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Magsalin vs National Organization of Working Men

FACTS:
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the services of respondent workers as "sales route helpers" for a limited period of five months. After five months,
respondent workers were employed by petitioner company on a day-to-day basis. According to petitioner company, respondent workers were hired to substitute for regular
sales route helpers whenever the latter would be unavailable or when there would be an unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its work places or an unusually high
volume of work. The practice was for the workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the sales office of petitioner company. If thus hired, the workers would then be
paid their wages at the end of the day.

Ultimately, respondent workers asked petitioner company to extend to them regular appointments. Petitioner company refused. Subsequently, the respondents filed with the
NLRC a complaint for the regularization of their employment with petitioner company. Claiming that petitioner company meanwhile terminated their services, respondent
workers filed a notice of strike and a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC. The parties, later on, agreed to submit the controversy, for voluntary
arbitration but the VA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the respondent workers were not employees of Coca-cola.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the nature of work of respondents in the company is of such nature as to be deemed necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner that
could qualify them to be regular employees.

HELD:
The SC ruled that he argument of petitioner that its usual business or trade is softdrink manufacturing and that the work assigned to respondent workers as sales route helpers
so involves merely “postproduction activities,” one which is not indispensable in the manufacture of its products, scarcely can be persuasive. If, as so argued by petitioner
company, only those whose work are directly involved in the production of softdrinks may be held performing functions necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade,
there would have then been no need for it to even maintain regular truck sales route helpers. The nature of the work performed must be viewed from a perspective of the
business or trade in its entirety and not on a confined scope.

The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of
the business or trade of petitioner company. The Court of Appeals has found each of respondents to have worked for at least one year with petitioner company. While this
Court, in Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, has upheld the legality of a fixed-term employment, it has done so, however, with a stern admonition that where from the circumstances
it is apparent that the period has been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, then it should be struck down as being contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order and public policy. The pernicious practice of having employees, workers and laborers, engaged for a fixed period of few months, short of the normal
six-month probationary period of employment, and, thereafter, to be hired on a day-to-day basis, mocks the law. Any obvious circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.

The fact that respondent workers have agreed to be employed on such basis and to forego the protection given to them on their security of tenure, demonstrate nothing more
than the serious problem of impoverishment of so many of our people and the resulting unevenness between labor and capital. A contract of employment is impressed with
public interest. The provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and “the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from
the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.”
xxx

Facts
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the services of respondent workers as "sales route helpers" for a limited period of five months. After five months,
respondent workers were employed by petitioner company on a day-to-day basis. According to petitioner company, respondent workers were hired to substitute for regular
sales route helpers whenever the latter would be unavailable or when there would be an unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its work places or an unusually high
volume of work. The practice was for the workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the sales office of petitioner company. If thus hired, the workers would then be
paid their wages at the end of the day. Ultimately, respondent workers asked petitioner company to extend to them regular appointments. Petitioner company refused.
Subsequently, the respondents filed with the NLRC a complaint for the regularization of their employment with petitioner company. Claiming that petitioner company
meanwhile terminated their services, respondent workers filed a notice of strike and a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC. The parties, later
on, agreed to submit the controversy, for voluntary arbitration but the VA dismissed he complaint on the ground that the respondent workers were not employees of Coca-
Cola. CA reversed VA. Hence, appeal.

Issue
WON the nature of work is deemed necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner that could qualify them to be regular employees.

Ruling
YES. The SC ruled that he argument of petitioner that its usual business or trade is soft drink manufacturing and that the work assigned to respondent workers as sales route
helpers so involves merely “postproduction activities,” one which is not indispensable in the manufacture of its products, scarcely can be persuasive. If, as so argued by petitioner
company, only those whose work are directly involved in the production of soft drinks may be held performing functions necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade,
there would have then been no need for it to even maintain regular truck sales route helpers. The nature of the work performed must be viewed from a perspective of the
business or trade in its entirety and not on a confined scope. The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the
necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the business or trade of petitioner company. The Court of Appeals has found each of respondents to have
worked for at least one year with petitioner company.

xxx
Skippers United vs NLRC

Continuation 1st column


Lopez vs MWSS

FACTS:
• By virtue of an Agreement, petitioners were engaged by the MWSS as collectors-contractors, wherein the former agreed to collect from the concessionaires of
MWSS, charges, fees, assessments of rents for water, sewer and/or plumbing services which the MWSS bills from time to time.
• In 1997, MWSS entered into a Concession Agreement with Manila Water Service, Inc. and Benpress-Lyonnaise, wherein the collection of bills was transferred to said
private concessionaires, effectively terminating the contracts of service between petitioners and MWSS.
• Regular employees of the MWSS were paid their retirement benefits, but not petitioners. Instead, they were refused said benefits.
• Petitioners filed a complaint with the CSC, but their claims were denied in a CSC Resolution, stating that:
o their contract of service explicitly provides that a bill collector-contractor is not an MWSS employee
o contract services/job orders are not considered government services, which do not have to be submitted to the CSC for approval, unlike contractual and
plantilla appointments (CSC Memo No. 38)
o crediting of services for purposes of retirement only for such services supported by appointment (CSC Memo No. 4)
o not being permanent employees of MWSS, not entitled to retirement benefits and terminal leave pay (subsequent Memo with no specific number)
• MR of CSC Resolution denied. CA affirmed CSC Resolution.

