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TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE LAW

PART I
Common Carriers
PRELIMINARIES
General Concepts
Obligations of the Parties
Extraordinary Diligence
Bill of Lading and other Formalities
Actions and Damages in Case of Breach

GENERAL CONCEPTS

Contract of Transportation
There is contract of transportation where a person obligates himself to transport persons or property from one
place to another for a consideration.
• The contract may therefore involve:
• Carriage of Passengers, or
• Carriage of Goods, or both.
• The person who obligates himself to transport the goods or passengers may be a:
• Common Carrier, or
• Private Carrier

Parties:

Carriage of Passengers
• PASSENGER - one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of contract, express or implied, with the
carrier as to the payment of fare or that which is accepted as an equivalent thereof (Nueca v. Manila
Railroad Co., G.R. No. 31731-R, 30 January 1968)

• COMMON CARRIER - one that holds itself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire as a
public employment and not as a casual occupation. (De Guzman v. CA, G.R. No. L-47822, 22 December
1988)

Carriage of Goods
• Shipper – is the person who delivers the goods to the carrier for transportation. He is the person who pays the
consideration or on whose behalf payment is made.
• Carrier
• Consignee – is the person to whom the goods are to be delivered.
• May be the shipper himself where the goods will be delivered to one of the branch offices of the
shipper, or
• May be a third person who is not actually a party to the contract.

Perfection of Contract:
CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS, IN GENERAL
• CONTRACT TO CARRY (1st Type) - an agreement to carry the passenger at some future date.
CONSENSUAL IN NATURE hence, PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT.

• CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE or OF COMMON CARRIAGE (2nd Type) - A REAL CONTRACT for not until
the facilities of the carrier are actually used can the carrier be said to have already assumed the obligation
as a carrier.
CARRIAGE OF GOODS, IN GENERAL

• CONTRACT TO CARRY (1st Type) – an agreement to carry and transport goods at some future date.
CONSENSUAL IN NATURE hence, PERFECTED BY MERE CONSENT.

• CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OR OF COMMON CARRIAGE

(2nd Type) - By the act of delivery of the goods, that is, when the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession and control of the carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract
of carriage is perfected.

SPECIFIC MODES OF PERFECTION

• AIRCRAFT :

• Contract to Carry - Even if no tickets have been issued to said passengers so long as there was
already a meeting of minds with respect to the subject matter and the consideration.

• Contract of Carriage - Passenger had checked in at the departure counter, passed through
customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded to the ramp of the aircraft and
that his baggage had already been loaded in the aircraft to be flown with the passenger to his
destination.
• BUSES, JEEPNEYS, and STREET CARS

• Once a public utility bus or jeepney stops, it is in effect making a continuous offer to the
passengers. Hence, it is the duty of the drivers to stop their conveyances for a reasonable length of
time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter.

• Passenger is deemed to be accepting the offer if he is already attempting to board the conveyances
and the contract of carriage is perfected from that point.

• Any injury suffered by the passenger resulting from the sudden starting up of the carrier is already

based on contract.

• TRAINS

• There is perfection when a person with a bona fide intention to use the facilities of the carrier and
possessing sufficient fare with which to pay for his passage, has presented himself to the carrier
for transportation in the place and manner provided.

• Where a person has already purchased a LRT token and while waiting on the platform designated
for boarding fell thereon and hit by the train, he was deemed a passenger. (LRTA, et.al. Vs.
Marjorie Navidad, et.al., G.R. No. 145804, 06 February 2003)
CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIAGE ANALOGOUS TO PUBLIC SERVICE

• The concept of common carrier under ARTICLE 1732 CCP may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of
public service under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least
partially supplements the law on common carriers.

• PUBLIC SERVICE includes: “every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the
Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or
accidental and done for general business purposes.

• Any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or

passenger, or both, with or without fixed route.

• Whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or
steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft.

• Engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock,
ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply
and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless
broadcasting stations and other similar public services.

TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PARTY IS A COMMON CARRIER OF GOODS:

• He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public employment, and must
hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for person generally as a business
and not as a casual occupation;
• He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is confined;
• He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is conducted and over his established roads;
• The transportation must be for hire. [First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. CA, G.R. 125948, Dec. 29,
1998];
• Provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee [National Steel
Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 112287, Dec. 12, 1997, quoting Mendoza v. PAL, 90 Phil. 836].

BASIC RULES

• Still a common carrier:

• Even if it carries persons, goods, or both only as an ancillary activity;


• Even if it offers transportation services on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis;
• Even if it offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population;
• Even if he did not secure a Certificate of Public Convenience;
• Even if means is not through motor vehicle;
• Even if it has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no tickets.
DE GUZMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS (168 SCRA 612)

• Art. 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is carrying of persons or goods
or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary, nor does it make distinctions between one who
offers the service to the ‘general public’ or a narrow segment of the general population.
• Therefore, a party who ‘back-hauled’ goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, even when such
activity was only periodical or occasional and was not its principal line of business would be subject to the
responsibilities and obligations of a common carrier.

LIMITED CLIENTELE NOT A DEFENSE

• Facts: Petitioner entered into a contract with SMC for the transfer of paper and kraft board from the port
area to SMC’s warehouse.

• Held: She is still a common carrier although she does not indiscriminately hold her services out to the public
but offers the same to select parties with whom she may contract in the conduct of her business. [Virgines
Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Co., G.R. 148496, Mar. 19, 2002]
PHIL. AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ET.AL. V. PKS SHIPPING COMPANY, G.R. NO. 149038,

09 APRIL 2003.

• Facts: Respondent shipping company transported the 75,000 bags of cement to Petitioner in its barge. The
bags of cement perished after its barge sank while being towed by a tug boat.

• Held: Respondent is a common carrier because it was engaged in the business of carrying goods for others
for a fee. The regularity of its activities in the area indicates more than just a casual activity on its part.
Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely because individual contracts are executed or
entered into with the patrons of the carrier.

NO FIXED ROUTE, NO TERMINAL, NO TICKET ISSUED NOT A DEFENSE

• Facts: Petitioner is involved in the business of carrying goods through its barges. It has no fixed and publicly
known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no tickets.

• Held: Petitioner is still a common carrier because its principal business is that of lighterage and drayage
and it offers its barges to the public for carrying or transporting by water for compensation. [Asia Lighterage
and Shipping, Inc. v. CA, G.R. 147246, Aug. 19, 2003]

MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION, NOT MATERIAL

• Issue: Are pipeline operators common carriers as to subject them to business taxes on common carriers?
• Held: Yes. The Code makes no distinction as to the means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or
air. It does not provide that the transportation of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. In
fact, in the US, oil pipe line operators are considered common carriers. Also under the Petroleum Act of the
Philippines (RA 387). (First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. CA, GR No. 147246, 19 August 2003).

CHARTER PART

• A contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a
specified time or use.

• Contract of Affreightment - owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a merchant or
other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight.
• Charter by Demise or Bareboat Charter - whole vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer to him of its entire
command and possession and consequent control over its navigation, including the master and the crew, who
are his servants.

CONTRACT OF AFFREIGHTMENT
• Time Charter - vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time.
• Voyage Charter - ship is leased for a single voyage.

EFFECT WHEN COMMON CARRIER ENTERS INTO A CHARTER PARTY

• If only by contract of affreightment, whether voyage or time charter, it remains a common carrier.
• If by bareboat or demise charter, a common carrier is transformed into a private carrier.

COMMON CARRIER V. PRIVATE CARRIER

• Common carrier holds himself out in common, that is, to all persons who choose to employ him, ready to cary
for hire while the private carrier or special carrier agrees in some special case with some private individual to
carry for hire;

• A private carrier is not bound to carry for any reason, unless it enters a special agreement to do so. A common
carrier is bound to carry for all who offer such goods as it is accustomed to carry and tender reasonable
compensation for carrying them.

• A common carrier is subject to regulation as it is a public service. A private carrier is not.

• The common carrier is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence while a private carrier owes only diligence of a
good father of a family.

