Statcon Cases (Escra)

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450 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Maceren
*
No. L-32166. October 18, 1977.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN,

CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES,
NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
Filling; Jurisdiction; Appeals; An offense punishable with a fine up to P500.00 falls under the concurrent
jurisdiction of a provincial capital town court and the Court of First Instance. The order of the former is
directly appealable to the Supreme Court.—It is obvious that the crime of electro fishing, which is punishable
with a fine up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of
First Instance. And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial
capital, the order of dismissal rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to this Court, not
the Court of First Instance of Laguna. It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court’s order of dismissal is void for lack of
jurisdiction. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court.
Fishing; Administrative law; Fishery Adm. Order No. 84 penalizing electro fishing is null and void
because the Fishery Laws under which it was issued (Act 4003 and R.A. 3512) did not expressly prohibit
electro fishing.—We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Law, Act No. 4003, and under the law
creating the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
* SECOND DIVISION.
451
VOL. 79, 451

OCTOBER 18,
1977
People vs. Maceren
Same; Same; Lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare what act
constitute a criminal offense.—The law making body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
Same; Same; Electro fishing is now punishable by virtue of P.D. 704.—However, at present, there is no
more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b456a07b8e5d7fd8003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/11
merely by executive regulation because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and consolidation of
all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G.
4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.
Same; Same; An administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not amend an act of
the legislature.—Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provision. By such relations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. x x x The rule-making power
must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Same; Same; In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it must clearly appear that the
order falls within the scope of the authority conferred by law.—A penal statute is strictly construed. While an
administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted,
that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can
have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. x x
x In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one
which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be
scrutinized with special care.
452
452 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Maceren
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Maceren, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.
Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted
to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by “using their own motor
banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray
or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as ‘senso’ with a somewhat webbed
copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was
attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru
electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its currect reach, to the detriment and
prejudice of the populace” (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No.
SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No.
5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it
is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower
court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and
judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
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18, 1977
People vs. Maceren
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits “the use of
any obnoxious or poisonous substance” in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance
in fishing with a fine of not less than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish “electro fishing.”
Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon
the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is
quoted below:
“SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
“Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4(h) of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules
and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are hereby
promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.
“SECTION 1.—Definition.—Words and terms used in this Order shall be construed as follows:
“(a) ‘Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines’ includes all waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, as defined in the treaties between the United States and Spain, dated respectively the
tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred.
For the purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.
“(b) Electro fishing.—Electro Fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. The
equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from
any available source of electric current.
“(c) ‘Persons’ includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
“(d) ‘Fish’ includes other aquatic products.
“SEC. 2.—Prohibition.—It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by
the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters except for research, educational and
scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources which shall be carried at all times.
“SEC. 3.—Penalty.—Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order shall subject the
offender to a fine of not
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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Maceren
exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00) or imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) months or both at the
discretion of the Court.
“SEC. 4.—Repealing Provisions.—All administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.
“SEC. 5.—Effectivity.—This Administrative Order shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in
the Official Gazette.”
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation
of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2
of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water
fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase “in any portion of the Philippine waters”, found in section 2, was changed by
the amendatory order to read as follows: “in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as
rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water.”
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is
punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides
that any other violation of that law “or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.”
That assumption is incorrect because section 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84
imposes a fine of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which
amount exceeds the maximum fine of P200 fixed in section 83. It seems that the Department
Secretary and the Commissioner of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for electro fishing,
which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not identical to
the light penalty imposed in section 83.
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the lighter penalty prescribed in section 83, then
the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court
(Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22, 1976, 73 SCRA 23).
We have discussed this preliminary point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that
the crime of electro fishing, which is punishable with a fine up to P500, falls within
the concurrent
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18, 1977
People vs. Maceren
original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First Instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-
40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial
capital, the order of dismissal rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the
Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the
Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
It results that the Court of First Intance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Its order affirming the municipal court’s order of dismissal is void for lack of jurisdiction. This
appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs.
Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not
issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by
means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as
already stated, the penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is
penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the
Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the
Fisheries Law and the regulations promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and
regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the
development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy
to encourage, promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4)
section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that “any other violation of” the Fisheries Law or
of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder “shall subject the offender to a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court.”
As already pointed out above, the prosecution’s reference to section 83 is out of place because
the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative Order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty
fixed in section 83.
456
456 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Maceren
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission,
Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2)
unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine mollusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6)
other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of
“other violations” because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next
lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section
76, and is not the same as the penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations fixed in
section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, citing
11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 1132).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban
against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the
impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters.
That circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro
fishing.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the
Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized
457

18, 1977
People vs. Maceren
merely by executive regulation because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and
consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated
on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water
areas.
That decree provides:
“SEC. 33.—Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products.—It shall be unlawful
for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/ aquatic
products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of
electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: x x x.”
The decree repealed Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586,
Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all Decrees, Acts, Executive Orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a dear
recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission
that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1(c) of Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for in the old Fisheries Law, is now found
in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the decree penalizes electro fishing by
“imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years”, a punishment which is more severe than the
penalty of a fine of not exceeding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed
in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies
and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of
Natural Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he exceeded his authority in
penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex
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ANNOTATED
People vs. Maceren
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to
the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs.
Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a
particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle
of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers.
Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation” calculated to promote the public interest
are necessary because of “the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects
of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law” (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended.
(U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress
(Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-
25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax
Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of
Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar vs.
Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
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18, 1977
People vs. Maceren
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making
powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries Law provides that the Secretary “shall from time to time issue
instructions, orders, and regulations consistent” with that law, “as may be necessary and proper
to carry into effect the provisions thereof.” That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural
Resources by section 7 of the Revised Fisheries Law, Presidential Decree No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Commissioner of Fisheries “to prepare and
execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms,
instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose” of that enactment “and for the
development of fisheries.”
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “the Department Head shall
have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulations, orders,
circulars, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, necessary to regulate the
proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and
dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws
relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders
shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law.”
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the
force of law (Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729,
733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L-20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316).
As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite
that he should not transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power;
otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a
surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that “administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.”
As noted by Justice Fernando, “except for constitutional officials who can trace their
competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied
upon a grant of
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ANNOTATED
People vs. Maceren
power before he can exercise it.” “department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority
conferred by statute.” (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236,
August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8).
“Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because
statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out
the taw are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this
sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create
new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.” The rule or regulation should be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said
law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra,promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the
attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the
importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement
so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the
government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes
an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the
law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute
a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs.
Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
It has been held that “to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is
a power vested exclusively in the
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People vs. Maceren
legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency” (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p.
938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with
the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not
expressly punish electro fishing.
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section
28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law.
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and
under the said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands
and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations
authorities of the United States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which
permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval
authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 45 of the
Federal Penal Code.
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite
for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the
Secretary within three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from
fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the
military and naval authorities concerned.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order,
the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary “is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a
power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved” to the
lawmaking body. “Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred
upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does
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People vs. Maceren
not have, and therefore” the said provision “is null and void and without effect”. Hence, the
charge against Santos was dismissed.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make
rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be
confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the
administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.
(Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 SE 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the
authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, 5 Wash. 2nd 322;
105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the
order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body,
and the order will be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles, supra).
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission “to adopt,
promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or
prohibiting the taking of the various classes of game.”
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that “it shall be unlawful to
offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing
or displaying of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof.”
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-dollar cash prize to
the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open season for hunting such game
animals. For that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule promulgated by the State Game
Commission.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute
penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game,
it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board
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Entienza vs. Laya
to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case
is similar to this case.
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Antonio, JJ., did not take part.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Decision set aside and order affirmed.
Notes.—The Supreme Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in all fishpond permits
issued by the Bureau of Fisheries of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, there
is the condition that such permit does not authorize the permittee to interfere with any prior
claim by settlement or occupancy within the areas granted to him until the consent of the
occupant or settler is first had and obtained or until such claim shall have been legally
extinguished. (Republic vs. De los Angeles,44 SCRA 255).
The existence of the impediment in the grant of a fishpond permit must be reckoned at the
time of the grant thereof, not at the time the application was filed. (Nera vs. Titong, Jr.,56 SCRA
40).
Governmental compromise with violations of the Fisheries Act cannot be had after the
criminal action had already been instituted. (Roldan vs. Arca,65 SCRA 336).
——o0o—
90 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Dacuycuy
*
G.R. No. 45127. May 5, 1989.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte,

petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO,
SEGUNDINO A. CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Enactments; Presumption of Constitutionality; Presumption is always in

favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. The basic principle underlying the entire field of
legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional
measure is thereby created. In every case where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the
court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have
enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative
enactment.
Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishments; A punisment is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the
nature of the offense unless it is barbarous, one unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. We note with approval the holding of
respondent judge that “The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute
is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown
to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. Based on this principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions of the
defense that the punishment of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People
vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua, 96 Phil 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language
of our Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here: ‘The
Constitution directs that ‘Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.’
The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to
* EN BANC.
91
VOL. 173, 91
MAY 5 , 1989
People vs. Dacuycuy
punishments which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or
obsolete (15 Am. Jr., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b458d542e7915a27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/10
at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note. 35 L.R.A. p.
561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.’ (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906).”
Same; Same; Same; The fact that punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
or unusual. That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the
law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court
will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due time since,
to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being “cruel and
unusual” or “excessive.”
Same; Separation of Powers; Undue Delegation of Legislative Powers; It is not for the courts to fix the
term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been made by the legislature. In the case under
consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been
provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of
imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment
where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and
sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits
will constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, of
legislative power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 4670; Criminal Law; Penalties; Sec.32 of RA 4670 which provides for an
indeterminate period of imprisonment, unconstitutional. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for
an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been
set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient
92
92 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Dacuycuy
standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute
to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty
essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of
powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality
has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby,
declared unconstitutional.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Fine; A fine is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment; it should not and
cannot be reduced to a prison term. It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the
actual term of imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It
is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism,
whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial
acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be
reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be considered as a separate and independent penalty
consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. It is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in
the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount
of a fine into a term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed
in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal
penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Criminal jurisdiction of the court determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. It has been the consistent rule that
the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action. With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said law should be limited to a fine
of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which
court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint against private respondents was
93
VOL. 173, 93
MAY 5 , 1989
People vs. Dacuycuy
filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No.
3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than P3,000.00 fall under the original
jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private
respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Br. 4. Dacuycuy, J.
The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase, of an
alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but without a specification as to the
term or duration thereof.
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to set aside
the decision
1
of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, dated September 8,
1976, penned by herein respondent judge and granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction filed by herein private respondents and2 docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 5428, as well as his resolution of October 19, 1976 denying the motions for
reconsideration filed by the parties therein. Subject of said decision were the issues on
jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school
officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case
No. 555 thereof for violation
1 Rollo, 80-105.
2 Ibid., 117-138.
94
94 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Dacuycuy
of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the
arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment
prescribed
3
for the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to writing on June4 13,
1975. On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. On
September 2, 1975, private respondents filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid
denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is
null and void for being unconstitutional. In an undated order received by the 5counsel for private
respondents on October 20, 1975, the motion for reconsideration
6
was denied.
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and
Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555
upon the ground that the former Municipal Court7 of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Subsequently, an amended petition alleged the additional ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the
term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of impris-
3 Ibid., 25-30.
4 Ibid., 31.
5 Ibid., 37-38.
6 Ibid., 19-24.
7 Ibid., 56-61.
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1989
People vs. Dacuycuy
onment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private respondents was
related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 442 previously
transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Judge Fortunato B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said petition to the latter branch
for further
8
proceedings and where it was subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case No.
5428. On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said
9 10
amended petition but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. On
August 2,11 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the amended
petition.
On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding
in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall
outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former
Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier 12stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower
court’s decision but the same was limited
13
only to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670. Respondent
14
judge denied both motions for reconsideration
in a resolution dated October 19, 1976.
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following questions of
law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of
8 Ibid., 5.
9 Ibid., 62-63.
10 Ibid., 64-62.
11 Ibid., 68-79.
12 Ibid., 106-112.
13 Ibid., 113-116.
14 Ibid., 117-138.
96
96 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Dacuycuy
Republic Act No. 4670; and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the
constitutionality of the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the adjudication of
the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition.
1 . The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:
“Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the
exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any
of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos
nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.” (Italics supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from
P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or
term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the
penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment,
although both appear to be qualified by the phrase “in the discretion of the court.”
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to be the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision on the specific
term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of punishment.
Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created. In
every case where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs this
doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have
enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a
legislative
97
VOL. 173, MAY 5 , 97

1989
People vs. Dacuycuy
15
enactment.
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that the
imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the Constitution. This contention is
inaccurate and should be rejected.
We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that
“The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. Based on this
principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of
fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil.
146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu
Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our Supreme Court in the first of the
cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here:
‘The Constitution directs that ‘Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.’ The
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than
its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in America, or which public
sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the whipping post,
or in the pillory, burn-ing at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 16
L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.’ (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906).”
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to
the form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and the
15 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 631.

16 Rollo, 98-99.
98
98 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Dacuycuy
crime. 17
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoista, where
an “excessive” penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a recommendation
for executive clemency, thus:
“x x x If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an act
of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the
heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this
that courts are advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the
penalty. x x x”
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact 18
that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In addition, what degree
of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await
appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no decision
has as yet struck down a penalty for being “cruel and unusual” or “excessive.”
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in
question should be invalidated as an “undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the lattter were the
legislative department of the govern-ment.”
Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to
determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue
delegation of legislative power. It is contended that the prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power is concerned only with the delegation of power to make laws and not to
17 93 Phil. 647 (1953).

18 24 C.J.S. 1187-1188.
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1989
People vs. Dacuycuy
interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the
discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative penalties
shall be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that “the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or
amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such
instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use legislative power
or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the19 administration of justice and the
application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases.” What respondent judge obviously
overlooked is his own reference to penalties “between designated limits.”
In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:
“x x x At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that legislative
power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating
the three powers of government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second is the
concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory20 functions to private persons.
Lastly, there is the maxim of agency ‘Delegata potestas non potest delegari.”
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the
courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that
when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is
exercised in discerning
21
the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of
the court to follow.
19 Rollo,
98.
20 Citedin Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., 73.
21 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 902.
100
100 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
People vs. Dacuycuy
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of
powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence
22
or the amount of
fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime.
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the
penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the
discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate.
It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of
discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed
within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will
constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption,
of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment,
with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority.
The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without
even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the
words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this
cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and
which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the
non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has to yield.
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as
it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.
22 Ohio ex rel. Lloyd vs. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, cited in 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 903.
101
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1989
People vs. Dacuycuy
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of
imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is,
however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle of
parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does
not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty,
should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be considered23 as a
separate and independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. It is
likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of
said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment.
Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction with
imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In24sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty
as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other.
2 . It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of
25
the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said law should be
limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the
basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the
complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a
fine of not more than P3,000.00 fall under the original
23 Peoplevs. Basalo, 101 Phil. 57(1957).

24 Peoplevs. Crisostomo, 5 SCRA 1048 (1962); People vs. Ignacio, 13 SCRA 153 (1965).
25 People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968); People vs. Mariano, et al., 71 SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs. Hon.
Presiding Judge, etc., et al., 145 SCRA 408 (1986).
102
102 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Pacific Banking
Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals
jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein
private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang,
Leyte.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to
be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,

Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-
Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed and set aside.
Notes. The legislative body acted in good faith and for an honest purpose in the light of
circumstances. ( De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294.)
Jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
( Lee vs. Municipal Trial Court of Legaspi City, Br. I, 145 SCRA 408.)
——o0o——
208 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Demetria vs. Alba
*
No. L-71977. February 27,1987.
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO,

M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P.,
OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P.,
ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO
M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA, M.P.,
petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and
VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; The Court may pass upon constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1177,
otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977".—Indeed, where the legislature or the executive
branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the
former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do,
as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "In one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section I of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section
1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances.
Same; Same; Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution declared null and void.—Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends
the privilege granted under said Section 16[5], It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
* EN BANC.
209
VOL. 148, 209

FEBRUARY 27,
1987
Demetria vs. Alba
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting
the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b45a5e8fd93be3c5003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/8
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
PETITION for prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the constitutionality of first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177.
FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise
known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of
the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties
with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and
1
as taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" listed the grounds relied upon
in this petition as follows:
"A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
MONEYS.
"B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE
CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR
WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
"C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO
OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE
1 Petition, p. 3, Rollo.
210
210 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Demetria vs. Alba
CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.

"D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
"E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE
PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER
AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES
2
ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION."
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19,1985,
the Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who
were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable
controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under
consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and
that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate
branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27,1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This,
they did, stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a
need to hold the resolution of the present case in 3
abeyance "until developments arise to enable
the parties to concretize their respective stands."
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder, The Solicitor General filed a
rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which
has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited 4
the "seven
pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) as basis for
the peti-
2 pp.6-7, Rollo,
3 p.169, Rollo.
4 The relevant portions read as follows:
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FEBRUARY 27,
1987
Demetria vs. Alba
tion's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R.
Nos. 68379-81, September 22,1986, We stated that:
"The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the
petitioner and the
"The Court developed, for its own governance in the case confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a
large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
"1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry
as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.' Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry, v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345.
"2. The Court will not 'anticipate question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' Liverpool. N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v.
Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39 . . . 'lt is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.' Burton v. United States. 196 U.S. 283, 295.
"3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Liverpool,
N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, supra.
"4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler
v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538. Appeals from the highest court of a state
challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
212
212 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Demetria vs. Alba
private respondents—both of whom have gone their separate ways—could be a convenient justification for
dismissing the case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not
only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant
pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
'The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and
decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53.
"5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler v. The
Judges, 179 U.S. 405; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the
denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v .Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit
brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
"6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. Great Falls Mfg.
Co. v. Attorney General, 124, U.S. 581. ..
"7. 'When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.' Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62." [pp. 176-177, Rollo].
213
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FEBRUARY 27,
1987
Demetria vs. Alba
resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone,
but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future."
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to
national interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents'
motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the
Filipino people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not
officially reconvened, We see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at
bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et. al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of
petitioners' locus standi.Thus:
"Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Although there are some
decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence
as follows:
'ln the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a
statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [11 Am. Jur. 761, Italics supplied.]' "
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said
that as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the
214
214 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Demetria vs. Alba
same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
"The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment."
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
"Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the
Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical
under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the
government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of
public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the
transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted
was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified,
i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be
made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch
or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5]. It em-
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FEBRUARY 27,
1987
Demetria vs. Alba
powers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment,
without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item
from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional
infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: x x x" and money belonging to no one in particular,
i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement.
This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously
prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in
Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of
money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose
[Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [Sec. 16(5) and the
requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall
abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to
naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed
upon the President, "x x x Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of
unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability
for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well
expand [sic] 5public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political and personal
expediency." The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177
was enacted pur-
5 p. 14, Rollo.
216
216 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Demetria vs. Alba
suant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perf orce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch
of the government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations,"Vol. I, Eight Edition,
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
"x x x The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each is
alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within
the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable
assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution
apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to
another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity
to the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must
enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it.
But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is
only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at
liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to
the mandates of the courts when the judges assume to act and to render judgments or decrees without
jurisdiction. 'ln exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the
administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have
any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the
will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any
law.' [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St.
544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409,105 Am. St. Rep. 825]" (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is

217
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FEBRUARY 27,
1987
Demetria vs. Alba
acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the
former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government
had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part
of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII,**Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power
this Court has exercised in many instances.
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have
earlier mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot
therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of
responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought
about by the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision
which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain
written in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void f or being unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
**Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil. 125; McGirr vs. Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563; Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of
Public Utility, 34 Phil. 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil. 599; US vs. Ang
Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 6; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440; Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, 48 Phil.
676; Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259; Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transp. Co., 57 Phil. 600; People vs.
Linsangan; 62 Phil. 464; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. Jose O. Vera, 65 Phil. 56: People vs.
Carlos, 78 Phil. 535; City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144; City of Cebu vs. Nawasa, 107 Phil. 1112; Rutter vs.
Esteban, 93 Phil. 68.
218
218 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Demetria vs. Alba
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,

Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.—The constitutional or unconstitutionality of legislation depends upon no other facts

than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of
law enforcement agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or
approval of the law. (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774.)
Republic Act No. 1383 insofar as it makes the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority,
the owner of all local waterworks systems in the Philippines, is unconstitutional upon the ground
that it constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation and without due
process of law. (Nawasa vs. Catolico,19 SCRA 980.)
For the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of the nullity of a statute passed by
Congress, it is enough if the respondents or defendants named be the government officials who
would give operation and effect to official action allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality. (J.M.
Tuazon and Company, Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413.)
——o0o——
288 PHILIPPINE
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Sumulong vs.
Commission on Elections
MORAN, M., disidente en parte y concurrente en parte:

No estoy conforme con el raciocinio de la mayoría; pero, por otra parte, tenemos el artículo 49
de la Ley No. 51 del Commonwealth, en el cual se dispone que la Ciudad de Davao sigue siende la
cabecera de la Provincia de Davao solamente para fines de residencia del Gobierno Provincial.
Abrigo serias dudas sobre si esta disposición legal debe interpretarse cómo que incluye no
solamente a los funcionarios sino también a los particulares, para no separar al gobierno del
pueblo de quien deriva su autoridad. Con esta interpretación se evitarían, al parecer, muchas
anomalías legales en la aplicación de la ley; pero, por otro lado, parece ser contraria a la intención
del legislador, expresada en el debate habido en la Legislatura. Cómo mi duda sobre este
particular persiste, yo la resuelvo en favor de la efectividad de la voluntad popular expresada en
las ultimas elecciones a favor del aquí recurrido.
Por tal razón, estoy conforme con la parte dispositiva de la decisión de la mayoría.
Se confirma la resolución.
———————
[No. 48609. October 10, 1941]

JUAN SUMULONG, in his capacity as President of the PAGKAKAISA NG BAYAN, petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
1. STATUTES; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF S ECTION 5 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT N O. 657; EXPRESSION OF S UBJECT IN TITLE OF BILL.—The
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so
as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical rather than
technical construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject. In the light of the relevant
provisions of the Constitution, the challenged provision of section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 has a necessary
and proper connection with the reorganization of the Commission on Elections, which is the subject
289

10, 1941
Sumulong vs.
expressed in the title of the Act. Under the Constitution the Commission on Elections is empowered to decide
administrative questions affecting the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, and the
requirement that, to be entitled to propose the appointment of one inspector and his substitute, a political party
must have polled at least ten per centum of the total number of votes cast in the preceding election, is germane to
the general subject of the reorganization of the Commission on Elections.
2. ID.; ID.; PROPRIETY, WISDOM AND EXPEDIENCY OF LEGISLATION.—There is no principle or rule of law which prevents the legislature
from amending statutes merely because the interpretation given to such statute by the courts would be rendered
nugatory. Instances abound where legislative acts have either been repealed or amended after the courts have had
occasion to interpret and apply them. The question is one of power, and it cannot be seriously disputed that
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b45bd1acdbda9f73003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/6
the organization of the boards of election inspectors is a proper subject for legislative cognizance. Because of the
theory of separation of the powers of government, it is a firmly established principle that the propriety, wisdom and
expediency of legislation are exclusively matters for legislative determination. The remedy against unwise
legislation is an appeal not to the courts, but to the people who elect the members of the legislative body.
3. ID.; ID.; N ATURE OF COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.—The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to
play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of less responsible organization. The
Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the iccom-plishment of the great objective for which it was created—free, orderly and
honest elections. We may not agree fully with its. choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute
gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must
be dealt with realistically—not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-
finding facilities, its' contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing
with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.—There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to
evolve pat-
290
290 PHILIPPINE
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Sumulong vs.
terns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the
conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment of election inspectors, we must not by any excessive zeal take
away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs
to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution, requires that the
power of this Court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in
appropriate cases. Held: That the present suit is not one of such cases.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus,

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Lorenzo Sumulong for petitioner.
Solicitor-General De la Costa and First Assistant Solicitor-General B. L. Reyes for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The Commission on Elections, acting under the authority of section 5 of Commonwealth Act
No. 657, adopted a resolution providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be proposed
by the political parties and persons named therein. One of those parties, Pagkakaisa Ng Bayan,
of which petitioner is the President, claiming the exclusive right to propose the appointment of
such inspectors, now seeks to nullify that resolution on the ground that section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 657 is unconstitutional, in so far as it requires that a political party must
have polled at least ten per centum of the total number of votes cast in the preceding election in
order to have the right to propose the appointment of one inspector and his substitute. Petitioner
contends that this requirement of section 5 is a subject not expressed in the title of the Act, and
that its inclusion in that section contravenes the provision of the Constitution that "No bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill." Constitution, Article VI, section 21 (1).
291

10, 1941
Sumulong vs.
Commonwealth Act No. 657 is entitled "An Act to reorganize the Commission on Elections." It
implements the provisions of the Constitution by reorganizing the Commission on Elections
created under Commonwealth Act No. 607, and converting it into the Commission on Elections
established under Article X of the Constitution. Among the powers conferred by the Constitution
on the Commission on Elections is that of deciding administrative questions affecting the
appointment of election inspectors; and section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 provides, among
other things, that "the Commission on Elections shall, directly or through its authorized provin-
cial representatives, appoint a board of election inspectors for each election precinct, to be
composed of three inspectors and poll clerk." It further provides that the appointment of one
inspector and his substitute and the poll clerk and his substitute shall be proposed by the party
which polled the largest number of votes in the preceding election, and that the appointment of
another inspector and his substitute shall be proposed by the party which polled the next largest
number of votes, if the same constitute at least ten per centum of the total number of votes cast in
the said election.
The constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation.
It should be given a practical rather than technical construction. It should be a sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
of the statute are germane to that general subject. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United
States: "We must give the constitutional provision a reasonable construction and effect. The
constitution requires no law to embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its
title. Now the object may be very comprehensive and still be without objection, and the one before
us is of that character. But it is by no means essential that every end
292
292 PHILIPPINE
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Sumulong vs.
and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of the general object should be either
referred to or necessarily indicated by the title. All that can reasonably be required is, that the
title shall not be made to cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment
can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection." (Blair v. Chicago, 26 S. Ct. 427,
201 U. S. 400, 50 L. ed. 801.)
It seems evident, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, that the challenged
provision of section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 has a necessary and proper connection with
the reorganization of the Commission on Elections, which is the subject expressed in the title of
the Act. Under the Constitution the Commission on Elections is empowered to decide
administrative questions affecting the appointment of election inspectors and other election
officials, and the requirement that, to be entitled to propose the appointment of one inspector and
his substitute, a political party must have polled at least ten per centum of the total number of
votes cast in the preceding election, is germane to the general subject of the reorganization of the
Commission on Elections.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that, if its validity is upheld, section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 657 would have the effect of nullifying the decision of this court in G. R.
No. 47940, Juan Sumulong vs. The Commission on Elections. That decision involved
controversies arising out of the elections held on December 10, 1940. It construed section 70 of
the Election Code in the sense that it gave the Pagkakaisa Ng Bayan the right to propose an
inspector for each and every election precinct in the municipality of Bauan, Province of Batangas.
The judgment entered pursuant to that decision had long been executed when Commonwealth
Act No. 657 was approved.
It is true that if the law had remained unchanged, the doctrine laid down in the case
mentioned would apply to future similar cases. But there is no principle or rule of law which
prevents the legislative from amending statutes
293

10, 1941
Sumulong vs.
merely because the interpretation given to such statute by the courts would be rendered
nugatory. Instances abound where legislative acts have either been repealed or amended after
the courts have had occasion to interpret and apply them. The question is one of power, and it
cannot be seriously disputed that the organization of the boards of election inspectors is a proper
subject for legislative cognizance. Because of the theory of separation of the powers of
government, it is a firmly established principle that the propriety, wisdom and expediency of
legislation are exclusively matters for legislative determination. The remedy against unwise
legislation is an appeal not to the courts, but to the people who elect the members of the
legislative body.
It remains to consider petitioner's contention that the resolution of the Commission on
Elections, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone faction of the Nationalista Party the
right to propose one election inspector for each of the precincts in each of the fifty-three
legislative districts mentioned in paragraph IV of the petition, contravenes section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that under that section the Nationalista Party has the
right to propose one, and only one inspector for each precinct, and that the resolution has the
effect of giving that party two inspectors in each and every precinct within those legislative
districts. The argument stems from a misapprehension of the provisions of said section 5. That
section provides, among other things: First, that the appointment of one inspector and his
substitute and the poll clerk and his substitute shall be proposed by the party which polled the
largest number of votes at the preceding election; second, that the appointment of another
inspector and his substitute shall be proposed by the party which polled the next largest number
of votes, if the same constitute at least ten per centum of the total number of votes cast in the said
election; and third, that the third inspector and his substitute shall be chosen by the Commission
on Elections, and this third inspector shall be the chairman of
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ANNOTATED
Sumulong vs.
the board. It also provides, that if the representatives of the national directorates of political
parties should fail to propose the names of persons to be appointed as election inspectors in their
respective legislative districts, or if there te no political party entitled to propose the appointment
of any inspectors, the Commission shall, at its discretion, choose said. inspectors and their
substitutes.
In the instant case, it appears that in the fifty-three legislative districts under consideration
none of the minority parties obtained in the preceding election the minimum number of votes
required to entitle it to propose the appointment of election inspectors. The question presented,
therefore, is whether the Commission on Elections, in giving the so-called rebel candidates and
free-zone factions of the Nationalista Party the right to propose election inspectors for the fifty-
three legislative districts, has acted within the limits of the discretion granted to it by law.
Petitioner maintains that the discretion given by section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the
Commission on Elections in the choice of election inspectors where none of the minority parties is
entitled to propose the appointment of such inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the
provision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only one inspector. We
think that this is taking a rather narrow view of the law. We are inclined to take a more liberal
view.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created—free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully
with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this, court should not interfere.
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Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically—not from
the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its factfinding facilities,
its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing
with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political
questions.
In the answer to the petition filed in this case, it is stated that in providing for the
appointment of election inspectors for the fifty-three legislative districts, the Commission on
Elections took into account the circumstances of each particular district, having considered,
among other factors, the availability of teachers and other government employees and the
strength of the opposing parties, factions and candidates; and adopted the following formula:
"a. In districts where the majority party is not opposed by any opposition party of substantial political
strength, and where the real opposition therein is represented by a candidate who has proven his political
strength in the past according to the records of the Commission, said candidate is given the minority
inspector, irrespective of his party.
"b. In districts where the opposition has not obtained at least 10 per cent of the total votes cast, but
shows sufficient political strength as evidenced by the Commission's records, the minority inspector is given
to such opposition party.
"c. In districts where the majority party is not opposed by any opposition party nor by any candidate of
substantial strength, teachers are appointed as minority inspectors.
"d. In districts where the opposition has not shown any political strength, the minority inspector is
denied them in order to avoid the trafficking with the appointment of inspectors."
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are
necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the
administration of the laws relative to the
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Sumulong vs.
conduct of elections, as well as in the appointment of election inspectors, we must not by any
excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional
and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Com-
mission, as ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this court to review the acts
of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.
We are not satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases.
The order of the Commission on Elections is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Díaz, Moran, and Horrillleno, J J., concur.
OZAETA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur on the constitutionality of section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, but dissent on the
interpretation given by the Commission on Elections to said section for the same reasons stated
in my dissenting opinions in the cases of Vinzons vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 48596;
Rimando vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 48603; and Sumulong vs. Commission on
Elections, G. R. No. 48634.
Order affirmed.
———————
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ANNOTATED
Lidasan vs. Commission
on Elections
No. L-28089. October 25, 1967.
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional law; Constitutionality of statute; Title and subject matter of statute; Constitutional
limitations.—Section 21(1), Art. VI of the Constitution contains dual limitations upon legislative power.
First, Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the
title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Same; Subject of statute to be expressed in the title of bill.—Of relevance here is the second directive. The
subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that
the Constitution does
497
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OCTOBER 25,
1967
Lidasan vs.
not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in
the case of House Bill 1247, which became R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House of Representatives, where the bill, being of local application, originated.
Same; Same; Purpose of such constitutional limitation.—The Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully indexed or catalogued, all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus,
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
Same; Same; Test of sufficiency of title.—The test of the sufficiency of a title whether or not it is
misleading; and, while technical accuracy is not essential and the subject need not be stated in express
terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents,
or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression on indication of the real subject or scope of the act,
is bad. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered,
and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept
in mind by the court.
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b45df0ba606fe715003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
Same; Same; Circumstances considered against the constitutionality of statute.—The baneful effects of
the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not appraise the people in the towns of Bulden and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from the
towns and province and added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur it kept the public in the dark as to
what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of R.A. 4700.
Same; Same; Title did not reflect transfer of a portion of territory from one province to another.—
Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in “the substantial
diminution of the territoral limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the incidental legal results of the
definition
498
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COURT
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ANNOTATED
Lidasan vs.
of the boundary” of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions
in Cotabato are taken away “need not be expressed in the title of the law.” This posture—we must say—but
emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable
portion of territory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and
income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation
of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Same; Separation of valid portion of statute from invalid parts; Exception to this rule.—But when the
parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that
if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some
parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall
with them.
Municipal corporations; Their twin functions.—Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly,
they serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly, they act
as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they
are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.
Constitutional law; Capacity to file suit challenging constitutionality of statute; Case at bar.—The right
of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that
the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence “in accordance with the Constitution” is
recognized in this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioner is a qualified voter. His right to vote in his own
barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in the
town different from his actual residence. Since his constitutional right to vote as citizen of that community is
affected by the statute in question, he may become a suitor to challenge its constitutionality.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios & Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on

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1
Elections is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”, but which includes barrios located in another
province—Cotabato—to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill” ? Comelec’s answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act
4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
“SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of
Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.
The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the
nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.”
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the
municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabatoand not of
Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August IS, 1967, the
pertinent portions of which are:
1 Hereinafter referred to as Comelec.
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“For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall
comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos
and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and
Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan Kat-
bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of
Parang, also of Cotabato.”
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios—in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato—are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the
Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until “clarified by correcting legislation.”
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that
the statute “should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a
resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the
1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec’s
resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for electoral
purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that “[n]o bill which may
be enacted2
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill.”
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First.Congress is to refrain from
2 Article VI, Sec. 21(1), Philippine Constitution.
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25, 1967
on Elections
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be “expressed
3
in the
title” of the bill. This constitutional requirement “breathes the spirit of command.” Compliance is
imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became Republic Act 4790,4 only its title was read from its introduction to its final5
approval in the
House of Representatives, where the bill, being of local application, originated.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that
it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the6 same, take appropriate action thereon,
and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the
constitutional requirement, the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
3 Stiglitzvs. Schiardien, 40 SW 2d 315, 317, 320.

4 Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 40, p. 8; Vol. I, No. 50, pp. 40-41.
5 Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution, provides: “SEC. 18. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”
6 Vidal de Roces vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 108, 111-112; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1188-1190.
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“The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details
set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
x x x x
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and
the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind
by the court.”7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title—“An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur”8—projects the
impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not
the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that
the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality
of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in
the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a
province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title
did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as
7 82 C.J.S. pp. 365, 370; emphasis supplied.

8 Emphasis ours.
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25, 1967
on Elections
to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which
heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in “the
substantial diminution of territorial limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the incidental legal
results of the definition of the boundary” of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore,
reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away “need not be expressed in the title
of the law.” This posture—we must say—but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in
writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to
another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a
municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here.
The Felwacase is not in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads.: “An Act
Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao.” That title
was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the law (Section 8
thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in
the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit “for, surely, an Act
creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs
thereof”—which is “manifestly germane to the subject” of the legislation, as set forth in its title.
The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of
barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical
consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the
two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of
Fruitport, 219 NW
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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
on Elections
648, 649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title “An Act to Incorporate the Village of
Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon.” The statute, however, in its Section 1 reads: “The people
of the state of Michigan enact, that the following described territory in the counties of Muskegon
and Ottawa, Michigan, to wit: x x x be, and the same is hereby constituted a village corporate, by
the name of the Village of Fruitport.” This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident
of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control,
including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan
State Constitution, which reads: “No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be
expressed in its title.” The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The
Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said
in Hume,may well apply to this case:
“It may be that words, ‘An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport,’ would have been a sufficient title, and
that the words, ‘in the county of Muskegon,’ were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the
words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
xxx Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the
purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to ‘challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its
provisions.’ Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. 9As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: ‘The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleadin.”
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions,

10
which legislative purpose
is not expressed in the title, werelikewise declared unconstitutional.
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
9 Emphasissupplied.
10Examples: Wilcox vs. Paddock, 31 NW 609, where the statute entitled “An act making an appropriation of state
swamp lands to aid the county of Gratiot in improving the channel of Maple river x x x” but the body of the act affected
another
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2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine
barrios in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of
Buidon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the limited
title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a
portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule,
thus:
“x x x But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional,
11
all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them,”
county other than Gratiot.

