11.) Avelino v Cuenco
) Angara v Electoral Commission
>Avelino is Senate president; charges against him
was filed by different senators and be read on the
next day
> senate president delayed his appearance, and
slowly read resolutions
> asked roll call be dispensed with, denied by allies
of senate pres; delaying tactics to prevent Tañada of
his speech
>Tañada asserts his right to speak but is turned
down and shouted of “out of order!” by the senate
president
>Petitioner walked-out followed by allies whereas
the remaining senators resumed session
>New senate president was assigned
*constitutional grant to senate of the power to elect
its own president.
*they have the liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change of reinstate them.
*The walk-out of the minority 10 should not
discontinue the session of senate of the remaining
12
*quorum – absolute majority can decide and vote.
DEC: Petition dismissed
12.) Santiago v Guingona
>principle of separation of powers grants the admin
of matters in their own respective branches
>defensor Santiago and Tatad seeks the ouster of
Guingona as minority leader of the senate and have
Tatad as it.
>During election of senate president, 20-2 voted for
Ople including Guingona
>defensor claimed that all those who voted for the
winner is the majority whereas those who voted to
the losing candidate is the minority
>The parties comprising the minorities selected
Guingona as the minority leader
* If court intervenes with the selection of who the
leader is, it is an unwarranted invasion to a coequal
branch of government.
*senate president as per consti, should be voted of
more than 50% of all the senators. No majority or
minority in voting reference.
*majority in Congress is those of higher numbers of
the same party; minority- those of lower numbers of
same party
*specific norms of party leaders were not specified in
Constitution, thus the Senate itself has the discretion
on how to select them.
20.
>The creation of the Electoral Commission carried
I. THE FACTS
>Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and
took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On
December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have
not been subject of an election protest prior to the
adoption of the said resolution.
>On December 8, 1935, however, private
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest
against the petitioner before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly. The following
day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted its own resolution providing that it will not
consider any election protest that was not submitted
on or before December 9, 1935.
>Citing among others the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral
Commission however denied his motion.
>Did the Electoral Commission act without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
>The Court DENIED the petition.
>NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without
or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly.
>The Electoral Commission acted within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by
the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of
the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of
the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
>The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
xxx.
with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to
be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed
by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission.
21.) Abbas v Senate
>In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before
the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of
the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-
elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by
the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of
three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification
of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair
play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the
proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the
following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24)
—- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for
the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is
a proviso that where more than four (4) members
are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions
by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously
tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that
situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the
only three Members who would remain, all Justices
of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
>ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be
given due weight.
>HELD: The most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17,
creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
>It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be
staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of
the Senate, the Constitution intended that both
those “judicial” and “legislative” components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The legislative component
herein cannot be totally excluded from participation
in the resolution of senatorial election contests,
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying
that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the
Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as
such; absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
22.) Lazatin v Comelec 1
>Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the
(Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office,
assumed office, and discharged the duties of
Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga.
Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is
the sole judge of all election contests.
>Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s
opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition had
become moot and academic because the assailed
COMELEC Resolution had already become final and
executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6,
1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges
that the petition should be given due course because
the proclamation was valid. The order issued by the
COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim
the winner if warranted under Section 245 of the
Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of
authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board,
to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was
filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation
of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board
simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin
without waiting for the final resolutions of the
petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin
himself, against certain election returns.
>ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed
under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
>HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November
17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition.
The petition is impressed with merit because Lazatin
has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional
elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken
his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as
Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which had been previously ordered by
the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in
connection therewith, and despite the pendency of
the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that
is also addressed, considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
23.) Lazatin v Comelec 2
>Petitioner filed the instant petition assailing the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his
proclamation after he had taken his oath of office,
assumed office, and discharged the duties of
Congressman of the First District of Pampanga. The
petitioner claims that the House Electoral Tribunal
and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election
contests. (Sec. 17 Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution),
>In the Comments of candidates Buan, Jr., and
Timbol, they allege that the instant petition has
become moot and academic because the assailed
COMELEC Resolution had already become final and
executory when the Supreme Court issued a
temporary restraining order on October 6, 1987.
