers
getting in for a share in the estate cannot be totally discounted specially
considering that the present intestate proceedings had been pending for
the last six (6) years without a motion to intervene having been filed by
the present claimants in spite of the notice of publication and the in
rem character of the intestate proceedings. According to their residence
certificate, the claimants are residents of Iloilo City (Rec. 20). The
procedure adopted by the lower court is more conducive to prejudice and
unnecessary loss of time, effort and expense than the method suggested
by jurisprudence of requiring first a prima facie evidence of status before
letting them come in to intervene. Hence, the order of July 30, 1966
sought to be nullified under the present petition insofar as it reconsidered
the approval of the project of partition and the first accounting is
unjustified, as practically putting the cart before the horse instead of the
horse before the cart. Moreover, the claims can be asserted in a separate
action against the legitimate children to whom the share of the deceased
Nicolas Jalandoni was adjudicated."4
Stress is laid in this petition for review in respondent Judge allowing
private respondents to intervene after the intestate proceedings were
closed. We do not see it that way. We repeat what we said at the outset.
The challenged resolution cannot be reversed insofar as it recognized the
power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and allow
intervention. While it is undeniable that the question presented has not
been definitely passed upon before, still an indication of how such an
issue should be resolved is to be found in an opinion of Justice Tuason
in Ramos v. Ortuzar,5 referred to in the resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Thus: "The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested
in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper
motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action
the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for
another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and
executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of."
The above excerpt commends itself for approval. We do so now and
definitely hold that rather than require any party who can allege a
grievance that his interest was not recognized in a testate or intestate
proceeding to file a separate and independent action, he may within the
reglementary period secure the relief that is his due by a reopening of the
case even after a project of partition and final accounting had been
approved.
Such a view finds support in the doctrine of liberality as to pleas for
intervention so consistently followed and adhered to by this Court.6 As
was emphatically expressed by Justice Makalintal, speaking for this
Court, in Balane v. De Guzman:7 "Respondent Judge would have done
well to brush aside narrow technicalities in this case, allow the
intervention prayed for and thus avoid needless delay in the resolution of
the conflicting interests of all the parties."
It is thus understandable why the resolution of the Court of Appeals
upholding the power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and
allow intervention is not vulnerable to attack. It was within his
competence to do so. The question remains, however, whether he did so
in the appropriate manner. It is not the existence of the power but the
mode of its exercise that is open to question. In that sense, the appealed
resolution bears further scrutiny.
It is indisputable that after the project of partition and final accounting was
submitted by the counsel for petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, as administratrix,
on June 14, 1966, respondent Judge approved the same and declared
closed and terminated the intestacy the next day, June 15, 1966.
Subsequently, on a verified petition by private respondents, filed on June
29, 1966, based on the assertion made that they should have had a
share in the estate as illegitimate children but that they were omitted in
the aforesaid project of partition, they sought to be allowed to intervene
and "to have the project of partition rejected for being contrary to law."
Such a pleading, without more, resulted in the questioned order of July
30, 1966, reopening the proceedings and reconsidering the approval of
the project of partition and final accounting, to enable the private
respondents "to present whatever evidence they may have to show their
right to participate in the estate of the deceased." Although the
recognition of their right to intervene appeared to be tentative and
conditional, it cannot be denied that they were given a standing sufficient
to set aside the project of partition.
Respondent Judge acted too soon. The verified motion on the part of
private respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of
respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be proof beyond
allegations in such motion to show the interest of the private movants. In
the absence thereof, the action taken by respondent Judge could be
considered premature. As was stated by us in an opinion penned by
Justice Sanchez: "No one may quibble over the existence of the court's
discretion on whether to admit or reject intervention. But such discretion
is not unlimited."8
WHEREFORE, the resolution of September 21, 1966 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby modified in the sense that respondent Judge,
Honorable Emigdio V. Nietes of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Judicial District, Branch I, or whoever may be acting in his place, is
directed to require private respondents Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria
Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify their right to
intervene in Special Proceeding No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of Nicolas
H. Jalandoni pending before such sala. In the event that they could so
justify such a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to
proceed conformably to law. Without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964
IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO
GERONA and DELFIN GERONA,petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE
GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE
GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMANrespondents.
Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners.
D. F. Castro and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that
of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958,
petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and
Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children
of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on
August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his
first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo
de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children,
namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica,
Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman
died on September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948,
respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of
the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein
that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced
heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing
the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the
name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of
title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual
interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only
the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith
demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties,
to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused
to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.
Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said
deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their
participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the
respondents to reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said
properties; ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer
certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated and to issue
new certificates of title in the name of both the petitioners and the
respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former and 7/8th for the
latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said
properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and
sentencing respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the
deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of
Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and
that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding
that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of
Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his
second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already
prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On
appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, with costs against them.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the
latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if
affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did
not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by
respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that
accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was
commenced on November 4, 1958.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an
action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as
long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an
adverse title (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The
statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs.
Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro v.
Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo
de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own
name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the
deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is
why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed
upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 1äw phï1.ñët
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza,
L-12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v. Fernandez, L-11764, January 31,
1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and Sevilla v. De
los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this
jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a
constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the
statute of limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September 30,
1960; Alzona v. Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-
judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25,
1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for
the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March
29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v. Gonzaga, L-
18788, January 31, 1964).
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that
plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of the alleged fraud
committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when
the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of
Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4
November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff
Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed
to have discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had,
therefore, only 4 years from the said date within which to file this
action. Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8
December 1949 or after the registration of the deed of extra-
 judicial settlement. She also had only the remainder of the period
of 4 years from December 1949 within which to commence her
action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9
January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained
knowledge (even if only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona
became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a
minor at the time he gained knowledge (although constructive) of
the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco
Gerona and Delfin Gerona had, therefore, two years after the
removal of their disability within which to commence their action
(Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190), that
is, January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August
1954, with respect to Delfin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,
with costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001]
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,
vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE,
CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed
RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN
LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY,
LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME
DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA,
HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO,
LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE
CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN
EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case
No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and
Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI
of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria
Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted
the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of
Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter,
petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement
of Miguels estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal
proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action
to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz
City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as
defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld
the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents
appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the
Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and
of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of
the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.
 The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered
fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square
meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen,
Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely
by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters
of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters
of parcels 7 and 9, respectively.[1] The total land area allocated
to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer
some parcels to the other respondents herein.[2]
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3,
designated as Lot 504, were transferred to respondents Chuan
Lung Fai,[3] but not included in the Deed of Settlement and
Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc.
and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot
560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and
Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C,
560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was
transferred to respondent Victorino Detall[4] and was
subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine who registered it
under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500
square meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo
Detalla[5] and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu
Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-
11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and registered under the name
of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D
was sold to and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita
M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining portion, Lot
560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by
respondent Immaculate Concepcion College and was registered
in its name under TCT No. T-10208.[6]
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to
annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to
Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to
claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The
latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs
since they were not their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983
partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to
include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise
were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the
same failed.[7]
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Its ruling was
premised on the following grounds:[8]
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from
questioning the validity of the partition, and since she is already
estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-in-
interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil
Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is
null and void is weakened by her inconsistent claim that the
partition would have been alright had she been given a more
equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed
late considering that it was filed beyond the 4 year period
provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;[9]
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.
 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated December
20, 1994.[10]
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the
following errors were allegedly committed by the Court of
Appeals in -
I. FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND
PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT JUREDINI
AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS
VALID AND BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION
II. CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO (2)
YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. ...CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS
CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL
IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC[C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208
IV. SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES CLAIM
THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET RECOGNIZED
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER
OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR
THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS S AND I
V. CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD
NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD
AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560
SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE
CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY
FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFFAPPELLANT NEVER
APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR REBUT THE
ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS THAT
THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. AWARDING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DAMAGES FOR
THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES IN
QUESTION[11]
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether
or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition had already prescribed; (2) whether or
not said deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred
to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed since the
prescriptive period which should be applied is four years
following the case of Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She
also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year
prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party
assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two, the
party assailing the partition must have participated
therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are not present in
her case,[12] since she did not participate in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition. She cites Villaluz vs.
Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of
extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same, is
fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus
an heir of Miguel.[13]
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were
buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise the necessary
due diligence required before purchasing the lots in
question.[14] In the alternative,
petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-
owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions of Article 1620 of the New
Civil Code.[15]
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the
partition would be allowed. She asks for the rescission of the
said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.[16]
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner
had already prescribed. In addition, they argue that petitioner,
Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate
of Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement
they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in AC- G.R.
SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation
of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial partition was understandable
since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In
any case, they assert that the shares of Miguels heirs were
adequately protected in the said partition.[17]
Section 4, Rule 74[18] provides for a two year prescriptive
period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the
provisions of Section 1[19] of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken
part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians.[20]
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive
period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as
provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964),
which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon
the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken
place when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.[21]
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on
January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the
questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the
basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable
rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall
be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.[22]
Under said provision, without the participation of all
persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement
cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a
notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of
Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was
when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule
74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did
not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding
on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when
the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the
ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.[23]Maria Elena
is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother,
Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the
collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil
Code.[24] The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that
they were not aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even
filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they
claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria
Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the
deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption
was filed only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption,
patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from
inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption
was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that
private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith
with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist
that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation
in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor,
must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or
summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2
respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be
precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the
partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because
it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the
partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years
from its execution in 1941.[25]
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the
partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was
no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only
represented her own interests and not those of Maria
Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal
shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include
Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from
buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are
constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide
this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the
petitioner are now all registered under the name of third
parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot
be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.[26]
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts,
agreements or any other documentary evidence was presented
to justify such claim for damages.Actual damages, to be
recoverable, must be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture
or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.[27] The same is true for moral damages. These cannot
be awarded in the absence of any factual basis.[28] The
unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay
and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that
damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.[29] Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to
substantiate her claims for damages does not mean that she will
be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal
damages are awarded, so that a plaintiffs right, which has been
invaded or violated by defendants may be vindicated and
recognized.[30]
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury
but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly
proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal
participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her
adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of the
properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged
on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in
petitioners favor nominal damages in recognition of the
existence of a technical injury.[31] The amount to be awarded as
such damages should at least commensurate to the injury
sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose
of said damages.[32] Such award is given in view of the peculiar
circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this
case.[33] Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in
view of the technical injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is
declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded
to petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who
are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5033 June 28, 1954
In the matter of the Summary Settlement of the intestate estate of
the deceased
JOSE M. FRANCISCO, TIBURCIA M. VDA. DE
FRANCISCO, administratrix-appellees,
vs.
FAUSTA CARREON and CATALINA CARREON, oppositors-appellants.
Celestino L. de Dios for appellants.
Pedro Magsalin for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
September 2, 1947, Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First
Instance of Rizal summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M.
Francisco who had died in 1944. Alleging under oath that they had three
minor children who were his legal heirs, and that the deceased left a
parcel of land with house thereon, and no creditors, she asked for
declaration that the persons entitled to share in his estate are the said
three minor children, with herself as usufructuary.
In connection with her petition she requested for appointment as
guardian ad item of her three minor children, and her request was
granted in due course.
After the requisite publication, the petition was heard, and later approved
by an order dated November 29, 1947, declaring "the petitioner Rosa
Aldana Francisco, and her children Jose Francisco Jr., Thelma Francisco
and Aurelio Francisco as the only heirs of the deceased" and adjudicating
unto the said heirs the above-mentioned property in the proportion of
one-half undivided share to the widow, and the other half in equal parts,
to the said children.
This order was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, who
issued thereafter (January 15, 1948) a new certificate of title in the
names and in the proportion already stated.
August 4, 1948, Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the
realty to the sisters Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon for the sum of
P13,000, and the deed of mortgage was duly registered August 16, 1948.
Afterwards, on January 19, 1950 she conveyed by absolute deed of sale,
to the aforesaid creditors, her interest and participation in the land. This
sale was likewise inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds.
However, in a motion of March 14, 1950, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de
Francisco, mother of the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in
representation of the minor Jose Francisco y Palumpon, seventeen,
averred that this minor was a recognized natural son of the deceased,
with legal right to participate in his estate, that the previous proceedings
were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco had concealed such fact, and
because she had interests in conflict with those of her three sons, the
truth being that the land was private property of Jose M. Francisco of
which she could not have been awarded a portion in fee simple.
Tiburcia prayed specifically for the following remedies:
(a) Her appointment as guardian ad item of Jose Francisco y
Palumpon; (b) her appointment as guardian ad item of the three
legitimate children Jose, Thelma and Aurelio, in place of Rosa Aldana
Francisco; (c) declaration that Jose Francisco y Palumpon was a
recognized natural child of the deceased with the right to
inherit; (d) annulment of the order of November 29, 1947, with the
adjudication that the only heirs of the deceased are the four children
already named, the widow being entitled to usufruct only; (e) annulment
of the mortgage and sale executed by Rosa Aldana Francisco in favor of
the Carreon sisters; and (f) appropriate instruction to the Register of
Deeds.
Oppositions to the motion were presented by Rosa Aldana Francisco and
by the two sisters Fausta and Catalina Carreon.
One of the objectors pointed out that Tiburcia Magsalin could not be
named guardian of the natural and the legitimate children, because she
would then be representing interests in conflict. Wherefore the court
chose to appoint, and did appoint, the natural mother of Jose Francisco y
Palumpon (Macaria Palumpon) as his guardian ad item even as it named
Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco the guardian ad item of the minors,
legitimate children Jose Thelma and Aurelio.
Now, when the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria
Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal, without prejudice, of
Jose Francisco y Palumpon's demand for recognition. Her request was
granted; but the court announced that the three minor children's petition
for reopening of the order adjudicating one-half to Rosa Aldana
Francisco, with all consequent effects upon the mortgage and sale, will
be taken up later, i.e., on May 5, 1950.
Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration,
contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter became a
closed incident.
Thereafter, and probably to meet objections, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de
Francisco, as guardian ad item of the three legitimate, submitted an
"amended motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations of
her previous motion and prayed for identical remedies — except those
touching the recognition of Jose Francisco y Palumpon.
Overruling objections, the court admitted the amended motion, heard it
granting the interested parties opportunity to present their evidence and
arguments, and rendered judgment holding the realty was private
property of the deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four years
before his marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it revoked the order of
November 29, 1947; it held that the whole property passed to the
ownership of the three legitimate children of the deceased, subject to
usufructuary rights of the widow; it annulled the mortgage and the sale
executed by Rosa Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and then issued
other appropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.
Rosa Aldana acquiesced in the resolution. Not the Carreon sisters, who
appealed in due time, asserting the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear
the motion for reopening, even after the natural child had withdrawn from
the litigation and (2) in taking cognizance of the annulment of the
mortgage and sale, which it could validly consider as a probate court.
Arguing their first assignment of error, the appellants assert that Jose
Francisco y Palumpon was the only one applying for positive relief —
recognition as natural child — and that once his petition for recognition
had been withdrawn, the court had no jurisdiction in ordering the
continuance of the hearing in so far as the other heirs were concerned.
The "amended motion", appellants add, could serve no purpose, because
the motion was not susceptible to any amendment, for it had ceased to
exist. Strictly speaking, and at first blush, appellants seem to be correct.
Yet inasmuch as the original order granting the widow Rosa Aldana one-
half of the property was entirely erroneous, and she apparently failed to
fully protect her children's right, their point results in pure technicality on
which "scant consideration" is ordinarily bestowed.1 All the more when it
serves to promote unfair advantage.
Nevertheless, let us carefully examine the motion of March 14, 1950. It is
signed by Tiburcia Magsalin. In it she asked for appointment as
guardian ad item for the natural child and for the three legitimate children.
She asked for remedial measures beneficial to the four children. Hence,
the motion may be regarded in a spirit of liberality, as interposed on
behalf of the said four children — not only a motion of the natural child. It
is true that the motion begins, "Comparece el menor Jose Francisco y
Palumpon, quien en este case sera representado por su curadura-ad-
litem etc."; but that did not necessarily exclude the other children for
whom relief was prayed. Precisely, because the complaint also prayed for
relief beneficial to the three legitimate children — contrary to the interests
of the natural child as hereinbefore related — the court declined to permit
Tiburcia Magsalin to represent the four children, but allowed her to act for
three only. At any rate "parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or of its own initiatives at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just".2 And in line with this receipt, the
court's position may equitably be upheld.
Again, supposing the original motion of March 14 did not afford legal
standing to the three legitimate children, and that it could not be
"amended", as contended by appellants, we perceive no reason to
prevent the court below from considering such amended motion as a
new and independent petition in the expediente, filed expressly on behalf
of the three minor children.3 The matter of time might conceivably be
material in regard in considering the "amended" motion as "original"
motion; but in this case it happens to be immaterial, because under
section 5 of Rule 74 such motion may be lodged with the court within one
year after the minors have reached majority; and they are still minors
now. Incidentally this section 5 fully answers appellants' contention that
Tiburcia's moves should have been initiated within two years after
November 8, 1947.
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for
readjustment or reopening could take place only within two years as
prescribed by section 4 of Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate of
title; because they are conclusively presumed to know the existence and
provisions of section 5, Rule 74. As the trial judge correctly observed:
But the whole trouble is that they accepted the mortgage with the
encumbrance annotated; and while it referred to Rule 74, Section
4, and did not specifically mention section 5, the fact that section
4, Rule 74 was therein noted should have been sufficient warning
to them that the title was subject to the interest of persons unduly
prejudiced hereby. We take judicial notice of the fact that in the
adjudication in summary settlements more often that not, the
order merely says that the sale shall be subject to the provisions
of section 4, Rule 74. This is the case because the Court can not
foresee whether the movant would be affected; but section 5
being an imposition of the law, and being a mere sequence to the
provisions of Section 4; we hold that where the title on its face
shows that it was subject to the provisions of Rule 74, section 4, a
third person who accepts it must take notice that he is running the
risk of interferring with the rights of minors as provided under
section 5, Rule 74.
Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be directed
against the bond which, according to appellants, should have been
demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because that section applies where
personal property is distributed — not where, as here, realty is the
subject of partition.
Last stand of appellants is the proposition that the court of first instance
of Rizal, acting as probate court, had no jurisdiction to act on the petition,
which should have been the subject of a separate action. And the case
of Mendiola vs. Mendiola 7 Phil., p. 7 is cited; but such precedent is
inapplicable, because there a partition by contract was signed by the
parties who were all of age.
Of course, several decisions hold that "If during the summary proceeding
some of the heirs claim, by title adverse to that of the decedent, some
parcels of land, the probate court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue which must be decided in a separate suit".4 But here there is no
question that the realty belonged to the decedent; and a separate suit
was unnecessary, specially remembering that in these summary
settlements the judge is expected to "proceed summarily" and "without
delay" "to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in
the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them."5
The resolution under review apportions property admittedly belonging to
the decedent among his legal heirs. It is no objection that it affects the
herein appellants. They knew or ought to know the rule permitting such to
reapportionment even after two years, and they have been given every
chance to be heard, having been by their own petition, regarded as
parties to the entire proceedings. And section 4, Rule 74 (which must be
deemed extensible to situations covered by section 5, Rule 74) expressly
authorizes the court to give to every heir his lawful participation in the real
estate "notwithstanding any transfers of such real estate" and to "issue
execution" thereon. All this implies that, when within the amendatory
period the realty has been alienated, the court in re-dividing it among the
heirs has authority to direct cancellation of such alienation in the same
estate proceedings, whenever it becomes necessary to do so. To require
the institution of a separate action for such annulment would run counter
to the letter of the above rule and the spirit of these summary
settlements.
From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial error was
committed by the lower court, whose order is, consequently, affirmed with
costs.
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.
Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.
Moises B. Ramos for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division,
affirming with slight modification a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four
parcels of land described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was
rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera, administrative of the
estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half share of
the aforesaid parcels of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased
Teodoro Tolete.
According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete
died intestate in January, 1945. He left for parcels of land, lots Nos.
12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel,
Pangasinan He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several
nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July
25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an
affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or
respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither
brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the
legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the
above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same day,
she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of
Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950,
Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup
for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Pangasinan (See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the
complaint).
In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the
administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete (Special Proceeding No.
3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as
administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis
pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice
was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June
26, 1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the
deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17,
1950.
The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to
execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired
no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo
acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an
amended answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action;
that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations;
that defendants are innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint
is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and
inconvenience the defendants.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff,
Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the
deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and
void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of
land in question, and finally declaring that the usufructuary rights of
Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of
the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was correct but
that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half
of the properties, conveyed is concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of
the same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified
the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only
insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the
responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants to
deliver to the plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of
Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-half of the lands
described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to
claim and secure adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said
properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his right to bring
an action for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de
Leon and Benny Sampilo.
Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by
certiorari and have assigned the following errors in their brief:
I the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa
Sinopera's right of action to recover her and her co-heirs'
participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the
time the action to recover was filed.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are
innocent purchasers for value.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial.
In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action
was instituted almost four years after the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit
"A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan,
the right of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed
because the same was not brought within the period of two years as
Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as decided
in the cases of McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.
Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at
any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of
an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first
two sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation of the such heir or such other
person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the
manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such
lawful participation. . . .
Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs.
— If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all
of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians,
the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office
of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent
left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts,
the first referring to a case in which there are two or more heirs interested
in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which there is only
one heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2331). Said Section 596
as amended, was as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal
Proceedings. — Whenever all the heirs of a person who died
intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no
debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the
heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them,
and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among
themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.
We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In
Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of
them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is
made more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the
addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title of Section 4, the
"distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights
violated by the extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also
significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of the
extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had
no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those
who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound
thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any
manner deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the
extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within
the period of two years, and both the distributes and estate would be
liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they are the persons
in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to
their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who did not take
part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or of
the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable
and unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the
period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to
those who did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any
express legal provision to that effect, would be violative of the
fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the appellants in this case, we held:
It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the
order of distribution may be had upon the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
no provision is made for notice, by publication or otherwise, of
such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and
purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and
incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held that a purely ex
parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by
publication, by which the court undertakes to distribute the
property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor
heirs who are not represented therein.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement,
or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic
be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third
persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of
the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such
effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have examined the
two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the
circumstances on which the ruling therein had been predicated and those
of the case at bar.
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from
such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and,
in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent
have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with
both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated
in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the
decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time
of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the
statute of limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74),
upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No.
190, fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing
therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a
bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar against the parties
who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third
persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations
is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if
Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it
would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the
statute.
But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still
unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the
widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of
partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs
except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a
period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil
Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial
proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must
have been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the
defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of
limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when
the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date
that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.
The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are
innocent purchasers for value was rejected as unfounded by the court of
Appeals. Said court said.
The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient
knowledge or notice of the claim of the heirs of Teodoro Tolete,
deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the
evidence of record. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an
admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had
been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of
the deceased who are claiming the property are residents of San
 Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny
Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was
not aware that they were nephews and nieces, children of the
deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact
furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia
de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public
Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him
prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of
conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she conveyed
to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to herself,
both of which she acknowledged before said notary public,
coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the
consideration for the conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been
paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that
the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the
property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was
a strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as
regards Honorato Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis
pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to
Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might be true, for
he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis
pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950,
nevertheless, he cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good
faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered lands who has
knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and
investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and
fails to make such inquiry and investigation cannot claim that he
as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid
title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644;
Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.
Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm
it in toto, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.
G.R. No. 12184 September 27, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CHIU GUIMCO, defendant-appellant.
Jose A. Clarin and Irureta Goyena and Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This is an appeal brought by the accused Chiu Guimco to reverse a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Misamis,
subjecting him to a fine of P1,800 for a violation of section 628 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and ordering him to be confined in the provincial
jail until he should produce the will of his deceased brother, or until the
further order of the court.
It appears that the testator, Joaquin Cruz, alias Piaua, had for many
years, resided in the municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, where
he had lived as a Chinese merchant and had amassed a considerable
estate, worth possibly forty or fifty thousand pesos. On or about the year
1898, Joaquin Cruz visited China and was there married to a Chinese
woman, Uy Cuan, and by her had one child. In the year 1902, after his
return from China, he was married in Gingoog to a Filipina woman named
Maria Villafranca. In the early part of the year 1910, Joaquin Cruz again
visited China, leaving his brother, Chiu Guimco, the accused, in charge of
his property and business in Gingoog as agent or attorney in fact
(apoderado). While absent on this visit to China Joaquin Cruz died.