ISSUE/RULING:
WON petitioners were employees of the MWSS and, consequently, entitled to the benefits they claim – YES

RATIO:
• For purposes of determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the Court has consistently adhered to the four-fold test, namely: (1) whether the
alleged employer has the power of selection and engagement of an employee; (2) whether he has control of the employee with respect to the means and methods
by which work is to be accomplished;(3) whether he has the power to dismiss; and (4) whether the employee was paid wages. Of the four, the control test is the
most important element.
• MWSS wielded its power of selection when it contracted with the individual petitioners, undertaking separate contracts or agreements. The same goes true for the
power to dismiss, with the Agreement stating causes for termination.

Universal Robina vs Catapang

FACTS:
The respondents were hired by the petitioner company on various dates from 1991 to 1993 to work at its duck farm. The respondents were hired under an employment contract
which provided for a five-month period. After the expiration of the said employment contracts, the petitioner company would renew them and re-employ the respondents.
This practice continued until sometime in 1996, when the petitioners informed the respondents that they were no longer renewing their employment contracts. The
respondents, then, filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners.

The petitioners submit that the respondents are not regular employees. They aver that it is of no moment that the respondents have rendered service for more than a year
since they were covered by the five-month individual contracts to which they duly acquiesced. The petitioners contend that they were free to terminate the services of the
respondents at the expiration of their individual contracts. The petitioners maintain that, in doing so, they merely implemented the terms of the contracts.

The petitioners further assert that the respondents’ contracts of employment were not intended to circumvent security of tenure. They point out that the respondents knowingly
and voluntarily agreed to sign the contracts without the petitioners having exercised any undue advantage over them. Moreover, there is no evidence showing that the
petitioners exerted moral dominance on the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are regular employees of petitioner corporation.

HELD:
The SC held that the CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter correctly categorized the respondents as regular employees of the petitioner company. The primary standard of
determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the
nature of work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year,
even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if
not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.

It is obvious that the said five-month contract of employment was used by petitioners as a convenient subterfuge to prevent private respondents from becoming regular
employees. Such contractual arrangement should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals. To uphold the same would, in effect, permit petitioners
to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating the employees’ security of tenure in their jobs.
Petitioners’ act of repeatedly and continuously hiring private respondents in a span of 3 to 5 years to do the same kind of work negates their contention that private respondents
were hired for a specific project or undertaking only.

Petition is denied.
xxx

xxx
FACTS:
The individual respondents were hired by the petitioner company on various dates from 1991 to 1993 to work at its duck farm in Laguna. The respondents were hired under an
employment contract which provided for a five-month period. After the expiration of the said employment contracts, the petitioner company would renew them and re-employ
the respondents. This practice continued until sometime in 1996, when the petitioners informed the respondents that they were no longer renewing their employment
contracts.

Respondents filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorneys fees against the petitioners.

The petitioners submit that the respondents are not regular employees. They aver that it is of no moment that the respondents have rendered service for more than a year
since they were covered by the five-month individual contracts to which they duly acquiesced. The petitioners contend that they were free to terminate the services of the
respondents at the expiration of their individual contracts. The petitioners maintain that, in doing so, they merely implemented the terms of the contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are regular employees of petitioner company.

RULING:
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to
the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
The connection can be determined by considering the nature of work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the
employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for
its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect
to such activity and while such activity exists.

Thus, we quote with approval the following excerpt from the decision of the CA:

It is obvious that the said five-month contract of employment was used by petitioners as a convenient subterfuge to prevent private respondents from becoming regular
employees. Such contractual arrangement should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy or morals. To uphold the same would, in effect, permit petitioners
to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating the employees’ security of tenure in their jobs.

Petitioners’ act of repeatedly and continuously hiring private respondents in a span of … 3 to 5 years to do the same kind of work negates their contention that private
respondents were hired for a specific project or undertaking only.

Further, factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but
even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.

Abesco vs Ramirez

FACTS:
Petitioner company was engaged in a construction business where respondents were hired on different dates from 1976 to 1992 either as laborers, road roller operators,
painters or drivers.