State vs. Burr, 238 P 585, the statute entitled “An act to amend Secs. 4318 and 4327 of the Codes of Montana relating
to changing the boundaries of Fergus and Judith Basin countries” was rendered void because the body of the act included
the boundaries of Petroleum county.
Atchison vs. Kearney County, 48 P 583, where the title of the act purported to attach Kearney county to Finney county
but the body of the act attached it to Hamilton county.
State vs. Nelson, 98 So. 715, the title of the act purporting to alter or rearrange the boundaries of Decatur city and the
body of the act which actually diminished the boundary lines of the city were considered by the court as dealing with
incongruous matters. The reading of the former would give no clear suggestion that the latter would follow and be made
the subject of the act. Jackson, Clerk vs. Sherrod, 92 So. 481; City of Ensley vs. Simpson, 52 So. 61, cited.
Fairview vs. City of Detroit, 113 NW 368, where the title gave notice that the entire village of Fairview is annexed to
Detroit when the body affected only a portion.
11 Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2d. ed., p. 116.
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In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this
Court, thus:
“The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another
part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do
this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the
other.xxx Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the
legislative intent, xxx. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy
for any purpose whatever, and what remains must 12
express the legislative will independently of the void part,
since the court has no power to legislate, x x x.”
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the
restricted area of nine barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the
town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato, were to be
excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of
the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly.They act as an agency of the
community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character13 that they are a
separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of
barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are
population, territory, and income. It was apparently these same factors which induced the
writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the original twenty-one
barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790, reads:
12 Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44, 47-48, quoted in Government vs. Springer (50 Phil. 259, 292; emphasis supplied).
13 I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., pp. 456-464.
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“The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income
is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy.”
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one
barrios—not nine barrios—was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly
evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the
government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then
the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus : Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to
assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed
into a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal
corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their
community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This
Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to
these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we
are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton
was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population
and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only
nine—of the original twenty-one—barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured.
For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point.
To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative
premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of powers, we may not now melt and
recast Republic Act
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4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intended twenty-one barrios.
Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of Congress, not of
this Court, to spell out that congressional will. 14
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has
no substantial legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790.
Stated differently, respondent’s pose is that petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional
requirement that
14 In the case of Fuqua vs. City of Mobile, 121 So. 696, it was asserted that the portion of the statute excluding a
territory from Mobile which was not expressed in the title “An act to alter and rearrange the boundary lines of the city of
Mobile in the state of Alabama” should be the only portion invalidated. The court, using the test whether or not after the
objectionable feature is stricken off there would still remain an act complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed,
ruled that there can be no segregation of that portion dealing with the excluded territory from that dealing with
additional territory because these two matters are all embraced and intermingled in one section dealing with the
corporate limits of the city.
In the case of Engle vs. Bonnie, 204 SW 2d 963, the statute involved was entitled “An Act relating to cities”. Section 4
thereof “requires the creation of a municipality on petition of a majority of voters or 500 voters.” But some of the
provisions were germane to the title of the law. This statute was declared void in toto. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
ruled as follows:
“The judgment declared only Section 4 [relative to the creation of a municipality on petition of the voters] to be void and the remainder
valid. While some of the provisions of the act are germane to the title, since they deal with the classification of cities to be created, they
seem merely to harmonize other sections of the statute which they amend with a new creation of cities other than sixth class towns. To
remove only Section 4 would be like taking the motor of an automobile which leaves the machine of no use. We are quite sure that these
provisions would not have been enacted without Section 4; hence, they too must fall.”
509

25, 1967
on Elections
the subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether
petitioner’s substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the
barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial
hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a
town to asfcertain that the law so created is not dismembering 15
his place of residence “in
accordance with the Constitution” is recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his
own barrio before it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here,
to vote in a town different from his actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of
hitherto different communities which are formed into the new town; he may prefer to remain in
the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he
acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of
desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the
town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a 16bill must be
shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, it stands to
reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that
community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as
passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit
respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
15 Macias vs. The Commission on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961.

16 Brooks vs. Hydorn, 42 NW 1122, 1123-1124; Fairview vs. City of Detroit, 113 NW 368, 370.
510
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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
on Elections
Concepcion, C.J.,Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,Makalintal, Bengzon,

J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J.,dissents in a separate opinion.
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable
to give my assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of
Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of
such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found in two other
municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity
by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the
insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not
in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon,
Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted 1
into law shall embrace
more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. This provision is similar to
those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against the evils of the so-
called omnibus
2
bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered
enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the
legislature as well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative
measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a
rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The
construction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without express-
1 Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1, Constitution.

2 Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank (1938), 66 Phil. 483.
511

25, 1967
on Elections
ing each and every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of that object. Mere details
need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete index
of its contents. The constitutional3 provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its
subject find expression in its title.
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines,
4
in 1938, construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai
Bank, held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization Law, providing
for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed
through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank
Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act.
Justice Laurel, however, vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the
act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation.
While the case of Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of
four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that the iconstitutional requirement is
to be given the liberal test as indicated n the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos,
and not the strict test as desired by the majority headed by Justice Laurel. Such a trend has 5
been
reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with 6
Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, up to
and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision, the opinion
7
coming from Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez, one of the grounds on which the invalidity of
Republic Act No.
3 People vs. Carlos (1947), 78 Phil. 535.

4 66 Phil. 483.
5 73 Phil. (1942) 228.
6 L-26511, October 29, 1960. The other cases that may be cited follows People v. Carlos (1947), 78 Phil. 535; Nuval v. de
la Fuente(1953), 92 Phil. 1074; Ichong y. Hernandez (1951), 101 Phil. 1155; Cordero v. Cabatuando, L-14542, Oct. 31,
WM, Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Company, L-18«54y, July 30, 1966.
7 L-23326, December 18, 1965.
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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
on Elections
3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retirement Act
for senators and representatives was entitled “AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c),
SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTYSIX,
AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX,” As we
noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable “refers to members of
Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service
Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to a
subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion
of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such
as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the
subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System
and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members.” Nonetheless our
opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus:
“we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to
construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.”
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not
susceptible to the indictment that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one
subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. The subject was the creation of the
municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions
coming from jurists illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged
erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary
and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem controlling, as the freedom of
this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two
municipalities outside Lanao
513

25, 1967
on Elections
del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself would not have
given rise to a constitutional question considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed
by Congress to alter provincial and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was
the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two municipalities located in
Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del
Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from
Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside
Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor
is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality from
barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying
precedents,8
which if not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v.
Agregado, certain provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and given a
“construction which would be more 9
in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law.” In
Sanchez v. Lyon Construction, this Court had a similar ruling: “Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution.” The
above principle gained acceptance
10
at a much earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in
a 1913 decision, In re Guariña: “In construing a statute enacted by the Philip-
8 86 Phil. 429 (1950).
9 87Phil. 309 (1950), Cf. City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, Inc. (1950), 85 Phil. 663. _
1024 Phil. 37. Justice Carson who penned the opinion cited Black on Interpretation of Laws to this effect: “Hence it
follows that the courts will not so construe the law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but will rather put such a n
interpretation upon it as will avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force and effect, if this can be done
without extravagance, If there is doubt, or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislature, if the words or provisions of
the statute are obscure, or
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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
on Elections
pine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to
an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not
in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard
contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion
that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However
specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be
disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an
attempt to transcend the righful limits of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to
enact an invalid law.”
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Stone, construed statutes,11
“with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so12 as to avoid doubts
as to [their] validity.” From the pen of the articulate jurist, Frankfurter: “Accordingly, the
phrase “lobbying activities” in the resolution must be given the meaning that may fairly be
attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes
it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional
questions avoided by another.” His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above
pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief Justices: “In the words of Mr. Chief Justice
Taft, ‘(i)t is our duty in the interpretation
if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid
the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent impact of the language employed.”
11 Lucas v. Alexander (1928), 279 US 573, 577-578, citing United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Delaware & H. Co. 213 US
366, 407, 408, 53 L. ed. 836, 848, 849, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527: United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 US 210, 220, 64 L.
ed. 229, 235, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co. 258 US 204, 217, 66 L. ed. 566, 572, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep.
281; Bratton v. Chandler, 260 US 110, 114, 67 L. ed. 157, 161, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 US
375, 390, 68 L. ed. 748, 754, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391.
12 United States v. Rumely(1953), 345 US 41, 45.
515

26, 1967
Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Velayo
of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality’, Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194,
198, 72 L. ed. 303. x x x. As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, “if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’ Crowell v.
Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and 13
cases cited.” The prevailing doctrine then as set forth by
Justice Clark in a 1963 decision, is that courts “have consistently sought an interpretation
which supports the constitutionality of legislation.” Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the
judiciary favors “that interpretation
14
of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving
the test of constitutionality.”
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a
legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter “should not be given a construction which
will imperil
15
its validity where it is reasonably open to construction free from such
peril.” Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril of
nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations
clearly brought to light in the opinion of the Court.
Petition granted.
VOL. 185, MAY 14, 329

1990
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Court of Tax
Appeals
*
G.R. No. 47421. May 14, 1990.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

AND MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., respondents.
Statutes; Taxation; An unconstitutional veto is ineffectual.—As mentioned earlier, We have already

ruled that the presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20%
caterer’s tax bracket but not to the whole section. But, as mentioned earlier also, the CTA opined that the
President could not veto words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item. Obviously, what the CTA meant
by “item” was an entire section. We do not agree. But even assuming it to be so, it would also be to
petitioner’s favor. The ineffectual veto by the President rendered the whole section 191-A as not having been
vetoed at all and it, therefore, became law as an unconstitutional veto has no effect, whatsoever. (See
Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valeria, No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486).
Same; Same; In a revenue bill the President may veto an “item” without need to veto the entire section
where such “item” appears.—How-ever, We agree with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his
associates that inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are “items” in
themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, the President
has the power to veto. An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a particular
kind of tax, but rather to the subjects of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which
actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the persons liable therefor with the
corresponding tax rate. To construe the word “item” as referring to the whole section would tie the
President’s hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at the expense of also approving a provision
therein which he deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of
the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the power to
disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile (See Commonwealth
ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 55 LRA 882 [1901]).
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
* FIRST DIVISION.
330
330 SUPREME COURT

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ANNOTATED
Appeals

http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b45f9a72fd0a73d9003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/6
Bito, Misa & Lozadafor private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Hotel Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 83250,
September 26, 1989, We overruled a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which declared the
collection of caterer’s tax under Section 191-A of Republic Act No. 6110 illegal because Sec. 42 of
House Bill No. 17839, which carries that proviso, was vetoed by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos when the bill was presented to him and Congress had not taken any step to override the
presidential veto. We held thus:
“The power of the State to impose the 3% caterer’s tax is not debatable. The Court of Tax Appeals erred,
however, in holding that the tax was abolished as a result of the presidential veto of August 4, 1969. It failed
to examine the law then, and up to now, existing on the subject which has always imposed a 3% caterer’s tax
on operators of restaurants. Since the Manila Hotel operates restaurants in its premises, it is liable to pay
the tax provided in paragraph (1), Section 206 of the Tax Code.” (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Manila Hotel Corporation and the Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 83250, September 26, 1989)
The petition now before Us presents an identical question: whether the presidential veto referred
to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipts of operators or
proprietors of restaurants, refreshments parlors, bars and other eating places which are
maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or resthouses. Reference to the
Manila Hotel case, therefore, might have been sufficient to dispose of this petition were it not for
the position of the CTA that a chief executive has no power to veto part of an item in a bill; either
he vetoes an entire section or approves it but not a fraction thereof.
Herein private respondent, Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock corporation. True,
it maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar and dining room, but these
facilities are for the exclusive use of its members and
331
VOL. 185, MAY 14, 331

1990
Appeals
accompanied guests, and it charges on cost-plus-expense basis. As such, it claims it should have
been exempt from payment of privilege taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A
of R.A. No. 6110, otherwise known as the “Omnibus Tax Law.” Section 191-A reads:
“Sec. 191-A. Caterer.—A caterer’s tax is hereby imposed as follows:
“(1) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors and other eating places, including
clubs, and caterers, three per cent of their gross receipts.
“(2) On proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eating places, including clubs,
where distilled spirits, fermented liquors, or wines are served, three per cent of their gross receipts
from sale of food or refreshments and seven per cent of their gross receipts from sale of distilled
spirits, fermented liquors or wines. Two sets of commercial invoices or receipts serially numbered in
duplicate shall be separately prepared and issued, one for sale of refreshments served, and another
for each sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines served, the originals of the invoices or
receipts to be issued to the purchaser or customer.
On proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other eating places
“(3) which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse, cockpit, race
track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club by means of a connecting door or passage twenty per cent of
their gross receipts.
“Where the establishments are operated or maintained by clubs of any kind or nature (irrespective of the
disposition of their net income and whether or not they cater exclusively to members or their guests) the
keepers of the establishments shall pay the corresponding tax at the rate fixed above.” (Italics ours)
Republic Act No. 6110 took effect on September 1, 1969. By this virtue, petitioners assessed the
club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurants, and also percentage tax (caterer’s tax)
for its sale of foods and fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969 to
December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96. The club protested claiming the assessment to be
without basis because Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos. The veto message reads:
332
332 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Appeals
“MALACAÑANG
Manila
August 4, 1969
“Gentlemen of the House

of Representatives:
“I have the honor to inform you that I have this day signed H.B. No. 17839, entitled:
‘AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN

PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED’
“Pursuant to the provisions of Section 20-(3), Article VI, of the Constitution, however, I
have vetoed the following items in this bill:
“x x x xxx xxx
pp. 44, SEC. 42. Inserting a new Section 191-A which imposes a caterer’s tax of three
percent of the gross receipts of proprietors or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors
and other eating places; three percent of gross receipts from sale of food or refreshment and
seven percent on gross receipts from the sale of distilled spirits, fermented liquors or wines,
on proprietors or operators of restaurants, bars, cafes and other eating places, including
clubs, where distilled spirits, fermented liquors, or wines are served; and twenty percent of
gross receipts on proprietor or operators of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and
other eating places maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel, resthouse,
cockpit, race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club, or which are accessible to patrons of
said establishments by means of a connecting door or passage.
‘The burden of taxation will be shifted to the consuming public.

‘The development of hotels, essential to our tourist industry, may be restrained considering that a
big portion of hotel earnings comes from food sale. x x x’
“This bill, H.B. No. 17839, has become Republic Act No. 6110.
“Respectfully,
“(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS”
[Italics ours]
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VOL. 185, MAY 14, 333

1990
Appeals
The protestation of the club was denied by the petitioner who maintains that Section 42 was not
entirely vetoed but merely the words “hotels, motels, resthouses” on the ground that it might
restrain the development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry. This in fact was the
position of the House Ways and Means Committee which reported, to wit:
“When Congress decided to split Section 191 into two parts, one dealing with contractors, and the other
dealing with those who serve food and drinks, the intention was to classify and to improve. While the
Congress expanded the coverage of both 191 and 191-A, it also provided for certain exemptions. The veto
message seems to object to certain additions to 191-A. What additions are objectionables can be gleaned
from the reasons given: a general reason that this sort of tax is passed on to the consuming public, and a
particular reason that hotel developments, so essential to the tourist industry, may be restrained. These
reasons have been taken together in the interpretations of the veto message and the deletions of such
enterprises as are connected with the tourist industry has therefore been recommended.
“To interpret the veto message otherwise would result in the exemption of entities already subject of tax.
This would be absurd. Where the Congress wanted to exempt, it was so provided in the bill. While the
President may veto any item or items in a revenue bill, the constitution does not give him the power to
repeal an existing tax. (2nd Indorsement dated December 9, 1969, Chairman on Ways and Means, Sixth
Congress of the Republic of the Phil.) (Exhs. 14, p. 85, B.I.R. rec.).” (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
It was by reason of this interpretation of the Committee that R.A. No. 6110 was published in
Volume 66, No. 18, p. 4531 of the Official Gazette (May 4, 1970) in such a way that Section 191-A
was included in the text save for the words “hotels, motels resthouses.”
As already mentioned, the Court of Tax Appeals, upon petition by the club, sustained the
latter’s position reasoning that the veto message was clear and unqualified, as in fact it was
confirmed three years later, after much controversy, by the Office of the President, thus:
“Mr. Antero M. Sison, Jr.

San Martin Building, 1564,
A. Mabini, P.O. Box 2288
334
334 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs.
Court of Tax Appeals
Manila, Philippines
“Dear Sir:
“With reference to your letter dated July 14, 1972, we wish to inform you that Section 42
(which contains Sec. 191-A) of House Bill No. 17839, now R.A. 6110 was one of the Sections
vetoed by the President in his veto message dated August 4, 1969, vetoing certain sections of
the said revenue bill.
Very Truly Yours,
“(SGD.) IRINEO T. AGUIRRE, JR.
Presidential Staff Assistant”
(p. 49, Rollo)
As mentioned earlier, We have already ruled that the presidential veto referred merely to the
inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket but not to the whole
section. But, as mentioned earlier also, the CTA opined that the President could not veto words or
phrases in a bill but only an entire item. Obviously, what the CTA meant by “item” was an entire
section. We do not agree. But even assuming it to be so, it would also be to petitioner’s favor. The
ineffectual veto by the President rendered the whole section 191-A as not having been vetoed at
all and it, therefore, became law as an unconstitutional veto has no effect, whatsoever.
(See Bolinao Electronics Corp. v. Valeria, No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486).
However, We agree with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that
inclusion of hotels, motels and resthouses in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are “items” in
themselves within the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore,
the President has the power to veto. An “item” in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section
imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the
portion of arevenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates
the persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word “item” as
referring to the whole section would tie the President’s hand in choosing
335
VOL. 185, MAY 14, 335

1990
Appeals
either to approve the whole section at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he
deems unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of the
kind of tax altogether. The evil which was sought to be prevented in giving the President the
power to disapprove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that power inutile
(See Commonwealth ex rel. Elkin v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 55 LRA 882 [1901]).
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in
CTA Case No. 2630 is set aside. Section 191-A of RA No. 6110 is valid and enforceable and, hence,
the Manila Golf & Country Club Inc. is liable for the amount assessed against it.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., On leave.
Petition granted. Decision set aside.
Notes.—To avoid surtax on excess profits the taxpayer must prove that the purchase of bonds
was within the reasonable needs of its business. (Manila Wine Merchants, Inc. vs. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 127 SCRA 483.)
The 25% surcharge is not imposable on taxpayer who acts in good faith in refusing to pay an
assessment. (Advertising Associates, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 765.)
———o0o———
446 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
*
No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs.HON.
JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE
LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Statutes; Words and Phrases; The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to
the effectivity of laws and not to the requirement of publication.—After a careful study of this provision and
of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
Same; Same; The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with.—lt is
not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason
is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws
that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of
* EN BANC.
447
VOL. 146, 447

DECEMBER
29, 1986
Tañada vs. Tuvera
it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but
simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
Same; Same; For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not
only to those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws; administrative rules
enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act; but not
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b4617e45e256ff59003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/10
mere interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal operations only.—The
term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts
of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra viresact of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
Same; Same; Same.—We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Same; Same; Same.—Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
448
448 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Same; Same; Same.—Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Same; Same; Same.—Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Same; Same; Local Governments; Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not
covered by the rule on prior publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by the
Local Government Code.—However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the
Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
Same; Same; Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.—We agree that the
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed
date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the
General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
449
VOL. 146, 449

DECEMBER
29, 1986
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Same; Same; Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the Official
Gazette and not elsewhere.—At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature.
Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of
the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or
after a different period provided by the legislature.
Same; Same; Laws must be published as soon as possible.—We also hold that the publication must be
made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There
is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.
This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
FERNAN, J., concurring:
Statutes; The requirement of prior publication seeks to prevent abuses by the lawmakers and ensure the
people's right to information.—The categorical statement by this Court on the need f or publication bef ore
any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time,
ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public
concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; To interpret Art 2, NCC literally so as to authorize a statute to be effective
upon its promulgation without publication is to make it collide with the due process clause.—A statute which
by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is properly interpreted as
coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come
450
450 SUPREME
COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For so to
interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause.
The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the
statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations
between a government and its people.
Same; Same; Specification by law that the Official Gazette shall be the organ where statutes must be
published before they take effect may be amended to authorize publication in other newspapers.—At the same
time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as distinguished from
any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a
constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and
reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A
specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed.
Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent
statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted. Article 2 of the Civil Code
must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
451
VOL. 146, 451

DECEMBER 29,
1986
Tañada vs. Tuvera
dispositive portion as follows:

"WHEREFORE the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall ha ve no binding
f orce and eff ect.''
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision.1 Specifically, they ask the f ollowing questions:
1. What is meant by '' law of public nature'' or " general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means 2
complete
publication; and that
3
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
In the Comment required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision 4
was concurred in only by
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply refuting these arguments.
Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Sec-
1 Rollo, pp. 242-250.

2 Ibid, pp. 244-248.
3 Id., pp. 271-280.
4 Id., pp. 288-299.
452
452 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
tion 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the
internal administration of a government agency or f or particular persons did not have to be
published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under5 reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by
eight members of this Court.
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteenday period shall be shortened or extended. An example, 6 as pointed out by
the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
"one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise
provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
5 Id., pp. 320-322.

6 136 SCRA 27, 46.
453
VOL. 146, 453

DECEMBER 29,
1986
Tañada vs. Tuvera
to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced
as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may af fect bef ore they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly
applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a
law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that allstatutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
454
454 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements, The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enf orce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inf orm the public of the contents of the laws, As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a
455
VOL. 146, 455

DECEMBER 29,
1986
Tañada vs. Tuvera
mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
7
of general applicability and
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision,
8
it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette and that six others felt that publication could be made
9 10
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. One reserved his vote and another
merely11 acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be
made. It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The
trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor
General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it
obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the
7 Rollo,
p. 24,6.
8 JusticesVenicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and Lorenzo Relova.
9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos, Efren I. Plana, Serafin P.
Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.

10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.
456
456 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That
function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to
give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although
not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however,
that we do not need to examine at this time. Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General
that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and
deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
457
VOL. 146, 457

DECEMBER 29,
1986
Tañada vs. Tuvera
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras,
JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., I concur. I add a few observations in a separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., I concur. Please see separate opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
FERNAN, J.:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous
dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters
of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the
legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill
as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different
subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on
March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President's
nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This
was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeff rey Moore and Dennis George Still.
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for
458
458 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
publication before any law may be made effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the
lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process
and to information on matters of public concern.
CONCURRING OPINION
FELICIANO, J.:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the
Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the
Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should
not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or
enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide
with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions
which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been
throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement
constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between
a government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is
embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out
in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette
as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code
could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
459
VOL. 146, 459

DECEMBER 29,
1986
Averia, Jr. vs. Caguioa
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the
Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.
All laws shall immediately upon their approval, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to
become effective only after fifteen days from publication.
——o0o——
630 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance
*
G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 115525. August 25, 1994.
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary;

ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 115543. August 25, 1994.
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
* EN BANC.
631
VOL. 235, AUGUST 631

25, 1994
Finance
G.R. No. 115544. August 25, 1994.*
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN

PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and
OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners, vs. HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754. August 25, 1994.*
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000165b46568913315f697003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/156
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA),

petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781. August 25, 1994.*
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C.

CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE
ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (“MABINI”), FREEDOM FROM
DEBT COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and WIGBERTO TAÑADA,
petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 115852. August 25, 1994.*
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
632
632 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Finance
G.R. No. 115873. August 25, 1994.*
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO,

in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931. August 25, 1994.*
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and ASSOCIATION OF

PHILIPPINE BOOKSELLERS, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the
Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Taxation; Origin of revenue bills; A bill originating in the House of
Representatives may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole; As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced and to insist that a revenue statute
must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with
amendments” but also to “propose amendments.”—Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did
not “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution,
because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this
connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal
Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the verb “shall originate” is qualified in the Philippine
Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase “as on other bills” in the American version is omitted.
This means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No.
7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197. This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not
the law—but the revenue bill—which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House
of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a
third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to
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Secretary of Finance
note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute—and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law
—must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur
with amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative
power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of “a
Senate and a House of Representatives,” not in any particular chamber.—The contention that the
constitutional design is to limit the Senate’s power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the
grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House
overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative
power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of “a Senate and a House of Represen-tatives.” The exercise of the treaty-ratifying
power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is,
therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of
the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S.
Senate has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is really no difference between the Senate preserving the House Bill up
to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter.—It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630
was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that
what the Senate did was merely to “take [H. No. 11197] into consideration” in enacting S. No. 1630. There is
really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing
its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In
either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution simply means that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
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must come from the House of Representatives and that it does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House.—Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.
Same; Same; Presidential certification on urgency of a bill dispenses with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.—The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase “except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two
stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and
(ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other
words, the “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because the two are really
coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the “except” clause as simply dispensing with the
second requirement in the “unless” clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval)
would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the “except” clause:
the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public
calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the
time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be
doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days
before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the
calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required
to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session.
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Same; Same; Judicial Review; While the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaration of martial law is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals
may be at hazard, the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with
procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly
should elicit a different standard of review.—It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this
case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a “growing
budget deficit” not being an unusual condition in this country. It is noteworthy that no member of the
Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S.
No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President’s certification.
Should such certifi-cation be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that,
because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate
were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation? The sufficiency of the factual
basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the
existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under
Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the
factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different
standard of review.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; A third version of the bill may result from the conference
committee, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” the only requirement being that
the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.—As to the possibility of an entirely
new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained: Under congressional rules of
procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at issue,
either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But
this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in
either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which
make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to
draft essentially a new bill . . . . The result is a third version, which is considered an “amendment in the
nature of a substitute,” the only requirement for
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which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.
Same; Same; Same; The report of the conference committee needs the approval of both houses of Congress
to become valid as an act of the legislative department.—Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the
power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in
the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an
“amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills
before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress
to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference
Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is common place in Congress that conference committee
reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee, and if a
change is desired in the practice, it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house.—To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a
conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the
Senate is cited to the effect that “If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the
Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jefferson’s Manual.” The following is then quoted from the Jefferson’s Manual: The managers
of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and may not include
subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue. Note that, according to Rule
XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The
Jefferson’s Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference
committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee.
This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral
argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson’s Manual must be considered to
have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in
Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house. Thus, Art. VI, §
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16(3) of the Constitution provides that “Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings ...... ”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bill-Drafting; The use of brackets and capital letters to indicate changes is a
standard practice in bill-drafting; The Supreme Court’s concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws, not the enforcement of internal Rules of Congress since
“parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.”—This
observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in
the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a “detailed and
sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure.” The Report used
brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We cannot
say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House.
Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as
we have already ruled, “parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts
have no concern.” Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of
laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in
these cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The three-reading requirement refers only to bills introduced for the first time
in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.—Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be
construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first timein either house of Congress, not to the
conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress
time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three readings;
that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that
although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which
it had prepared by “taking into consideration” the House bill; that for its part the Conference Committee
consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was
thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members.
We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of
the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our
view, without warrant in fact and in law.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also of its due enactment.—Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an
enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims
that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not
been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been “smuggled” in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no
reason now to depart from this rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the “enrolled bill” rule is not absolute, the Supreme Court should
decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill where allegations that the constitutional
procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared.—No claim is
here made that the “enrolled bill” rule is absolute. In fact in one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate
in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a
mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider. But
where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no
more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into
a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government.
Same; Same; Titles of Bills; The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the
members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard
regarding it.—The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title
of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the
statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT
system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted
before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be
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Tolentino vs.
mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to,
would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content. The constitutional
requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending
legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not
know before that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps
for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls
attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title
of PAL’s own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption.
Same; Same; Same; The trend is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts
do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation.—The trend in our cases is to construe the
constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of
necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and
all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed.
Same; Same; Public Utilities; Franchises; The grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.—In contrast, in
the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL’s franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically
excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL’s exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within
the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a
franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when
the common good so requires.
Same; Taxation; Expanded Value Added Tax Law; Bill of Rights; Freedom of Expression; Even with due
recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, the press is not immune from general
regulation by the State.—To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its faceoperates in the
area of press freedom. The PPI’s claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press
freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however,
the press is not immune from general regulation by the State.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The VAT law would perhaps be open to the
charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press.—What
it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving
printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for
discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media
by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable
to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment.
If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled
out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption previously
granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions,
likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the
scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the
only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is a reasonable basis for the classification and different
treatment between print media and broadcast media.—Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that
print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving
printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a
reasonable basis for the classification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Religion; The Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit
imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious
organization.—What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the
exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing
and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials
by a religious organization.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The VAT registration fee is a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.—In this case, the fee in § 107, although a
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fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying
part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is
designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays
an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is
thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional
right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Hierarchy of Values; When freedom of the mind is imperiled by
law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect and when property is imperiled, it is the
lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect.—There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the
statute violates the guarantees of freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible “chilling effect” which
it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of
communication are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court’s power of review.
There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that
taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection of
the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on
constitutional law thus: “[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a
momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect.
This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but
obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause.”
Same; Same; Same; The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or none” in choosing the
subject of taxation.—On the other hand, the CUP’s contention that Congress’ withdrawal of exemption of
producers cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to
electric cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments
of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a
policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or none” in choosing the subject
of taxation.
Same; Same; Same; Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce since what Congress is
required by the Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”—Indeed, regressivity
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is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is
to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to
give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social,
economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the right to “quality education”
(Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as
judicially enforceable rights.
Same; Same; Same; Contract Clause; Contracts; Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to
fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order.—Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless
hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate
by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional
provision that “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” It is enough to say that the
parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing
power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic
postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of
society.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Contract Clause is not a limitation on the power of taxation save only
where a tax exemption was granted for a valid consideration.—In truth, the Contract Clause has never been
thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has
been granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not
understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax
exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.
Same; Judicial Review; Public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable
provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; There must be before the Court a fully
developed factual record that alone can impart to its adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that
decision-making is informed and well-grounded.—The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are
presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of a
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concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that public actions by
“non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement
of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a “special function” of vindicating
constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases
a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality to insure
that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to render
advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to
do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these cases—to sit as a third
legislative chamber to review legislation.
Same; Same; The duty of the Court to exercise its power of judicial review must still be performed in the
context of a concrete case or controversy; That the other departments of the government may have committed a
grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising the Court’s power.—It does not add
anything, therefore, to invoke this “duty” to justify this Court’s intervention in what is essentially a case
that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of “cases,” and nothing but “cases.”
That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an
independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and
controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For,
as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may
appear to be the opinion of the day.
NARVASA, C.J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Origin of Revenue Bills; Origination should have no reference to time of
conception but to the affirmative act which effectively puts the bicameral legislative procedure in motion, i.e.,
the transmission by one chamber to the other of a bill for its adoption, and it may be that in the Senate,
revenue or tax measures are discussed, even drafted, before a similar activity takes place in the House.—
Exclusive origination, I submit, should have no reference to time of conception. As a practical matter,
origination should refer to the affirmative act which effectively puts the bicameral legislative procedure in
motion, i.e., the transmission by one chamber to the other of a bill for its adoption. This is the purposeful act
which sets the legislative machinery in operation
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to effectively lead to the enactment of a statute. Until this transmission takes place, the formulation
and discussions, or the reading for three or more times of proposed measures in either chamber, would be
meaningless in the context of the activity leading towards concrete legislation. Unless transmitted to the
other chamber, a bill prepared by either house cannot possibly become law. In other words, the first
affirmative, efficacious step, the operative act as it were, leading to actual enactment of a statute, is the
transmission of a bill from one house to the other for action by the latter. This is the origination that is
spoken of in the Constitution in its Article VI, Section 24, in reference to appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bills, etc. It may be that in the Senate, revenue or tax measures are discussed, even drafted, and this before
a similar activity takes place in the House. This is of no moment, so long as those measures or bills remain
in the Senate and are not sent over to the House. There is no origination of revenue or tax measures by the
Senate in this case. However, once the House completes the drawing up of a similar tax measure in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, even if this is done subsequent to the Senate’s own measure—
indeed, even if this be inspired by information that a measure of the same nature or on the same subject has
been formulated in the Senate—and after third reading transmits its bill to the Senate, there isorigination
by (or in) the House within the contemplation of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Supreme Court; Petitioners may not, by raising what are concededly novel
and weighty constitutional questions, compel the Supreme Court to assume the role of a trier of facts.—The
Court will reject a case where the legal issues raised, whatever they may be, depend for their resolution on
still unsettled questions of fact. Petitioners may not, by raising what are concededly novel and weighty
constitutional questions, compel the Court to assume the role of a trier of facts. It is on the contrary their
obligation, before raising those questions to this Court, to see to it that all issues of fact are settled in
accordance with the procedures laid down by law for proof of facts. Failing this, petitioners would have only
themselves to blame for a peremptory dismissal.
Same; Same; “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine; Separation of Powers; There is no proof worthy of the name of any
facts to justify the reexamination and, possibly, disregard, of the “enrolled bill” theory.—I would myself
consider the “enrolled bill” theory as laying down a presumption of so strong a character as to be well nigh
absolute or conclusive, fully in accord with the familiar and fundamental philosophy of separation of powers.
The result, as far as I am concerned, is to make discussion of the enrolled bill principle purely academic; for
as already
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pointed out, there is no proof worthy of the name of any facts to justify its reexamination and, possibly,
disregard.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; Both chambers of Congress entrust the function of
reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference committee with full awareness, and tacit consent, that
new provisions may be included even if not within the “disagreeing provisions.”—The fact is that conference
committees only take up bills which have already been freely and fully discussed in both chambers of the
legislature, but as to which there is need of reconciliation in view of “disagreeing provisions” between them;
and both chambers entrust the function of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference committee
with full awareness, and tacit consent, that conformably with established practice unquestioningly observed
over many years, new provisions may be included even if not within the “disagreeing provisions” but of
which, together with other changes, they will be given detailed and sufficiently explicit information prior to
voting on the conference committee version.
Same; Same; Same; It is an unacceptable theorization that when the BCC report and its proposed bill
were submitted to the Senate and the House, and the members thereof did not bother to read, or what is
worse, having read did not understand, what was before them.—In any case, all the changes and revisions,
and deletions, made by the conference committee were all subsequently considered by and approved by both
the Senate and the House, meeting and voting separately. It is an unacceptable theorization, to repeat, that
when the BCC report and its proposed bill were submitted to the Senate and the House, and the members
thereof did not bother to read, or what is worse, having read did not understand, what was before them, or
did not realize that there were new provisions in the reconciled version unrelated to any “disagreeing
provisions,” or that said new provisions or revisions were effectively concealed from them. Moreover, it
certainly was entirely within the power and prerogative of either legislative chamber to reject the BCC bill
and require the organization of a new bicameral conference committee. That this option was not exercised by
either house only proves that the BCC measure was found to be acceptable as in fact it was approved and
adopted by both chambers.
CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Where a specific procedure is fixed by the Constitution itself, it
should not suffice for Congress to simply say that the rules have been observed and flatly consider the
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matter closed.—I am persuaded even now that where a specific procedure is fixed by the Constitution
itself, it should not suffice for Congress to simply say that the rules have been observed and flatly consider
the matter closed. It does not have to be as final as that. I would imagine that the judiciary, and particularly
this Court, should be able to verify that statement and determine for itself, through the exercise of its own
powers, if the Constitution has, indeed, been obeyed. In fact, the Court has already said that the question of
whether certain procedural rules have been followed is justiciable rather than political because what is
involved is the legality and not the wisdom of the act in question. So we ruled in Sanidad v. Commission on
Elections (73 SCRA 333) on the amendment of the Constitution; in Daza v. Singson (180 SCRA 496) on the
composition of the Commission on Appointments; and in the earlier case of Tañada v. Cuenco (100 SCRA
1101) on the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, among several other cases. By the same token,
the ascertainment of whether a bill underwent the obligatory three readings in both Houses of Congres
should not be considered an invasion of the territory of the legislature as this would not involve an inquiry
into its discretion in approving the measure but only the manner in which the measure was enacted.
Same; Expanded VAT Law; Bicameral Conference Committee; The resultant enrolled bill did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.—The two bills were separately introduced in their
respective Chambers. Both retained their independent existence until they reached the bicameral conference
committee where they were consolidated. It was this consolidated measure that was finally passed by
Congress and submitted to the President of the Philippines for his approval. House Bill No. 11197 originated
in the House of Representatives but this was not the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7716. The
measure that was signed into law by President Ramos was the consolidation of that bill and another
bill, viz., Senate Bill No. 1630, which was introduced in the Senate. The resultant enrolled bill thus did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The enrolled bill itself says that part of it (and it does
not matter to what extent) originated in the Senate.
Same; Same; Same; The participation of the Senate was not in proposing or concurring with
amendments but in originating its own Senate bill which was not embodied in but merged with the House
bill.—It would have been different if the only participation of the Senate was in the amendment of the
measure that was originally proposed in the House of Representatives. But this was not the case. The
participation of the Senate was not in proposing or concurring with
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Tolentino vs.
amendments that would have been incorporated in House Bill No. 11197. Its participation was
in originating its own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was not embodied in but merged with House Bill No.
11197. Senate Bill No. 1630 was not even an amendment by substitution, assuming this was permissible. To
“substitute” means “to take the place of; to put or use in place of another.” Senate Bill No. 1630 did not, upon
its approval, replace (and thus eliminate) House Bill No. 11197. Both bills retained their separate identities
until they were joined or united into what became the enrolled bill and ultimately R.A. No. 7716.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Origin of Revenue Bills; The approval by the Senate of Senate Bill No.
1630, after it had considered House Bill No. 11197, may be taken as an amendment by substitution by the
Senate not only of Senate Bill No. 1129 but of House Bill No. 11197 as well.—Since the Senate is, under the
above-quoted constitutional provision, empowered to concur with a revenue measure exclusively originating
from the House, or to propose amendments thereto, to the extent of proposing amendments by
SUBSTITUTION to the House measure, the approval by the Senate of Senate Bill No. 1630, after it had
considered House Bill No. 11197, may be taken, in my view, as an AMENDMENT BY SUBSTITUTION by
the Senate not only of Senate Bill No. 1129 but of House Bill No. 11197 as well which, it must be
remembered, originated exclusively from the House.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Presidential Certification of Bills; A becoming respect for a co-equal
and coordinate department of government points that weight and credibility be given to such Presidential
judgment.—We have here then a situation where the President did certify to the necessity of Senate Bill No.
1630’s immediate enactment to meet an emergency and the Senate responded accordingly. While I would be
the last to say that this Court cannot review the exercise of such power by the President in appropriate
cases ripe for judicial review, I am not prepared however to say that the President gravely abused his
discretion in the exercise of such power as to require that this Court overturn his action. We have been
shown no fact or circumstance which would impugn the judgment of the President, concurred in by the
Senate, that there was an emergency that required the immediate enactment of Senate Bill No. 1630. On
the other hand, a becoming respect for a co-equal and coordinate department of government points that
weight and credibility be given to such Presidential judgment.
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Same; Bill of Rights; Freedom of Expression; R.A. 7716 in imposing a value-added tax on circulation
income of newspapers and similar publications and on income derived from publishing advertisements in
newspapers violates Sec. 4, Art III of the Constitution.—Rep. Act No. 7716 in imposing a value-added tax on
circulation income of newspapers and similar publications and on income derived from publishing
advertisements in newspapers, to my mind, violates Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution. Indeed, even the
Executive Department has tried to cure this defect by the issuance of BIR Regulation No. 11-94 precluding
implementation of the tax in this area. It should be clear, however, that the BIR regulation cannot amend
the law (Rep. Act No. 7716). Only legislation (as distinguished from administration regulation) can amend
an existing law.
Same; Same; Freedom of Religion; The imposition of the VAT on the sale and distribution of religious
articles must be struck down for being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. III of the Constitution.—Similarly, the
imposition of the VAT on the sale and distribution of religious articles must be struck down for being
contrary to Sec. 5, Art. III of the Constitution which provides: “Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”
Same; Same; Taxation; The inherent power of the State to tax, which is vested in the legislature, includes
the power to determine whom or what to tax, as well as how much to tax.—CREBA which specifically assails
the 10% value-added tax on the gross selling price of real properties, fails to distinguish between a sale of
real properties primarily held for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business and isolated sales by individual real property owners (Sec. 103[s]). That those engaged in the
business of real estate development realize great profits is of common knowledge and need not be discussed
at length here. The qualification in the law that the 10% VAT covers only sales of real property primarily
held for sale to customers, i.e. for trade or business thus takes into consideration a taxpayer’s capacity to
pay. There is no showing that the consequent distinction in real estate sales is arbitrary and in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The inherent power to tax of the State, which is vested in the
legislature, includes the power to determine whom or what to tax, as well as how much to tax. In the
absence of a clear showing that the tax violates the due process and equal protection
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clauses of the Constitution, this Court, in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, has to defer
to the discretion and judgment of Congress on this point.
Same; Same; Franchises; R.A. 7716 can be considered a special law amending PAL’s franchise.—There can
be no dispute, in my mind, that the clear intent of Congress was to modify PAL’s franchise with respect to
the taxes it has to pay. To this extent, Rep. Act No. 7716 can be considered as a special lawamending PAL’s
franchise and its tax liability thereunder. That Rep. Act No. 7716 imposes the value-added taxes on other
subjects does not make it a general law which cannot amend PD No. 1590.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; It is not believed that judicial tyranny is
envisioned, let alone institutionalized, by the people in the 1987 Constitution.—I cannot yet concede to the
novel theory, so challengingly provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the Court may
now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people’s imprimatur, into every affair of government. What
significance can still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed principle of separation of
powers, if at every turn the Court allows itself to pass upon, at will, the disposition of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think of the so varied
uncertainties that such an undue interference can lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our
jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity not timidity, of stability rather than quiescence. It
has never occurred to me, and neither do I believe it has been intended, that judicial tyranny is envisioned,
let alone institutionalized, by our people in the 1987 Constitution. The test of tyranny is not solely on how it
is wielded but on how, in the first place, it can be capable of being exercised. It is time that any such
perception of judicial omnipotence is corrected.
REGALADO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Expanded VAT Law; The Senate clearly and deliberately violated the requirements
of the Constitution not only in the origination of the bill but in the very enactment of R.A. 7716.—This writer
consequently agrees with the clearly tenable proposition of petitioners that when the Senate passed and
approved S.B. No. 1630, had it certified by the Chief Executive, and thereafter caused its
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consideration by the bicameral conference committee in total substitution of H.B. No. 11197, it clearly
and deliberately violated the requirements of the Constitution not only in the origination of the bill but in
the very enactment of Republic Act No. 7716. Contrarily, the shifting sands of inconsistency in the
arguments adduced for respondents betray such lack of intellectual rectitude as to give the impression of
being mere rhetorics in defense of the indefensible.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Expanded VAT Law; R.A. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House.—Since
R.A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it must originate exclusively in the House—not in the Senate. As
correctly asserted by petitioner Tolentino, on the face of the enrolled copy of R.A. No. 7716, it is a
“CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND SENATE BILL NO. 1630.” In short, it is an illicit
marriage of a bill which originated in the House and a bill which originated in the Senate. Therefore, R.A.
No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House.
Same; Same; Origin of Revenue Bills; The Senate cannot amend by substitution with an entirely new bill
of its own any bill covered by Section 24 of Article VI which the House transmitted to it because such
substitution would indirectly violate Section 24.—Since the origination is not exclusively vested in the House
of Representatives of the United States, the Senate’s authority to propose or concur with amendments is
necessarily broader. That broader authority is further confirmed by the phrase “as on other Bills,” i.e.,its
power to propose or concur with amendments thereon is the same as in ordinary bills. The absence of this
phrase in our Constitution was clearly intended to restrict or limit the Philippine Senate’s power to propose
or concur with amendments. In the light of the exclusivity of origination and the absence of the phrase “as on
other Bills,” the Philippine Senate cannot amend by substitution with an entirely new bill of its own any bill
covered by Section 24 of Article VI which the House of Representatives transmitted to it because such
substitution would indirectly violate Section 24.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Certification of Bills; The only revenue bill which could be properly
certified on permissible constitutional grounds is the bill that was introduced in the House.—I submit,
however, that the Presidential certification is void ab initio not necessarily for the reason adduced by
petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc., but because it was addressed to the Senate for a bill which is prohibited from
originating therein. The only bill which could be properly certified on permissible
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Tolentino vs.
constitutional grounds even if it had already been transmitted to the Senate is HB No. 11197. As earlier
observed, this was not so certified, although HB No. 9210 (one of those consolidated into HB No. 11197) was
certified on 1 June 1993. Also, the certification of SB No. 1630 cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
extended to HB No. 11197 because SB No. 1630 did not substitute HB No. 11197 but SB No. 1129.
Considering that the certification of SB No. 1630 is void, its approval on second and third readings in one
day violated Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Same; Statutes; Bicameral Conference Committee; The duty of the BCC is limited to the reconciliation of
disagreeing provisions or the resolution of differences or inconsistencies of the bills from both Houses of
Congress.—Even granting arguendo that both HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 had been validly approved by
both chambers of Congress and validly referred to the bicameral conference committee, the latter had very
limited authority thereon. It was created “in view of the disagreeing provisions of” the two bills. Its duty was
limited to the reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or the resolution of differences or inconsistencies. The
committee recognized that limited authority in the opening paragraph of its Report when it said: “The
Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197 x x x and Senate Bill No. 1630
x x x.” Under such limited authority, it could only either (a) restore, wholly or partly, the specific provisions
of HB No. 11197 amended by SB No. 1630, (b) sustain, wholly or partly, the Senate’s amendments, or (c) by
way of a compromise, to agree that neither provisions in HB No. 11197 amended by the Senate nor the
latter’s amendments thereto be carried into the final form of the former.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Ratification; The doctrine of ratification may apply to minor procedural
flaws or tolerable breaches of the parameters of the bicameral conference committee’s limited powers but never
to violations of the Constitution.—I cannot agree with the suggestion that since both the Senate and the
House had approved the bicameral conference committee report and the bill proposed by it in substitution of
HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, whatever infirmities may have been committed by it were cured by
ratification. This doctrine of ratification may apply to minor procedural flaws or tolerable breaches of the
parameters of the bicameral conference committee’s limited powers but never to violations of the
Constitution. Congress is not above the Constitution. In the instant case, since SB No. 1630 was introduced
in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, was passed in the Senate in violation of the “three
readings” rule, and was not transmitted to the House for the completion of the constitutional
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process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise passed by the Senate on second and third
readings, neither the Senate nor the House could validly approve the bicameral conference committee report
and the proposed bill.
Same; Same; “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine; Invocation of the “enrolled bill” doctrine is misplaced.—The
majority opinion, however, invokes the enrolled bill doctrine and wants this Court to desist from looking
behind the copy of the assailed measure as certified by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House. I
respectfully submit that the invocation is misplaced. First, as to the issue of origination, the certification in
this case explicitly states that R.A. No. 7716 is a “consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630.” This is conclusive evidence that the measure did not originate exclusively in the House. Second, the
enrolled bill doctrine is of American origin, and unquestioned fealty to it may no longer be justified in view
of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution. Third, even
under the regime of the 1935 Constitution which did not contain the above provision, this Court, through
Mr. Chief Justice Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas, declared that it cannot be truly said that Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito has laid to rest the question of whether the enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should
be adhered to in this jurisdiction. Fourth, even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has been
substantially undercut. This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting
opinion, citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction.
ROMERO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Expanded VAT Law; Bicameral Conference Committee; A bicameral conference
committee is a creature, not of the Constitution, but of the legislative body under its power to determine rules
of its proceeding.—As a conference committee has been defined: “. . . unlike the joint committee is two
committees, one appointed by each house. It is normally appointed for a specific bill and its function is to
gain accord between the two houses either by the recession of one house from its bill or its amendments or
by the further amendment of the existing legislation or by the substitution of an entirely new bill. Obviously
the conference committee is always a special committee and normally includes the member who introduced
the bill and the chairman of the committee which considered it together with such other representatives of
the house as seem expedient. (Horack, Cases and Materials on Legislation [1940] 220. See also Zinn,
Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ 864 [1952]; Steiner, The Congressional Conference
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Tolentino vs.
Committee [U of Ill. Press, 1951]).” From the foregoing definition, it is clear that a bicameral conference
committee is a creature, not of the Constitution, but of the legislative body under its power to determine
rules of its proceedings under Article VI, Sec. 16 (3) of the Constitution. Thus, it draws its life and vitality
from the rules governing its creation.
Same; Same; Same; The Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded the power and authority granted in
the Rules of its creation.—Even a cursory perusal of the above outline will convince one that, indeed, the
Bicameral Conference Committee (henceforth to be referred to as BICAM) exceeded the power and authority
granted in the Rules of its creation. Both Senate and House Rules limit the task of the Conference
Committee in almost identical language to the settlement of differences in the provisions or amendments to
any bill or joint resolution. If it means anything at all, it is that there are provisions in subject bill, to start
with, which differ and, therefore, need reconciliation. Nowhere in the Rules is it authorized to initiate or
propose completely new matter. Although under certain rules on legislative procedure, like those
in Jefferson’s Manual, a conference committee may introduce germane matters in a particular bill, such
matters should be circumsribed by the committee’s sole authority and function to reconcile differences.
Same; Same; Same; Insertion of new matter on the part of the Bicameral Conference Committee is an
ultra vires act which makes the same void.—Parenthetically, in the Senate and in the House, a matter is
“germane” to a particular bill if there is a common tie between said matter and the provisions which tend to
promote the object and purpose of the bill it seeks to amend. If it introduces a new subject matter not within
the purview of the bill, then it is not “germane” to the bill. The test is whether or not the change represented
an amendment or extension of the basic purpose of the original, or the introduction of an entirely new and
different subject matter. In the BICAM, however, the germane subject matter must be within the ambit of
the disagreement between the two Houses. If the “germane” subject is not covered by the disagreement but
it is reflected in the final version of the bill as reported by the Conference Committee or, if what appears to
be a “germane” matter in the sense that it is “relevant or closely allied” with the purpose of the bill, was not
the subject of a disagreement between the Senate and the House, it should be deemed an extraneous matter
or even a “rider” which should never be considered legally passed for not having undergone the three-day
reading requirement. Insertion of new matter on the part of the BICAM is, therefore, an ulta vires act which
makes the same void.
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BELLOSILLO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Origin of Revenue Bills; Statutory Construction; The provision in the Constitution
requiring that all revenue bills shall originate exclusively from the Lower House is mandatory.—Verily, the
provision in our Constitution requiring that all revenue bills shall originate exclusively from the Lower
House is mandatory. The word “exclusively” is an “exclusive word,” which is indicative of an intent that the
provision is mandatory. Hence, all American authorities expounding on the meaning and application of Sec.
7, par. (1), Art. I, of the U.S. Constitution cannot be used in the interpretation of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987
Constitution which has a distinct feature of “exclusiveness” all its own. Thus, when our Constitution
absolutely requires—as it is mandatory—that a particular bill should exclusively emanate from the Lower
House, there is no alternative to the requirement that the bill to become valid law must originate exclusively
from that House.
Same; Same; Same; It is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to
leave any discretion to the will of the legislature to obey or disregard them.—In the interpretation of
constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The
courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the tendency
of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general
rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any discretion to the will of the
legislature to obey or disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it
is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. So strong is the
inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even been said that
neither by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision of the Constitution
be regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative
and mandatory, without reference to the rules and distinguishing between the directory and the mandatory
statutes.
Same; Same; A Senate amendment by substitution simply means that the bill did not in effect originate
from the lower chamber but from the upper chamber, disguising itself as a mere amendment of the House
version.—In fine, in the cases cited which were lifted from American authorities, it appears that the revenue
bills in question actually originated from the House of Representatives and were amended by the Senate
only after they were transmitted to it. Perhaps, if the factual
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circumstances in those cases were exactly the same as the ones at bench, then the subject revenue or
tariff bill may be upheld in this jurisdiction on the principle of substantial compliance, as they were in the
United States, except possibly in instances where the House bill undergoes what is now referred to as
“amendment by substitutionn,” for that would be in derogation of our Constitution which vests solely in the
House of Representatives the power to initiate revenue bills. A Senate amendment by substitution simply
means that the bill in question did not in effect originate from the lower chamber but from the upper
chamber and now disguises itself as a mere amendment of the House version.
Same; Judicial Review; Courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action
might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.—The rule is fixed
that the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in
accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is
directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
cannot shirk from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal
said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give
effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitutionn. Since the
question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of
jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the
judgment of the judicial tribunals.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Bicameral Conference Committee; Ex Post Veto Power; There is absolutely no legal
warrant for the bold submission that a Bicameral Conference Committee possesses the power to add or delete
provisions in bills already approved on third reading by both Houses or an ex post veto power.—There is
absolutely no legal warrant for the bold submission that a Bicameral Conference Committee possesses the
power to add/delete provisions in bills already approved on third reading by both Houses or an ex post veto
power. To support this postulate that can enfeeble Congress itself, respondents cite no constitutional
provision, no law, not even any rule or regulation. Worse,
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their stance is categorically repudiated by the rules of both the Senate and the House of Representatives
which define with precision the parameters of power of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
Same; Same; Same; The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can wield ex post veto power
wages war against our settled ideals of representative democracy.—But the thesis that a Bicameral
Conference Committee can wield ex post veto power does not only contravene the rules of both the Senate
and the House. It wages war againt our settled ideals of representative democracy. For the inevitable,
catastrophic effect of the thesis is to install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third Chamber of our
Congress, similarly vested with the power to make laws but with the dissimilarity that its laws are not the
subject of a free and full discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant power, a Bicameral
Conference Com-mittee acting as a Third Chamber will be a constitutional monstrosity.
Same; “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine; The enrolled bill theory is a historical relic that should not continuously
rule us from the fossilized past.—Respondents seek sanctuary in the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to bar
any judicial inquiry on whether Congress observed our constitutional procedure in the passage of R.A. No.
7716. The enrolled bill theory is a historical relic that should not continuously rule us from the fossilized
past. It should be immediately emphasized that the enrolled bill theory originated in England where there is
no written constitution and where Parliament is supreme. In this jurisdiction, we have a written
constitution and the legislature is a body of limited powers. Likewise, it must be pointed out that starting
from the decade of the 40’s, even American courts have veered away from the regidity and unrealism of the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill.
Same; Same; The previous rulings of the Supreme Court on the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill are no
longer good law.—I am not unaware that this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill
as enunciated in the 1947 lead case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, and reiterated in subsequent cases. With due
respect, I submit that these rulings are no longer good law. Suffice to state that section 313 of the Old Code
of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our statute books. It has long been repealed
by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also relied on jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are
under severe criticisms by modern scholars. Hence, even in the United States the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill has been junked by most of the States.
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ORIGINAL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

