16.

G.R. No. 78656 August 30, 1988

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, respondents.

Facts:

Vinluan, a practicing lawyer in Manila had to travel to several cities in Europe and US. While in Paris, he went
to the office of TWA to confirm his reservation for first class accommodation. It was confirmed twice. During
the time of the flight, he was told that there was no 1 st class seat available. Hence, he was downgraded to
economy. He protested but he was arrogantly treated by a TWA employee. And while waiting for his flight,
he saw white Caucasians who arrived much later than him, in first class seats.

On February 15, 1980, Vinluan filed an action for damages against the TWA in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal alleging breach of contract and bad faith. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant holding the latter liable to the former for the amount representing the difference in
fare between first class and economy class accommodations on board Flight No. 6041 from New York to
San Francisco plus damages.

Not satisfied therewith, the TWA appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter court affirmed and modified
the decision with regard only to damages and interest.

The theory of the petitioner is that because of maintenance problems of the aircraft on the day of the flight,
TWA Flight No. 41 was cancelled and a special Flight No. 6041 was organized to operate in lieu of Flight
No. 41. 3 Flight No. 41 was to have utilized a Lockheed 1011 with 34 first class seats, but instead, a smaller
Boeing 707 with only 16 first class seats was substituted for use in Flight No. 6041. Hence, passengers who
had first class reservations on Flight No. 41 had to be accommodated on Flight No. 6041 on a first-come,
first-served basis. An announcement was allegedly made to all passengers in the entire terminal of the
airport advising them to get boarding cards for Flight No. 6041 to San Francisco and that the first ones
getting them would get first preference as to seats in the aircraft. It denied declining to give any explanation
for the downgrading of private respondent as well as the discourteous attitude of Mr. Braam.

On the other hand, private respondent asserts that he did not hear such announcement at the terminal and
that he was among the early passengers to present his ticket for check-in only to be informed that there
was no first class seat available for him and that he had to be downgraded.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON Vinluan is entitled to damages.

Held:

Yes. The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was subjected is
undeniable. Consequently, the award of moral and exemplary damages by the respondent court is in order.

The contention is devoid of merit. Private respondent had a first class ticket for Flight No. 41 of petitioner
from New York to San Francisco on April 20, 1979. It was twice confirmed and yet respondent
unceremoniously told him that there was no first class seat available for him and that he had to be
downgraded to the economy class. As he protested, he was arrogantly threatened by one Mr. Braam. Worst
still, while he was waiting for the flight, he saw that several Caucasians who arrived much later were
accommodated in first class seats when the other passengers did not show up.

Indeed, private respondent had shown that the alleged switch of planes from a Lockheed 1011 to a smaller
Boeing 707 was because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be
accommodated in the smaller plane and not because of maintenance problems.

Inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration,
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral
damages. More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private respondent of his being
downgraded under the circumstances, he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner.

Wherefore, the decision is affirmed.

G.R. No. 78656 August 30, 1988

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, respondents.

Guerrero & Torres Law Offices for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Rogelio A. Vinluan is a practicing lawyer who had to travel in April, 1979 to several cities in Europe and the
U.S. to attend to some matters involving several clients. He entered into a contract for air carriage for
valuable consideration with Japan Airlines first class from Manila to Tokyo, Moscow, Paris, Hamburg, Zurich,
New York, Los Angeles, Honolulu and back to Manila thru the same airline and other airlines it represents
for which he was issued the corresponding first class tickets for the entire trip.

On April 18, 1979, while in Paris, he went to the office of Trans World Airlines (TWA) at the De Gaulle Airport
and secured therefrom confirmed reservation for first class accommodation on board its Flight No. 41 from
New York to San Francisco which was scheduled to depart on April 20, 1979. A validated stub was attached
to the New York-Los Angeles portion of his ticket evidencing his confirmed reservation for said flight with
the mark "OK " 1 On April 20, 1979, at about 8:00 o'clock A.M., Vinluan reconfirrred his reservation for first
class accommodation on board TWA Flight No. 41 with its New York office. He was advised that his
reservation was confirmed. He was even requested to indicate his seat preference on said flight on said
scheduled date of departure of TWA Flight No. 41. Vinluan presented his ticket for check-in at the counter
of TWA at JFK International Airport at about 9:45 o'clock A.M., the scheduled time of the departure being
11:00 o'clock A.M. He was informed that there was no first class seat available for him on the flight. He
asked for an explanation but TWA employees on duty declined to give any reason. When he began to
protest, one of the TWA employees, a certain Mr. Braam, rudely threatened him with the words "Don't argue
with me, I have a very bad temper."

