Biraogo vs Truth Commission
the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It
is through the Constitution that the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and
defined, and by which these powers are distributed
among the several departments. [2] The Constitution is
the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must
defer.[3] Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It
cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the
whims and caprices of government and the people
who run it.[4]
For consideration before the Court are two
consolidated cases[5] both of which essentially assail
the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action
for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for
being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution[6] as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr.,
Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of
the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of
his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality,
President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous
administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President
on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said
executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF
2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that
a public office is a public trust and mandates that
public officers and employees, who are servants of
the people, must at all times be accountable to the
latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable
acts of defiance of this principle and notorious
violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which
seriously affects the political, economic, and social
life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold
misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached
very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples
trust and confidence in the Government and its
institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports
of large scale graft and corruption in the government
and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the
evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his
campaign for the Presidency in the last
elections kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected,
he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives
the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman
and four (4) members who will act as an
independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of
reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the
previous administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of
such graft and corruption which it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence
related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to
this end require any agency, official or employee of
the Executive Branch, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, to produce documents,
books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain
information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations
conducted by committees thereof relating to matters
or subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation,
obtain information from the courts, including the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court
Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their
testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to
utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the
ends of justice be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of
Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious
prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial
authorities, by means of a special or interim report
and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of
public officers and employees and their private
sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if
any, when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to
believe that they are liable for graft and corruption
under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or
prosecutorial agency such as the Department of
Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such
assistance and cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource
persons, professionals and other personnel
determined by it as necessary to carry out its
mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of
procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive
Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including
the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are
appropriate and necessary in connection with the
objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or
Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel
who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
subpoena issued by the Commission or who,
appearing before the Commission refuses to take
oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be
subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any
private person who does the same may be dealt with
in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the
Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of
the President shall provide the necessary funds for the
Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers,
execute its functions, and perform its duties and
responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and
expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission
shall accomplish its mission on or before December
31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the
Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning
Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the mandate of
the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to
include the investigation of cases and instances of
graft and corruption during the prior administrations,
such mandate may be so extended accordingly by
way of a supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of
this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall
not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take
effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of
July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted
provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a
mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described
as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an
entity within the Office of the President Proper and
subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public
office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as
to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil
or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in
other countries which have been created as official,
transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to
establish the facts and context of serious violations of
human rights or of international humanitarian law in a
countrys past.[9] They are usually established by states
emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or
authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies
that share the following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate
patterns of abuse committed over a period of time,
as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are
temporary bodies that finish their work with the
submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially
sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the
State.[10] Commissions members are usually
empowered to conduct research, support victims,
and propose policy recommendations to prevent
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more
about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them.
They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions
and recommend institutional reforms. [11]
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to
reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory
body set up to try and punish those responsible for
crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory
tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa, the principal function of which was to
heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent
future conflict by providing a cathartic experience
for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The
latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than
on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the
PTC is the identification and punishment of
perpetrators. As one writer[12] puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the
Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his
inaugural speech: To those who talk about
reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to
simply forget about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to say: There can
be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow
crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their
occurring over and over again.
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order
No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments
of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are
essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators
summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the
President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if
not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution
and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as
it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute
truth commissions to exclusively investigate human
rights violations, which customary practice forms part
of the generally accepted principles of international
law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to
pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in
the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise
in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a
launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a
mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the
people that widespread poverty will altogether
vanish if corruption is eliminated without even
addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not
constitutionally challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual
question on the constitutionality and validity of an
executive issuance or even a statute. [13]
In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and defended the assailed
executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress to create a public office because the
Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution,
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as
amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17] and
settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated
by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and
not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and
validity of other executive orders and presidential
issuances creating similar bodies to justify the
creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint
and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon
B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on
Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by
President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency
on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and
memoranda, the following are the principal issues to
be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have
the legal standing to file their respective petitions and
question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No.
1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the
powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive
relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court
needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid
exercise of its power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution,
the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to
wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.[19]
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of
the petitioners has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of
the case. It argues that the petitioners have not
shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of
the commissions investigations, petitioners will not
sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its
proceedings.[20]
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the
legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to
assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take
the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present
the complaints on the usurpation of their power and
rights as members of the legislature before the
Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,[21]
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it
that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.[22]
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a
taxpayer, he has no standing to question the
creation of the PTC and the budget for its
operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used
for the creation and operation of the commission are
to be taken from those funds already appropriated
by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement
of funds for the commission will not entail
congressional action but will simply be an exercise of
the Presidents power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not
shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining,
any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in
his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may
justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial
power and to wield the axe over presidential
issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case
of David v. Arroyo[24]explained the deep-seated rules
on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly,
the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put,
the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises
in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from
any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or
in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either
case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection.In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen
and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,
where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens
suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is
but the mere instrument of the public concern. As
held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel
Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least
the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
and see that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from
seeking judicial interference in any official policy or
act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders
the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United State Supreme Court laid
down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same
Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he
has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action,
and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a
result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of
cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De
la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v.
Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that
the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.[25]

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v.
Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed
and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right
of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders although they had only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the
public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of
transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v.
ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion
that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but
also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the
Filipino people are more than interested to know the
status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a
promised change to the country. The Court takes
cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming
political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes
of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its
oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal
controversies with overreaching significance to
society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth
Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo
asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office
and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may
create a public office he must be empowered by the
Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in
him by law. According to petitioner, such power
cannot be presumed[32] since there is no provision in
the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes
the President to create a truth commission.[33] He
adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987, granting the President the continuing authority
to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the
creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as
reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and
abolish.[34] Insofar as it vests in the President the
plenary power to reorganize the Office of the
President to the extent of creating a public office,
Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of
separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution
and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity
thereof.[35]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators
argue that the creation of a public office lies within
the province of Congress and not with the executive
branch of government. They maintain that the
delegated authority of the President to reorganize
under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code:
1) does not permit the President to create a public
office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to
the reorganization of the administrative structure of
the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the
restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of
the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer
of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing
authority of the President to reorganize his office is
limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the
President overstepped the limits of this delegated
authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively
legislative about the creation by the President of a
fact-finding body such as a truth commission.
Pointing to numerous offices created by past
presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of
the President Proper has long been
recognized.[37] According to the OSG, the Executive,
just like the other two branches of government,
possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding
committees to assist it in the performance of its
constitutionally mandated functions and in the
exercise of its administrative functions. [38] This power,
as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the
plenary powers wielded by the President under
Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17,
both of Article VII of the Constitution. [39]
It contends that the President is necessarily vested
with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations,
pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are
enforced by public officials and employees of his
department and in the exercise of his authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of his officials.[40] The power of the President
to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his
power of control over his subordinates in the
executive branch, but extends further in the exercise
of his other powers, such as his power to discipline
subordinates,[41] his power for rule making,
adjudication and licensing purposes[42] and in order
to be informed on matters which he is entitled to
know.[43]
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v.
Ermita,[44] where it was held that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with his constitutionally
granted power of control and by virtue of a valid
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control
necessarily includes the power to create offices. For
the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order
to, among others, put a closure to the reported large
scale graft and corruption in the government.[45]
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does
the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the
power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code? Section 31
contemplates reorganization as limited by the
following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring
any agency under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the
provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. These point to situations where a body or
an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of
an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer
to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of
the Office of the President under Section 31 is a
misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term restructure an alteration of
an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part
of the structure of the Office of the President prior to
the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held
in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary,[46]
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the
President to reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to end here. We
must not lose sight of the very source of the power
that which constitutes an express grant of power.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we
ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions." It takes place when there is an alteration
of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them.The EIIB is a bureau
attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under
the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not
justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the
latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The
former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter
finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the
laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of
power from Congress, empowering the President to
create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth
commission pursuant to the above provision finds
statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D.