Arturo M. Tolentino for and in his behalf.
Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. Davidfor petitioners in G.R. No. 115525.
Roco, Bunag, Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S. Roco.
Villaraza and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
Carlos A. Raneses and Manuel M. Serrano for petitioner in G.R. No. 115754.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedom From Debts Coalition, Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No.
115873.
R.B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
Rene A.V. Saguisag for MABINI.
MENDOZA, J.:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts
from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code.
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this
Court, as follows:
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I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?
1. § 1
2. § 4
3. § 5
4. § 10
B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?
1. Art. VI, § 28(1)

2. Art. VI, § 28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained
not all of these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution
are self executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government
are equally charged with the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to
them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-
Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had
originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply
consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the
bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in
support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did
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not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:
Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
1
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills were
introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the
House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H.
No. 11197, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND
ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103,
104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF
TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on
November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final
reading.
1 H.
Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100. (Respondents’ Consolidated Memorandum,
Annexes 3-12).
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It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee
on Ways and Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S.
No. 1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND
ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103,
104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 AND 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted “in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking
into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197.”
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished
debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it
approved the bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one
abstention.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference
committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that
“House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with
the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.”
The Conference Committee bill, entitled “AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED
TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,” was thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by
the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the
Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994,
Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28,
1994, it took effect, although
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its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of
business entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped
because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order
on June 30, 1994.
First. Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact
the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this
connection, petitioners2
point out that although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American
Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the verb “shall originate” is qualified in the
Philippine Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase “as on other bills” in the
American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having
originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law—but the revenue bill—
which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives.
It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of
a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute—and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law—must substantially be the same as the House bill would
be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose
amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate’s power in respect of
revenue bills in order to compensate
2 U.S.
CONST., Art. 1, § 7, cl. 1: “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.”
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3
for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and
those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are
dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any
particular chamber4
but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of “a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative
power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for
comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of
such nonlegislative
5
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S.
Senate has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of
Representatives.
In the United States, the validity of a provision (§ 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the
weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld
against the claim that the provision was a revenue 6
bill which originated in the Senate in
contravention of Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution. Nor is the power to amend limited to adding
a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far
as changing the whole of bills following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In
1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in
its place its own measure, and the House subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate
likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it
dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote
7
an extensive tax revision bill in the
same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922. Given, then, the power of the Senate to
propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required by the Constitution to originate in the House.
3 Art. VII, § 21.

4 Art. VI, § 1.
5 U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6 Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 309, 58 L. Ed. 117 (1914).
7 F.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 309, n. 2 (1945).
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It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of
another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to “take
[H. No. 11197] into consideration” in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between
the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by
substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the
same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed
over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No.
1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it.
It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of
H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that
matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was
in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992.
Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H.
No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.
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Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S.
No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners 8
that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings 9
were done on the same day, 10
March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 and
again on March 22, 1994, the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed
in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In other words, the “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because the
two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the “except” clause as simply
dispensing with the second requirement in the “unless” clause (i.e.,printing and distribution three
days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the
very premise of the “except” clause: the necessity of securing
8 Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly require that bills must pass three readings in each House, this was
clearly implied from its Art. VI, § 21(2) so that the two Houses by their rules prescribed three readings for the passage of
bills. Later the requirement was expressly provided in the 1973 Constitution from which Art. VI, § 26(2) was taken. Art.
VIII, § 19(2) of the 1973 document provided: No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members three days before its passage,
except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and naysentered in the Journal.
9 Respondents’ Consolidated Reply, Annex 14.
10 Memorandum of Petitioner Arturo M. Tolentino, Supplement C.
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the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or
emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the
time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring imme-diate enactment. It may
well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the
bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an
emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the
Constitution such a11 law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in
emergency session.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight
of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court
which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on
second and third readings in the House of Representatives
12
on the same day (May 14, 1968) after
the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only
with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage
but
11 Art. VII, § 10 provides: “The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the
offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within
seven days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than
forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading by the Congress. Appro-priations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the
Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.”
12 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SIXTH CONGRESS, FOURTH SESSION 398-399 (1968).
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not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.

It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there
was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a “growing budget deficit” not being
an unusual condition in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual
basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on
March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President’s certification. Should such certification be
now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No.
1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate
were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying
the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to
judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of
presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements
designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a
different standard of review.
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H.
No. 11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter
was before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 then pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill
which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is
claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House
bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were “surreptitiously” inserted by the Conference
Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25,
1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions
were not the result of the give and take that often mark the
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proceedings of conference committees.

Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee
met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to
meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to
be made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to
the conferees on the basis solely of their “secret meetings” on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read
anything into the incomplete remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic
notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer’s own
limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted
some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.
In any event, in the United States conference committees had been 13customarily held in
executive sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance. Only in November
1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions. 14
Even then a majority of either chamber’s
conferees may vote in public to close the meetings.
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has
been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material
change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by
inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house
amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and
substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions

15
are now altogether different,
permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill . . . .
13 Zinn,Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ 864-865 (1952).

14 CONG. QUARTERLY 65 (1983); M. JEWELL, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 169
(1986); LEES AND SHAW, COMMITTEES IN LEGISLATURES 163 (1979).
15 W. KEEFE AND M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 149 (1985).
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The result is a third version, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,”
the only requirement for 16
which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the
House and Senate bills.
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to
include in its17
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the
Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions,
there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an
“amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject
of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of
both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that
in this18 case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any
basis.
16 W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND POLICY PROCESS 214 (1984).

17 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, Nov. 11, 1993.
18 The charge is an old one. In the United States, the same charge, including claims that important provisions were
being “surreptitiously added” in the committee, was made in the 1940s. But no satisfactory alternative to the conference
committee has been devised. And today, given the bicameral nature of the U.S. Congress, the charge is no longer heard.
Compare the following from a 1945 comment: “As a devise for oiling the machinery of legislation, committees of conference
are, under American conditions, useful, if not indispensable. Nevertheless, they have shortcomings. Without exception,
they work behind closed doors, hold no hearings, and give their proceedings no publicity. Doubtless it would be difficult
for them to make headway if they did otherwise. Nevertheless, in view of the power which they wield, strong objection can
be, and is, raised. For, while the committees are supposed to deal only with actual differences between the houses and to
stay well within the bounds set by the extreme positions which the houses have taken, they often work into measures, as
reported, provisions of their own devising, even going so far as to rewrite whole sections with the sole purpose of
incorporating the views which the majority members happen to hold In practice, this often results in the adoption of
important provisions, more or less surreptitiously added, without consideration by either house—in other words,
legislation nominally by Congress but
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Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill
and a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions
not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of this
contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
§ 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any
bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall
meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with subparagraph
(c), Section 3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary
of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
§ 85. Conference Committee Reports.—In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the
amendments to any bill or
actually by conference committee. Any remedy found will probably take the form of reducing the need for using conference
committees at all; and the principal suggestion to that end is that bills and resolutions be referred, not, as now, to separate committees
of the two houses, but to joint committees, which not only would hold single sets of hearings, but might deliberate and report back bills
to the two houses in such agreed form that further significant differences would not be likely to develop. Arrangements of this nature
yield excellent results in the legislature of Massachusetts. But there are obstacles to adoption of the plan for Congress, not the least of
them being a natural aversion of House members to joint committees in which senators seem likely to dominate; and,
as indicatedbelow, the outlook for the reform is problematical.” F.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, supra note 7 at 310-311.
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joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when the journal is
being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such
reports shall be signed by the conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement
of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the
Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient that
three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting

provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that “If there is
no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the
Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson’s
Manual.” The following is then quoted from the Jefferson’s Manual:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and may
not include subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must
be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson’s Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is
common place in Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though
germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul
S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then,
may be provided in the Jefferson’s Manual must be considered to have been modified by the
legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house.
Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides that “Each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings ”
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This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise
disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not
contain a “detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the
subject measure.” The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a
standard practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the
Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled,
“parliamentary
19
rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern.” Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment
of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been
faithfully observed in these cases.
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report in these cases must have
undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to
negotiation since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the
bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a “take it or leave it” basis, with
the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference committee must
be appointed. But then again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be
wholly satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first
timein either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of
requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid
that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was
considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the
Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it
had prepared by “taking into consideration” the House bill; that for its part the Conference
Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a
19 Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871 (1960).
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compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the
House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say
that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the
bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is,
in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there20may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must
be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a
bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a
proposed constitutional
21
amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had
not been 22
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been “smuggled” in the printing of
the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the
government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule. 23
No claim is here made that the “enrolled bill” rule is absolute. In fact in one case we “went
behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a
statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate
himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that
in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
“surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such
cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.
20 E.g.,
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947); Casco (Phil.) Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Morales v.
Subido, 27 SCRA 131(1969).
21 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, supranote 20.
22 Morales v. Subido, supra note 20.
23 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
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Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, § 26(1)
which provides that “Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.” It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 provided
for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was
made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without
reflecting this fact in its title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND
ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:
§ 103. Exempt transactions.—The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the
Philippines is a signatory.
Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because it was exempted
under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the payment of all “other taxes . . . now or in the near
future,” in consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax
of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:
§ 103. Exempt transactions.—The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree
Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
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The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is
concerned.
The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of
Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those
which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is
to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of
the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law,
in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the
title of a bill should be a complete index of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of
Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be
heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had
been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other
statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their
existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of
PAL’s own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The
title of P.D. No. 1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO ESTABLISH,
OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIRTRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE
PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts
do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if
the title expresses the general subject
24
of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the
general subject thus expressed.
24See, e.g., Alalayan v. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172 (1968); Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA
418(1962); Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941).
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It is further contended that amendment of petitioner’s franchise may only be made by special
law, in view of § 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified, amended, or repealed
expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any
section or provision thereof.
This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere
implication resulting from the enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the
fact that a franchise is a contract25 which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus
in Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress, which provided
for the payment of tax on certain goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend
the franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes except those mentioned in its
franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended by a general law.
In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL’s franchise (P.D.
No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL’s exemption
under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the
Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom

The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of
newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the
other hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit
organization engaged in the
25 40 Phil. 224 (1919).
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printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of
their rights under §§ 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.
The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to
the press under § 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by
administrative regulation with respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses
its claim because of the possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere revocation of
the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to question
the Secretary’s power to grant exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no
power to grant tax exemption because 26
this is vested in Congress and requires for its exercise the
vote of a majority of all its members and (2) the Secretary’s duty is to execute the law. § 103 of
the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously
granted exemption were:
(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin
which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is devoted
principally to the publication of advertisements.
Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became
subject to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue
Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the “circulation income of print media
pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment
of freedom of the press, among others.” The exemption of “circulation income” has left income
from advertisements still subject to the VAT.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the
authority of the Secretary of Finance to
26 Art. VI, § 28(4) provides: “No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of the Congress.”
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give, in view of PPI’s contention that even with the exemption of the circulation revenue of print
media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of
the VAT on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition of
paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no exemption has effectively
been granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press
freedom. The PPI’s claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press
freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society,
however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State. It has been held:
The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for 27
contempt of court . . . . Like others, he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business . . . .
The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media
transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No.
7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass
media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment.
We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of
the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now
required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out,
much less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption
previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases.
Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the
27 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132, 81 L.Ed. 953, 961 (1937).
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scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to
the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to
the press. But that is not the case.
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its
claim that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited,
the discriminatory purpose was clear either from28the background of the law or from its operation.
For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2%
of the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of
more than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement
alone but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the
thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only
slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious
competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the thirteen
newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of
Louisiana responded by taxing what Long described as the “lying newspapers” by imposing on
them “a tax on lying.” The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their circulation.
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was “a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of
a tax to limit the circulation
29
of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties.” The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax
is the power to destroy.
30
In the other case invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out
because everything was exempt from the “use tax” on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota
imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a
complementary tax on the privilege of “using, storing or consuming in that state tangible
personal
28 297U.S. 233, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936).

29 297U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 669.
30 Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983).
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property” by eliminating the residents’ incentive to get goods from outside states where the sales
tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to
1971. In 1971, however, the state legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the “use tax”
on the cost of paper and ink used for publication. The law was held to have singled out the press
because (1) there was no reason for imposing the “use tax” since the press was exempt from the
sales tax and (2) the “use tax” was laid on an “intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate
retail sale.” Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to
do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory because the
legislature, by again amending the law so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used,
further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that “only31 a handful of publishers pay any tax at all
and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax.” The discriminatory purpose was thus very
clear. 32
More recently, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, it was held that a law which
taxed general interest magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and
sports journals was discriminatory because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole,
it targeted a small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis of
contents (i.e., between general interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the law
became “entirely incompatible with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.”
These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press
creates risks of suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a
wide range of goods and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print 33
media
whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000, the law discriminates is
31 460 U.S. at 591, 75 L.Ed.2d at 308-9 (1983).

32 481 U.S. 221, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987).
33 § 103(t) of the NIRC exempts from the VAT “Sale or lease of goods or properties or the performance of services other
than the transactions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the gross annual sales and/or receipts [of which] do not
exceed the amount prescribed in regulations to be promulgated by the President upon the recommendation
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without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has been
unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press alone but to
all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media
are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication,
which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for
the classification.
The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that “owners of newspapers
are immune from any forms of ordinary taxation.” The license tax in the Grosjean case was
declared invalid because it34was “one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against
the freedom of the press.” On the other hand, Minneapolis Staracknowledged that “The First
Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the Federal
Government can subject newspapers 35
to generally applicable economic regulations without
creating constitutional problems.”
What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the
exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their
printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the36U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, the
Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use
tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. 37
This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law, although of
general applicability, nonetheless is
by the Secretary of Finance which shall not be less than Four hundred eighty thousand pesos (P480,000.00) or more
than Seven hundred twenty thousand pesos (P720,000.00) subject to tax under Section 112 of this Code.”
34 297 U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 668.
35 460 U.S. at 581, 75 L.Ed.2d at 302.
36 493 U.S. 378, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990).
37 § 107 of the NIRC provides: “Any person subject to a value added tax under Sections 100 and 102 of this Code shall
register with the appropriate Revenue District Officer and pay an annual registration
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invalid when applied to the press because it lays 38

a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The
case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila is cited by both the PBS and the PPI in support
of their contention that the law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of
the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the business of general
merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant’s
39
sale of bibles and other religious literature.
This Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania, in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed
in amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a
religious sect, was actually being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect’s right under
the Constitution. For that reason, it was held, the license fee “restrains in advance 40those
constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise.”
But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the
exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The
registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record
of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax,
even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus
a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a
constitutional right.
fee in the amount of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for every separate or distinct establishment or place of business
and every year thereafter on or before the last day of January. Any person just commencing a business subject to the value-
added tax must pay the fee before engaging therein . . .”
38 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
39 319 U.S. 105, 113, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943).
40 319 U.S. at 114, 87 L.Ed. 1292 at 1298. For the same reason, in People v. Korins, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (1976) a decision
of the city court of Utica, Oneida County held that to apply an ordinance requiring a business license to be obtained before
a person could sell newspapers in the streets would be to impose a prior restraint on press freedom because “a newspaper
is not in the same category as pineapple or a soap powder or a pair of shoes” whose sale may be conditioned on the
possession of a business license.
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For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it
offends the free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be
without merit. For the same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers
Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931that the increase in the price of books and other
educational materials as a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional mandate to the
government to give priority to education, science and technology (Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.
B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment of Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of
freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible “chilling effect” which it may have on the
essential freedom of the mind and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of
communication are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this Court’s power
of review.
There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the
rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners’ right to due process and the
equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by
an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: “[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by
law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled it is the
lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil
41
liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
values within the due process clause.”
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less
evident and underscores the essential nature of petitioners’ attack on the law on the grounds of
regressivity, denial of due process and equal protection and
41 P.A.
FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT II (1950), quoted in Ermita, Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Ass’n v. City Mayor, 21 SCRA 449, 459 (1967).
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impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is
that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations
at the administrative levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and
enable us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these
suits.
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the
requirement that “The rule of taxation
42
shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve
a progressive system of taxation.” Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled
“VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports” by Alan A. Tait of the
International Monetary Fund, that “VAT payment by low-income households will be a higher
proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higher-income households. That
is, the VAT will be regressive.” Petitioners contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the
tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higher-income bracket, which before were taxed
at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic commodities, which before were taxed at
rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by
respondents that in fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible
particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law
exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the
VAT are those used or consumed by higher-income groups. These include real properties held
primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or
privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar
places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand, small business establishments, with
annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This,
42 Art.
VI, § 28(1). Related to this argument is the claim that Republic Act No. 7716 likewise infringes the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Bill of Rights, Art. III, § 1(1).
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according to respondents, removes from the coverage of 43

the law some 30,000 business
establishments. On the other hand, an occasional paper of the Center for Research and
Communication cites a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income
distribution and that while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is only P301 or
1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any
discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the “poor” and middle-
income group in society harder than it will the “rich,” as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines
(CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the CUP’s
contention that Congress’ withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing
cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives,
not only goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social
justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually
a policy argument. The44legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or none” in choosing
the subject of taxation.
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA),
petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as
85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the
Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive some of its
members out of circulation because their profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay
for their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the financial statements of the newspapers
in question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating
the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required
by the Constitution to do is to
43 Neri, “In Support of the Expanded Value-Added Tax,” (CRC Economic Policy Papers No. 5 1994) pp. 3-4.
44 Cf. Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955).
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“evolve a progressive system of taxation.” This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to
it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the
reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the
right to “quality education” (Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
45
rights.
At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran should have laid to rest the questions now raised
against the VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order
No. 273) were held to be hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this
Court found to be “hearsay and [without] evidentiary value.” As Republic Act No. 7716 merely
expands the base of the VAT system and its coverage as provided in the original VAT Law,
further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the
imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into
prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that “No law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” It is enough to say that the parties to a
contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing
power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairment presupposes the maintenance46 of a government which retains adequate authority to
secure the peace and good order of society.
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the
State’s power of taxation save
45 Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371.
46 Cf. Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135 (1968).
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47
only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the case of
PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as
discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only
by a specific, law.
The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form
because of the lack of a concrete record. We accept48 that this Court does not only adjudicate
private cases; that public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable
provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2
the Court has a “special function” of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling
cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases 49a fully developed factual record
that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that decision-making
is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions
or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to do
what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these cases—to sit as a
third legislative chamber to review legislation.
47 See E. M. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 560-561 (2d Ed., 1977).
48 The term is Professor Jaffe’s (JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965) adopted by Justice
Harlan in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-120, L.Ed.2d 947, 973 (1968) to distinguish between the personal
and proprietary interest of traditional plaintiffs and the public interest of a citizen suing in a public action. The term was
mentioned by some members of this Court in the Lotto case (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994).
49 Compare Justice Laurel: “Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.” Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
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We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed
on this Court by the Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if
we decline to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, § 1, ¶
2 is cited in support of this view:
Judicial power includes the dutyof the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in
1803, to justify the assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound50and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligationassigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish
51
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
52
This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several cases of this Court
following Angara.
50 1
Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60(1803) (emphasis added).
51 Supranote 49 (emphasis added).
52 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94 (1937); Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1061-2 (1957); Macias v. COMELEC, 3
SCRA 1, 7-8 (1961).
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It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this “duty” to justify this Court’s intervention in
what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be
performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our
jurisdiction in terms of “cases,” and nothing but “cases.” That the other departments of the
government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for
exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy
requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For,
as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what
may appear to be the opinion of the day.
In the preceding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act
No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before
us. To sum up, we hold:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by
Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes—
beyond those prescribed by the Constitution—have been observed is precluded by the
principle of separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere
with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education;
and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is
regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under
the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective
relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