To be able to keep his schedule, Vinluan was compelled to take the economy seat offered to him and he
was issued a refund application" as he was downgraded from first class to economy class.

While waiting for the departure of Flight No. 41. Vinluan noticed that other passengers who were white
Caucasians and who had checked-in later than him were given preference in some first class seats which
became available due to "no show" passengers.

On February 15, 1980, Vinluan filed an action for damages against the TWA in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal alleging breach of contract and bad faith. After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant holding the
latter liable to the for-mer for the amount representing the difference in fare between first class and
economy class accommodations on board Flight No. 6041 from New York to San Francisco, the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the amount of
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, all such amounts to earn interest at the rate of twelve (12%) percent
per annum from February 15, 1980 when the complainant was filed until fully paid.

Correspondingly, defendant's counterclaim is dismissed. Costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied therewith, the TWA appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on May 27, 1987, 2 the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 8, 1984 is hereby modified by (1) fixing the interest which appellant
must pay on the awards of moral and exemplary damages at six per cent (6%) per annum from the date of
the decision a quo, March 8, 1984 until date of full payment and (2) reducing the attorne's fees to P50,000.00
without interest, the rest of the decision is affirmed. Cost against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the herein petition for review.

The theory of the petitioner is that because of maintenance problems of the aircraft on the day of the flight,
TWA Flight No. 41 was cancelled and a special Flight No. 6041 was organized to operate in lieu of Flight
No. 41. 3 Flight No. 41 was to have utilized a Lockheed 1011 with 34 first class seats, but instead, a smaller
Boeing 707 with only 16 first class seats was substituted for use in Flight No. 6041. Hence, passengers who
had first class reservations on Flight No. 41 had to be accommodated on Flight No. 6041 on a first-come,
first-served basis. An announcement was allegedly made to all passengers in the entire terminal of the
airport advising them to get boarding cards for Flight No. 6041 to San Francisco and that the first ones
getting them would get first preference as to seats in the aircraft. It denied declining to give any explanation
for the downgrading of private respondent as well as the discourteous attitude of Mr. Braam.

On the other hand, private respondent asserts that he did not hear such announcement at the terminal and
that he was among the early passengers to present his ticket for check-in only to be informed that there
was no first class seat available for him and that he had to be downgraded.
The petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in
finding that petitioner acted maliciously and discriminatorily, and in granting excessive moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.

The contention is devoid of merit. Private respondent had a first class ticket for Flight No. 41 of petitioner
from New York to San Francisco on April 20, 1979. It was twice confirmed and yet respondent
unceremoniously told him that there was no first class seat available for him and that he had to be
downgraded to the economy class. As he protested, he was arrogantly threatened by one Mr. Braam. Worst
still, while he was waiting for the flight, he saw that several Caucasians who arrived much later were
accommodated in first class seats when the other passengers did not show up.

The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was subjected is undeniable.
Consequently, the award of moral and exemplary damages by the respondent court is in order. 4

Indeed, private respondent had shown that the alleged switch of planes from a Lockheed 1011 to a smaller
Boeing 707 was because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be
accommodated in the smaller plane and not because of maintenance problems.

Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private respondent Vinluan for the
sake of econonmy. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to
its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the
passenger to the award of moral damages.5 More so in this case where instead of courteously informing
private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances, he was angrily rebuffed by an
employee of petitioner.

At the time of this unfortunate incident, the private respondent was a practicing lawyer, a senior partner of
a big law firm in Manila. He was a director of several companies and was active in civic and social
organizations in the Philippines. Considering the circumstances of this case and the social standing of
private respondent in the community, he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages.
However, the moral damages should be reduced to P300,000.00, and the exemplary damages should be
reduced to P200,000.00. This award should be reasonably sufficient to indemnify private respondent for the
humiliation and embarrassment that he suffered and to serve as an example to discourage the repetition
of similar oppressive and discriminatory acts.

WHEREFORE, with the above modification reducing the moral and exemplary damages as above-stated, the
decision subject of the petition for review is AFFIRMED in all other respects, without pronouncement as to
costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

17.