Before his departure from the Philippine Islands he had executed a will
before Anastacio Servillon, notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-
Iden were named as executors. In August 1910, Chiu Guimco and Co-
Iden appeared before Anastacio Servillo; and at their request the latter
drew up a petition for the probate of the will. This petition was signed by
Co-Iden and the accused. The will itself was not produced before the
notary public upon this occasion, and he was not informed by them as to
who then had possession of the will. Nothing further was done in the
matter of the probate of the will and Co-Iden subsequently died.
In September, 1910, the accused, as attorney in fact (apoderado) and
manager of the estate of his deceased brother, entered into an
arrangement with Maria Villafranca whereby, in consideration of the
conveyance of certain property to her, she relinquished in favor of the
other persons interested in the estate of the deceased all her claims in
respect to the same property.
No further action was taken by the accused to distribute the estate to the
persons in interest. In 1914 Uy Cuan, the Chinese wife, secured a special
permit to enter the Philippine Islands for the period of six months to effect
some settlement of the estate of her deceased husband. When she
arrived in Misamis, the accused made the claim that he and his brother
had been partners in the business which had been conducted originally
by Joaquin Cruz. He also asserted that another brother living in China,
named Chiu Tamco, was also a partner in the business though he had
never been in the Philippine Islands. In a document which was then
drawn up, it was agreed that Uy Cuan and her child Chiu Machay were to
receive 40 per centum of the estate of the deceased, that the defendant
Chiu Guimco was to receive another 40 per centum, and Chiu Tamco 20
per centum. Later upon the same visit, Uy Cuan, on behalf of herself and
child, entered into a contract with the accused whereby he agreed to pay
the sum of P350 per quarter by way of rental on their interest in the real
estate of the decedent. No payments have, however, been made by him
in compliance with this contract.
In 1915 Ramon Contreras, a Chinese merchant of Cagayan, Misamis,
acting on behalf of Uy Cuan and her child, began to make inquries into
the affairs of the estate and on January 26, 1915, wrote a letter to the
defendant Chiu Guimco, urging him to produce the will of the decedent
for the institution of lawful proceedings in accordance therewith. The
letter called his attention to the penalty denounce by sections 628 and
629 of the Code of Civil Procedure for withholding a will, but assured him
that if he would then produce the will no penalty would be incurred. Chiu
Guimco was somewhat disturbed by this letter and called in his friend
Antonio Yacapin, then municipal president of Gingoog, for advice. Upon
this occasion he showed Yacapin the will; and the latter says he advised
the Chinaman to present the will to the court, but the latter dissented from
this opinion and stated that if he should now present the will he would
suffer prejudice as a long time had already elapsed. In deference to this
determination of the accused a letter was written for him by Yacapin to
Ramon Contreras, in which the accused asserted that the will in question
had never been in his possession and that he had never seen it.
A few months later the complaint in this case was filed, under section 628
of the Code of Civil Procedure, charging the defendant with the failure to
produce the will within the time required by law. The principal witness for
the prosecution was Antonio Yacapin, who meanwhile had ceased to
have friendly relation with the defendant. The court found the accused
guilty. That the will was duly executed and that the accused and his
coexecutor appeared before the notary public and procured the latter to
prepare a petition for the probate of the will are facts which are not
disputed. The action of the accused in possessing himself of the property
of his deceased brother and in refusing to take the proper steps to
distribute the estate, as well as his refusal to comply with the contract for
the payment of rent to the wife and child in China, all tend to show that he
was acting in bad faith; and we have no doubt that the will was in his
possession at the time when Yacapin professes to have seen it. In finding
the defendant guilty and imposing upon him a fine of P1,800, the Court of
First Instance therefore committed no error.
During the hear of this cause the trial judge formed the opinion that the
accused still had possession of the will. He therefore, upon July 22,
ordered the accused to produce the will in court and addressed to him,
while he was testifying as a witness in his own behalf, the following
words: "I serve notice on you now to produce the will of your deceased
brother Joaquin Cruz or make a reasonable and satisfactory explanation
as to why you cannot do so. And be back here on the 8th of August and
we will take up the case again." The accused, however, failed to produce
the will at the time specified in the notice, alleging that though he had
searched diligently among his papers he was unable to find it; and he
reiterated his previous assertion that the will had never been in his
possession. The judge was not satisfied with this explanation, and upon
deciding the present case against the defendant he not only imposed the
fine mentioned above but also included in the judgment an order to the
effect that the accused should be committed to the provincial jail until he
should produce the will or until further order the court,
The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the
notice and make the order in question under section 629 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which provides the testator neglects without reasonable
cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by
the course so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province
by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in close confinement until
he delivers the will.
It is our opinion that this provision can only be applied when a court is
acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the
estates of deceased persons; and where administration proceedings are
not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section,
should require that there be before it some petition, information, or
affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this
section appropriate.
The proceedings in this case, under section 628 of the Code of the Civil
Procedure, is an ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that
section (628) is a special statutory offense and is properly prosecuted
upon complaint or information as other criminal offenses created by law.
The fact that this penal provision is contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure does not make the proceeding to enforce the penalty a civil
proceeding in any sense. The remedy provided in section 629 of the
Code of Procedure is evidently a totally different remedy, having no
relation with that provided in section 628; and it is in our opinion not
permissible in a prosecution under the last mentioned section to
superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional
penalty of imprisonment prescribed in section 629.
I may further be observed that one grace difficulty in applying the remedy
provided in section 629 in a prosecution under section 628 is that to
enforce the production of the will b the accused at such trial would
virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the
will by him would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged
in the criminal complaint; and it seems probable that this would constitute
an infringement of that provision of law which says that in a criminal
action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.
(See Gen. Orders No. 58, sec. 15.)
From what has been said it follows that the order of commitment made by
the lower court remanding the accused to jail should be vacated and if
subsidiary imprisonment should be imposed for insolvency the defendant
shall, under the provisions of Act No. 2557, be credited with the time
during which he was confined in pursuance of the order of the lower
court, With this modification the judgment of the court below should be
affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-12207 December 24, 1959
JUAN PALACIOS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MARIA CATIMBANG PALACIOS, oppositor-appellee.
Augusto Francisco and Vicente Reyes Villavicencio for appellant.
Laureano C. Alano and Enrique A. Amador for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and
availing himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed on May
23, 1956 before the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition for its
approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children
Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios.
On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed a opposition to the probate of
the will alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of
petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said will thus impairing
here legitime.
After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to the essential
requisites and formalities provided by law for the validity of a will, the
court on July 6, 1956 issued an order admitting the will to probate. The
court, however, set a date for the hearing of the opposition relative to the
intrinsic validity of the will and, after proper hearing concerning this
incident, the court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the
natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it impairs her
legitime, with costs against petitioner.
From this last order, petitioner gave notice of his intention to appeal
directly to the Supreme Court, and accordingly, the record was elavated
to this Court.
It should be noted that petition instituted the present proceeding in order
to secure the probate of his will availing himself of the provisions of
Article 838, paragraph 2, of the new Civil Code, which permit a testator to
petition the proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his will,
but to such petition on Maria Catimbang filed an opposition alleging that
she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was
completely ignored in the will thus impairing her object to the probate of
the will insofar as it due execution is concerned or on the ground that it
has not complied with the formalities prescribed by law; rather she
objects to its intrinsic validity or to the legality of the provisions of the will.
We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding
because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the
purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an
acknowledged natural child who allegedly has been ignored in the will for
issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so
when the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely
filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the effects thereof after
his death. lawphi 1.net
This is in line with our ruling in Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676,
wherein we said: "The authentication of the will decides no other
questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of a will. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; that may be impugned
as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions
relating to these points remain entirely un-affected, and may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated."
On the other hand, "after a will has been probated during the lifetime of a
testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or revoke the
same before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary
probate proceedings after the testator's death would be in order" (Report
of the Code Commission, pp. 53-54).The reason for this comment is that
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil Code.).
It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in
annulling the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the
oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an extraneous matter
which should be treshed out in a separate action.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement
as to costs.
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. L-23662 October 12, 1967
MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
Jose D. Villena for petitioners.
Antonio Barredo and Exequiel M. Zaballero for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
The heirs intestate of the late Benedicta de los Reyes have petitioned for
a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G. R. No. 31221-
R) affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding No. 831 of said Court, admitting to probate the alleged last
will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition to the
probate.
It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba,
now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the
probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed
on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was
set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and
Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and
Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the
decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for
the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by
laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of
conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in
favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were
finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on
August 3, 1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by
decision of June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly
executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and
revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the
properties is opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or
new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be
considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court
overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate
of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of
implied revocation at the opportune time."
On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz
as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the
estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue
whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger
portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and
1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked
the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil
Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held
the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by
the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the
will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the
same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation;
that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no
legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale,
because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Oppositors then appealed to this Court.
In this instance, both sets of oppositors-appellants pose three main
issues: (a) whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance
allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; (b)
whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959,
overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise
become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los
Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of
conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3,
1944.
As to the first point, oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing
the will to probate should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to
resolve the issues of estoppel and revocation propounded in their
opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand
is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
(Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215;
Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final
and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section
1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such
order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's
resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an
appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the
higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section
1, expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be
taken in special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below
was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.
Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review
the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly
lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of
conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and
separate from the question of whether the testament was duly executed.
For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will
and hence there would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation
invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the will
itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked
testament (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, supra.).
As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs.
Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are
requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the
testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a
consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within
legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to
deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed
for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow
public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the
order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the
defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so
ruled.
The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article
957 of the Civil Code of 1950 (Art. 869 of the Code of 1889), which
recites:
 Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) . . . .
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing
bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the
latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with
respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing
should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of
nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be
valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue
of the exercise of the right of repurchase;
xxx xxx xxx
It is well to note that, unlike in the French and Italian Codes, the basis of
the quoted provision is a presumed change of intention on the part of the
testator. As pointed out by Manresa in his Commentaries on Article 869
of the Civil Code (Vol. 6, 7th Ed., p. 743) —
Este caso se funda en la presunta voluntad del testador. Si este,
despues de legar, se desprende de la cosa por titulo lucrativo u
oneroso, hace desaparecer su derecho sobra ella, dando lugar a
la presuncion de que ha cambiado de voluntad, y no quiere que
el legado se cumpla. Mas para que pueda presumirse esa
voluntad, es necesario que medien actos del testador que la
indiquen. Si la perdida del derecho sobre la cosa ha sido
independiente de la voluntad del testador, el legado podraquedar
sin efecto, mas no en virtud del numero 2 del articulo 869, que
exige siempre actos voluntarios de enajenacion por parte del
mismo testador.
As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change
or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her
1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the
subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the
legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of
Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in that
point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and
Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no
consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of
the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in
conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to
comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather
than an alteration or departure therefrom.1 Revocation being an
exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of
the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does
not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the
conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the
legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision
decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale
were also that
it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential
relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of Exhs.
A and B (the 1943 and 1944 conveyances). (Decision, L-5618
and L-5620).
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage
implies, then the transferor was not expressing her own free will and
intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be concluded, either,
that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.
True it is that the legal provision quoted prescribes that the recovery of
the alienated property "even if it be by reason of the nullity of the
contract" does not revive the legacy; but as pointed out by Scaevola
(Codigo Civil, Vol. XV, 4th Ed., pp. 324-325) the "nullity of the contract"
can not be taken in an absolute sense.2 Certainly, it could not be
maintained, for example, that if a testator's subsequent alienation were
avoided because the testator was mentally deranged at the time, the
revocatory effect ordained by the article should still ensue. And the same
thing could be said if the alienation (posterior to the will) were avoided on
account of physical or mental duress. Yet, an alienation through undue
influence in no way differs from one made through violence or
intimidation. In either case, the transferor is not expressing his real
intent,3 and it can not be held that there was in fact an alienation that
could produce a revocation of the anterior bequest.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and
Fernandez. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. 115925. August 15, 2003]
SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and
CONSOLACION SIOSON, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS S.
EUGENIO-GINO, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 31
[1]
January 1994 of the Court of Appeals ordering the
Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III, to place
TCT No. (232252) 1321 in the name of respondent
Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino. The Decision ordered the
Register of Deeds to cancel the names of petitioners
Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson (petitioners) in
TCT No. (232252) 1321. The Decision also directed
petitioners to pay respondent moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
The Facts
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson (CONSOLACION) and
respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino (REMEDIOS) are
the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late
Canuto Sioson (CANUTO). CANUTO and 11 other
individuals, including his sister Catalina Sioson
(CATALINA) and his brother Victoriano Sioson
(VICTORIANO), were co-owners of a parcel of land in
Tanza, Navotas, Metro Manila. The property, known as
Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an area of 9,347 square
meters and was covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
CATALINA, CANUTO, and VICTORIANO each owned an
aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2. [2]
On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed
and subdivided into eight lots (Lot Nos. 2-A to 2-H)
through Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the Director of
Lands approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No. 2-A, with an
area of 670 square meters, and Lot No. 2-E, with an area
of 2,000 square meters, were placed under CANUTOs
name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots. [3]
On 26 September 1956, CANUTO and
CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan (KASULATAN). Under
[4]
the KASULATAN,
CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of
CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. The KASULATAN,
notarized by Notary Public Jose T. de los Santos of
Navotas, provides:
Na ako, CANUTO SIOSON, mamamayang Pilipino, may
katampatang gulang, kasal kay Raymunda San Diego, at
naninirahan sa Tanza, Navotas, Rizal, sa bisa at pamamagitan
ng kasulatang ito ay nagpapatunay at nagpapatibay:
1. Na ako ang lubos at tunay na may-ari ng 10/70
bahaging hindi hati (10/70 porcion pro-
indiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote No.
2, Plano Psu-13245), na nasa sa nayon ng
Tanza, Municipio ng Navotas, Provincia
ng Rizal, at ang descripcion o
 pagkakakilanlan ng nasabing lote ay
nakasaad sa Certificado Original, de Titulo
No. 4207 ng Oficina ng Registrador de
Titulos ng Rizal, gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
2. Na dahil at alang-alang sa halagang Dalawang
Libo Dalawang Daan at Limampung Piso
(P2,250.00), salaping Pilipino, na sa akin
ay ibinayad ni CONSOLACION SIOSON,
kasal kay Ricardo S. Pascual, may sapat na
gulang, mamamayang Pilipino, at
naninirahan sa Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
at ang pagkakatanggap ng nasabing halaga
ay aking inaamin at pinatutunayan, ay
aking ipinagbili, inilipat at isinalin, sa
pamamagitan ng bilihang tuluyan at
walang pasubali a favor [sic] sa nasabing
si CONSOLACION SIOSON, sa kanyang
tagapagmana at mapaglilipatan ang lahat
ng aking titulo, karapatan at kaparti na
binubuo ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati
(10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng loteng
descrito or tinutukoy sa itaas nito.
(Emphasis supplied)
CONSOLACION immediately took possession of Lot Nos.
2-A and 2-E. She later declared the land for taxation
purposes and paid the corresponding real estate taxes. [5]
On 23 October 1968, the surviving children of
CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint
affidavit (JOINT AFFIDAVIT) affirming the KASULATAN
[6]
in favor of CONSOLACION. They also attested that the
lots their father had sold to CONSOLACION were Lot Nos.
2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713. The JOINT
AFFIDAVIT reads:
KAMING sina FELICIDAD SIOSON at BEATRIZ SIOSON,
pawang mga Pilipino, kapuwa may sapat na gulang at
naninirahan, ang una sa Tanza, Navotas at ang ikalawa sa
Concepcion, Malabon, lalawigan ng Rizal, sa ilalim ng
isang ganap na panunumpa alinsunod sa batas, ay malayang
nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod:
Na kami ang mga buhay na anak na naiwan ni CANUTO
SIOSON na nagmamay-ari ng 10/70 bahaging hindi hati
(10/70 porcion pro-indiviso) ng isang lagay na lupa (Lote No.
2, plano Psu-13245), na nasa Nayon ng Tanza, Navotas, Rizal,
at ang mga palatandaan nito ay nasasaad sa Certificado
Original de Titulo No. 4207 ng Tanggapan ng Registrador de
Titulos ng Rizal;
Na sa lubos naming kaalaman, ay ipinagbili ng aming Ama na
si Canuto Sioson ang kaniyang buong bahagi na 10/70 sa
nasabing Lote No. 2, kay CONSOLACION SIOSON, may-
bahay ni Ricardo S. Pascual, na taga Dampalit, Malabon,
Rizal, sa halagang P2,250.00, salaping pilipino, noong ika 16
[sic] ng Septiembre, 1956, sa pamamagitan ng isang
KASULATAN NG BILIHANG TULUYAN na pinagtibay sa
harap ng Notario Publico Jose T. de los Santos nang pechang
nabanggit, sa Navotas, Rizal, (Doc. No. 194, Page No. 84;
Book No. IV; Series of 1956);
Na ang nasabing lupa na ipinagbili ng aming Ama kay
Consolacion Sioson ni Pascual, ay nakikilala ngayong mga
Lote No. 2-A at Lote 2-E ng Plano de Subdivision Psd-34713;
na pinagtibay ng Assistant Director of Lands noong Mayo 30,
1952;
Na aming ngayong pinatitibayan ang pagka-pagbili ng bahagi
ng aming Ama kay Consolacion Sioson ni Pascual ng ngayoy
nakikilalang Lote No. 2-A at Lote No. 2-E ng Plano de
Subdivision Psd-34713. (Emphasis supplied)
On 28 October 1968, CONSOLACION registered the
KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal (Register of
Deeds). Based on these documents, the Register of
Deeds issued to CONSOLACION Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (232252) 1321 covering Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of
Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 with a total area of 2,670
square meters.
On 4 February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint
against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascual
in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for
Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title]
and Damages. REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner
of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA devised
these lots to her in CATALINAs last will and
testament (LAST WILL) dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS
[7]
added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots
through fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT
(232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share in Lot
2. REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of
CONSOLACIONs title, the issuance of another title in her
name, and the payment to her of damages.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that the basis
of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed
the action within four years from the registration of
CONSOLACIONs title on 28 October 1968 and not some
19 years later on 4 February 1988. REMEDIOS opposed
the motion, claiming that she became aware of
CONSOLACIONs adverse title only in February
1987. CONSOLACION maintained that she had timely
filed her complaint within the four-year prescriptive on 4
February 1988.
In its order of 28 April 1988, the trial court denied
petitioners motion to dismiss. The trial court held that the
reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing REMEDIOS
complaint is evidentiary in nature and must await the
presentation of the parties evidence during the
trial. During the pre-trial stage, REMEDIOS clarified that
she was claiming only CATALINAs 10/70 share in Lot 2,
or 1,335 square meters, which constitute of the area of Lot
Nos. 2-A and 2-E. The trial of the case then ensued.
[8]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 26 November 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the case and ordering REMEDIOS to
pay petitioners P10,000 as attorneys fees and the cost of
suit. The trial court held that the action filed by
REMEDIOS is based on fraud, covered by the four-year
prescriptive period. The trial court also held that
REMEDIOS knew of petitioners adverse title on 19
November 1982 when REMEDIOS testified against
petitioners in an ejectment suit petitioners had filed
against their tenants in Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Thus, the
complaint of REMEDIOS had already prescribed when
she filed it on 4 February 1988.
The trial court further ruled that REMEDIOS has no
right of action against petitioners because CATALINAs
LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive her
title has not been admitted to probate. Under Article 838
of the Civil Code, no will passes real or personal property
unless it is allowed in probate in accordance with the
Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against plaintiff, ordering:
1. The dismissal of this case;
2. The plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as and for
attorneys fees; and
3. The plaintiff to pay the costs of suit. [9]
REMEDIOS appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 31 January 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment reversing the decision of the trial court. The
appellate court held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit
to enforce an implied trust allegedly created in her favor
when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title
over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive
period for filing the complaint is ten years, not four. The
Court of Appeals counted this ten-year period from 19
November 1982. Thus, when REMEDIOS filed her
complaint on 4 February 1988, the ten-year prescriptive
period had not yet expired.
The appellate court held that CATALINAs unprobated
LAST WILL does not preclude REMEDIOS from seeking
reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST WILL
may subsequently be admitted to probate. The dispositive
portion of the appellate courts ruling provides:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Registry of Deeds of Rizal or Metro
Manila, District III, is ordered to place Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (232252) 1321 under the name of Remedios S.
Eugenio-Gino as executor of the will of Catalina Sioson and
cancel the names of the Spouses Ricardo Pascual and
Consolacion Sioson inscribed over said title as owners of the
covered lot. Defendants-appellees spouses Ricardo Pascual
and Consolacion Sioson are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant
Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P20,000[.00] and
attorneys fees of P20,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance. [10]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the ruling.
However, the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its
order dated 15 June 1994.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners allege the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF
ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
WHICH FINDING IS MANIFESTLY CONTRARY
TO LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT.
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOES
NOT HAVE ANY TITLE AND HAS UTTERLY
FAILED TO PROVE ANY TITLE TO THE LOTS
INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING
THE CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE OF PETITIONERS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION AND IN GROSS VIOLATION
OF THE RULES OF COURT IN ORDERING THE
ENTIRE PROPERTY COVERED BY TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. (232252) 1321 TO
BE PLACED IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, BECAUSE THE CLAIM OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS LIMITED ONLY TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF THE PROPERTY,
AND THE OTHER HALF THEREOF
UNQUESTIONABLY BELONGS TO
PETITIONERS.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONERS ACTED FRAUDULENTLY
AND IN BAD FAITH IN SECURING THEIR
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING
PETITIONERS TO PAY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS MORAL DAMAGES,
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
FEES.[11]
The pivotal questions are: (1) whether prescription
bars the action filed by REMEDIOS, and (2) whether
REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
The Action is Barred by Prescription
The trial court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS
is one based on fraud. REMEDIOS action seeks to
recover real property that petitioners allegedly acquired
through fraud. Consequently, the trial court held that the
action prescribes in four years counted from REMEDIOS
actual discovery of petitioners adverse title. The trial court
concluded that REMEDIOS belatedly filed her suit on 4
February 1988 because she actually knew of petitioners
adverse title since 19 November 1982.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that what
REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied
trust. REMEDIOS had ten years counted from actual
notice of the breach of trust, that is, the assertion of
adverse title, within which to bring her action. The
appellate court held that REMEDIOS seasonably filed her
complaint on 4 February 1988 because she allegedly
discovered petitioners adverse title only on 19 November
1982.
What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an
implied trust but the same is already barred by
prescription.
Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted
From Registration of Adverse Title
The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the
trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an
implied trust, and the action is to annul a voidable contract
under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the
[12]
four-year prescriptive period under Article 1391 begins to
[13]
run from the time of discovery of the mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek to
annul the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS does not assail the
KASULATAN as a voidable contract. In fact, REMEDIOS
admits the validity of the sale of 1,335 square meters of
land under the KASULATAN. However, REMEDIOS
alleges that the excess area of 1,335 meters is not part of
the sale under the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the
removal of this excess area from TCT No. (232252) 1321
that was issued to CONSOLACION. Consequently,
REMEDIOS action is for Annulment or Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages. [14]
REMEDIOS action is based on an implied trust under
Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of the
additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321
was without basis. In effect, REMEDIOS asserts that
CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square
meters through mistake or fraud and thus
CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the rightful owner of the
property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten
years under Article 1144 and not four years under Articles
1389 and 1391.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to
recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise
to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code,
[15]
is ten years pursuant to Article 1144. This ten-year
[16]
prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse
party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes
place when the adverse party registers the land. [17]
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or
more than 19 years after CONSOLACION registered her
title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October
1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint
late thus warranting its dismissal. As the Court recently
declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses Borras, [18]
Following Caro, we have consistently held that an action for
[19]
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten
years. We went further by specifying the reference point of the
ten-year prescriptive period as the date of the registration of
the deed or the issuance of the title.
The Court of Appeals Reckoning of
Prescriptive Period from Actual Notice
of Adverse Title Not Justified
In holding that the action filed by REMEDIOS has not
prescribed, the Court of Appeals invoked this Courts ruling
in Adille v. Court of Appeals. In Adille, the Court
[20]
reckoned the ten-year prescriptive period for enforcing
implied trusts not from registration of the adverse title but
from actual notice of the adverse title by the cestui que
trust. However, the Court, in justifying its deviation from
the general rule, explained:
[W]hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes (sic)
in ten years, reckoned from the date of the registration of the
property, we x x x are not prepared to count the period from
such date in this case. We note the petitioners sub rosa efforts
to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning
with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit
of extrajudicial settlement that he is the only heir and child of
his mother Feliza[] with the consequence that he was able to
secure title in his name also. (Emphasis supplied)
Such commission of specific fraudulent conduct is
absent in the present case. Other than asserting that
petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured title to
Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E with an area twice bigger than what
CANUTO allegedly sold to CONSOLACION, REMEDIOS
did not present any other proof of petitioners fraudulent
conduct akin to Adille.