No. 1772.[48] The said law granted the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, including the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to
standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in
relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has
been invoked in several cases such as Larin v.
Executive Secretary.[49]
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No.
1416 as a justification for the President to create a
public office. Said decree is already stale,
anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the
national government including the power to create
offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of
the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last
Whereas clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary
form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing
manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D.
No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of
the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the
Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was
enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416
says it was enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a
parliamentary form of government, the legislative
and executive powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D.
1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that
P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective
anymore upon the promulgation, adoption,
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D.
[No.] 1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the
President to reorganize the entire National
Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]
While the power to create a truth commission cannot
pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC
finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section
17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this
case, fundamental laws on public accountability
and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers
as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As
explained in the landmark case of Marcos v.
Manglapus:[52]
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back
the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that
"executive power" is the power to enforce the laws,
for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one of
the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over
the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although
the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent
in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in
ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As
stated above, the powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-
mandated duty is the power to create ad
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue
Administrative Order No. 298, creating an
investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of
the Department of Health for the anomalous
purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it
was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full
control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation
to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact
that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the
same composition, or that the former used the offices
and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
[Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad
hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if
history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of
the investigative bodies created in the past like the
PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the
Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission.
There being no changes in the government structure,
the Court is not inclined to declare such executive
power as non-existent just because the direction of
the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1
transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate
funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to
say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on
the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, in the words of the Solicitor
General, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission.[55] Moreover, since
the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations,
there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution
clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president
represents the government as a whole and sees to it
that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive
department.[57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the
PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate
action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers
have been vested in the said body as it cannot
adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It
has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide
in accordance with the standards laid down by law
itself in enforcing and administering the same
law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved
in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such
that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must
be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of
administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and
the power to adjudicate was delineated by the
Court in Cario v. Commission on Human
Rights.[59] Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to
examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to
subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved
in the facts inquired into by application of the law to
the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the
same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to
find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking
of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described
as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a
certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood,
means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially:
x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in
the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and
"adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x.
Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations
Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function
of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To
be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying
the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit that the
commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not
supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function
of the commission will complement those of the two
offices.As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence
of the overall task of the commission to conduct a
fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual prosecution
of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on
the merits of the charges against them,[63] is certainly
not a function given to the commission. The phrase,
when in the course of its investigation, under Section
2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a
contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable
cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman.[64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate
under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with
other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus,
in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was
written:
This power of investigation granted to the
Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with
other similarly authorized government agencies such
as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct
preliminary investigation on charges against public
employees and officials is likewise concurrently
shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the
passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the
Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the
Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to
investigate complaints against local elective officials.
[Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal
cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which
states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of
government, the investigation of such
cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as
enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the
existence of probable cause. This is categorically out
of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC
commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans
primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its
authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book
IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of
crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be
inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors,
the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at
best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so,
the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree
of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible
indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls
within the investigative power of the President, the
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it
is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
contend that it does not apply equally to all
members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the previous administration as its sole
object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan
hostility.[66] Thus, in order to be accorded with validity,
the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to
that of former President Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind
the reported cases of graft and corruption must
encompass acts committed not only during the
administration of former President Arroyo but also
during prior administrations where the same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies [68] were
reported to have been committed against the
Filipino people. They assail the classification
formulated by the respondents as it does not fall
under the recognized exceptions because first, there
is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order
No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their
public office for personal gain; and second, the
selective classification is not germane to the purpose
of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption. [69] In
order to attain constitutional permission, the
petitioners advocate that the commission should
deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to
the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the
law with equal force.[70]
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No.
1 identifies the previous administration as the initial
subject of the investigation, following Section 17
thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of
large scale graft and corruption solely during the said
administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the
commission would confine its proceedings to officials
of the previous administration, the petitioners argue
that no offense is committed against the equal
protection clause for the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous
administration as possible subjects of investigation is a
valid classification based on substantial distinctions
and is germane to the evils which the Executive
Order seeks to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo
administration from past administrations, it recited the
following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread
reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
previous administration which have eroded public
confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore,
an urgent call for the determination of the truth
regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to
them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and
confidence in the Government and in their public
servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding
administration as the object of fact-finding is
warranted by the reality that unlike with
administrations long gone, the current administration
will most likely bear the immediate consequence of
the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration
as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality
that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the
evidence that could lead to recovery of public
monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be
learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are
faithfully executed, are more easily established in the
regime that immediately precede the current
administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions
of their predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or
even as a routine measure of due diligence and
good housekeeping by a nascent administration like
the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C.
Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor
former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies,
and the Saguisag Commission created by former
President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order
No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens
committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial
projects of his predecessor, former President Fidel V.
Ramos.[73][Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the
basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
the equal protection clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. [76] The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly
constituted authorities.[77] In other words, the concept
of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. [78]
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official
state actions, not just those of the legislature. [79] Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. [80]
It, however, does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.[81] Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification.[82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.[83] The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is
not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in
equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as
long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere
fact that an individual belonging to a class differs
from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him.[84]
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude
those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line
of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a
statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or
practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that
of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that
the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations
omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order
No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous
administration[87] only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least
three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon
to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of
reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration and thereafter submit its
finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class
of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences
between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to
the previous administration only. The reports of
widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration
cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
administration from earlier administrations which were
also blemished by similar widespread reports of
impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not
inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice
Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.[88]
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive
Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the
intended investigation to the previous administration
only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other
past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness.[89] The reason given is specious. It is
without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption
and the evil it breeds.[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in
unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports
involving the earlier administrations were already
inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased
presidents and cases which have already prescribed
can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC.
Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous
investigations of previous administrations, given the
bodys limited time and resources. The law does not
require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad
impossibilia).[91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility,
the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of
investigating almost a centurys worth of graft
cases. However, the fact remains that Executive
Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The
PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the
truth, must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is
an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court,
however, is of the considered view that although its
focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection under the laws should not in any
way be circumvented. The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. [93] Laws that do
not conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of
the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of
graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to
survive, must be read together with the provisions of
the Constitution. To exclude the earlier
administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions
would only confirm the petitioners lament that the
subject executive order is only an adventure in
partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was
written: A rather limited number of such classifications
have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary;
those include: race, national origin, gender, political
activity or membership in a political party, union
activity or membership in a labor union, or more
generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on
existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude additions to the number included within a
class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all
those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions.Furthermore, all who are in situations
and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are
indistinguishable from those of the members of the
class must be brought under the influence of the law
and treated by it in the same way as are the
members of the class.[97]
The Court is not unaware that mere
underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law
under the equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is
not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-
embracing and does not include all the evils within its
reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation
challenged under the equal protection clause is not
devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete.[100] In several instances,
the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid
reason to strike down a law or regulation where the
purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations. These cases refer to the step by step
process.[101]With regard to equal protection claims, a
legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that
might conceivably have been attacked. [102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
inadvertence. That the previous administration was
picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at
least three times in the assailed executive order. It
must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not
even mention any particular act, event or report to
be focused on unlike the investigative commissions
created in the past. The equal protection clause is
violated by purposeful and intentional
discrimination.[103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is
deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the
commission does not only confine itself to cases of
large scale graft and corruption committed during
the previous administration.[104] The OSG points to
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate.