G.R. Nos. 100374-75 November 27, 1992

RUFINO Y. LUNA, RODOLFO J. ALONSO and PORFIRIO RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISTINA M. ESTRADA in her capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-
Pasig, Br. 69, Metro Manila, HON. TERESITA D. CAPULONG in her capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-
Valenzuela, Br. 172, Metro Manila, and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

Facts:

This joint petition for review on certiorari originated from two (2) separate complaints arising from an
airline's delay in the delivery of the luggage of its passengers at their destination which respondent courts
dismissed for lack of cause of action. The resulting issue is whether the application of the Warsaw
Convention operates to exclude the application of the provisions of the New Civil Code and the other
statutes.

Briefly, the facts: On 19 May 1989, at around 8:00 AM, petitioners Rufino Luna, Rodolfo Alonso and Porfirio
Rodriguez boarded Flight 020 of private respondent Northwest Airlines bound for Seoul, South Korea, to
attend the four-day Rotary International Convention from the 21st to the 24th of May 1992. They checked
in one (1) piece of luggage each. After boarding, however, due to engine trouble, they were asked to
disembark and transfer to a Korean Airlines plane scheduled to depart four (4) hours later. They were
assured that their baggage would be with them in the same flight.

When petitioners arrived in Seoul, they discovered that their personal belongings were nowhere to be found
instead, they were allegedly flown to Seattle, U.S.A. It was not until four (4) days later, and only after repeated
representations with Northwest Airlines personnel at the airport in Korea were petitioners able to retrieve
their luggage. By then the Convention, which they were hardly able to attend, was almost over.

Petitioners Rufino Y. Luna and Rodolfo J. Alfonso assert that on 6 June 1989, or thirteen (13) days after they
recovered their luggage, they sent a written claim to private respondent's office along Roxas Blvd., Ermita,
Manila. Petitioner Porfirio Rodriquez, on his part, asserverates that he filed his claim on 13 June 1989.
However, private respondent, is a letter of 21 June 1989, disowned any liability for the delay and averred
that it exerted "its best efforts to carry the passenger and baggage with reasonable dispatch."

On 14 July 1989, petitioners Luna and Alonso jointly filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages
before the RTC of Pasig, while petitioner Rodriquez filed his own complaint with the RTC of Valenzuela.
However, upon motion of private respondent, both complaints were dismissed 4 for lack of cause of action
due to petitioners' failure to state in their respective complaints that they filed a prior claim with private
respondent within the prescribed period.

Petitioners Luna and Alonso then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to set aside the order of
respondent Judge Cristina M. Estrada granting private respondent's motion to dismiss, while petitioner
Rodriquez proceeded directly to this Court on certiorari for the same purpose. However, in Our resolution
of 26 Feb 1990, We referred his petition to the CA.

On 26 Mar 1991, respondent CA, applying the provisions of the Warsaw Convention and ruling
that certiorari was not a substitute for a lost appeal, dismissed the petition of Luna and Alonso, 5 and on 7
June 1991 denied their motion for reconsideration.6 Meanwhile, on 28 Feb 199, respondent Court of
Appeals, ruling that the questioned order of the trial court had already become final, similarly rejected the
petition of Rodriquez, and on 6 June 1991 denied his motion for reconsideration.7 Hence, this present
recourse by petitioners Luna, Alonso and Rodriguez.

Issue:
WON the application of Warsaw Convention operates to exclude the application of the provisions of the
New Civil Code and the other statutes.

Held:

No. Technicalities should be disregarded if only to render to the respective parties that which is their due.
Thus, although We have said that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lapsed appeal, We have, time and
again, likewise held that where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice, the rule may be relaxed. 13 Hence, considering the broader and primordial interests of justice,
particularly when there is grave abuse of discretion, thus impelling occasional departure from the general
rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, respondent appellate court
may legally entertain the special civil action for certiorari.

Previously, We ruled that the Warsaw Convention was a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government; consequently, it has the force and effect of law in this country. 15 But, in the same
token, We are also aware of jurisprudence that the Warsaw Convention does not operate as an exclusive
enumeration of the instances for declaring an airline liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. 16The Convention merely declares the carrier liable for damages
in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are present. 17 For sure, it does not regulate the
liability, much less exempt, the carrier for violating the rights of others which must simply be respected in
accordance with their contracts of carriage. The application of the Convention must not therefore be
construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. In fact, in Alitalia
v. IAC, 18 We awarded Dr. Felipa Pablo nominal damages, the provisions of the Convention notwithstanding.