CONSOLACION obtained title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-
E through the KASULATAN executed by CANUTO and
the JOINT AFFIDAVIT executed by his surviving children,
one of whom, Felicidad, is the mother of REMEDIOS. The
KASULATAN referred to the sale of CANUTOs 10/70
share in Lot 2 without specifying the area of the lot
sold. The JOINT AFFIDAVIT referred to the Plano de
Subdivision Psd-34713 without also specifying the area of
the lot sold. However, Subdivision Plan Psd 34713, as
certified by the Assistant Director of Lands on 30 May
1952, showed an area of 2,670 square meters in the name
of CANUTO. Based on these documents, the Register of
Deeds issued TCT No. (232252) 1321 to CONSOLACION
covering an area of 2,670 square meters.
REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN or the
JOINT AFFIDAVIT as fictitious or forged. REMEDIOS
even admits the authenticity of Subdivision Plan Psd
34713 as certified by the Assistant Director of
Lands. Moreover, REMEDIOS has not contested
[21]
petitioners claim that CANUTO doubled his share in Lot 2
by acquiring VICTORIANOs share. [22]
Plainly, the increase in the area sold from 1,335
square meters to 2,670 square meters is a glaring
mistake. There is, however, no proof whatsoever that this
increase in area was the result of fraud. Allegations of
fraud in actions to enforce implied trusts must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence. Adille, which is
[23]
anchored on fraud, cannot apply to the present case.
[24]
At any rate, even if we apply Adille to this
case, prescription still bars REMEDIOS complaint. As
executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS
submitted to the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan
in Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 the inventory of
all the property comprising CATALINAs estate, which
included Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. In a motion dated 7
November 1977, CONSOLACION sought the exclusion of
these lots from the inventory, invoking her title over
them. REMEDIOS was served a copy of the motion on 8
November 1977 against which she filed an opposition.
Nevertheless, the trial court overruled REMEDIOS
objection. In its order of 3 January 1978, the trial court
granted CONSOLACIONs motion and ordered the
exclusion of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E from the estate of
CATALINA. REMEDIOS did not appeal from this ruling.
REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners
adverse title on 8 November 1977. Even if, for the sake of
argument, the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run
upon actual notice of the adverse title, still REMEDIOS
right to file this suit has prescribed. REMEDIOS had until
11 November 1987 within which to file her complaint.
When she did so on 4 February 1988, the prescriptive
period had already lapsed.
Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest
 Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS
complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real party-in-interest
who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit
or suffer from the judgment in the suit. If one who is not
[25]
a real party-in-interest brings the action, the suit is
dismissible for lack of cause of action. [26]
REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and
2-E (or over its one-half portion) on the devise of these
lots to her under CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, the
trial court found that the probate court did not issue any
order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS
does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial,
REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No.
C-208 is still pending.[27]
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that [N]o will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. This
Court has interpreted this provision to mean, until
admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder. REMEDIOS anchors
[28]
her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of
CATALINAs LAST WILL.However, since the probate court
has not admitted CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS
has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL.
REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action either to
seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce
an implied trust over these lots.
The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency
by ordering the reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E to
REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of CATALINAs
LAST WILL. This is inappropriate because REMEDIOS
sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged
owner of the disputed lots. Thus, REMEDIOS alleged in
her complaint:
3. The plaintiff is a niece and compulsory heir of the late
CATALINA SIOSON who died single and without any child
of her own and who, during herlifetime, was the owner
of those two (2) parcels of land located at Tanza, Navotas,
Rizal (now Metro Manila), formerly covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4207 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, x x x.
4. The plaintiff, aside from being the compulsory heir of the
deceased CATALINA SIOSON, has sole and exclusive claim
of ownership over the above-mentioned two (2) parcels of land
by virtue of a will or Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya executed
by Catalina Sioson on May 19, 1964 before Notary Public
Efren Y. Angeles at Navotas, Rizal, in which document the
deceased Catalina Sioson specifically and exclusively
bequeathed to the plaintiff the above-mentioned Lots 2-A and
2-E of Psd-34713 approved by the Bureau of Lands on May
30, 1952. Copy of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya
consisting of four (4) pages is hereto attached and forms an
integral part hereof as Annex A;
5. Sometime on or about February, 1987,
plaintiff discovered that the above-mentioned Lots 2-A and 2-
E of subdivision plan Psd-34713 are now registeredor titled in
the name of the defendants under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. (232252) 1321 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, now
Metro-Manila District III. Copy of the title is hereto attached
and forms an integral part hereof as Annex B;
6. Upon further inquiry and investigation, plaintiff discovered
that the defendants were able to obtain title in their name of the
said parcels of land by virtue of a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan allegedly executed by Canuto Sioson on September
26, 1956 before Notary Public Jose [T.] de los Santos of
Navotas, Metro-Manila. Copy of the said document is hereto
attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex C;
7. The plaintiff also discovered that although x x x the original
sale did not specify the parcels of land sold by Canuto Sioson,
the defendants submitted an alleged Affidavit executed by
Felicidad Sioson and Beatriz Sioson identifying the lots sold
by Canuto Sioson to the defendants as Lots 2-A and 2-E of
subdivision plan Psd-34713. Copy of the Affidavit dated
October 3, 1968 on the basis of which the present Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 was issued to the
defendants is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof
as Annex D;
8. The defendants are clearly guilty of fraud in presenting the
aforementioned Affidavit (Annex D) to the Register of Deeds
as the basis of their claim to Lots 2-A and 2-E in view of the
fact that the parcels sold to them by Canuto Sioson, assuming
there was such a sale, were different parcels of land, Lots 2-A
and 2-E being the properties of the late Catalina Sioson who
bequeathed the same to the plaintiff.
xxxx
12. Because of the defendants fraudulent actuations on this
matter, plaintiff suffered and continious [sic] to suffer moral
damages arising from anxiety, shock and wounded feelings.
Defendants should also be assessed exemplary damages by
way of a lesson to deter them from again committing the
fraudulent acts, or acts of similar nature, by virtue of which
they were able to obtain title to the parcels of land
involved in this case x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
[29]
Indeed, all throughout the proceedings below and even in
her Comment to this petition, REMEDIOS continued to
pursue her claim as the alleged owner of one-half of the
disputed lots.
Other Matters Raised in the Petition
The Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the
other errors petitioners assigned concerning the award of
damages and attorneys fees to REMEDIOS. Such award
assumes that REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest and
that she timely filed her complaint. As earlier shown, this
is not the case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1994 and its
Resolution dated 15 June 1994 are SET ASIDE. The
complaint filed by respondent Remedios Eugenio-Gino,
dated 2 February 1988 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG
JOHNSON, applicant-appellant,
Hartigan & Welch for applicant and appellant.
Hartford Beaumont for Victor Johnson and others as appellees.
Chas. E. Tenney for Alejandra Ibañez de Johnson, personally and as
guardian,
and for Simeona Ibañez, appellees.

STREET, J.:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a
naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving
a will, dated September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the
value of which, as estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an
holographic instrument, being written in the testator's own handwriting,
and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three
witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law
generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and
hence could not have been proved under section 618.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the
ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of
Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in
accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be
probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This section reads as follows:
Will made here by alien. — A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is
executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of
which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and
allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved,
allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have
the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these
Islands.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three
weeks publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin."
Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March
6, 1916, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will;
and upon March 16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal
and was admitted to probate. At the same time an order was made
nominating Victor Johnson and John T. Pickett as administrators of the
estate, with the sill annexed. Shortly thereafter Pickett signified his desire
not to serve, and Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator.
By the will in question the testator gives to his brother Victor one hundred
shares of the corporate stock in the Johnson-Pickett Rope Company; to
his father and mother in Sweden, the sum of P20,000; to his daughter
Ebba Ingeborg, the sum of P5,000; to his wife, Alejandra Ibañez, the sum
of P75 per month, if she remains single; to Simeona Ibañez, spinster,
P65 per month, if she remains single. The rest of the property is left to
the testator's five children — Mercedes, Encarnacion, Victor, Eleonor and
Alberto.
The biographical facts relative to the deceased necessary to an
understanding of the case are these: Emil H. Johnson was born in
Sweden, May 25, 1877, from which country he emigrated to the United
States and lived in Chicago, Illinois, from 1893 to 1898. On May 9, 1898,
at Chicago, he was married to Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately
thereafter embarked for the Philippine Islands as a soldier in the Army of
the United States. As a result of relations between Johnson and Rosalie
Ackeson a daughter, named Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after
their marriage. This child was christened in Chicago by a pastor of the
Swedish Lutheran Church upon October 16, 1898.
After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United
States he continued to live in the Philippine Islands, and on November
20, 1902, the wife, Rosalie Johnson, was granted a decree of divorce
from him in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, on the ground of
desertion. A little later Johnson appeared in the United States on a visit
and on January 10, 1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at
Chicago. From Chicago he appears to have gone to Sweden, where a
photograph, exhibited in evidence in this case, was taken in which he
appeared in a group with his father, mother, and the little daughter, Ebba
Ingeborg, who was then living with her grandparents in Sweden. When
this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila, where he
prospered in business and continued to live until his death.
In this city he appears to have entered into marital relations with
Alejandra Ibañez, by whom he had three children, to wit, Mercedes,
baptized May 31, 1903; Encarnacion, baptized April 29, 1906; and Victor,
baptized December 9, 1907. The other two children mentioned in the will
were borne to the deceased by Simeona Ibañez.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been
probated, the attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson entered an
appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the other admitting
the will to probate. On October 31, 1916, the same attorneys moved the
court to vacate the order of March 16 and also various other orders in the
case. On February 20, 1917, this motion was denied, and from this action
of the trial court the present appeal has been perfected.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the
petitioner is to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into
intestate administration, thus preparing the way for the establishment of
the claim of the petitioner as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
The grounds upon which the petitioner seeks to avoid the probate are
four in number and may be stated, in the same sequence in which they
are set forth in the petition, as follows:
(1) Emil H. Johnson was a resident of the city of Manila and not a
resident of the State of Illinois at the time the will in question was
executed;
(2) The will is invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property
in the State of Illinois;
(3) The order admitting the will to probate was made without notice to the
petitioner; and
(4) The order in question was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
It cannot of course be maintained that a court of first instance lacks
essential jurisdiction over the probate of wills. The fourth proposition
above stated must, accordingly, be interpreted in relation with the third
and must be considered as a corollary deduced from the latter. Moreover,
both the third and fourth grounds stated take precedence, by reason of
their more fundamental implications, over the first two; and a logical
exposition of the contentions of the petitioner is expressed in the two
following propositions:
(I) The order admitting the will to probate was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice to
the petitioner;
(II) The judgment from which the petitioner seeks relief should be
set aside because the testator was not a resident of the State of
Illinois and the will was not in conformity with the laws of that
State.
In the discussion which is to follow we shall consider the problems arising
in this cae in the order last above indicated. Upon the question, then, of
the jurisdiction of the court, it is apparent from an inspection of the record
of the proceedings in the court below that all the steps prescribed by law
as prerequisites to the probate of a will were complied with in every
respect and that the probate was effected in external conformity with all
legal requirements. This much is unquestioned. It is, however, pointed
out in the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the time
the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that
the petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she
was necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore,
insisted that the court should have appointed a date for the probate of the
will sufficiently far in the future to permit the petitioner to be present either
in person or by representation; and it is said that the failure of the court
thus to postpone the probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that
provision of the Philippine Bill which declared that property shall not be
taken without due process of law.
On this point we are of the opinion that the proceedings for the probate of
the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the
court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be
probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the
proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the
very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining
the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a
proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an
exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving
a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being
strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the
constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
In that case the petitioner had been domiciled in the Hawaiian Islands at
the time of the testator's death; and it was impossible, in view of the
distance and means of communication then existing, for the petitioner to
appear and oppose the probate on the day set for the hearing in
California. It was nevertheless held that publication in the manner
prescribed by statute constituted due process of law. (See Estate of
Davis, 151 Cal., 318; Tracy vs. Muir, 151 Cal., 363.)
In the Davis case (136 Cal., 590) the court commented upon the fact that,
under the laws of California, the petitioner had a full year within which
she might have instituted a proceeding to contest the will; and this was
stated as one of the reasons for holding that publication in the manner
provided by statute was sufficient. The same circumstance was
commented upon in O'Callaghan vs. O'Brien (199 U. S., 89), decided in
the Supreme Court of the United States. This case arose under the laws
of the State of Washington, and it was alleged that a will had been there
probated without the notice of application for probate having been given
as required by law. It was insisted that this was an infringement of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. This
contention was, however, rejected and it was held that the statutory right
to contest the will within a year was a complete refutation of the argument
founded on the idea of a violation of the due process provision.
The laws of these Islands, in contrast with the laws in force in perhaps all
of the States of the American Union, contain no special provision, other
than that allowing an appeal in the probate proceedings, under which
relief of any sort can be obtained from an order of a court of first instance
improperly allowing or disallowing a will. We do, however, have a
provision of a general nature authorizing a court under certain
circumstances to set aside any judgment, order, or other proceeding
whatever. This provision is found in section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a judgment, order or other
proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That application therefor
be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six
months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The use of the word "judgment, order or other proceeding" in this section
indicates an intention on the part of the Legislature to give a wide latitude
to the remedy here provided, and in our opinion its operation is not to be
restricted to judgments or orders entered in ordinary contentious litigation
where a plaintiff impleads a defendant and brings him into court by
personal service of process. In other words the utility of the provision is
not limited to actions proper but extends to all sorts of judicial
proceedings.
In the second section of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that
the provisions of this Code shall be liberally construed to promote its
object and to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. We think that
the intention thus exhibited should be applied in the interpretation of
section 113; and we hold that the word "party," used in this section,
means any person having an interest in the subject matter of the
proceeding who is in a position to be concluded by the judgment, order,
to other proceeding taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the
section cited, at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon
showing that she had been precluded from appearing in the probate
proceedings by conditions over which she had no control and that the
order admitting the will to probate had been erroneously entered upon
insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of facts contrary to the truth,
the court would have been authorized to set the probate aside and grant
a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was, under the
circumstances, a very short period of time within which to expect the
petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the probate with the proof
which she might have desired to collect from remote countries.
Nevertheless, although the time allowed for the making of such
application was inconveniently short, the remedy existed; and the
possibility of its use is proved in this case by the circumstance that on
June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her attorneys and
excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
It results that, in conformity with the doctrine announced in the Davis
case, above cited, the proceedings in the court below were conducted in
such manner as to constitute due process of law. The law supplied a
remedy by which the petitioner might have gotten a hearing and have
obtained relief from the order by which she is supposed to have been
injured; and though the period within which the application should have
been made was short, the remedy was both possible and practicable.
From what has been said it follows that the order of March 16, 1916,
admitting the will of Emil H. Johnson to probate cannot be declared null
and void merely because the petitioner was unavoidably prevented from
appearing at the original hearing upon the matter of the probate of the will
in question. Whether the result would have been the same if our system
of procedure had contained no such provision as that expressed in
section 113 is a matter which we need not here consider.
Intimately connected with the question of the jurisdiction of the court, is
another matter which may be properly discussed at this juncture. This
relates to the interpretation to be placed upon section 636 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The position is taken by the appellant that this section is
applicable only to wills of liens; and in this connection attention is directed
to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made
here by an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of
the section is not capitalized. From this it is argued that section 636 is not
applicable to the will of a citizen of the United States residing in these
Islands.lawphil.net
We consider these suggestions of little weight and are of the opinion that,
by the most reasonable interpretation of the language used in the statute,
the words "another state or country" include the United States and the
States of the American Union, and that the operation of the statute is not
limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and
capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a
statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the
written words. Furthermore, the epigraph, or heading,, of a section, being
nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision,
cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the
body of the text. It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his
death a citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, his will
was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippine Islands,
provided the instrument was so executed as to be admissible to probate
under the laws of the State of Illinois.
We are thus brought to consider the second principal proposition stated
at the outset of this discussion, which raises the question whether the
order f probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground
stated in the petition, namely, that the testator was not a resident of the
State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws
of that State.
The order of the Court of First Instance admitting the will to probate
recites, among other things:
That upon the date when the will in question was executed Emil
H. Johnson was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the
State of Illinois, County of Cook, and that the will in question was
executed in conformity with the dispositions of the law f the State
of Illinois.
We consider this equivalent to a finding that upon the date of the
execution of the will the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and
that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State. Upon
the last point the finding is express; and in our opinion the statement that
the testator was a citizen of the United States, naturalized in the State of
Illinois, should be taken to imply that he was a citizen of the State of
Illinois, as well as of the United States.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a condition
precedent to the granting of the certificate of naturalization, that the
applicant should have resided at least five years in the United States and
for one year within the State or territory where the court granting the
naturalization papers is held; and in the absence of clear proof to the
contrary it should be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a
certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the
United States.
In this connection it should be remembered that the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares, in its
opening words, that all persons naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul the probate
of this will does not assert that the testator was not a citizen of Illinois at
the date when the will was executed. The most that is said on this point is
he was "never a resident of the State of Illinois after the year 1898, but
became and was a resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in
the Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and it must
be considered that the allegations of the petition on this point are,
considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute citizenship in Illinois,
wholly insufficient.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the
State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws
of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
And how is it possible to evade the effect of these findings?
In Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the
allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be
conclusive as to its due execution."
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of
matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing
of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the
acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act.
The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each
and all of them the probate is conclusive. (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3
Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., 436; Chiong Joc-
Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395;
Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.)
Our reported cases do not contain the slightest intimation that a will
which has been probated according to law, and without fraud, can be
annulled, in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed
irregularity or defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error
in the action of the court upon the proof adduced before it. This court has
never been called upon to decide whether, in case the probate of a will
should be procured by fraud, relief could be granted in some other
proceeding; and no such question is now presented. But it is readily seen
that if fraud were alleged, this would introduce an entirely different factor
in the cae. In Austrua vs. Ventenilla (21 Phil. Rep., 180, 184), it was
suggested but not decided that relief might be granted in case the
probate of a will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will
was executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that
the testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an
unassailable basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the fact
of the judgment is concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the
judgment had not contained these recitals, there would have been a
presumption from the admission of the will to probate as the will of a
citizen of Illinois that the facts were as recited in the order of probate.
As was said by this court in the case of Banco Español-
Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921), "There is no principle of law
better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every
act of a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been
rightly done. This rule is applied to every judgment or decree rendered in
the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their
completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S.,
449); and if the record is silent with respect to any fact which must have
established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be presumed
that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge."
The Court of First Instance is a court of original and general jurisdiction;
and there is no difference in its faculties in this respect whether exercised
in matters of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation. The trial
court therefore necessarily had the power to determine the facts upon
which the propriety of admitting the will to probate depended; and the
recital of those facts in the judgment was probably not essential to its
validity. No express ruling is, however, necessary on this point.
What has been said effectually disposes of the petition considered in its
aspect as an attack upon the order of probate for error apparent on the
face of the record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment
reviewed, it being asserted that the findings of the trial court — especially
on the question of the citizenship of the testator — are not supported by
the evidence. It needs but a moment's reflection, however, to show that in
such a proceeding as this it is not possible to reverse the original order
on the ground that the findings of the trial court are unsupported by the
proof adduced before that court. The only proceeding in which a review
of the evidence can be secured is by appeal, and the case is not before
us upon appeal from the original order admitting the will to probate. The
present proceedings by petition to set aside the order of probate, and the
appeal herein is from the order denying this relief. It is obvious that on
appeal from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is not possible to
review the evidence upon which the original judgment was based. To
permit this would operate unduly to protract the right of appeal.
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just conception of the case from
the point of view of the petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence
submitted upon the original hearing, in connection with the allegations of
the petition, in order to see, first, whether the evidence submitted to the
trial court was sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, whether the
petition contains any matter which would justify the court in setting the
judgment, aside. In this connection we shall for a moment ignore the
circumstance that the petition was filed after the expiration of the six
months allowed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the testator. The
evidence adduced upon this point in the trial court consists of the
certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, Illinois, in connection with certain biographical
facts contained in the oral evidence. The certificate of naturalization
supplies incontrovertible proof that upon the date stated the testator
became a citizen of the United States, and inferentially also a citizen of
said State. In the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that,
when Johnson first came to the United States as a boy, he took up his
abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he came as a
soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine Islands. Although he
remained in these Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no
evidence was adduced showing that at the time he returned to the United
States, in the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the
State of his permanent domicile, and on the contrary the certificate of
naturalization itself recites that at that time he claimed to be a resident of
Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of the
United States and of the State of Illinois, how has he lost the character of
citizen with respect to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in
force by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity can become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore,
impossible for the testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate
himself from the United States and change his political status from a
citizen of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being true, it
is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State of Illinois
along with his status as a citizen of the United States. It would be novel
doctrine to Americans living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by
living here they lose their citizenship in the State of their naturalization or
nativity.
We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of one State leaves it
and takes up his abode in another State with no intention of returning, he
immediately acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. This is
in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States which says that every citizen of the
United States is a citizen of the State where in he resides. The effect of
this provision necessarily is that a person transferring his domicile from
one State to another loses his citizenship in the State of his original
above upon acquiring citizenship in the State of his new abode. The
acquisition of the new State citizenship extinguishes the old. That
situation, in our opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a
citizen of an American State comes to reside in the Philippine Islands.
Here he cannot acquire a new citizenship; nor by the mere change of
domicile does he lose that which he brought with him.
The proof adduced before the trial court must therefore be taken as
showing that, at the time the will was executed, the testator was, as
stated in the order of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in
connection with the circumstance that the petition does not even so much
as deny such citizenship but only asserts that the testator was a resident
of the Philippine Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of setting the
probate aside for lack of the necessary citizenship on the part of the
testator. As already observed, the allegation of the petition on this point is
wholly insufficient to justify any relief whatever.
Upon the other point — as to whether the will was executed in conformity
with the statutes of the State of Illinois — we note that it does not
affirmatively appear from the transaction of the testimony adduced in the
trial court that any witness was examined with reference to the law of
Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was
satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874 of
the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr &
Curtis's Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have
assumed that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion
mistaken. that section authorizes the courts here to take judicial notice,
among other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United
States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress of
the United States; and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can,
under this provision, take judicial notice of the multifarious laws of the
various American States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be
derived from the broader language, used in the same action, where it is
said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge "similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we
think is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the American
Union whenever their provisions are determinative of the issues in any
action litigated in the Philippine courts.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in
taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such
error is not now available to the petitioner, first, because the petition does
not state any fact from which it would appear that the law of Illinois is
different from what the court found, and, secondly, because the
assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no
question based on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have
acted upon pure conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois,
its judgment could not be set aside, even upon application made within
six months under section 113 of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it
should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was wrong.
The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is
invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of
Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the
petition is accompanied contain no reference to the subject, and we are
cited to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tent to raise a
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court. It is very
clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment.
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the will in question was
not properly admissible to probate because it contains provisions which
cannot be given effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine Islands;
and it is suggested that as the petitioner is a legitimate heir of the testator
she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under the
law governing testamentary successions in these Islands. Upon this point
it is sufficient to say that the probate of the will does not affect the
intrinsic validity of its provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive
only as regards the due execution of the will. (Code of Civil Procedure,
secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349;
Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11
Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it should appear that any
legacy given by the will or other disposition made therein is contrary to
the law applicable in such case, the will must necessarily yield upon that
point and the law must prevail. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten
that the intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined
by the law of Illinois and not, as the appellant apparently assumes, by the
general provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the second
paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and
testamentary successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well
as to the amount of the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws of the nation of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country where it may be situate."
From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that the petition
submitted to the court below on October 31, 1916, was entirely
insufficient to warrant the setting aside of the other probating the will in
question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on the validity
of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an
application for a rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the
affidavits which accompany the petition. And in this latter aspect the
petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was not presented
within the time allowed by law.
It follows that the trial court committed no error in denying the relief
sought. The order appealed from is accordingly affirmed with costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 38050 September 22, 1933
In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA
MANAHAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent-appellant.