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Bidin, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Narvasa (C.J.) and Melo, J., Concur in separate opinions.
Cruz, Padilla and Vitug, JJ., See separate opinions.
Feliciano, J., I join in both the majority opinion by Mendoza, J. and the concurring
opinion of Narvasa, C.J.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno, JJ., See dissenting opinions.
SEPARATE OPINION
NARVASA, C.J.:
I fully concur with the conclusions set forth in the scholarly opinion of my learned colleague, Mr.
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. I write this separate opinion to express my own views relative to the
procedural issues raised by the various petitions and dealt with by some other Members of the
Court in their separate opinions.
By their very nature, it would seem, discussions of constitutional issues prove fertile ground
for a not uncommon phenomenon: debate marked by passionate partisanship amounting
sometimes to impatience with adverse views, an eagerness on the part of the proponents on each
side to assume the role of, or be perceived as, staunch defenders of constitutional principles,
manifesting itself in flights of rhetoric, even hyperbole. The peril in this, obviously, is a
diminution of objectivity—that quality which, on the part of those charged with the duty and
authority of interpreting the fundamental law, is of the essence of their great function. For the
Court, more perhaps than for any other person or group, it is necessary to maintain that
desirable objectivity. It must make certain that on this as on any other occasion, the judicial
function is meticulously performed, the facts ascertained as comprehensively and as accurately as
possible, all the issues particularly identified, all the arguments clearly understood; else, it may
itself be accused, by its own members or by others, of a lack of adherence to, or a careless
observance of, its own procedures, the signatures of its individual members on its enrolled
verdicts notwithstanding.
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In the matter now before the Court, and whatever reservations some people may entertain about
their intellectual limitations or moral scruples, I cannot bring myself to accept the thesis which
necessarily implies that the members of our august Congress, in enacting the expanded VAT law,
exposed their ignorance, or indifference to the observance, of the rules of procedure set down by
the Constitution or by their respective chambers, or what is worse, deliberately ignored those
rules for some yet undiscovered purpose nefarious in nature, or at least some purpose other than
the public weal; or that a few of their fellows, acting as a bicameral conference committee, by
devious schemes and cunning maneuvers, and in conspiracy with officials of the Executive
Department and others, succeeded in “pulling the wool over the eyes” of all their other colleagues
and foisting on them a bill containing provisions that neither chamber of our bicameral
legislature conceived or contemplated. This is the thesis that the petitioners would have this
Court approve. It is a thesis I consider bereft of any factual or logical foundation.
Other than the bare declarations of some of the petitioners, or arguments from the use and
import of the language employed in the relevant documents and records, there is no evidence
before the Court adequate to support a finding that the legislators concerned, whether of the
upper or lower chamber, acted otherwise than in good faith, in the honest discharge of their
functions, in the sincere belief that the established procedures were being regularly observed or,
at least, that there occurred no serious or fatal deviation therefrom. There is no evidence on
which reasonably to rest a conclusion that any executive or other official took part in or unduly
influenced the proceedings before the bicameral conference committee, or that the members of the
latter were motivated by a desire to surreptitiously introduce improper revisions in the bills
which they were required to reconcile, or that after agreement had been reached on the mode and
manner of reconciliation of the “disagreeing provisions,” had resorted to stratagems or employed
under-handed ploys to ensure their approval and adoption by either House. Neither is there any
proof that in voting on the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) version of the reconciled bills,
the members of the Senate and the House did so in ignorance of, or without understanding, the
contents thereof or the bills therein reconciled.
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Also unacceptable is the theory that since the Constitution requires appropriation and revenue
bills to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, it is improper if not
unconstitutional for the Senate to formulate, or even think about formulating, its own draft of
this type of measure in anticipation of receipt of one transmitted by the lower Chamber. This is
specially cogent as regards much-publicized suggestions for legislation (like the expanded VAT
Law) emanating from one or more legislators, or from the Executive Department, or the private
sector, etc. which understandably could be expected to forthwith generate much Congressional
cogitation.
Exclusive origination, I submit, should have no reference to time of conception. As a practical
matter, origination should refer to the affirmative act which effectively puts the bicameral
legislative procedure in motion, i.e., the transmission by one chamber to the other of a bill for its
adoption. This is the purposeful act which sets the legislative machinery in operation to
effectively lead to the enactment of a statute. Until this transmission takes place, the formulation
and discussions, or the reading for three or more times of proposed measures in either chamber,
would be meaningless in the context of the activity leading towards concrete legislation. Unless
transmitted to the other chamber, a bill prepared by either house cannot possibly become law. In
other words, the first affirmative, efficacious step, the operative act as it were, leading to actual
enactment of a statute, is the transmission of a bill from one house to the other for action by the
latter. This is the origination that is spoken of in the Constitution in its Article VI, Section 24, in
reference to appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, etc.
It may be that in the Senate, revenue or tax measures are discussed, even drafted, and this
before a similar activity takes place in the House. This is of no moment, so long as those
measures or bills remain in the Senate and are not sent over to the House. There is
no origination of revenue or tax measures by the Senate in this case. However, once the House
completes the drawing up of a similar tax measure in accordance with the prescribed procedure,
even if this is done subsequent to the Senate’s own measure—indeed, even if this be inspired by
information that a measure of the same nature or on the same subject has been formulated in the
Senate—and after third
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reading transmits its bill to the Senate, there isorigination by (or in) the House within the
contemplation of the Constitution.
So it is entirely possible, as intimated, that in expectation of the receipt of a revenue or tax bill
from the House of Representatives, the Senate commences deliberations on its own concept of
such a legislative measure. This, possibly to save time, so that when the House bill reaches it, its
thoughts and views on the matter are already formed and even reduced to writing in the form of a
draft statute. This should not be thought illegal, as interdicted by the Constitution. What the
Constitution prohibits is for the Senate to begin the legislative process first, by sending its own
revenue bill to the House of Representatives for its consideration and action. This is the initiation
that is prohibited to the Senate.
But petitioners claim that this last was what in fact happened, that the bill that went through
the legislative mill and was finally approved as R.A. No. 7716, was the Senate version, SB 1630.
This is disputed by the respondents. They claim it was House Bill 11197 that, after being
transmitted to the Senate, was referred after first reading to its Committee on Ways and Means;
was reported out by said Committee; underwent second and third readings, was sent to the
bicameral conference committee and then, after appropriate proceedings therein culminating in
extensive amendments thereof, was finally approved by both Houses and became the Expanded
VAT Law.
On whose side does the truth lie? If it is not possible to make that determination from the
pleadings and records before this Court, shall it require evidence to be presented? No, on both law
and principle. The Court will reject a case where the legal issues raised, whatever they may be,
depend for their resolution on still unsettled questions of fact. Petitioners may not, by raising
what are concededly novel and weighty constitutional questions, compel the Court to assume the
role of a trier of facts. It is on the contrary their obligation, before raising those questions to this
Court, to see to it that all issues of fact are settled in accordance with the procedures laid down
by law for proof of facts. Failing this, petitioners would have only themselves to blame for a
peremptory dismissal.
Now, what is really proven about what happened to HB 11197 after it was transmitted to the
Senate? It seems to be admitted on
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all sides that after going through first reading, HB 11197 was referred to the Committee on Ways
and Means chaired by Senator Ernesto Herrera.
It is however surmised that after this initial step, HB 11197 was never afterwards deliberated
on in the Senate, that it was there given nothing more than a “passing glance,” and that it never
went through a proper second and third reading. There is no competent proof to substantiate this
claim. What is certain is that on February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means
submitted its Report (No. 349) stating that HB 11197 was considered, and recommending that SB
16301
be approved “in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No.
734 and H.B. No. 11197.” This Report made known to the Senate, and clearly indicates, that
H.B. No. 11197 was indeed deliberated on by the Committee; in truth, as Senator Herrera
pointed out, the BCC later “agreed to adopt (a broader coverage of the VAT) which is closely
adhering to the Senate version ** ** with some new provisions or amendments.” The plain
implication is that the Senate Committee had indeed discussed HB 11197 in comparison with the
inconsistent parts of SB 1129 and afterwards proposed amendments to the former in the form of
a new bill (No. 1630) more closely akin to the Senate bill (No. 1129).
And it is as reasonable to suppose as not that later, during the second and third readings on
March 24, 1994, the Senators, assembled as a body, had before them copies of HB 11197 and SB
1129, as well as of the Committee’s new “SB 1630” that had been recommended for their
approval, or at the very least were otherwise perfectly aware that they were considering the
particular provisions of these bills. That there was such a deliberation in the Senate on HB 11197
in light of inconsistent portions of SB 1630, may further be necessarily inferred from the request,
made by the Senate on the same day, March 24, 1994, for the convocation of a bicameral
conference committee to reconcile “the disagreeing provisions of said bill (SB 1630) and House
Bill No. 11197,” a
1Resolution “Urging the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to Exempt Local Movie
Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an Incentive to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino
Movies Whenever they Feature an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses.”
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request that could not have been made had not the Senators more or less closely examined the
provisions of HB 11197 and compared them with those of the counterpart Senate measures.
Were the proceedings before the bicameral conference committee fatally flawed? The
affirmative is suggested because the committee allegedly overlooked or ignored the fact that SB
1630 could not validly originate in the Senate, and that HB 11197 and SB 1630 never properly
passed both chambers. The untenability of these contentions has already been demonstrated.
Now, demonstration of the indefensibility of other arguments purporting to establish the
impropriety of the BCC proceedings will be attempted.
There is the argument, for instance, that the conference committee never used HB 11197 even
as “frame of reference” because it does not appear that the suggestion therefor (made by House
Panel Chairman Exequiel Javier at the bicameral conference committee’s meeting on April 19,
1994, with the concurrence of Senator Maceda) was ever resolved, the minutes being regrettably
vague as to what occurred after that suggestion was made. It is, however, as reasonable to
assume that it was, as it was not, given the vagueness of the minutes already alluded to. In fact,
a reading of the BCC Report persuasively demonstrates that HB 11197 was not only utilized as a
“frame of reference” but actually discussed
2
and deliberated on.
Said BCC Report pertinently states:
“CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197, entitled:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE
AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102,
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND
238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113SD AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
2 Italics supplied.
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and Senate Bill No. 1630 entitled:

103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115, 117 AND 121 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237,
AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114, 116, 119 AND 120 OF TITLE V, ALL OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
having met, after full and free conference, has agreed to recommend and do hereby recommend to their
respective Houses that House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in
accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
Approved.”
The Report, it will be noted, explicitly adverts to House Bill No. 11197, it being in fact mentioned
ahead of Senate Bill No. 1630; graphically shows the very close identity of the subjects of both
bills (indicated in their respective titles); and clearly says that the committee met in “full and free
conference” on the “disagreeing provisions” of both bills (obviously in an effort to reconcile them);
and that reconciliation of said “disagreeing provisions” had been effected, the BCC having agreed
that “House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance
with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.”
It may be concluded, in other words, that, conformably to the procedure provided in the
Constitution with which all the Members of the bicameral conference committee cannot but be
presumed to be familiar, and no proof to the contrary having been adduced on the point, it was
the original bill (HB 11197) which said body had considered and deliberated on in detail,
reconciled or harmonized with SB 1630, and used as basis for drawing up the amended version
eventually reported out and submitted to both houses of Congress.
It is further contended that the BCC was created and convoked prematurely, that SB 1630
should first have been sent to the House of Representatives for concurrence. It is maintained, in
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other words, that the latter chamber should have refused the Senate request for a bicameral
conference committee to reconcile the “disagreeing provisions” of both bills, and should have
required that SB 1630 be first transmitted to it. This, seemingly, is nit-picking given the urgency
of the proposed legislation as certified by the President (to both houses, in fact). Time was of the
essence, according to the President’s best judgment—as regards which absolutely no one in either
chamber of Congress took exception, general acceptance being on the contrary otherwise
manifested—and that judgment the Court will not now question. In light of that urgency, what
was so vital or indispensable about such a transmittal that its absence would invalidate all else
that had been done towards enactment of the law, completely escapes me, specially considering
that the House had immediately acceded without demur to the request for convocation of the
conference committee.
What has just been said should dispose of the argument that the statement in the enrolled bill,
that “This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was
finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994 and May 2,
1994,” necessarily signifies that there were two (2) bills separately introduced, retaining their
independent existence until they reached the bicameral conference committee where they
were consolidated, and therefore, the VAT law did not originate exclusively in the House having
originated in part in the Senate as SB 1630, which bill was not embodied in but merely merged
with HB 11197, retaining its separate identity until it was joined by the BCC with the house
measure. The more logical, and fairer, course is to construe the expression, “consolidation of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630” in the context of accompanying and
contemporaneous statements, i.e.: (a) the declaration in the BCC Report, supra, that the
committee met to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the two bills, “and after full and free
conference” on the matter, agreed and so recommended that “House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the
bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees;” and (b) the averment of Senator Herrera, in the
Report of the Ways and Means Committee, supra, that the committee had actually “considered”
(discussed)
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HB No. 11197 and taken it “into consideration” in recommending that its own version of the
measure (SB 1630) be the one approved.
That the Senate might have drawn up its own version of the expanded VAT bill,
contemporaneously with or even before the House did, is of no moment. It bears repeating in this
connection that no VAT bill ever originated in the Senate; neither its SB 1129 or SB 1630 or any
of its drafts was ever officially transmitted to the House as an initiating bill which, as already
pointed out, is what the Constitution forbids; it was HB 11197 that was first sent to the Senate,
underwent first reading, was referred to Committee on Ways and Means and there discussed in
relation to and in comparison with the counterpart Senate version or versions—the mere
formulation of which was, as also already discussed, not prohibited to it—and afterwards
considered by the Senate itself, also in connection with SB 1630, on second and third readings.
HB 11197 was in the truest sense, the originating bill.
An issue has also arisen respecting the so-called “enrolled bill doctrine” which, it is said,
whatever sacrosanct status it might originally have enjoyed, is now in bad odor with modern
scholars on account of its imputed rigidity and unrealism; it being also submitted that the ruling
in “Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1) and the cases 3
reaffirming it, is no longer good law, it being
based on a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure long since stricken from the statute books.
I would myself consider the “enrolled bill” theory as laying down a presumption of so strong a
character as to be well nigh absolute or conclusive, fully in accord with the familiar and
fundamental philosophy of separation of powers. The result, as far as I am concerned, is to make
discussion of the enrolled bill principle purely academic; for as already pointed out, there is no
proof worthy of the name of any facts to justify its reexamination and, possibly, disregard.
The other question is, what is the nature of the power given to a bicameral conference
committee of reconciling differences
3 Giving “conclusive” character to copies of Acts of the Philippine Commission which have been signed by its presiding
officers and secretaries.
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between, or “disagreeing provisions” in, a bill originating from the House in relation to
amendments proposed by the Senate—whether as regards some or all of its provisions? Is the
mode of reconciliation, subject to fixed procedure and guidelines? What exactly can the committee
do, or not do? Can it only clarify or revise provisions found in either Senate or House bill? Is it
forbidden to propose additional or new provisions, even on matters necessarily or reasonably
connected with or germane to items in the bills being reconciled?
In answer, it is postulated that the reconciliation function is quite limited. In these cases, the
conference committee should have confined itself to reconciliation of differences or inconsistencies
only by (a) restoring provisions of HB 11197 eliminated by SB 1630, or (b) sustaining wholly or
partly the Senate amendments, or (c) as a compromise, agreeing that neither provisions nor
amendments be carried into the final form of HB 11197 for submission to both chambers of the
legislature.
The trouble is, it is theorized, the committee incorporated activities or transactions which were
not within the contemplation of both bills; it made additions and deletions which did not enjoy
the enlightenment of initial committee studies; it exercised what is known as an “ex post veto
power” granted to it by no law, rule or regulation, a power that in truth is denied to it by the
rules of both the Senate and the House. In substantiation, the Senate rule is cited, similar to that
of the House, providing that “differences shall be settled by a conference committee” whose report
shall contain “detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the
subject measure, ** (to be) signed by the conferees;” as well as the “Jefferson’s Manual,” adopted
by the Senate as supplement to its own rules, directing that the managers of the conference must
confine themselves to differences submitted to them; they may not include subjects not within the
disagreements even though germane to a question in issue.”
It is significant that the limiting proviso in the relevant rules has been construed and applied
as directory, not mandatory. During the oral argument, counsel for petitioners admitted that the
practice for decades has been for bicameral conference committees to include such provisions in
the reconciled bill as they believed to be germane or necessary and acceptable to both
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chambers, even if not within any of the “disagreeing provisions,” and the reconciled bills,
containing such provisions had invariably been approved and adopted by both houses of
Congress. It is a practice, they say, that should be stopped. But it is a practice that establishes in
no uncertain manner the prevailing concept in both houses of Congress of the permissible and
acceptable modes of reconciliation that their conference committees may adopt, one whose
undesirability is not all that patent if not, indeed, incapable of unquestionable demonstration.
The fact is that conference committees only take up bills which have already been freely and fully
discussed in both chambers of the legislature, but as to which there is need of reconciliation in
view of “disagreeing provisions” between them; and both chambers entrust the function of
reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference committee with full awareness, and tacit
consent, that conformably with established practice unquestioningly observed over many years,
new provisions may be included even if not within the “disagreeing provisions” but of which,
together with other changes, they will be given detailed and sufficiently explicit information prior
to voting on the conference committee version.
In any event, a fairly recent decision written for the Court by Senior Associate Justice Isagani
A. Cruz, promulgated on November 11, 1993 (G.R. No. 105371, The Philippine Judges
Association, etc., et al. v. Hon. Pete Prado, etc., et al.), should leave no doubt of the continuing
vitality of the enrolled bill doctrine and give an insight into the nature of the reconciling function
of bicameral conference committees. In that case, a bilateral conference committee was
constituted and met to reconcile Senate Bill No. 720 and House Bill No. 4200. It adopted a
“reconciled” measure that was submitted to and approved by both chambers of Congress and
ultimately signed into law by the President, as R.A. No. 7354. A provision in this statute
(removing the franking privilege from the courts, among others) was assailed as being an invalid
amendment because it was not included in the original version of either the senate or the house
bill and hence had generated no disagreement between them which had to be reconciled. The
Court held:
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“While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,
legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill.
But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions
occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1987 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3,
1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification
of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez (7 SCRA 347) laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeasand nays on the final
reading of the bill) (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1). The journals are themselves also binding
on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. v. Pons (34 Phil. 729),
where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying these
principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’
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charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually R.A. No. 7354 and
that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.”
Withal, an analysis of the changes made by the conference committee in HB 11197 and SB 1630
by way of reconciling their “disagreeing provisions,”—assailed by petitioners as unauthorized or
incongruous—reveals that many of the changes related to actual “disagreeing provisions,” and
that those that might perhaps be considered as entirely new are nevertheless necessarily or
logically connected with or germane to particular matters in the bills being reconciled.
For instance, the change made by the bicameral conference committee (BCC) concerning
amendments to Section 99 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)—the addition
of “lessors of goods or properties and importers of goods”—is really a reconciliation of disagreeing
provisions, for while HB 11197 mentions as among those subject to tax, “one who sells, barters, or
exchanges goods or properties and any person who leases personal properties,” SB 1630 does not.
The change also merely clarifies the provision by providing that the contemplated taxpayers
includes “importers.” The revision as regards the amendment to Section 100, NIRC, is also simple
reconciliation, being nothing more than the adoption by the BCC of the provision in HB 11197
governing the sale of gold to Bangko Sentral, in contrast to SB 1630 containing no such provision.
Similarly, only simple reconciliation was involved as regards approval by the BCC of a provision
declaring as not exempt, the sale of real properties primarily held for sale to customers or held for
lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, which provision is found in HB 11197 but not in
SB 1630; as regards the adoption by the BCC of a provision on life insurance business, contained
in SB 1630 but not found in HB 11197; as regards adoption by the BCC of the provision in SB
1630 for deferment of tax on certain goods and services for no longer than 3 years, as to which
there was no counterpart provision in SB 11197; and as regards the fixing of a
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period for the adoption of implementing rules, a period being prescribed in SB 1630 and none in
HB 11197.
In respect of other revisions, it would seem that questions logically arose in the course of the
discussion of specific “disagreeing provisions” to which answers were given which, because
believed acceptable to both houses of Congress, were placed in the BCC draft. For example,
during consideration of radio and television time (Sec. 100, NIRC) dealt with in both House and
Senate bills, the question apparently came up, the relevance of which is apparent on its face,
relative to satellite transmission and cable television time. Hence, a provision in the BCC bill on
the matter. Again, while deliberating on the definition of goods or properties in relation to the
provision subjecting sales thereof to tax, a question apparently arose, logically relevant, about
real properties intended to be sold by a person in economic difficulties, or because he wishes to
buy a car, i.e., not as part of a business, the BCC evidently resolved to clarify the matter by
excluding from the tax, “real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of business.” And in the course of consideration of the term, sale or exchange of
services (Sec. 102, NIRC), the inquiry most probably was posed as to whether the term should be
understood as including other services: e.g., services of lessors of property whether real or
personal, of warehousemen, of keepers of resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts, or of common
carriers, etc., and presumably the BCC resolved to clarify the matter by including the services
just mentioned. Surely, changes of this nature are obviously to be expected in proceedings before
bicameral conference committees and may even be considered grist for their mill, given the
history of such BCCs and their general practice here and abroad.
In any case, all the changes and revisions, and deletions, made by the conference committee
were all subsequently considered by and approved by both the Senate and the House, meeting
and voting separately. It is an unacceptable theorization, to repeat, that when the BCC report
and its proposed bill were submitted to the Senate and the House, the members thereof did not
bother to read, or what is worse, having read did not understand, what was before them, or did
not realize that there were new provisions in the reconciled version unrelated to any “disagreeing
provisions,” or that said new provisions or revisions were effectively concealed
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from them.
Moreover, it certainly was entirely within the power and prerogative of either legislative
chamber to reject the BCC bill and require the organization of a new bicameral conference
committee. That this option was not exercised by either house only proves that the BCC measure
was found to be acceptable as in fact it was approved and adopted by both chambers.
I vote to DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
It is a curious and almost incredible fact that at the hearing of these cases on July 7, 1994, the
lawyers who argued for the petitioners—two of them former presidents of the Senate and the
third also a member of that body—all asked this Court to look into the internal operations of
their Chamber and correct the irregularities they claimed had been committed there as well as in
the House of Representatives and in the bicameral conference committee.
While a member of the legislature would normally resist such intervention and invoke the
doctrine of separation of powers to protect Congress from what he would call judicial intrusion,
these counsel practically implored the Court to examine the questioned proceedings and to this
end go beyond the journals of each House, scrutinize the minutes of the committee, and
investigate all other matters relating to the passage of the bill (or bills) that eventually became
R.A. No. 7716.
In effect, the petitioners would have us disregard the time-honored inhibitions laid down by
the Court upon itself in the landmark case of U.S. v. Pons (34 Phil. 725), where it refused to
consider extraneous evidence to disprove the recitals in the journals of the Philippine Legislature
that it had adjourned sine die at midnight of February 28, 1914. Although it was generally known
then that the special session had actually exceeded the deadline fixed by the Governor-General in
his proclamation, the Court chose to be guided solely by the legislative journals, holding
significantly as follows:
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* * * From their very nature and object, the records of the legislature are as important as those of the
judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legis-lature, when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which
the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
of the Govern-ment, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But
counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly’s clock was stopped on February 28,
1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other
words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment
apparently within the fixed time by the Governor’s proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in
direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested,
“the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of
legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to
loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.”
* * * The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles
the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond the journals.
As one who has always respected the rationale of the separation of powers, I realize only too well
the serious implications of the relaxation of the doctrine except only for the weightiest of reasons.
The lowering of the barriers now dividing the three major branches of the government could lead
to invidious incursions by one department into the exclusive domains of the other departments to
the detriment of the proper discharge of the functions assigned to each of them by the
Constitution.
Still, while acknowledging the value of tradition and the reasons for judicial non-interference
announced in Pons, I am not disinclined to take a second look at the ruling from a more
pragmatic viewpoint and to tear down, if we must, the iron curtain it has hung, perhaps
improvidently, around the proceedings of the legislature.
I am persuaded even now that where a specific procedure is fixed by the Constitution itself, it
should not suffice for Congress to simply say that the rules have been observed and flatly
consider the matter closed. It does not have to be as final as that.
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I would imagine that the judiciary, and particularly this Court, should be able to verify that
statement and determine for itself, through the exercise of its own powers, if the Constitution
has, indeed, been obeyed.
In fact, the Court has already said that the question of whether certain procedural rules have
been followed is justiciable rather than political because what is involved is the legality and not
the wisdom of the act in question. So we ruled in Sanidad v. Commission on Elections (73 SCRA
333) on the amendment of the Constitution; in Daza v. Singson (180 SCRA 496) on the
composition of the Commission on Appointments; and in the earlier case of Tañada v. Cuenco
(103 Phil. 1051) on the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, among several other cases.
By the same token, the ascertainment of whether a bill underwent the obligatory three
readings in both Houses of Congress should not be considered an invasion of the territory of the
legislature as this would not involve an inquiry into its discretion in approving the measure but
only the manner in which the measure was enacted.
These views may upset the conservatives among us who are most comfortable when they allow
themselves to be petrified by precedents instead of venturing into uncharted waters. To be sure,
there is much to be said of the wisdom of the past expressed by vanished judges talking to the
future. Via trita est tuttisima.Except when there is a need to revise them because of an altered
situation or an emergent idea, precedents should tell us that, indeed, the trodden path is the
safest path.
It could be that the altered situation has arrived to welcome the emergent idea. The
jurisdiction of this Court has been expanded by the Constitution, to possibly include the review
the petitioners would have us make of the congressional proceedings being questioned. Perhaps it
is also time to declare that the activities of Congress can no longer be smoke-screened in the
inviolate recitals of its journals to prevent examination of its sacrosanct records in the name of
the separation of powers.
But then again, perhaps all this is not yet necessary at this time and all these observations are
but wishful musings for a more activist judiciary. For I find that this is not even necessary, at
least for me, to leave the trodden path in the search for new
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adventures in the byways of the law. The answer we seek, as I see it, is not far afield. It seems to
me that it can be found through a study of the enrolled bill alone and that we do not have to go
beyond that measure to ascertain if R.A. No. 7716 has been validly enacted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in case of conflict between the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals, it is the former that should prevail except only as to matters that the
Constitution requires to be entered in the journals. (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1). These are
the yeasand nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of at least one-
fifth of the members of the House (Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 16 [4]), the objections of the
President to a vetoed bill or item (Ibid, Sec. 27 [1]), and the names of the members voting for or
against the overriding of his veto (Id.Section 27 [1]). The origin of a bill is not specifically
required by the Constitution to be entered in the journals. Hence, on this particular matter, it is
the recitals in the enrolled bill and not in the journals that must control.
Article VI, Section 24, of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
The enrolled bill submitted to and later approved by the President of the Philippines as R.A. No.
7716 was signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
It carried the following certification over the signatures of the Secretary of the Senate and the
Acting Secretary of the House of Representatives:
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by the
House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994, and May 2, 1994.
Let us turn to Webster for the meaning of certain words:

To “originate” is “to bring into being; to create something (original); to invent; begin; start.”
The word “exclusively” means “excluding all others” and is derived from the word “exclusive,”
meaning “not shared or divided; sole; single.” Applying these
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meanings, I would read Section 24 as saying that the bills mentioned therein must be brought
into being, or created, or invented, or begun or started, only or singly or by no other body than the
House of Representatives.
According to the certification, R.A. No . 7716 “is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and
Senate Bill No. 1630.” Again giving the words used their natural and ordinary sense conformably
to an accepted canon of construction, I would read the word “consolidation” as a “combination or
merger” and derived from the word “consolidate,” meaning “to combine into one; merge; unite.”
The two bills were separately introduced in their respective Chambers. Both retained their
independent existence until they reached the bicameral conference committee where they were
consolidated. It was this consolidated measure that was finally passed by Congress and
submitted to the President of the Philippines for his approval.
House Bill No. 11197 originated in the House of Representatives but this was not the bill that
eventually became R.A. No. 7716. The measure that was signed into law by President Ramos was
the consolidation of that bill and another bill, viz.,Senate Bill No. 1630, which was introduced in
the Senate. The resultant enrolled bill thus did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. The enrolled bill itself says that part of it (and it does not matter to what extent)
originated in the Senate.
It would have been different if the only participation of the Senate was in the amendment of
the measure that was originally proposed in the House of Representatives. But this was not the
case. The participation of the Senate was not in proposing or concurring with amendments that
would have been incorporated in House Bill No. 11197. Its participation was in originating its
own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was not embodied in but merged with House Bill No. 11197.
Senate Bill No. 1630 was not even an amendment by substitution, assuming this was
permissible. To “substitute” means “to take the place of; to put or use in place of another.” Senate
Bill No. 1630 did not, upon its approval, replace (and thus eliminate) House Bill No. 11197. Both
bills retained their separate identities until they were joined or united into what became the
enrolled bill and ultimately R.A. No. 7716.
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The certification in the enrolled bill says it all. It is clear that R.A. No. 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives.
To go back to my earlier observations, this conclusion does not require the reversal of U.S. vs.
Pons and an inquiry by this Court into the proceedings of the legislature beyond the recitals of its
journals. All we need to do is consider the certification in the enrolled bill and, without entering
the precincts of Congress, declare that by its own admission it has, indeed, not complied with the
Constitution.
While this Court respects the prerogatives of the other departments, it will not hesitate to rise
to its higher duty to require from them, if they go astray, full and strict compliance with the
fundamental law. Our fidelity to it must be total. There is no loftier principle in our democracy
than the supremacy of the Constitution, to which all must submit.
I vote to invalidate R.A. No. 7716 for violation of Article VI, Sec. 24, of the Constitution.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
The original VAT law and the expanded VAT law
1
In Kapatiran v. Tan, where the ponente was the writer of this Separate Opinion,
a unanimous Supreme Court en banc upheld the validity of the original VAT law (Executive
Order No. 273, approved on 25 July 1987). It will, in my view, be pointless at this time to re-open
arguments advanced in said case as to why said VAT law was invalid, and it will be equally
redundant to re-state the principles laid down by the Court in the same case affirming the
validity of the VAT law as a tax measure. And yet, the same arguments are, in effect, marshalled
against the merits and substance of the expanded VAT law (Rep. Act No. 7716, approved on 5
May 1994). The same Supreme Court decision should
1 G.R. No. 81311, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 371.
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therefore dispose, in the main, of such arguments, for the expanded VAT law is predicated
basically on the same principles as the original VAT law, except that now the tax base of the VAT
imposition has been expanded or broadened.
It only needs to be stated—what actually should be obvious—that a tax measure, like the
expanded VAT law (Republic Act No. 7716), is enacted by Congress and approved by the
President in the exercise of the State’s power to tax, which is an attribute of sovereignty. And
while the power to tax, if exercised without limit, is a power to destroy, and should, therefore, not
be allowed in such form, it has to be equally recognized that the power to tax is an essential right
of government. Without taxes, basic services to the people can come to a halt; economic progress
will be stunted, and, in the long run, the people will suffer the pains of stagnation and
retrogression.
Consequently, upon careful deliberation, I have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that
the expanded VAT law comes within the legitimate powerof the state to tax. And as I had
occasion to previously state:
“Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom, exigency, or
even necessity. Neither the Executive2 nor the Legislative (Commission on Appointments) can create power
where the Constitution confers none.”
Likewise, in the first VAT case, I said:

“In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued application of the VAT are
prejudicial to the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek recourse
and relief from the political branches of the government. The Court, following the time-honored doctrine of
separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that3
of the President (and Congress) as to the
wisdom, justice and advisability of the adoption of the VAT.”
2 Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160.
3 Kapatiran, supra at 385.
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This Court should not, as a rule, concern itself with questions of policy, much less, economic
policy. That is better left to the two (2) political branches of government. That the expanded VAT
law is unwise, unpopular and even anti-poor, among other things said against it, are arguments
and considerations within the realm of policy-debate, which only Congress and the Executive
have the authority to decisively confront, alleviate, remedy and resolve.
II
The procedure followed in the approval of Rep. Act No. 7716 Petitioners however posit that the
present case raises a far-reaching constitutional question which
4
the Court is duty-bound to decide
under its expanded jurisdiction in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners more specifically question
and impugn the manner by which the expanded VAT law (Rep. Act No. 7716) was approved by
Congress. They contend that it was approved in violation of the Constitution from which fact it
follows, as a consequence, that the law is null and void. Main reliance of the petitioners in their
assault is Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bill of local
propose or concur with amendments.”
While it should be admitted at the outset that there was no rigorous and strict adherence to the
literal command of the above provision, it may however be said, after careful reflection, that there
was substantial compliance with the provision.
There is no question that House Bill No. 11197 expanding the VAT law originated from the
House of Representatives. It is undeniably a House measure. On the other hand, Senate Bill No.
1129, also expanding the VAT law, originated from the Senate. It
4 Sec. 1, Art. VIII.
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is undeniably a Senate measure which, in point of time, actually antedated House Bill No. 11197.
But it is of record that when House Bill No. 11197 was, after approval by the House, sent to
the Senate, it was referred to, and considered by the Senate Committee on Ways and Means
(after first reading) together with Senate Bill No. 1129, and the Committee came out with Senate
Bill No. 1630 in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 but after expressly taking into consideration
House Bill No. 11197.
Since the Senate is, under the above-quoted constitutional provision, empowered to concur
with a revenue measure exclusively originating from the House, or to propose amendments
thereto, to the extent of proposing amendments by SUBSTITUTION to the House measure, the
approval by the Senate of Senate Bill No. 1630, after it had considered House Bill No. 11197, may
be taken, in my view, as an AMENDMENT BY SUBSTITUTION by the Senate not only of Senate
Bill No. 1129 but of House Bill No. 11197 as well which, it must be remembered, originated
exclusively from the House.
But then, in recognition of the fact that House Bill No. 11197 which originated exclusively
from the House and Senate Bill No. 1630 contained conflicting provisions, both bills (House Bill
No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630) were referred to the Bicameral Conference Committee for
joint consideration with a view to reconciling their conflicting provisions.
The Conference Committee came out eventually with a Conference Committee Bill which was
submitted to both chambers of Congress (the Senate and the House). The Conference Committee
reported out a bill consolidating provisions in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630.
What transpired in both chambers after the Conference Committee Report was submitted to
them is not clear from the records in this case. What is clear however is that both chambers voted
separately on the bill reported out by the Conference Committee and both chambers approved the
bill of the Conference Committee.
To me then, what should really be important is that both chambers of Congress approved the
bill reported out by the Conference Committee. In my considered view, the act of both chambers
of Congress in approving the Conference Committee bill, should put an end to any inquiry by this
Court as to how the
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bill came about. What is more, such separate approvals CURED whatever constitutional
infirmities may have arisen in the procedures leading to such approvals. For, if such infirmities
were serious enough to impugn the very validity of the measure itself, there would have been an
objection or objections from members of both chambers to the approval. The Court has been
shown no such objection on record in both chambers.
Petitioners contend that there were violations of Sec. 26 paragraph 2, Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
“SEC. 26. x x x
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.”
in that, when Senate Bill No. 1630 (the Senate counterpart of House Bill No. 11197) was
approved by the Senate, after it had been reported out by the Senate Committee on Ways and
Means, the bill went through second and third readings on the same day (not separate days) and
printed copies thereof in its final form were not distributed to the members of the Senate at least
three (3) days before its passage by the Senate. But we are told by the respondents that the
reason for this “short cut” was that the President had certified to the necessity of the bill’s
immediate enactment to meet an emergency—a certification that, by leave of the same
constitutional provision, dispensed with the second and third readings on separate days and the
printed form at least three (3) days before its passage.
We have here then a situation where the President did certify to the necessity of Senate Bill
No. 1630’s immediate enactment to meet an emergency and the Senate responded accordingly.
While I would be the last to say that this Court cannot review the exercise of such power by the
President in appropriate cases ripe for judicial review, I am not prepared however to say that the
President gravely abused his discretion in the exercise of such power as to require that this Court
overturn his action. We have
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been shown no fact or circumstance which would impugn the judgment of the President,
concurred in by the Senate, that there was an emergency that required the immediate enactment
of Senate Bill No. 1630. On the other hand, a becoming respect for a co-equal and coordinate
department of government points that weight and credibility be given to such Presidential
judgment.
The authority or power of the Conference Committee to make insertions in and deletions from
the bills referred to it, namely, House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 is likewise assailed
by petitioners. Again, what appears important here is that both chambers approved and ratified
the bill as reported out by the Conference Committee (with the reported insertions and deletions).
This is perhaps attributable to the known legislative practice of allowing a Conference Committee
to make insertions in and deletions from bills referred to it for consideration, as long as they are
germane to the subject matter of the bills under consideration. Besides, when the Conference
Committee made the insertions and deletions complained of by petitioners, was it not actually
performing the task assigned to it of reconciling conflicting provisions in House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630?
This Court impliedly if not expressly recognized the fact of such
5
legislative practice
in Philippine Judges Association, etc. vs. Hon. Peter Prado, etc.. In said case, we stated thus:
“The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment
to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both
Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the
Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:
‘A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences
5 G.R. No. 103371, 11 November 1993.
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between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur
even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).’
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and
duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with
its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.”
It would seem that if corrective measures are in order to clip the powers of the Conference
Committee, the remedy should come from either or both chambers of Congress, not from this
Court, under the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers.
Finally, as certified by the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives—
“This Act (Rep. Act No. 7716) is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 (w)as
finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994 and May 2, 1994
respectively.”
Under the long-accepted doctrine of the “enrolled bill,” the Court in deference to a co-equal and
coordinate branch of government is held to a recognition of Rep. Act No. 7716 as a law validly
enacted by Congress and, thereafter, approved by the President on 5 May 1994. Again, we quote
from our recent decision in Philippine Judges Association, supra:
“Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez6
67 SCRA 347.
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laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except
7
in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nayson the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves
8
also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we
explained the reason thus:
‘To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.’
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to
which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.”
III
Press Freedom and Religious Freedom and Rep. Act No. 7716
The validity of the passage of Rep. Act No. 7716 notwithstanding, certain provisions of the law
have to be examined separately and carefully.
Rep. Act No. 7716 in imposing a value-added tax on circulation income of newspapers and 9
similar publications and on income derived from publishing advertisements in newspapers, to
my mind, violates Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution. Indeed, even the Executive Department has
tried to cure this defect by the issuance of BIR Regulation No. 11-94precluding implementation of
the tax in this area. It should be clear, however, that the BIR
7 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.

8 34Phil. 729.
9 Executive Order No. 273, in Sec. 103 (f), had exempted this kind of income from the VAT. Rep. Act. No. 7716 removed
the exemption.
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regulation cannot amend the law (Rep. Act No. 7716). Only legislation (as distinguished from
administration regulation) can amend an existing law.
Freedom of the press was virtually unknown in the Philippines before 1900. In fact, a prime
cause of the revolution against Spain at the turn of the 19th century was the repression of the
freedom of speech and expression and of the press. No less than our national hero, Dr. Jose P.
Rizal, in “Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos” (The Philippines a Century Hence) describing the
reforms sine quibus nonwhich the Filipinos were insisting upon, stated: “The minister x x x who 10
wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free x x x.”
Press freedom in the Philippines has met repressions, most notable of which was the closure of
almost all forms of existing mass media upon the imposition of martial law on 21 September
1972.
Section 4, Art. III of the Constitution maybe traced to the United States Federal Constitution.
The guarantee of freedom of expression was planted in the Philippines by President McKinley in
the Magna Carta of Philippine Liberty, Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission on 7
April 1900.
The present constitutional provision which reads:
“Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”
is essentially the same as that guaranteed in the U.S. Federal Constitution, for which reason,
American case law giving judicial expression as to its meaning is highly persuasive in the
Philippines.
The plain words of the provision reveal the clear intention that no prior restraint can be
imposed on the exercise of free speech and expression if they are to remain effective and
meaningful. 11
The U.S. Supreme Court in the leading case of Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc. declared
a statute imposing a gross
10 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731.

11 297 U.S. 233.
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receipts license tax of 2% on circulation and advertising income of newspaper publishers as

constituting a prior restraint which is contrary
12
to the guarantee of freedom of the press.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “Any system of prior
restraint of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutionality.” In this jurisdiction, prior restraint on the exercise of free expression can be
justified only on the ground that there
13
is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent.
In the present case, the tax imposed on circulation and advertising income of newspaper
publishers is in the nature of a prior restraint on circulation and free expression and, absent a
clear showing that the requisite for prior restraint is present, the constitutional flaw in the law is
at once apparent and should not be allowed to proliferate.
Similarly, the imposition of the VAT on the sale and distribution of religious articles must be
struck down for being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. III of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.”
That such a tax on the sale and distribution of religious articles is unconstitutional, has been long
settled in American Bible Society, supra.
Insofar, therefore, as Rep. Act No. 7716 imposes a value-added tax on the exercise of the
above-discussed two (2) basic constitutional rights, Rep. Act No. 7716 should be declared
unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
IV
Petitions of CREBA and PAL and Rep. Act No. 7716
12 372 U.S. 58.