Hence, petitioners' alleged failure to file a claim with the common carrier as mandated by the provisions of
the Warsaw Convention should not be a ground for the summary dismissal of their complaints since private
respondent may still be held liable for breach of other relevant laws which may provide a different period
or procedure for filing a claim. Considering that petitioners indeed filed a claim which private respondent
admitted having received on 21 June, 1989, their demand may have very well been filed within the period
prescribed by those applicable laws. Consequently, respondent trial courts, as well as respondent appellate
court, were in error when they limited themselves to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention and
disregarding completely the provisions of the Civil Code.

We are unable to agree however with petitioners that Art. 25 of the Convention operations to exclude the
other provisions of the Convention if damage is caused by the common carrier's willful misconduct. As
correctly pointed out by private respondent, Art. 25 refers only to the monetary ceiling on damages found
in Art. 22 should damage be caused by the carrier's willful misconduct. Hence, only the provisions of Art. 22
limiting the carrier's liability and imposing a monetary ceiling in case of willful misconduct on its part that
the carrier cannot invoke. 19 This issue however has become academic in the light of our ruling that the trial
courts erred in dismissing petitioners' respective complaints.

We are not prepared to subscribed to petitioners' argument that the failure of private respondent to deliver
their luggage at the designated time and place amounted ipso facto to willful misconduct. For willful
misconduct to exist, there must be a showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an intention to
violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or
shamefully wrong or improper conduct.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions and resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

G.R. Nos. 100374-75 November 27, 1992

RUFINO Y. LUNA, RODOLFO J. ALONSO and PORFIRIO RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISTINA M. ESTRADA in her capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-
Pasig, Br. 69, Metro Manila, HON. TERESITA D. CAPULONG in her capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-
Valenzuela, Br. 172, Metro Manila, and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This joint petition for review on certiorari originated from two (2) separate complaints arising from an
airline's delay in the delivery of the luggage of its passengers at their destination which respondent courts
dismissed for lack of cause of action. The resulting issue is whether the application of the Warsaw
Convention operates to exclude the application of the provisions of the New Civil Code and the other
statutes.

Briefly, the facts: On 19 May 1989, at around 8:00 in the morning, petitioners Rufino Luna, Rodolfo Alonso
and Porfirio Rodriguez boarded Flight 020 of private respondent Northwest Airlines bound for Seoul, South
Korea, to attend the four-day Rotary International Convention from the 21st to the 24th of May 1992. They
checked in one (1) piece of luggage each. After boarding, however, due to engine trouble, they were asked
to disembark and transfer to a Korean Airlines plane scheduled to depart four (4) hours later. They were
assured that their baggage would be with them in the same flight.

When petitioners arrived in Seoul, they discovered that their personal belongings were nowhere to be found
instead, they were allegedly flown to Seattle, U.S.A. It was not until four (4) days later, and only after repeated
representations with Northwest Airlines personnel at the airport in Korea were petitioners able to retrieve
their luggage. By then the Convention, which they were hardly able to attend, was almost over.

Petitioners Rufino Y. Luna and Rodolfo J. Alfonso assert that on 6 June 1989, or thirteen (13) days after they
recovered their luggage, they sent a written claim to private respondent's office along Roxas Blvd., Ermita,
Manila. Petitioner Porfirio Rodriquez, on his part, asserverates that he filed his claim on 13 June 1989.
However, private respondent, is a letter of 21 June 1989, disowned any liability for the delay and averred
that it exerted "its best efforts to carry the passenger and baggage with reasonable dispatch."1

Thus, on 14 July 1989, petitioners Luna and Alonso jointly filed a complaint for breach of contract with
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 58390,
subsequently raffled to Br. 69,2 while petitioner Rodriquez filed his own complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 3194-V-89, assigned to Br. 172.3 However,
upon motion of private respondent, both complaints were dismissed4 for lack of cause of action due to
petitioners' failure to state in their respective complaints that they filed a prior claim with private respondent
within the prescribed period.

Petitioners Luna and Alonso then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to set aside the
order of respondent Judge Cristina M. Estrada granting private respondent's motion to dismiss, while
petitioner Rodriquez proceeded directly to this Court on certiorari for the same purpose. However, in Our
resolution of 26 February 1990, We referred his petition to the Court of Appeals.

On 26 March 1991, the Third Division of respondent Court of Appeals, applying the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention and ruling that certiorari was not a substitute for a lost appeal, dismissed the petition of Luna
and Alonso,5 and on 7 June 1991 denied their motion for reconsideration.6 Meanwhile, on 28 February 1991
the Seventh Division of respondent Court of Appeals, ruling that the questioned order of the trial court had
already become final, similarly rejected the petition of Rodriquez, and on 6 June 1991 denied his motion for
reconsideration.7 Hence, this present recourse by petitioners Luna, Alonso and Rodriguez.