If and when in the judgment of the President there is
a need to expand the mandate of the Commission
as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and
corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way
of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17
allows the President the discretion to expand the
scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the
acts of graft and corruption committed in other past
administrations, it does not guarantee that they
would be covered in the future. Such expanded
mandate of the commission will still depend on the
whim and caprice of the President. If he would
decide not to include them, the section would then
be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the
petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was
crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration. [105]
The Court tried to seek guidance from the
pronouncement in the case of Virata v.
Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter
(composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14)
does not violate the equal protection clause. The
decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on
how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the
principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency
of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is
- whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of
its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the
legislature and the executive department, is
exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal,
which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time
and again, this issue has been addressed by the
Court, but it seems that the present political situation
calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its
action lest it continually be accused of being a
hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with
Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with
the power of judicial review which is the power to
declare a treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to
rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations. These provisions, however, have been
fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme
Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has
been accused of asserting superiority over the other
departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel
would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.[107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial
review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal
body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds
no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no
more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to
pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions
are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards
the betterment of the nation and its people. But then
again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: The end does not justify the means. No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the
purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed
in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be
allowed.[108] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye
and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the
Constitution and its enshrined principles.
The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must
bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not
be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude.[109]
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for
a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the
executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government,
it is the judiciary which is the most interested in
knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a
hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth
must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a
government of laws and not of men. [110]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby
ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
LACSON MAGALLANES CO. vs. PANO
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question — May the Executive Secretary, acting
by authority of the President, reverse a decision of
the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the
Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources — yielded an affirmative answer from the
lower court.1
Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court
of Appeals upon the provisions of Sections 17 and 31
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
The undisputed controlling facts are:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual
occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in
Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of
Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and
interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the
above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to
plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as
pasture land and declared agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other
claimants2 applied for the purchase of ninety
hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its
own sales application covering the entire released
area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his
nineteen companions upon the averment that they
are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by
their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of
the conflict, rendered a decision on July 31, 1956
giving due course to the application of plaintiff
corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño
and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for
himself and his companions — held that the appeal
was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the
Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo,
"[b]y authority of the President" decided the
controversy, modified the decision of the Director of
Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be
for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly
landless farmers who depend on the land for their
existence, be allocated that portion on which they
have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the
controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC
Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with
Latian River as the dividing line) "should be
subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated
to actual occupants, without prejudice to the
corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of
surveying this portion." It may be well to state, at this
point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the
Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts as
found in said decision.
Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to
the Court of First Instance praying that judgment be
rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the
Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal
force and effect.
And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the
court a quo dismissing plaintiff's case.
1. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act 141. The precept there is that decisions of the
Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be
conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff's
trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling not
only upon courts but also upon the President.
Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to
execute the law is of constitutional origin.3 So, too, is
his control of all executive departments. 4 Thus it is,
that department heads are men of his confidence.
His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the
privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he
controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President cannot
rule on the correctness of a decision of a department
secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the
Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard
practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to
the Office of the President.5This Court has recognized
this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of
the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was
considered superseded by that of the President's
appeal.6 In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to
this last remedy of appeal was considered a fatal
defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-
exhaustion of all administrative remedies. 7
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to
appeal to the President reposes upon the President's
power of control over the executive
departments.8 And control simply means "the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter." 9
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the
President cannot undo an act of his department
secretary.
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the
Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of
power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not
contain any provision whereby the presidential
power of control may be delegated to the Executive
Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty
of the President to act personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are
which the President must exercise in person. 10 Not as
correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive
may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts
which the Constitution does not command that he
perform in person.11 Reason is not wanting for this
view. The President is not expected to perform in
person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the
President. The rule which has thus gained recognition
is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive
Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority
of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to
affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue. 12
3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive
Secretary is equal in rank to the other department
heads, no higher than anyone of them. From this,
plaintiff carves the argument that one department
head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the
President, cannot intrude into the zone of action
allocated to another department secretary. This
argument betrays lack of appreciation of the fact
that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary
acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is
that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full
faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority
of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For,
only the President may rightfully say that the
Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so.
Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains
the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be
successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of this
case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is
hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.
SIERRA MADRE TRUST VS SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 8,
1970, in DANR Cases Numbered 3502 and 3502-A. The
decision affirmed a decision of the Director of Mines
dated November 6, 1969.
The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the
Mining Law (C.A. No. 137, as amended) which
provides: "... Findings of facts in the decision or order
of the Director of Mines when affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall
be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or
parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order
shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review
wherein only questions of law may be raised."
The factual background is given in the brief of the
petitioner-appellant which has not been
contradicted by the respondents-appellees and is as
follows:
On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the
Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-
7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over
six (6) lode mineral claims, viz.: (1) Finland 2, (2)
Finland 3, (3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6, (5) Finland 8 and
(6) Finland 9, all registered on December 11, 1964
with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva
Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio
Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned
six (6) lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V-
7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven
(11) lode mineral claims of the herein petitioner Sierra
Madre Trust, viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12, (3) JC-11, (4) W-11,
(5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10, (8) A-9, (9) N-9, (10) W-8,
and (11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio of
Abaca, Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, and duly registered with the office of the
Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on
May 14, 1965.
The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision
declaring the above- mentioned six (6) lode mineral
claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company,
null, void, and illegal; and denying lode lease
application LLA No. V-7872 over said claims. Further,
the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs
and remedies available in the premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of
Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and
on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502.
Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the same
Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an
Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J & S
Partnership over six (6) lode mineral claims viz.: (1) A-
19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4) A-25, (5) A-29, and (6) A-30,
all registered on March 30, 1965 and amended
August 5, 1965, with the office of the Mining Recorder
of Nueva Vizcaya, and situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio
of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva
Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned
six (6) lode mineral claim covered by LLA No. V-9028,
encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode
mineral claims of herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust,
viz.: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3) A-13, (4) H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6)
W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9) F-11, (10) Wm-11, (11)
F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all situated in Sitio
Taduan, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya and duly registered with
the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, on May 14,1965.
The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision
declaring the above- mentioned six (6) claims of
respondent J & S Partnership, null void, and illegal;
and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-9028
over the said claims. Further, the adverse claimant
prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available
in the premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of
Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and
on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502A.
These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 and V-
404 were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and
also jointly considered in the appeal in the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by
the Director of Mines reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and
so holds that the respondents have the preferential
right over their "Finland-2", "Finland- 3", "Finland-5",
"Finland-6", "Finland-8", "Finland-9", "A-19", "A-20", "A-
24", "A-25", "A-29" and "A-30" mining claims.
Accordingly, the protests (adverse claims) filed by
protestant Sierra Madre Trust should be, as hereby
they are, DISMISSED.
And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal
interposed by the appellant, Sierra Madre Trust is
hereby dismissed and the decision of the Director of
Mines dated November 6, 1969, affirmed. "
The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against
Jusan Trust Mining Company and J and S Partnership
were based on the allegation that the lode lease
applications (LLA) of the latter "encroached and
overlapped" the former's mineral claims, However,
acting on the adverse claims, the Director of Mines
found that, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is
constrained to believe that there exists no conflict or
overlapping between the protestant's and
respondents' mining claims. " And this finding was
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources thus: "Anent the first allegation, this Office
finds that the Director of Mines did not err when he
found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents
Jusan Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership
did not encroach and overlap the eighteen (18) lode
mineral claims of the appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For
this fact has been incotrovertibly proven by the
records appertaining to the case."