13 American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386.
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The Chamber of Real Estate and Builder’s Association, Inc. (CREBA) filed its own petition (GR
No. 11574) arguing that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7716 imposing a 10% value-added tax on
the gross selling price or gross value in money of every sale, barter or exchange of goods or
properties (Section 2) and a 10% value-added tax on gross receipts derived from the sale or
exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties (Section 3), violate the equal
protection, due process and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution as well as the rule
that taxation should be uniform, equitable and progressive.
The issue of whether or not the value-added tax is uniform, equitable and progressive has been
settled in Kapatiran.
CREBA which specifically assails the 10% value-added tax on the gross selling price of real
properties, fails to distinguish between a sale of real properties primarily held for sale to
customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business and isolated sales by
individual real property owners (Sec. 103[s]). That those engaged in the business of real estate
development realize great profits is of common knowledge and need not be discussed at length
here. The qualification in the law that the 10% VAT covers only sales of real property primarily
held for sale to customers, i.e. for trade or business thus takes into consideration a taxpayer’s
capacity to pay. There is no showing that the consequent distinction in real estate sales is
arbitrary and in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The inherent power
to tax of the State, which is vested in the legislature, includes the power to determine whom or
what to tax, as well as how much to tax. In the absence of a clear showing that the tax violates
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, this Court, in keeping with the
doctrine of separation of powers, has to defer to the discretion and judgment of Congress on this
point.
Philippine Airlines (PAL) in a separate petition (G.R. No. 115852) claims that its franchise
under PD No. 1590 which makes it liable for a franchise tax of only 2% of gross revenues “in lieu
of all the other fees and charges of any kind, nature or description, imposed, levied, established,
assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial, or national authority or government
agency, now or in the future,” cannot be amended by Rep. Act No. 7716 as to make it (PAL) liable
for a 10% value-added tax
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on revenues, because Sec. 24 of PD No. 1590 provides that PAL’s franchise can only be amended,
modified or repealed by a special law specifically for that purpose.
The validity of PAL’s above argument can be tested by ascertaining the true intention of
Congress in enacting Rep. Act No. 7716. Sec. 4 thereof dealing with Exempt Transactions states:
“Section 103. Exempt Transactions.—The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decrees
No. 66 , 529, 972, 1491, 1590, x x x” (emphasis supplied)
The repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 7716 further reads:

“Sec. 20. Repealing clauses.—The provisions of any special law relative to the rate of franchise taxes are
hereby expressly repealed.
xxx
All other laws, orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly” (emphasis supplied)
There can be no dispute, in my mind, that the clear intent of Congress was to modify PAL’s
franchise with respect to the taxes it has to pay. To this extent, Rep. Act No. 7716 can be
considered as a special law amending PAL’s franchise and its tax liability thereunder. That Rep.
Act No. 7716 imposes the value-added taxes on other subjects does not make it a general law
which cannot amend PD No. 1590.
To sum up: it is my considered view that Rep. Act No. 7716 (the expanded value-added tax) is
a valid law, viewed from both substantive and procedural standards, except only insofar as it
violates Secs. 4 and 5, Art. III of the Constitution (the guarantees of freedom of expression and
the free exercise of religion). To that extent, it is, in its present form, unconstitutional.
I, therefore, vote to DISMISS the petitions, subject to the above qualification.
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SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Lest we be lost by a quagmire of trifles, the real threshold and prejudicial issue, to my mind, is
whether or not this Court is ready to assume and to take upon itself with an overriding authority
the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Far from it, ours is merely to
construe and to apply the law regardless of its wisdom and salutariness, and to strike it down
only when it clearly disregards constitutional proscriptions. It is what the fundamental law
mandates, and it is what the Court must do.
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly provocative as it might be, that
under the 1987 Constitution the Court may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the
people’s imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can still then remain, I
ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed principle of separation of powers, if at every turn
the Court allows itself to pass upon, at will, the disposition of a co-equal, independent and
coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties
that such an undue interference can lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our
jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity not timidity, of stability rather than
quiescence.
It has never occurred to me, and neither do I believe it has been intended, that judicial
tyranny is envisioned, let alone institutionalized, by our people in the 1987 Constitution. The test
of tyranny is not solely on how it is wielded but on how, in the first place, it can be capable of
being exercised. It is time that any such perception of judicial omnipotence is corrected.
Against all that has been said, I see, in actuality in these cases at bench, neither a
constitutional infringement of substance, judging from precedents already laid down by this
Court in previous cases, nor a justiciability even now of the issues raised, more than an attempt
to sadly highlight the perceived short comings in the procedural enactment of laws, a matter
which is internal to Congress and an area that is best left to its own basic concern. The fact of the
matter is that the legislative enactment,
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in its final form, has received the ultimate approval of both houses of Congress. The finest
rhetoric, indeed fashionable in the early part of this closing century, would still be a poor
substitute for tangibility. I join, nonetheless, some of my colleagues in respectfully inviting the
kind attention of the honorable members of our Congress in the suggested circumspect
observance of their own rules.
A final remark. I should like to make it clear that this opinion does not necessarily foreclose
the right, peculiar to any taxpayer adversely affected, to pursue at the proper time, in
appropriate proceedings, and in proper fora, the specific remedies prescribed therefor by the
National Internal Revenue Code, Republic Act 1125, and other laws, as well as rules of
procedure, such as may be pertinent. Some petitions filed with this Court are, in essence,
although styled differently, in the nature of declaratory relief over which this Court is bereft of
original jurisdiction.
All considered, I, therefore, join my colleagues who are voting for the dismissal of the petitions.
DISSENTING OPINION
REGALADO, J.:
It would seem like an inconceivable irony that Republic Act No. 7716 which, so respondents
claim, was conceived by the collective wisdom of a bicameral Congress and crafted with sedulous
care by two branches of government should now be embroiled in challenges to its validity for
having been enacted in disregard of mandatory prescriptions of the Constitution itself. Indeed,
such impugnment by petitioners goes beyond merely the procedural flaws in the parturition of
the law. Creating and regulating as it does definite rights to property, but with its own passage
having been violative of explicit provisions of the organic law, even without going into the
intrinsic merits of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7716 its substantive invalidity is pro
factonecessarily entailed.
How it was legislated into its present statutory existence is not in serious dispute and need not
detain us except for a recital of some salient and relevant facts. The House of Representatives
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1
passed House Bill No. 11197 on third reading on November 17, 1993 and, the following day, it
transmitted the same to the Senate for concurrence. On its part, the Senate approved Senate Bill
No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994. It is important to note in this regard
that on March 22, 1994, said S.B. No. 1630 had been certified by President Fidel V. Ramos for
immediate enactment to meet a public emergency, that is, a growing budgetary deficit. There was
no such certification for H.B. No. 11197 although it was the initiating revenue bill.
It is, therefore, not only a curious fact but, more importantly, an invalid procedure since that
Presidential certification was erroneously made for and confined to S.B. No. 1630 which was
indisputably a tax bill and, under the Constitution, could not validly originate in the Senate.
Whatever is claimed in favor of S.B. No. 1630 under the blessings of that certification, such as its
alleged exemption from the three separate readings requirement, is accordingly negated and
rendered inutile by the inefficacious nature of said certification as it could lawfully have been
issued only for a revenue measure originating exclusively from the lower House. To hold
otherwise would be to validate a Presidential certification of a bill initiated in the Senate despite
the Constitutional prohibition against its originating therefrom.
Equally of serious significance is the fact that S.B. No. 1630 was reported out in Committee
Report No. 349 submitted to the Senate on February 7, 1994 and approved by that body “in
substitution
2
of S.B. No. 1129,” while merely “taking into consideration P.S. No. 734 and H.B. No.
11197.” S.B. No. 1630, therefore, was never filed in substitution of either P.S. No. 734 or, more
emphatically, of H.B. No. 11197 as these two legislative issuances were merely taken account of,
at the most, as referential bases or materials.
This is not a play on misdirection for, in the first instance, the respondents assure us that H.B.
No. 11197 was actually the sole
1 Insubstitution of H.B. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100 which were filed over the
period from July 22, 1992 to August 3, 1993.
2 P.S. Res. No. 734 had earlier been filed in the Senate on September 10, 1992, while S.B. No. 1129 was filed on March
1, 1993.
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source of and started the whole legislative process which culminated in Republic Act No. 7716.
The participation of the Senate in enacting S.B. No. 1630 was, it is claimed, justified as it was
merely in pursuance of its power to concur in or propose
3
amendments to H.B. No. 11197. Citing
the 83-year old case of Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co., it is blithely announced that such power to
amend includes an amendment by substitution, that is, even to the extent of substituting the
entire H.B. No. 11197 by an altogether completely new measure of Senate provenance. Ergo, so
the justification goes, the Senate acted perfectly in accordance with its amending power under
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution since it merely proposed amendments through a bill
allegedly prepared in advance.
This is a mode of argumentation which, by reason of factual inaccuracy and logical
implausibility, both astounds and confounds. For, it is of official record that S.B. No. 1630 was
filed, certified and enacted in substitution of S.B. No. 1129 which in itself was likewise in
derogation of the Constitutional prohibition against such initiation of a tax bill in the Senate. In
any event, S.B. No. 1630 was neither intended as a bill to be adopted by the Senate nor to be
referred to the bicameral conference committee as a substitute for H.B. No. 11197. These
indelible facts appearing in official documents cannot be erased by any amount of strained
convolutions or incredible pretensions that S.B. No. 1630 was supposedly enacted in anticipation
of H.B. No. 11197.
On that score alone, the invocation by the Solicitor General of the hoary concept of amendment
by substitution falls flat on its face. Worse, his concomitant citation of Flint to recover from that
prone position only succeeded in turning the same postulation over, this time supinely flat on its
back. As elsewhere noted by some colleagues, which I will just refer to briefly to avoid
duplication, respondents initially sought sanctuary in that doctrine supposedly laid down
in Flint, thus: “It has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an4 entirely new measure for the
one originally proposed can be supported as a valid amendment.” (Emphasis supplied.) During
the interpellation by the writer at
3 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911).

4 Consolidated Comment, 36-37.
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the oral argument held in these cases, the attention of the Solicitor General was called to the fact
that the amendment in Flintconsisted only of a single item, that is, the substitution of a corporate
tax for an inheritance tax proposed in a general revenue bill; and that the text of the decision
therein nowhere contained the supposed doctrines he quoted and ascribed to the court, as those
were merely summations of arguments of counsel therein. It is indeed a source of disappointment
for us, but an admission of desperation on his part, that, instead of making a clarification
5
or a
defense of his contention, the Solicitor General merely reproduced all over again the same
quotations as they appeared in his original consolidated comment, without venturing any
explanation or justification.
The aforestated dissemblance, thus unmasked, has further undesirable implications on the
contentions advanced by respondents in their defense. For, even indulging respondents ex gratia
argumenti in their pretension that S.B. No. 1630 substituted or replaced H.B. No. 11197, aside
from muddling the issue of the true origination of the disputed law, this would further enmesh
respondents in a hopeless contradiction.
In a publication authorized by the Senate and from which the Solicitor General has liberally
quoted, it is reported as an accepted rule therein that “(a)n amendment by 6
substitution when
approved takes the place of the principal bill. C.R. March 19, 1963, p. 943.” Stated elsewise, the
principal bill is supplanted and goes out of actuality. Applied to the present situation, and
following respondents’ submission that H.B. No. 11197 had been substituted or replaced in its
entirety, then in law it had no further existence for purposes of the subsequent stages of
legislation except, possibly, for referential data.
Now, the enrolled bill thereafter submitted to the President of the Philippines, signed by the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, carried this solemn
certification over the signatures of the respective secretaries of
5 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 56-57.

6 Orquiola,H. M., Annotated Rules of the Senate and Procedure, Precedents and Practices of the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines since 1946, 1991 Ed., 108.
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both chambers: “This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994, and
May 2, 1994.” (Italics mine.) In reliance thereon, the Chief Executive signed the same into law as
Republic Act No. 7716.
The confusion to which the writer has already confessed is now compounded by that official
text of the aforequoted certification which speaks, and this cannot be a mere lapsus calami, of
two independent and existingbills (one of them being H.B. No. 11197) which were consolidated to
produce
7
the enrolled bill. In parliamentary usage, to consolidate two bills, is to unite them into
one and which, in the case at bar, necessarily assumes that H.B. No. 11197 never became legally
inexistent. But did not the Solicitor General, under the theory of amendment by substi-tution of
the entire H.B. No. 11197 by S.B. No. 1630, thereby premise the same upon the replacement,
hence the total elimination from the legislative process, of H.B. 11197?
It results, therefore, that to prove compliance with the requirement for the exclusiveorigination
of H.B. No. 11197, two alternative but inconsistent theories had to be espoused and defended by
respondents’ counsel. To justify the introduction and passage of S.B. No. 1630 in the Senate, it
was supposedly enacted only as an amendment by substitution, hence on that theory H.B. No.
11197 had to be considered as displaced and terminated from its role or existence. Yet, likewise
for the same purpose but this time on the theory of origination by consolidation, H.B. No. 11197
had to be resuscitated so it could be united or merged with S.B. No. 1630. This latter alternative
theory, unfortunately, also exacerbates the constitutional defect for then it is an admission of
a dualorigination of the two tax bills, each respectively initiated in and coming from the lower
and upper chambers of Congress.
Parenthetically, it was also this writer who pointedly brought this baffling situation to the
attention of the Solicitor General during the aforesaid oral argument, to the extent of reading
aloud the certification in full. We had hoped thereby to be clarified on these vital issue in
respondents’ projected memo-
7 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1951), 381, citing Fairview vs. Durham, 45 Iowa 56.
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randum, but we have not been favored with an explanation unraveling this dilemma. Verily, by
passing sub silentio on these intriguing submissions, respondents have wreaked havoc on both
logic and law just to gloss over their non-compliance with the Constitutional mandate for
exclusive origination of a revenue bill. The procedure required therefor, we emphatically add, can
be satisfied only by complete and strict compliance since this is laid down by the Constitution
itself and not by a mere statute.
This writer consequently agrees with the clearly tenable proposition of petitioners that when
the Senate passed and approved S.B. No. 1630, had it certified by the Chief Executive, and
thereafter caused its consideration by the bicameral conference committee in total substitution of
H.B. No. 11197, it clearly and deliberately violated the requirements of the Constitution not only
in the origination of the bill but in the very enactment of Republic Act No. 7716. Contrarily, the
shifting sands of inconsistency in the arguments adduced for respondents betray such lack of
intellectual rectitude as to give the impression of being mere rhetorics in defense of the
indefensible.
We are told, however, that by our discoursing on the foregoing issues we are intruding into
non-justiciable areas long declared verboten by such time-honored doctrines as those on political
questions, the enrolled bill theory and the respect due to two co-equal and coordinate branches of
Government, all derived from the separation of powers inherent in republicanism. 8We appreciate
the lectures, 9
but we are not exactly unaware of the teachings in U.S. vs.10 Pons, Mabanag vs.
Lopez11
Vito, Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, etc., et al., Morales vs. Subido,
12
etc., and Philippine Judges Association,
13
etc., et al. vs. Prado, etc., et al., on the one
14
hand,
and Tañada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al., Sanidad, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., and
8 34 Phil. 729 (1916).

9 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
10 L-17931, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 347.
11 L-29658, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 131.
12 G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.
13 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
14 L-46640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333.
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15
Daza vs. Singson, et al., on the other, to know which would be applicable to the present
controversy and which should be rejected.
But, first, a positional exordium. The writer of this opinion would be among the first to
acknowledge and enjoin not only courtesy to, but respect for, the official acts of the Executive and
Legislative departments, but only so long as the same are in accordance with or are defensible
under the fundamental charter and the statutory law. He would readily be numbered in the
ranks of those who would preach a reasoned sermon on the separation of powers, but with the
qualification that the same are not contained in tripartite compartments separated by imper-
meable membranes. He also ascribes to the general validity of American constitutional doctrines
as a matter of historical and legal necessity, but not to the extent of being oblivious to political
changes or unmindful of the fallacy of undue generalization arising from myopic disregard of the
factual setting of each particular case.
These ruminations have likewise been articulated and dissected by my colleagues, hence it is
felt that the only issue which must be set aright in this dissenting opinion is the so-called
enrolled bill doctrine to which we are urged to cling with reptilian tenacity. It will be
preliminarily noted that the official certification appearing right on the face of Republic Act No.
7716 would even render unnecessary any further judicial inquiry into the proceedings which
transpired in the two legislative chambers and, on a parody of tricameralism, in the bicameral
conference committee. Moreover, we have the excellent dissertations of some of my colleagues on
these matters, but respondents insist en contra that the congressional proceedings cannot
properly be inquired into by this Court. Such objection confirms a suppressive pattern aimed at
sacrificing the rule of law to the fiat of expediency.
Respondents thus emplaced on their battlements the 16pronouncement of this Court in the
aforecited case of Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado. Their reliance thereon falls into the
same error committed by their seeking refuge in the Flint case, ante., which, as has earlier been
demonstrated (aside from
15 G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.

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the quotational misrepresentation), could not be on par with the factual situation in the present
case. Flint, to repeat, involved a mere amendment on a single legislative item, that is,
substituting the proposal therein of an inheritance tax by one on corporate tax. Now, in their
submission based on Philippine Judges Association, respondents studiously avoid mention of the
fact that the questioned insertion referred likewise to a single item, that is, the repeal of the
franking privilege theretofore granted to the judiciary. That both cases cannot be equated with
those at bar, considering the multitude of items challenged and the plethora of constitutional
violations involved, is too obvious to belabor. Legal advocacy and judicial adjudication must have
a becoming sense of qualitative proportion, instead of lapsing into the discredited and maligned
practice of yielding blind adherence to precedents.
The writer unqualifiedly affirms his respect for valid official acts of the two branches of
government and eschews any unnecessary intrusion into their operational management and
internal affairs. These, without doubt, are matters traditionally protected by the republican
principle of separation of powers. Where, however, there is an overriding necessity for judicial
intervention in light of the pervasive magnitude of the problems presented and the gravity of the
constitutional violations alleged, but this Court cannot perform its constitutional duty expressed
in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution unless it makes the inescapable inquiry, then the
confluence of such factors should compel an exception to the rule as an ultimate recourse. The
cases now before us present both the inevitable challenge and the inescapable exigency for
judicial review. For the Court to now shirk its bounden duty would not only project it as a citadel
of the timorous and the slothful, but could even undermine its raison d’etre as the highest and
ultimate tribunal.
Hence, this dissenting opinion has touched on events behind and which transpired prior to the
presentation of the enrolled bill for approval into law. The details of that law which resulted from
the legislative action followed by both houses of Congress, the substantive validity of whose
provisions and the procedural validity of which legislative process are here challenged as
unconstitutional, have been graphically presented by petitioners and admirably explained in the
respective opinions of my brethren. The writer concurs in the conclusions drawn therefrom and
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rejects the contention that we have unjustifiably breached the dike of the enrolled bill doctrine.
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity originally
attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the
competency of judicial inquiry, it has been held that “(u)nder the ‘enrolled bill rule’ by which an
enrolled bill is sole expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid
enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by
the Constitution
17
of which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the
evidence.” 18
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
“(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative officers and filed with the
secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from
the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers,
contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of
the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text
633, 41 So. 72, 73:
‘This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they control, and against such proof the
enrolled bill is not conclusive.’ ”
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13,
1980 by19
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue,
et al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder:
17 Brailsford
vs. Walker, 31 S.E. 2d 385, 387, 388, 205 S.C. 228.
18 110So. 343, 346.
19 602 South Western Reporter, 2d Series, 402-425, jointly deciding Carrollton Wholesale Tobaccos, Inc. et al. vs.
Department of Revenue, et al., and Bluegrass Provisions Co., Inc., et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al.
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“x x x In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of decisions of this
court which created and nurtured the so-called ‘enrolled bill’ doctrine.
xxx
“[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the legislature must follow
before a bill can be considered for final passage. x x x.
xxx
“x x x Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a
bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.
xxx
“x x x In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled
and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety of its
enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was
reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second, reasons of
convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records and anticipated
considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor record-
keeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as enrolled,
rather than opening up the records of the legislature. x x x.
xxx
“Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim. There are four
historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a ‘record’ and, as such, was not subject to attack at
common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal,
must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule was originally
formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing of equities required that
the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of convenience as expressed by the
Kentucky court in Lafferty.
“The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however, and it has not been without its critics. From an
examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticisms as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions,
especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results
which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to fraud, forgery,
corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and electronic record-keeping devices now used by
legislatures
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remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to
seek the truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
“[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is “Stare
decisis et non quieta movere,” which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and not disturb settled
points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or
logic. As we stated in Daniel’s Adm’r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941) (citations
omitted):
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the extent of the disturbance of rights
and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent
considerations are whether there is clear error and urgent reasons ‘for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to go
from one doubtful rule to another,’ and whether or not the evils of the principle that has been followed will be more
injurious than can possibly result from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is
unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
“[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Laffertydecision, the poor record-keeping of the
legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in record-keeping by our
General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment,
printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as to the
ability of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.
“It is also apparent that the ‘convenience’ rule is not appropriate in today’s modern and developing
judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if
one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice is
done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any doctrine
or presumption that so provides.
“Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government requires that we
shut our eyes to constitutional failings and other errors of our coparceners in government. We simply do not
agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any
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law contrary to the constitution is ‘void.’ The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any
law which is unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without belaboring the point, we believe that under
section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to ‘support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth.’ We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution—by any person, corporation, state
agency or branch of government—are brought to light and corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law
that silences our voices when confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court.
“We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the ‘extrinsic
evidence’ rule. x x x. Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid,
but such presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that
constitutional requirements have not been met.
“We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called enrolled bill
doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. x x x”
(Emphases mine.)
Undeniably, the value-added tax system may have its own merits to commend its continued
adoption, and the proposed widening of its base could achieve laudable governmental objectives if
properly formulated and conscientiously implemented. We would like to believe, however, that
ours is not only an enlightened democracy nurtured by a policy of transparency but one where the
edicts of the fundamental law are sacrosanct for all, barring none. While the realization of the
lofty ends of this administration should indeed be the devout wish of all, likewise barring none, it
can never be justified by methods which, even if unintended, are suggestive of Machiavellism.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the instant petitions and to invalidate Republic Act No. 7716 for
having been enacted in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The legislative history of R.A. No. 7716, as highlighted in the Consolidated Memorandum for the
public respondents submitted
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by the Office of the Solicitor General, demonstrates beyond doubt that it was passed in violation
or deliberate disregard of mandatory provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of both
chambers of Congress relating to the enactment of bills.
I therefore vote to strike down R.A. No. 7716 as unconstitutional and as having been enacted
with grave abuse of discretion.
The Constitution provides for a bicameral Congress. Therefore, no bill can be enacted into law
unless it is approved by both chambers—the Senate and the House of Representatives
(hereinafter House). Otherwise stated, each chamber may propose and approve a bill, but until it
is submitted to the other chamber and passed by the latter, it cannot be submitted to the
President for its approval into law.
Paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
“No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.”
The “three readings” refer to the three readings in both chambers.

There are, however, bills which must originate exclusively in the House. Section 24, Article VI
of the Constitution enumerates them:
“SEC. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
1
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines originate as follows:

“vt 1: to cause the beginning of: give rise to: INITIATE . . . 2. to start (a person or thing) on a course of
journey . . . vi: to take or have
1 1971 ed., 1592.
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origin: be derived: ARISE, BEGIN, START . . .”

2
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word exclusivelyin this wise:
“Apart from all others; only; solely; substantially all or for the greater part. To the exclusion of all others;
without admission of others to participation; in a manner to exclude.”
3
In City Mayor vs. The Chief of Philippine Constabulary, this Court said:
“The term ‘exclusive’ in its usual and generally accepted sense, means possessed to the exclusion of others;
appertaining to the subject alone, not including, admitting or pertaining to another or others, undivided,
sole. (15 Words and Phrases, p. 510, citing Mitchel v. Tulsa Water, Light, Heat and Power Co., 95 P. 961, 21
Okl. 243; and p. 513, citing Commonwealth v. Superintendent of House of Correction, 64 Pa. Super. 613,
615).”
Indisputably then, only the House can cause the beginning or initiate the passage of any
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, any bill increasing the public debt, any bill of local
application, or any private bill. The Senate can only “propose or concur with amendments.”
Under the Rules of the Senate, the first reading is the reading of the title of the bill and its
referral to the corresponding committee; the second reading consists of the reading of the bill in
the form recommended by the corresponding committee; and the 4third reading is the reading of
the bill in the form it will be after approval on second reading. During the second reading, the
following takes place:
(1) Second reading of the bill;

(2) Sponsorship by the Committee Chairman or any member designated by the corresponding
committee;
2 Sixth Edition (1990), 565, citing Standard Oil Co. of Texas vs. State, Tex. Civ. App., 142 S.W.2d 519, 521, 522, 523.
3 21 SCRA 665, 673 [1967].
4 Sections 52 and 53, Rule XXIII.
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(3) If a debate ensues, turns for and against the bill shall be taken alternately;
(4) The sponsor of the bill closes the debate;
(5) After the close of the debate, the period of amendments follows;
5
(6) Then, after the period of amendments is closed, the voting on the bill on second reading.
After approval on second reading, printed copies thereof in its final form shall be distributed to
the Members of the Senate at least three days prior to the third reading, except in cases of
certified bills. At the third
6
reading, the final vote shall be taken and the yeasand nays shall be
entered in the Journal.
Under the Rules of the House, the first reading of a bill consists of a reading
7
of the number,
title, and author followed by the referral to the appropriate committees; the second reading
consists
8
of the reading in full of the bill with the amendments proposed by the committee, if
any; and the third reading is the reading of the bill in the form as approved on second reading
and takes place only after printed copies thereof in its final form 9 have been distributed to the
Members at least three days before, unless the bill is certified. At the second reading, the
following takes place:
(1) Reading of the bill;

(2) Sponsorship;
(3) Debates;
(4) Period of Amendments; and
10
(5) Voting on Second Reading.
At the third
11
reading, the votes shall be taken immediately and the yeasand nays entered in the
Journal.
5 Section 57, Rule XXV.
6 Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution; paragraph (7), Section 57, Rule XXV.
7 Section 69, Rule XIV.
8 Section 77, Id.
9 Section 82, Rule XIV.
10 Sections 77-81, Id.
11 Section 82, Id., in relation to Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution.
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Clearly, whether in the Senate or in the House, every bill must pass the three readings on
separate days, except when 12
the bill is certified. Amendments to the bill on third reading are
constitutionally prohibited.
After its passage by one chamber, the bill should then be transmitted to the other chamber for
its concurrence. Section 83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House expressly provides:
“SEC. 83. Transmittal to Senate.—The Secretary General, without need of express order, shall transmit to
the Senate for its concurrence all the bills and joint or concurrent resolutions approved by the House or the
amendments of the House to the bills or resolutions of the Senate, as the case may be. If the measures
approved without amendments are bills or resolutions of the Senate, or if amendments of the Senate to bills
of the House are accepted, he shall forthwith notify the Senate of the action taken.”
Simplified, this rule means that:
1. As to a bill originating in the House:
(a) Upon its approval by the House, the bill shall be transmitted to the Senate;
(b) The Senate may approve it with or without amendments;
(c) The Senate returns the bill to the House;
(d) The House may accept the Senate amendments; if it does not, the Secretary General shall
notify the Senate of that action. As hereinafter be shown, a request for conference shall
then be in order.
2. As to bills originating in the Senate:
(a) Upon its approval by the Senate, the bill shall be transmitted to the House;
(b) The House may approve it with or without amendments;
(c) The House then returns it to the Senate, informing it of the action taken;
(d) The Senate may accept the House amendments; if it does not, it shall notify the House
and make a request for conference.
The transmitted bill shall then pass three readings in the other chamber on separate days.
Section 84, Rule XIV of the
12 Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution.
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Rules of the House states:
“SEC. 84. Bills from the Senate.—The bills, resolutions and communications of the Senate shall be referred
to the corresponding committee in the same manner as bills presented by Members of the House.”
and Section 51, Rule XXIII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
“SEC. 51. Prior to their final approval, bills and joint resolutions shall be read at least three times.”
It is only when the period of disagreement is reached, i.e.,amendments proposed by one chamber
to a bill originating from the other are not accepted by the latter, that a request for conference is
made or is in order. The request for conference is specifically covered by Section 26, Rule XII of
the Rules of the Senate which reads:
“SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of
any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after its composition.”
and Section 85, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House which reads:
“SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.—In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of
both Chambers.”
The foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of both chambers of Congress are
mandatory. 13
In his Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations, more particularly on enactment of bills,
Cooley states:
13 VolumeI, Eight Edition, Chapter VI, 267. See Miller vs. Mardo, 2 SCRA 898 [1961]; Everlasting Pictures, Inc. vs.
Fuentes, 3 SCRA 539 [1961].
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“Where, for an instance, the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and by settled and well-
understood parliamentary law these two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the
determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other,
the constitution, in providing for two houses, has evidently spoken in reference to this settled custom,
incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation; so that it would require no prohibitory clause to
forbid the two houses from combining in one, and jointly enacting laws by the vote of a majority of all. All
those rules which are of the essentials of law-making must be observed and followed; and it is only the
customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative body are always understood to be under
its control, and subject to constant change at its will, that the constitution can be understood to have left as
matters of discretion, to be established, modified, or abolished by the bodies for whose government in non-
essential matters they exist.”
In respect of appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, bills increasing the public debt, bills of local
application, or private bills, the return thereof to the House after the Senate shall have “proposed
or concurred with amendments” for the former either to accept or reject the amendments would
not only be in conformity with the foregoing rules but is also implicit from Section 24 of Article
VI.
With the foregoing as our guiding light, I shall now show the violations of the Constitution and
of the Rules of the Senate and of the House in the passage of R.A. No. 7716.
VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 24, ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION:
First violation.—Since R.A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it must originate exclusively in the
House—not in the Senate. As correctly asserted by petitioner Tolentino, on the face of the
enrolled copy of R.A. No. 7716, it is a “CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND
SENATE BILL NO. 1630.” In short, it is an illicit marriage of a bill which originated in the House
and a bill which originated in the Senate. Therefore, R.A. No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in
the House.
The only bill which could serve as a valid basis for R.A. No. 7716 is House Bill (HB) No. 11197.
This bill, which is the substitute bill recommended by the House Committee on Ways
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and Means in substitution of House Bills Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 14

7033, 8086,9030, 9210, 9397,
10012, and 10100, and covered by its Committee
15
Report No. 367, was approved
16
on third reading
by the House on 17 November 1993. Interestingly, HB No. 9210, which was filed by
Representative Exequiel B. Javier on 19 May17 1993, was certified by the President in his letter to
Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. of 1 June 1993. Yet, HB No. 11197, which substituted HB No. 9210
and the others abovestated, was not. Its certification seemed to have been entirely forgotten.
On 18 November 1993, the Secretary-General of the House, pursuant to Section 83, Rule XIV
of the Rules of the House, transmitted to the President
18
of the Senate HB No. 11197 and
requested the concurrence of the Senate therewith.
However, HB No. 11197 had passed only its first reading in the Senate by its referral to its
Committee on Ways and Means. That Committee19never deliberated on HB No. 11197 as it should
have. It acted only on Senate Bill (SB) No. 1129 introduced by Senator Ernesto F. Herrera on 1
March 1993. It then prepared and proposed SB No. 1630, and in its Committee Report No.
20 21
349 which was submitted to the Senate on 7 February 1994, it recommended that SB No. 1630
be approved “in substitution
22
of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and
H.B. No. 11197.” It must be carefully noted that SB No. 1630 was proposed and submitted for
approval by the Senate in SUBSTITUTION of SB No. 1129, and not HB No. 11197.Obviously,
the principal measure which the Committee deliberated
14 ConsolidatedMemorandum for Respondents, Annexes “2” to “12,” inclusive.

15 ConsolidatedMemorandum for Respondents, 18.
16 Id., Annex “9.”
17 Id., Annex “1.”
18 Id., 18.
19 Id., Annex “15.” Entitled “An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax (VAT) System By Expanding Its Tax Base,
Amending Sections 103, 113, 114 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.”
20 Id., Annex “17.”
21 Id., 20.
22 Emphasis supplied.
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on and acted upon was SB No. 1129 and not HB No. 11197. The latter, instead of being the only
measure to be taken up, deliberated upon, and reported back to the Senate for its consideration
on second reading and, eventually, on third reading, was, at the most, merely given by the
Committee a passing glance.
This specific unequivocal action of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, i.e., proposing
and recommending approval of SB No. 1630 as a substitute for or in substitution of SB No. 1129
demolishes at once the thesis of the Solicitor General that:
“Assuming that SB 1630 is distinct from HB 11197, amendment by substitution is within the purview of
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.”
because, according to him, (a) “Section 68, Rule XXIX of the Rules of the Senate authorizes an
amendment by substitution and the only condition required is that ‘the text thereof is submitted
in writing’; and (b) ‘[I]n Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. (220 U.S. 107) the United States Supreme
Court, interpreting the provision in the United States Constitution similar to Section 24, Article
VI of the Philippine Constitution, stated that the power of the Senate to amend a revenue bill
includes substitution
23
of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed by the House of
Representatives.’ ”
This thesis is utterly without merit. In the first place, it reads into the Committee Report
something which it had not contemplated, that is, to propose SB No. 1630 in substitution of HB
No. 11197; or speculates that the Committee may have committed an error in stating that it is SB
No. 1129, and not HB No. 11197, which is to be substituted by SB No. 1630. Either, of course, is
unwarranted because the words of the Report, solemnly signed by 24
the Chairman, Vice-Chairman
(who dissented), seven members, and three ex-officio members, leave no room for doubt that
although SB No. 1129, P.S. Res No. 734, and HB No. 11197 were referred to and considered by
the Committee, it had prepared the attached SB No. 1630 which it recommends for approval “in

24 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex “17.” Two signed with reservations and four signed subject to
amendments.
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substitution of S.B. No. 11197, taking into consideration P.S. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197 with
Senators Herrera, Angara, Romulo, Sotto, Ople and Shahani as authors.” To do as suggested
would be to substitute the judgment of the Committee with another that is completely
inconsistent with it, or, simply, to capriciously ignore the facts.
In the second place, the Office of the Solicitor General intentionally
25
made it appear, to mislead
rather than to persuade us, that in Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. the U.S. Supreme
26
Court ruled, as
quoted by it in the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, as follows:
“The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is not confined to the elimination
of provisions contained in the original act, but embraces as well the addition of such provisions thereto as
may render the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It has, in fact, been
held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed can be supported as a
valid amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
It is contended in the first place that this section of the act is unconstitutional, because it is a revenue
measure, and originated in the Senate in violation of section 7 of article 1 of the Constitution, providing that
‘all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with the amendments, as on other bills.’ ”
The first part is not a statement of the Court, but a summary of the arguments of counsel in one
of the companion cases (No. 425, entitled, “Gay vs. Baltic Mining Co.”). The second part is the
second paragraph of the opinion of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Day. The
misrepresentation that the first part is a statement of the Court is highly contemptuous. To show
such deliberate misrepresentation, it is well to quote what actually are found in 55 L.Ed. 408,
410, to wit:
“Messrs. Charles A. Snow and Joseph H. Knight filed a brief for appellees in No. 425:
25 And companion cases, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389 [1911].

26 Page 56.
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x x x
The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is not confined to the elimination
of provisions contained in the original act, but embraces as well the addition of such provisions thereto as
may render the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It has, in fact, been
held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed can be supported as a
valid amendment.
Brake v. Collison, 122 Fed. 722.
Mr. James L. Quackenbush filed a statement for appellees in No. 442.
Solicitor General Lehmann (by special leave) argued the cause for the United States on reargument.
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:
These cases involve the constitutional validity of § 38 of the act of Congress approved August 5, 1909, known as ‘the
corporation tax’ law. 36 Stat. at L. 11, 112-117, chap. 6, U.S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, pp. 659, 844-849.
It is contended in the first place that this section of the act is unconstitutional, because it is a revenue measure, and
originated in the Senate in violation of § 7 of article 1 of the Constitution, providing that ‘all bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with the amendments, as on other
bills.’ The history of the act is contained in the government’s brief, and is accepted as correct, no objection being made to
its accuracy.
This statement shows that the tariff bill of which the section under consideration is a part, originated in the House of
Representatives, and was there a general bill for the collection of revenue. As originally introduced, it contained a plan
of inheritance taxation. In the Senate the proposed tax was removed from the bill, and the corporation tax, in a measure,
substituted therefor. The bill having properly originated in the House, we perceive no reason in the constitutional
provision relied upon why it may not be amended in the Senate in the manner which it was in this case. The amendment
was germane to the subject-matter of the bill, and not beyond the power of the Senate to propose.” (Emphasis supplied)
x x x
As shown above, the underlined portions were deliberately omitted in the quotation made by the
Office of the Solicitor General.
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In the third place, a Senate amendment by substitution with an entirely new bill of a bill, which
under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution can only originate exclusively in the House, is not
authorized by said Section 24. Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. cannot be invoked in favor of such a view.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado during the oral arguments of these cases and
during the initial deliberations thereon by the Court, Flint involves a Senate amendment to a
revenue bill which, under the United States Constitution, should originate from the House of
Representatives. The amendment consisted of the substitution of a corporation tax in lieu of the
plan of inheritance taxation contained in a general bill for the collection of revenue as it came
from the House of Representatives where the bill originated. The constitutional provision in
question is Section 7, Article I of the United States Constitution which reads:
“Section 7. Bills and Resolutions.—All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments, as on other Bills.”
This provision, contrary to the misleading claim of the Solicitor General, is not similar to Section
24, Article VI of our Constitution, which for easy comparison is hereunder quoted again:
“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
Note that in the former the word exclusively does not appear. And, in the latter, the phrase “as on
other Bills,” which is found in the former, does not appear. These are very significant in
determining the authority of the upper chamber over the bills enumerated in Section 24. Since
the origination is not exclusively vested in the House of Representatives of the United States, the
Senate’s authority to propose or concur with amendments is necessarily broader. That broader
authority is further confirmed by the phrase “as on other Bills,” i.e., its power to propose or
concur with amendments thereon is the same as in ordinary bills. The absence of this phrase in
our Constitution was clearly intended to restrict or limit the Philippine Senate’s power to
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propose or concur with amendments. In the light of the exclusivity of origination and the absence
of the phrase “as on other Bills,” the Philippine Senate cannot amend by substitution with an
entirely new bill of its own any bill covered by Section 24 of Article VI which the House of
Representatives transmitted to it because such substitution would indirectly violate Section 24.
These obvious substantive differences between Section 7, Article I of the U.S. Constitution and
Section 24, Article VI of our Constitution are enough reasons why this Court should
27
neither allow
itself to be misled by Flint
28
vs. Stonenor be awed by Rainey vs. United States and the opinion of
Messrs. Ogg and Ray which the majority cites to support the view that the power of the U.S.
Senate to amend a revenue measure is unlimited. Rainey concerns the Tariff Act of 1909 of the
United States of America and specifically involved was its Section 37 which was an amendment
introduced by the U.S. Senate. It was claimed by the petitioners that the said section is a revenue
measure which should originate in the House of Representatives. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, adopted and approved the finding of the court a quo that:
“the section in question is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate, and not in the
House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill
for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient.”
Messrs. Ogg and Ray, who are professors emeritus of political science, based their statement not
even on a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court but on their perception of what Section 7,
Article I of the U.S. Constitution permits. In the tenth edition (1951) of their work, they state:
“Any bill may make its first appearance in either house, except only that bills for raising revenue are
required by the constitution to ‘originate’ in the House of Representatives. Indeed, through its right to
amend revenue bills, even to the extent of substituting new ones, the
27 232 U.S. 309, 58 L ed. 117 [1914].