J. Fernando Rodrigo for appellant.
Heraclio H. del Pilar for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the appellant herein, Engracia Manahan, from
the order of the Court of the First Instance of Bulacan dated July 1, 1932,
in the matter of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, special
proceedings No. 4162, denying her motion for reconsideration and new
trial filed on May 11, 1932.
The fact in the case are as follows:
On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings
No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan,
who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. The
petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix in said
will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice
required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of
the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was
presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as
prayed for. The will was probated on September 22, 1930. The trial court
appointed the herein petitioner executrix with a bond of P1,000, and
likewise appointed the committed on claims and appraisal, whereupon
the testamentary proceedings followed the usual course. One year and
seven months later, that is, on My 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant
herein filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the
order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will
declared null and void ab initio. The appellee herein, naturally filed her
opposition to the petition and, after the corresponding hearing thereof,
the trial court erred its over of denial on July 1, 1932. Engracia Manahan,
under the pretext of appealing from this last order, likewise appealed
from the judgment admitting the will to probate.
In this instance, the appellant assigns seven (7) alleged errors as
committed by the trial court. Instead of discussing them one by one, we
believe that, essentially, her claim narrows down to the following: (1) That
she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as
such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of the
will; (2) that the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really
probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and (3)
that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external
formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been
complied with in the execution thereof.
The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable.
She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither
had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested
party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof.
Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's
sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the
testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted
heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any
successional right.
The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the
authentication and probate of the will in question, which is the only
pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will
may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law.
In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference
between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words
authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law
requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the
will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in
view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of
the law.
The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating
that, once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate,
questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal.
The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law,
except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceedings (sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure; Castañeda vs. Alemany,
3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393; Montañano vs.
Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs.
Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vaño, 8 Phil., 119).
But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from
successfully maintaining the present action and it is that inasmuch as the
proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's
decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against
her, in accordance with the provisions of section 306 of the said Code of
Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate
of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or
legal condition or relation of a particular person the judgment or
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition or relation of the
person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters
of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death
of the testator or intestate; . . . .
On the other hand, we are at a loss to understand how it was possible for
the herein appellant to appeal from the order of the trial court denying her
motion for reconsideration and a new trial, which is interlocutory in
character. In view of this erroneous interpretation, she succeeded in
appealing indirectly from the order admitting the will to probate which was
entered one year and seven months ago.
Before closing, we wish to state that it is not timely to discuss herein the
validity and sufficiency of the execution of the will in question. As we
have already said, this question can no more be raised in this case on
appeal. After due hearing, the court found that the will in question was
valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus
promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of
the will in question now constitutes res judicata.
Wherefore, the appeal taken herein is hereby dismissed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, G.R. No. 156021
FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE
P. COLLADO, JUDITH Present:
PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO,
ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PUNO, J.,
PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA Chairman,
E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ,
JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO CALLEJO,
SR.,
ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH TINGA, and
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Elevencionado (decedent), who died on 26 October
DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo.[4] Respondent alleged that
MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and he was the heir of the decedent and the executor
MATHILDE MARIN, Promulgated: of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial
Petitioners,
Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North,
September 23, 2005
Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision,[5] allowing
- versus - the probate of the will of the decedent and
directing the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.[6]
COURT OF APPEALS and
FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO, More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October
Respondents. 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the
x----------------------------------------------------------- reopening of the probate proceedings.[7] Likewise,
--------x they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will
of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent,[8] claiming that they
DECISION are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners
claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
TINGA, J.:
over the petition due to non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of
This is a petition for review of the Resolutions[1] of
notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged
the
that the will could not have been probated
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
because: (1) the signature of the decedent was
69221,[2] dismissing petitioners petition for
forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance
annulment of judgment.
with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below
the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco
testamentary capacity to execute and publish a
Provido (respondent) filed a petition, docketed as
will; (4) the will was executed by force and under
SP Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last
duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent
Will and Testament[3] of the late Soledad Provido
had no intention to make a will at the time of
affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know
the properties to be disposed of, having included
in the will properties which no longer belonged to
her. Petitioners prayed that the letters
testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn
and the estate of the decedent disposed of under
intestate succession.[9]
On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued
an Order[10] denying petitioners motion for being
unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction,
the RTC held that petitioners were deemed notified
of the hearing by publication and that the
deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a
ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It
merely required respondent to pay the
deficiency.[11] Moreover, the RTCs Decision was
already final and executory even before petitioners
filing of the motion to reopen.[12]
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition[13] with an
application for preliminary injunction with the CA,
seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision dated
30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002.
They claimed that after the death of the decedent,
petitioners, together with respondent, held several
conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the
estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing
to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share.
Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise
agreement to implement the division of the estate.
Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent
refused to sign and return the same. Petitioners
opined that respondent feigned interest in
participating in the compromise agreement so that
they would not suspect his intention to secure the
probate of the will.[14] They claimed that they
learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of
2001, as a result of which they filed their motion
to reopen the proceedings and admit their
opposition to the probate of the will only on 4
October 2001. They argued that the
RTC Decisionshould be annulled and set aside on
the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.[15]
In its Resolution[16] promulgated on 28 February
2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that
there was no showing that petitioners failed to
avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or
other appropriate remedies through no fault of
their own.[17] Moreover, the CA declared as
baseless petitioners claim that the proceedings in
the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither
was there any showing that they availed of this
ground in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA
added.[18] Petitioners sought reconsideration of
the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA
for lack of merit.[19]
Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed their petition for the alleged failure to
show that they have not availed of or resorted to
the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment or other remedies through no fault
of their own, and held that petitioners were not
denied their day in court during the proceedings
before the RTC.[20] In addition, they assert that this
Court has yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant
petition should be given due course for the
guidance of the bench and bar.[21]
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners
were in a position to avail of the remedies provided
in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they
filed a motion for new trial.[22] Moreover, they could
have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment
since they learned of the RTCs judgment only
three and a half months after its
promulgation. Respondent likewise maintains
[23]
that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the
annulment of the RTCs Decision, since there was
no showing that they were denied their day in
court. Petitioners were not made parties to the
probate proceedings because the decedent did not
institute them as her heirs.[24] Besides,
assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of
the decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal
defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a
matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite.[25] Finally, respondent
charges petitioners of forumshopping, since the
latter have a pending suit involving the same
issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is SP No.
1181[26] filed before Branch 23, RTC of General
Santos City and subsequently pending on appeal
before the CA in CA-G.R. No.74924.[27]
It appears that one of the petitioners herein,
Dolores M. Flores (Flores), who is a niece of the
decedent, filed a petition for letters of
administration with the RTC of General Santos
City, claiming that the decedent died intestate
without any issue, survived by five groups of
collateral heirs. Flores, armed with a Special
Power of Attorney from most of the other
petitioners, prayed for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in
Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since the venue for
a petition for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent is the place where the decedent died.
This is also in accordance with the rule that the
first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue
hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts,
the RTC added.[28] On 9 January 2002, Flores filed
a Notice of Appeal [29] and on 28 January 2002, the
case was ordered forwarded to the CA.[30]
Petitioners maintain that they were not made
parties to the case in which the decision sought to
be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could
not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and
other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling
of the CA. They aver that respondents offer of a
false compromise and his failure to notify them of
the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud
that necessitates the annulment of the RTCs
judgment.[31]
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an
aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the
ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. The same
Rule permits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award
of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the
decision or final order, or that the decision or final
order is contrary to law.[32] Both motions should be
filed within the period for taking an appeal, or
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from
judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to
when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a
party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may
file a petition in the same court and in the same
case to set aside the judgment, order or
proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment and
within six (6) months after entry thereof.[33]
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a
petition for relief from judgment are remedies
available only to parties in the proceedings where
the assailed
judgment is rendered.[34] In fact, it has been held
that a person who was never a party to the case,
or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail
of a petition for relief from judgment.[35]
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in
asserting that they are not or have not become
parties to the probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor,
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed.[36] Notice of the time and place for proving
the will must be published for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province,[37] as well as furnished to the designated
or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator.[38] Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem,
such that with the corresponding publication of
the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement
of the estate of the decedent.[39]
Publication is notice to the whole world that
the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely
all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established.
It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.[40] Thus, even though petitioners were not
mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a
consequence of the publication of the notice of
hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners
could have validly availed of the remedies of
motion for new trial or reconsideration and
petition for relief from judgment. In fact,
petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is
essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners
praying for the reopening of the case and the
setting of further proceedings. However, the
motion was denied for having been filed out of
time, long after the Decision became final and
executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of
the Decision after it had become final, they could
have still filed a petition for relief from judgment
after the denial of their motion to reopen.
Petitioners claim that they learned of
the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost
four (4) months from the time the Decision had
attained finality. But they failed to avail of the
remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient
justification of the said remedies available to them,
petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for
annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would
benefit from their own inaction or negligence.[41]

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the
petition for annulment of judgment must still fail
for failure to comply with the substantive
requisites, as the appellate court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a
remedy in law independent of the case where the
judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. The purpose of such action is to have
[42]
the final and executory judgment set aside so that
there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted
to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner,[43] and is based
on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process.[44] A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove
his allegation that the judgment was obtained by
the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.[45]
An action to annul a final judgment on the
ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character.[46] Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting his entire case to the court,
or where it operates upon matters pertaining not
to the judgment itself but to the manner in which
it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party
from having his day in court.[47]
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud,
petitioners assert that as a result of respondents
deliberate omission or concealment of their
names, ages and residences as the other heirs of
the decedent in his petition for allowance of the
will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and
thus they were denied their day in court. In
addition, they claim that respondents offer of a
false compromise even before the filing of the
petition prevented them from appearing and
opposing the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced.
According to the Rules, notice is required to
be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator.[48] A perusal of the will
shows that respondent was instituted as the sole
heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and
nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor
testate heirs[49]who are entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent
had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in
the petition for probate, or to personally notify
them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners
are entitled to be so notified, the purported
infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.
After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter
of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite.[50]
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the
petition and the alleged failure to personally notify
them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic
fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in
court, as they were not prevented from
participating in the proceedings and presenting
their case before the probate court.
One other vital point is the issue of forum-
shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping
consists of filing multiple suits in different courts,
either simultaneously or successively, involving
the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the
same or related causes and/or to grant the same
or substantially same reliefs,[51] on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.[52] Obviously, the parties in the
instant case, as well as in the appealed case before
the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the
existence and validity of the alleged will of the
decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause
on the state of intestacy. In the probate
proceedings, petitioners position has always been
that the decedent left no will and if she did, the will
does not comply with the requisites of a valid will.
Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their
present petition. Of course, respondent maintains
the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the
petition for letters of administration, petitioner
Flores prayed for her appointment as
administratrix of the
estate on the theory that the decedent died
intestate. The petition was dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order
of dismissal which is the subject of review in CA-

G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is forum-
shopping.
Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the
Court of the said pending case in their certification
against forum- shopping. Neither have they done
so at any time thereafter. The Court notes that
even in the petition for annulment of judgment,
petitioners failed to inform the CA of the pendency
of their appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though
the notice of appeal was filed way before the
petition for annulment of judgment was instituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45463 March 18, 1937
EMERITA SANTOS, in her behalf and as guardian of the persons
and property of the minors Bienvenido, Apolonio Manuel, Juana and
Norberta, surnamed Azores y Santos, petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, and,
JOSE, SINFOROSA, and ANTONIO AZORES,respondents.
J. E. Blanco for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondents Azores.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to have this court declare null and
void the order issued by the respondents judge of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, on January 26, 1937, dismissing the petition
docketed therein as case No. 1310. Said petition had been filed by the
petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian of the minor
acknowledge natural children of the deceased Nicolas Azores, for the
purpose of applying for the probate of the will, Exhibit A, which she
claims to e the expression died in the municipality of San Pablo, Laguna,
on January 5, 1937.
Two days after the petition in question had been docketed, the petitioner
filed a motion for the appointment of a special administrator and
commissioners on appraisal, of the properties of the deceased Nicolas
Azores. At the hearing of said motion which took place on January 13th,
the herein respondents Jose, Sinforosa and Antonio Azores, legitimate
children of said deceased, opposed the court's taking action thereon on
the ground that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the case, the
allegations made in the petition being insufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon said court, because the petitioner did not allege that she had the
custody of the will and, therefore, was not entitled to present it for
probate; and furtherance because the will that should be probate is the
original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner.
Before the court decided the incident relative to its lack of jurisdiction, the
petitioner, on January 16th, filed an amended petition with an affidavit,
adding to the original application the following paragraph:
That four typewritten copies of said will Exhibit A, all identically
containing each and every provision thereof, were made, which
were at once signed and subscribed by the testator and the
instrumental witnesses, and that after the will had been made, the
testator Nicolas Azores designated nobody in particular as
"custodian" thereof but instead he directed his nephew, Attorney
Manuel Azores Concordia, to deliver a copy of the petitioner
Emerita Santos, to keep the other copy in his (Manuel Azores
Concordia's) possession, and to deliver the other two copies to
his son Jose Azores, with instructions to the effect that if the
herein petitioner Emerita Santos or his son Jose failed to present
said will to probate, he (Manuel Azores Concordia) should take
charge of presenting it to the court for said purpose, as stated
more particularly in the affidavit Exhibit B. The copy Exhibit A
belonged to the petitioner.
In said amended petition, the petitioner prayed that Jose Azores and
Manuel Azores Concordia be required to present immediately, in said
case No. 3101, the copies of the will in their possession as well as any
alleged codicil claimed by them to have been made by the testator.
On January 19th, the court issued an order which reads as follows:
Considering the petition of Atty. Jesus E. Blanco in representation
of petitioner Emerita Santos, for the appointment of a special
administrator in this case, and the opposition filed thereto by Atty.
Claro M. Recto in representation of the children of the deceased
in his first marriage; and considering further the arguments in
favor of and against said petition given by the parties, as well as
the manifestation in open court made by Atty. Recto that the
opponents will present for probate the original last will and
testament of the deceased together with the codicil as soon as
the novena for the decease is through and taking into account the
period of time that has elapsed since the death of Nicolas Azores;
Said petition for the appointment of a special administrator is
hereby denied; and Jose Azores under whose custody the last
will and testament and all other document having relation thereto
are opposed to be, is hereby ordered to deliver said papers to the
court within ten (10) days from notice hereof; . . . .
On January 20th, the petitioner filed a motion praying that her amended
petition be admitted, that a special administrator and commissioners on
appraisal be appointed and that Jose Azores and Manuel Azores
Concordia be required to present in said case the copies of the will and
the codicil that they had in their possession. Before this motion was
decided, the respondents, on January 21st, that is, 16 days after their
father's death, presented the original of the will and codicil made by the
deceased Nicolas Azores, with a petition docketed as case No. 3140,
praying for the probate of said will and codicil.
On the 23d of said month, the petitioner's motion of January 20th was
heard. It was opposed by the respondents Azores on the ground that as
the jurisdiction of the court to pass upon the original petition for probate
filed by the petitioner is questioned, the amendment thereto could not
legally be considered until the previous question is decided by the court.
The respondents prayed that said original petition of the petitioner be
dismissed on the ground that as the originals of the will and codicil of the
deceased Azores had been presented together with a petition for the
probate thereof, the petitioner's defective petition was unfounded.
On the 26th of said month, the respondents Judge Modesto Castillo
issued order in question, dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner
which gave rise to the proceeding docketed as case No. 3101 of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna. The day following the issuance of said
order, the petition excepted thereto and filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the court. The petitioner excepted to the order
denying her motion.
It is alleged in the petitioner's petition filed in this court that the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily and
irregularly in dismissing the petition for probate filed by her in case No.
3110 as well as in ordering the publication of the notice of the hearing of
the probate of the will in case No. 3104 instituted by the Azores brothers
and sister before the order of January 26, 1937, issued in said No. 3101
became final. It is claimed that said judge also exceeded his jurisdiction
and acted arbitrarily and irregularly in giving preference to the petition for
probate filed by the Azores brothers and sister, disregarding the petition
filed by the herein petitioner, instead of ordering said respondents Jose
Azores et al. to present their copies of the will and alleged codicil in case
No. 3101.
First of all, is advisable to separate in this case the actuations of the
respondents judge in case No. 3101 from his actuations in case No.
3140. This court is of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled at all to
interpose this appeal in connection with code No. 3140 instituted by the
legitimate children of the deceased Azores, on the ground that she is not
a party thereto and has not asked therein for the reconsideration of the
court's order directing the publication of the notice of the hearing of the
probate of the will in said case No. 3104.
With respect to cae No. 3101 in order to decide the question whether or
not the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in dismissing the
petitioner's application, we should first consider who was entitled to apply
for the probate of the will of Nicolas Azores. To get to the bottom of this
question, it is necessary to ascertain beforehand who was bound by law
to apply for the probate of the will.
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will pass
either the real or personal state, unless it is proved and allowed. For this
purpose, section 626 provides that the person who was the custody of a
will shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator,
deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor
named in the will, and sections 628 and 629 prescribed coercion means
to compel a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the court
having jurisdiction.
The petitioner alleges that the deceased Azores designated nobody
as custodian of his will but that he directed his nephew Manuel Azores
Concordia to deliver a copy thereof to the petitioner, to preserve the other
copy in his (Manuel Azores Concordia's) possession, and to turnover the
two copies to his son Jose Azores, with instructions to the effect that if
the petitioners or his son Jose Azores failed to present said will for
probate, he (Manuel Azores Concordia) should take charge of presenting
it to the court for said purpose. Granting that thereof the conclusion that
the testator designated nobody as custodian of his will, the petitioner is
silent as to the disposition made by the testator of the original of his will.
To whom was the original delivered? It is, of course, evident that there
must be an original of the will in question even if four equal copies have
been made thereon. Well, one of the two copies of the will turned over to
Jose Azores must be the original because the respondents had the
original of the will as well as the codicil. Taking this into account, we may
conclude that it was Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, who had the
custody of the will because the original thereof was turned over to him. If
in addition of the foregoing it is considered that the respondents Azores
also had the original of the codicil, it necessarily follows that, by provision
of the testator, it was said respondents who had the custody of his will
and of his codicil.
For the sake of arguments, however, let us admit that the testator had
designated nobody as custodian of his will in distributing the copies
thereof and in entrusting his nephew Manuel Azores Concordia, as
above-stated, with the presentation of a copy of said will to he court for
probate. Even so, it cannot be denied that as the testator had
subsequently made his codicil and had entrusted the custody thereof to
his legitimate children, his last will, as to the custody of his will and
codicil, was clearly modified in the sense of entrusting the custody of both
to his legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores Concordia or to the
petitioner.
Therefore, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody of the
originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could, had the right and
where bound by law to apply for the probate of their father's last will.
Consequently, the respondent judge, in dismissing the application
prosecuted arbitrarily of irregularly, but reasonably made use of his
bound discretion.
The petitioner contends that instead of dismissing her application, the
respondents judge should have compelled the respondents Azores to
present the copy of the will and the alleged codicil in case No. 3101. The
court could not prudently to do so: first, because in said case the
eptittionerapplied for the probate of the will and nothing more:
andsecond, because the petitioner has clearly statd that eveniof she had
the codicil n her possession, she would nothave presented it to the court
because said codicil was allegedly"marked", not signed, by the testator
about fifteendays before his death, yhat is, on a date when, accordingto
the medial opinion og Doctors Manuel B. Calupitan andFortunato
Manzanero, he was physically and mentally incapacitatedto govern his
properties, thereby making itclearly understood that she would oppose
the probate ofthe codicil in questio. If scuh is the petitioner' s attitude and
intention, were the codicil attached to case No. 3101,there would be the
anomaly of her being applicant and atthe same time oppsitor therein.
Who would be the applicantfor the probate of the codicil? Could the
court,or rather, would the court have authjority to compekl thelegitimate
children of the deceased Azores to appear asapplicant in case No. 3101
where they have precisely questionedthe jurisdiction of the court?
With respect to the court's jurisdiction, this court finds that it is a fact
impliedly admitted by the petitioner, from the time she presented an
amended petition for the probate of curing the deficiencies of her
application, that the allegations of said application were insufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court. As said amendment had not been
admitted by the court, the lack of jurisdiction continued to be manifest
upon the face of the proceedings.
Wherefore, this court holds in conclusion that in order that the court may
acquire jurisiction over the case for the probate of a will and for the
administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application
must allege, in addition to the residence of the deceased and other
indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant is the executor in
the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated. The
original of said document must be presented or sufficient reasons given
to justify the nonrepresnetation of said original and the acceptance of the
copy or duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these requisites had not been
complied within the application filed by the peittioner, the respondent
judge did not exceeded his jurisdiciotn in dismissing the application in
question.
The petition is denied, with the costs to the petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-12359 July 15, 1959
In the Matter of the Petition for the Summary Settlement of the
Estate left by the deceased Carida Perez. BERNARDINO
PEREZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CONRADA PEREZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Efrain B. Treñas for appellee.
Gaudioso Geduspan for appellants.
BENGZON, J.:
This appeal does not belong here. Involving, as it does the summary
settlement of a testate estate worth P6,000.00 according to petitioner, or
P10,000 according to oppositors, it should not have been brought directly
to this Court from the Iloilo Court of First Instance, inasmuch as several
questions of fact are raised in relation with testimonial evidence: for
example, the soundness of the mind of the testatrix and her freedom from
constraint in signing the will.
The printed brief makes no assignment expressly challenging the court's
jurisdiction; but in discussing their second error, oppositors-appellants
insist the lower court did not "acquire jurisdiction to receive the evidence
for the allowance of the alleged will" because two heirs (Melanio Perez,
Jr. and Milagros Perez) had not been notified in advance of such will.
In reply to this, the petitioner-appellee says the persons mentioned were
not entitled to notice, since they were not forced heirs — grandnephew
and niece — and had not been mentioned as legatees or devisees in the
will of the deceased (Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil., 448). And as to
Milagros Perez, petitioner asserts that notice had been addressed to her
last known residence in this country.
Thus, it appears that such "no notice" argument has no legal foundation.
At any rate the omission, if any, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court:
it constituted a mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of
reversal (Jocson vs. Nable, 48 Off. Gaz., 90). Indeed, this Tribunal has
ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested in the
estate through the publication of the petition in the newspapers (In re
Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 159; Joson vs. Nable, supra) — which in this
case admittedly took place.
Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of
procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. (Joson vs.
Nable, supra) So much so that even if the names of some legatees or
heirs had been omitted from the petition for allowance of the will and
therefore were not adviced — the decree allowing the will does not ipso
facto become void for want of jurisdiction. (Nicholson vs. Leathan, 153
Pacific Reports, 965; Moran, Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., Vol. II, p. 355; see
also In re Estate of Johnson, supra, and Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil.,
938.)
The result is that the matter of "jurisdiction" discussed by oppositors
appears to be so unsubstantial as to furnish no reason to bypass the
Court of Appeals authority to appraise the factual issues in the litigation.
(Cf. People vs. Imas, 64 Phil., 419; Uy vs. Villafranca, 64 Phil., 561.)
Needless, to add, in fine, the jurisdictional question directly appealable to
this Court refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter, not mere
jurisdiction over the persons, (Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil., 484; Bernabe vs.
Vergara, 73 Phil., 676; Sy Oa vs. Co Ho, 74 Phil., 239.)
Wherefore, this record will be referred to the Court of Appeals for
disposition in accordance with law.
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS
R. INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-
INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA
R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK
and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166,
PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.
Belo, Abiera and Associates for petitioners.
Miguel J. Lagman for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 13 January
1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-Infante de Aranz, et al., petitioners vs. Hon.
Nicolas Galing, etc., et al., respondents," dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition
as-, sailing the orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12 May 1986 and 30
May 1986, respectively, in Sp. Proc. No. 9995, entitled, "In the Matter of Petition for Approval of the
Last Will and Testament of Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola Joaquin R. Infante, Petitioner."
On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last
will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition
specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees
and devisees, as follows:
Joaquina R-Infante Roxas de Aranz residing at No. 86
10th St., New Manila, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Antonio R-Infante Roxas residing at #91 Cambridge,
North Forbes, Makati, Metro Manila;
Carlos R-Infante Roxas residing at #46 Washington St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila;
Mercedes R-Infante Roxas de Lednicky residing at #386
P. Guevarra St., San Juan, Metro Manila;
Alfredo R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 A Scout Tobias
St., Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Teresita R-Infante Roxas residing at #121 9th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Ramon R-Infante Roxas residing at #27 B Scout Tobias
St., Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Florencia R-Infante Roxas de Diaz residing at Calle
Sancho Davila, 13-19-D, Madrid, 28028 Spain;
Martin R-Infante Roxas residing at #2 Bongavilla St.,
Cubao, Quezon City, Metro Manila;
Jose R-Infante Link residing at 174R-Pascual St., San
Juan, Metro Manila;
Joaquin R-Infante Campbell C/O Pilar Campbell, 15
Briones, Makati, Metro Marta. 3
On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order selling the petition
for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was
published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the
hearing, no oppositor appeared. The hearing was then reset to 12 May
1986, on which date, the probate court issued the following order:
There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed
for, the oner to-receive Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
designated Co evidence ex-parte of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 4
On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his
evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary
witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings, private
respondent was appointed executor.