They also allege that the COMELEC hastily
proclaimed petitioner Lazatin without first resolving
their separate written protests against the Election
returns in Pampanga, docketed as SPC Nos. 87-234,
87-358, 87-351.
>In the COMMENT of the Solicitor General, he
alleges that the instant petition should be given due
course because the proclamation was valid. The
Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the
canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted
under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,
was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to
the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner.
>A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC,
alleging that the proclamation of petitioner was
illegal and void because the board simply corrected
the returns contested by the petitioner without
waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of
candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and the petitioner
himself, against certain election returns.
>The Consolidated Reply filed by the petitioner,
reiterates previous arguments.
>The Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated
November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to
the petition.
>The petition is impressed with merit because
petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the
Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and
assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court
to take cognizance of the electoral protest against
him would be to usurp the functions of the House
Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which had been previously ordered by
the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in
connection therewith, and despite the pendency of
the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that
is also addressed, considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
>WHEREFORE, the revocation by the COMELEC of
petitioner’s proclamation is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED
24.) Vinzons v HoR
25.) Tagolino v HRET
>In this case, on November 30, 2009, Richard
Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy
(CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
seeking congressional office as Representative for
the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the
ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on
December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified
Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a
resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan
City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he
resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City.
In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to
meet the one (1) year residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be
declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said
office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC
be denied due course and/or cancelled.The COMELEC
First Division rendered a Resolution granting
Juntilla’s petition without any qualification.
>Juntilla, opposed the candidacy of Ms. Lucy as
Richard’s substitute. Juntilla stated that there should
be no substitution because there is no candidate to
substitute for.
>The COMELEC First Division decision was the cause
of the confusion when it used the word
“disqualification” instead of “denied due course to
and/or cancelled”. Still, the COMELEC en banc could
have corrected this confusion. At this point, the
Supreme Court has this to say;
>“In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was
disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due
to his failure to comply with the one year residency
requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from
the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17,
2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,
which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in
granting the substitution of private respondent, and
even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the
quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that
Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his
CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled –
would mean that he could have been validly
substitute by private respondent, thereby
legitimizing her candidacy.
>“In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En
Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First
Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution when it
adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard
was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not
denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the
way for the approval of private respondent’s
substitution. It overlooked the fact that the
COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the
cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence,
disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It
was therefore grave and serious error on the part of
the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private
respondent’s substitution.”
26.) Barbers v Comelec
27.) Pimentel v Hret
>Facts:
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took
effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the
Party-List System Act, national elections were held
which included, for the first time, the election
through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14
party-list representatives from 13 organizations,
including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.
Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P.
Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from party-list
groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng
mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at
Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party (COOP-
NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to
the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other
party-list groups had one representative each. Also
elected were district representatives belonging to
various political parties. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing
its representatives to these two constitutional
bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members
who are to occupy seats in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Commission on Appointments (CA). From available
records, it does not appear that after the 11 May
1998 elections the party-list groups in the House
nominated any of their representatives to the HRET
or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present
petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed
solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties. On 18 January 2000,
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters
addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as
Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as
Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate
President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the
restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively,
to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the
HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal
to refer Senator Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives. On the
same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in
an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to
House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto
P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed
with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET,
its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its
Chairman and Members. They contend that, under
the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least
1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They
charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on
the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11
February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a
motion to amend their petitions to implead then
Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional
respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House
and as one of the members of the CA. The Court
granted both motions and admitted the amended
petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present petitions
on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and
uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as
taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined
by 5 party-list representatives from APEC, ABA,
ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-
petitioners.
>Issue:
>Whether the present composition of the House
Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because
there are no party-list representatives in the hret.
>Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to
reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
>Held:
>NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House
of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among
its district and party-list representatives those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the
HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on
the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within
constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each
chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These
constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and
4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of
the House to choose its members to the HRET and
the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court may not interfere
>with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of
separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as
it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on
what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership
in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of
any allegation that respondents prevented the party-
list groups in the House from participating in the
election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither
does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections,
the House barred the party-list representatives from
seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather,
it appears from the available facts that the party-list
groups in the House at that time simply refrained
from participating in the election process. The party-
list representatives did not designate their nominees
even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the
predictable result that the House did not consider
any party-list representative for election to the HRET
or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list
representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues
presented by petitioners at this time.