• A common carrier cannot stipulate that it is exempt from liability for the negligence of its agents or employees.
Such stipulation is void as it is against public policy. A private carrier may validly enter into such stipulation
(1980, 1981, 1984 Bar Exams)

FGU INSURANCE V. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING, GR 141910, 06 AUGUST 2002

• Facts: GPS, as the exclusive hauler of Concepcion Industries, undertook to deliver thirty (30) units of
Condura refrigerators from latter’s plant in Alabang to Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north
diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified
truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes. Petitioner FGU as subrogee to
Concepcion Industries filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its
driver.
• Issue No. 1: WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A COMMON CARRIER.
• Held: GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its
services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. The above conclusion
notwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.
• In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify,
prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
• A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have
been lost or suffered.
• The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his:
• “Expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a
position as he would have been in had the contract been performed; or

• “Reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or

• “Restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the

other party.

• The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a good father of
a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of
extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
• In this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of
lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to
establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.

• Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may not himself be
ordered to pay petitioner.
• The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioner’s principal and defendant, may
not be held liable under the agreement
• A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their
personality or their juridical position.

• Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor

prejudice a third person.

• Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa
contractual, would require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the
defendant.
• Issue No. 2: WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT
CASE.
• Held: Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner, holds a defendant liable where the thing
which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latter’s management and the accident is
such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management
or control use proper care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care
It is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not create an independent ground of liability.
Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute
for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.
• The maxim simply places on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.
• Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff.

• Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some
of which the defendant could not be responsible.
• Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff
and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence
and not from the nature of the relation of the parties.
• Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other than those due to defendant’s conduct must first
be eliminated, for the doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-
contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so pointed
out, immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.

In the case of the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa acquiliana, while he
admittedly can be said to have been in control and management of the vehicle which figured in the
accident, it is not equally shown, however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his
negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work against him.

COMMON CARRIAGE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER CONTRACTS


• VS. TOWAGE -

• In towage, one vessel is hired to bring another vessel to another place. Thus, a tugboat may be
hired by a common carrier to bring the vessel to a port. In this case, the operator of the tugboat
cannot be considered a common carrier.

• In maritime law, towage refers to a service rendered to a vessel by towing for the mere purpose of
expediting her voyage without reference to any circumstances of danger. It usually confined to
vessels that have received no injury or damage.

• VS. ARRASTRE
• The functions of an arrastre operator usually include the following:

1. Receive, handle, care for, and deliver all merchandise imported and
exported, upon or passing over Government-owned wharves and
piers in the port;

2. Record or check all merchandise which may be delivered to said port at

shipside, and in general and;

3. Furnish light, and water services and other incidental services in order

to undertake its arrastre service.

• Hence, the functions of an arrastre operator has nothing to do with the trade and business of navigation, nor
to the use or operation of vessels.
• Both as to the nature of the functions and the place of their performance (upon wharves and piers shipside),
the arrastre operator’s services are clearly not maritime.

• They are in fact, no different from those of a depositary or warehouseman.

• Even if the arrastre service depends on, assists, or furthers maritime transportation, it may be deemed merely
incidental and does not make its service maritime

Vs. Stevedoring
• The diligence required of a stevedore is the diligence of a good father of a family.

• Not a common carrier for it does not transport goods or passengers; it is not akin to a
warehouseman for it does not store goods for profit.

• The loading and stowing of cargoes would not have a far reaching public ramification as that of a
common carrier and a warehouseman; the public is adequately protected by our laws on contract
and quasi-delict.

• The public policy considerations in legally imposing upon a common carrier or a warehouseman a
higher degree of diligence is not present in a stevedoring outfit which mainly provides labor in
loading and stowing of cargoes for its clients.

Vs. Travel AGENCY


• Not a common carrier. The object of contractual relation of a person who purchases a ticket
through a travel agency is only the agency’s service of arranging and facilitating the booking,
ticketing, and accommodation in a package tour.

• In contrast, the object of the contract with a common

carrier is transportation. The contract between the travel agency is a contract of service and not a
contract of carriage. (Crisostomo v. CA, et.al., GR No. 138334, 25 August 2003, 409 SCRA 528,
534)

TWO TYPES OF CARGO OPERATION


• Line Service - operation of a common carrier which publicly offers services without discrimination to any user,
has regular ports of call/ destination, fixed sailing schedules and frequencies and published freight rates and
attendant charges and usually carriers multiple consignments (RA 9515). Liners carry general cargoes,
meaning whatever is offered is accepted for shipment.