In 1997, respondents filed two separate complaints for illegal dismissal against the company and its General Manager, Oscar Banzon, before the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners
allegedly dismissed them without a valid reason and without due process of law. The complaints also included claims for non-payment of the 13th month pay, five days’ service
incentive leave pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, and moral and exemplary damages. The LA later on ordered the consolidation of the two complaints.

Petitioners denied liability to respondents and countered that respondents were “project employees” since their services were necessary only when the company had projects
to be completed. Petitioners argued that, being project employees, respondents’ employment was coterminous with the project to which they were assigned. They were not
regular employees who enjoyed security of tenure and entitlement to separation pay upon termination from work.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents were project employees or regular employees.

HELD:
The SC held that respondents were regular employees. The principal test for determining whether employees are “project employees” or “regular employees” is whether they
are assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which are specified at the time they are engaged for that project. Such duration, as well
as the particular work/service to be performed, is defined in an employment agreement and is made clear to the employees at the time of hiring.

In this case, petitioners did not have that kind of agreement with respondents. Neither did they inform respondents of the nature of the latter’s work at the time of hiring.
Hence, for failure of petitioners to substantiate their claim that respondents were project employees, we are constrained to declare them as regular employees.

Petition is denied.
xxx
Chua vs CA

Facts:
PR Lydia Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a complaint-affidavit against petitioner for committing acts of falsification by falsifying the Minutes of the Annual
Stockholders meeting of the Board of Directors by causing it to appear in said Minutes that LYDIA HAO CHUA was present and has participated in said proceedings, when in
truth and in fact, as the said accused fully well knew that said Lydia Hao was never present during the meeting.

Petitioner alleges that respondent Lydia Hao has no the authority to bring a suit in behalf of the Corporation since there was no Board Resolution authorizing her to file the suit.
For her part, respondent Hao claimed that the suit was brought under the concept of a derivative suit.

Issue:
(1) Is the criminal complaint in the nature of a derivative suit?
(2) Is Siena Realty Corporation a proper petitioner in SCA No. 99-94846?

Held:
Under Section 36 of the Corporation Code, read in relation to Section 23, where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors or
trustees. An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate
rights, whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold the control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is
regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest.

A derivative action is a suit by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The corporation is a necessary party to the suit. And the relief which is granted is a judgment
against a third person in favor of the corporation. Similarly, if a corporation has a defense to an action against it and is not asserting it, a stockholder may intervene and defend
on behalf of the corporation.

In the Criminal Case, the complaint was instituted by respondent against petitioner for falsifying corporate documents whose subject concerns corporate projects of Siena
Realty Corporation. Clearly, SRC is an offended party. Hence, SRC has a cause of action. And the civil case for the corporate cause of action is deemed instituted in the criminal
action.

However, the board of directors of the corporation in this case did not institute the action against petitioner. Private respondent was the one who instituted the action. Private
respondent asserts that she filed a derivative suit in behalf of the corporation. This assertion is inaccurate. Not every suit filed in behalf of the corporation is a derivative suit.
For a derivative suit to prosper, it is required that the minority stockholder suing for and on behalf of the corporation must allege in his complaint that he is suing on a derivative
cause of action on behalf of the corporation and all other stockholders similarly situated who may wish to join him in the suit. It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation
be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The judgment must be
made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same
cause of action. In other words, the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res adjudicata
against it.

In the criminal complaint filed by herein respondent, nowhere is it stated that she is filing the same in behalf and for the benefit of the corporation. Thus, the criminal complaint
including the civil aspect thereof could not be deemed in the nature of a derivative suit.

Labayog vs MY Sans Biscuit

Facts:
On various dates in 1992, petitioners entered into contracts of employment with respondent company as mixers, packers and machine operators for a fixed term. On the
expiration of their contracts, their services were terminated. Forthwith, they each executed a quitclaim.

Petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal, among others. The labor arbiter ruled their dismissal to be illegal on the ground that they had become regular employees who
performed duties necessary and desirable in respondent company's business and ordered for their reinstatement.

The NLRC reversed the ruling, which the CA eventually affirmed.

ISSUE:
W/N the fixed term contract of petitioners were valid.

RULING:
YES. Where the duties of the employee consist of activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are not prohibited from
agreeing on the duration of employment. Article 280 of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period provided it is not intended
to circumvent the security of tenure.

Two criteria validate a contract of employment with a fixed period: (1) the fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any
force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear on the employee and without any circumstances vitiating consent or, (2) it satisfactorily appears that the employer
and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter. Against these criteria,
petitioners' contracts of employment with a fixed period were valid.