28 Introduction to American Government, 309, n. 2 [1945].
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29
Senate may, in effect, originate them also.”
Their “in effect” conclusion is, of course, logically correct because the word exclusivelydoes not
appear in said Section 7, Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
Neither can I find myself in agreement with the view of the majority that the Constitution
does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House
bill, thereby stating, in effect, that S.B. No. 1129 was such an anticipatory substitute bill, which,
nevertheless, does not seem to have been considered by the Senate except only after its receipt of
H.B. No. 11197 on 23 November 1993 when the process of legislation in respect of it began with a
referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Firstly, to say that the Constitution does
not prohibit it is to render meaningless Section 24 of Article VI or to sanction its blatant
disregard through the simple expedient of filing in the Senate of a so-called anticipatory
substitute bill. Secondly, it suggests that S.B. No. 1129 was filed as an anticipatory measure to
substitute for H.B. No. 11197. This is a speculation which even the author of S.B. No. 1129 may
not have indulged in. S.B. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate by Senator Herrera on 1 March 1993.
H.B. No. 11197 was approved by the House on third reading only on 17 November 1993. Frankly,
I cannot believe that Senator Herrera was able to prophesy that the House would pass any VAT
bill, much less to know its provisions. That “it does not seem that the Senate even considered” the
latter not until after its receipt of H.B. No. 11197 is another speculation. As stated earlier, S.B.
No. 1129 was filed in the Senate on 1 March 1993, while H.B. No. 11197 was transmitted to the
Senate only on 18 November 1993. There is no evidence on record to show that both were referred
to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means at the same time. Finally, in respect of H.B. No.
11197, its legislative process did not begin with its referral to the Senate’s Ways and Means
Committee. It begin upon its filing, as a Committee Bill of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, in the House.
29 At 317.
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Second violation.—Since SB No. 1129 is a revenue measure, it could not even be validly
introduced or initiated in the Senate. It follows too, that the Senate cannot validly act thereon.
Third violation.—Since SB No. 1129 could not have been validly introduced in the Senate and
could not have been validly acted on by the Senate, then it cannot be substituted by another
revenue measure, SB No. 1630, which the Senate Committee on Ways and Means introduced in
substitution of SB No. 1129. The filing or introduction in the Senate of SB No. 1630 also violated
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 26(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION:
First violation.—The Senate, despite its lack of constitutional authority to consider SB No. 1630
or SB No. 1129 which the former substituted, opened deliberations on second reading of SB No.
1630 on 8 February 30
1994. On 24 March 1994, the Senate approved it on second reading and
on third reading. That approval on the same day violated Section 26(2), Article VI of the
Constitution. The justification therefor was that on 24 February 1994 the President
31
certified to
“the necessity of the enactment of SB No. 1630 . . . to meet a public emergency.”
I submit, however, that the Presidential certification is void ab initio not necessarily for the
reason adduced by petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc., but because it was addressed to the Senate for a
bill which is prohibited from originating therein. The only bill which could be properly certified on
permissible constitutional grounds even if it had already been transmitted to the Senate is HB
No. 11197. As earlier observed, this was not so certified, although
32
HB No. 9210 (one of those
consolidated into HB No. 11197) was certified on 1 June 1993.
Also, the certification of SB No. 1630 cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be extended to
HB No. 11197 because SB No. 1630 did not substitute HB No. 11197 but SB No. 1129.

31 Id., Annex “14.”
32 Id., Annex “1.”
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Considering that the certification of SB No. 1630 is void, its approval on second and third
readings in one day violated Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Second violation.—It further appears that on 24 June 1994, after the approval of SB No. 1630,
the Secretary of the Senate, upon directive of the Senate President, formally notified the House
Speaker of the Senate’s approval thereof and its request for a33bicameral conference “in view of the
disagreeing provisions of said bill and House Bill No. 11197.”
It must be stressed again that HB No. 11197 was never submitted for or acted on second and
third readings in the Senate, and SB No. 1630 was never sent to the House for its concurrence.
Elsewise stated, both were only half-way through the legislative mill. Their submission to a
conference committee was not only anomalously premature, but violative of the constitutional
rule on three readings.
The suggestion that SB No. 1630 was not required to be submitted to the House for otherwise
the procedure would be endless, is unacceptable for, firstly, it violates Section 26, Rule XII of the
Rules of the Senate and Section 85, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, and, secondly, it is never
endless. If the chamber of origin refuses to accept the amendments of the other chamber, the
request for conference shall be made.
VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF BOTH CHAMBERS; GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION.
The erroneous referral to the conference committee needs further discussion. Since S.B. No. 1630
was not a substitute bill for H.B. No. 11197 but for S.B. No. 1129, it (S.B. No. 1630) remained a
bill which originated in the Senate. Even assuming arguendo that it could be validly initiated in
the Senate, it should have been first transmitted to the House where it would undergo three
readings. On the other hand, since HB No. 11197 was never acted upon by the Senate on second
and third readings, no differences or inconsistencies could as yet arise so as to warrant a request
for a conference. It should be noted that under Section
33 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex “18.”
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83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, it is only when the Senate shall have approved with
amendments HB No. 11197 and the House declines to accept the amendments after having been
notified thereof that the request for a conference may be made by the House, not by the Senate.
Conversely, the Senate’s request for a conference would only be proper if, following the
transmittal of SB No. 1630 to the House, it was approved by the latter with amendments but the
Senate rejected the amendments.
Indisputably then, when the request for a bicameral conference was made by the Senate, SB
No. 1630 was not yet transmitted to the House for consideration on three readings and HB No.
11197 was still in the Senate awaiting consideration on second and third readings. Their referral
to the bicameral conference committee was palpably premature and, in so doing, both the Senate
and the House acted without authority or with grave abuse of discretion. Nothing, and absolutely
nothing, could have been validly acted upon by the bicameral conference committee.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE

COMMITTEE.
Serious irregularities amounting to lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion were

committed by the bicameral conference committee.
First, it assumed, and took for granted that SB No. 1630 could validly originate in the Senate.
This assumption is erroneous.
Second, it assumed that HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 had properly passed both chambers of
Congress and were properly and regularly submitted to it. As earlier discussed, the assumption is
unfounded in fact.
Third, per the bicameral conference committee’s proceedings of 19 April 1994, Representative
Exequiel Javier, Chairman of the panel from the House, initially suggested that HB No. 11197
should be the “frame of reference,” because it is a revenue measure, to which Senator Ernesto
Maceda concurred. However, after an incompletely recorded reaction of Senator Ernesto Herrera,
Chairman of the Senate panel, Representative Javier seemed to agree that “all amendments will
be coming from the Senate.” The issue of what should be the “frame of reference” does not appear
to have been resolved. These facts are recorded
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34
in this wise, as quoted in the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents:
Yes. That’s true for

every revenue
measure. There’s no
other way. The House
Bill has got to be the
base.Of course, for the
record, we know that
this is an
administration; this is
certified by the
President and I was
about to put into the
recordsas I am saying
now that your problem
about the impact on
prices on the people
was already decided
when the President
and the administration
sent this to us and
certified it. They have
already gotten over
that political
implication of this bill
and the economic
impact on prices.
“CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
First of all, what would
be the basis, no, or
framework para huwag
naman mawala yung
personality namin dito
sa bicameral, no,
because the bill
originates from the
House because this is a
revenue bill, so we
would just want to
ask, we make the House
Bill as the frame of
reference, and then
everything will just be
inserted?
HON. MACEDA.
CHAIRMAN HERRERA.
Yung concern mo about
the bill as the reference
in this discussion is
something that we can
just . . .
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
We will just . . . all the
amendments will be
coming from the
Senate.
(BICAMERAL
CONFERENCE ON
MAJOR DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN HB NO.
11197 AND SB NO. 1630
[Cte. on Ways & Means]
APRIL 19, 1994, II-6 and
II-7; italics supplied)”
These exchanges would suggest that Representative Javier had wanted HB No. 11197 to be the
principal measure on which reconciliation of the differences should be based. However, since the
Senate did not act on this Bill on second and third readings because its Committee on Ways and
Means did not deliberate on it but instead proposed SB No. 1630 in substitution of SB No. 1129,
the suggestion has no factual basis. Then, when finally he agreed that “all amendments will be
coming from the Senate,” he
34 Page 22.
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in fact withdrew the former suggestion and agreed that SB No. 1630, which is the Senate version
of the Value Added Tax (VAT) measure, should be the “frame of reference.” But then SB No. 1630
was never transmitted to the House for the latter’s concurrence. Hence, it cannot serve as the
“frame of reference” or as the basis for deliberation. The posture taken by Representative Javier
also indicates that SB No. 1630 should be taken as the amendment to HB No. 11197. This, too, is
unfounded because SB No. 1630 was not proposed in substitution of HB No. 11197.
Since SB No. 1630 did not pass three readings in the House and HB No. 11197 did not pass
second and third readings in the Senate, it logically follows that no disagreeing provisions had as
yet arisen. The bicameral conference committee erroneously assumed the contrary.
Even granting arguendothat both HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 had been validly approved
by both chambers of Congress and validly referred to the bicameral conference committee, the
latter had very
35
limited authority thereon. It was created “in view of the disagreeing provisions of”
the two bills. Its duty was limited to the reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or the resolution
of differences or inconsistencies.
36
The committee recognized that limited authority in the opening
paragraph of its Report when it said:
“The Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197 x x x and Senate Bill No.
1630 x x x.”
Under such limited authority, it could only either (a) restore, wholly or partly, the specific
provisions of HB No. 11197 amended by SB No. 1630, (b) sustain, wholly or partly, the Senate’s
amendments, or (c) by way of a compromise, to agree that neither provisions in HB No. 11197
amended by the Senate nor the latter’s amendments thereto be carried into the final form of the
former.
But as pointed out by petitioners Senator Raul Roco and Kilosbayan, Inc., the bicameral
conference committee not only
35 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex “18.”

36 Id., Annex, “19.”
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25, 1994
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struck out non-disagreeing provisions of HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, i.e.,provisions where
both bills are in full agreement; it added more activities or transactions to be covered by VAT,
which were not within the contemplation of both bills. Since both HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630
were still half-cooked in the legislative vat, and were not ready for referral to a conference, the
bicameral conference committee clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it consolidated both into one bill which became R.A. No. 7716.
APPROVAL BY BOTH CHAMBERS OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT AND

PROPOSED BILL DID NOT CURE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.
I cannot agree with the suggestion that since both the Senate and the House had approved the
bicameral conference committee report and the bill proposed by it in substitution of HB No.
11197 and SB No. 1630, whatever infirmities may have been committed by it were cured by
ratification. This doctrine of ratification may apply to minor procedural flaws or tolerable
breaches of the parameters of the bicameral conference committee’s limited powers but never to
violations of the Constitution. Congress is not above the Constitution. In the instant case, since
SB No. 1630 was introduced in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, was passed
in the Senate in violation of the “three readings” rule, and was not transmitted to the House for
the completion of the constitutional process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise
passed by the Senate on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor the House could
validly approve the bicameral conference committee report and the proposed bill.
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that for non-compliance with mandatory
provisions of the Constitution and of the Rules of the Senate and of the House on the enactment
of laws, R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. A discussion then of the
intrinsic validity of some of its provisions would be unnecessary.
The majority opinion, however, invokes the enrolled bill doctrine and wants this Court to
desist from looking behind the copy of the assailed measure as certified by the Senate President
and the
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Speaker of the House. I respectfully submit that the invocation is misplaced. First, as to the issue
of origination, the certification in this case explicitly states that R.A. No. 7716 is a
“consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630.” This is conclusive evidence that
the measure did not originate exclusively in the House. Second, the enrolled bill doctrine is of
American origin,
37
and unquestioned fealty to it may no longer be justified in view of the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution which now expressly
grants authority to this Court to:
“determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Third, even under the regime of the 1935 Constitution which did not contain
38
the above provision,
this Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas, declared that it cannot
39
be truly said that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito has laid to rest the question of whether the enrolled
bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction, and stated:
“As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval of Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that ‘[e]very bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President.’ In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the
37 ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., 226; Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 [1989]; Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187
SCRA 377[1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue
Ribbon Com- mittee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]; Oposa vs. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [1993].
38 56 SCRA 714, 719, 723 [1974].
39 78 Phil. 1 [1947].
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25, 1994
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State Constitution, said that the same ‘makes it clear that the indispensable step in the passage’ and it
follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, other proof that
it has ‘passed both houses will satisfy the constitutional requirement.’ ”
Fourth, even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has been substantially undercut.
This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion,
citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction.
Last, the pleadings of the parties have established beyond doubt that HB No. 11197 was not
acted on second and third readings in the Senate and SB No. 1630, which was approved by the
Senate on second and third readings in substitution of SB No. 1129, was nevertransmitted to the
House for its passage. Otherwise stated, they were only passed in their respective chamber of
origin but not in the other. In no way can each become a law under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article VI of the Constitution. For the Court to close its eyes to this fact because of the 40
enrolled
bill doctrine is to shirk its duty to hold “inviolate what is decreed by the Constitution.”
I vote then to GRANT these petitions and to declare R.A. No. 7716 as unconstitutional.
DISSENTING OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
Few issues brought before this Court for resolution have roiled the citizenry as much as the
instant case brought by nine petitioners which challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7716 (to be referred to herein as the “Expanded Value Added Tax” or EVAT law to
distinguish it from Executive Order No. 273 which is the VAT law proper) that was enacted on
May 5, 1994. A visceral issue, it has galvanized the populace into mass action and strident
protest even as the EVAT proponents have taken to podia and media in a post facto information
campaign.
40 Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228 [1970].
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The Court is confronted here with an atypical case. Not only is it a vatful of seething controversy
but some unlikely petitioners invoke unorthodox remedies. Three Senator-petitioners would
nullify a statute that bore the indispensable stamp of approval of their own Chamber with two of
them publicly repudiating what they had earlier endorsed. With two former colleagues, one of
them an erstwhile Senate President, making common cause with them, they would stay the
implementation by the Executive Department of a law which they themselves have initiated.
They address a prayer to a co-equal Department to probe their official acts for any procedural
irregularities they have themselves committed lest the effects of these aberrations inflict such
damage or irreparable loss as would bring down the wrath of the people on their heads.
To the extent that they perceive that a vital cog in the internal machinery of the Legislature
has malfunctioned from having operated in blatant violation of the enabling Rules they have
themselves laid down, they would now plead that this other Branch of Government step in,
invoking the exercise of what is at once a delicate and awesome power. Undoubtedly, the case at
bench is as much a test for the Legislature as it is for the Judiciary.
A backward glance on the Value Added Tax (VAT) is in order at this point.
The first codification of the country’s internal revenue laws was effected with the enactment of
Commonwealth Act No. 466, commonly known as the ‘National Internal Revenue Code’ which
was approved on June 15, 1939 and took effect on July 1, 1939, although the provisions on the
income tax were made retroactive to January 1, 1939.
“Since 1939 when the turnover tax was replaced by the manufacturer’s sales tax, the Tax Code
had provided for a single-stage value-added tax on original sales by manufacturers, producers
and importers computed on the ‘cost deduction method’ and later, on the basis of the ‘tax credit
method.’ The turnover tax was re-introduced 1
in 1985 by Presidential Decree No. 1991 (as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 2006).”
1 Vitug, Jose C., COMPENDIUM OF TAX LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, Third Revised Edition, 1993 at 201.
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In 1986, a tax reform package was approved by the Aquino Cabinet. It contained twenty-nine
measures, one of which proposed the adoption of the VAT, as well as the simplification of the
sales tax structure and the abolition of the turnover tax.
“Up until 1987, the system of taxing goods consisted of (a) an excise tax on certain selected
articles (b) fixed and percentage taxes on original and subsequent sales, on importations and on
milled articles and (c) mining taxes on2 mineral products. Services were subjected to percentage
taxes based mainly on gross receipts.”
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 273 which
adopted the VAT. From the former single-stage value-added tax, it introduced the multi-stage
VAT system where “the value-added tax is imposed on the sale of and distribution process
culminating in sale, to the final consumer. Generally described, the taxpayer (the seller)
determines his tax liability by computing the tax on the gross selling price or gross receipt
(“output tax”) and subtracting or crediting the earlier VAT on the purchase 3or importation of
goods or on the sale of service (“input tax”) against the tax due on his own sale.”
On January 1, 1988, implementing rules and regulations for the VAT were promulgated.
President Aquino then issued Proclamation No. 219 on February 12, 1988 urging the public and
private sectors to join the nationwide consumers’ education campaign for VAT.
Soon after the implementation of Executive Order No. 273, its constitutionality was assailed
before this Court 4 in the case of Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,
Inc., et al. v. Tan. The four petitioners sought to nullify the VAT law “for being unconstitutional
in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the President; that the VAT is
oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process and equal protection clauses
and other provisions of the 1987
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 L-81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 with Justice Teodoro R. Padilla as ponente.
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5
Constitution.” In dismissing the consolidated petitions, this Court stated:
“The Court, following the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the President as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the VAT. The Court can only look into and
determine whether or not Executive Order No. 273 was enacted and made effective as law, in the manner
required by and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was not issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
6
and, in this regard, the Court finds no reason to
impede its application or continued implementation.”
Although declared constitutional, the VAT law was sought to be amended from 1992 on by a
series of bills filed in both Houses of Congress. In chronological sequence, these were:
HB/SB Date Filed

No. in
Congress
HB No. — July 22,
253 1992
HB No. — August 10,
771 1992
HB No. — September
2450 9, 1992
Senate — September
Res.7 No. 10, 1992
734
HB No. — February
7033 3, 1993
SB No.
8
— March 1,
1129 1993
HB No. — March 9,
8086 1993
HB No. — May 11,
9030 1993
5 Ibid at 378.
6 Ibid at 385.
7 Senate Resolution No. 734 filed on September 10, 1992 was entitled “Resolution Urging the House Committee on
Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to Exempt Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an
Incentive to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies, Whenever They Feature an All-Filipino Cast of
Actors and Actresses.”
8 SB No. 1129 sought to include under the VAT Law such items as lease of real properties, excluding agricultural lands
and residential properties with monthly rentals of less than P10,000.00; hotels; restaurants, eating places, caterers;
services by persons in the exercise of their professions; actors, actresses, talents, singers and professional athletes; and
lawyers, accountants, doctors and other professionals registered with the Philippine Regulatory Commission.
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25, 1994
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HB No.
9 — May 19,
9210 1993
HB No. — May 25,
9297 1993
HB No. — July 28,
10012 1993
HB No. — August 3,
10100 1993
HB No. — November
11197 in 5, 1993
substitution
of HB Nos.
253, 771,
2450, 7033,
8086, 9030,
9210, 9297,
10012 10and
10100
We now trace the course taken by H.B. No. 11197 and S.B. No. 1129.
HB/SB No.
HB No. 11197 — November
was approved 11, 1993
in the Lower
House on
second
reading
HB No. 11197 — November
was approved 17, 1993
in the Lower —
House on November
third reading 18, 1993
and voted
upon with 114
Yeas and 12
Nays
HB/SB No.
HB No. 11197 — February
was 7, 1994
transmitted to
the Senate
Senate
Committee on
Ways and
Means
submitted
Com. Report
No. 349
recommending
for approval
SB No. 1630
in substitution
of SB No.
1129, taking
into
consideration
PS Res. No.
734 and HB 11
No. 11197
9 On June 1, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos certified for immediate enactment House Bill No. 9210 entitled “An Act
Amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, to meet a public
emergency.”
10 House Bill No. 11197 is entitled “An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax (VAT) System to Widen its Tax Base
and Enhance Its Administration, Amending for these Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 110
of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237, and 238 of Title IX and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V,
all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.”
11 Senate Bill No. 1630 is entitled “An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax (VAT) System to Widen its Tax Base
and Enhance Its Administration, Amending for these Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108 and 110 of
Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V, all of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended, and for other Purposes.”
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Certification — March
by President 22,
Fidel V. 1994
Ramos of
Senate Bill
No. 1630 for
immediate
enactment to
meet a public
emergency
SB No. 1630 — March
was approved 24,
by the Senate 1994
on second and
third readings
and
subsequently
voted upon
with 13 yeas,
none against
and one
abstention
Transmittal — March
by the Senate 24,
to the Lower 1994
House of a
request for a
conference in
view of
disagreeing
provisions of
SB No. 1630
and HB No.
11197
The — April
Bicameral 13,
Conference 19,
Committee 20,
conducted 21, 25
various
meetings to
reconcile the
proposals on
the VAT
The House — April
agreed on the 27,
Conference 1994
Committee
Report
The Senate — May
agreed on the 2,
Conference 1994
Committee
Report
The President — May
signed 5,
Republic Act 1994
No. 7716—
The Expanded
12
VAT Law
Republic Act — May
No. 7716 was 12,
published in 1994
two
newspapers of
general
circulation
Republic Act — May
No. 7716 28,
became 1994
effective
Republic Act No. 7716 merely expanded the base of the VAT law even as the tax retained its
multi-stage character.
At the oral hearing held on July 7, 1994, this Court delimited petitioners’ arguments to the
following issues culled from their respective petitions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
13
Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Article VI, Section 24, of the Constitution?
12 Republic Act No. 7716 is entitled “An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax (VAT) System, Widening Its Tax Base
And Enhancing Its Administration, And For These Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant Provisions Of The
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.”
13 Article VI, Section 24: “All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and
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14
Does it violate Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2, of the Constitution?

What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Does the law violate the following provisions in Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution:
15
1. Section 1
16
2. Section 4
17
3. Section 5 18
4. Section 10
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.”
14 Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2: “No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the president certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and naysentered in the Journal.”
15 Article III, Section 1: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”

16 Article III, Section 4: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”
17 Article III, Section 5: “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”
18 Article III, Section 10: “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”
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Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?
19
1. Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1
20
2. Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3
As a result of the unedifying experience of the past where the Court had the propensity to steer
clear of questions it perceived to be “political” in nature, the present Constitution, in contrast, has
explicitly expanded judicial power to include the duty of the courts, especially the Supreme Court,
“to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting 21to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” I submit
that under this explicit mandate, the Court is empowered to rule upon acts of other Government
entities for the purpose of determining whether there may have been, in fact, irregularities
committed tantamount to violation of the Constitution, which case would clearly constitute a
grave abuse of discretion on their part.
In the words of the sponsor of the above-quoted Article of the Constitution on the Judiciary,
the former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question
of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter exhibit its wonted reticence
19 ArticleVI, Section 28, paragraph 1: “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.”
20 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3: “Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”
21 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
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22
by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.”
In the instant petitions, this Court is called upon, not so much to exercise its traditional power
of judicial review as to determine whether or not there has indeed been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Legislature amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Where there are grounds to resolve a case without touching on its constitutionality, the Court
will do so with utmost alacrity in due deference to the doctrine of separation of powers anchored
on the respect that must be accorded to the other branches of government which are coordinate,
coequal and, as far as practicable, independent of one another.
Once it is palpable that the constitutional issue is unavoidable, then it is time to assume
jurisdiction, provided that the following requisites for a judicial inquiry are met: that there must
be an actual and appropriate case; a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity and the decision of the constitutional question must 23
be necessary to the
determination of the case itself, the same being the lis mota of the case.
Having assured ourselves that the above-cited requisites are present in the instant petitions,
we proceed to take them up.
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 24

Some petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 as being in violation of
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution which provides:
“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.”
22 Volume One, CONCOM RECORD, p. 436.

23 Luz Farms v. The Hon. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990, 192
SCRA 51; Dumlao, et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392; People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937).
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In G.R. Nos. 115455 and 115781, petitioners argue:
(a) The bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. The Senate, after receiving H.B. No. 11197, submitted its own bill, S.B.
No. 1630, and proceeded to vote and approve the same after second and third readings.
(b) The Senate exceeded its authority to “propose or concur with amendments” when it
submitted its own bill, S.B. No. 1630, recommending its approval “in substitution of S.B.
No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197.”
(c) H.B. No. 11197 was not deliberated upon by the Senate. Neither was it voted upon by the
Senate on second and third readings, as what was voted upon was S.B. No. 1630.
Article VI, Section 24 is taken word for word from Article VI, Section 18 of the 1935 Constitution
which was, in turn, patterned after Article I, Section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the United
States, which states:
“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments as on other bills.”
The historical precedent for requiring

24
revenue bills to originate in Congress is explained in the
U.S. case of Morgan v. Murray:
“The constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives stemmed from a remedial outgrowth of the historic conflict between Parliament (i.e.,
Commons) and the Crown, whose ability to dominate the monarchially appointive and hereditary Lords was
patent. See 1 Story, Constitution, S 875 et seq., 5th Ed.; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 267, 268,
8th Ed., 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, S 806, 3d Ed. There was a measure of like justification for
the insertion of the provision of articles I, S 7, cl. 1, of the Federal Constitution. At that time (1787) and
thereafter until the adoption (in 1913) of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct election of
senators, the members of the United States Senate were elected for each state by the joint vote of both
houses of the Legislature of the respective states, and hence, were removed from the people. x x x”
24 328 P. 2d 644 (1958).

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The legislative authority under the 1935 Constitution being unicameral, in the form of the
National Assembly, it served no purpose to include the subject provision in the draft submitted by
the 1934 Constitutional Convention to the Filipino people for ratification.
In 1940, however, the Constitution was amended to establish a bicameral Congress of the
Philippines composed of a House of Representatives and a Senate.
In the wake of the creation of a new legislative machinery, new provisions were enacted
regarding the law-making power of Congress. The National Assembly explained how the final
formulation of the subject provision came about:
“The concurrence of both houses would be necessary to the enactment of a law. However, all appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, although the Senate could propose or
concur with amendments.
In one of the first drafts of the amendments, it was proposed to give both houses equal powers in
lawmaking. There was, however, much opposition on the part of several members of the Assembly. In
another draft, the following provision, more restrictive than the present provision in the amendment, was
proposed and for sometime was seriously considered:
‘All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the
Senate of any such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon, the
bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event
that the Senate should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the
next regular sessions of the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of
the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the president for
corresponding action.’
However, the special committee voted finally to report the present amending provision as it is now
worded; and in that form it was approved by the National Assembly with the approval of Resolution No.
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25
38 and later of Resolution No. 73.” (Italics supplied)
Thus, the present Constitution is identically worded as its 1935 precursor: “All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.” (Italics supplied)
That all revenue bills, such as Republic Act No. 7716, should “originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives” logically flows from the more representative and broadly-based
character of this Chamber.
“It is said that the House of Representatives being the more popular branch of the legislature,
being closer to the people, and having more frequent contacts with them than the Senate, should
have the privilege of taking the initiative in the proposals of revenue and tax projects, the
disposal of the people’s money, and the contracting of public indebtedness.
These powers of initiative in the raising and spending of public funds enable the House of
Representatives not only to implement but even to determine the fiscal policies of the
government. They place on its shoulders much of the responsibility of solving the financial
problems of the government, which are so closely related to the economic life of the country, and
of deciding26 on the proper distribution of revenues for such uses as may best advance public
interests.”
The popular nature of the Lower House has been more pronounced with the inclusion of
Presidentially-appointed sectoral representatives, as provided in Article VI, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution, thus: “The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by
25 Aruego, Jose M., PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION, University Publishing Co., 1950,
pp. 65-66.
26 Sinco, Vicente G., PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, Eleventh Edition, p. 196.
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selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.”(Italics
supplied)
This novel
27
provision which was implemented in the Batasang Pambansa during the martial
law regime was eventually incorporated in the present Constitution in order to give those from
27 Remarks of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum: “At a time when we did not have a lawmaking body after martial law was
declared, there were tripartite conferences called by the President for the purpose of acting as a recommendatory body
regarding settlement of labor and management disputes. During the said conferences, labor had shown that it can act
with maturity. As a result, in 1976, an amendment was introduced in the Constitution providing for sectoral
representation. In the Constitution that was approved, the number of sectors was not indicated. However, in the Election
Code of 1978, it provided for three sectors; namely, industrial labor, agricultural labor and the youth. The agricultural
labor was given four seats; two for Luzon, one for the Visayas and one for Mindanao. The same is true with the industrial
labor sector. As far as the youth are concerned, they were also given four seats: two for Luzon, one for Mindanao and one
for the Visayas, with the condition that there will be an additional two at large. And so, the youth had six representatives
plus four from the agricultural labor sector and four from the industrial labor sector—we had 14 seats.
In 1981, the Constitution was again amended. In the course of the amendment, the labor representatives in the
Batasang Pambansa proposed that sectoral representation be included as a permanent addition to the lawmaking body.
Again, in that Constitution which was approved in 1981, the number and the name of the sectors were not indicated.
However, in the Election Code that was approved before the 1984 election, there was really a definition of who will
constitute the sectors and how they will be appointed. Let me quote from that law that was passed in 1984. Under Section
27 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the scope of the sectors has been defined as follows:
The agricultural labor sector covers all persons who personally and physically till the land as their principal
occupation. It includes agricultural tenants and lessees, rural workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators, settlers
and small fishermen.
The industrial labor sector includes all nonagricultural workers and employees.
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the marginalized and often deprived sector, an opportunity to have their voices heard in the halls
of the Legislature, thus giving substance and meaning to the concept of “people empowerment.”
That the Congressmen indeed have access to, and consult their constituencies has been
demonstrated often enough by the fact that even after a House bill has been transmitted to the
Senate for concurrence, some Congressmen have been known to express their desire to change
their earlier official position or reverse themselves after having heard their constituents’ adverse
reactions to their representations.
In trying to determine whether the mandate of the Constitution with regard to the initiation of
revenue bills has been preserved inviolate, we have recourse to the tried and tested method of
definition of terms. The term “originate” is defined by Webster’s New International Dictionary
(3rd Edition, 1986) as follows: “v.i., to come into being; begin; to start.”
On the other hand, the word “exclusively” is defined by the same Webster’s Dictionary as “in
an exclusive manner; to the exclusion of all others; only; as, it is his, exclusively.” Black’s Law
Dictionary has this definition: “apart from all others; only; solely; substantially all or for the
greater part. To the exclusion of all others; without admission of others to participation; in a
manner to exclude. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. State, Tex. Civ. App., 142 S.W. 2d 519, 521, 522,
523.”
This Court had occasion to define the term “exclusive” as follows:
“. . . In its usual and generally accepted sense, the term means possessed to the exclusion of others;
appertaining
28
to the subject alone; not including, admitting or pertaining to another or others; undivided,
sole.”
When this writer, during the oral argument of July 7, 1994, asked the petitioner in G.R. No.
115455 whether he considers the
The youth sector embraces persons not more than twenty-five years of age.” (Volume Two, CONCOM RECORD, p.
564).
28 City Mayor, et al. v. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Col. Nicanor Garcia, L-20346, October 31, 1967, 21
SCRA 673.
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29
word “exclusively” to be synonymous with “solely,” he replied in the affirmative.

A careful examination of the legislative history traced earlier in this decision shows that the
original VAT law, Executive Order No. 273, was sought to be amended by ten House bills which
finally culminated in House Bill No. 11197, as well as two Senate bills. It is to be noted that the
first House Bill No. 253 was filed on July 22, 1992, and two other House bills followed in quick
succession on August 10 and September 9, 1992 before a Senate Resolution, namely, Senate Res.
No. 734, was filed on September 10, 1992 and much later, a Senate Bill proper, viz., Senate Bill
No. 1129 on March 1, 1993. Undoubtedly, therefore, these bills originated or had their start in the
House and before any Senate bill amending the VAT law was filed. In point of time and venue,
the conclusion is ineluctable that Republic Act No. 7716, which is indisputably a revenue
measure, originated in the House of Representatives in the form of House Bill No. 253, the first
EVAT bill.
Additionally, the content and substance of the ten amendatory House Bills filed over the
roughly one-year period from July 1992 to August 1993 reenforce the position that these revenue
bills, pertaining as they do, to Executive Order No. 273, the prevailing VAT law, originated in the
Lower House.
29 Transcript
of the Stenographic Notes (TSN) on the Hearing Had on Thursday, July 7, 1994, pp. 18-19: JUSTICE
FLERIDA RUTH P. ROMERO:
Q—Mr. Counsel, may I interrupt at this stage?
When you say that according to the Constitution such Revenue Bills should originate exclusively from the House. In this instance,
did it not originally originate exclusively from the House?
The word used was not “solely”; if there were Bills later also introduced, let us say in the Senate, but the House Bill came ahead.
So, are you using the two (2) words originate “exclusively” and “solely” synonymously?
SENATOR TOLENTINO:
A—The verb “originate” remains the same, Your Honor, but the word “exclusively,” as I said, means “solely.” x x x
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House Bill Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100 were intended to
restructure the VAT system by exempting or imposing the 30
tax on certain items or otherwise
introducing reforms in the mechanics of implementation. Of these, House Bill No. 9210 was
favored with a Presidential certification on the need for its immediate enactment to meet a public
emergency. Easily the most comprehensive, it noted that the revenue performance of the VAT,
being far from satisfactory since the collections have always fallen short of projections, “the
system is rendered inefficient, inequitable and less comprehensive.” Hence, the Bill proposed 31
several amendments designed to widen the tax base of the VAT and enhance its administration.
That House Bill No. 11197 being a revenue bill, originated from the Lower House was
acknowledged, in fact was virtually taken for granted, by the Chairmen of the Committee on
Ways and Means of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Consequently, at the April
19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee, the Members agreed to make the
House Bill as the “frame of reference” or “base” of the discussions of the Bicameral
32
Conference
Committee with the “amendments” or “insertions to emanate from the Senate.”
30 H.B. 771—exempting the sale of copra from VAT coverage; H.B. 2450—exempting the lessors or distributors of
cinematographic films from paying the VAT; H.B. 7033—amending Sec. 103 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended by EO 273; H.B. 8086—exempting packaging materials of export products from the VAT; H.B. 9030—amending
Sec. 120 of the NIRC, as renumbered by EO 273; H.B. 9210—amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the NIRC;
H.B. 9297—restructuring the VAT system by expanding its tax base, and amending Sections 99, 100 (A), 102 (A), 103,
113, 114, 115 and 116 of the NIRC; H.B. 10012—reducing the rate of VAT imposed on sale and importation of goods, and
sale of services; H.B. 10100—amending certain provisions of the NIRC on VAT.
31 Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9210.
32 Excerpts from the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee: “CHAIRMAN Javier. First of all,
what would be the basis, no, or framework para huwag naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no,
because the bill originates from the House because this is a revenue bill, so we would just want to ask, we make the House
Bill as the frame of reference,and then
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As to whether the bills originated exclusively in the Lower House is altogether a different matter.
Obviously, bills amendatory of VAT did not originate solely in the House to the exclusion of all
others for there were P.S. Res. No. 734 filed in the Senate on September 10, 1992 followed by
Senate Bill No. 1129 which was filed on March 1, 1993. About a year later, this was substituted
by Senate Bill No. 1630 that eventually became the EVAT law, namely, Republic Act No. 7716.
Adverting to the passage of the amendatory VAT bills in the Lower House, it is to be noted
that House Bill No. 11197 which substituted all the prior bills introduced in said House complied
with the required readings, that is, the first reading consisting of the reading of the title and
referral to the appropriate Committee, approval on second reading on November 11, 1993 and on
third reading on November 17, 1993 before being finally transmitted to the Senate. In the Senate,
its identity was preserved and its provisions were taken into consideration when the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means submitted Com. Report No. 349 which recommended for approval
“S.B. No 1630 in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and
H.B. No. 11197.” At this stage, the subject bill may be considered to have passed first reading in
the Senate with the submission of said Committee Report No. 349 by the Senate Committee on
Ways and Means to which it had been referred earlier. What
everything will just be inserted?
“HON. MACEDA. Yes, That’s true for every revenue measure. There’s no other way. The House Bill has got to be the
base. Of course, for the record, we know that this is an administration bill; this is certified by the president and I was
about to put into the records as I am saying now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people was
already decided when the President and the administration sent this to us and certified it. They have already gotten
over that political implication of this bill and the economic impact on prices.
“CHAIRMAN HERRERA. Yung concern mo about the bill as the reference in this discussion is something that we
can just. . . .
“CHAIRMAN JAVIER. We will just ...... all the amendments will be coming from the Senate.”
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remained, therefore, was no longer House Bill No. 11197 but Senate Bill No. 1630. Thence, the
Senate, instead of transmitting the bill to the Lower House for its concurrence and amendments,
if any, took a “shortcut,” bypassed the Lower House and instead, approved Senate Bill No. 1630
on both second and third readings on the same day, March 24, 1994.
The first irregularity, that is, the failure to return Senate Bill No. 1630 to the Lower House for
its approval is fatal inasmuch as the other chamber of legislature was not afforded the
opportunity to deliberate and make known its views. It is no idle dictum that no less than the
Constitution ordains: “The legislative power shall be vested in the33Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives ...” (Italics supplied)
It is to be pointed out too, that inasmuch as Senate Bill No. 1630 which had “taken into
consideration” House Bill No. 11197 was not returned to the Lower House for deliberation, the
latter Chamber had no opportunity at all to express its views thereon or to introduce any
amendment. The customary practice is, after the Senate has considered the Lower House Bill, it
returns the same to the House of origin with its amendments. In the event that there may be any
differences between the two, the same shall then be referred to a Conference Committee
composed of members from both Chambers which shall then proceed to reconcile said differences.
In the instant case, the Senate transmitted to the Lower House on March 24, 1994, a letter
informing the latter that it had “passed S. No. 1630 entitled . . . (and) in view of the disagreeing
provisions of said bill and House Bill No. 11197, entitled . . . the Senate requests a conference . . .”
This, in spite of the fact that Com. Report No. 349 of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means
had already recommended for approval on February 7, 1994 “S.B. No. 1630 . . . taking into
consideration H.B. No. 11197.” Clearly, the Conference Committee could only have acted upon
Senate Bill No. 1630, for House Bill No. 11197 had already been fused into the former.
At the oral hearing of July 7, 1994, petitioner in G.R. No. 115455 admitted, in response to this
writer’s query, that he had
33 Article VI, Section 1.
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attempted to rectify some of the perceived irregularities by presenting a motion in the Senate to
recall the bill from the Conference Committee
34
so that it could revert to the period of amendment,
but he was outvoted, in fact “slaughtered.”
In accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate, Republic Act No.
7716 was duly authenticated after it was signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives followed by the certifications35of the Secretary of the Senate and
the Acting Secretary General of the House of Representatives. With the signature of
34 Transcript of the Stenographic Notes (TSN) on the Hearing Had on Thursday, July 7, 1994, pp. 45-46:
“Justice Romero: Q: Mr. Counsel, is it not a fact that in the Bicameral Conference Committee, you presented a
Motion to return the Bill as it was to the Lower House with also your proposal that this be referred to a Referendum
for the entire nation to vote upon, then Senator Wigberto Tañada amended your Motion and convinced you to drop that
portion about referral to a Referendum and you agreed.
So that Motion of yours to return to the House was the one voted upon by the Bicameral Conference Committee and
it lost.
What can you say to that?
Senator Tolentino: A: No, No, if Your Honor please. My Motion was voted upon by the Senate itself because I
presented that said motion in order to recall the Bill from the Bicameral Conference Committee so that the Senate
could go back to the period of amendment and see if we could amend the House Bill itself, but that was defeated. So, it
became academic. Thus, what we did we proceeded with the procedure already being followed by the Senate.
I thought, as a matter of fact, that was the one way of correcting this procedural error, but I was only one (1), or two
(2), or three (3) of us only, then we were defeated in the voting, if Your Honor please.
Justice Romero: Q: You mean you were outvoted?
Senator Tolentino: A: Yes, Your Honor; we were actually slaughtered in the voting, so to speak, if Your Honor
please.”
35 The certification states: “This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was
finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 7, 1994 and May 2, 1994, respectively.”
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President Fidel V. Ramos under the words “Approved: 5 May 1994,” it was finally promulgated.
Its legislative journey ended, Republic Act No. 7716 attained the status of an enrolled bill
which is defined as one “which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by
the proper
36
officers of each, approved by the governor (or president) and filed by the secretary of
state.”
Stated differently:
“It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus
attested, has received in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act
in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when
37
the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.”
The enrolled bill assumes importance when there is some variance between what actually
transpired in the halls of Congress, as reflected in its journals, and as shown in the text of the
law as finally enacted. But suppose the journals of either or both Houses fail to disclose that the
law was passed in accordance with what was certified to by their respective presiding officers and
the President. Or that certain constitutional requirements regarding its passage were not
observed, as in the instant case.
36 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th Ed. (1979).