It should be noted that according to the Director of
Mines in his decision, "during the intervening period
from the 31st day after the discovery [by the
respondents] to the date of location nobody else
located the area covered thereby. ... the protestant
[petitioner herein] did not establish any intervening
right as it is our findings that their mining claims do not
overlap respondents' mining claims."
After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources had affirmed the factual findings of the
Director of Mines to the effect that there was no
overlapping of claims and which findings were final
and conclusive, Sierra Madre Trust should have kept
its peace for obviously it suffered no material injury
and had no pecuniary interest to protect. But it was
obstinate and raised this legal question before Us:
"May there be a valid location of mining claims after
the lapse of thirty (30) days from date of discovery, in
contravention to the mandatory provision of Section
33 of the New Mining Law (Com. Act No. 137, as
amended)?" It also raised ancillary questions.
We see no reason why We have to answer the
questions in this petition considering that there is no
justiciable issue between the parties. The officers of
the Executive Department tasked with administering
the Mining Law have found that there is neither
encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the
claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the
answers to the questions will not materially serve the
interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to
remind litigation prone individuals that the
interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted
to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In
his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the
findings of the Director of Mines that the mining
claims of the appellees were validly located,
surveyed and registered."
Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association
and/or partnership registered with the Mining
Recorder of a province, but not registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, be vested with
juridical personality to enable it to locate and then
lease mining claims from the government?" Suffice it
to state that this question was not raised before the
Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. There is also nothing in the
record to indicate whether or not the appellees are
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. For these reasons, even assuming that
there is a justiciable issue between the parties, this
question cannot be passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTIPOLO VS NHA
FELICIANO, J.:
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970,
Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial
ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the
petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights
over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson.
The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment
and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed
with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr.
Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's
obligations under the original contract, including
payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears.
However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the
subdivision project in accordance with its
undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell,
Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the
period up to, and including, the month of August
1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments
falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads:
Clause 17. — SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure
the beauty of the subdivision in line with the modern
trend of urban development, the SELLER hereby
obligates itself to provide the subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
c) Asphalt paved roads
d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre
h) 24-hour security guard service.
These improvements shall be complete within a
period of two (2) years from date of this
contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER
to suspend his monthly installments without any
penalties or interest charges until such time that such
improvements shall have been completed. 1
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty
sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising
that the required improvements in the subdivision
had already been completed, and requesting
resumption of payment of the monthly installments on
Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he
would conform with the request as soon as he was
able to verify the truth of the representation in the
notice.
In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo
Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume
payment of his monthly installments, citing the
decision rendered by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled
"Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes,
respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have
"substantially complied with its commitment to the lot
buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by
and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In
addition, a formal demand was made for full and
immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73,
representing installments which, Antipolo Realty
alleged, had accrued during the period while the
improvements were being completed — i.e.,
between September 1972 and October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-
October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay
the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty
responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and
claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments
previously made by Mr. Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell,
Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty
before public respondent NHA through a letter-
complaint dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was
docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was
heard on 2 September 1977. Antipolo Realty, without
presenting any evidence, moved for the
consolidation of Case No. 2123 with several other
cases filed against it by other subdivision lot buyers,
then pending before the NHA. In an Order issued on
7 February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to
dismiss and scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9
March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell under the following conditions:
l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio
Yuzon a statement of account for the monthly
amortizations from November 1976 to the present;
m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the
period from November 1976 to the date of the
statement of account; and
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay
the arrears shown in the statement of account. 2
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration
asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of
law since it had not been served with notice of the
scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to
hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged
in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that
complaint involved the interpretation and
application of the Contract to Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28
June 1978 by respondent NHA General Manager
G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA
to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also
found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served
with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its
counsel had failed to attend the hearing. 3 The case
was submitted for decision, and eventually decided,
solely on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this
Court with a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as
G.R. No. L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of the
NHA was assailed. Petitioner further asserted that,
under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could validly
terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a
consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment
payments made by the latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution
issued on 11 December 1978, "without prejudice to
petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A
motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January
1979.
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the
NHA decision with the Office of the President which,
on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through public
respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo
C. Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts
that, in hearing the complaint of private respondent
Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had
not only acted on a matter beyond its competence,
but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was
not authorized to perform.
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
It is by now commonplace learning that many
administrative agencies exercise and perform
adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a
limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or
quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies
(e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the National Labor Relations Commission) is well
recognized in our jurisdiction,7 basically because the
need for special competence and experience has
been recognized as essential in the resolution of
questions of complex or specialized character and
because of a companion recognition that the
dockets of our regular courts have remained
crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and
Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et
al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee,
said:
In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the
move to vest jurisdiction in administrative
commissions and boards the power to resolve
specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in
corporations, public transportation and public
utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial
Court's intervention in the resolution of labor
management controversies likely to cause strikes or
lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive,
although it did not so expressly state in the law. The
Court held that under the "sense-making and
expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered" (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v.
Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes on technical
matters or essentially factual matters, subject to
judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion
has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984,
the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in
an administrative body and a court, the
unmistakeable trend has been to refer it to the
former, "Increasingly, this Court has been committed
to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and
unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan
administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419,
428, citing precedents). The Court in the earlier case
of Ebon vs. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]),
noted that the lawmaking authority, in restoring to
the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to
award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against
the previous P.D. amendment splitting their
jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently, . . . had
second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters
and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in
labor cases because that setup would mean
duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and
possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two
tribunals on one and the same claim."
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs.
National Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice
Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed that:
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive
original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over
certain disputes and controversies falling within the
agency's special expertise. The very definition of an
administrative agency includes its being vested with
quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of
powers and functions given to administrative
agencies recognizes the need for the active
intervention of administrative agencies in matters
calling for technical knowledge and speed in
countless controversies which cannot possibly be
handled by regular courts.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such agency. 10 In
the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned
must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such
contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of
administrative agencies is that the interpretation of
contracts and the determination of private rights
thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function,
exercisable only by our regular courts.
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested
with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by
referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957,
known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers'
Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as
follows:
National Housing Authority. — The National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the real estate trade and business in accordance
with the provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the
regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are
indicated in the second and third preambular
paragraphs of the statute which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,
and/or sellers have reneged on their representations
and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems
lighting systems and other similar basic
requirements, thus endangering the health and
safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show
cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to
deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and
fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to
different innocent purchasers for value — . (emphasis
supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled
out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of
regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite
specific terms:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate
the real estate trade and business and in addition to
its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed
by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.(emphasis supplied.)
The substantive provisions being applied and
enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found in
Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which
reads:
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment
payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or
condominium project for the lot or unit he
contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the
owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice
to the owner or developer, desists from further
payment due to the failure of the owner or
developer to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved
plans and within the time limit for complying with the
same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed
the total amount paid including amortization and
interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis
supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual
obligation to complete certain specified
improvements in the subdivision within the specified
period of two years from the date of the execution of
the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to
exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract.
Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract
to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by
the private respondent as forfeited in its favor.