On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order of 12 May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were
sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and
they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to
file their opposition to the probate of the will.
On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private
respondent and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13
January 1987, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing
the petition. 5Hence, the instant petition.
It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and
devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.
Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals that the requirement of
notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of
procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the
requirements of due process, petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule
76 of the Rules of Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory and its
omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave
abuse of discretion. 6
We grant the petition:
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be
notified by mail or personally. — The court shag also
cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines at their places of residence,
and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon
prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if
such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice
must in like manner be mailed to the person named as
executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person
named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of
residence be known. Personal service of copies of the
notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing
shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the
hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is
no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and
devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance
of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and
devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court
did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The
requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by
mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The case of Joson vs. Nable 8 cited by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
decision to support its theory is not applicable in the present case. In that
case, petitioners Purificacion Joson and Erotica Joson failed to contest
the will of Tomas Joson because they had not been notified of the
hearing of the petition for probate. he the petition included the residence
of petitioners as Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila, petitioners claimed that
their residence was not Dagupan Street No. 83, Manila. There the Court
said:
Petitioners maintain that no notice was received by them
partly because their residence was not Dagupan Street
No. 83 as alleged in the petition for probate. If the
allegation of the petition was wrong and the true
residence of petitioners was not known, then notice upon
them individually was not necessary. Under the provision
abovequoted, individual notice upon heirs, legatees and
devisees is necessary only when they are known or when
their places of residence are known. In other instances,
such notice is not necessary and the court may acquire
and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication of
the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. ... 9
In Re: Testate Estate of Suntay, 10 the Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Sabino Padilla, said:
... It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such
proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to
all interested parties must be made. The interested
parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was
received by the interested parties residing in the
Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t.s.n., hearing of 24
February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a
deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it
were so it does not measure or come up to the standard
of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to
all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the
back of such interested parties.
xxx xxx xxx
... In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof
cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the
accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles
followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings
held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot
be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the
probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will
referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded
by a competent court of court. 11
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January
1987 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42226 July 26, 1935
In re estate of the deceased Ines Basa de Mercado.
JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ATILANO G. MERCADO, respondent-appellee.
Briones and Martinez for appellants.
Jose Gutierrez David for appellee.
GODDARD, J.:
By virtue of an order dated June 27, 1931, the Honorable Hermogenes
Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, allowed and
probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. On January
30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of
the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and
closed the administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein
petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that said
proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to
act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with requirements
as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in the following
section of the Code of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a will is
delivered to a court having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall
appoint a time and place when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice
thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or
newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the
province, three weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been
given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath,
reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.
In this motion the appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of
the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the
fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the
publication of the required notice for "three weeks successively" previous
to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first publication was
on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place
on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first
publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing.
Section 630 of our Code of Civil Procedure is taken from the Code of
Civil Procedure of the State of Vermont. The Supreme Court of that
State, commenting on the phrase "three weeks successively", held:
The date of examining and allowing P.A. Barlett's final account of
administration, and for decreeing the residue of the estate to the
lawful claimants of the same, was set by the probate court for
December 19, 1919, at the probate office in Brighton, and an
order was made to this effect on November 28, 1919. The order
provided also that notice should be given by publication for three
weeks successively in the Essex County Herald. In accordance
with this order, the notice was published in the issues for
December 4, 11 and 18, respectively. This was "public notice" to
all persons interested of the time and place of examining and
allowing said account and making decree of distribution, and was
sufficient under the provisions of G.L. 3276.
(Lenehen vs. Spaulding, 57 Vt., 115.) "The proceeding was
according to law in all respects, and being in the nature of a
proceeding in rem, it binds everybody by its legal effect."
(Burbeck vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713.) At the time and place set for the
hearing none of the petitioners or other legatees under the will of
Nickerson Warner appeared. Thereupon the judge of probate
then and there continued the hearing until April 6, 1920, at which
time the final account of P.A .Barlett as administrator de bonis
non with will annexed was filed and, no one appearing to object,
the same was allowed, and the decree of distribution was
entered. (In re Warner's Estate [Supreme Court of Vermont]
1925; 127 Atl. Rep., 362, 364; 98 Vt., 254, 261.)
It will be noted that in the above cited case the last of the three
publications was on December 18, 1919, and the hearing on the
administrators's final account was set for December 19 of that year, only
fifteen days after the date of the first publication.
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630
of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to
therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for
the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the notice
need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the
hearing.
The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the
weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was
published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga.
The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general
circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of
local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription
list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that
the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing
Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in
the Province of Pampanga."
Furthermore no attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper
devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular
class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The fact
that there is another paper published in Pampanga that has a few more
subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies also have a
larger circulation in that province is unimportant. The law does not require
that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure,
should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary
to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.
The assignments of error of the appellants are overruled and the
appealed order of the trial court is affirmed with costs in this instance
against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S.
ASENETA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang
and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta".
Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila,
Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my
personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by
Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived
continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra.
Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to
me. ... I have found peace and happiness with them even
during the time when my sisters were still alive and
especially now when I am now being troubled by my
nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not
incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I know
what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do
things against my will.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate
of the Will of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV,
Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred to as the
Testate Case).
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the
adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta,
instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance-Branch
XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate
Case" for brevity).
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered
consolidated before Branch XI, presided by respondent Judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on
the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the
only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should
ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited
the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA
449), and Ramos vs. Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878). 1
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it
is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the
will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the
decedent. 2
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the
Testate Case in this wise:
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court finds
meritorious, the petition for probate of will filed by Soledad
L. Maninang and which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
23304 is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs.
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack
of merit and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator
of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia Aseneta "considering
that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad
Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not
been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust. "
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent
Court of Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in
issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case (September 8, 1980)
and denial of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied certiorari and ruled that the
trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the
Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which
petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that even granting that the
lower Court committed errors in issuing the questioned Orders, those are
errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal and not by Certiorari. 'Thus,
this Petition before us.
We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
it dismissed the Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is
mandatory.
No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. 4
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because
unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered
nugatory. 5
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
... The authentication of a will decides no other question
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned
as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.
The que0stions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has
been authenticated .... 6
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the
provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance
with the requirements of the law. 7
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid
vs. Nuguid 8, reading:
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area
of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution
on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed
 by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court
should meet that issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez 9 had a similar thrust:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an Idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the
rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon
even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded.
Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that
case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be
allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of
the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the Will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was
intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator.
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether
under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been
preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid
disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
... Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will
of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
(Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs
of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by
law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of
Philippine Civil Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases)
Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon the
other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary" (Sanchez
Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume
2.o p. 1131). 10
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
... The effects flowing from preterition are totally different
from those of disinheritance. Pretention under Article 854
of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir.
This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises
or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918
of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul
the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was
omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet,
in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the
estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived. 11
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the
assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent
Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face
of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso 12
... it is as important a matter of public interest that a
purported will is not denied legalization on dubious
grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation, ...
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our
finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done
by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by Certiorari. 13 And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal,
we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for
certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford
speedy and adequate relief.
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of
the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980
and December 19, 1980, are nullified. Special Proceeding No. Q-23304
is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal,
therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No.
8569 for further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON,
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the
dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October
23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and
respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial
Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to
dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as
follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the
late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p.
29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya
(Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by
petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will
contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of
the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will
provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our
properties. house, lands and money which I earned jointly
with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to
my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal
age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street,
Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-
deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses
there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
my share shall be given to me to his children, namely:
Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores,
Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of
Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner
in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984
the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally
adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson
Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the
petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the
lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution
of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3;
Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents'
petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate
of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this
present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on
December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on
June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
(Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22,
1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on
September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction is not the
proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to
inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity
thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore,
be admitted to probate. The preterition mentioned in
Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
"compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to
private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the
direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of
heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator
says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil
Code, that suggests that mere institution of a universal
heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in
the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of
the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his
will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest
and standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591
ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder.
It is therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have
been pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all
of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall he effectual, without prejudice
to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court
of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated
otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be
said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption
by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for
the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and
that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre
(que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion"
Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating
the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-
without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear
terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having
been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been
left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect
of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a
total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed
to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as
executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or
a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any
gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to
receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an
interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code
as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition
of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing
to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except
when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority
(People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v.
Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals,
128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587
[1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD
Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]).
They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of
discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is
founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125
SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated
by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority
is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not
called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v.
Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982];
Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court
of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
(Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the
oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs.
On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court,
induced by practical considerations. The Court said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught
that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we
 might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the
petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal
capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The
Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to
dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as
on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the
respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the
probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It
was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the
reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to
be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the
merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be
intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted
as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private
respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility.
It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility.
The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before
the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v.
Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and
prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are
indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy,
and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the
trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of
Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of
justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where
appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of
Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23,
1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased.
FAUSTO E. GAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for
appellant.
Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure
in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan,
Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the
Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a
holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially in
these words:
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
 Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip,
ay nagsasalaysay na ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan,
Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking mga kamag-anakang
sumusunod:
Vicente Esguerra, Sr.
.............................................
Fausto E. Gan
.........................................................
Rosario E. Gan
.........................................................
Filomena Alto
..........................................................
Beatriz Alto
..............................................................
At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba
panglugar ay aking ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso
D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y magpapagawa ng isang Health
Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa halagang
P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking
pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may
kakulangan man ay bahala na ang aking asawa ang magpuno
upang matupad ang aking kagustuhan.
(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that
the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her
lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon
R. San Jose, Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page
motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents
and due execution by the statements in open court of Felina Esguerra,
Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, whose
testimonies may be summarized as follows:
Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra
mentioned to her first cousin, Vicente Esguerra, her desire to make a will.
She confided however that it would be useless if her husband discovered
or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. Gan, nephew of
Felicidad, who was then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter
5 Bahagi replied it could be done without any witness, provided the document was
entirely in her handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra
lost no time in transmitting the information, and on the strength of it, in
2 Bahagi the morning of November 5, 1951, in her residence at Juan Luna Street,
Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic will substantially
2 Bahagi of the tenor above transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina
Esguerra (daughter of Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the
afternoon of that day, Felicidad was visited by a distant relative, Primitivo
1 Bahagi
Reyes, and she allowed him to read the will in the presence of Felina
Esguerra, who again read it.
1 Bahagi
Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and
Rosario Gan Jimenez, a niece. To these she showed the will, again in the
presence of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third time.
When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T.
Hospital for her last illness, she entrusted the said will, which was
contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later, Ildefonso
Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being afraid of him by
reason of his well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him.
Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap returned the purse to Felina,
only to demand it the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad.
Again, Felina handed it to him but not before she had taken the purse to
the toilet, opened it and read the will for the last time.2
From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been
suffering from heart disease for several years before her death; that she
had been treated by prominent physicians, Dr. Agerico Sison, Dr. Agustin
Liboro and others; that in May 1950 husband and wife journeyed to the
United States wherein for several weeks she was treated for the disease;
that thereafter she felt well and after visiting interesting places, the couple
returned to this country in August 1950. However, her ailment recurred,
she suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the
early morning of the first Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The whole
household was surprised and alarmed, even the teachers of the
Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower floors and of by the Yap
spouses. Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio
arrived at about 8:00 a.m., found the patient hardly breathing, lying in
bed, her head held high by her husband. Injections and oxygen were
administered. Following the doctor's advice the patient stayed in bed, and
did nothing the whole day, her husband and her personal attendant, Mrs.
Bantique, constantly at her side. These two persons swore that Mrs.
Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will, and could have made no will on
that day.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several
reasons, the most important of which were these: (a) if according to his
evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her
husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it in the presence
of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did that witnesses were unnecessary;
(b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was a confidant of the
decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the
former to see and read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the
decedent would have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez
and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely wanted its
contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable
that her purpose being to conceal the will from her husband she would
carry it around, even to the hospital, in her purse which could for one
reason or another be opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that the
husband demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that
the will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it without
destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the will
was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the
oppositor's evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed
such holographic will.
In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the
testimony of the oppositor and of his witnesses in a vigorous effort to
discredit them. It appears that the same arguments, or most of them,
were presented in the motion to reconsider; but they failed to induce the
court a quo to change its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other hand,
aptly answers the criticisms. We deem it unnecessary to go over the
same matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on
the weakness of the opposition but on the strength of the evidence of the
petitioner, who has the burden of proof.
The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills
along with other forms. The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved
August 7, 1901, adopted only one form, thereby repealing the other
forms, including holographic wills.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts.
810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines,
and need not be witnessed."
This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided
for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required
wills to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses
in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets
used and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that
they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee
their truth and authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476) and to
avoid those who have no right to succeed the testator would succeed him
and be benefited with the probate of same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off.
Gaz., 1855). However, formal imperfections may be brushed aside when
authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez vs Yap, 40 Off.
Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be
fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that
purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be
sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three
must testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291;
Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the testimony of such
witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its
opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the
circumstances its due execution.
Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and
veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses;
provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose,
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its
own safeguard, since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be — or
not to be — in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a
holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such
witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses,
(familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary,
expert testimony may be resorted to."
The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of
the holographic will. They may be mistaken in their opinion of the
handwriting, or they may deliberately lie in affirming it is in the testator's
hand. However, the oppositor may present other witnesses who also
know the testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after
comparing the will with other writings or letters of the deceased, have
come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand of
the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such
contradictory testimony may use its own visual sense, and decide in the
face of the document, whether the will submitted to it has indeed been
written by the testator.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of
opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the
only guaranty of authenticity3 — the testator's handwriting — has
disappeared.
Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be
probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and
who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator? How can the
oppositor prove that such document was not in the testator's
handwriting? His witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not
examined it. His experts can not testify, because there is no way to
compare the alleged testament with other documents admittedly, or
proven to be, in the testator's hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be
caught between the upper millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or
the form thereof, and the nether millstone of his inability to prove its
falsity. Again the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but
they may have been shown a faked document, and having no interest to
check the authenticity thereof have taken no pains to examine and
compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in the knowledge
that none could convict them of perjury, because no one could prove that
they have not "been shown" a document which they believed was in the
handwriting of the deceased. Of course, the competency of such perjured
witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could be tested by exhibiting to
them other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased;
but what witness or lawyer would not foresee such a move and prepare
for it? His knowledge of the handwriting established, the witness (or
witnesses) could simply stick to his statement: he has seen and read a
document which he believed was in the deceased's handwriting. And the
court and the oppositor would practically be at the mercy of such witness
(or witnesses) not only as to the execution, but also as to the contents of
the will. Does the law permit such a situation?
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate)
of a lost or destroyed will by secondary — evidence the testimony of
witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not
have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly
made here. (See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830-New Civil Code.)
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the
holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen4 — an implied admission
that such loss or theft renders it useless..
This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and
presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and
require its identity to be established by the three witnesses who depose
that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the
testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will
has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply
presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a
greater degree. It requires that the surviving spouse and the legitimate
ascendants and descendants be summoned so that they may make "any
statement they may desire to submit with respect to the authenticity of
the will." As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually
done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from
knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could
not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they
know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think
the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is
presented to the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the
choice of either complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to
oppose it, if they think it spurious.5 Such purpose is frustrated when the
document is not presented for their examination. If it be argued that such
choice is not essential, because anyway the relatives may oppose, the
answer is that their opposition will be at a distinct disadvantage, and they
have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right
which they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof from
them.
We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document
itself--in the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925,
which denied protocolization or probate to a document containing
testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of the deceased, but
apparently mutilated, the signature and some words having been torn
from it. Even in the face of allegations and testimonial evidence (which
was controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the will.
The aforesaid tribunal declared that, in accordance with the provision of
the Civil Code (Spanish) the will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el
parrafo segundo del articulo 688 del Codigo civil, que para que
sea valido el testamento olografo debera estar escrito todo el y
firmado por testador, con expression del año, mes y dia en que
se otorque, resulta evidente que para la validez y eficacia de
esos testamentos, no basta la demostracion mas o menos
cumplida de que cuando se otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos
requisitos, sino que de la expresada redaccion el precepto legal,
y por el tiempo en que el verbo se emplea, se desprende la
necesidad de que el documento se encuentre en dichas
condiciones en el momento de ser presentado a la Autoridad
competente, para au adveracion y protocolizacion; y como
consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso es affirmar que el de
autos carece de validez y aficacia, por no estarfirmado por el
testador, cualquiera que sea la causa de la falta de firma, y sin
perjuicio de las acciones que puedan ejercitar los perjudicados,
bien para pedir indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la persona
culpable, si la hubiere, o su castigo en via criminal si procediere,
por constituir dicha omision un defecto insubsanable . . . .
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo,
admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.6
PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V,
ley 15--E depues que los herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta
manda, fasta ... annos muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o al juez
fasta VI meses y el obispo o el juez tomen otros tales tres
escritos, que fuesen fechos por su mano daquel que fizo la
manda; e por aquellos escriptos, si semjara la letra de la manda,
sea confirmada la manda. E depues que todo esto fuere
connoscido, el obispo o el juez, o otras testimonios confirmen el
escripto de la manda otra vez, y en esta manera vala la manda.
(Art. 689, Scaevola--Codigo Civil.)
(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with
specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of
the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are
shown his handwriting and signature.7
Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers
the loss of the holographic will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho Civil
Frances, traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V, page 555).
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion
that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will.8
Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are
empowered to adopt this opinion as a Rule of Court for the allowance of
such holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make this Rule decisive
of this controversy, simultaneously with its promulgation. Anyway,
decision of the appeal may rest on the sufficiency, rather the
insufficiency, of the evidence presented by petitioner Fausto E. Gan.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain
why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial
evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the
wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting
itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental
witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses
(four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be
checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day,
the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with
the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the
testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme to
distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on
account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were
admissible9 only one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making
a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the
deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see
and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall
for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and
authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have purposely
destroyed it in an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the
trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And
considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages,
and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned
pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more
objectionable feature — feasibility of forgery — would be added to the
several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman
and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers
of Civil Law.10
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three
subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw,
namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case
of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of
the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be
tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the
handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find
ourselves sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious
circumstances described in the appealed decision, we find it hard to
believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to relatives who
had received nothing from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These
could pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten
to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to
another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her
husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to
do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few
days after the alleged execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a
lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner
is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to
measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.11
Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.
Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RICARDO B. BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by the appellees
Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita
Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following
grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the
deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within
twenty days of the death of the testator as required by
Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did
not contain a disposition of property after death and was
not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it
was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged
copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would
produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509;
and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the
case with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion
was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the
cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition
for the probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely
an instruction as to the management and improvement of
the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B.
Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved
by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss
was denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the order was contrary to law and settled
pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to
which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23,
1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979
and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy
of the holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand
in lieu of the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the
Supreme Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills
the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of
said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged
holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while
Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the
lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the
execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact
that the original of the will could not be located shows to
our mind that the decedent had discarded before his
death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to
the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of
appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on
the ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged
that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A
LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY
A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS
DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or
cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant
to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved.
The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one
Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may
be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are
required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and
no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best
and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic
copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the
case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic
or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979,
denying appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of
the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will
of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO
SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Sison and Aruego for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on
November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in
Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The
value of the estate left by the deceased is more than P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the
Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of
China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a
house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first
marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio,
Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose,
Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria
Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings
No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to
Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was
appointed administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving
widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and
signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay.
This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of
the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the
evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken from
said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the
evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will
and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
further proceedings (63 Phil., 793). In spite of the fact that a commission
from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the
deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938
the probate court denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by
cablegram from China by the surviving widow and dismissed the petition.
In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming
that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late
father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by
the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded
and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China,
Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the
probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit
B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931
(Exhibit N).
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and
his mother Maria Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the
probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the transfer or
assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late
Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez
and Victoria Goño and the subsequent assignment thereof by the
assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico C. Suntay,
for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in
this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and
testament executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the
foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed to
have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China.
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7
February 1938 was no bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or
before the expiration of ten years.
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the
execution and validity of the same be established, and the will is
proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally
destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, nor
unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions
thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the judge, under
the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and
recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh,
an attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez,
who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the
hearing of this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies that
he was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three
sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and
every page thereof in the presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez
and himself and underneath the testator's signature the attesting
witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation clause and
each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of the
other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th, 50th, 55th and
63rd interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting
thereof (answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the contents
of the will written in Spanish although he knew very little of that language
(answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-
interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the lost will was
revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers
to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.);
that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as
those of the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-
8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of Alberto Barretto in
November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd,
and 74th interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and
said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want any correction"
(answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after
checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the
original signed and executed" (answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to
X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the will
(Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers
to the 67th interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not
compare it (check it up) with the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-
20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of
her brother Apolonio Suntay she learned that her father left a will
"because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing
along with him certain document and he told us or he was telling us that it
was the will of our father Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh.
..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948); that she saw her
brother Apolonio Suntay read the document in her presence and of
Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her father of
his estate, to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to Silvino and his
mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose, Jr.
(pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion,
then he turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p.
528, t. s. n., Id.). On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the
part of the will on adjudication to know what was the share of each heir
(pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that she saw the
signature of her father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p.
546, t. s. n., Id.).
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s.
n., hearing of 19 January 1948), before the last postponement of the
hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the De
los Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief
[Exhibit C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he checked
up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A with those on the will placed
in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as
the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio
Teodoro And returned by the latter to the former because they could not
agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the latter's office
straight from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that
brought him to the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in
November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay
that she saw and heard her brother Apolonio Suntay read the will
sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February
1948), must not be true.
Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was
testifying against her own interest, still the fact remains that she did not
read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s.
n., Id.) and saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go
Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her
testimony on cross-examination that she read the part of the will on
adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony in chief that after Apolonio
had read that part of the will he turned over or handed the document to
Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto
Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed, then the part of his
testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B. Suntay to
whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that
"after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had
the original signed and executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time
for correcting the draft of the will, because it must have been corrected
before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must have
been inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on
that occasion. The bringing in for the draft (Exhibit B) on that occasion is
just to fit it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At any rate, all
of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost
will is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned to them from
information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation
of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who
testifies that he read the supposed will or the alleged will of his father and
that the share of the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-thirds of
the estate (p. 229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness
testified to oppose the appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for
the reason that he had acquired the interest of the surviving widow not
only in the estate of her deceased husband but also in the conjugal
property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the
original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the
important point was that he had acquired all the share, participation and
interest of the surviving widow and of the only child by the second
marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his
testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take two-thirds of
the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and the
testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict
legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino,
Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for
the surviving widow and her child Silvino.
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay
placed in the envelope (Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time
of, and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of Anastacio
Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of
the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those
who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor
credible witnesses.
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929
he prepared or drew up two mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's
request, the rough draft of the first will was in his own handwriting, given
to Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after
checking up the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final
draft to Manuel Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and
the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that two
months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the
former asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and child
Silvino; that he had the rough draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449
t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did
not sign as witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from the
typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the handwritten
insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7
435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the first will made up of four
or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three
months after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t.
s. n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the China Banking
Building on Dasmariñas street by Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a
Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on
that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following
words were written: "Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s.
n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was placed inside the envelope
(Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay
and the envelope was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the
attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he
again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later
part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect
condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on the following
Monday Go Toh went to his law office bringing along with him the
envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he
would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.);
that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his house or
in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep
it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s.
n., Id.).
