Rabadilla v. CA | G.R. No. 113725 | June 29, 2000 | Purisima, J.

Petitioner: Johnny S. Rabadilla

Respondents: Court of Appeals, Maria Marlena Coscoluella y Belleza Villacarlos

SUMMARY: [Case is lengthy and instructive on a lot of lecture points; just read the entirety of this digest.]

FACTS:

 In a Codicil appended to Aleja Belleza’s Last Will and Testament, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla (predecessor-in-interest
of petitioner Johnny) was instituted devisee of a parcel of land
- First provision: property is given to Dr. Rabadilla, and should he die before Aleja, it shall be inherited
by his children and spouse
- Fourth provision: upon Aleja’s death, and Dr. Rabadilla’s receipt of ownership over the lot, and upon
the expiry of Balbinito Guanzon’s lease, Dr. Rabadilla shall give (respondent) Maria 75 piculs of export
sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar every year until Maria dies
- Fifth provision: should Dr. Rabadilla die, his heir who shall receive the lot shall have the above-
mentioned obligation, on each month of December
- Sixth provision: if the one to whom Aleja gives the lot, and his heir, shall later sell, lease, or mortgage
the lot, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall also have the above-mentioned obligation, on each month
of December; should he not respect such command, Maria shall immediately seize the lot and turn it
over to Aleja’s descendants, the latter having the above-mentioned obligation; should Aleja’s heirs and
their heirs sell, lease, or mortgage the lot, they cannot negotiate with people other than Aleja’s near
descendants and her sister
 The lot was transferred to Dr. Rabadilla; he died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia, and Zenaida
 1989: Maria brought a complaint before the RTC against Dr. Rabadilla’s heirs to enforce the provisions of
the Codicil. The complaint alleged violations of the provisions:
- The lot was mortgaged to PNB and Republic Planters Bank, in disregard of the instruction to negotiate
only to Aleja’s near descendants and sister
- Heirs failed to deliver sugar from 1985 until the institution of the Complaint, despite demands
- Banks failed to comply with the sixth provision to deliver the sugar to Maria
 During pre-trial, parties admitted that in 1998, petitioner Johnny and a certain Alan Azurin, his son-in-law
and lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of the heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar
- For crop year 1988-89, the sugar shall be delivered, considered compliance
- Annuity for crop years 1985-88 will be complied in cash equivalent of the piculs (P105,000)
 However, there was no compliance with the Memorandum, except for partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of
sugar for the year 1988-89
 RTC: dismissed the complaint
- No cause of action against defendants have arisen in favor of plaintiff; despite non-performance,
exaction from them simply because they are children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder, does not
warrant the filing of the complaint
- Being a creditor of the left estate, plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish
the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and give full meaning to her claim under the Codicil
 CA: reversed RTC
- Non-compliance is sufficient reason to order reconveyance from Jorge’s estate to Aleja’s; however
Maria must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja’s estate, secure an administrator, and
distribute the lot to Aleja’s legal heirs to enforce her right
 Appeal to SC
ISSUES/RULING

W/N CA erred in resolving the appeal, deviating from the issue of prematurity of cause of action – NO

1. Court: Untenable; CA did not deviate from the issue of prematurity of cause of action. It found that
respondent had a cause of action against petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was to
stress that the respondent had a legally demandable right pursuant to the Codicil
a. General rule: successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants,
in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs
b. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the
successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent.
2. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death.
a. Whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs,
at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate
of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Jorge, were
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
b. In the Codicil, Aleja devised the lot to Jorge subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to Maria every year. Upon his death, his compulsory heirs also assumed such obligation,
corresponding to Maria’s right over the usufruct, the basis of her cause of action.

W/N Article 882 is not applicable – NO

1. Petitioner: 882 on modal institutions cannot apply; testatrix intended mere simple substitution with “near
descendants”, and since she died single and without issue, there cannot be substitution
2. Court: Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation
of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her,
renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her
property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others,
as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
a. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. The provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should
Jorge default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should he or his heirs not fulfill the conditions, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
b. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir. In this case, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of
the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation
clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second
heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution." Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Jorge or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver
part of the usufruct to private respondent.
c. Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863,
the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one
 degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first
heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants
are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
3. CA did not err in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a
modal institution.
a. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states
(1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or
(3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.
b. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights
to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition
suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is
similar to a resolutory condition.
c. From the provisions of the Codicil, the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity
of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though,
that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's
near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently
modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
efficacy of such institution.
d. Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir
should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the
intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.

W/N respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself, being expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee – NO

1. In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any
of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold the
Will in all its parts must be adopted.
2. The Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver 100 piculs yearly to Maria. The
obligation is imposed on Jorge, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee. The non-performance of
the said obligation is with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted
heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment
of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

W/N by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the
lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee – NO

1. Petitioner: deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the
consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a
settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation
under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
 2. Court: a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to
take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties
be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the
subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition DISMISSED.

Provisions:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by
the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears
that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir
or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should
disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article
cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner
most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.