>There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of
action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and
18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their
internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any
power to reconstitute themselves.
28.) Bondoc v Pineda
>FACTS:
Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party
(NP) were rival candidates for Representative for
4TH district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107
votes.
Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP
Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc because he was
‘consistent with truth, justice and self-respect’ and
that they would abide by the results of the recounted
votes where Bondoc was leading.
Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party
(LDP) because it was a complete betrayal to his
party when he decided for Bondoc.
HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and
rescind his nomination from the tribunal.
Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to HRET from its resolution.
>ISSUE:
W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO
INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF AN
ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY
REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE
TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO
WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS
VALID
>HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY
POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE
TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING
TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF
HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
BECAUSE:
IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO
BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST
BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION
INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD
REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE
AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)
MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-
PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS
FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT,
IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO
PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT
VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF
THE TRIBUNAL
IT VIOLATES CAMASURA’S RIGHT TO SECURITY OF
TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO
SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE
TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS:
EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH,
PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM
POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH
ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID
CAUSE!
29.) Eastern Shipping lines v poea
30.) Tablarin v Gutierrez
31.) Tatad v Secretary
Facts:
>The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA
No. 8180 “An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes.” The deregulation
process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and
the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
>The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
to the President and the Sec. of Energy because it
does not provide a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not
provide any specific standard to determine when the
prices of crude oil in the world market are considered
to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the
peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
>Issues:
>Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the
one title one subject requirement of the Constitution.
Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power.
>Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition
>Discussions:
>The Court consistently ruled that the title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and
minute details of a law. A law having a single general
subject indicated in the title may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general
subject.
Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
vs. POEA, the Court states that:
“There are two accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power,
viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
>A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage
vested in one or more persons or companies,
consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on
a particular business or trade, manufacture a
particular article, or control the sale or the whole
supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of
market structure in which one or only a few firms
dominate the total sales of a product or service. On
the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is
an agreement or understanding between two or
more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool,
holding company, or other form of association, for
the purpose of unduly restricting competition,
monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain
commodity, controlling its production, distribution
and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of
trade without statutory authority. Combination in
restraint of trade refers to the means while
monopoly refers to the end.
>Rulings:
>The Court does not concur with this contention. The
Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one
title – one subject rule. The Court hold that section
5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of
the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed
to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in
our country and make them rely less on imported
petroleum.[i][20] We shall, however, return to the
validity of this provision when we examine its
blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.
Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It
will be noted that Congress expressly provided in
R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the
end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of
any event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final
date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation
before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down
the standard to guide the judgment of the President.
He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices
of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly
violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No.
8180 mandates: “The State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed.”
32.) People v Dacuycuy
Facts:
>In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of
Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.
>Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials
of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555... thereof
for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was
set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At
the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as
the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the...
charge.
>the facts charged do not constitute an... offense
considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670
is null and void for being unconstitutional.
>On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a
petition[6] for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the former Court of
First Instance of
>Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge,
Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte
from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case
No.
>555 upon the ground that the former Municipal
Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
>On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an
opposition to the admission of the said amended
petition... respondent judge denied the same in his...
resolution of April 20, 1976.[10] On August 2, 1976,
herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum
in answer to the amended... petition.
Issues:
>It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the
term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run
to... reclusion perpetua; and
>(2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of
the court as if the latter were the legislative...
department of the Government.
>Ruling:
>That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the
crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law
unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and
unusual.
>The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not... make it cruel or unsual.
>An apparent exception to the general rule
forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to
the courts exists in cases where discretion is
conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that
when the courts are said to exercise a... discretion, it
must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in
discerning the course prescribed by law and which,
when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow.
>criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
>the decision and resolution of respondent judge are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case
No. 555 filed against private respondents... herein is
hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial
Court of Hindang, Leyte
>Principles:
>The basic principle underlying the entire field of
legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation
is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional
measure is thereby created.
>whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to
the form or nature of the penalty and not to the
proportion between the penalty and the crime.
>the discretion granted therein by the legislature to
the courts to determine the period of imprisonment
is a matter of statutory construction and not an
undue delegation of legislative power.