In this case, there was no allegation of vitiated consent. Respondents did not exercise moral dominance over petitioners. The contracts were mutually advantageous to the
parties.

While their employment as mixers, packers and machine operators was necessary and desirable in the usual business of respondents, they were employed temporarily only,
during periods when there was heightened demand for production. Consequently, there could have been no illegal dismissal when their services were terminated on
expiration of their contracts. There was even no need for notice of termination because they knew exactly when their contracts would end. Contracts of employment for a
fixed period terminate on their own at the end of such period.
xxx
FACTS:
On various dates in 1992, petitioners entered into contracts of employment with respondent company as mixers, packers and machine operators for a fixed term. On the
expiration of their contracts, their services were terminated. Forthwith, they each executed a quitclaim.

On April 15, 1993, petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime, night differential and 13th month pay, damages and
attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter ruled their dismissal to be illegal on the ground that they had become regular employees who performed duties necessary and desirable in
respondent company’s business. The labor arbiter ordered the reinstatement of petitioners with award of backwages, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the decision of the labor arbiter was set aside. Having entered into their employment contracts freely and
voluntarily, they knew that their employment was only for a fixed period and would end on the prescribed expiration date. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

In a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners, the CA set aside the NLRC decision and reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter. However, on respondents’ motion for
reconsideration, the CA reversed itself. The CA reasoned that, while petitioners performed tasks which were necessary and desirable in the usual business of respondent
company, their employment contracts providing for a fixed term remained valid. No force, duress, intimidation or moral dominance was exerted on them. Respondents dealt
with petitioners in good faith and within the valid parameters of management prerogatives. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied

ISSUE
Whether the Petitioners were regular employees of the Respondent.

HELD
Where the duties of the employee consist of activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are not prohibited from agreeing on
the duration of employment. Article 280 does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period provided it is not intended to circumvent the security of
tenure.

Two criteria validate a contract of employment with a fixed period: (1) the fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any
force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear on the employee and without any circumstances vitiating consent or, (2) it satisfactorily appears that the employer
and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter. [12] Against these criteria,
petitioners’ contracts of employment with a fixed period were valid.

Contracts of employment for a fixed period are not unlawful. What is objectionable is the practice of some scrupulous employers who try to circumvent the law protecting
workers from the capricious termination of employment. Employers have the right and prerogative to choose their workers. “The law, while protecting the rights of the
employees, authorizes neither the oppression nor destruction of the employer. When the law angles the scales of justice in favor of labor, the scale should never be so tilted if
the result is an injustice to the employer.”

Palomares vs NLRC
Integrated Contractor vs CA

xxx

FACTS:
Petitioner is a plumbing contractor. Its business depends on the number and frequency of the projects it is able to contract with its clients. Private respondent Solon worked
for petitioner. And his employment record shows that he has by petitioner from December 1994 to January 1998 in 10 projects. On February 23, 1998, while private respondent
was about to log out from work, he was informed by the warehouseman that the main office had instructed them to tell him it was his last day of work as he had been
terminated. When private respondent went to the petitioner’s office on February 24, 1998 to verify his status, he found out that indeed, he had been terminated. He went back
to petitioner’s office on February 27, 1998 to sign a clearance so he could claim his 13th month pay and tax refunds. However, he had second thoughts and refused to sign the
clearance when he read the clearance indicating he had resigned. On March 6, 1998, he filed a complaint alleging that he was illegally dismissed without just cause and without
due process.

The petitioner asserts that the private respondent was a project employee. Thus, when the project was completed and private respondent was not re-assigned to another
project, petitioner did not violate any law since it was petitioner’s discretion to re-assign the private respondent to other projects.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent is a project employee of the petitioner or a regular employee.

HELD:
The SC held that the principal test in determining whether an employee is a “project employee” or “regular employee,” is, whether he is assigned to carry out a “specific project
or undertaking,” the duration (and scope) of which are specified at the time the employee is engaged in the project. “Project” refers to a particular job or undertaking that is
within the regular or usual business of the employer, but which is distinct and separate and identifiable from the undertakings of the company. Such job or undertaking begins
and ends at determined or determinable times.

The SC was convinced he was initially a project employee. The services he rendered, the duration and scope of each project are clear indications that he was hired as a project
employee.

However, once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, re-hired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks;
and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee.

The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent,
the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Thus, we held
that where the employment of project employees is extended long after the supposed project has been finished, the employees are removed from the scope of project
employees and are considered regular employees.

While length of time may not be the controlling test for project employment, it is vital in determining if the employee was hired for a specific undertaking or tasked to perform
functions vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Here, private respondent had been a project employee several times over. His
employment ceased to be coterminous with specific projects when he was repeatedly re-hired due to the demands of petitioner’s business. Where from the circumstances it
is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals,
good customs or public order.