Four (4) grounds are relied upon by petitioners which, nevertheless, may be reduced to three, namely: (a)
that respondent appellate court disregarded Our ruling in Alitalia v. CA8 where We said that "[t]he
Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability, or as
an absolute limit of the extent of that liability;"9 (b) that "petitions to revoke orders and decisions may be
entertained even after the time to appeal had elapsed, in cases wherein the jurisdiction of the court had
been exceeded;" 10 and, (c) that Art. 26 of the Warsaw Convention which prescribes the reglementary period
within which to file a claim cannot be invoked if damage is caused by the carrier's willful misconduct, as
provided by Art. 25 of the same Warsaw Convention.

Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that the dismissal order of respondent courts had already
become final after petitioners failed to either move for reconsideration or appeal from the orders within the
reglementary period, hence, certiorari is no substitute for a lost appeal.

Private respondent also maintains that it did not receive any demand letter from petitioners within the 21-
day reglementary period, as provided in par. 7 of the Conditions of Contract appearing in the plane ticket.
Since Art. 26. par. (4), of the Warsaw Convention provides that "[f]ailing complaint within the times aforesaid,
no action shall lie against the carrier, save in the case of fraud on his part," the carrier consequently cannot
be held liable for the delay in the delivery of the baggage. In other words, non-observance of the prescribed
period to file a claim bars claimant's action in court for recovery.

Private respondent, citing foreign jurisprudence, 11 likewise submits that Art. 25, par. (1), of the Warsaw
Convention which excludes or limits liability of common carriers if the damage is caused by it willful
misconduct, refers only to the monetary ceiling on damages found in Art. 22.

We find the appeal impressed with merit.

From the facts, it appears that private respondent Northwest Airlines indeed failed to deliver petitioners'
baggage at the designated time and place. For this, all that respondent carrier could say was that "[w]e
exerted all efforts to comply with this condition of the contract." 12 Hence, it is evident that petitioners
suffered some special specie of injury for which they should rightly be compensated. Private respondent
cannot be allowed to escape liability by seeking refuge in the argument that the trial courts' orders have
attained finality due to petitioners failure to move for reconsideration or to file a timely appeal therefrom.
Technicalities should be disregarded if only to render to the respective parties that which is their due. Thus,
although We have said that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lapsed appeal, We have, time and again,
likewise held that where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of
justice, the rule may be relaxed. 13 Hence, considering the broader and primordial interests of justice,
particularly when there is grave abuse of discretion, thus impelling occasional departure from the general
rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, respondent appellate court
may legally entertain the special civil action for certiorari. 14

Previously, We ruled that the Warsaw Convention was a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government; consequently, it has the force and effect of law in this country. 15 But, in the same
token, We are also aware of jurisprudence that the Warsaw Convention does not operate as an exclusive
enumeration of the instances for declaring an airline liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. 16The Convention merely declares the carrier liable for damages
in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are present. 17 For sure, it does not regulate the
liability, much less exempt, the carrier for violating the rights of others which must simply be respected in
accordance with their contracts of carriage. The application of the Convention must not therefore be
construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. In fact, in Alitalia
v. IAC, 18 We awarded Dr. Felipa Pablo nominal damages, the provisions of the Convention notwithstanding.

Hence, petitioners' alleged failure to file a claim with the common carrier as mandated by the provisions of
the Warsaw Convention should not be a ground for the summary dismissal of their complaints since private
respondent may still be held liable for breach of other relevant laws which may provide a different period
or procedure for filing a claim. Considering that petitioners indeed filed a claim which private respondent
admitted having received on 21 June, 1989, their demand may have very well been filed within the period
prescribed by those applicable laws. Consequently, respondent trial courts, as well as respondent appellate
court, were in error when they limited themselves to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention and
disregarding completely the provisions of the Civil Code.

We are unable to agree however with petitioners that Art. 25 of the Convention operations to exclude the
other provisions of the Convention if damage is caused by the common carrier's willful misconduct. As
correctly pointed out by private respondent, Art. 25 refers only to the monetary ceiling on damages found
in Art. 22 should damage be caused by the carrier's willful misconduct. Hence, only the provisions of Art. 22
limiting the carrier's liability and imposing a monetary ceiling in case of willful misconduct on its part that
the carrier cannot invoke. 19 This issue however has become academic in the light of our ruling that the trial
courts erred in dismissing petitioners' respective complaints.