37 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L ed. 294.
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Which shall prevail: the journal or the enrolled bill?

A word on the journal.
“The journal is the official record of the acts of a legislative body. It should be a true record of
the proceedings arranged in chronological order. It should be a record of what is done rather than
what is said. The journal should be a clear, concise, unembellished statement of all proposals
made and all actions taken complying with all requirements of constitutions,
38
statutes, charters or
rules concerning what is to be recorded and how it is to be recorded.”
Article VI, Section 16 (4) of the Constitution ordains:
“Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeasand nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.” (Italics supplied)
The rationale behind the above provision and of the “journal entry rule” is as follows:
“It is apparent that the object of this provision is to make the legislature show what it has done, leaving
nothing whatever to implication. And, when the legislature says what it has done, with regard to the
passage of any bill, it negatives the idea that it has done anything else in regard thereto. Silence proves
nothing where one is commanded to speak. . . . Our constitution commands certain things to be done in
regard to the passage of a bill, and says that no bill shall become a law unless these things are done. It
seems a travesty upon our supreme law to say that it guaranties to the people the right to have their laws
made in this manner only, and that there is no way of enforcing this right, or for the court to say that this is
law when the constitution says it is not law. There is one safe course which is in harmony with the
constitution, and that is to adhere to the rule that the legislature must show, as commanded by the
constitution, that it has done everything required by the constitution to be done in the serious and
important matter of making laws. This is the rule of evidence
38 Mason, Paul, MASON’s MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, 1953.
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provided by the constitution. It is not presumptuous 39

in the courts, nor disrespectful to the legislature, to
judge the acts of the legislature by its own evidence.”
Confronted with a discrepancy between the journal proceedings and the law as duly enacted,
courts have indulged in different theories. The “enrolled bill” and “journal entry” rules, being
rooted deep in the Parliamentary practices of England where there is no written constitution, and
then transplanted to the United States, it may be instructive to examine which rule prevails in
the latter country through which, by a process of legislative osmosis, we adopted them in turn.
“There seems to be three distinct and different rules as applicable to the enrolled bill recognized by the
various courts of this country. The first of these rules appears to be that the enrolled bill is the ultimate
proof and exclusive and conclusive evidence that the bill passed the legislature in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. Such has been the holding in California, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas,
Washington, New Mexico, Mississippi, Indiana, South Dakota, and may be some others.
The second of the rules seems to be that the enrolled bill is a verity and resort cannot be had to the
journals of the Legislature to show that the constitutional mandates were not complied with by the
Legislature, except as to those provisions of the Constitu-tion, compliance with which is expressly required
to be shown on the journal. This rule has been adopted in South Carolina, Montana, Oklahoma, Utah, Ohio,
New Jersey, United States Supreme Court, and others.
The third of the rules seems to be that the enrolled bill raises only a prima facie presumption that the
mandatory provisions of the Constitution have been complied with and that resort may be had to the
journals to refute that presumption, and if the constitutional provision is one, compliance with which is
expressly required by the Constitution to be shown on the journals, then the mere silence of the journals to
show a compliance therewith will refute the presumption. This rule has been adopted in Illinois, Florida,
Kansas, Louisiana, Tennessee,
40
Arkansas, Idaho, Minnesota, Nebraska, Arizona, Oregon, New Jersey,
Colorado, and others.”
39 Cohn v. Kingsley, 49 P. 985 (1897).

40 Smith v. Thompson, 258 N.W. 190.
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In the 1980 case of D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky which had subscribed in the past to the first of the three theories, made the
pronouncement that it had shifted its stand and would henceforth adopt the third. It justified its
changed stance, thus:
“We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the ‘extrinsic
evidence’ rule ........ Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but
such presumption may be over-come by clear41 satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that
constitutional requirements have not been met.”
What rule, if any, has been adopted in this jurisdiction?

42
Advocates of the “journal entry rule” cite the 1916 decision in U.S. v. Pons where this Court
placed reliance on the legislative journals to determine whether Act No. 2381 was passed on
February 28, 1914 which is what appears in the Journal, or on March 1, 1914 which was closer to
the truth. The confusion was caused by the adjournment sine die at midnight of February 28,
1914 of the Philippine Commission.
A close examination of the decision reveals that the Court did not apply the “journal entry
rule” vis-a-vis the “enrolled bill rule” but the former as against what are “behind the legislative
journals.”
“Passing over the question of whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by authority of law, is
conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the
legislative
43
journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and
explicit.”
It is to be noted from the above that the Court “passed over” the probative value to be accorded to
the enrolled bill. Opting for the journals, the Court proceeded to explain:
41 602 S.W. 2d 420 (1980).

42 34 Phil. 729 (1916).
43 Ibid at 733.
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“From their very nature and object, the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary,
and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department
44
of
the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.”
Following the courts in the United States since the Constitution of the Philippine Government is
modeled after that of the Federal Government, the Court did not hesitate to follow the courts in
said country, i.e., to consider the journals decisive of the point at issue. Thus: “The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 451914. This settles the question
and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.”
The Court made a categorical 46
stand for the “enrolled bill rule” for the first time in the 1947
case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where it held that an enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts. This Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the
fact that the vote of three-fourths of the Members of the Congress (as required by the
Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on
account of the suspension of some members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In
this connection, the Court invoked the “enrolled bill rule” in this wise: “If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly47certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the ‘enrolled bill rule’ born of that respect.”
Mindful that the U.S. Supreme Court is on the side of those who favor the rule and for no
other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body (i.e., Sec. 313 of
the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210), the Court said that “duly certified
copies shall be conclusive proof of
44 Ibid at 733-734.
45 Ibid at 735.
46 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
47 Ibid at 3.
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the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.” Without pulling the legal
underpinnings from U.S. v. Pons, it justified its position by saying that if the Court at the time
looked into the journals, “in all probability, those were the documents offered in evidence” and
that “even if both the journals and authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal
of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrolled
theory; for as already stated, the due enactment of a48law may be proved in either of the two ways
specified in Section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended.” Three Justices voiced their dissent from the
majority decision.
Again, the Court
49
made its position plain in the 1963 case of Casco Philippine Chemical Co.,
Inc. v. Gimenez when a unanimous Court ruled that: “The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If
there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation not
by judicial decree.” According to Webster’s New 20th Century Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1983, the word
“tenor” means, among others, “the general drift of something spoken or written; intent, purport,
substance.”
Thus, the Court upheld the respondent Auditor General’s interpretation that Republic Act No.
2609 really exempted from the margin fee on foreign exchange transactions “urea
formaldehyde” as found in the law and not “urea and formaldehyde” which petitioner insisted
were the words contained in the bill and were so intended by Congress.
In 1969, the Court similarly placed the weight of its authority behind the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill. In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court ruled in Morales v. Subido that
“the enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows
that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau
of Printing. x x x Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver
Wendell Holmes but of a
48 Ibid at 18.
49 117 Phil. 363 (1963).
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50
Sherlock Holmes.” The alleged omission of a phrase in the final Act was made, not at any stage
of the legislative proceedings, but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more
specifically in the proofreading thereof.
But the Court did include a caveat that qualified the absoluteness of the “enrolled bill” rule
stating:
“By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the
journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution (Art. VI,
secs. 10 [4], 20 [1], and 21 [1]) expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what
extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the
journal, is a question which we do not now decide (Cf. e.g., Wilkes Country Comm’rs. v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506
[1900]). All we hold is that with respect to matters not51
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.”
52
More recently, in the 1993 case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, this Court, in ruling
on the unconstitutionality of Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 withdrawing the franking
privilege from the entire hierarchy of courts, did not so much adhere to the enrolled bill rule
alone as to both “enrolled bill and legislative journals.” Through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, we
stated: “Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted, i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very
least, a becoming courtesy.”
Aware of the shifting sands on which the validity and continuing relevance of the “enrolled
bill” theory rests, I have taken pains to trace the history of its applicability in this jurisdiction, as
influenced in varying degrees by different Federal rulings.
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural
irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630,
outside of the
50 136 Phil. 405, 409 (1969).

51 Ibidat 412.
52 G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.
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reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no
longer be impugned, having been “saved” by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no
cogent reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect
to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their
subsequent engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively
minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence
and substance of the law itself.
Certainly, “courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since
constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over
facts—whether or not the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever—not over the
meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to
rule on the facts. The argument 53
is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts
examined legislative procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill
introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and
the public unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith.
EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
One of the issues raised in these petitions, especially in G.R. Nos. 115781, 115543 and 115754,
respectively, is whether or not—
“Congress violated Section 26, par. 2, Article VI (of the 1987 Constitution) when it approved the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report which embodied, in violation of Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate, a
radically altered tax measure containing provisions not reported out or discussed in either House as well as
provisions on which
53 Davies, Jack, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, 2nd ed., 1986.
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there was no disagreement between the House and the Senate and,54
worse, provisions contrary to what the
House and the Senate had approved after three separate readings.”
and
“By adding or deleting provisions, when there was no conflicting provisions between the House and Senate
versions, the BICAM acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to
loss of jurisdiction. x x x In adding to the bill and thus subjecting to VAT, real properties, media and
cooperatives despite the contrary decision of both Houses, the BICAM
55
exceeded its jurisdiction or acted with
such abuse of discretion as to amount to loss of jurisdiction ”
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that
“(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice x x x to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.” We are also guided by the principle that a court
may interfere 56
with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the
Constitution.
A conference committee has been defined:
“ unlike the joint committee is two committees, one appointed by each house. It is normally appointed for
a specific bill and its function is to gain accord between the two houses either by the recession of one house
from its bill or its amendments or by the further amendment of the existing legislation or by the
substitution of an entirely new bill. Obviously, the conference committee is always a special committee and
normally includes the member who introduced the bill and the chairman of the committee which considered
it together with such other representatives of the houses as seem expedient. (Horack, Cases and Materials
on Legislation [1940] 220. See also Zinn, Conference Procedure in 57
Congress, 38 ABAJ 864 [1952]; Steiner,
The Congressional Conference Committee [U of Ill. Press, 1951]).”
54 Petitionin G.R. No. 115781, p. 18.

55 Petitionin G.R. No. 115543, pp. 2-3.
56 Davies, Jack, supra at 90.
57 Sutherland, J.G., STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp. 293-294.
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From the foregoing definition, it is clear that a bicameral conference committee is a creature, not
of the Constitution, but of the legislative body under its power to determine rules of its
proceedings under Article VI, Sec. 16 (3) of the Constitution. Thus, it draws its life and vitality
from the rules governing its creation. The why, when, how and wherefore of its operations, in
other words, the parameters within which it is to function, are to be found in Section 26, Rule XII
of the Rules of the Senate and Section 85 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
respectively, which provide:
Rule XII, Rules of the Senate
“SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of
any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with subparagraph
(c), Section 8 of Rule III.
changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary
of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.”
Rules of the House of Representatives

“SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.—In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on
the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committee of
both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when the journal is
being read, while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such
reports shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the
subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the
Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient that
three copies of the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.”
782
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Under these Rules, a bicameral conference committee comes into being only when there
are disagreements and differences between the Senate and the House with regard to certain
provisions of a particular legislative act which have to be reconciled.
Jefferson’s Manual,which, according to Section 112, Rule XLIX of the Senate Rules,
supplements it, states that a conference committee is usually called “on the occasion of
amendments between the Houses” and “in all 58
cases of difference of opinion between the two
Houses on matters pending between them.” It further states:
“The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them, and may not
include subjects not within the disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue. But they may
perfect amendments committed to them if they do not in so doing
59
go beyond the differences. x x x Managers
may not change the text to which both Houses have agreed.” (Italics supplied.)
Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedures which is also60 considered as controlling authority for
any situation not covered by a specific legislative rule, states that either House may “request a
conference with the other on any matter of difference or dispute between
61
them” and that in such
a request, “the subject of the conference should always be stated.”
In the Philippines, as in the United States, the Conference Committee exercises such a wide
range of authority that they virtually constitute a third House in the Legislature. As admitted by
the Solicitor General, “It was the practice in past Congresses for Conference Committees to insert
in bills62 approved by the two Houses new provisions that were not originally contemplated by
them.”
In Legislative Procedure,Robert Luce gives a graphic description of the milieu and the
circumstances which have conspired to
58 Page 261.
59 Page 268.
60 Davies, supra, at 65.
61 Sec. 764, p. 541.
62 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, p. 71.
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transform an initially innocuous mechanism designed to facilitate legislative action into an all-
powerful Frankenstein that brooks no challenge to its authority even from its own members.
“Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees must be accepted without
amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is to get done with the matters and so the motion to accept
has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable provisions rather than
prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a
session, when to seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At any time in
the session there is some risk of such a result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not be
possible to secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal chance to develop
more strength.
xxx xxx xxx
Entangled in a network of rule and custom, the Representative who resents and would resist this theft of
his rights, finds himself helpless. Rarely can he vote, rarely can he voice his mind, in the matter of any
fraction of the bill. Usually he cannot even record himself as protesting against some one feature while
accepting the measure as whole. Worst of all, he cannot by argument or suggested change, try to improve
what the other branch has done.
This means more than the subversion of individual rights. It means to a degree the abandonment of
whatever advantage the bicameral system may have. By so much it in effect transfers the lawmaking power
to a small group of members who work out in private a decision that almost always prevails. What is worse,
these men are not chosen in a way to ensure the wisest choice. It has become the practice to name as
conferees the ranking members of the committee, so that the accident of seniority determines. Exceptions
are made, but in general it is not a question of who are most competent to serve. Chance governs, sometimes
giving way to favor, rarely to merit.
xxx xxx xxx
Speaking broadly, the system of legislating by conference committee is unscientific and therefore
defective. Usually it forfeits the benefit of scrutiny and judgment by all the wisdom available. Uncontrolled,
it is
63
inferior to that process by which every amendment is secured independent discussion and vote. x x
x.” (Italics supplied)
63 Pages 404-405 and 407.
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Not surprisingly has it been said: “Conference Committee action is the most undemocratic 64
procedure in the legislative process; it is an appropriate target for legislative critics.”
In the case at bench, petitioners insist that the Conference Committee to which Senate Bill No.
1630 and House Bill No. 11197 were referred for the purpose of harmonizing their differences,
overreached themselves in not confining their “reconciliation” function to those areas of
disagreement in the two bills but actually making “surreptitious insertions” and deletions which
amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
At this point, it becomes imperative to focus on the errant provisions which found their way
into Republic Act No. 7716. Below is a breakdown to facilitate understanding the grounds for
petitioners’ objections:
INSERTIONS MADE BY BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE (BICAM) TO

SENATE BILL (SB) NO. 1630 AND HOUSE BILL (HB) NO. 11197
1. Sec. 99 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
(1) Under the HB, this section includes any person who, in the course of trade or business,
sells, barters or exchanges goods OR PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES
PERSONAL PROPERTIES.
(2) The SB completely changed the said section and defined a number of words and phrases.
Also, Section 99-A was added which included one who sells, exchanges, barters
PROPERTIES and one who imports PROPERTIES.
(3) The BICAM version makes LESSORS of goods OR PROPERTIES and importers of goods
LIABLE to VAT (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754).
2. Section 100 (VAT on Sale of Goods)
The term “goods” or “properties” includes the following, which were not found in either the HB or
the SB:
64 Davies, supra, at 81.
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—In addition to
radio and television
time; SATELLITE
TRANSMISSION
AND CABLE
TELEVISION
TIME.
—The term “Other
similar properties”
was deleted, which
was present in the
HB and the SB.
—Real properties
held primarily for
sale to customers or
held for lease in the
ordinary course or
business were
included, which
was neither in the
HB nor the SB
(subject of petition
in G.R. No.
115754).
3. Section 102
On what are included in the term “sale or exchange of services,” as to make them subject to VAT,
the BICAM included/inserted the following (not found in either House or Senate Bills):
1. Services of lessors of property, whether personal or real (subject of petition in G.R. No.
115754);
2. Warehousing services;
3. Keepers of resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts;
4. Common carriers by land, air and sea;
5. Services of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph;
6. Radio and television broadcasting;
7. All other franchise grantees except those under Section 117 of this Code (subject of
petition in G.R. No. 115852);
8. Services of surety, fidelity, indemnity, and bonding com-panies;
9. Also inserted by the BICAM (on page 8 thereof) is the lease or use of or the right to use of
satellite transmission and cable television time.
4. Section 103 (Exempt Transactions)
The BICAM deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its inclusion in both the House and
Senate Bills. Therefore, under Republic Act No. 7716, the “printing, publication, importation or
sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular
intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is not devoted principally to the
publication of advertisements” is subject to VAT (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115931 and G.R.
No. 115544).
The HB and SB did not touch Subsection (g) but it was amended by the BICAM by changing
the word TEN to FIVE.
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Thus, importation of vessels with tonnage of more than five thousand tons is VAT exempt.
Subsection L, which was identical in the HB and the SB that stated that medical, dental,
hospital and veterinary services were exempted from the VAT was amended by the BICAM by
adding the qualifying phrase: EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS, thus
subjecting doctors, dentists and veterinarians to the VAT.
Subsection U which exempts from VAT “transactions which are exempt under special laws,”
was amended by the BICAM by adding the phrase: EXCEPT THOSE GRANTED UNDER PD
Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, AND 1590, AND NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES UNDER RA 6938
(subject of petition in G.R. No. 115873), not found in either the HB or the SB, resulting in the
inclusion of all cooperatives to the VAT, except non-electric cooperatives.
The sale of real properties was included in the exempt transactions under the House Bill, but
the BICAM qualified this with the provision:
“(S) SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES NOT PRIMARILY HELD FOR SALE TO CUSTOMERS OR HELD FOR
LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR BUSINESS OR REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR
LOW-COST AND SOCIALIZED HOUSING AS DEFINED BY RA NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING ACT OF 1992 AND OTHER RELATED LAWS.” (subject of
petition in G.R. No. 115754)
The BICAM also exempted the sale of properties, the receipts of which are not less than
P480,000.00 or more than P720,000.00. Under the SB, no amount was given, but in the HB it was
stated that receipts from the sale of properties not less than P350,000.00 nor more than
P600,000.00 were exempt.
It did not include, as VAT exempt, the sale or transfer of securities, as defined in the Revised
Securities Act (BP 178) which was contained in both Senate and House Bills.
5. Section 104
Not included in the HB or the SB is the phrase “INCLUDING PACKAGING MATERIALS” which
was inserted by the BICAM
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in Section 104 (A) (1) (B), thus excluding from creditable input tax packaging materials and the
phrase “ON WHICH A VALUE-ADDED TAX HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PAID” in Section 104 (A)
(2).
6. Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT registration fee but this
was increased by BICAM to P1,000.00.
7. Section 112
Regarding a person whose sales or receipts are exempt under Section 103 (w), the BICAM
inserted the phrase: “THREE PERCENT UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR
PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS THEREAFTER,” although the SB and the HB provide only “three
percent of his gross quarterly sales.”
8. Section 115
The BICAM adopted the HB version which subjects common carriers by land, air or water for the
transport of passengers to 3% of their gross quarterly sales, which is not found in the SB.
9. Section 117
The BICAM amended this section by subjecting franchises on electric, gas and water utilities to a
tax of two percent (2%) on gross receipts derived x x x, although neither the HB nor the SB has a
similar provision.
10. Section 17 (d)
(a) The BICAM defers for only 2 years the VAT on services of actors and actresses, although
the SB defers it for 3 years.
(b) The BICAM uses the word “EXCLUDE” in the section on deferment of VAT collection on
certain goods and services. The HB does not contain any counterpart provision and SB
only allows deferment for no longer than 3 years.
788
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11. Section 18 on the Tax Administration Development Fund is an entirely new provision not
contained in the House/Senate Bills. This fund is supposed to ensure effective
implementation of Republic Act No. 7716.
12. Section 19
No period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations is found in the HB
or the SB but BICAM provided “within 90 days” which found its way in Republic Act No. 7716.
Even a cursory perusal of the above outline will convince one that, indeed, the Bicameral
Conference Committee (henceforth to be referred to as BICAM) exceeded the power and authority
granted in the Rules of its creation. Both Senate and House Rules limit the task of the
Conference Committee in almost identical language to the settlement of differences in the
provisions or amendments to any bill or joint resolution. If it means anything at all, it is that
there are provisions in subject bill, to start with, which differ and, therefore, need reconciliation.
Nowhere in the Rules is it authorized to initiate or propose completely new matter. Although
under certain rules on legislative procedure, like those in Jefferson’s Manual,a conference
committee may introduce germane matters in a particular bill, such matters should be
circumscribed by the committee’s sole authority and function to reconcile differences.
Parenthetically, in the Senate and in the House, a matter is “germane” to a particular bill if
there is a common tie between said matter and the provisions which tend to promote the object
and purpose of the bill it seeks to amend. If it introduces 65
a new subject matter not within the
purview of the bill, then it is not “germane” to the bill. The test is whether or not the change
represented an amendment or extension of the 66
basic purpose of the original, or the introduction of
an entirely new and different subject matter.
65 See: 18 Words and Phrases 482 citing Kennedy v. Truss, Del. Super., 13 A. 2nd 431, 435, 1 Terry 424 (1940).
66 United States Gypsum Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 110 N.W. 2d 698, 71, 363, Mich. 548 (1961).
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In the BICAM, however, the germane subject matter must be within the ambit of the
disagreement between the two Houses. If the “germane” subject is not covered by the
disagreement but it is reflected in the final version of the bill as reported by the Conference
Committee
67
or, if what appears to be a “germane” matter in the sense that it is “relevant or closely
allied” with the purpose of the bill, was not the subject of a disagreement between the Senate
and the House, it should be deemed an extraneous matter or even a “rider” which should never be
considered legally passed for not having undergone the three-day reading requirement. Insertion
of new matter on the part of the BICAM is, therefore, an ultra vires act which makes the same
void.
The determination of what is “germane” and what is not may appear to be a difficult task but
the Congress, having been confronted with the problem before, resolved it in accordance with the
rules. In that case, the Congress approved a Conference Committee’s insertion of new provisions
that were not contemplated in any of the provisions in question between the Houses simply
because of the provision in Jefferson’s Manual that conferees may report matters “which 68
are germane modifications of subjects in disagreement between the Houses and the committee. In
other words, the matter was germane to the points of disagreement between the House and the
Senate.
As regards inserted amendments in the BICAM, therefore, the task of determining what is
germane to a bill is simplified, thus: If the amendments are not circumscribed by the subjects of
disagreement between the two Houses, then they are not germane to the purpose of the bill.
In the instant case before us, the insertions and deletions made do not merely spell an effort at
settling conflicting provisions but have materially altered the bill, thus giving rise to the instant
petitions on the part of those who were caught unawares by the legislative legerdemain that took
place. Going by the definition of the word “amendment” in Black’s Law Dictionary,
67 BLACK’sDICTIONARY, 6th ed., p. 687 citing State ex. rel. Riley v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist. in and for
Silver Bow County, 103 Mont. 576, 64 P. 2d 115, 119 (1937).
68 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 3, 1952, p. 885 cited in Orquiola, Annotated Rules of the Senate, 1991 ed., pp. 40-
41.
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5th Ed., 1979, which means “to change or modify for the better; to alter by modification, deletion,
or addition,” said insertions and deletions constitute amendments. Consequently, these violated
Article VI, Section 26 (2) which provides inter alia: “Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed . . .” This proscription is intended to subject all bills and
their amendments to intensive deliberation by the legislators and the ample ventilation of issues
to afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or objections issues to afford the
public an opportunity to express their opinions or objections thereon. The same rationale
underlies the three-reading requirement to the end that no surpises may be sprung on an
unsuspecting citizenry.
Provisions of the “now you see it, now you don’t” variety, meaning those which were either in
the House and/or Senate versions but simply disappeared or were “bracketed out” of existence in
the BICAM Report, were eventually incorporated in Republic Act No. 7716. Worse, some goods,
properties or services which were not covered by the two versions and, therefore, were never
intended to be so covered, suddenly found their way into the same Report. No advance notice of
such insertions prepared the rest of the legislators, much less the public who could be adversely
affected, so that they could be given the opportunity to express their views thereon. Well has the
final BICAM report been described, therefore, as an instance of “taxation without
representation.”
That the conferees or delegates in the BICAM representing the two Chambers could not
possibly be charged with bad faith or sinister motives or, at the very least, unseemly behavior, is
of no moment. The stark fact is that items not previously subjected to the VAT now fell under its
coverage without interested sectors or parties having been afforded the opportunity to be heard
thereon. This is not to say that the Conference Committee Report should have undergone the
three readings required in Article VI, Section 26(2), for this clearly refers only to bills which, after
having been initially filed in either House, negotiated the labyrinthine passage therein until its
approval. The composition of the BICAM including as it usually does, the Chairman of the
appropriate Committee, the sponsor of the bill and other interested members ensures an
informed discussion, at least with respect to the disagreeing provisions. The same does not obtain
as regards completely new
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matter which suddenly spring on the legislative horizon.

It has been pointed out that such extraneous matters notwithstanding, all Congressmen and
Senators were given the opportunity to approve or turn down the Committee Report in toto,thus
“curing” whatever defect or irregularity it bore. Earlier in this opinion, I explained that the
source of the acknowledged power of this ad hoc committee stems from the precise fact that, the
meetings, being scheduled “take it or leave it” basis. It has not been uncommon for legislators
who, for one reason or another have been frustrated in their attempt to pass a pet bill in their
own chamber, to work for its passage in the BICAM where it may enjoy a more hospitable
reception and faster approval. In the instant case, had there been full, open and unfettered
discussion on the bills during the Committee sessions, there would not have been as much
vociferous objections on this score. Unfortunately, however, the Committee held two of the five
sessions behind closed doors, sansstenographers, record-takers and interested observers. To that
extent, the proceedings were shrouded in mystery and the public’s69
right to information on
matters of public concern as enshrined in Article III, Section 7 and the government’s policy of
transparency70 in transactions involving public interest in Article II, Section 28 of the
Constitution are undermined.
Moreover, that which is void ab initio such as the objectionable provisions in the Conference
Committee Report, cannot be “cured” or ratified. For all intents and purposes, these never
existed. Quae ab initio non valent, ex post facto convalescere non possunt.Things that are invalid
from the beginning are not made valid by a subsequent act.
69 Article III, Section 7. “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.”
70 Article II, Section 28. “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”
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Should this argument be unacceptable, the “enrolled bill” doctrine, in turn, is invoked to support
the proposition that the certification by the presiding officers of Congress, together with the
signature of the President, bars further judicial inquiry into the validity of the law. I reiterate my
submission that the “enrolled bill ruling” may be applicable but only with respect to questions
pertaining to the procedural enactment, engrossment, printing, the insertion or deletion of a word
or phrase here and there, but would draw a dividing line with respect to substantial substantive
changes, such as those introduced by the BICAM herein.
We have before us then the spectacle of a body created by the two Houses of Congress for the
very limited purpose of settling disagreements in provisions between bills emanating therefrom,
exercising the plenary legislative powers of the parent chambers but holding itself exempt from
the mandatory constitutional requirements that are the hallmarks of legislation under the aegis
of a democratic political system. From the initial filing, through the three readings which entail
detailed debates and discussions in Committee and plenary sessions, and on to the transmittal to
the other House in a repetition of the entire process to ensure exhaustive deliberations—all these
have been skipped over. In the proverbial twinkling of an eye, provisions that probably may not
have seen the light of day had they but run their full course through the legislative mill, sprang
into existence and emerged full-blown laws.
Yet our Constitution vests the legislative power in “the Congress
71
of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives . . . .” and not in any special, standing or
super committee of its own creation, no matter that these have been described, accurately
enough, as “the eye, the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the house.”
Firstly, that usage or custom has sanctioned this abbreviated, if questionable, procedure does
not warrant its being legitimized and perpetuated any longer. Consuetudo, contra rationem
introducta, potius usurpatio quam consuetudo appellari debet. A custom against reason is rather
an usurpation. In the hierarchy
71 Article VI, Section 1.
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of sources of legislative procedure, constitutional rules, statutory provisions and adopted rules (as
for example, the Senate and House Rules), rank highest, certainly much ahead of customs and
usages.
Secondly, is this Court to assume the role of passive spectator or indulgent third party,
timorous about exercising its power or more importantly, performing its duty, of making a
judicial determination on the issue of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion by the
other branches or instrumentalities of government, where the same is properly invoked? The time
is past when the Court was not loathe to raise the bogeyman of the political question to avert a
head-on collision with either the Executive or Legislative Departments. Even the separation of
powers doctrine was burnished to a bright sheen as often as it was invoked to keep the judiciary
within bounds. No longer does this condition obtain. Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution
partly quoted in this paragraph has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry. This Court can now
safely fulfill its mandate of delimiting the powers of co-equal departments like the Congress, its
officers or its committees which may have no compunctions about exercising legislative powers in
full.
Thirdly, dare we close our eyes to the presumptuous assumption by a runaway committee of
its progenitor’s legislative powers in derogation of the rights of the people, in the process,
subverting the democratic principles we all are sworn to uphold, when a proper case is made out
for our intervention? The answers to the above queries are self-evident.
I call to mind this exhortation: “We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution—by any
person, corporation, state agency or branch of government—are brought to light and corrected. To
countenance an artificial rule of law that silences72 our voices when confronted with violations of
our Constitution is not acceptable to this Court.”
I am not unaware that a rather recent decision of ours brushed aside an argument that a
provision in subject law regarding the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the petitioners
and this Court itself, not having been included in the original version
72 D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, supra.
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of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200 but only in the Conference Committee Report,
was violative of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution. Likewise, that said Section 35,
never having been a subject of disagreement between both Houses, could not have been validly
added as an amendment before the Conference Committee.
The majority opinion in said case explained:
“While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader
function is described thus:
‘A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in
its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted
into the conference bill.But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian73
power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative
Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).’ ” (Italics supplied)
At the risk of being repetitious, I wish to point out that the general rule, as quoted above, is:
“Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference
bill.” What follows, that is, “occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results beyond its mandate . . .” is the exception. Then it concludes with a declaration that: “This
is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee.” Are we about to reinstall
another institution that smacks of authoritarianism which, after our past experience, has become
anathema to the Filipino people?
The ruling above can hardly be cited in support of the proposition that a provision in a BICAM
report which was not
73 The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pete Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 709.
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the subject of differences between the House and Senate versions of a bill cannot be nullified. It
submits that such is not authorized in our Basic Law. Moreover, this decision concerns merely
one provision whereas the BICAM Report that culminated in the EVAT law has a wider scope as
it, in fact, expanded the base of the original VAT law by imposing the tax on several items which
were not so covered prior to the EVAT.
One other flaw in most BICAM Reports, not excluding this one under scrutiny, is that, hastily
drawn up, it often fails to conform to the Senate and House Rules requiring no less than a
“detailed” and “sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure.” The Report of the committee, as may be gleaned from the preceding pages, was no
more than the final version of the bill as “passed” by the BICAM. The amendments or subjects of
dissension, as well as the reconciliation made by the committee, are not even pointed out, much
less explained therein.
It may be argued that legislative rules of procedure74 may properly be suspended, modified,
revoked or waived at will by the legislators themselves. This principle, however, does not come
into play in interpreting what the record of the proceedings shows was, or was not, done. It is
rather designed to test the validity of legislative
75
action where the record shows a final action in
violation or disregard of legislative rules. Utilizing the Senate and the House Rules as both
guidelines and yardstick, the BICAM here obviously did not adhere to the rule on what the
Report should contain.
Given all these irregularities that have apparently been engrafted into the BICAM system,
and which have been tolerated, if not accorded outright acceptance by everyone involved in or
conversant with, the institution, it may be asked: Why not leave well enough alone?
74In Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, (109 Phil. 863 [1960]), the Court held that parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and they may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Hence, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage
will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
75 State v. Essling, 128 N.W. 2d 307, 316 (1964).
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That these practices have remained unchallenged in the past does not justify our closing our eyes
and turning a deaf ear to them. Writ large is the spectacle of a mechanism ensconced in the very
heart of the people’s legislative halls, that now stands indicted with the charge of arrogating
legislative powers unto itself through the use of dubious “shortcuts.” Here, for the people to judge,
is the “mother of all shortcuts.”
In the petitions at bench, we are confronted with the enactment of a tax law which was
designed to broaden the tax base. It is rote learning for any law student that as 76
an attribute of
sovereignty, the power to tax is “the strongest of all the powers of government.”77
Admittedly, “for
all its plenitude, the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions.” Were there none,
then the oft-quoted 78
1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that “the power to tax involves the
power to destroy” would be a truism. Happily, we can concur with, and the people can find
comfort in, the reassuring words79
of Mr. Justice Holmes: “The power to tax is not the power to
destroy while this Court sits.”
Manakanakâ, mayroóng dumudulóg dito sa Kátaastaasang Hukuman na may kamangha-
mangháng hinaíng. Angkóp na halimbawà ay ang mga petisyóng iniharáp ngayón sa amin.
Ang ilán sa kanilá ay mga Senadór na nais mapawaláng bisà ang isáng batás ukol sa buwís na
ipinasá mismo nilá. Diumanó itó ay hindî tumalima sa mga itinatadhana ng Sáligang Batás.
Bukód sa rito, tutol silá sa mga bagong talatà na isiningit ng “Bicameral Conference Committee”
na nagdagdág ng mga bagong bagay bagay at serbisyo na papatawan ng buwís. Ayon sa kanilá,
ginampanán ng komiténg iyán ang gawain na nauukol sa buóng Kongreso. Kung kayá’t ang
nararapat na mangyari ay ihatol ng Kátaastaasang Hukuman na malabis na pagsasamantala sa
sariling pagpapasiyá ang ginawâ ng Kongreso.
Bagamá’t bantulót kamíng makialám sa isáng kapantáy na sangáy ng Pamahalaán, hindî
naman nararapat na kamí ay
76 Sarasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252, 262 (1919).