Further, Policy Instructions No. 20 requires employers to submit a report of an employee’s termination to the nearest public employment office every time his employment
was terminated due to a completion of a project. The failure of the employer to file termination reports is an indication that the employee is not a project employee. Department
Order No. 19 superseding Policy Instructions No. 20 also expressly provides that the report of termination is one of the indications of project employment. In the case at bar,
there was only one list of terminated workers submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. If private respondent was a project employee, petitioner should have
submitted a termination report for every completion of a project to which the former was assigned.

Juxtaposing private respondent’s employment history, vis the requirements in the test to determine if he is a regular worker, we are constrained to say he is.

As a regular worker, private respondent is entitled to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code and can only be removed for cause. We found no valid cause
attending to private respondent’s dismissal and found also that his dismissal was without due process.
Brent vs Zamora

FACTS:
Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific
term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973,
August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.

On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976.
The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination stating
that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status of regular
employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976
as full payment of contract."

The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the
recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.

RULING:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is
declared not entitled to reinstatement.

The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been
promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was
the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition
against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.

It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the
duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.

The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code
contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term
employment began to take place at about this time.

Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as
the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period." And Article
319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following manner: …where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.

Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and "regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective
December 16, 1975.

Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered
(becoming Article 271).

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a
fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration
of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity
in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a
means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.

Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero
vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination following the
expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the
expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a condition
sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire
and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.

Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the


expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to
said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the
approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

xxx
Mistubishi vs Chrystler Phils.

FACTS:
Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttle bus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982 because he went to Saudi
Arabia and worked there as a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator from 1982 to 1993. Upon his return, Mitsubishi Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a
tooling shop from November 1, 1994 to March 3, 1995.

On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He had an orientation on May
15, 1996 and afterwhich, with respect to the company’s rules and guidelines, started reporting for work on May 27, 1996.

Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of working. The supervisors rating Paras’ performance were Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as
part of the MMPC’s company policies. Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an average rating.

Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received an average performance rating but it is a rate which would still qualify him to be
regularized. But as part of the company protocols, the Division Managers namely A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria and Dante Ong reviewed the performance evaluation made on
Paras. Despite the recommendations of the supervisors, they unanimously agreed that the performance was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not considered for
regularization.

Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was dated November 25, 1996. This letter’s intent is to formally relieve him off of his services and position
effective the date since he failed to meet the company’s standards.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Paras’ termination was legal or not.
HELD:
The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on a probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The Court stresses the
existence of the statements under Article 281 of the Labor Code which specifies that the employer must inform the employee of the standards they were to meet in order to
be granted regularization and that such probationary period shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless specified in the apprenticeship
agreement.

Respondent Paras was employed on a probationary basis and was apprised of the standards upon which his regularization would be based during the orientation. His first day
to report for work was on May 27, 1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months. Applying Article 13
of the Civil Code, the probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. The Court conforms with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code
providing that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. This case, the Labor Code pertains to 180 days.
Also, as clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, it is said that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one
hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras
only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court held that by that time, he was actually already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code. His
position as a regularized employee is thus secured until further notice.

xxx

Facts:
Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the assembly and distribution of Mitsubishi motor vehicles. Chrysler Philippines Labor
Union (CPLU) is a legitimate labor organization and the duly certified bargaining agent of the hourly-paid regular rank and file employees of MMPC. Nelson Paras was a member
of CPLU. His wife, Cecille Paras, was the President of the Chrysler Philippines Salaried Employees Union (CPSU).

Nelson Paras was first employed by MMPC as a shuttle bus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982. He applied for and was hired as a diesel mechanic and
heavy equipment operator in Saudi Arabia from 1982 to 1993. When he returned to the Philippines, he was re-hired as a welder-fabricator at the MMPC tooling shop from
October 3, 1994 to October 31, 1994. On October 29, 1994, his contract was renewed from November 1, 1994 up to March 3, 1995.

Sometime in May of 1996, Paras was re-hired on a probationary basis as a manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. Paras started reporting
for work on May 27, 1996. Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors Lito R. Lacambacal6and Wilfredo J. Lopez7 after six (6) months, and received an average rating.
Later, Lacambacal informed Paras that based on his performance rating, he would be regularized.

However, the Department and Division Managers, A.C. Velando and H.T. Victoria, including Mr. Dante Ong, reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. They
unanimously agreed, along with Paras’ immediate supervisors, that the performance of Paras was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not considered for regularization.
On November 26, 1996, he received a Notice of Termination dated November 25, 1996, informing him that his services were terminated effective the said date since he failed
to meet the required company standards for regularization.