33.) Chiongbian v Orbos
34.) Sema v Comelec
35.) Daza v Singson
36.) Coseteng v Mitra
Facts:
>The congressional elections of May 11, 1987
resulted in the election to the House of the
candidates of diverse political parties such as the
PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP),
NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL),
Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan
(KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna
Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA.
>2. Then, House , upon nomination by the
Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong,
elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out
of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House
in the Commission on Appointments (CA).
>3. Upon nomination of the Minority Floor
Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan,
Jr., KBL, as the 12th CA member, representing the
Coalesced Minority in the House.
>4. A year later, the LDP was organized as a
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the
House affiliated with it the House committees,
including the House representation in the CA, had to
be reorganized to conform with the new political
alignments.
>5. Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker
Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of
KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the CA and
HRET. Her request was endorsed by nine (9)
congressmen. After the reorganization, Congressman
Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority.
>6. Hence the petition of for Extraordinary legal
writs by Coseteng to declare as null and void the
election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero,
Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial,
Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members
of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them
from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of
the Commission on Appointments on the theory that
their election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation
on following grounds:
>a. the New Majority (158 LDP members out of
the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only
nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the
House;
>b. the members representing the political parties,
or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their
respective political parties or coalitions;
>c. the nomination and election of respondent
Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of
the minority was clearly invalid; and
>d. that similarly invalid was the retention of
respondent Ablan as Minority member in the
Commission because he was neither nominated nor
elected as such by the minority party or parties in
the House.
>7. Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that
she is qualified to sit in the CA as a representative of
the Minority because she has the support of nine (9)
other congressmen and congresswomen of the
Minority .
>8. Respondent’s contention was that: (1)
that the legality of the reorganization of the CA is a
political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction of
this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the
reorganization was "strictly in consonance with
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e.,
on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties, considering the majority coalition
"as a form of a political party"
>ISSUE: W/N the members of the House in the
Commission on Appointments were chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political
parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution
>YES.
>1. The Court held that the petition should be
dismissed, not because it raises a political question,
(which it does not), but because the revision of the
House representation in the CA is based on
proportional representation of the political parties
therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, there is no merit in the
petitioner's contention that the House members in
the CA should have been nominated and elected by
their respective political parties, as they were
nominated by their respective floor leaders in the
House. They were elected by the House (not by their
party) in accordance with the Constitution. The
validity of their election to the Commission on
Appointments — eleven (11) from the Coalesced
Majority and one from the minority — is
unassailable.
>2. There are 160 members of the LDP in the
House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%).
Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the
Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6
members, which may be rounded out to ten (10)
members from the LDP. The remaining two seats
were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna
Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque
Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House.
There is no doubt that this apportionment of the
House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein.
>3. The other political parties or groups in the
House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is
presumably a member also of the Coalesced
Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even
if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition
party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng)
represents only .4% or less than 1% of the House
membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the
12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments.
To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party
should represent at least 8.4% of the House
membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect
at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.
>4. The indorsements of the nine (9)
congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the
petitioner's election to the Commission are
inconsequential because they are not members of
her party and they signed identical indorsements in
favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman
Verano-Yap.
37.) Guingona Jr. v Gonzales
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was
composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN
senator. To suffice the requirement that each house
must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties
agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of
Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No.
of Senators elected. The results of such a formula
would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members
for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5
member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority
floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party
because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada
from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party
to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition
compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that
the elected members of the CoA should consist of
eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one
LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the
compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in
determining a party’s representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that
each of them is entitled to a fractional membership
on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A
literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application.
The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or
1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator
by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving
the latter’s representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of
Senator Romulo gave more representation to the
LDP and reduced the representation of one political
party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A
party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly
elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there
are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has
only one member senator cannot constitutionally
claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties
may coalesce with each other in order to come up
with proportional representation especially since one
party may have affiliations with the other party.
38.) Arnault v Nazareno
39.) Bengzon v Senate
40.) Sabio v Gordon
41.) Neri v Senate

42.) Garcillano v House

43.) Abaskida v Senate

44.) Abakada Guro v Executive Secretary

45.) Arroyo v De Venecia
46.) Garcia v Mata

47.) Demetria v Alba

48.) Aquino v Araullo