• Tramp Service - operation of a common carrier which has no regular and fixed routes and schedules but
accepts cargo wherever and whenever the shipper desires, is hired on a contractual basis, or chartered by
any one or few shippers under mutually agreed terms and usually carries bulk or break bulk cargoes.
GOVERNING LAWS
• Coastwise Shipping
• New Civil Code (Arts. 1732-1766)
• Code of Commerce
• Carriage from Foreign Ports to Phil. Ports
• New Civil Code (primary)
• Code of Commerce (suppletory)
• Carriage of Goods by Sea Act [COGSA] (suppletory)
• Carriage From Phil. Port to Foreign Ports The laws of the country to which the goods are to be
transported.

• Overland Transportation
• Civil Code (Primary)
• Code of Commerce (Suppletorily)
• R.A. 4136 (The Land Transportation and Traffic Code)

• Air Transportation
• Civil Code (primary)
• Code of Commerce (suppletorily)
• For international carriage - Warsaw Convention [Convention for the Unification of Certain of Rules

Relating to the International Carriage by Air]

NATURE OF BUSINESS OF COMMON CARRIERS


• Common carriers are public utilities within the contemplation of the public service law.

• Public utilities are privately owned and operated businesses whose services are essential to the general
public.

• They are enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and conduce to their comfort and
convenience.

• When, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to the control by the public for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has thus created. (KMU v. Garcia, GR 115381, 23 December 1994)*

REGISTRATION LAWS
• Registration of motor vehicles is now governed by Republic Act No. 4136 otherwise known as “The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.”
• Administered by the Land Transportation Office.

PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
Art. 2185, Civil Code – It is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle is negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation, unless the contrary.

CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION OF A VEHICLE IS FOR HIRE


• A vehicle habitually used to carry freight not belonging to the registered owner thereof, or passengers not
related by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree to such owner, shall be conclusively
presumed to be "for hire."
REGISTERED OWNER RULE
• The person who is the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for any damage caused by the negligent
operation of the vehicle although the same was already sold or conveyed to another person at the time of
the accident.

• This is subject to the right of recourse by the registered owner against the transferee or buyer.

REGISTERED OWNER RULE, APPLICATION


• RO is not liable if the vehicle was taken from his garage without his knowledge and consent.
• ROR applies even if the RO leased the vehicle to another who is the actual operator.
• ROR applies in a financial lease.
• ROR applicable whenever the persons involved are engaged in what is known as the “kabit system.”

REGISTRATION
• PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S):

• Identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident;

• The knowledge that means of detection are always available may act as a deterrent from lax
observance of the law and of the rules of conservative and safe operation.

KABIT SYSTEM
• An arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other
persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a fee or percentage of the
earnings.

• Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, the KS is invariably recognized
as being contrary to public policy and therefore void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. (Aberlado
Lim, et.al., v. CA, et.al., No. 125817, 16 January 2002; Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. CA, 147 SCRA 82 [1987])
• May also be applied to vessels and aircrafts that are covered by certificates of public convenience and
necessity.

PARTIES IN KABIT SYSTEM COVERED BY PARI DELICTO RULES


• Ex pact illicito non oritur action – No action arises out of an illicit bargain.

• Having entered into an illegal contract, parties to the kabit system cannot seek relief from the courts, and
each must bear the consequences of his acts. (Lita Enterprises v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 64693,
27 April 1984, 129 SCRA 79)

TEJA MARKETING V. IAC, 148 SCRA 347, 9 MARCH 1987


• Facts: Petitioner was constrained to file an action for damages because private respondent allegedly failed to
pay the balance of the purchase price of its motorcycle sold. The motorcycle which was used for sidecar
remained under the name of petitioner and operated under its franchise under an arrangement called ‘kabit
system’.
• Held: Dismissal of case sustained. Both parties are in pari delicto. The court will not aid either party to
enforce an illegal contract.

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