According to CPLU and Paras, the latter’s dismissal was an offshoot of the heated argument during the CBA negotiations between MMPC Labor Relations Manager, Atty. Carlos
S. Cao, on the one hand, and Cecille Paras, the President of the Chrysler Philippines Salaried Employees Union (CPSU) and Paras’ wife, on the other.

Paras and CPLU asserted that pursuant to Article 13 of the New Civil Code, the period of May 27, 1996 to November 26, 1996 consisted of one hundred eighty-three (183) days.
They asserted that the maximum of the probationary period is six (6) months, which is equivalent to 180 days; as such, Paras, who continued to be employed even after the
180th day, had become a regular employee as provided for in Article 282 of the Labor Code. They averred that as a regular employee, Paras’ employment could be terminated
only for just or authorized causes as provided for under the Labor Code, and after due notice. They posited that in the Letter of Termination dated November 25, 1996, the
ground for Paras’ termination was not among those sanctioned by the Labor Code; hence, his dismissal was illegal.

The MMPC, for its part, averred that under Article 13 of the New Civil Code, Paras’ probationary employment which commenced on May 27, 1996 would expire on November
27, 1996. Since he received the notice of termination of his employment on November 25, 1996, the same should be considered to have been served within the six-month
probationary period.

Voluntary Arbitrator: The VA declared that hiring an employee on a probationary basis to determine his or her fitness for regular employment was in accord with the MMPC’s
exercise of its management prerogative. The VA agreed with the MMPC that the termination of Paras’ employment was effected prior to the expiration of the six-month
probationary period.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in representation of Voluntary Arbitrator Danilo Lorredo, agreed that Parasand CPLU’s allegation, that the notice of
termination was served on Paras’ 183rd day, was erroneous. The OSG opined that the six-month probationary period was to expire on November 27, 1996 and since Paras was
served such notice on November 25, 1996, his employment was deemed terminated within the six-month probationary period. It posited that the failure of Paras to get a
satisfactory performance rating justified the termination of his probationary employment, and that the inclusion of his five-month contractual employment as welder-fabricator
did not qualify him for regular employment.

Court of Appeals: CA agreed with Paras and CPLU’s interpretation that six (6) months is equivalent to one hundred eighty (180 days) and that computed from May 27, 1996,
such period expired on November 23, 1996. Thus, when Paras received the letter of termination on November 26, 1996, the same was served on the 183rd day or after the
expiration of the six-month probationary period. The CA stated that since he was allowed to work beyond the probationary period, Paras became a regular employee

Issue:
Whether Paras was already a regular employee on November 26, 1996 (started working May 27, 1996 and terminated November 26, 1996.)

Held:
Yes, Paras is a regularized employee.

May 27-31 = 4 days

June 1-30 = 1 month (30 days)

July 1-31 = 1 month (30 days)

Aug 1-31 = 1 month (30 days)


Sept 1-30 = 1 month (30 days)

Oct 1-31 = 1 month (30 days)

Nov 1-26 = 26 days

Under Article 281 of the Labor Code, the employer must inform the employee of the standards for which his employment may be considered for regularization. Such
probationary period, unless covered by an apprenticeship agreement, shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working. The employee’s services
may be terminated for just cause or for his failure to qualify as a regular employee based on reasonable standards made known to him

Respondent Paras was employed as a management trainee on a probationary basis. During the orientation conducted on May 15, 1996, he was apprised of the standards upon
which his regularization would be based. He reported for work on May 27, 1996. As per the company’s policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a maximum
of six (6) months.

Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. This is in conformity with paragraph one, Article 13 of
the Civil Code, which provides that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. The number of months in
the probationary period, six (6), should then be multiplied by the number of days within a month, thirty (30); hence, the period of one hundred eighty (180) days.

As clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180)
days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of
November 26, 1996. He was, by then, already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code.

Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, an unsatisfactory rating can be a just cause for dismissal only if it amounts to gross and habitual neglect of duties. Gross negligence has
been defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard
of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. A careful perusal of the records of this case does not show that respondent Paras was grossly negligent in the
performance of his duties.

Considering that respondent Paras was not dismissed for a just or authorized cause, his dismissal from employment was illegal. Furthermore, the petitioner’s failure to inform
him of any charges against him deprived him of due process. Clearly, the termination of his employment based on his alleged unsatisfactory performance rating was effected
merely to cover up and “deodorize” the illegality of his dismissal.

International Catholic Migration vs NLRC

FACTS
Petitioner ICMC is a non-profit organization dedicated to refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center in Morong, Bataan. It engaged the services of private
respondent Bernadette Galang on 1/24/1983 as a probationary cultural orientation teacher. After 3 months, she was informed orally and in writing that her services were being
terminated because she failed in the performance evaluation of her supervisors during the teacher evaluation program.