Indeed, under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of
petitioner's breach of its contract with private
respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the
option either to rescind the contract and receive
reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal
interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot
in question, or to suspend payment of further
purchase installments until such time as the petitioner
had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was
therefore correct in holding that private respondent's
prior installment payments could not be forfeited in
favor of petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a
grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its
jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the
Contract to Sell between the parties. Such
reinstatement is no more than a logical
consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted,
that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the
Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question
that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was
legally empowered to determine and protect the
rights of contracting parties under the law
administered by it and under the respective
agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations
thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been
denied the right to due process. This assertion lacks
substance. The record shows that a copy of the order
denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the
hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March
1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as
evidenced by the annotation appearing at the
bottom of said copy indicating that such service had
been effected. 14 But even if it be assumed,
arguendo, that such notice had not been served on
the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not
deprived of due process, for what the fundamental
law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but
rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner was given
ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard
on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just
on a motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due
process must hence sound even more hollow. 16
We turn finally to the question of the amount of
P16,994.73 which petitioner insists had accrued during
the period from September 1972 to October 1976,
when private respondent had suspended payment
of his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision
lot. The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that
the regular monthly installments under the Contract
to Sell did not accrue during the September 1972 —
October 1976 period:
[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend
payment of his monthly installments until the
improvements in the subdivision shall have been
completed. Respondent informed complainant on
November 1976 that the improvements have been
completed. Monthly installments during the period of
suspension of payment did not become due and
demandable Neither did they accrue Such must be
the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending
payments. If the suspension is lifted the debtor shall
resume payments but never did he incur any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for
complainant to pay the arrears due during the
period of suspension of payment is null and
void. Consequently, the notice of cancellation based
on the refusal to pay the s that were not due and
demandable is also null and void. 17
The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need
of certification and amplification. The NHA correctly
held that no installment payments should be
considered as having accrued during the period of
suspension of payments. Clearly, the critical issue is
what happens to the installment payments which
would have accrued and fallen due during the
period of suspension had no default on the part of
the petitioner intervened. To our mind, the NHA
resolution is most appropriately read as directing that
the original period of payment in the Contract to Sell
must be deemed extended by a period of time
equal to the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4)
years and two (2) months) during which extended
time (tacked on to the original contract period)
private respondent buyer must continue to pay the
monthly installment payments until the entire original
contract price shall have been paid. We think that
such is the intent of the NHA resolution which
directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor
shall resume payments" and that such is the most
equitable and just reading that may be given to the
NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect
the disputed amount in a lump sum after it had
defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would
tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization
(under Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957, supra)
to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. As the
NHA resolution pointed out, [s]uch must be the case,
otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments."
Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount
that would have become due would be an
expressively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and
would result in the unjust enrichment of the private
respondent at the expense of the petitioner. It should
be recalled that the latter had already fulfilled, albeit
tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their
Contracts to Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer
should not be regarded as delinquent and as such
charged penalty interest. The suspension of
installment payments was attributable to the
petitioner, not the private respondent. The tacking on
of the period of suspension to the end of the original
period precisely prevents default on the part of the
lot buyer. In the words of the NHA resolution, "never
would [the buyer] incur any arrears."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
The NHA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the
original contract period for payment of installments
under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two
(2) months, during which extended time private
respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly
installment payments until the entire original contract
price shall have been paid. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
BAGUIO VS NINO
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to
Narcisa A. Placino (Narcisa) a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 10 (the lot) located at Saint
Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay, Baguio
City.
Francisco Niño (Niño), one of the herein respondents,
who has been occupying the lot, contested the
award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23,
1975 before the Bureau of Lands.
The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by
Order of November 11, 1976.
Niño appealed the dismissal all the way to the
Supreme Court but he did not succeed.
The decision of the Director of Lands dated
November 11, 1976 having become final and
executory,1 the then-Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on
petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution
dated February 1, 1993 directing the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner
Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from
continuously occupying the area and remove
whatever improvements they may have introduced
thereto."2
Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed,
prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment
before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC). The MTCC dismissed Narcisa’s complaint,
however, by Order3of August 7, 1996.
Narcisa’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall (Atty.
Claravall), later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the
issuance of a Special Order authorizing the City
Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the
Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish
or remove the improvements on the lot introduced
by Niño. The DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing
lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of Baguio, the
City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the
City Government. The DENR-CAR also invoked
Section 14 (now Section 10 (d)) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.4
Atty. Claravall thereupon moved to have the Order
of Execution previously issued by the DENR-CAR
amended, which was granted. As amended, the
Order of Execution addressed to the CENRO Officer
read:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section
1844 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Act No. 3077, you are hereby enjoined
to enforce the aforementioned order, with the
assistance upon request of the City Sheriff of Baguio
City, the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the
Baguio City Police Station, by Ordering Petitioner
Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from
continuously occupying the area and remove
whatever improvements they may have introduced
thereto.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The DENR-CENRO, together with the Demolition Team
of Baguio City and the Baguio City police, desisted,
however, in their earlier attempt to enforce the
Amended Order of Execution.6
On July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City
headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the
Baguio City Police, on orders of then Baguio City
Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian,
started demolishing the houses of Niño and his herein
co-respondents.7
The demolition was, however, temporarily stopped
upon the instructions of DENR-CENR Officer Guillermo
Fianza, who later advised Niño that the DENR-CENRO
would implement the Amended Order of Execution
on August 4, 1997.8
Niño and his wife Josefina Niño thereupon filed a
Petition9 for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baguio City against Guillermo Fianza,
Teofilo Olimpo of the DENR-CENRO, Mayor Mauricio
Domogan (hereafter petitioner), Atty. Claravall, Engr.
Orlando Genove (hereafter petitioner), Rolando
Angara, and Police Officer Donato Bacquian
challenging the Amended Order of Execution issued
by the DENR-CENRO.1avvphil.net
The Niño spouses later filed an Amended Petition10 by
impleading Emmanuel Niño and Eurlie Ocampo as
therein co-petitioners and the City of Baguio
(hereafter petitioner) and Narcisa as therein
additional respondents, and further praying for
damages.
Branch 6 of the Baguio RTC dismissed the petition of
Niño et al. (hereafter respondents) for lack of
merit.11Respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration12 having been denied, they filed a
Petition for Review 13 under Rule 42 of the Rules before
the Court of Appeals.
By Decision14 of December 11, 2002, the Court of
Appeals granted the Petition for Review, holding that
Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules reading:
SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
xxxx
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of
execution. — When the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or
planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after due hearing and after the former has failed to
remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by
the court. (Underscoring supplied)
applies.
Thus disposed the appellate court:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED
and the Orders dated September 24, 1997 and
November 23, 1998 are hereby SET ASIDE. Public
respondent City Mayor Mauricio Domogan thru the
Demolition Team and City Engineer’s Office are
hereby ordered to cease and desist from enforcing
the amended order of execution issued by Oscar N.
Hamada, Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources,
concerning the demolition or removal of the
structures made by petitioners until private
respondent applied for a special order
abovementioned with the proper court.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.15 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondents filed before the appellate court an Ex-
Parte Motion for Reconsideration16 on January 9,
2003, alleging that some of the reliefs they prayed for
in their petition were left unacted upon. 17 Petitioners
too filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 on January
28, 2003, raising the following grounds:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
THE CITY MAYOR HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THE
DEMOLITION OF ILLEGALLY-BUILT STRUCTURES;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT MISAPPLIED SEC. 10 (d),
RULE 39 of the RULES OF COURT.19(Underscoring
supplied)
In support of the first ground, petitioners raised before
the appellate court, in their Motion for
Reconsideration, for the first time, the power of the
City Mayor to validly order the demolition of a
structure constructed without a building permit
pursuant to Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in relation to the National
Building Code of the Philippines.
Alleging that respondents built their house without
the required entry and building permits, petitioners
argued that the City Mayor may order the demolition
of a house without a special court order. 20
The Court of Appeals denied both parties’ motions
for reconsideration by Resolution21 of December 17,
2003.
Hence, the present petition of the City of Baguio,
Mayor Domogan (now a Congressman), and
Orlando Genove, faulting the appellate court:
1. . . . IN RULING THAT A SPECIAL COURT ORDER IS
NEEDED FOR THE DEMOLITION OF RESPONDENTS’
STRUCTURES;
2. . . . IN APPLYING SEC. 10(d) RULE 39 OF THE RULES
OF COURT IN THIS CASE;
3. . . . IN ENTERTAINING RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR
REVIEW.22
The petition fails.