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert
in connection with the complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay
for the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A), corroborates the
testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by
Jose B. Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez
and Go Toh took part as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go
Toh testified before the same assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will
in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said,
quoting his own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope even
though the contract (on fees) was signed. I have to bring that document
to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy,
China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the
laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the
Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the
court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for
the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the
Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed
and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect
as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate
court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or
allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the
execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified
answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the
Consul General of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-
2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because
apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and
make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure
in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be
deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls
are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the
proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the
purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and
that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to
probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of
Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate
matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or
to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure
same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings
in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested
parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence
shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing
in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24
February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such
proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties
and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as
follows:
ORDER:
SEE BELOW
 The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the
interrogated parties, who declare that there are no errors, after
said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the
court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month
of the 35th year of the Republic of China in the Civil Section of
the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
HUANG KUANG CHENG
Clerk of Court
CHIANG TENG HWA
Judge
(Exhibit N-13, p. 89 Folder of Exhibits.).
does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof
cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic
and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot
be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or
allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A.
Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in
New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive,
Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18;
Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament,
bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal
property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In
the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his
children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He
appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will
states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die
under such circumstances that there is not sufficient
evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it
shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate
shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in
accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own
last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will
of her husband. Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under
such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be
presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall
be administered and distributed in all respects, in
accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when
they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed
separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of
the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were
admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and
petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a
petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate
proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the
special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting
primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan,
presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the
issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her
filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond
and took her oath as special administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the
Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in
the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as
beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company then filed a manifestation,
stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of
P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company
passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings
Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel
for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr.,
Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan
and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested
that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were
unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the
interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings
(Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motions
of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983,
asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors
of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or
proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the
wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being
American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and
formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in
accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that
under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband
predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither
distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only
by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York
(Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19,
1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the
proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify,
petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan
and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the
"brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the
probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading
the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the
spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to
"due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of
Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of
the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the
Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment
committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix;
(4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of
attorney, authorized his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of
the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the
proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the
appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3)
that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of
the estate of the deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit
an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the
estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only
heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the
"Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the
proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have
"concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills
but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule
applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the
allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in
Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the
executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary
ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate
came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his
worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5)
that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to
the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and
irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer
(Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982,
petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the
United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that under
Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing
and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of
court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for
appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged
that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the
Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on
April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P.
Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd
[a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped
from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the
estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules
of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the
requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must
be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in
the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special
administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods,
chattels and monies which she had received and to surrender the same
to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the
regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983
decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made
"unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982"
(Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the
proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the
estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The
Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating
that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s Court as
part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982
(Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the
reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as
special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an
inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and
declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana
reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling
whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York.
In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of
succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the
Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the
wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three
witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a
requirement of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the
applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and
testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the
motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her
15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the other order
issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second
order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the
Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable
portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent
provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim
Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued
an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied
probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore
issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February
21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the
inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and
purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on
account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in
New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the
reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the
February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in
the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the
Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion
and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter,
Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort
Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special
administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special
administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order
of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan
spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the
significant probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer
and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses
including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection
with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned
denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents
submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled
abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real
and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that
proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a
competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and
being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the
wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that the documents
did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of
wills (Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further
evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25,
1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that
insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect
and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner
45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence,
respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found
"no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed
petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of
the testator" (Records, p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second
motion for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further
evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that
she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of
the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills"
(Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the
probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the
typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of
one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in
question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate
proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of
the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even
named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go
against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the
proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for
reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932)
(Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out
of time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy
thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a
copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her
motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of
separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband
and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-
378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence
offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the
State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of
the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had
submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the
allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills
of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the
Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New
York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that
Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country
of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature
and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is
duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of
Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk
Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their records
and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7,
1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3",
"F-6" and Exh. "G-3" — "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk
certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the
exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate
General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge
Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of
the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all
proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that
letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan
(Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of
Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate
had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as
alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that
proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4"
and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they
were properly executed, genuine and valid and that the
said instruments were admitted to probate and
established as wills valid to pass real and personal
property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on
the genuineness and authenticity of each other’s
signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of
probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in
their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the
Surrogate Court’s Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings
were terminated on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the
following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New
York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the
will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules
of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for
more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York
laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the
probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the
rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the
matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied
probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view
that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and
therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate
probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal
and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the
rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only
result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA
33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the
testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code
of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan
spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially
the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are
conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As
this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743
[1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very
glaring fact — petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself
an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of
the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is
being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor
General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall
"cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented
for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that
with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it
were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first
time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which
require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to
the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's
claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills.
DECISION
Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall
also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the
will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence
needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see
to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all
notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, G.R. No. 139868 (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in
Petitioner,
Present: the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter,
Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died,
PANGANIBAN, C.J. (Chairperson) leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Richard, who was also designated as executor.[1] The will was
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips
CANDELARIA GUERSEY- as executor due to Richards renunciation of his
DALAYGON, Promulgated: appointment.[2] The court also named Atty. Alonzo
Respondent. June 8, 2006 Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena
& Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.[3]
x---------------------------------------------
- - - - - -x
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
 On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted
to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No.
9625.[4] As administrator of Audreys estate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audreys conjugal share in real estate with
improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park,
Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati
property); (2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash
balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G
Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.[5]
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will,
wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.[6] The will was also
admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann
Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was
likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated
Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha
Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.
Richards will was then submitted for probate
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.[7] Atty.
Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July
24, 1986.[8]
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special
Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle
as heirs of Audrey.[9] Petitioner also filed on October 23,
1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard
being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati
property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48
from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided
interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G
Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.[10]
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved
by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.[11] The
trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the
name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided interest) and
Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G
Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the
Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary
administrator for distribution to the heirs.[12]
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June
23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey and Kyle.[13]
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special
Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati
property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were
allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State
of Maryland, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property subject of the
legacy.[14] Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire undivided interest in
the Makati property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondents opposition,
and in its Order dated December 6, 1991, disapproved the
project of partition insofar as it affects
the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richards
entire undivided interest in the Makatiproperty to
respondent.[15]
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court
of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the annulment of
the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.[16] Respondent
contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the
distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her
will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire
estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly
adjudicated to him, and not merely thereof, and since Richard
left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over
the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati
property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents
allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition before the trial court in
Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the
State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate
succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the
best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be
applied as they would receive their just shares. Petitioner also
alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final
and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision annulling the trial courts Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No.
9625.[17] The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders
of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are
hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of
Audrey ONeill Guersey in favor of the estate of
W. Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and
the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate
of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27, 1999.[19]
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely erred in
not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988
AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 IN THE MATTER
OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE
WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY
GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA,
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR, ARE VALID
AND BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME
FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY
IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN
NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR
HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT
COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR
INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR
OF AUDREY ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO FRAUD,
EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS
EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID
ORDERS.[20]
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that
the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988 can no
longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is
conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved
in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and
in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are
concerned, all matters therein determined, and the same has
already been executed.[21]
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith
in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He
maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of
partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State
of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance
with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on
the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubreys
will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will
be divided.[22]
Respondent argues that petitioners breach of his
fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubreys estate
amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent,
petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express terms of
Aubreys will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of
Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner
in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the
relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any
opposition to the project of partition because she was not a
party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubreys will
bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty.
Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 for the settlement of Richards estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a
timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like
any other judgment in rem.[23]However, in exceptional cases,
a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside
for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.[24]Further, in Ramon v.
Ortuzar,[25] the Court ruled that a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence.[26]
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA
on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law
is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed
under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment
is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was
obtained by extrinsic fraud.[27] For fraud to become a basis for
annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,[28] and
must be brought within four years from the discovery of the
fraud.[29]
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud
as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February
12, 1988and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in
respondents cause and found that petitioners failure to follow
the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of
good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that
under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the
decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have
distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her
will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to
distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws
in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys
adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondents cause of action
had already prescribed because as early as 1984, respondent
was already well aware of the terms of Audreys will,[30] and
the complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the
other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying
that she had no opportunity to question petitioners acts since
she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it
was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in
the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another
counsel to protect her interest.[31]
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences
to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent
act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is
immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of.
Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent
act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed
against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should
be counted from the time of respondents discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of
partition of Richards estate, the opposition thereto, and the
order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.[32] Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed
orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special
Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the
ramifications of petitioners acts. Obviously, respondent had
no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the
annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in
1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court stated that man
in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive
new schemes to fool the unwary.
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning
of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one
the effect of which prevents a party from hearing
a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his
case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but
to the manner in which it was procured so that
there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In
other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the
litigation which is committed outside of the trial of
the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping
him away from court, a false promise of a
compromise; or where the defendant never had
any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat; these and similar cases which show that
there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case are reasons for which a new
suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and
fair hearing.[34]
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is
alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.[35]
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys
estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and
confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable
diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of
that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the
safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the
same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person
of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar
transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his
conduct is to be judged.[36]
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the
distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her
will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be
However, intestate and testamentary
upheld. succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate the national law of the person whose succession
of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the
among others, that at the time of Audreys death, she was
country wherein said property may be found.
residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, (Emphasis supplied)
U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972
was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated
capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and
decedent.
attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was
admitted by the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of
September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the
Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines
Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the
and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
Philippine Embassy.
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, testamentary, or letters of administration with the
will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the
Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit: testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
to such will, so far as such will may operate
property is subject to the law of the country where
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed
it is situated.
of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
 Philippines belonging to persons who are the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner
inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied) is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a big legal
staff and a large library.[39] He had all the legal resources to
determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on
notice of them;[37] however, petitioner, as ancillary
him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his
administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce
fiduciary duties.
in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.[38]

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not,

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in
the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law
evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12,
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is
1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as
the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus,
Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to
the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and
the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This
totally disregarded the terms of Audreys will. The obvious
eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her
result was that there was no fair submission of the case before
full successional right to the Makati property.
the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence
presented.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,[40] the
Court held that when the rule that the negligence or mistake
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws
of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid
was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioners
to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its
protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that
rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of
prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power
Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already
brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in
to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his
responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audreys
estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made
by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom
petitioner believed should equally benefit from
the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the
Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his
duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo
H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes
the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign
law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the
absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter
law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205,
210). In defending his actions in the light of the
foregoing principle, however, it appears that the
defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary
responsibility as ancillary administrator was to
distribute the subject estate in accordance with the
will of Audrey ONeill Guersey. Considering the
principle established under Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship
and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes
without saying that the defendant was also duty-
bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on
the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort
was made to prove the national law of Audrey
ONeill Guersey during the proceedings before the
court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in
distributing the subject estate in accordance with
the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put
his actuations in a different light as indicated in a
portion of his direct examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual
distribution of the estate of Audrey
ONeill Guersey was prompted by defendant
Alonzo H. Anchetas concern that the subject
realty equally benefit the plaintiffs adopted
daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant
Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as
ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be
considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said
defendants position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedents last will, combine
to create a circumstance that is tantamount to
extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo
H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws
of the decedent and to follow the latters last will,
in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues
involved in the case.[41] (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result
of petitioners abject failure to discharge his fiduciary
duties. It does not rest upon petitioners pleasure as to which
law should be made applicable under the
circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus
excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property
through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners
omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to
analyze the legal implications of petitioners omission and it
was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the
same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases
like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide
judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.[42]
The trial court in its Order dated December 6,
1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the
State of Marylandon Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the
Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, all property of a
decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents
law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the
personal representative, who shall hold the legal
title for administration and distribution, while
Section 4-408 expressly provides that unless a
contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of
the testator in the property which is the subject of
the legacy. Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on
the other hand, declares that a personal
representative is a fiduciary and as such he is
under the general duty to settle and distribute the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms
of the will and the estate of decedents law as
expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value
as is reasonable under the circumstances.[43]
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate,
consisting of the following: (1) Audreys conjugal share in
the Makatiproperty; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and
(3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard
upon Audreys death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will,
bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his
rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which
he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the
entire Makati property should have then passed on to
respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the
law of the State of Maryland which allows a legacy to pass to
the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property
which is the subject of the legacy, was sufficiently proven in
Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may
take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling
in Bohanan v. Bohanan.[44] Therein, the Court took judicial
notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the
same.The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of
the case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the
motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal
of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially
Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was
introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein)
counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance).
Again said law was presented by the counsel for
the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit
"B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records,
Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of
the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law
of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the
Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law
having been offered at the hearing of the project of
partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State
of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and
the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately
took note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of
partition of Richards estate, not to mention that petitioner or
any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute
the existence or validity of said law, then Audreys and
Richards estate should be distributed according to their
respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the
entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion
in Santos v. Manarang,[45] wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death.
Its provisions have substantially the same force
and effect in the probate court as if the testator
stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in
the will. That was the special purpose of the law in
the creation of the instrument known as the last
will and testament. Men wished to speak after they
were dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's
having meant just what he said.
 Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in equitably
distributing Audreys estate cannot prevail over Audreys and
Richards wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:[46]
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount
of successional rights, to the decedent's national
Law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.[47]
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey
and Richard Guersey were American citizens who owned real
property in the Philippines, although records do not show
when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935
Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of the
public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines,
and to operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and
entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic
v. Quasha,[48] the Court clarified that the Parity Rights
Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens
and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands
of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization of natural resources of the
Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation
of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against
acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the
1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the
exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession
and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born
citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now
stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution
explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding
title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except
only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made
by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid.[49] In this case, since the Makati property
had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then
whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by
the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential,
as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our
lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision
dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27,
1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties as an official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17091 September 30, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CHUNG LIU,
NGO THE HUA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CHUNG KIAT HUA, LILY CHUNG CHO, BONIFACIO CHUNG SIONG
PEK and CHUNG KA BIO, oppositors-appellees,
CHUNG KIAT, KANG, oppositor-appellant,
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, special administrator.
Lorenzo Sumulong for petitioner-appellant.
Zosimo Rivas for oppositor-appellant Chung Kiat Kang.
Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. for oppositor-appellee Bonifacio Chung Siong
Pek.
Crispin D. Baizas for other oppositors-appellees.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City Branch, Hon. Jesus Perez presiding, appointing Chung Kiat
Hua as administrator of the estate of the deceased Chung Liu in Special
proceeding No. 1552-P of said court.
On December 7, 1957, Ngo The Hua, claiming to be surviving spouse of
the deceased Chung Liu, filed a petition to be appointed administratrix of
the estate of aforementioned deceased. Her petition was opposed Chung
Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Sio Pek and Chung Ka Bio,
all claiming to be children of the deceased Chung Liu by his first wife,
Tan Hua. They claim that Ngo The Hua is morally and physically unfit to
execute the duties of the trust as administratrix, and that she and the
deceased have secured an absolute divorce in Taiwan, both being
Chinese citizens, confirmed a legalized by the Taipei District Court,
Taipei, Taiwan August 25, 1955. In this same opposition they prayed the
Chung Kiat Hua, allegedly the eldest child of the deceased, be appointed
administrator instead. These oppositors prayer was in turn opposed by
Ngo The Hua who claim that the oppositors are not children of Chung
Liu.
On January 13, 1957, Chung Kiat Kang, claiming be a nephew of the
deceased, filed his opposition to the appointment of either Ngo The Hua
or Chung Kiat Hu on the ground that to be appointed they must first prove
their respective relationship to the deceased Chung Li and prayed that he
be appointed administrator.
The petition was heard and evidence presented by both petitioner Ngo
The Hua and the oppositors Chung Kiat Hua, et al. When Chung Kiat
Kang's turn to present his evidence came, he manifested, through his
counsel, that he was waiving his right to present evidence in so far as the
appointment of administrator of the estate is concerned (t.s.n. pp. 3-6,
hearing of July 3, 1958).
On December 2, 1959, after a lengthy hearing, the low court found that
Ngo The Hua and the deceased were validly divorced by the
aforementioned Taipei District Court, and that Chung Kiat Hua, Lily
Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Kiat Bio are children
of the deceased. So it issued the order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as
administrator of the estate of Chung Liu.
From this order, both the petitioner and Chung Kiat Kang appealed. On
May 30, 1961, however, petitioner Ngo The Hua filed a petition to
withdraw her appeal stating that she had entered into an amicable
settlement with the oppositors-appellees. Her petition was granted by this
Court in a resolution dated June 26, 1961.
Hence only the appeal of oppositor Chung Kiat Kang remains for the
consideration of this Court.
Appellant now contends that the lower court erred in passing upon the
validity of the divorce obtained by the petitioner and the deceased and
upon the filiation of the oppositors-appellees, such being a prejudgment
"since it is well-settled that the declaration of heirs shall only take place
after all debts, expenses and taxes have been paid" in accordance with
See. 1, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. The pertinent portion of the section
cited by appellant is as follows:.
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — . .
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration,
the allowances to the widow and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid,
the court . . shall assign the residue of the estate of the Persons
entitled to the same . .
No distribution shall be allowed until payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for . . (Emphasis
supplied).
A cursory reading of the above-quoted section discloses that what the
court is enjoined from doing is the assignment or distribution of the
residue of the deceased's estate before the above-mentioned obligations
chargeable to the estate are first paid. Nowhere from said section may it
be inferred that the court cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the
satisfaction of these obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court
in making the appointment of the administrator did not purport to make a
declaration of heirs.
On the other hand, it is clear from the facts of this case that is was
deemed necessary by the lower court to determine the relationship of the
parties, as advanced by petitioner and the oppositors-appellees, to be
able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the order preference
established in Section 5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. Said section
provides that letters of administration shall be granted to the surviving
spouse the next of kin, or to any principal creditor, in this
order. Oppositors-appellees denied petitioner Ngo The Hua's claim that
she is the surviving spouses of Chung Liu, and petitioner likewise denied
the oppositors-appellees' claim that they are children of the deceased.
Since these applicants were asking for the letter of administration on the
theory that they are preferred according to Section 5 Rule 79 because of
their relationship to the deceased Chu Liu, the lower court necessarily
had to pass first on the truth of their respective claims of relationship to
be able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the
aforementioned order of preference.
Let it be made clear, that what the lower court actual decided and what
we also decide is the relationships between the deceased and the parties
of claiming the right to be appointed his administrator, to determine who
among them is entitled to the administration, not who are his heirs who
are entitled to share in his estate. This issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court in
the case at bar on the relationship of the parties is not a final
determination of such relationships as a basis of distribution.
1awphîl.nèt
Having resolved the issue raised, it is unnecessary to rule on the other
questions raised by the appellant Chun Kiat Rang. It is well-settled that
for a person to be able to intervene in an administration proceeding
concerning the estate of a deceased, it is necessary for him to have
interest in such estate (Sec. 4, Rule 80, Rules of Court Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, 195 ed. P. 382). An interested
party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited
by the estate such as an heir, or one who has a certain claim against the
estate, such as a creditor (Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et al., G.R. No. L-
17759, Dee. 17, 1962; Intestate Estate Julio Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171;
Williams vs. Williams, 11 Ga. 1006, cited in Francisco, Rules of Court,
Vol. IV, 195 ed., p. 411). Appellant Chung Kiat Kang does not claim of to
be a creditor of Chung Liu's estate. Neither is he an heir in accordance
with the Civil Code of the Republic of China (Exh. 28 of Chung Kiat Hua),
the law that applies in this case, Chung Liu being a Chinese citizen (Art.
16, New Civil Code). The appellant not having any interest in Chung Liu's
estate, either as heir or creditor, he cannot be appointed as co-
administrator of the estate, as he now prays.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-34760 September 28, 1973
SERAFIN MEDINA and ROSALIA M. DEL CARMEN, assisted by
DOMINADOR DEL CARMEN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES and BEDA
GONZALES, respondents.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for petitioners.
Jose S. Sarte and Felipe K. Medina for private respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this review by certiorari of the appellate court's resolution dismissing
the petition filed by petitioners challenging the lower court's orders
appointing private respondent Beda Gonzales as special administrator of
the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina, the Court excludes
the said special administrator from interfering in the possession and
enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as "Bitukang Manok" by
petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been
sold, and full payment therefor received, by the estate through Gonzales'
predecessor with the approval of the lower court, which overruled
Gonzales' opposition thereto as an assignee of some heirs of the estate,
and as one personally interested in the purchase of the property for
himself.
The Court's action is based on the established doctrine that a person with
an adverse conflicting interest is unsuitable for the trust reposed in an
administrator of an estate. Respondent Gonzales, whose appeal of the
lower court's order of approval of the sale to the Court of Appeals is
pending, cannot be at the same time an appellant in his personal
capacity opposing the sale of the property and an appellee representing
the estate and upholding the same sale as made by the estate through
Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator with the due approval
and confirmation of the lower court. Since the estate proceedings have
been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court once having
appointed a regular administrator, said court is directed to name a
suitable person as regular administrator charged with the task of
accomplishing the administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable
dispatch.
From the papers submitted with the petition, it appears that as noted by
respondent court of first instance of Zambales, presided by Judge
Augusto M. Amores in an order dated March 6, 1970,1 wherein it
approved and confirmed the deed of sale executed on May 8, 1969 by
then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion of the intestate estate of
the decedent Agustin Medina covering the sale of its property known as
"Bitukang Manok" for P24,000.00 to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, a
daughter-heir of the decedent, the said intestate proceedings have
"already lasted for over ten (10) years now contrary to the spirit of the law
in the settlement of estates the most expeditious way", and the said court
expressed its "desire ... to terminate the proceedings once and for all."
Respondent lower court, through its said order, overruled the opposition
of therein oppositor-heir Uldarico S. Medina and of assignee Beda J.
Gonzales, private respondent herein, who claimed therein "to have an
interest over the estate on the ground that certain heirs have already sold
their shares and/or interest over the same in his favor" as being "without
merit." It found Uldarico's interest as "confined solely to his desire to
partake of whatever share he has in the estate in the same way with that
of the rest of the heirs." It further held that respondent Beda J. Gonzales
"could not ... claim a better right over that of the herein vendee Rosalia
Medina del Carmen in the deed of sale because the said Beda J.
Gonzales is merely subrogated, if at all, to the interests of the heirs
concerned who according to the records, have received more benefits
from the estate even before its distribution as against that of the vendee,
who according to the records has never received anything yet from the
estate."2
In the same order, upon "suggestion and agreement of the parties" which
the lower court "considered to be well taken for the speedy termination of
the instant proceedings," it designated its clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de
Castro, Jr. as "special administrator and to qualify immediately as such in
lieu of special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion."3
No regular administrator to settle the estate once and for all appears to
have ever been appointed by respondent lower court during the period of
over thirteen years that the estate has been pending settlement.
Respondent Gonzales appealed respondent court's order of approval and
confirmation of the sale of the "Bitukang Manok" property as an
interested party-assignee opposed to the sale executed by the estate of
the deceased Agustin Medina through its then special administrator
Demetrio Encarnacion, later replaced by the clerk of court, Atty. Pastor
de Castro, Jr., as above stated, on his assertion that he had bought the
rights of the other heirs of the estate — those of a majority of the heirs,
according to his answer at bar. The appeal is now pending in the Court of
Appeals.4
Almost a year later, in an order dated February 11, 1971, acting on the
motion dated October 5, 1970 of respondent Gonzales for appointment
as regular administrator of the estate, respondent lower court appointed
him "not as a regular administrator but only as special administrator for
the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina" and he qualified as
such upon posting of the bond fixed in the amount of P5,000.00 and
replaced "judicial administrator Pastor de Castro, Jr."5
An urgent motion dated March 22, 1971 to revoke Gonzales' appointment
as special administrator on the ground that "by said order, Beda
Gonzales is now assuming the inconsistent positions of administering the
estate especially the Bitukang Manok property and at the same
time appealing from the order approving the sale of that property only for
the purpose of enabling himself to buy and acquire that property to the
loss and prejudice of the estate contrary to law"6 was denied by
respondent lower court in its order dated July 21, 1971.7
In the same order of July 21, 1971, said court also rejected the petitioner
Rosalia's petition dated May 5, 1971, for the appointment of a regular
administrator as "very urgent and necessary" and proposing that co-
petitioner Serafin Medina, as heir and son and next of kin of the
decedent, who has no adverse interests in his favor and against the
estate and is a qualified and competent resident of Olongapo City be
named as such, holding that:
... considering that whatever rights and interest the heirs
may have over the estate now under administration by
Beda J. Gonzales could be amply protected since the
said special administrator has posted a bond in the
amount of P5,000.00; considering further that there is no
showing that said administrator has been remiss in the
performance of his duties or violated the trust reposed on
him as administrator; and in order not to delay any further
the termination of this proceeding which has lagged long
enough, the Court finds said petition of Serafin Medina to
be without merit and the same is hereby denied and the
appointment of said J. Gonzales as special administrator
is hereby retained.8
Reconsideration having been denied by respondent lower court under its
order of September 28, 1971, petitioners instituted in the Court of
Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction under date of
September 20, 1971, citing respondent Gonzales' conflicting interests as
special administrator and as "interested buyer ... persisting in objecting to
the sale, in his desire to be the buyer (of the Bitukang Manok property)
despite Court approval, thereby causing the estate unnecessary delay
and expense to the prejudice of the other heirs" and his interference with
and collection of the harvests of the said property duly sold to petitioner
Rosalia M. del Carmen, as well as pressing for the appointment instead
of petitioner Serafin Medina, as disinterested heir and next of kin, as
administrator of the estate.9
Respondent court of appeals, however, under its resolution of January 6,
1972, found the "petition insufficient in substance to merit due course"
and ordered the dismissal thereof, on the ground "(1) that it is not
disputed that the lower court has jurisdiction to appoint respondent Beda
J. Gonzales as special administrator; (2) that petitioners merely allege
that the lower court had gravely abused its discretion without any prima
facie showing to this effect: (3) considering further that the lower court
had considered and resolved herein petitioners' objections to respondent
Gonzales' continuation as such administrator, to wit, [quoting the
considerations stated in the lower court's order dated July 21, 1971,
already quoted hereinabove]; considering, finally, that it is well-settled
that the actuations of the trial court should not be disturbed except upon
showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the tribunal, involving whimsical and/or capricious exercise of discretion."