We are not prepared to subscribed to petitioners' argument that the failure of private respondent to deliver
their luggage at the designated time and place amounted ipso facto to willful misconduct. For willful
misconduct to exist, there must be a showing that the acts complained of were impelled by an intention to
violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of one's rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or
shamefully wrong or improper conduct.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions and resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaints for breach of contract of carriage with damages in Civil Case No. 3194-V-89 and Civil
Case No. 58390 dismissed by respondent Judges Teresita D. Capulong and Cristina M. Estrada, respectively,
are ordered REINSTATED and given due course until terminated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
18.

EDNA LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS GR NO. 171092 March 15, 2010

Facts:

On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint[2] for damages against respondent
British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005,
she took respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly
requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in placing her
hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and
even sarcastically remarked that If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken
back!

Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant,
Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to
lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant,
uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted,
petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the planes safety regulations being a frequent
traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the
petitioner and menacingly told her that We dont like your attitude.

Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were only doing their job.

On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against respondent British
Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The tortuous conduct by the flight attendants
of said Airways, which prompted petitioner to file a case for damages, allegedly transpired when petitioner
boarded respondent’s flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy.

On May 30, 2005, respondent,by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged
that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides: “An action for damages must
be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal
place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before
the court of the place of destination.”

RTC granted respondent’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion
was denied in an Order.

Petitioner now comes directly before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari on pure questions of law.

Issue:

WON Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere to the provision of the Warsaw
Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with respect to a case for damages involving a tortuous
conduct committed by an airline personnel while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen.

Held:
Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.

In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The Republic of the Philippines
is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was
concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish
government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9,
1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our
formal adherence thereto, “to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed
and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.” The Convention is
thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force
and effect of law in this country.

The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was
between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.

Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by
aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport
undertaking.

2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories
of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed
stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same
High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within
the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an international carriage. The High
Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which
subsequently adhered to it.[14]

In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of
destination was Rome, Italy.[15] Both the United Kingdom[16] and Italy[17] signed and ratified the Warsaw
Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an international carriage within the
contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.

Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;

3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or

4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United
Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional
rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the
passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the
ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the
option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver
that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the
said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts
of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the
case filed by the petitioner.

Wherefore, petition is dismissed.

EDNA Lhuillier vs. British Airways GR No. 171092 March 15, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris dicendi. Jurisdiction is a power introduced
for the public good, on account of the necessity of dispensing justice. [1]

Factual Antecedents

On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint[2] for damages against respondent
British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005,
she took respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly
requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in placing her
hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and
even sarcastically remarked that If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken
back!

Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant,
Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to
lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant,
uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted,
petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the planes safety regulations being a frequent
traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the
petitioner and menacingly told her that We dont like your attitude.
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were only doing their job.

Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as
moral damages, P2 million as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as
attorneys fees, P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the suit.

On May 16, 2005, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent
through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.[3]

On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss [4] on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged
that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention,[5]Article 28(1) of which provides:

An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of
the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract
has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.

Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b) respondents principal place of business is in London;
c) petitioner bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome);[6] and d) Rome, Italy is
petitioners place of destination, then it follows that the complaint should only be filed in the proper courts
of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent because the summons was erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is
not its resident agent in the Philippines.

On June 3, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring herein petitioner to file her Comment/Opposition
on the Motion to Dismiss within 10 days from notice thereof, and for respondent to file a Reply
thereon.[7] Instead of filing a Comment/Opposition, petitioner filed on June 27, 2005, an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Formal Amendment to the Complaint and Issuance of Alias Summons.[8] Petitioner alleged
that upon verification with the Securities and Exchange Commission, she found out that the resident agent
of respondent in the Philippines is Alonzo Q. Ancheta. Subsequently, on September 9, 2005, petitioner filed
a Motion to Resolve Pending Incident and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. [9]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 14, 2005, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 132, issued an Order [10] granting respondents Motion
to Dismiss. It ruled that:

The Court sympathizes with the alleged ill-treatment suffered by the plaintiff. However, our Courts have to
apply the principles of international law, and are bound by treaty stipulations entered into by
the Philippines which form part of the law of the land. One of this is the Warsaw Convention. Being a
signatory thereto, the Philippines adheres to its stipulations and is bound by its provisions including the
place where actions involving damages to plaintiff is to be instituted, as provided for under Article 28(1)
thereof. The Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from the indicated limitations as it will only run
counter to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Said adherence is in consonance with the comity of
nations and deviation from it can only be effected through proper denunciation as enunciated in
the Santos case (ibid). Since the Philippines is not the place of domicile of the defendant nor is it the
principal place of business, our courts are thus divested of jurisdiction over cases for damages. Neither was
plaintiffs ticket issued in this country nor was her destination Manila but Rome in Italy. It bears stressing
however, that referral to the court of proper jurisdiction does not constitute constructive denial of plaintiffs
right to have access to our courts since the Warsaw Convention itself provided for jurisdiction over cases
arising from international transportation. Said treaty stipulations must be complied with in good faith
following the time honored principle of pacta sunt servanda.

The resolution of the propriety of service of summons is rendered moot by the Courts want of jurisdiction
over the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED and this case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied in an Order [11] dated January 4,
2006.

Petitioner now comes directly before us on a Petition for Review on Certiorari on pure questions of law,
raising the following issues:

Issues

I. WHETHER X X X PHILIPPINE COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER

A TORTIOUS CONDUCT COMMITTED AGAINST A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND RESIDENT BY AIRLINE PERSONNEL
OF A FOREIGN CARRIER TRAVELLING BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY; AND
THUS IS OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION.
 II. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT AIR CARRIER OF PASSENGERS, IN
FILING ITS MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE AND OVER ITS PERSON MAY BE DEEMED AS HAVING IN FACT AND IN LAW SUBMITTED ITSELF TO
THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT, ESPECIALLY SO, WHEN THE VERY LAWYER ARGUING FOR IT IS
HIMSELF THE RESIDENT AGENT OF THE CARRIER.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from
the tortious conduct committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil
Code on Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage,
petitioner asserts that she has the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.

Respondents Arguments

In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioners claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention. As such, the same can only be filed before the courts of London, United
Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.

It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines,[12] we held that:

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February
13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16,
1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirinoon October 13, 1950,
and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable
to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto, to the end that the same and every article
and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the
citizens thereof.

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as
such, has the force and effect of law in this country.[13]

The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred,
was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.

Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by
aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport
undertaking.

2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories
of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed
stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same
High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the purposes of this Convention. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within
the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an international carriage. The High
Contracting Parties referred to herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which
subsequently adhered to it.[14]

In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of
destination was Rome, Italy.[15] Both the United Kingdom[16] and Italy[17] signed and ratified the Warsaw
Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an international carriage within the
contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.

Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;

3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or

4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United
Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional
rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the
passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the
ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the
option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver
that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the
said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts
of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the
case filed by the petitioner.

Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines[18] applies in this case.

Petitioner contends that Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines [19] cited by the trial court is inapplicable to
the present controversy since the facts thereof are not similar with the instant case.

We are not persuaded.

In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines,[20] Augusto Santos III, a resident of the Philippines, purchased a
ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines in San Francisco, for transport between San
Francisco and Manila via Tokyo and back to San Francisco. He was wait-listed in
the Tokyo to Manila segment of his ticket, despite his prior reservation. Contending that Northwest Orient
Airlines acted in bad faith and discriminated against him when it canceled his confirmed reservation and
gave his seat to someone who had no better right to it, Augusto Santos III sued the carrier for damages
before the RTC. Northwest Orient Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction
citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. The trial court granted the motion which ruling was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. When the case was brought before us, we denied the petition holding that under
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, Augusto Santos III must prosecute his claim in the United States,
that place being the (1) domicile of the Northwest Orient Airlines; (2) principal office of the carrier; (3) place
where contract had been made (San Francisco); and (4) place of destination (San Francisco).[21]

We further held that Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is jurisdictional in character. Thus:

A number of reasons tends to support the characterization of Article 28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue
provision. First, the wording of Article 32, which indicates the places where the action for damages "must"
be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Article 28(1). Second, this characterization is consistent
with one of the objectives of the Convention, which is to "regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of
international transportation by air." Third, the Convention does not contain any provision prescribing rules
of jurisdiction other than Article 28(1), which means that the phrase "rules as to jurisdiction" used in Article
32 must refer only to Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article 32 specifically deals with the exclusive
enumeration in Article 28(1) as "jurisdictions," which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the parties
regardless of the time when the damage occurred.