While it is noted that respondent’s appeal to the
Court of Appeals was erroneously brought under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court, instead of under Rule 41, the
RTC having rendered the questioned decision in the
exercise of its original, not appellate, jurisdiction, this
Court overlooks the error in view of the merits of
respondents’ case.23
Petitioners’ contention that the enforcement of the
Amended Order of Execution does not need a
hearing and court order which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court requires does not lie. That an
administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-
judicial functions issued the Amended Order of
Execution is of no moment, since the requirement in
Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoes the
constitutional provision that "no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws."24
Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing
Authority teaches:
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may
exercise is defined in the enabling act of such
agency. In other words, the extent to which an
administrative entity may exercise such powers
depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the
statute creating or empowering such
agency.25(Underscoring supplied)
There is, however, no explicit provision granting the
Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management
Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the
Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an
order of demolition26— which the Amended Order of
Execution, in substance, is.
Indeed,
[w]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is
confined to the determination of the respective rights
of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which
involve the disposition of public lands, the power to
determine who has the actual, physical possession or
occupation or the better right of possession over
public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not
have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither
does it have the means to prevent disorders or
breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power
is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and
while it may decide disputes over possession, this is
but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate
power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized
to be within the legal competence of the civil courts
and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual
possessors and occupants with a view to quell social
unrest.27 (Emphasis added)
Consequently, this Court held:28
x x x the power to order the sheriff to remove
improvements and turn over the possession of the
land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs
only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of
Lands.29(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to
remove improvements introduced by respondents
on, and turn over possession of, the lot to Narcisa.
Petitioners’ invocation of the City Mayor’s authority
under Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government
Code to order the demolition or removal of an
illegally constructed house, building, or structure
within the period prescribed by law or ordinance and
their allegation that respondents’ structures were
constructed without building permits30 were not
raised before the trial court. Petitioners having, for the
first time, invoked said section of the Local
Government Code and respondents’ lack of building
entry permits in their Motion for Reconsideration of
the Court of Appeals’ decision, it was correctly
denied of merit,31 it being settled that matters,
theories or arguments not brought out in the
proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered
by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DAR vs SUTTON
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003
and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared
DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993,
null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate,
inherited by respondents which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October
26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform
program of the government, respondents made a
voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the
law.
 On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It
included in its coverage farms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the
case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2] this Court
ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-
raising are not included in the definition of
agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar
as they included livestock farms in the coverage of
agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with
petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS
as their landholding was devoted exclusively to
cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage
of the CARL.[3]
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected
respondents land and found that it was devoted
solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He
recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner
DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the
return of the supporting papers they submitted in
connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their
request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series
of 1993,[5] which provided that only portions of
private agricultural lands used for the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall
be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In
determining the area of land to be excluded, the
A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1
animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head
of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a
ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for
every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded
from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR
Secretary and advised him to consider as final and
irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under
the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is
exempted from the CARL.[6]
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao issued an Order[7] partially granting the
application of respondents for exemption from the
coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits
outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner
exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for
grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635
hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest
of respondents landholding to be segregated and
placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They
contend that their entire landholding should be
exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-
raising. Their motion was denied. [8] They filed a notice
of appeal [9] with the Office of the President assailing:
(1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land
and livestock in determining the land area qualified
for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of
the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising
lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian
reform.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President
affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. [10] It
ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run
counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided
the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel
of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the
issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was
left for the determination of the courts as the sole
arbiters of such issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void
for being contrary to the intent of the 1987
Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms
from the land reform program of the government.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR
Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is
hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of
the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in
so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian
Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered
by the agrarian reform program of the government
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this petition.
The main issue in the case at bar is the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,
which prescribes a maximum retention limit for
owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of
the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O.
No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be
retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to
place all public and private agricultural lands under
the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also
contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that
some unscrupulous landowners have converted their
agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade
their coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioners arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers
legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and
regulations. They have been granted by Congress
with the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them.
Delegated rule-making has become a practical
necessity in modern governance due to the
increasing complexity and variety of public functions.
However, while administrative rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law, they are not
immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly
challenged before the courts to ensure that they do
not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of
administrative discretion is committed by the
administrative body concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to
be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be
issued by authority of a law and must not contravene
the provisions of the Constitution.[13] The rule-making
power of an administrative agency may not be used
to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by
the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the
power of the administrative agency beyond the
scope intended. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations. [14]
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is
invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them
in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership.
However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine
and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz
Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the
definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from
crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the
investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial
fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and
facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill
with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds
and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-
gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and
concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances.[15]
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate
livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It
has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v.
DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case.
In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial,
commercial and residential lands are not covered by
the CARL.[17] We stressed anew that while Section 4 of
R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all
public and private agricultural lands, the term
agricultural land does not include lands classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still
undeveloped, could not be considered as
agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these
lots were already classified as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the
case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock,
poultry and swine have been classified as industrial,
not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian
reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the
impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports
it has received that some unscrupulous landowners
have been converting their agricultural lands to
livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the
agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic
in this contention. The undesirable scenario which
petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the
A.O. clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents
family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948.
They have long been in the business of breeding
cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the
cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. [18]Petitioner
DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no
evidence on record that respondents have just
recently engaged in or converted to the business of
breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL
that may lead one to suspect that respondents
intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed
that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of
agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after
the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no
change of business interest in the case of
respondents.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory
construction that the reenactment of a statute by
Congress without substantial change is an implied
legislative approval and adoption of the previous
law. On the other hand, by making a new law,
Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. [19] In the
case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended
certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new
law changed the definition of the terms agricultural
activity and commercial farming by dropping from its
coverage lands that are devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine-raising.[21] With this
significant modification, Congress clearly sought to
align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the
intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to
exclude livestock farms from the coverage of
agrarian reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative
bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the
Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the
Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and
be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict
between an administrative order and the provisions
of the Constitution, the latter prevails. [22] The assailed
A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as
unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of
agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the
1987 Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4,
2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CABARRUS VS BERNAS
TORRES, JR., J.:
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of
professional Resposibility.In his complaint-
affidavit [1] dated August 12, 1996, complainant
alleged as follows:
A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B.
Pascual, Jr., subscribe under oath before Marie
Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a notary public in Makati City,
wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and
certification of non-forum shopping which was
appended to a complaint for reconveyance of
property and damages, denominated as Civil Case
No. 65646, filed before the Regional Trial Court in
National Capital Region, RTC, which case was raffled
to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said
complaint is hereto attached and marked as
Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B.That as basis for the instant complaint for
falsification of public document, I am hereto quoting
verbatim, the test (sic) of Annex A-6, the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and
states:
He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he
cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading, the
content of which are true to his personal knowledge
and that he has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in any court,
including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency. If he should learn
that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court or any
other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic)
that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to
this notice (sic) to this Honorable Court. Underscoring
supplied.
C.That the cause of action relied upon by the
respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud,
facilitated by forgery as gleaned from paragraph 15,
16, and 22;
D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing
(sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant
complaint, respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio
Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a
criminal complaint for falsification of a public
document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the
filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the
National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave.,
a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto attached
and marked as Annex B.
D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the
affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the
same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646;
D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent
counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written
complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action
which was reiterated in another letter submitting to
the NBI standard specimen signitures dated October
1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto
attached and marked as Annexes (sic) C.
