Thayer Consultancy Background Brief

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Vietnam’s New Maritime
Strategy to 2030: Ends, Ways
and Means
October 2, 2018

This week the eighth plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) Central
Committee will adopt a resolution on Vietnam’s sustainable maritime economic
development strategy. This update is timely given two contradictory trends that will
determine the success or failure of Vietnam’s new maritime strategy.
The first trend is positive. China and the eleven members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) appear to be entering the final stages of approving
a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. While much diplomatic work remains
to be done the final COC will attempt to regulate state behavior and create an
environment more conducive to “peace, cooperation and development.”
The second trend is negative. Tensions are rising between China and the United States
as both sides flex their military muscles. China has further militarized its artificial
islands with electronic jammers, surface to air and anti-ship missiles. China continues
to conduct offensive naval exercises as well as take off and landings of nuclear-capable
bombers from Woody Island in the Paracels. The United States has not only increased
the frequency of its freedom of navigation operational patrols but has stepped up its
continuous bomber presence patrols with overflights by B-52 bombers. Both countries
are on the brink of a trade war.
In April 2006, the CPV’s tenth national congress adopted a policy on Vietnam’s
maritime economy. At that time economists estimated that by 2020 Vietnam’s
maritime economy would contribute 53-55 percent of GDP and provide 55-60 percent
of Vietnam’s exports.
In January 2007, the fourth plenum of the CPV’s Central Committee discussed
Vietnam’s maritime economy and on February 9, 2007 issued Resolution 09-NQ/TW,
“Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020” (Chiến lược biển Việt Nam đến
Năm 2020). This strategy was completed at the end of the year and set out guidelines
to fully integrate the economic development of Vietnam’s coastal provinces and
territorial sea with marine and hydrocarbon resources in Vietnam’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. In April 2010, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan
Dung approved Decision 568 to develop Vietnam’s sea and islands-based economy by
2020.
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Strategy is often described as comprising three components: ends, ways and means.
The ends of strategy refer to the ultimate objective of the strategy. The ways of
strategy refer to the integration of diverse methods such as economic, financial,
political, diplomatic, technological, environmental, cultural, security, and defence.
The means of strategy refers to specific actions to implement the methods of strategy.
A national strategy should reflect an integrated whole-of-government approach
involving all relevant stakeholders such as central ministries, provincial and commune
governments, people’s organisations, law enforcement agencies and the people’s
armed forces.
After Vietnam adopted its “Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020” China
responded by cutting the cables of seismic survey vessels, harassing and arresting
Vietnamese fishermen, imposing an annual unilateral fishing ban in the East Sea,
stepping up illegal fishing in Vietnam’s EEZ, and pressuring foreign oil companies to
pull out of their contracts with Vietnam. In 2014, there was a major confrontation
when China moved a mega oil drilling rig, the Hai Yang Shi You 981, into Vietnam’s
EEZ.
Vietnam’s new maritime economic strategy will only be successful if its ultimate goal
is to proactively integrate and promote economic development while protecting
national sovereignty and territorial integrity simultaneously. Vietnam’s new maritime
economic strategy must generate new sources of power for Vietnam, create new
advantages for Vietnam and exploit the weaknesses of any potential adversary.
As members of the CPV Central Committee deliberate a new s maritime economic
development strategy they will have to take into account the two trends mentioned
above, particularly negotiations on a final COC but also the possibility that the security
situation in the East Sea will deteriorate due to increased rivalry and friction between
China and the United States.
More than ever Vietnam’s new strategy must integrate political-diplomatic ways of
achieving the strategy’s ends with security-defence considerations. These two ways
are intertwined because the draft COC text is still a work-in-progress and contains
many overlapping propositions that involve interaction between regional military
forces to promote “trust, cooperation and confidence” and to prevent, manage and
resolve incidents when they arise.
In sum, Vietnam’s diplomats and government leaders will have to redouble their
efforts to ensure that the final COC gives Vietnam advantages while constraining China
at the same time. Vietnam’s government leaders, diplomats, and military officers must
integrate and coordinate their planning as never before. This is because defending
national sovereignty and territorial integrity will now be linked to an external Code of
Conduct that will provide both opportunities and challenges for Vietnam.
Vietnam must ensure that its national interests are promoted by the final COC. The
COC is supposed to set norms to guide how states conduct themselves in the South
China Sea pending the resolution of territorial and sovereignty disputes. The Single
Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text provides many proposals on
practical maritime cooperation to build trust and confidence. For example, the current
draft COC includes many general proposals such as practical maritime cooperation,
self-restraint, notification of joint military exercises, operational procedures,
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procedures for reporting, managing and resolving incidents, non-militarization, and

prohibiting blockades of supply ships, simulated attacks and declaring an Air Defence
Identification Zone. But the draft COC lacks specific detail on how these measures are
to be carried out in real life.
In the past Vietnam pursued a two-prong political-diplomatic/security-defence
strategy. First, Vietnam placed priority on engagement with China bolstered by
leveraging political-diplomatic relations with ASEAN, ASEAN-related multilateral
institutions, individual ASEAN members, the major powers (India, Japan, Russia and
the United States), and other members of the international community. Now Vietnam
will be called upon to work more intensively with East Sea littoral states the
Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei in a multilateral setting to implement the
final COC.
Second, Vietnam has modernized its air defence air force, navy, and maritime law
enforcement agencies (Vietnam Coast Guard and Vietnam Fishery Surveillance Force).
Vietnam must now markedly improve its C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities to perform in
real time 24/7. This will involve upgrading and integrating capabilities across the
board such as real time satellite coverage, unmanned aerial vehicles/drones, ship
borne sensors, and coastal radar. The information gathered from these sources must
be fused and disseminated in a timely fashion.
Further, Vietnam must improve communications between its defence and law
enforcement agencies with its coastal communities, fishing fleet, fishing militia and
residents on off-shore islands and technical support structures in the East Sea.
Vietnam’s fishing fleet and militia must be linked into this network through GPS and
satellite phones.
In the present situation, Vietnam will be called upon to more effectively integrate and
coordinate the internal and external ways and means of its maritime strategy. In other
words, internal maritime economic development must be pursued in tandem with
external political-diplomatic and security-defence engagement in a multilateral
setting,

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam’s New Maritime Strategy to 2030:

Ends, Ways and Means,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October 2, 2018. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
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