xxxx

In other words, where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual
concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant
to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the
issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the
case is submitted.[22]

Contrary to the contention of petitioner, Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines[23] is analogous to the instant
case because (1) the domicile of respondent is London, United Kingdom;[24] (2) the principal office of
respondent airline is likewise in London, United Kingdom;[25] (3) the ticket was purchased in Rome,
Italy;[26] and (4) the place of destination is Rome, Italy.[27] In addition, petitioner based her complaint on
Article 2176[28] of the Civil Code on quasi-delict and Articles 19[29] and 21[30] of the Civil Code on Human
Relations. In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines,[31] Augusto Santos III similarly posited that Article 28 (1)
of the Warsaw Convention did not apply if the action is based on tort. Hence, contrary to the contention of
the petitioner, the factual setting of Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines[32] and the instant case are parallel
on the material points.

Tortious conduct as ground for the petitioners complaint is within the purview of
the Warsaw Convention.

Petitioner contends that in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines,[33] the cause of action was based on a
breach of contract while her cause of action arose from the tortious conduct of the airline personnel and
violation of the Civil Code provisions on Human Relations. [34] In addition, she claims that our
pronouncement in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines [35] that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting
in a tort is insufficient to exclude the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention, is more of
an obiter dictum rather than the ratiodecidendi.[36] She maintains that the fact that said acts occurred aboard
a plane is merely incidental, if not irrelevant.[37]

We disagree with the position taken by the petitioner. Black defines obiter dictum as "an opinion entirely
unnecessary for the decision of the case" and thus "are not binding as precedent." [38] In Santos III v.
Northwest Orient Airlines,[39] Augusto Santos III categorically put in issue the applicability of Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention if the action is based on tort.

In the said case, we held that the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude
the case from the realm of the Warsaw Convention. In fact, our ruling that a cause of action based on tort
did not bring the case outside the sphere of the Warsaw Convention was our ratio decidendi in disposing
of the specific issue presented by Augusto Santos III.Clearly, the contention of the herein petitioner that the
said ruling is an obiter dictum is without basis.

Relevant to this particular issue is the case of Carey v. United Airlines,[40] where the passenger filed an action
against the airline arising from an incident involving the former and the airlines flight attendant during an
international flight resulting to a heated exchange which included insults and profanity. The United States
Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) held that the passenger's action against the airline carrier arising from alleged
confrontational incident between passenger and flight attendant on international flight was governed
exclusively by the Warsaw Convention, even though the incident allegedly involved intentional misconduct
by the flight attendant.[41]

In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,[42] the passenger brought nine causes of action against the airline in the state
court, arising from a confrontation with the flight attendant during an international flight
to Mexico. The United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) held that the Warsaw Convention governs
actions arising from international air travel and provides the exclusive remedy for conduct which falls within
its provisions. It further held that the said Convention created no exception for an injury suffered as a result
of intentional conduct [43] which in that case involved a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

It is thus settled that allegations of tortious conduct committed against an airline passenger during the
course of the international carriage do not bring the case outside the ambit of the Warsaw Convention.

Respondent, in seeking remedies from the trial court through special appearance of counsel, is not
deemed to have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Petitioner argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when
the latter stated in its Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that Defendant [is at a loss]
x x x how the plaintiff arrived at her erroneous impression that it is/was Euro-Philippines Airlines Services,
Inc. that has been making a special appearance since x xx British Airways x x x has been clearly specifying in
all the pleadings that it has filed with this Honorable Court that it is the one making a special appearance. [44]

In refuting the contention of petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals[45] where we held that even if a party challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as by
reason of absence or defective service of summons, and he also invokes other grounds for the dismissal of
the action under Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the jurisdiction
over his person.[46]

This issue has been squarely passed upon in the recent case of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,[47] where we
reiterated our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals [48] and elucidated thus:

Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction Is Not

Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court.
What the rule on voluntary appearance the first sentence of the above-quoted rule means is that the
voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have
waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily
appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss;
(b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion
to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And
in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.

The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special
appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three
children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three
children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both
Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for
reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer
Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for
damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of
jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the
foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not
voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.

Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals applies to the instant case. Said case
elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the courtchallenging its
jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not
tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is
not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the
defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of
jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the
subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack
of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other
pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said
trial court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner and rule that there was no voluntary
appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondents objection to
jurisdiction over its person.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 14, 2005 Order of

the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.