On 8/22/1983, Galang filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and unpaid wages against petitioner with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, praying
for reinstatement with back wages, exemplary and moral damages.

On 10/8/1983, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for moral and exemplary damages but ordering the ICMC to pay Galang the
sum of P6,000.00 as payment for the last 3 months of the agreed employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of employment.

Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC. On 8/22/1985, the NLRC, by a majority vote of Commissioners Guillermo C. Medina and Gabriel M. Gatchalian, sustained the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed both appeals for lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not an employee who was terminated during the probationary period of her employment is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her six-month
probationary employment

RULING
NO. Galang was terminated during her probationary period of employment for failure to qualify as a regular member of petitioner’s teaching staff in accordance with its
reasonable standards. Galang was found by petitioner to be deficient in classroom management, teacher-student relationship and teaching techniques. Failure to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of the employer is a just cause for terminating a probationary employee specifically recognized under Article
282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code.

The labor arbiter’s decision is erroneous. The award of salary for the unexpired portion of the probationary employment on the ground that a probationary employment for 6
months is an employment for a "definite period" which requires the employer to exhaust the entire probationary period to give the employee the opportunity to meet the
required standards.

A probationary employee is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A probationary
appointment is made to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether he will become a proper and
efficient employee. The word “probationary,” as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period, but not its length.

Being in the nature of a “trial period” the essence of a probationary period of employment fundamentally lies in the purpose or objective sought to be attained by both the
employer and the employee during said period. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both in dealing with each other during said period.

It is within the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of
the former before hiring him permanently. As the law now stands, Article 281 of the Labor Code gives ample authority to the employer to terminate a probationary employee
for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. Nothing would preclude the employer from extending a regular or a permanent appointment to an employee once the employer finds that the employee is
qualified for regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary period.
There was no showing, as borne out by the records, that there was circumvention of the rights of Galang when she was informed of her termination. Her dismissal does not
appear to us as arbitrary, fanciful or whimsical. She was duly notified, orally and in writing, that her services were terminated for failure to meet the prescribed standards of
petitioner as reflected in the performance evaluation conducted by her supervisors during the teacher evaluating program. The dissatisfaction of petitioner over the
performance of private respondent in this regard is a legitimate exercise of its prerogative to select whom to hire or refuse employment for the success of its program or
undertaking.

The lower court abused its discretion when it ordered ICMC to Galang her salary for the unexpired three-month portion of her six-month probationary employment when she
was validly terminated during her probationary employment. To sanction such action would not only be unjust, but oppressive on the part of the employer.

DISPOSITION:
The petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the NLRC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it ordered petitioner to pay private respondent her P6, 000.00 salary for the
unexpired portion of her six-month probationary employment. No cost.

Alcira vs NLRC

FACTS:
Respondent Middleby Philippines Corporation hired petitioner as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months. Apparently unhappy with
petitioner's performance, respondent Middleby terminated petitioner's services. The bone of contention centered on whether the termination occurred before or after the six-
month probationary period of employment.

The parties, presenting their respective copies of Alcira's appointment paper, claimed conflicting starting dates of employment: May 20, 1996 according to petitioner and May
27, 1996 according to respondent. Both documents indicated petitioner's employment status as "probationary (6 mos.)" and a remark that "after five months (petitioner's)
performance shall be evaluated and any adjustment in salary shall depend on (his) work performance."

Petitioner asserts that, on November 20, 1996, in the presence of his co-workers and subordinates, a senior officer of respondent Middleby in bad faith withheld his time card
and did not allow him to work. Considering this as a dismissal "after the lapse of his probationary employment," petitioner filed on November 21, 1996 a complaint in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against respondent Middleby contending that he had already become a regular employee as of the date he was illegally dismissed.

In their defense, respondents claim that, during petitioner's probationary employment, he showed poor performance in his assigned tasks, incurred ten absences, was late
several times and violated company rules on the wearing of uniform. Since he failed to meet company standards, petitioner's application to become a regular employee was
disapproved and his employment was terminated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner attained regular employment in the private respondent’s company.

HELD:
The SC ruled that under the terms of his contract, petitioner’s probationary employment was only for five months as indicated by the remark "Please be informed that after
five months, your performance shall be evaluated and any adjustment in salary shall depend on your work performance." The argument lacks merit. As correctly held by the
labor arbiter, the appointment contract also stated in another part thereof that petitioner's employment status was "probationary (6 mos.)." The five-month period referred to
the evaluation of his work.