E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis
of Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings
knowingly subverted and perverted the truth when
he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
that:
He has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in any court,
including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other Tribunal or agency. Where verification-
certification was placed under oath and was
conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of
respondent in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in
Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis
(sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the Supreme
Court prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of
the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same
lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI
for forgery and respondents themselves conspired
and confabulated with each other in facilitating and
insuring the open, blatant and deliberate violation of
Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of
falsified documents.- The penalty of prison
correctional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than p 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of
exchange (sic) or any other kind of commercial
documents; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party,
or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding
article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in
evidence in any judicial proceeding or the damage
of another or who, with the intent to cause such
damage , shall use any of the false documents
embraced in the next preceding article, or any of the
foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished
by the penalty next lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred
for having instigated abetted and facilitated the
perversion and subversion of truth in the said
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02,
Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the code of Professional
responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinent provisions of
which are herein below quoted and a copy of said
code is hereto attached and marked as Annex E;
CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL
SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic)
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
In his Comment, [2] respondents Jose Antonio Bernas
avers that he has not committed forum shopping
because the criminal action is not an action that
involves the same issue as those in the civil action
and both suits can exist without constituting forum
shopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet been
prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that
forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs are
issued by the same parties in multiple fora.
In his Supplemental Comment,[3] respondent further
contends that neither he or his client Pascual has
commenced any criminal action. Pascual merely
requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or
prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine
whether the filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would determine probable caused,
would be appropriate. It was only upon request of
the NBI the he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an
affidavit-complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant. Likewise,
respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter
transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action or
proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no
prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is
incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI
cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular.
The core issue to be resolved here is whether
respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-
91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and administrative
Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the
administrative complaint bereft of merit and should
be dismissed.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another. Therefore, a party to a case resort to
forum shopping because by filling another petition
involving the same essential facts and circumstances,
xxx, respondents approached two different for a in
order to increase their chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action, [4] In this case, there is
no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, as
counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the
assistance of the NBI to investigate the the alleged
fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus
Cabarrus.[5] The filing of the civil case for conveyance
and damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a
criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case
independently with the criminal case without
violating the circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcely
necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so
interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes
projected by the Supreme Court when it
promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was designed to
serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure-which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[6]
Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 [7], specifically section 1
hereof provides, viz:
Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of
Investigation under the Department of Justice which
shall have the following functions:
(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other
offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its
initiative and as public interest may require;
(b) To render assistance, whenever properly
requested in the investigation or detection of crimes
and other offenses;
(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal
and other infromations for the benefit and use of the
prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the
Philippines, identification records of all person without
criminal convictions, records of identifying marks,
characteristics, and ownership or possession of all
firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom;
(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-
enforcement officers and entities of the Government
as well as the courts that may request its services;
(e) To extend its services, whenever properly
requested in the investigation of cases of
administrative or civil nature in which the
Government is interested;
(f) To undertake the instruction and training of
representative number of city and municipal peace
officers at the request of their respective superiors
along effective methods of crime investigation and
detection in order to insure greater efficiency in the
discharge of their duties;
(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific
crime laboratory and to conduct researches inn
furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal
investigation;
(h) To perform such other related function as the
secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.
Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of
Investigations are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-
judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief
to a party. It cannot even determine probable
cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings
are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as
public welfare may require. It renders assistance
when requested in the investigation or detection of
crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in
order to prosecute those person responsible for
defrauding his client.
The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under
Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested
with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and
those who not only hear and determine controversies
between adverse parties, but to make binding orders
or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI
is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those
forums contemplated by the Circular that can
entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any
relief, declaratory or otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
GMA VS MOVIE
CORONA, J.:
Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the June 18, 2001 decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the January 7, 2000
order[2] of respondent Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB) which read:
In view thereof, the BOARD, by the undersigned,
hereby imposes the administrative penalty of
SUSPENSION FROM AIRING/BROADCASTING any
program on EMC Channel 27 for a period of seven
(7) days which period shall commence immediately
upon receipt of this Order. Your failure to comply with
this ORDER shall be construed by the BOARD as
defiance on your part of a lawful order of the
BOARD.
The facts follow.
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages
the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On
January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order
of suspension against petitioner for airing Muro Ami:
The Making without first securing a permit from it as
provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.[3]
The penalty of suspension was based on
Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15,
1998[4] which provided for the penalties for exhibiting
a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
suspension order and, at the same time, informed
MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the
suspension order by going off the air since midnight
of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which
was merely noted by the MTRCB thereby, in effect,
denying both the motion for reconsideration and
letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari which was dismissed in the now assailed
June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000
suspension order issued by MTRCB was
affirmed in toto.
Hence, this recourse.
The pivotal issues for our resolution are:
(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority
to review the show Muro Ami: The Making prior to its
broadcast by television and
(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was
enforceable and binding on petitioner.
First, Section 3 of PD 1986[5] empowers the MTRCB to
screen, review and examine all motion pictures,
television programs including publicity materials. This
power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and
Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which
reads
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No
motion picture, television program or related publicity
material shall be imported, exported, produced,
copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or
broadcasted by television without prior permit issued
by the BOARD after review of the motion picture,
television program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power of
review are those expressly mentioned in Section
7,[6] such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a
publicity for the movie, Muro Ami. In adopting this
finding, we hold that Muro Ami: The Making, did not
fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore
within the power of review of MTRCB.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that Muro Ami:
The Making was a public affairs program.[7] Even if
that were so, our resolution of this issue would not
change. This Court has already ruled that a public
affairs program -- described as a variety of news
treatment; a cross between pure television news and
news-related commentaries, analysis and/or
exchange of opinions -- is within the MTRCBs power of
review.[8] Clearly, MuroAmi: The Making (which
petitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was
well within the purview of MTRCBs power of prior
review.
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the
subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which
was the basis of the suspension order, was not
binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of
1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires
each agency to file with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the
Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which
are not published or filed with the ONAR are
ineffective and may not be enforced. [9]
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for
the penalties for the first, second and third offenses
for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit,
has not been registered with the ONAR as of January
27, 2000.[10] Hence, the same is yet to be
effective.[11] It is thus unenforceable since it has not
been filed in the ONAR.[12] Consequently, petitioner
was not bound by said circular and should not have
been meted the sanction provided thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 18, 2001, insofar as it affirmed the public
respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Boards jurisdiction over Muro Ami: The
Making, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued
against petitioner GMA Network, Inc. pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is hereby declared
null and void.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS QUE PO LAY
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection
with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to
pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in
possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting
to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following the
receipt of such foreign exchange as required by
Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that
said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official
Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the
appellant, and that consequently, said circular had
no force and effect. It is contended that
Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both
require said circular to be published in the Official
Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
applicability. The Solicitor General answering this
contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638
and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official
Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation
of a law in order to have force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in
question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned
in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions,
decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to
be of no force and effect. In other words, said two
Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette,
presumably, for the guidance of the different
branches of the Government issuing same, and of
the Bureau of Printing.
However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect
at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the
Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or
law but being issued for the implementation of the
law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and
effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See
U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities
cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and
regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty
for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory
that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents
and its penalties.
Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has
a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding
twenty days after their promulgation, and that their
promulgation shall be understood as made on the
day of the termination of the publication of the laws
in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article
is of the opinion that the word "laws" include
regulations and circulars issued in accordance with
the same. He says:
El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del
codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en
el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de
leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas
por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el
poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como
lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus
disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que
empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en
la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente
inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o
del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol.