Their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal having failed,
petitioners instituted the present action for review on February 23, 1972.
The Court issued on February 29, 1972 a temporary restraining order
restraining respondent lower court and respondent Gonzales "from
implementing (the lower court's) orders dated February 11, 1971, July 21,
1971 and September 28, 1971 ... and from otherwise interfering in the
possession by the petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen of a property known
as "Bitukang Manok" of the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin
Medina ... and private respondent ... from interfering in the cultivation and
harvests or otherwise disturbing the possession of aforementioned
property by said petitioner." Upon the Court's giving due course to the
petition per its resolution of March 24, 1972, it ordered the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect upon the posting of an
injunction bond of P2,000.00, and such writ was issued on May 29, 1972.
Insofar as the petition assails the appointment of respondent Gonzales
as special administrator giving rise to the anomalous situation "where in
an appealed intestate case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 49439-
R, entitled "Intestate Estate of the Deceased Agustin R. Medina; Pastor
de Castro, Jr. (now Beda Gonzales) Special
Administrator, versus Uldarico Medina and Beda J. Gonzales, Movant's)
the appellate and the appellant are one and the same person," the
petition is manifestly meritorious and must be granted.The sale to Rosalia
of the Bitukang Manok property having been approved and confirmed by
respondent lower court over the personal opposition of said respondent
on March 6, 1970 which approval he appealed to the Court of Appeals,
his subsequent appointment as special administrator of the estate a year
later under respondent lower court's order of February 11, 1971 created a
clear conflict of interest that could cause grave damage and prejudice to
the estate and subject it to unnecessary suits.
With specific reference to the Bitukang Manok property as sold by the
estate through Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator and
confirmed by the lower court, the same has passed to petitioner Rosalia's
ownership and possession since the court's confirmation of the sale
on March 6, 1970 and the estate makes no further claim against the
same but on the contrary has defended the sale and Rosalia's title
thereto as the vendee thereof as against Gonzales' adverse opposition in
the appeal brought by Gonzales in his personal capacity. Yet now, as
complained of by Rosalia, Gonzales by virtue of his appointment, as
special administrator a year later seeks in such other capacity to interfere
with her in the harvests of the property purportedly on behalf of the estate
when in fact he is going against the official stand of the estate
which upholds the sale.
It is readily seen thereby that Gonzales has been placed in an unduly
favored position where he may use his position as special administrator
to favor his personal interests as one interested in the purchase of the
property for himself, although he denies obliquely in his brief such
personal interest with the statement that "there is no evidence or pleading
of record that (he) is interested in the acquisition for himself of the
Bitukang Manok property ... and it is a matter of record that having
acquired the rights and interests of the majority of the heirs, he had
stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, his concern and interest to
protect the estate, as special administrator" 10 — which is to say, to
protect his claimed majority interest in the estate, hence his insistence on
opposing the sale.
Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by him on petitioner Rosalia's as
an heir as well as the other heirs such as petitioner Serafin Medina
because of the further delay (13 years now) in their receiving their
distributive shares of their father's estate (as against their co-heirs who
have sold and assigned their rights and shares in the estate to Gonzales)
as well as to Rosalia as buyer because of Gonzales' interference with her
enjoyment of the property paid for in full by her since 1970.
Hence, the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed
unsuitable and should be removed where his personal interests conflict
with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that
an administrator is a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties
of the estate, 11 and who should be indifferent between the estate and
claimants of the property except to preserve it for due
administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts
with such right and duly. 12
As restated by the Court in Lim vs. Dias-Millares, 13 "(I)n this jurisdiction,
one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when
he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate.".
The Court noted from the questioned order of February 11, 1971 that
respondent Gonzales was designated special administrator in
replacement of the lower court's clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr.,
who had been appointed as such in the earlier order of March 6, 1970.
The Court does not look with favor on such practice of clerks of court or
other court employees being appointed as administrators of estates of
decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity
and impartiality of such clerks of court or other employees so appointed
as administrators in discharging their regular functions may be easily
compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because of the
administrator's fees and compensation payable to them, it is not
inconceivable that self-interest intrudes and consciously or
unconsciously, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and
termination of the proceedings in derogation of the primordial purpose of
the law to strive to have the estate settled expeditiously and promptly so
that the benefits that may flow therefrom may be immediately enjoyed by
the decedent's heirs and beneficiaries. 14 Probate courts are therefore
enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their clerks of court or
other court employees as administrators or receivers of estates or the
like.
On this consideration (the replacement of the clerk of court) and on the
further consideration of the specific and limited powers of special
administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and subsists
only until a regular administrator is duly appointed (since Rule 80, section
1 provides for the appointment of a special administrator as a caretaker
only "when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause") 15 the Court has resolved to allow the
appointment of respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand,
insofar as taking care of the other properties of the estate are concerned,
to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the
estate to petitioner Rosalia del Carmen. (The said property shall pertain
to said petitioner's possession and enjoyment as the vendee thereof and
in the event that the appellate courts find cause to set aside the lower
court's confirmation of the sale in her favor in the pending appeal of
Gonzales in his personal capacity, then shall be the time for the estate
and/or the heirs to reclaim possession of the property upon return to her
of the purchase price paid by her).
The Court has finally noted that while the estate involved is not large and
there seem to be no complicated questions that have impeded its prompt
settlement, and notwithstanding the lower court's avowed desire to
terminate the proceedings once and for all, the said estate proceedings
have been pending now for over thirteen years without the lower
court once having appointed a regular administrator in accordance with
the Rules of Court to take charge of the settlement thereof and the
distribution and partition of the net estate to the heirs entitled thereto.
As time and again stated by the Court, while the provisions of the Rules
of Court may be deemed directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of
the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our
probate law" 16 and "courts of first instance should exert themselves to
close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented,
and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and
administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even
adopt harsher measures." 17
As in the cited jurisprudence, therefore, respondent lower court is
directed to name a suitable person or entity, who is competent and
qualified and doesnot suffer from any proscribed conflict of interest, (and
preferably upon the common agreement of the heirs, to avoid any further
bickerings) as regular administrator charged with the task of
accomplishing and terminating the administration of the estate with the
utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the net
estate among the heirs and persons entitled thereto.
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is
hereby modified and in lieu thereof, judgment is entered allowing the
appointment of respondent Gonzales special administrator to stand,
insofar as taking care temporarily of the other properties of the estate are
concerned, but to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property
previously sold by the estate to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, who is
entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore granted is hereby ordered
liftedexcept as to the portion thereof enjoining private respondent from
interfering in the cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing the
possession of the Bitukang Manok property by petitioner Rosalia M. del
Carmen which is hereby made permanent.
Respondent lower court is ordered to implement the above directive of
this Court to name a suitable person as regular administrator charged
with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of the
estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch and to submit a report of his
action thereon to the Court within thirty (30) days from notice of entry of
this judgment.
Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000]
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE
LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his
Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati,
Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged
executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of
the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of
Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in
the settlement of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases
were consolidated considering that they involve the same
parties and some of the issues raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident
of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will in the
[1]
Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that
he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as
sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate
value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said
will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the
will was annexed to the petition for probate.
[2]
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of
RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition
and allowing the will. The order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order
setting the hearing of the petition on 12
September 1995, at 8:30 oclock in the morning,
copies of which were served to Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 September
1995 attached to the records). When the case was
called for hearing on the date set, no oppositor
appeared nor any written opposition was ever
filed and on motion of petitioner, he was allowed
to adduce his evidence in support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court
and was placed on the witness stand and was
directly examined by the Court through "free
wheeling" questions and answers to give this
Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner when he executed the subject will.
After the examination, the Court is convinced
that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and
not acting on duress, menace and undue influence
or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will
and Testament on his own free and voluntary will
and that he was neither forced nor influenced by
any other person in signing it.
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the
evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime,
executed his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A",
"A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his residence
situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets,
Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and
Testament was signed in the presence of his three
(3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio
Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16",
"A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-
3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and
Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-
13", "A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in
the presence of the testator and in the presence of
each and all of the witnesses signed the said Last
Will and Testament and duly notarized before
Notary Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-
15"); on the actual execution of the Last Will and
Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-
3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de
Santos Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9
Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes Park,
Makati City has been named as sole legatee and
 devisee of petitioners properties, real and
personal, approximately valued at not less than
P2 million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was
designated as executor and to serve as such
without a bond.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the
petitioner has substantially established the
material allegations contained in his petition. The
Last Will and Testament having been executed
and attested as required by law; that testator at
the time of the execution of the will was of sane
mind and/or not mentally incapable to make a
Will; nor was it executed under duress or under
the influence of fear or threats; that it was in
writing and executed in the language known and
understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof
and attested and subscribed by three (3) credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
another; that the testator and all the attesting
witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament
freely and voluntarily and that the testator has
intended that the instrument should be his Will at
the time of affixing his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner
(testator himself) the petition for the allowance of
the Last Will and Testament of Arturo de Santos
is hereby APPROVED and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on
February 26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a
motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of
Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr.,
he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr.
De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the
order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips, the designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for
the issuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61. Later,
however, private respondent moved to withdraw her motion.
This was granted, while petitioner was required to file a
memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said
court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his
intervention.[3]
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13,
1996. On the other hand, private respondent, who earlier
withdrew her motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in
Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same purpose with the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos
of Branch 65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing
her as special administrator of Dr. De Santoss estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 and to set aside the appointment of private
respondent as special administrator. He reiterated that he was
the sole and full blooded nephew and nearest of kin of the
testator; that he came to know of the existence of Sp. Proc. No.
M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still
pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of
the testators estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the
special administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should
be given letters of administration for the estate of Dr. De
Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer
of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it]
is related to the case before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 .
. ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge
Gorospe had denied on August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for
intervention. Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of
Appeals which, in a decision promulgated on February 13,
[4]
1998, upheld the denial of petitioners motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September
4, 1996, returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to
Branch 65 on the ground that there was a pending case
involving the Estate of Decedent Arturo de Santos pending
before said court. The order reads:
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of
Branch 65, this Court, transferring this case to
this Branch 61 on the ground that this case is
related with a case before this Court, let this case
be returned to Branch 65 with the information
that there is no related case involving the
ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE
SANTOS pending before this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE
SANTOS, as petitioner under Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court for the Allowance of his will
during his lifetime docketed as SP. PROC. NO.
M-4223 which was already decided on 16
February 1996 and has become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that
after it became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de
los Reyes Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY,
which was subsequently withdrawn after this
Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the
motion could not be admitted as the subject
matter involves a separate case under Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, and movant withdrew her
motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION
FOR INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223
and this motion was already DENIED in the
order (Branch 61) of 26 August 1996 likewise for
the same grounds that the matter is for a separate
case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court and cannot be included in this case filed
under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that
consolidation of cases must be approved by the
Presiding Judges of the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996, Judge
[5]
Abad Santos appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would
be improper for (Branch 65) to hear and resolve the petition
(Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that the probate
proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus
ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch.
However, he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of
the case "to expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order,
dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V.
Gorospe, Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this
case notwithstanding the fact that said branch
began the probate proceedings of the estate of the
deceased and must therefore continue to exercise
its jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others, until
the entire estate of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed as per Order dated 23
September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial
Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the
petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and
under the concept that the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City is but one court.
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the
Chief justice and the Office of the Court
Administrator, of the Supreme Court; the Hon.
Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita De Los Reyes
Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos
Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners
motion for intervention. Private respondent moved for a
reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court.
She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision setting
[6]
aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not
shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-
4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial
Court - Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to
proceed with the probate proceedings upon its
issuance of an order allowing the will of Dr.
Arturo de Santos
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial
Court - Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction
over the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor
of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of
forum shopping in filing her petition for issuance
of letters testamentary with the Regional Trial
Court - Makati, Branch 65 knowing fully well
that the probate proceedings involving the same
testate estate of the decedent is still pending with
the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch
61.
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in
Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance
of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the
cases of Santiesteban v. Santiesteban and Tagle v.
[7]
Manalo, he argues that the proceedings must continue until
[8]
the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and
legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of
Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could
not lawfully act upon private respondents petition for issuance
of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the
authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. [9]
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the
death of the testator, so much so that, after approving and
allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator. The cases
cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of
the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory
nature of wills.[10]
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a
petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It
provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime,
petition the court having jurisdiction for the
allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court for the
allowance of wills after the testators death shall
govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such
additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for
the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of
the will, either during the lifetime of the testator
or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of
will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in
a will, or any other person interested in the estate,
may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the
will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime,
petition in the court for the allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the
lifetime of testator has been explained by the Code
Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve
either the testamentary capacity of the testator or
the formalities adopted in the execution of wills.
There are relatively few cases concerning the
intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions. It
is far easier for the courts to determine the mental
condition of a testator during his lifetime than
after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue
influence are minimized. Furthermore, if a will
does not comply with the requirements prescribed
by law, the same may be corrected at once. The
probate during the testators life, therefore, will
lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a
 will is probated during the lifetime of the testator,
the only questions that may remain for the courts
to decide after the testators death will refer to the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions.
It is possible, of course, that even when the
testator himself asks for the allowance of the will,
he may be acting under duress or undue
influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime
of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that
he cannot alter or revoke the same before his
death. Should he make a new will, it would also
be allowable on his petition, and if he should die
before he has had a chance to present such
petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the
testators death would be in order. [11]
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on
February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do
except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to
Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis
for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-
Makati that -
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
having begun the probate proceedings of the
estate of the deceased, it continues and shall
continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others. It should be noted that
probate proceedings do not cease upon the
allowance or disallowance of a will but continues
up to such time that the entire estate of the
testator had been partitioned and distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the
lifetime of the testator meant merely that the
partition and distribution of the estate was to be
suspended until the latters death. In other words,
the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary, should have
simply filed a manifestation for the same purpose
in the probate court.[12]
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him
to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of
actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
In Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, it was held: [13]
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly
Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the state," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the
Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have
been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter "existed was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure,
which simply directs the manner in which the
power or authority shall be fully and justly
exercised. There are cases though that if the
power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the
court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. However, this does not
amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Rather, it means that the court may
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that
the judgment may thereby be rendered defective
for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural
law at once raises a strong presumption that it has
nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a
matter of method, of convenience to the
parties.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and
settlement of estates with approximate value of over
P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro
Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under B.P. Blg.
129, as amended. The different branches comprising each
court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
independent of and incompatible with each other. [14]
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the
venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is
concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court
from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the
testator after his death. As held in the leading case of Bacalso
v. Ramolote: [15]
The various branches of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial
District, are a coordinate and co-equal courts, and
the totality of which is only one Court of First
Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court,
not in the judges. And when a case is filed in one
branch, jurisdiction over the case does not attach
to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of
the other branches. Trial may be held or
proceedings continue by and before another
branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section
57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the
Secretary of Justice, the administrative right or
power to apportion the cases among the different
branches, both for the convenience of the parties
and for the coordination of the work by the
different branches of the same court. The
apportionment and distribution of cases does not
involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction, the
 jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in
the Court of First Instance of the province, and
the trials may be held by any branch or judge of
the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City
has jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose
the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private
respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and
creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and
direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to intervene in the
proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court
of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or
legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de
Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the
latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative
of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter
only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has
left a will which has already been probated and
disposes of all his properties the private
respondent can inherit only if the said will is
annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is,
therefore, not direct or immediate.
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a
belated one, having been raised for the first time
only in his reply to the opposition to his motion
to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not
supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a
direct interest in the estate or the will, and the
private respondent has none. Moreover, the
ground cited in the private respondents
opposition, that the petitioner has deliberately
misdeclared the truth worth and value of the
estate, is not relevant to the question of her
competency to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76
of the Rules of Court requires only an allegation
of the probable value and character of the
property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the
settlement of the estate.[16]
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary.
Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any
person interested in a will may state in writing
the grounds why letters testamentary should not
issue to the persons named therein as executors,
or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon
notice, shall pass upon the sufficiency of such
grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be
filed for letters of administration with the will
annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested
person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor, and whose interest is material and direct, not merely
incidental or contingent.[17]
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos,
he cannot be considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has
no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate
by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose
by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor
of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of
his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in
Article 287 of the Civil Code. [18]
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir
who may have been preterited in the testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement
proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the
deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in
his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires
of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v. Pecson: [19]
The choice of his executor is a precious
prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant
of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator
should desire to appoint one of his confidence,
one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in
the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this
right may be considered a curtailment of the right
to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the
trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons
to administer the estate. None of these circumstances is
[20]
present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of
forum shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were still pending.
According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are
founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result
in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for
probate was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the
purpose of authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his
will, the proceedings were terminated.
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary was filed by private respondent, as executor of
the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the purpose of securing August 4, 2009
authority from the Court to administer the estate and put into
effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings
commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the
distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the
persons named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between
the two petitions, nor was the latter filed during the pendency
of the former. There was, consequently, no forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of

the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. x-------------------------------------------------
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855

DECISION
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
PERALTA, J.:
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
NACHURA, and on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
PERALTA, JJ. to set aside the March 13, 1997 Decision[2] and August 27,
1997 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43450.
Promulgated: The facts of the case are as follows:
 On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in Special
Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order[4] granting letters
testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R.
Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as
executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand
E. Marcos.
The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament
of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos to have been duly
executed in accordance with law, the same is
hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO PROBATE.
Upon the filing of a bond in the amount
of P50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued
in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-
Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II,
named executors therein.
Pending the filing of said bond and their oath,
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized
to continue her functions as Special Administrator
of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.
Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and
creditors of the decedent, and to any other
persons having an interest in the estate for them
to lay their claim against the Estate or forever
hold their peace.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
[6]
Reconsideration in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC
Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the
other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion
for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and
that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.
On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a
Compliance stating that he already filed a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996
RTC Order and that he took his oath as named executor of
the will on January 30, 1996.
On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of
Administration[7] to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-
Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September
9, 1994, appointing her as Special Administratrix of the
Marcos Estate.
On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a
Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration issued by the
RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.
[8]
On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the
motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner as well
as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda
Marcos, the penultimate portion of which reads:
Under the Rules, a decedents testamentary
privilege must be accorded utmost respect.
Guided by this legal precept, therefore, in
resolving the two (2) motions at hand, the Court
is constrained to DENY both.
Examining the arguments poised by the movants,
the Court observed that these are but a mere
rehash of issues already raised and passed upon
by the Court.
One has to review the previous orders issued by
the Court in this case, e.g., the orders
dated September 9, 1994, November 25, 1994, as
well as October 3, 1995, to see that even as far
back then, the Court has considered the matter of
competency of the oppositors and of
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as having
been settled.
It cannot be overstressed that the assailed
January 11, 1996 Orders of the Court was arrived
at only after extensive consideration of every
legal facet available on the question of validity of
the Will.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration filed separately
by petitioner Republic and oppositor Imelda R.
Marcos are both DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court,
questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters
testamentary to respondents.
On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a
Resolution referring the petition to the CA, to wit:
xxxx
The special civil action for certiorari as well as all
the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED to
the Court of Appeals for consideration and
adjudication on the merits or any other action as
it may deem appropriate, the latter having
jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the
Case, and this Court having been cited to no
special and important reason for it to take
cognizance of said case in the first
instance.[10] (Emphasis and Underscoring
Supplied)
On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision,[11] dismissing
the referred petition for having taken the wrong mode of
appeal, the pertinent portions of which reads:
Consequently, for having taken the wrong mode
of appeal, the present petition should be
dismissed in accordance with the same Supreme
Court Circular 2-90 which expressly provides
that:
4. Erroneous Appeals An appeal
taken to either the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall
be dismissed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
for review is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[13] which was, however denied by the CA in
a Resolution[14] dated August 27, 1997.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON TECHNICAL
GROUNDS DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT
RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY REFERRING SAID
PETITION FOR A DECISION ON THE MERITS.
II.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENTS IMELDA R.
MARCOS AND FERDINAND R. MARCOS II SHOULD
BE DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS
EXECUTORS.
III.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAVE DENIED AND DISCLAIMED THE VERY
EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS WILL.
IV.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT ITS ORDER OF JANUARY 11,
1996, WHICH ADMITTED THE MARCOS WILL TO
PROBATE AND WHICH DIRECTED THE ISSUANCE
OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY IN SOLIDUM TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS EXECUTORS OF SAID
MARCOS WILL, WAS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF
THE REPUBLIC ALONE.
V.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT BOTH PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED THE
TRANSFER TO THE PHILIPPINES OF THE MARCOS
ASSETS DEPOSITED IN THE SWISS BANKS.[15]
In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting
on the pending unresolved motions before it, issued an
Order[16] which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints as joint
special administrators of the estate of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic
of the Philippines (the Undersecretary of the
Department of Justice whom the Secretary of
Justice will designate for this purpose) and Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R.
 Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is
finally appointed.
SO ORDERED.
The petition is without merit.
When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary
in solidum to respondents were issued by the RTC, petitioner
sought to question them by filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,[17] which was then in
effect, reads:
2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the
Supreme Court. Except in criminal cases where
the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to
reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial
courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court
only by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, this being the clear
intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules
that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be
governed by Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied)
The pertinent portions of Section 17[18] of the Judiciary Act of
1948 read:
The Supreme Court shall further have
exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules
of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts as herein provided, in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order or regulation is in question;
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto;
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue;
(4) All other cases in which only errors or
questions of law are involved: Provided, however,
That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or
jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the
three next preceding paragraphs also involve
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court
of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of
the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed,
modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on
writ of certiorari; and
 (5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of
the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax
Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public
Service Commission, and the Workmens
Compensation Commission.
A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, clearly shows that the
subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of
granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall
within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal
to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the
issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme
Court should take cognizance of the instant case.[19]
Moreover, the Courts pronouncement in Suarez v.
Judge Villarama[20] is instructive:
Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at
the time of the antecedents, provides that an
appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule
is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Moreover, the filing of the case directly
with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine,
direct resort from the lower courts to the
Supreme Court will not be entertained unless
the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in
the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision involving both questions of fact and law
must first be brought before the Court of
Appeals.[21]
Also, in Southern Negros Development Bank v. Court
of Appeals,[22] this Court ruled:
It is incumbent upon private
respondent qua appellants to utilize the correct
mode of appeal of the decisions of trial courts to
the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of
their remedy, they can blame no one but
themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550
[1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. National Labor
Union, 101 Phil. 409 [1957]).
xxxx
Pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90,
which provides that "[a]n appeal taken to either
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by
the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed," the only course of action of the
Court to which an erroneous appeal is made is to
dismiss the same. There is no longer any
 justification for allowing transfers of erroneous
appeals from one court to another (Quesada v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, November 12,
1990, First Division, Minute Resolution).[23]
Based on the foregoing, petitioner cannot deny that
the determination of whether or not respondents should be
disqualified to act as executors is a question of fact. Hence,
the proper remedy was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court.