Petitioner insists that he already attained the status of a regular employee when he was dismissed on November 20, 1996 because, having started work on May 20, 1996, the
six-month probationary period ended on November 16, 1996. According to petitioner's computation, since Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that one month is composed of
thirty days, six months total one hundred eighty days. As the appointment provided that petitioner's status was "probationary (6 mos.)" without any specific date of termination,
the 180th day fell on November 16, 1996. Thus, when he was dismissed on November 20, 1996, he was already a regular employee.

Petitioner's contention is incorrect. In CALS Poultry Supply Corporation, et al. vs. Roco, et al., this Court dealt with the same issue of whether an employment contract from
May 16, 1995 to November 15, 1995 was within or outside the six-month probationary period. We ruled that November 15, 1995 was still within the six-month probationary
period. We reiterate our ruling in CALS Poultry Supply:

Our computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. In short, since the
number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationary employee when respondent Middleby opted not to "regularize" him on November
20, 1996.

Petition is denied.

xxx

Facts:
Petitioner Radin C. Alcira was hired by respondent Middle by as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary period for six months. Despite the indication of
probationary period in the appointment paper, the dates indicated in the copies in the possession of the petitioner and the respondent, were different, May 20, 1996 and May
27, 1996, respectively. On November 20, 1996, unhappy with petitioner’s performance, respondent Midde by terminated the former’s services. But according to the petitioner
he is already a regular employee effective November 16, 1996, using Article 13 of the Civil Code that one month is composed of 30 days, six months total 180 days. Hence, using
May 20, 1996 as the reference point, it was already considered a dismissal since it was made after the lapse of his probationary employment.

Issue:
WON PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT IS EMPLOYMENT FOR A DEFINITE PERIOD?

Held:
Section 6 (d) of Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code (Department Order No. 10, Series of 1997) provides that: In all cases of probationary employment,
the employer shall make known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards are made
known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a regular employee. We hold that respondent Middle by substantially notified petitioner of the standards to qualify
as a regular employee when it apprised him, at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months. Conversely, an employer is deemed
to substantially comply with the rule on notification of standards if he apprises the employee that he will be subjected to a performance evaluation on a particular date after
his hiring. We agree with the labor arbiter when he ruled that:
In the instant case, petitioner cannot successfully say that he was never informed by private respondent of the standards that he must satisfy in order to be converted into
regular status. This runs counter to the agreement between the parties that after five months of service the petitioner’s performance would be evaluated. It is only but natural
that the evaluation should be made vis-à-vis the performance standards for the job. Private respondent Trifona Mamaradlo speaks of such standard in her affidavit referring to
the fact that petitioner did not perform well in his assigned work and his attitude was below par compared to the company’s standard required of him.

Cebu Stevedoring vs NLRC

xxx
Chiang Kai Shek vs. CA

Facts:
Fausta F. Oh had been teaching in the Chiang Kai Shek School since 1932 for a continuous period of almost 33 years. She was told she had no assignment for the next semester.
For no apparent or given reason, she was dismissed from her work. As a result, she sued and demanded separation pay, social security benefits, salary differentials, maternity
benefits and moral and exemplary damages. The original defendant was the Chiang Kai Shek School but when it filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it could not be
sued, the complaint was amended. Certain officials of the school were also impleaded to make them solidarily liable with the school.

The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissed the complaint. On appeal, its decision was set aside by the respondent court, which held the school suable and liable while
absolving the other defendants. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, the school then came to this Court in this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not a school that has not been incorporated may be sued by reason alone of its long continued existence and recognition by the government

Ruling:
As a school, the petitioner was governed by Act No. 2706 as amended by C.A. No. 180, which provided as follows: Unless exempted for special reasons by the Secretary of Public
Instruction, any private school or college recognized by the government shall be incorporated under the provisions of Act No. 1459 known as the Corporation Law, within 90
days after the date of recognition, and shall file with the Secretary of Public Instruction a copy of its incorporation papers and by-laws.Having been recognized by the
government, it was under obligation to incorporate under the Corporation Law within 90 days from such recognition. It appears that it had not done so at the time the complaint
was filed notwithstanding that it had been in existence even earlier than 1932. The petitioner cannot now invoke its own non-compliance with the law to immunize it from the
private respondent’s complaint. There should also be no question that having contracted with the private respondent every year for thirty two years and thus represented itself
as possessed of juridical personality to do so, the petitioner is now estopped from denying such personality to defeat her claim against it. According to Article 1431 of the Civil
Code, “through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on
it.” As the school itself may be sued in its own name, there is no need to apply Rule 3, Section 15, under which the persons joined in an association without any juridical
personality may be sued with such association. Besides, it has been shown that the individual members of the board of trustees are not liable, having been appointed only after
the private respondent’s dismissal.