I. p. 52).
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3
months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is
clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision,
did not have any legal effect and bound no one until
its publication in the Official Gazzette or after
November 1951. In other words, appellant could not
be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at
the time he was found to have failed to sell the
foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this
question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which
cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may
raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has
been raised in the court below and which is within
the issues made by the parties in their pleadings.
(Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the
question of non-publication is fundamental and
decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not
been published as required by law before its
violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no
such circular to be violated and consequently
appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be
said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be
raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not
raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision
appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.
PEOPLE VS MACEREN
AQUINO, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967
regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law
creating the Fisheries Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo
Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito
del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary
investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused
in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro
fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with
motor; with a generator colored green with attached
dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and
electrocuting device locally known as sensored with
a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other
end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment
which was attached to the dynamo direct and with
the use of these devices or equipments catches fish
thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic
animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and
prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court
quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the
order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is
now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution
under Republic Act No. 5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be
penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I
of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at
all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by
substances. The lower court further held that, since
the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider
it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that section
11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any
obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who
uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor
more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for
not less than six months nor more than five years.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not
expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the
silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The
order is quoted below: ñé+.£ªwph!1
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL
WATERS ñé+.£ªwph!1
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended,
and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules and
regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing
in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for
the information and guidance of all
concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1
SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in
this Order 11 construed as follows:
(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the
Philippines' includes all waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United
States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of
December, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the
seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the
purpose of this order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of
fresh waters are included.
(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of
fish with the use of electric current. The equipment
used are of many electrical devices which may be
battery or generator-operated and from and
available source of electric current.
(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association,
agent or employee.
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any
person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by
the use of electric current in any portion of the
Philippine waters except for research, educational
and scientific purposes which must be covered by a
permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times.
SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of
this Administrative Order shall subject the offender to
a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00)
or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or
both at the discretion of the Court.
SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative
orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions
of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.
SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall
take effect six (60) days after its publication in the
Office Gazette.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative
Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro
fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine
waters" found in section 2, was changed by the
amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water
fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of
fresh water."
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11
of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable
under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under
section 76 thereof), which provides that any other
violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or
in t for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court."
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the
aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a
fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in
electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that
the Department of Fisheries prescribed their own
penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the
severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is
not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter
penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of electro
fishing would be within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary
Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the
briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro
fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People
vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531 and
the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal
court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the
order of d rendered by that municipal court was
directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of
First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of
section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-
25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had
no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order
affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is
void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated
as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this
Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not
issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as
indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an
obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is
not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal
provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that
electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by
means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance
under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the
prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department
Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the
function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce
the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations
Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules
and regulations consistent with the purpose for the
creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the
development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic
Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to
encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing
resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4)
section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that
"any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
As already pointed out above, the prosecution's
reference to section 83 is out of place because the
penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order
No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section
83.
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in
issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-
1 and that those orders are not warranted under the
Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words,
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing
electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro
fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2)
unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful
taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of
sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other
violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically
punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing
electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an
offense fails within the category of "other violations"
because, as already shown, the penalty for electro
fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for
fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as
the penalty for "other violations" of the law and
regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself. (People vs.
Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p.
11 32).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished
electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against
electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries.
The amendment created the impression that electro
fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be
tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances
strengthens the view that the old law does not
eschew all forms of electro fishing.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that
electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law
and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive
revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704,
which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and
decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was
promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269),
expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and
salt water areas.
That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1
SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught
fish or fishery/aquatic products. — It shall he unlawful
for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to
be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic
products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by
the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1),
(m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ...
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic
Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential
Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts,
Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and
penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the
deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries
Law. It is an admission that a mere executive
regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro
fishing.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is
found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries
Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note
further that the decree penalty electro fishing by
"imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years", a
punishment which is more severe than the penalty of
a time of not excluding P500 or imprisonment of not
more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making power of
executive officials and administrative agencies and,
in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural
Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the view
that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by
means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making
powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All
that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and
that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director
of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA
1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all
the details in the enforcement of a particular statute
(U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs.
Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co.,
Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative
agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation
of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of
legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the
growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication
of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law"
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs.
Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should
be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the
law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina,
supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422;
Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-
25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs.
General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971,
42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it his been enacted. The power
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs.
Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46.
As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs.
Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655,
676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-
27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources has rule-making powers.
Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the
Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions,
orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as
may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions
thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of
Natural Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries
law, Presidential December No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the
Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations
consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and
for the development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that "the Department Head shall have the
power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do
so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and
other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the
proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and
dependencies of his Department, and for the strict
enforcement and proper execution of the laws
relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
Department; but none of said rules or orders shall
prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except
as expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department
Head in conformity with law have the force of law
(Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural
Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs.
Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he
exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the
lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not
transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for
the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be
improperly exercising legislative power in his own right
and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic
principle that administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for
constitutional officials who can trace their
competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a
public office must be in the statute relied upon a
grant of power before he can exercise it."
"department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the
authority conferred by statute." (Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago,
L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8).
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in
pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred
upon the administrative agency by law, partake of
the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith
may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in
the law. This is so because statutes are usually
couched in general terms, after expressing the
policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to
the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules
and regulations are the product of a delegated
power to create new or additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation
should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited
in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security
Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the
basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra,
promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of
technical men in the executive departments, who
draft rules and regulations, to the importance and
necessity of closely following the legal provisions
which they intend to implement so as to avoid any
possible misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed
by an executive officer of the government in
conformity with and based upon a statute
authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense
and renders the offender liable to punishment in
accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs.
Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or
regulation validly issued can constitute a crime
punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and
by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil.
1125, 1132).
It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute
a crime and how it shall be punished is a power
vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not
be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am.
Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery,
73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro
fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries
Law, under which the regulation was issued, because
the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil.
300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish and
Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the
Fisheries Law.
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not
licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the said
administrative order may fish within three kilometers
of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military
reservations authorities of the United States only upon
receiving written permission therefor, which
permission may be granted by the Secretary upon
recommendation of the military or naval authorities
concerned. A violation of the proviso may be
proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal
Penal Code.
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that
provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for
having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and
anchor without permission from the Secretary within
three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor
Island.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not
prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing
within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and
reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by
naval and military authorities of the United States,
without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the
military and naval authorities concerned.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned
in section 28 of the administrative order, the
promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is
equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power
which has not been and cannot be delegated to
him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking
body. "Such an act constitutes not only an excess of
the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary
but also an exercise of a legislative power which he
does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is
null and void and without effect". Hence, the charge
against Santos was dismiss.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an
administrative agency has the right to make ranks
and regulations to carry into effect a law already
enacted, that power should not be confused with
the power to enact a criminal statute. An
administrative agency can have only the
administrative or policing powers expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs.
State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr.
2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or
administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative
purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards, which have the effect of extending, or which
conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power
but constitute an attempt by an administrative body
to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac.
2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative
order, it must clearly appear that the order is one
which falls within the scope of the authority conferred
upon the administrative body, and the order will be
scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra).
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized
the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate,
amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules
and regulations governing and/or prohibiting
the taking of the various classes of game.
Under that statute, the Game Commission
promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer,
pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for
the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of
any game animal, game bird or game fish or any
part thereof."
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store,
regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person
displaying the largest deer in his store during the
open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he
was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated
by the State Game Commission.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing
the display of game. What the statute penalized was
the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to
prohibit the display of game, it could have readily
said so. It was not lawful for the administrative board
to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the
indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case
is similar to this case.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9,

1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and
the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal
court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is
affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.