Petitioner is adamant, however, that notwithstanding the
improper remedy, the CA should not have dismissed therein
petition. Petitioner argues in the wise:
However, as can be seen in the Resolution of
February 5, 1997, (Annex H) this Honorable Court
deemed it more proper to transmit the first
Petition for Review to respondent appellate court
for the reason that:
This Court having been cited to no special and
important reason for it to take cognizance of said
case in the first instance. x x x
It would appear then that even though this
Honorable Court apparently considers the
Republics petition as deserving to be given due
course, it deemed it in the best interest of the
parties concerned if the Court of Appeals would
first take cognizance of said case, thereby
preserving its stance as a court of last resort.
Additionally, this Honorable Court itself plainly
stated that the case under review is:
.REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for
consideration and adjudication on the merits. The
latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this
Court over the case[24]
Petitioners arguments are misplaced. To stress, the February
5, 1997 Resolution reads:
The special civil action for certiorari as well as all
the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED to
the Court of Appeals for consideration and
adjudication on the merits or any other action as
it may deem appropriate, the latter having
jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the
Case, and this Court having been cited to no
special and important reason for it to take
cognizance of said case in the first instance.[25]
 Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the
CA that said resolution gave the CA discretion and latitude to
decide the petition as it may deem proper. The resolution is
clear that the petition was referred to the CA for
consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other
action as it may deem appropriate. Thus, no error can be
attributed to the CA when the action it deemed appropriate
was to dismiss the petition for having availed of an improper
remedy. More importantly, the action of the CA was
sanctioned under Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular 2-90
which provides that an appeal taken to either the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies in Oriental Media,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[26] in which this Court made the
following pronouncements:
In the case at bar, there was no urgency or need
for Oriental to resort to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari for when it learned of the
case and the judgment against it on July 25, 1986,
due to its receipt of a copy of the decision by
default; no execution had as yet been ordered by
the trial court. As aforementioned, Oriental had
still the time and the opportunity to file a motion
for reconsideration, as was actually done. Upon
the denial of its motion for reconsideration in
the first case, or at the latest upon the denial of
its petition for relief from judgment, Oriental
should have appealed. Oriental should have
followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of
Court for
Rules of procedure are intended to
ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of
substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to purpose that substantive
law and adjective law are
contradictory to each other or, as
has often been suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules
should never be permitted if it will
result in prejudice to the substantive
rights of the litigants. This is not
exactly true; the concept is much
misunderstood. As a matter of fact,
the policy of the courts is to give
effect to both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the
just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive
rights is equally guaranteed by due
process whatever the source of such
rights, be it the Constitution itself or
only a statute or a rule of court.[27]
 In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February
5, 1997 Resolution, therein petition offered no important or
special reason for the Court to take cognizance of it at the
first instance. Petitioner offered no plausible reason why it
went straight to this Court when an adequate and proper
remedy was still available. The CA was thus correct that the
remedy that petitioner should have availed of was to file an
appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court which states:
Section 1. Orders of judgments from which
appeals taken. An interested person may appeal
in special proceedings from an order or judgment
rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court, where such order
or judgment:
(a) allows or disallows a will;
Because of the preceding discussion, herein petition
must necessarily fail. However, even if this Court were to set
aside petitioners procedural lapses, a careful review of the
records of the case reveal that herein petition is without
merit.
At the crux of the controversy is a determination of whether
or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors of
the will of Ferdinand Marcos.
Ozeata v. Pecson[28] is instructive:
The choice of his executor is a precious
prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant
of his right to dispose of his property in the manner
he wishes. It is natural that the testator should
desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who
can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the
disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right
may be considered as a curtailment of the right to
dispose. And as the rights granted by will take
effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil
Code of the Philippines), the management of his
estate by the administrator of his choice should be
made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable
objection to his assumption of the trust can be
interposed any longer. It has been held that when
a will has been admitted to probate, it is the
duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to
the person named as executor upon his
application (23 C.J. 1023).
xxxx
The case of In re Erlanger's Estate, 242
N.Y.S. 249, also reiterates the same principle.
The courts have always respected the right
to which a testator enjoys to determine who is
 most suitable to settle his testamentary affairs,
and his solemn selection should not lightly be
disregarded. After the admission of a will to
probate, the courts will not name a better
executor for the testator nor disqualify, by a
judicial veto, the widow or friend or other
person selected in the will, except upon strict
proof of the statutory grounds of incompetency.
Matter of Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 387, 393, 114
N.E. 854. x x x[29]
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who
are incompetent to serve as executors, to wit:
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as
executors or administrators. No person is
competent to serve as executor or administrator
who:
xxxx
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute
the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding
or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis
Supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition
to the grant of letters testamentary to respondents,
specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity,
and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral
turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been
convicted of a number of cases[30] and, hence, should be
characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with
questionable integrity.[31]
The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made
the following findings:
However, except for petitioner Republics
allegation of want of integrity on the part of
Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos and
Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors
in the last will and testament, so as to render
them incompetent to serve as executors, the
Court sees at this time, no evidence on record,
oral or documentary, to substantiate and
support the said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)
Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an
appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an
executor or administrator unless positive error or gross
abuse of discretion is shown.[32] The Rules of Court gives the
lower court the duty and discretion to determine whether in
its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The
sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be
determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the
first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the
administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules
of orders of the court.[33]
Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this
Court must evaluate the evidence presented or alleged by
petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification.
However, after a painstaking review of the records and
evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed
no error or gross abuse of discretion when it ruled that
petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation.
Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two
cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have already been
reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No.
17453 was reversed by this Court in Dans, Jr. v.
People.[34] Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No.
17450 was reversed by this Court in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan.[35] Hence, the so-called convictions against
respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her
disqualification to serve as an executor.
On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent
Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges for violation of
Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four
charges for violation of Section 50 (non-payment of
deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1977 (NIRC).
It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No.
18569,[36] the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II
of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and
sustained his conviction for all the four charges for violation
of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only
ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to
file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by
petitioner,[37] said decision is still pending appeal.
Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has
appealed his conviction relating to four violations of Section
45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to
disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of the will of
his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that
his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient
to disqualify him as the failure to file an income tax return is
not a crime involving moral turpitude.
In Villaber v. Commision on Elections,[38] this Court held:
 As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we
have consistently adopted the definition in
Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman,
or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals."
In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude"
is considered as encompassing "everything which
is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good
morals."
xxxx
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs.
Commission on Elections that "not every criminal
act involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to
what crime involves moral turpitude is for the
Supreme Court to determine."[39]
Moreover, In De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces:[40]
Indeed, it is well-settled that
"embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling
are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as
a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an
element are looked on as involving moral
turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).
The failure to file an income tax return is not a crime
involving moral turpitude as the mere omission is already a
violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of
the individual. This conclusion is supported by the provisions
of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions which show
that with regard to the filing of an income tax return, the
NIRC considers three distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2)
a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3) failure
to file a return.
The same is illustrated in Section 51(b) of the NIRC which
reads:
(b) Assessment and payment of deficiency tax xxx
In case a person fails to make and file a
return or list at the time prescribed by
law, or makes willfully or otherwise, false or
fraudulent return or list x x x. (Emphasis
Supplied)
 namely, "falsity," "fraud" and
"omission." (Emphasis Supplied)
[42]
Likewise, in Aznar v. Court of Tax Appeals,[41] this
Court observed:

Applying the foregoing considerations to the case at

bar, the filing of a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax
To our minds we can dispense with these
is a crime involving moral turpitude as it entails willfulness
controversial arguments on facts, although we do
not deny that the findings of facts by the Court of
and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual. The same,
Tax Appeals, supported as they are by very however, cannot be said for failure to file a return where the
substantial evidence, carry great weight, by mere omission already constitutes a violation. Thus, this
resorting to a proper interpretation of Section Court holds that even if the conviction of respondent Marcos
332 of the NIRC. We believe that the proper and II is affirmed, the same not being a crime involving moral
reasonable interpretation of said provision turpitude cannot serve as a ground for his disqualification.
should be that in the three different cases of (1)
false return, (2) fraudulent return with intent to
evade tax, (3) failure to file a return, the tax may
Anent the third error raised by petitioner, the same
be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the
has no merit.
collection of such tax may be begun without
assessment, at any time within ten years after the
Petitioner contends that respondents denied the
discovery of the (1) falsity, (2) fraud, and (3)
existence of the will, and are, therefore, estopped from
omission. Our stand that the law should be
claiming to be the rightful executors thereof. Petitioner
interpreted to mean a separation of the three
further claims that said actions clearly show that
different situations of false return, fraudulent
respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as
return with intent to evade tax, and failure to file
officers of the court.
a return is strengthened immeasurably by the
last portion of the provision which segregates
the situations into three different classes,
 This Court does not agree with the posture taken by
petitioner, and instead, accepts the explanation given by
respondents, to wit:
Respondents opposed the petition for
probate not because they are disclaiming the
existence of the will, but because of certain legal
grounds, to wit: (a) petitioner does not have the
requisite interest to institute it; (b) the original
copy of the will was not attached to the petition
for probate as required by the rules; and (c) the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
is not qualified to be appointed as administrator
of the estate.[43]
Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their
opposition, respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel as
they merely acted within their rights when they put in issue
legal grounds in opposing the probate proceedings. More
importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled by
the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were
fit to serve as executors notwithstanding their earlier
opposition. Again, in the absence of palpable error or gross
abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the
RTCs discretion.
As for the remaining errors assigned by petitioner, the
same are bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that respondents have strongly
objected to the transfer to the Philippines of the Marcos
assets deposited in the Swiss Banks[44] and thus the same
should serve as a ground for their disqualification to act as
executors. This Court does not agree. In the first place, the
same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve
scant consideration. Time and again, this Court has stressed
that this Court is a court of law and not a court of public
opinion. Moreover, petitioner had already raised the same
argument in its motion for partial reconsideration before the
RTC. Said court, however, still did not find the same as a
sufficient ground to disqualify respondents. Again, in the
absence of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this
Court will not interfere with the RTCs discretion.
Lastly, petitioner argues that the assailed RTC Orders
were based solely on their own evidence and that
respondents offered no evidence to show that they were
qualified to serve as executors.[45] It is basic that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.[46] Consequently, it was the
burden of petitioner (not respondents) to substantiate the
grounds upon which it claims that respondents should be
disqualified to serve as executors, and having failed in doing
so, its petition must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 13, 1997
Decision and August 27, 1997 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156,
acting as a probate court in Special Proceeding No. 10279, is
hereby ORDERED to issue letters testamentary,
in solidum, to Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand
Marcos II.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10560 March 24, 1916
In the matter of the administration of the estate of Tan Po Pic,
deceased. MARTA TORRES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUAN L. JAVIER, as administrator of the estate of Tan Po Pic,
deceased, respondent-appellee.
Lucas Paredes for appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal in proceeding to appoint an administrator of the estate
of Tan Po Pic, deceased. The trial court refused to appoint Marta Torres
who claimed to be the lawful wife of the deceased, and, instead,
appointed Juan L. Javier administrator. The appeal is taken by Marta
Torres from that order of appointment.
It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po
Pic, deceased, Marta Torres and a Chinese woman named Yu Teng
New. Marta Torres objected to the appointment of any one except
herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman,
opposed the appointment of Marta Torres. The probate court being
unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased,
appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator.
We are of the opinion that the decision of the probate court is so far
correct that it must be affirmed. Section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure requires that letters of administration should be granted, first,
to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other relatives in the order
named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected
by them be unsuitable, the administration may be granted to some other
person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if there is no
such creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go
to such person as the court may appoint.
The first error assigned is that the court erred in allowing Tan Y. Soc to
appear in the proceeding. It appears that Tan Y. Soc was appointed
administrator of the said Tan Po Pic, deceased, the Court of First
Instance of Manila under the misapprehension that Tan Po Pic was a
resident of the city of Manila at the time of his death. After it ad been
ascertained that the deceased was a resident of the Province of Rizal,
the Court of First Instance of Manila transferred the case to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. In that court, as we have already seen, the
appointment by the Court of First Instance of Manila was disregarded the
proceedings were begun for the appointment of an administrator by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal. Tan Y. Soc and Juan Cailles Tan Poo
appeared in those proceedings, apparently representing the interests of
Yu Teng New, the alleged Chinese wife of the deceased. Messrs.
Crossfield & O'Brien, attorneys for the appellee in this case, appeared for
the alleged Chinese wife and acted in conjunction with Tan Y. Soc and
Juan Cailles Tan Poo in protecting her interests.
The second error assigned is that the court erred in taking into
consideration the claim that Tan Po Pic, deceased, had a Chinese wife in
China. It must be remembered that the probate court did not find as a fact
that there was a wife in China; nor does his appointment of a third person
determine the fact of the existence of another wife in China. The court
considered the facts and circumstances as they were presented in the
proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all
concerned to appoint as administrator a disinterested third person,
particularly in view of the fact that there was likely to be litigation between
Marta Torres and the Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and
entitled to an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic. We do
not find the errors assigned sufficient to warrant any action on the part of
this court.
The third error assigned is to the effect that the trial court erred in not
finding that Marta Torres was the lawful wife of the deceased Tan Po Pic.
We do not believe the court erred in this respect. The court had a right in
view of the controversy between the women to name a disinterested third
person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be
settled in the administration proceedings at the proper time.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-46134 April 18, 1939
In the Matter of the Intestate of Proceso de Guzman.
NICOLASA DE GUZMAN, applicant-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA LIMCOLIOC, oppositor-appellant.
Camus and Zaballa for appellant.
Arsenio Santos for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a will. The
deceased was first married to Agatona Santos, with whom he had four
children, named Nicolasa, Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa. After Agatona's
death, the deceased contracted a second marriage with Angela
Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child.
On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicial administratrix of
the properties of the deceased Proceso de Guzman. On the 8th of the
same month of January, 1937, Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased,
asked that this appointment be set aside and that she had named
administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the widow.
The court denied this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
From these resolutions, Angela appealed.
In this instance the appellant contends that the trial court erred in not
appointing her administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de
Guzman and in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix
without first setting the case for hearing.
The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as such administrator. This is the same
consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the
preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon
the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as
a partner in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by
law is not absolute, if there are other reasons justifying the appointment
of an administrator other than surviving spouse. If the interest in the
estate is what principally determines the preference in the appointment of
an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if, under the
circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has
more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the preference
established in the latter's favor becomes untenable.
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her appointment alleges
that during the marital life of the deceased with his first wife Agatona
Santos, both, through their mutual labor, acquired all the properties left
by the deceased, not having acquired any property during his second
marriage with Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in mind.
It is true that the case was not heard for the purpose of establishing these
allegations, but when Angela asked for the reconsideration of the
appointment of Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations and merely
stated that they do not justify her appointment as administratrix. For
failure of Angela to deny these allegations, thus taking them for granted,
the court was justified in considering them when it denied the
reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the appointment of
Nicolasa.
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired
during his marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them
Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now widow, Angela
Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion
equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received no
betterment.
The appealed decision is affirmed, with costs to the appellant. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-5236 May 25, 1953
Intestate estate of the deceased Luis Morales, JOSE
TORRES, petitioner,
PEDRO DE JESUS, administrator-appelle,
vs.
HERMENEGILDA SICAT VDA. DE MORALES, oppositor-appellant.
Filemon Cajator for appellant.
Aganon & Aganon for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
On August 25, 1950, Luis Morales, married to Hermenegilda Sicat, died
in the municipality of Tarlac, Tarlac Seven days later, Jose Torres
alleging to be a creditor of the conjugal partnership commenced this
special proceeding in the Tarlac court petitioning for the issuance of letter
of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus, for the purpose of
settling the estate of the deceased.
Twelve days afterwards the widow voiced her opposition, and claimed
preference to be appointed as administratrix. She said the only close
relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate minor children, besides
herself.
The petitioner presented evidence. The oppositor submitted none. Then
the trial judge, disregarding the preference established by law for the
surviving widow, entered on August 16, 1951 an order appointing Atty.
Pedro B. De Jesus as administrator.
The widow appealed on time, and argued several assignments of error
revolving around the principal issue whether this appointment should be
upheld, ignoring the surviving widows preferential right.
The order making the appointment is undoubtedly appealable. (Section 1,
Rule 105, Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc Suy, 8 Phil., 594, Moran, Comments,
1952 ed., Vol. 2, p. 592.)
Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies
intestate, administration should be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or nect
of kin, or both, . . . ;
(b) if such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, . . . it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
The order of preference provided in this section is founded on the
assumption that the persons preferred are suitable. If they are not, the
court may entirely disregard the preference thus provided. This is the
reason for the rule that in the selection of an administrator courts may
exercise discretion, and, as stated elsewhere, the person appearing in
the order of preference may not be appointed where he appears to be
unsuitable for the trust, he having an adverse interest or is hostile to the
interested parties to such an extent as to make his selection inadvisable.
But, of course, the order of preference may be disregarded only when the
reasons therefor are positive and clear." (Moran, Comments, 1952 ed.,
Vol. 2, p. 387.)
The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But he
expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying in effect:
"Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of the conjugal
assets; therefore the interest of the creditors deserves paramount
consideration. Now inasmuch as the widow has shown hostility to the
creditors by openly disputing their credits, she is therefore unsuitable, for
having adverse interests." He reasoned from the above-quoted statement
of principles and others, particularly Sioca vs. Garcia, 44 Phil., 711:
A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights
of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of a
deceased person; but if the person enjoying such preferential
rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another person.
Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate of such an extent as to render the
appointment inadvisable.
"The surviving widow" the trial judge stated, "has always consistently
refused to recognize the credits" and manifested her determination to
"resist the claims of creditors."
In our opinion it is a sound juridical principle that the administrator should
not adopt attitudes nor take steps inimical to the interests of the creditors.
The administration of the intestate is undertaken for the benefit of both
the heirs and the creditors. but by creditors we mean those declared to
be so in appropriate proceedings. Before their credits are fully
established they are not "creditors" within the purview of the above
principle. So it is not improper — it is even proper — for the administrator
or whoever is proposed for appointment as such, to oppose, or to require
competent proof of, claims advanced against the estate. "The propriety of
contesting particular claims must frequently be left largely to his
discretion and no presumption of bad faith or misconduct will be made
against him." (34 C. J. S., p. 259.)
At the hearing of the petition for the appointment of administrator, this
widow practically did nothing more than to inform the alleged creditors,
"prove your credit before I honor it." That is not necessarily dishonest nor
contrary to real creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors,
because she did not deny the estate's liability to the People's Bank, she
could not strictly be considered hostile to the creditors. Had she
acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward with a claim,
regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even harmful, both to the
heirs and the actual creditors.
Under the rules (Rule 87) creditors; claims may be filed, and considered,
only after the regular administrator has been appointed. Hence, in
selecting the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord
priority treatment to the interests of those whose credits were in dispute.
And counsel for herein appellant did well in opposing the presentation of
evidence of the objected credits at the hearing, arguing in part,
. . . the time has not yet arrived when this court can even
entertain the presentation of those exhibits because the stage of
presenting claims has not yet arrived. Consequently, this court
can not even receive as evidence the said documents as
evidence of indebtedness, because if those evidence will be
accepted then we will be in a position to rebut them and to enter
into actual trial to show that they are not really evidence of
indebtedness, and in that case we will not terminate because
then we will be contending as to whether those were really
executed or really contracted. . . .
On the other hand, the appealed order conceding that the evidence
"showed clearly that the surviving widow is fully competent in a high
degree to administer the intestate of her deceased husband", plainly
indicates that except for her supposed hostility to creditors she was
suitable for the trust. Consequently, having found that her attitude did not
per se constitute antagonism to the creditors, we must necessarily
declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as administratrix
under Rule 79.
Wherefore, the questioned order appointing Atty. Pedro B. De Jesus is
annulled, and one will be entered requiring the issuance by the court a
quo of letters of administration to the widow appellant subject to such
terms and conditions as are appropriate under the Rules. Costs against
the appellee.
G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched
imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We
issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need
to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No.
183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of
administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to
be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination
and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according
to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons
with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4
June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay
(Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren,
including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren,
including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child,
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared
from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate
grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s
parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her
paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases,
including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I.
Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his
wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as
null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel
Cojuangco on the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the
Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide
case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he
continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental
aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves
manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time,
until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist
(sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the
remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was
effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in.
This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article
85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes
after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew
about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff
continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint
add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the
patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and
Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita,
Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile
Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their
prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently
reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent
Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and
her siblings stress and anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death,
Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1)
as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed
administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference
in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been
alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the
enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention
the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the
death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties,
and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s
estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was
grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties
are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of
administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to
the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as
a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void.
However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that
Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as
opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil
Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in
the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer
the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration
issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-
Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered
a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and
the Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of ₱ 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees,
and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration
be issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III,
if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is
hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor
upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱
200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set
aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as
co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in
Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,
and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of
the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal
partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still
commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and
unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share
in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree
from Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of
administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code
must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated
adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve
to become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild
and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III,
not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to
justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations
since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001
emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of
preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no
basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions
to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as
between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of
the decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his
demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should
likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as
a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice
and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of
preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of
preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next
of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been
reinforced in jurisprudence.8
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over
the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes
into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those
who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration
of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the
rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in
the administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving
spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or community property
forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her
share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment
of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again
refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically
states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to
Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than
one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested
therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment
of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where
the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives
to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;17 and when a
person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment
of special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the
probate of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we
recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal
heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be
excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and
equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory
heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and
intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the
management of the decedent’s estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that
"inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and
that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any
hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v.
Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we
drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio
Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and
Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has
been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally
said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more
preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among
members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to
be preferred.’" (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court,
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio
Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the
nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over
the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel
Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6
of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are
Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both
interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the
legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as
regular administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving
spouse who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v.
Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment
as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility
to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of
heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to
set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-
administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of
the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the
evidence weighed by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in
his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early part of his
administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias,
Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales,
Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the
assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish
an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special
co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of
squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the
authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or
more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the
probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting
among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon
factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs
which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court
ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the
applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the
will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection
during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower
court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one
special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the
lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of
another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of
Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide
latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to
compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest
from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests
among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation
of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into account only
to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to
the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the
decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered
opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The
special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held
that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the
proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good
or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more
critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals
we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as
regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we
counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to
justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and
Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and
moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to
the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by
respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory
character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters
of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of
preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and
requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It
would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously
set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and
sufficient reason therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the
legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is
preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of
"next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute
of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such
that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an
heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters
of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate
court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and
passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco
Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of,
and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-
administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-
administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of
preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of
the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof.
We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate
to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-
administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor
adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference
set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted
nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of
the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely
to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the
attendant circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of
this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater
interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of
preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They
compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between
Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back
from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can
be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility
of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and
Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in
prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement
thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of
Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and
has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s
demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator
thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an
unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that
after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in
2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has
actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the
following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a
complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed
therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of
land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor
vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section
1,36paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against
Federico’s settlement of the decedent’s estate which adjudicated
to himself a number of properties properly belonging to said
estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a
declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or
heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to
respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14,
2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of
the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to
different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay
himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of
falsified documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in
assuming and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s
estate:
1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as
administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had
vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office, arguing
that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not
among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which
may be immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to
Isabel’s vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as
administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the
Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in
the nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy
process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it cannot
constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s
properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where
Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and
testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44
of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a
possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the
blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature
thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of
a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s
accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the
inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he
claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as
administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and
complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed
partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two
occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs,
herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and
executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the
decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any.
This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission
and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his
unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to
those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes
1aw p++i1
highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III,
the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and
Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their
grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s
estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein
respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a
preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we
here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his
interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we
mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested
persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or
intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of
evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of
the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons
interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the
persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate"
to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of
the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy
found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or
administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an
executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court,
or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes
insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the
court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the
remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone,
unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no
remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to
any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial
restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the
decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the
curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to
refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the
presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico,
considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good
law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although
the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the
deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the
proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate
which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any
of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental
Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which
issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the
operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional
and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its
Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio,
acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court:
one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special
Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the
Supreme Court in Manila.47
For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in
Baguio is not a different division created by the Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16
June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a
different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on
13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of
decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents
subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. – Motions for
reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and
all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be
acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who
participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion
for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through
raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of
the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court
who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed
resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010
is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is
likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision
or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is
disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion
for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through
raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired
Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace
the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle

from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special
Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the
Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the
case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be
acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of
the Division to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of

the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted
upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other
Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said
pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change

in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48