77 Sison,Jr. v. Ancheta, L-59431, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 654, 660.
78 McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316.
79 Quoted in Graves. v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 490.
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tumanggíng gampanán ang tungkulin na iniatas sa amin ng Saligang Batas. Lalu’t-lalò nang ang
batás na kinauukulan ay maaaring makapinsalá sa nakararami sa sambayanán.
Sa ganang akin, itong batas na inihaharap sa amin ngayón, ay totoóng labág sa Saligang
Batás, samakatuwíd ay waláng bisà. Nguni’t itó ay nauukol lamang sa mga katiwalián na may
kinalaman sa paraán ng pagpapasabatás nitó. Hindî namin patakarán ang makialám o
humadláng sa itinakdáng gawain ng Saligang Batás sa Pangulò at sa Kongreso. Ang dalawáng
sangáy na iyán ng Pamahalaán ang higít na maalam ukol sa kung ang anumáng panukalang
batás ay nararapat, kanais-nais o magagampanán; kung kayá’t hindî kamí nararapat na
maghatol o magpapasiyá sa mga bagay na iyán. Ang makapapataw ng angkop na lunas sa
larangan na iyán ay ang mismong mga kinatawán ng sambayanán sa Kongreso.
Faced with this challenge of protecting the rights of the people by striking down a law that I
submit is unconstitutional and in the process, checking the wonted excesses of the Bicameral
Conference Committee system, I see in this case a suitable vehicle to discharge the Court’s
Constitutional mandate and duty of declaring that there has indeed been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Legislature.
Republic Act No. 7716, being unconstitutional and void, I find no necessity to rule on the
substantive issues as dealt with in the majority opinion as they have been
rendered mootand academic. These issues pertain to the intrinsic merits of the law. It is
axiomatic that the wisdom, desirability and advisability of enacting certain laws lie, not within
the province of the Judiciary but that of the political departments, the Executive and the
Legislative. The relief sought by petitioners from what they perceive to be the harsh and onerous
effect of the EVAT on the people is within their reach. For Congress, of which Senator-petitioners
are a part, can furnish the solution by either repealing or amending the subject law.
For the foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
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DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
With a consensus already reached after due deliberations, silence perhaps should be the better
part of discretion, except to vote. The different views and opinions expressed are so persuasive
and convincing; they are more than enough to sway the pendulum for or against the subject
petitions. The penetrating and scholarly dissertations of my brethren should dispense with
further arguments which may only confound and confuse even the most learned of men.
But there is a crucial point, a constitutional issue which, I submit, has been belittled, treated
lightly, if not almost considered insignificant and purposeless. It is elementary, as much as it is
fundamental. I am referring to the word “exclusively” appearing in Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987
Constitution. This is regrettable, to say the least, as it involves a constitutional mandate which,
wittingly or unwittingly, has been cast aside as trivial and meaningless.
A comparison of the particular provision on the enactment of revenue bills in the U.S.
Constitution with its counterpart in the Philippine Constitution will help explain my position.
Under the U.S. Constitution, “[a]ll bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills” (Sec.
7, par. [1], Art. I). In contrast, our 1987 Constitution reads: “All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments” (Sec. 24, Art. VI; italics supplied).
As may be gleaned from the pertinent provision of our Constitution, all revenue bills are
required to originate “exclusively” in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the U.S.
Constitution does not use the word “exclusively”; it merely says, “[a]ll bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the House of
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Representatives.”
Since the term “exclusively” has already been adequately defined in the various opinions, as to
which there seems to be no dispute, I shall no longer offer my own definition.
Verily, the provision in our Constitution requiring that all revenue bills shall originate
exclusively from the Lower House is mandatory. The word “exclusively”
1
is an “exclusive word,”
which is indicative of an intent that the provision is mandatory. Hence, all American authorities
expounding on the meaning and application of Sec. 7, par. (1), Art. I, of the U.S. Constitution
cannot be used in the interpretation of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987 Constitution which has a
distinct feature of “exclusiveness” all its own. Thus, when our Constitution absolutely requires—
as it is mandatory—that a particular bill should exclusively emanate from the Lower House,
there is no alternative to the requirement that the bill to become valid law must originate
exclusively from that House.
In the interpretation of constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular
sections are mandatory or directory. The courts usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional
provision is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions
which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional
provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any discretion to the will of the legislature to obey or
disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is
unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. So strong is the
inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even been
said that neither by the courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision
of the Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone of its provisions
should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without2
reference to the rules and distinguishing
between the directory and the mandatory statutes.
The framers of our 1987 Constitution could not have used the term “exclusively” if they only
meant to replicate and adopt in
1 See McGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 821 (1954).
2 See Tañada v. Cuenco , 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
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toto the U.S. version. By inserting “exclusively” in Sec. 24, Art. VI of our Constitution, their
message is clear: they wanted it different, strong, stringent. There must be a compelling reason
for the inclusion of the word “exclusively,” which cannot be an act of retrogression but
progression, an improvement on its precursor. Thus,”exclusively” must be given its true meaning,
its purpose observed and virtue recognized, for it could not have been conceived to be of minor
consequence. That construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute—its
every word. Ut magis valeat quam pereat.
Consequently, any reference to American authorities, decisions and opinions, however wisely
and delicately put, can only mislead in the interpretation of our own Constitution. To refer to
them in defending the constitutionality of R.A. 7716, subject of the present petitions, is to argue
on a false premise, i.e., that Sec. 24, Art. VI of our 1987 Constitution is, or means exactly, the
same as Sec. 7, par. (1), Art. I of the U.S. Constitution, which is not correct. Hence, only a wrong
conclusion can be drawn from a wrong premise.
For example, it is argued that in the United States, from where our own legislature is
patterned, the Senate can practically substitute its own tax measure for that of the Lower House.
Thus, according to the Majority, citing an American case, “the validity of Sec. 37 which the
Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909 by imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight
of vessels, was upheld against the claim that the revenue 3
bill originated in the Senate in
contravention of Art. I, Sec. 7, of the U.S. Constitution.” In an effort to be more convincing, the
Majority even quotes the footnote in Introduction to American Government by F.A. Ogg and P.O.
Raywhich reads—
Thus in 1883 the upper house struck out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote its
own measure, which the House eventually felt obliged to accept. It likewise added 847 amendments to the
Payne-Aldrich tariff act of 1909, dictated the schedules of the emergency tariff act of 1921, rewrote an
extensive tax revision bill in the same year, and recast most of the permanent tariff
3 See Majority Opinion, p. 15, citing Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S., 309, 58 Law Ed. 617.
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4
bill of 1922 —
which in fact suggests, very clearly, that the subject revenue bill actually originated from the
Lower House and was only amended, perhaps considerably, by the Senate after it was passed by
the former and transmitted to the latter.
In the cases cited, where the statutes passed by the U.S. Congress were upheld, the revenue
bills did not actually originate from the Senate but, in fact, from the Lower House. Thus, the
Supreme5
Court of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice White in Rainey v. United
States upheld the revenue bill passed by Congress and adopted the ruling of the lower court that
—
x x x the section in question is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the Senate and not in the
House of Representatives. It appears that the section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill
for raising revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient.
6
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., on which the Solicitor General heavily leans in his Consolidated
Comment as well as in his Memorandum, does not support the thesis of the Majority since the
subject bill therein actually originated from the Lower House and not from the Senate, and the
amendment merely covered a certain provision in the House bill.
In fine, in the cases cited which were lifted from American authorities, it appears that the
revenue bills in question actually originated from the House of Representatives and were
amended by the Senate only after they were transmitted to it. Perhaps, if the factual
circumstances in those cases were exactly the same as the ones at bench, then the subject
revenue or tariff bill may be upheld in this jurisdiction on the principle of substantial compliance,
as they were in the United States, except possibly in instances where the House bill undergoes
what is now referred to as “amendment by substitution,” for that would be in derogation
4 Id.,citing F.A. Ogg and P.O. Ray, Introduction to American Government, 302, n. 2 (1945).
5 See Note 3.
6 22 U.S. 107.
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of our Constitution which vests solely in the House of Representatives the power to initiate
revenue bills. A Senate amendment by substitution simply means that the bill in question did not
in effect originate from the lower chamber but from the upper chamber and now disguises itself
as a mere amendment of the House version.
It is also theorized that in the U.S., amendment by substitution is recognized. That may be
true. But the process may be validly effective only under the U.S. Constitution. The cases before
us present a totally different factual backdrop. Several months before the Lower House could
even pass HB No. 11197, P.S. Res. No. 734 and SB No. 1129 had already been filed in the Senate.
Worse, the Senate subsequently approved SB No. 1630 “in substitution of SB No. 1129, taking
into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and HB No. 11197,” and not HB No. 11197 itself “as
amended.” Here, the Senate could not have proposed or concurred with amendments because
there was nothing to concur with or amend except its own bill. It must be stressed that the
process of concurring or amending presupposes that there exists a bill upon which concurrence
may be based or amendments introduced. The Senate should have reported out HB No. 11197, as
amended, even if in the amendment it took into consideration SB No. 1630. It should not have
submitted to the Bicameral Conference Committee SB No. 1630 which, admittedly, did not
originate exclusively from the Lower House.
But even assuming that in our jurisdiction a revenue bill of the Lower House may be amended
by substitution by the Senate—although I am not prepared to accept it in view of Sec. 24, Art. VI,
of our Constitution—still R.A. 7716 could not have been the result of amendment by substitution
since the Senate had no House bill to speak of that it could amend when the Senate started
deliberating on its own version.
Be that as it may, I cannot rest easy on the proposition that a constitutional mandate calling
for the exclusive power and prerogative of the House of Representatives may just be discarded
and ignored by the Senate. Since the Constitution is for the observance of all—the judiciary as
well as the other departments of government—and the judges are sworn to support its provisions,
the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands. And it is not fair and just to
impute to them undue interference if
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they look into the validity of legislative enactments to determine whether the fundamental law
has been faithfully observed in the process. It is their duty to give effect to the existing
Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their opinion as to the
wisdom of such provisions.
The rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be
declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before
which the validity of the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a
statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of
the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shirk from it without violating
their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law
of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute
is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the
question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the
exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that 7action might be taken by political agencies in
disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.
It is my submission that the power and authority to originate revenue bills under our
Constitution is vested exclusively in the House of Representatives. Its members being more
numerous than those of the Senate, elected more frequently, and more directly represent the
people, are therefore considered better aware of the economic life of their individual
constituencies. It is just proper that revenue bills originate exclusively from them.
In this regard, we do not have to devote much time delving into American decisions and
opinions and invoke them in the interpretation of our own Constitution which is different from
the American version, particularly on the enactment of revenue bills. We have our own
Constitution couched in a language our own legislators thought best. Insofar as revenue bills are
concerned, our Constitution is not American; it is distinctively
7 11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-13, 713-715.
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Filipino. And no amplitude of legerdemain can detract from our constitutional requirement that
all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, although
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In this milieu, I am left no option but to vote to grant the petitions and strike down R.A. 7716
as unconstitutional.
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners plead that we affirm the self-evident proposition that they who make law should not
break the law. There are many evils whose elimination can be trusted to time. The evil of
lawlessness in lawmaking cannot. It must be slain on sight for it subverts the sovereignty of the
people.
First, a fast snapshot of the facts. On November 17, 1993, the House of Representatives passed
on third reading House Bill (H.B.) No. 11197 entitled “An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax
(VAT) System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Administration, Amending for These
Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102 to 108 and 110 of Title V and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and
Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code as
Amended.” The vote was 114 Yeas and 12 Nays. The next day, November 18, 1993, H.B. No.
11197 was transmitted to the Senate for its concurrence by the Hon. Camilo L. Sabio, Secretary
General of the House of Representatives.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted Senate Bill (S.B.)
No. 1630, recommending its approval “in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and House Bill No. 11197.” On March 24, 1994, S.B. No. 1630 was
approved on second and third readings. On the same day, the Senate, thru Secretary Edgardo E.
Tumangan, requested the House for a conference “in view of the disagreeing provisions of S.B.
No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197.” It designated the following as members of its Committee: Senators
Ernesto F. Herrera, Leticia R. Shahani, Alberto S. Romulo, John H. Osmeña, Ernesto M. Maceda,
Blas F. Ople, Francisco S.
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Tatad, Rodolfo G. Biazon, and Wigberto S. Tañada. On the part of the House, the members of the
Committee were: Congressmen Exequiel B. Javier, James L. Chiongbian, Renato V. Diaz, Arnulfo
P. Fuentebella, Mariano M. Tajon, Gregorio Andolong, Thelma Almario, and Catalino Figueroa.
After five (5) meetings,1 the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report to the Senate
and the House stating:
“CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197, entitled:
103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND
238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
and Senate Bill No. 1630 entitled:
103, 104, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115, 117 AND 121 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND
238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114, 116, 119 AND 120 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
having met, after full and free conference, has agreed to recommend and do hereby recommend to their
respective Houses that House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in
accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
Approved.”
1 April 13, 19, 20, 21, and 25, 1994.
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The Report was approved by the House on April 27, 1994. The Senate approved it on May 2, 1994.
On May 5, 1994, the President signed the bill into law as R.A. No. 7716.
There is no question that the Bicameral Conference Committee did more than reconcile
differences between House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. In several instances, it either
added new provisions or deleted provisions already approved in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate
Bill No. 1630. These insertions/dele-tions
2
numbering twenty four (24) are specified in detail by
petitioner Tolentino as follows:
“SOME SALIENT POINTS ON THE (AMENDMENTS TO THE VAT LAW [EO 273]) SHOWING
ADDITIONS/INSERTIONS MADE BY BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE TO SB 1630 & HB
11197
I On Sec. 99 of the NIRC
H.B. 11197 amends this section by including, as liable to VAT, any person who in the course of trade of
business, sells, barters, or exchanges goods or PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES PERSONAL
PROPERTIES.
Senate Bill 1630 deleted Sec. 99 to give way for a new Section 99—DEFINITION OF TERMS—where
eleven (11) terms were defined. A new Section, Section 99-A was incorporated which included as subject to
VAT, one who sells, exchanges, barters PROPERTIES and one who imports PROPERTIES.
The BCC version (R.A. 7716) makes LESSORS of goods OR PROPERTIES and importers of goods
LIABLE to VAT.
II On Section 100 (VAT on sale of goods)
A. The H.B., S.B., and the BCC (R.A. 7716) all included sale of PROPERTIES as subject to VAT.
The term GOODS or PROPERTIES includes the following:
HB (pls. SB BCC
refer to Sec. (pls. (RA
2) refer 7716
to (Sec.
Sec. 2)
1(4)
1. Right or 1. 1.
the The The
privilege to same same
use patent,
copyright,
de
2 See also Annex “A,” Memorandum of Petitioner Kilosbayan in G.R. No. 115781; also the Petition in G.R. No. 115543,
pp. 2-3.
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sign, or
model,
plan, secret
formula or
process,
goodwill
trademark,
tradebrand
or other
like
property or
right.
2. Right or 2. 2. The same
the The
privilege to same
use in the
Philippines
of any
industrial,
commercial,
or scientific
equipment.
3. Right or 3. 3. The same
the The
privilege to same
use motion
picture
films, films,
tapes and
discs.
4. Radio 4. 4. In addition to
and The radio and
Television Same television time
time the following
were included:
SATELLITE
TRANSMISSION
and CABLE
TELEVISION
TIME
5. Other 5. 5. ‘Other similar
Similar The properties’ was
properties Same deleted
6.— 6.— 6. Real properties
held primarily
for sale to
customers or
held for lease in
the ordinary
course or
business
The HB and the BCC Bills has each a provision which includes THE SALE OF GOLD TO BANGKO
B. SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS as falling under the term Export Sales, hence subject to 0% VAT. The
Senate Bill does not contain such provision (See Section 102-A thereof).
III. On Section 102
This section was amended to include as subject to a 10% VAT the gross receipts derived from THE SALE OR
EXCHANGE OF SERVICES, INCLUDING THE USE OR LEASE OF PROPERTIES.
The SB, HB, and BCC have the same provisions on this.
However, on what are included in the term SALE OR EXCHANGE OF SERVICES, the BCC
included/inserted the following (not found in either the House or Senate Bills):
1. Services of lessors of property WHETHER PERSONAL OR REAL; (See BCC Report/Bill p. 7)

2. WAREHOUSING SERVICES (Ibid.,)
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3. Keepers of RESTHOUSES, PENSION HOUSES, INNS, RESORTS (Ibid.,)

4. Common carriers by LAND, AIR AND SEA (Ibid.,)
5. SERVICES OF FRANCHISE GRANTEES OF TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH;
6. RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING
7. ALL OTHER FRANCHISE GRANTEES EXCEPT THOSE UNDER SECTION 117 OF THIS CODE
8. SERVICES OF SURETY, FIDELITY, INDEMNITY, AND BONDING COMPANIES.
9. Also inserted by the BCC (on page B thereof) is the LEASE OR USE OF OR THE RIGHT TO USE
OF SATTELITE TRANSMISSION AND CABLE TELEVISION TIME
IV. On Section 103 (Exempt Transactions)
The BCC deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its retention in both the House and Senate Bills, thus
under RA 7716, the ‘printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine,
review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which
is not devoted principally to the publication of advertisements’ is subject to VAT.
Subsection (g) was amended by the BCC (both Senate and House Bills did not) by changing the word TEN
to FIVE, thus: “Importation of passenger and/or cargo vessel of more than five thousand ton to ocean going,
including engine and spare parts of said vessel to be used by the importer himself as operator thereof.” In
short, importation of vessels with tonnage of more than 5 thousand is VAT exempt.
Subsection L, was amended by the BCC by adding the qualifying phrase: EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED
BY PROFESSIONALS.
Subsection U which exempts from VAT “Transactions which are exempt under special laws,” was
amended by BCC by adding the phrase: EXCEPT THOSE GRANTED UNDER PD Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491,
and 1590, and NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES under RA 6938. This is the reason why cooperatives are
now subject to VAT.
While the SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES was included in the exempt transactions under the House Bill,
the BCC made a qualification by stating:
‘(S) SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES NOT PRIMARILY HELD FOR SALE TO CUSTOMERS OR HELD FOR LEASE IN
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR BUSINESS OR REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR LOW-COST AND
SOCIALIZED HOUSING AS DEFINED BY R.A. NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
AND
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HOUSING ACT OF 1992 AND OTHER RELATED LAWS.

Under the Senate Bill, the sale of real property utilized for low-cost and socialized housing as defined by RA 7279, is one
of the exempt transactions.
Under the House Bill, also exempt from VAT, is the SALE OF PROPERTIES OTHER THAN THE TRANSACTIONS
MENTIONED IN THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS WITH A GROSS ANNUAL SALES AND/OR RECEIPTS OF
WHICH DOES NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNT PRESCRIBED IN THE REGULATIONS TO BE PROMULGATED BY
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE WHICH SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN P350,000.00 OR HIGHER THAN P600,000.00
x x x Under the Senate Bill, the amount is P240,000.00. The BCC agreed at the amount of not less than P480,000.00 or
more than P720,000.00 SUBJECT TO TAX UNDER SEC. 112 OF THIS CODE.
The BCC did not include, as VAT exempt, the sale or transfer of securities as defined in the Revised Securities Act
(BP 178) which was contained in both Senate and House Bills.
V On Section 104
The phrase INCLUDING PACKAGING MATERIALS was included by the BCC on Section 104 (A) (1) (B),
and the phrase ON WHICH A VALUE-ADDED TAX HAS BEEN ACTUALLY on Section 104 (A) (2). These
phrases are not contained in either House and Senate Bills.
VI On Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT registration fee. The BCC provides
for P1,000.00 VAT fee.
VII On Section 112
While both the Senate and House Bills provide that a person whose sales or receipts and are exempt
under Section 103[w] of the Code, and who are not VAT registered shall pay a tax equivalent to THREE (3)
PERCENT of his gross quarterly sales or receipts, the BCC inserted the phrase: THREE PERCENT UPON
THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS THEREAFTER.
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VIII On Section 115
Sec. 17 of SB 1630, Sec. 12 of House Bill 11197 amends this Section by clarifying that common carriers by
land, air or water FOR THE TRANSPORT OF PASSENGERS are subject to Percentage Tax equivalent to
3% of their quarterly gross sales.
The BCC adopted this and the House Bill’s provision that the GROSS RECEIPTS OF COMMON
CARRIERS DERIVED FROM THEIR INCOMING AND OUTGOING FREIGHT SHALL NOT BE
SUBJECTED TO THE LOCAL TAXES IMPOSED UNDER RA 7160. The Senate Bill has no similar
provision.
IX On Section 117
This Section has not been touched by either Senate and House Bills. But the BCC amended it by
subjecting franchises on ELECTRIC, GAS and WATER UTILITIES A TAX OF TWO PERCENT (2%) ON
GROSS RECEIPTS DERIVED x x x.
X On Section 121
The BCC adopted the Senate Bills’ amendment to this section by subjecting to 5% premium tax on life
insurance business. The House Bill does not contain this provision.
XI Others
A) The House Bill does not contain any provision on the deferment of VAT collection on Certain Goods
and Services as does the Senate Bill (Section 19, SB 1630). But although the Senate Bill authorizes
the deferment on certain goods and services for no longer than 3 years, there is no specific provision
that authorizes the President to EXCLUDE from VAT any of these. The BCC uses the word
EXCLUDE.
B) Moreover, the Senate Bill defers the VAT on services of actors and actresses etc. for 3 years but the
BCC defers it for only 2 years.
C) Section 18 of the BCC Bill (RA 7716) is an entirely new provision not contained in the House/Senate
Bills.
D) The period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations is within 60 days
under SB 1630; No specific period under the House Bill, within 90 days under RA 7716 (BCC).
E) The House Bill provides for a general repealing clause i.e., all inconsistent laws etc. are repealed.
Section 16 of the Senate Bill expressly repeals Sections 113, 114, 116, 119 and 120 of the code. The
same Senate Bill however contains a general repealing clause in Sec. 21
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thereof.
RA 7716 (BCC’s Bill) expressly repeals Sections 113, 114 and 116 of the NIRC; Article 39 (c) (d) and (e) of
EO 226 and provides the repeal of Sec. 119 and 120 of the NIRC upon the expiration of two (2) years unless
otherwise excluded by the President.”
The charge that the Bicameral Conference Committee added new provisions in the bills of the
two chambers is hardly disputed by respondents. Instead, respondents justify them. According to
respondents: (1) the Bicameral Conference Committee has an ex postveto power or a veto after
the fact of approval of the bill by both Houses; (2) the bill prepared by the Bicameral Conference
Committee, with its additions and deletions, was anyway approved by both Houses; (3) it was the
practice in past Congresses for conference committees to insert in bills approved by the two
Houses new provisions that were not originally contemplated by them; and (4) the enrolled bill
doctrine precludes inquiry into the regularity of the proceedings that led to the enactment of R.A.
7716.
With due respect, I reject these contentions which will cave in on closer examination.
First. There is absolutely no legal warrant for the bold submission that a Bicameral
Conference Committee possesses the power to add/delete provisions in bills already approved on
third reading by both Houses or an ex post veto power. To support this postulate that can enfeeble
Congress itself,
3
respondents cite no constitutional provision, no law, not even any rule or
regulation. Worse, their stance is categorically repudiated by the rules of both the Senate and
the House of Representatives which define with precision the parameters of power of a Bicameral
Conference Committee.
Thus, Section 209, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
“In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill
or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses
3 See p. 66 of the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents where they refer to certain statements from Canlan, Weightson and
Beam but without citing their specific book or article.
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which shall meet within ten days after their composition.

changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.” (Emphasis
supplied)
The counterpart rule of the House of Representatives is cast in near identical language. Section
85 of the Rules of the House of Representatives pertinently provides:
“In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution,
the differences may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
x x x. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure.” (Emphasis supplied)
4
The Jefferson’s Manual has been adopted as a supplement to our parliamentary rules and
practice. Section
5
456 of Jefferson’s Manual similarly confines the powers of a conference
committee, viz:
“The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and may
not include subjects not within the disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.”
This rule of antiquity has been honed and honored in practice by the Congress of the United
States. Thus,6
it is chronicled by Floyd Biddick, Parliamentarian Emeritus of the United States
Senate, viz:
“Committees of conference are appointed for the sole purpose of compromising and adjusting the differing
and conflicting opinions of the two Houses and the committees of conference alone can grant
4 SeeRule 49 of the Rules of the Senate.

5 Seep. 22, Memorandum of Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 citing Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives, by
Lewis Deschler, Parliamentarian, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 264.
6 Ibid, citing Riddick, Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, US Senate, 1981, US Government Printing Office, pp. 383-384.
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25, 1994
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compromises and modify propositions of either Houses within the limits of the disagreement. Conferees are
limited to the consideration of differences between the two Houses.
Conferees shall not insert in their report matters not committed to them by either House, nor shall they
strike from the bill matters agreed to by both Houses. No matter on which there is nothing in either the
Senate or House passed versions of a bill may be included in the conference report and actions to the
contrary would subject the report to a point of order.” (Emphasis ours)
In fine, there is neither a sound nor a syllable in the Rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives to support the thesis of the respondents that a bicameral conference committee
is clothed with an ex post veto power.
But the thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can wield ex postveto power does not
only contravene the rules of both the Senate and the House. It wages war against our settled
ideals of representative democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of the thesis is to install
a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third Chamber of our Congress, similarly vested with
the power to make laws but with the dissimilarity that its laws are not the subject of a free and
full discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant power, a Bicameral Conference
Committee acting as a Third Chamber will be a constitutional monstrosity.
It needs no omniscience to perceive that our Constitution did not provide for a Congress
composed of three chambers. On the contrary, section 1, Article VI of the Constitution provides in
clear and certain language: “The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives . . . .” Note that in
vesting legislative power exclusively to the Senate and the House, the Constitution used the word
“shall.” Its command for a Congress of two houses is mandatory. It is not mandatory sometimes.
In vesting legislative power to the Senate, the Constitution means the Senate “. . . composed of
twenty-four
7
Senators x x x elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines . . .
.” Similarly, when the Constitution vested the legislative power to
7 Section 2, Article VI.
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the House, it means the House “. . . composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members x
x x who shall be elected from legislative districts x x x and those who x x x shall be elected
through a party-list
8
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.” The Constitution thus, did not vest on a Bicameral Conference Committee with
an ad hoc membership the power to legislate for it exclusively vested legislative power to the
Senate and the House as co-equal bodies. To be sure, the Constitution does not mention the
Bicameral Conference Committees of Congress. No constitutional status is accorded to them.
They are not even statutory creations. They owe their existence from the internal rules of the two
Houses of Congress. Yet, respondents peddle the disconcerting idea that they should be
recognized as a Third Chamber of Congress and with ex post veto power at that.
The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can exercise law making power with ex
postveto power is freighted with mischief. Law making his a power that can be used for good or
for ill, hence, our Constitution carefully laid out a plan and a procedure for its exercise. Firstly, it
vouchsafed that the power to make laws should be exercised by no other body except the Senate
and the House. It ought to be indubitable that what is contemplated is the Senate acting as a full
Senate and the House acting as a full House. It is only when the Senate and the House act as
whole bodies that they truly represent the people. And it is only when they represent the people
that they can legitimately pass laws. Laws that are not enacted by the people’s rightful
representatives subvert the people’s sovereignty. Bicameral Conference Committees, with
their ad hoc character and limited membership, cannot pass laws for they do not represent the
people. The Constitution does not allow the tyranny of the majority. Yet, the respondents will
impose the worst kind of tyranny—the tyranny of the minority over the majority. Secondly, the
Constitution delineated in deft strokes the steps to be followed in making laws. The overriding
purpose of these procedural rules is to assure that only bills that successfully survive the
searching scrutiny of the proper committees of Congress and the full and
8 Section 5(1), Article VI.
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unfettered deliberations of both Houses can become laws. For this reason, a bill has to undergo
three (3) mandatory separate readings in each House. In the case at bench, the additions and
deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee did not enjoy the enlightened studies of
appropriate committees. It is meet to note that the complexities of modern day legislations have
made our committee system a significant part of the legislative process. Thomas Reed called the
committee system as “the eye, the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the house.” President
Woodrow Wilson of the United States once referred to the government of the United
9
States as “a
government by the Chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress . . . .” Neither did these
additions and deletions of the Bicameral Conference Committee pass through the coils of
collective deliberation of the members of the two Houses acting separately. Due to this
shortcircuiting of the constitutional procedure of making laws, confusion shrouds the enactment
of R.A. No. 7716. Who inserted the additions and deletions remains a mystery. Why they were
inserted is a riddle. To use a Churchillian phrase, lawmaking should not be a riddle wrapped in
an enigma. It cannot be, for Article II, section 28 of the Constitution mandates the State to adopt
and implement a “policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”
The Constitution could not have contemplated a Congress of invisible and unaccountable John
and Mary Does. A law whose rationale is a riddle and whose authorship is obscure cannot bind
the people.
All these notwithstanding, respondents resort to the legal cosmetology that these additions
and deletions should govern the people as laws because the Bicameral Conference Committee
Report was anyway submitted to and approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The submission may have some merit with respect to provisions agreed upon by the Committee in
the process of reconciling conflicts between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. In these instances,
the conflicting provisions had been previously screened by the proper committees, deliberated
upon by both Houses and approved by them. It is, however, a different matter with respect to
additions and deletions
9 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 151.
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which were entirely new and which were made not to reconcile inconsistencies between S.B. No.
1630 and H.B. No. 11197. The members of the Bicameral Conference Committee did not have any
authority to add new provisions or delete provisions already approved by both Houses as it was
not necessary to discharge their limited task of reconciling differences in bills. At that late stage
of law making, the Conference Committee cannot add/ delete provisions which can become laws
without undergoing the study and deliberation of both chambers given to bills on 1st, 2nd, and
3rd readings. Even the Senate and the House cannot enact a law which will not undergo these
mandatory three (3) readings required by the Constitution. If the Senate and the House cannot
enact such a law, neither can the lesser Bicameral Conference Committee.
Moreover, the so-called choice given to the members of both Houses to either approve or
disapprove the said additions and deletions is more of an optical illusion. These additions and
deletions are not submitted separately for approval. They are tucked to the entire bill. The vote is
on the bill as a package, i.e., together with the insertions and deletions. And the vote is either
“aye” or “nay,” without any further debate and deliberation. Quite often, legislators vote “yes”
because they approve of the bill as a whole although they may object to its amendments
10
by the
Conference Committee. This lack of real choice is well observed by Robert Luce:
“Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees must be accepted without
amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is to get done with the matter and so the motion to accept
has undue advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable provisions rather than
prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a
session, when to seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At any time in
the session there is some risk of such a result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not be
possible to secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal chance to develop
more strength.”
10 Legislative Procedure, 1922 ed., Riverside Press, p. 404.
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In a similar vein, Prof. Jack Davies commented that “conference reports are returned to assembly
and Senate on a take-it or leave-it-basis,11
and the bodies are generally placed in the position that
to leave-it is a practical impossibility.” Thus, he concludes 12that “conference committee action is
the most undemocratic procedure in the legislative process.”
The respondents also contend that the additions and deletions made by the Bicameral
Conference Committee were in accord with legislative customs and usages. The argument does
not persuade for it misappreciates the value of customs and usages in the hierarchy of sources of
legislative rules of procedure. To be sure, every legislative assembly has the inherent right to
promulgate its own internal rules. In our jurisdiction, Article VI, section 16(3) of the Constitution
provides that “Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings x x x.” But it is hornbook
law that the sources of 13
Rules of Procedure are many and hierarchical in character. Mason laid
them down as follows:
“x x x
1. Rules of Procedure are derived from several sources. The principal sources are as follows:
a. Constitutional rules.
b. Statutory rules or charter provisions.
c. Adopted rules.
d. Judicial decisions.
e. Adopted parliamentary authority.
f. Parliamentary law.
g. Customs and usages.
2. The rules from the different sources take precedence in the order listed above except that judicial
decisions, since they are interpretations of rules from one of the other sources, take the same
precedence as the source interpreted. Thus, for example, an interpretation of a constitutional
provision takes precedence over a statute.
3. Whenever there is conflict between rules from these sources the rule from the source listed earlier
prevails over the rule from the source
11 Legislative Law and Process in a Nut Shell, West Publishing Co., 1986 ed., p. 81.
12 Ibid.
13 Manual of Legislative Procedure for Legislative and other Governmental Bodies, McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 1953 ed., pp. 32-33.
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listed, later. Thus, where the Constitution requires three readings of bills, this provision controls
over any provision of statute, adopted rules, adopted manual, or of parliamentary law, and a rule of
parliamentary law controls over a local usage but must give way to any rule from a higher source of
authority.” (Emphasis ours)
As discussed above, the unauthorized additions and deletions made by the Bicameral Conference
Committee violated the procedure fixed by the Constitution in the making of laws. It is reasonless
for respondents therefore to justify these insertions as sanctioned by customs and usages.
Finally, respondents seek sanctuary in the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to bar any judicial
inquiry on whether Congress observed our constitutional procedure in the passage of R.A. No.
7716. The enrolled bill theory is a historical relic that should not continuously rule us from the
fossilized past. It should be immediately emphasized that the enrolled bill theory originated
14
in
England where there is no written constitution and where Parliament is supreme. In this
jurisdiction, we have a written constitution and the legislature is a body of limited powers.
Likewise, it must be pointed out that starting from the decade of the 40’s, even American courts
have veered away from 15
the rigidity and unrealism of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill. Prof.
Sutherland observed:
“x x x.
Where the failure of constitutional compliance in the enactment of statutes is not discoverable from the
face of the act itself but may be demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals, debates, committee
reports or papers of the governor, courts have used several conflicting theories with which to dispose of the
issue. They have held: (1) that the enrolled bill is conclusive and like the sheriff’s return cannot be attacked;
(2) that the enrolled bill is prima faciecorrect and only in case the legislative journal shows affirmative
contradiction of the constitutional requirement will the bill be held invalid, (3) that although the enrolled
bill is prima facie correct, evidence from the journals, or other extrinsic sources is admissible to strike the
bill down; (4) that the legislative journal is conclusive and the enrolled bill is valid only if it
14 82 CJS 136.
15 Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I., p. 223.
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Finance
accords with the recital in the journal and the constitutional procedure.”
Various jurisdictions have adopted these alternative approaches in view of strong dissent and
dissatisfaction against the philosophical underpinnings of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill.
Prof. Sutherland further observed:
“x x x Numerous reasons have been given for this rule. Traditionally, an enrolled bill was ‘a record’ and as
such was not subject to attack at common law. Likewise, the rule of conclusiveness was similar to the
common law rule of the inviolability of the sheriff’s return. Indeed, they had the same origin, that is, the
sheriff was an officer of the king and likewise the parliamentary act was a regal act and no official might
dispute the king’s word. Transposed to our democratic system of government, courts held that as the
legislature was an official branch of government the court must indulge every presumption that the
legislative act was valid. The doctrine of separation of powers was advanced as a strong reason why the
court should treat the acts of a co-ordinate branch of government with the same respect as it treats the
action of its own officers; indeed, it was thought that it was entitled to even greater respect, else the court
might be in the position of reviewing the work of a supposedly equal branch of government. When these
arguments failed, as they frequently did, the doctrine of convenience was advanced, that is, that it was not
only an undue burden upon the legislature to preserve its records to meet the attack of persons not affected
by the procedure of enactment, but also that it unnecessarily complicated litigation and confused the trial of
substantive issues.
Although many of these arguments are persuasive and are indeed the basis for the rule in many states
today, they are not invulnerable to attack. The rule most relied on—the sheriff’s return or sworn official rule
—did not in civil litigation deprive the injured party of an action, for always he could sue the sheriff upon
his official bond. Likewise, although collateral attack was not permitted, direct attack permitted raising the
issue of fraud, and at a later date attack in equity was also available; and that the evidence of the sheriff
was not of unusual weight was demonstrated by the fact that in an action against the sheriff no
presumption of its authenticity prevailed.
The argument that the enrolled bill is a ‘record’ and therefore unimpeachable is likewise misleading, for
the correction of records is a matter of established judicial procedure. Apparently, the justification is either
the historical one that the king’s word could not be questioned or the separation of powers principle that one
branch of the government must treat as valid the acts of another.
820
820 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Finance
Persuasive as these arguments are, the tendency today is to avoid reaching results by artificial presumptions
and thus it would seem desirable to insist that the enrolled bill stand or fall on the basis of the relevant
evidence which may be submitted for or against it.”(Emphasis ours)
Thus, as far back as the 1940’s, Prof. Sutherland confirmed that “x x x the tendency seems to be
toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule
leaving only a prima facie
16
presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative
source of information.”
I am not unaware that this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill 17as
enunciated in the 1947 lead case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, and reiterated in subsequent cases.
With due respect, I submit that these rulings are no longer good law. Part of the ratiocination
in Mabanag states:
“x x x.
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to
follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:
‘Official documents’ may be proved as follows: * * * (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of
any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission
or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.”
16
Op. cit., pp. 224-225 citing Barndall Refining v. Welsh, 64 S.D. 647, 269 N.W. 853, 859 [1936]. Jones, Constitutional
Provisions Regulating the Mechanics of Enactment in Iowa (1935), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 79, Charlton, Constitutional
Regulation of Legislative Procedure (1936), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 538; Note (1936) 21 Iowa Law Rev. 573.
17 See Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. Rep. 1 [1947]; Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, L-17931, February 28,
1963; Morales v. Subido, No. L-29658, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 131; Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No.
105371, November 11, 1993.
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Suffice to state that section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 is
no longer in our statute books. It has long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanagalso
relied on jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are under severe criticisms by
modern scholars. Hence, even in the United States the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill has been
junked by most of the States. It is also true that as late as last year, in the case of Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, op. cit.,this Court still relied on the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill
as it refused to invalidate a provision of law on the ground that it was merely inserted by the
bicameral conference committee of both Houses. Prado, however, is distinguishable. In Prado,the
alleged insertion of the second paragraph of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the franking
privilege of the judiciary does not appear to be an uncontested fact. In the case at bench, the
numerous additions/deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee as detailed by
petitioners Tolentino and Salonga are not disputed by the respondents. In Prado,the Court was
not also confronted with the argument that it can no longer rely on the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill in light of the new provision in the Constitution defining judicial power. More
specifically, section 1 of Article VIII now provides:
“Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the dutyof the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” (Emphasis supplied)
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision18 in the Constitutional
Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:
18 Record, Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 436; see also, Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. A Commentary, 1988 ed., p. 255.
822
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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Finance
“x x x.
x x x In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute political
question.”(Emphasis ours)
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which
it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as
a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of
its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the
other branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the
legislators
19
being elected by the people. It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing
new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the significant changes made in our constitutional
canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically
changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between and among
the three great branches of our government—the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To
upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the
independence of courts. Thus, it further protected the security of tenure of the members of the
Judiciary by providing “No law shall 20be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines
21
the security of tenure of its Members.” It also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar Council
which was tasked with
19 Citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 L. ed [1803].

20 Article VIII, section 2.
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25, 1994
Finance
screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary.

22
The power of confirming
23
appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise
given a specific time to fill up vacancies in24 the judiciary—ninety (90) days from the occurrence of
the vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of
25
recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To
further insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was
given the power to 26“appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the
Civil Service Law.” And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of
government more watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to27 be “. . . designated to any
agency performing quasi judicial or administrative functions.” While the Constitution
strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of the two other branches of
government, especially the Executive. Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the
Constitution is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The
exercise of this power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the
factual basis for the exercise 28of said power may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen.
The provision defining judicial power as including the “duty of the courts of justice . . . to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this Court vis-
a-vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort

24 Article VIII, section 4(1).
28 Article VII, section 18.
824
824 SUPREME COURT

REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Finance
abuses in government. As sharply stressed by petitioner Salonga, this provision is distinctly

Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable
foreign jurisprudence. It is thus crystal clear that unlike other Supreme Courts, this Court has
been mandated by our new Constitution to be a more active agent in annulling acts of grave
abuse of discretion committed by a branch of government or any of its officials. This new role,
however, will not compel the Court, appropriately defined by Prof. A. Bickel as the least
dangerous branch of government, to assume imperial powers and run roughshod over the
principle of separation of power for that is judicial tyranny by any language. But while respecting
the essentials of the principle of separation of power, the Court is not to be restricted by its non-
essentials. Applied to the case at bench, by voiding R.A. No. 7716 on the ground that its
enactment violated the procedure imposed by the Constitution in lawmaking, the Court is not by
any means wrecking the wall separating the powers between the legislature and the judiciary.
For in so doing, the Court is not engaging in lawmaking which is the essence of legislative power.
But the Court’s interposition of power should not be defeated by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill. A resort to this fiction will result in the enactment of laws not properly deliberated
upon and passed by Congress. Certainly, the enrolled bill theory was not conceived to cover up
violations of the constitutional procedure in law making, a procedure intended to assure the
passage of good laws. The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill can, therefore, be disregarded for it
is not necessary to preserve the principle of separation of powers.
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from
passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987
Constitution, there is a shift in stress—this Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge
this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
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25, 1994
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I vote to declare R.A. No. 7716 unconstitutional.

Petitions dismissed.
Notes.—Despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional
issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be
done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its
conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives
and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. (Luz Farms vs.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51[1990])
We start with the established principle that the exclusive nature of any public franchise is not
favored. We may interpret in favor of exclusiveness only when the statute grants it in express,
clear, and unmistakable terms. In all grants by the government to private corporations, the
interpretation of rights, privileges, or franchises is taken against the grantee. Whatever is not
clearly and expressly granted is withheld. (Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA
37 [1985])
———o0o———

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450 SUPREME COURT

No. L-32166. October 18, 1977.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN,

VOL. 79, 451

People vs. Maceren

452 SUPREME COURT

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Maceren, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 79, OCTOBER 453

454 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 79, OCTOBER 455

456 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 79, OCTOBER 457

458 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 79, OCTOBER 459

460 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 79, OCTOBER 461

462 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 79, OCTOBER 463

Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Decision set aside and order affirmed.

G.R. No. 45127. May 5, 1989.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte,

Constitutional Law; Legislative Enactments; Presumption of Constitutionality; Presumption is always in

People vs. Dacuycuy

People vs. Dacuycuy

People vs. Dacuycuy

VOL. 173, MAY 5 , 95

VOL. 173, MAY 5 , 97

15 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 631.

17 93 Phil. 647 (1953).

VOL. 173, MAY 5 , 99

100 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 173, MAY 5 , 101

23 Peoplevs. Basalo, 101 Phil. 57(1957).

Presiding Judge, etc., et al., 145 SCRA 408 (1986).

102 SUPREME COURT

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,

Decision reversed and set aside.

208 SUPREME COURT

No. L-71977. February 27,1987.

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO,

VOL. 148, 209

Demetria vs. Alba

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

210 SUPREME COURT

CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.

VOL. 148, 211

212 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 148, 213

214 SUPREME COURT

VOL. 148, 215

216 SUPREME COURT

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is

VOL. 148, 217

218 SUPREME COURT

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,

Notes.—The constitutional or unconstitutionality of legislation depends upon no other facts

MORAN, M., disidente en parte y concurrente en parte:

[No. 48609. October 10, 1941]

VOL. 73, OCTOBER 289

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus,

ABAD SANTOS, J.: