Admin Cases 10.2.2018 PDF

10/2/2018 G.R. No.
L-15138
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961
BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ATANACIO A. MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-15377 July 31, 1961
NUMERIANA RAGANAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SEN BEE TRADING COMPANY, MACARIO TAN, and SERGIO TAN, defendants-appellees.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-16660 July 31, 1961
VICENTE ROMERO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANGEL HERNANDO ETC., and SIA SENG, respondents-appellants.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-16781 July 31, 1961
CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY, and LAO KANG SUY, petitioners-appellees,

vs.
ATANACIO A. MARDO, JORGE BENEDICTO, and CRESENCIO ESTAÑO, respondents-appellants.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-17056 July 31, 1961
FRED WILSON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MELITON C. PARDUCHO, ETC., and MARIANO PABILIARE, respondents-appellees.
R. L. Resurreccion for petitioner-appellee.

Paciano C. C. Villavieja for respondents-appellants.
BARRERA, J.:
These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here treated together in this single
decision because they present but one identical question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-
A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the authority of
Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional
Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and
separation pay, etc.
In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a
complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from
December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being
paid separation pay. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. Upon
receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor
required Miller to file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil
Case No. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case, for the reason
that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. The court then
required the Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and, as prayed for, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The
latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as
implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the
Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from
violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court. Answers were
then filed and the case was heard. Thereafter, the court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos. 997
and 1241, as well as Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A issued pursuant
thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to
take cognizance of money claims arising from violations of labor standards. The question of venue was also
dismissed for being moot, the same having been already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition previously filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v. De Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed
for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7, 1958. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
respondents Hearing Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us.
In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a complaint (RO
3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and
Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955, for
which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal holidays) and
vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. Chin Hua Trading, et al.,
filed their answer and, issues having been joined, hearing thereof was started before Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio
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10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-15138
Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. Before trial of the case could be terminated, however, Chin Hua
Trading, et al., filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
(Civil Case No. 26826)), to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the disposition of the case, on the
ground that they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same, as Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and Executive Order
No. 218, series of 1956, in relation to Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, empowering
them to adjudicate the complaint, is invalid or unconstitutional. As prayed for, a preliminary injunction was issued by
the court. After due hearing the court rendered a decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void
and therefore, granted the writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously issued. From
this decision, the claimant and the hearing officers appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us,
as it involves only questions of law.
In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil
Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she
was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she was
underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for judgment on the
amount due her for the same plus damages. To said complaint, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground
that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should, under
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor; and there is pending
before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a claim for separation vacation, sick and maternity leave pay
filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). Acting on said motion, the court
dismissed the case, relying on the provision of Section 25, Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and on our
resolution in the case of NASSCO v. Arca, et al. (G.R. No. L-12249, May 6, 1957). From this order, appellant
Raganas appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said court certified the case to us.
In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint
(Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia
Seng, filed an answer. At the date set for hearing the latter did not appear despite due notice to him and counsel.
Upon his petition, Romero was allowed to present his evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered by the Hearing
Officer in favor of Romero. Upon the latter's motion for execution, the records of the case were referred to Regional
Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ of execution, being the officer charged with the duty of
issuing the same. Hernando, believing that Sia Seng should be given a chance to present his evidence, refused to
issue the writ of execution and ordered a re-hearing. As a consequence, Romero filed with the Court of First
Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus (Case No. Br. II-35) praying that an order be issued commanding
respondent Regional Labor Administrator to immediately issue a writ of execution of the decision in Wage Case No.
196-W. To this petition, respondent Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that it
states no cause of action, but action thereon was deferred until the case is decided on the merits. Sia Seng filed his
answer questioning the validity of the rules and regulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No.
20-A. After hearing, the court rendered a decision ordering, inter alia, respondent Regional Labor Administrator to
forthwith issue the corresponding writ of execution, as enjoined by Section 48, of the Rules and Regulations No. 1 of
the Labor Standards Commission. From this decision of the Court of First Instance, Sia Seng and Regional Labor
Administrator Hernando appealed to us. Appellant Sia Seng urges in his appeal that the trial court erred in not
dismissing the petition, in spite of the fact that the decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered
by a hearing officer who had no authority to render the same, and in failing to hold that Reorganization Plan No. 20-
A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a complaint
(IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic,
Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was summarily dismissed without
cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. He also claimed that during his employment he was not paid
for overtime rendered by him. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtime and separation pay.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that said regional office "being purely an administrative
body, has no power, authority, nor jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action." Said
motion to dismiss having been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho, petitioner Fred Wilson &
Co., Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
injunction (Civil Case No. 41954) to restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case, and praying,
among others, that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice) on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of
the Department of Labor, be declared null and void and unconstitutional. As prayed for, the court granted a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer and the case was heard. After
hearing, the court rendered a decision declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A.
1241, Plan No. 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in 1956' (Res. of May 6,
1957 in National Shipyards Steel Corporation v. Vicente Area, G.R. No. L-12249). It follows that the questioned
reorganization Plan No. 20-A is valid.".
Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. appealed directly to us from this decision.
The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject matter
involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which is hereunder quoted:
25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the
Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards
on working conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay
and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay
and payment for medical services of domestic help.
Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;
(b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, unpaid
wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and .
(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of
domestic help.
Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of Labor, except the Workmen's
Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law, had
no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had being to mediate merely or
arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing, In case of refusal by a party to submit to such settlement, the remedy
is to file a complaint in the proper court.1
It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those sought
to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore
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exercised by it. The question thus presented by these cases is whether this is valid under our Constitution and
applicable statutes.
It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government
Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered —
(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which
way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis
supplied.)
But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial functions. For
the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the
Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No. 1241),
which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution expressly provides that "the Judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of
the Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be conceded that the legislature may
confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as
incident to the performance of administrative functions.2 But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in
express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be
valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively
vested in the courts.3
If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies with
quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body
such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection with the
reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L-14837 and companion cases,
June 30, 1961);
. . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize the transfer of powers
and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be
created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial
powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission
was not authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said
jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could
not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive body, as the
Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of
the Government. (Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. vs. Price Stabilization Board, G.R. No. L-4465, July 12,
1951; Surigao Consolidated vs. Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-5692, March 5, 1954; U.S. vs.
Shreveport, 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. ed 175, and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11 Am. Jur 921-922.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-judicial functions to the
Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the
non-disapproval of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic Act
No. 997, as amended. It is, in effect, argued that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is not merely the creation of the
Reorganization Commission, exercising its delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congress itself, a regular
statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the
enabling act.
The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of this argument reads as follows:
SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the President during the Second
Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session, and
those of the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the
Second Session, shall be deemed approved after the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress
following the date on which the plan is transmitted to it, unless between the date of transmittal and the
expiration of such period, either House by simple resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any,
modification thereof. The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may, likewise, be approved
by Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period.
It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the
President who, in turn, transmitted the same to Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its sessions
without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that,
independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion), said plan,
nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision.
Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. By specific
provision of the Constitution —
No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form
furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly
(Congress), except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon
the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall
be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI).
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be
returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by
adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within
thirty days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).
A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and that
prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the first, consent or
approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case, the
contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by each House
of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two
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houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law
is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).
Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure, as that word is commonly
used and understood, and with the requirement presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the
effect suggested in counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the
Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by Congress. Such a
procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way, if Congress is so disposed, because of
weakness or indifference, to eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under our
Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. To sanction such a procedure will
be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme four democracy.
Even in the United States (in whose Federal Constitution there is no counterpart to the specific method of passaging
laws prescribed in Section 21[2] of our Constitution) and in England (under whose parliamentary system the Prime
Minister, real head of the Government, is a member of Parliament), the procedure outlined in Section 6(a) herein
before quoted, is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule-making power, to preserve the control of the
legislature and its share in the responsibility for the adoption of proposed regulations.4 The procedure has ever
been intended or utilized or interpreted as another mode of passing or enacting any law or measure by the
legislature, as seems to be the impression expressed in one these cases.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as
confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's
Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect.
This ruling does not affect the resolution of this Court in the case of National Steel & Shipyards Corporation v. Arca
et al., G.R. No. L-12249, dated May 6, 1957, considering that the said case refers to a claim before the Workmen's
Compensation Commission, which exercised quasi-judicial powers even before the reorganization of the
Department of Labor.
WHEREFORE
(a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G.R. No. L-15138 is hereby affirmed,
without costs;
(b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G.R. No. L-16781 is hereby affirmed,
without costs;
(c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed from in case G.R. No. L-15377 is
set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without costs;
(d) In case G.R. No. L-16660, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, directing the Regional Labor
Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of the Regional Office No. 2, is hereby reversed, without costs;
and .
(e) In case G.R. No. L-17056, the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before the Regional office No. 3, is hereby reversed and
the preliminary injunction at first issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs. SO
ORDERED.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Concepcion and Paredes JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Potente v. Saulog, G.R. No. L-12300, April 24, 1959; Figueroa v. Saulog, G.R. No. L-12745, June 29, 1959;
Santos v Caparas, G.R. No. L-11777, June 29, 1959; La Union Labor Union v. Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing
and Redrying Corporation, G.R. No. L-14087, June 30, 1960.
2 16 CJS 866.
3 Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 218 P. 563, 161 CA. 770.
4 Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) p. 76, et seq.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
10/2/2018 Cabarrus Jr vs Bernas : AC 4634 : September 24, 1997 : J. Torres, Jr : Second Division
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4634. September 24, 1997]
JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant, vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS,

respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and
Code of professional Resposibility. In his complaint-affidavit [1] dated August 12, 1996, complainant
alleged as follows:
A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia
Bernas, a notary public in Makati City, wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and certification of
non-forum shopping which was appended to a complaint for reconveyance of property and damages,
denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region, RTC,
which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said complaint is hereto attached and
marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the
test (sic) of Annex A-6, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of
which are true to his personal knowledge and that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency. If he should learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that the fact within Five (5) days
from the notice to this notice (sic) to this Honorable Court. Underscoring supplied.
C.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery
as gleaned from paragraph 15, 16, and 22;
D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant complaint,
respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for
falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at
the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a xerox copy of said complaint is
hereto attached and marked as Annex B.
D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same
legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646;
D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the
NBI for the same cause of action which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI standard specimen
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/sep1997/ac_4634.htm 1/4
signitures dated October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto attached and marked as Annexes (sic)
C.
E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings
knowingly subverted and perverted the truth when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, that:
He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency. Where verification-certification was
placed under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of respondent in both cases at
Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus
(sic) of the Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same
lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired and
confabulated with each other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and deliberate violation of Art. 172 of
the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.- The penalty of prison correctional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than p 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in
any public or official document or letter of exchange (sic) or any other kind of commercial documents; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or the damage of another or
who, with the intent to cause such damage , shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article, or any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated abetted and facilitated the
perversion and subversion of truth in the said verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Contrary to
Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the code of Professional responsibility for Lawyers, the
pertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as
Annex E;
CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
In his Comment, [2] respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum
shopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in the civil
action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not
yet been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exist when
identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora.
In his Supplemental Comment,[3] respondent further contends that neither he or his client Pascual
has commenced any criminal action. Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in the investigation
or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would determine probable caused, would be appropriate. It was only upon request of
the NBI the he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant. Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted
to the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power
and is incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the
circular.
The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No.
28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative complaint bereft of merit and
should be dismissed.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resort
to forum shopping because by filling another petition involving the same essential facts and
circumstances, xxx, respondents approached two different for a in order to increase their chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action, [4] In this case, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty.
Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the
the alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus.[5] The filing of the civil case for
conveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent
to institute a criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal
case without violating the circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No.
28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court
when it promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure-which is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[6]
Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 [7], specifically section 1 hereof provides, viz:
Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which shall have
the following functions:
(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its initiative
and as public interest may require;
(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes and other
offenses;
(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other infromations for the benefit and use of the
prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the Philippines, identification records of all person without
criminal convictions, records of identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership or possession of all
firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom;
(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-enforcement officers and entities of the Government as well
as the courts that may request its services;
(e) To extend its services, whenever properly requested in the investigation of cases of administrative or civil
nature in which the Government is interested;
(f) To undertake the instruction and training of representative number of city and municipal peace officers at the
request of their respective superiors along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order
to insure greater efficiency in the discharge of their duties;
(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conduct researches inn furtherance
of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation;
(h) To perform such other related function as the secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.
Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief
to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are
merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public
welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes
which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person responsible for
defrauding his client.
The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91
and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers
and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make
binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the
Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, p.2.

[2] Rollo, p.29.
[3] Rollo, p. 58.
[4] Silahis International Hotel, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 104513, August 4, 1993, 225 SCRA 94.
[5] Annex C, rollo, p.17.
[6] Gabioza vs. CA, G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994, 234 SCRA 192.
[7] An Act Creating a Bureau of Investigation, Providing Funds Therefor, And For Other Purposes.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24281 May 16, 1967
ROSITA C. TALEON and MIGUEL SOLIS, petitioners appellants,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE DISTRICT ENGINEER, Province of
Davao,
and LUCIA O . TOLENTINO, respondents-appellees.
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners-appellants.

Tolentino, Amoguis and Madrazo for respondent-appellee L. O. Tolentino.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico de Castro and Solicitor C. S.
Gaddi for respondent-appellee Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner-appellant Rosita Taleon is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Lupon, Davao, which she acquired
from her co-petitioner-appellant Miguel Solis who had constructed therein man-made canals and fishpond dikes.
On April 17, 1961, respondent-appellee Lucia Tolentino wrote a letter-complaint to the Secretary of Public Works
stating that several fishpond operators and/or owners in Lupon, Davao have built dams across and closed the
Cabatan River, a public navigable stream, thereby depriving her and the residents therein of passageway, fishing
ground and water supply. This letter-complaint was formally amended on June 9, 1961, wherein Tolentino specified
appellants Taleon and Solis, and another neighbor, one Humberto de los Santos, as those responsible for the
closing of the alleged Cabatan River, on the banks of which their lands abutted. On June 13, 1961, Taleon filed her
answer denying the existence of the alleged river and claiming that the dams were constructed inside her registered
property and that her water source was a man-made canal connected to the sea.
An administrative hearing was thereafter held. On July 11, 1961, the Secretary of Public Works, through the
department undersecretary, rendered a decision finding that appellants were indeed obstructing the Cabatan River,
a Public navigable stream which used to pass inside their lands, with the dams they constructed thereon, and
ordering their demolition. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider claiming that the ruling was contrary to the facts
established and that the Secretary had no jurisdiction over the Case. This was denied.
Appellants elevated the case to the Office of the President on October 11, 1961. After reviewing the records, said
office affirmed on November 10, 1961 the decision of July 11, 1961. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider based
on an alleged decision of Public Works Secretary Moreno rendered on November 24, 1961, reversing the former
ruling of July 11, 1961. On January 10, 1962, the Office of the President denied the motion, on two grounds: (1) An
official examination of the records of the case showed that said decision of Secretary Moreno did not form part
thereof, and (2) even if it were genuine, it had no legal effect since the Secretary had already lost jurisdiction when
appellants filed their appeal to the President.
On February 9, 1962, Taleon was informed by the District Engineer of Davao that her dams would be demolished on
February 16, 1962, upon orders of the Executive Secretary, the administrative decision having become final and
executory. To stop the threatened demolition, appellants filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Davao against the
Public Works Secretary and the Engineer of Davao. They were able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction on
February 15, 1962.
On September 1, 1962, appellants filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against the herein respondents-appellees in the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the latters' respective
answers were filed and the case in Davao was dismissed, upon appellants' motion, said Manila court issued the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for, altho in form a temporary restraining order with bond.
The issues having been joined, a pre-trial conference was held and the Court of First Instance of Manila allowed
respondents to file a motion to dismiss the petition. Upon orders of said court, the administrative records were sent
up. On January 11, 1965, acting on the respective memoranda submitted by the parties in support of and in
opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, the court a quo ruled that appellants were given a fair hearing in the
administrative case and that the decision therein was supported by the evidence adduced and dismissed the petition
stating:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the respondents' Motion to Dismiss, GRANTED. Let this petition be, as it
hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioners.
The temporary restraining order issued on 17 December 1962 is hereby dissolved and the bond filed by
petitioners, cancelled.
Taking issue with this ruling, the petitioners instituted the present appeal, raising questions purely of law. They
submit that the court a quo erred in dismissing the case without giving them a full trial, thereby depriving them of the
opportunity to prove that the alleged extension of the Cabatan River passing across their property is but a
depression and that the decision rendered by Secretary Moreno on November 24, 1961, is genuine. Appellants also
reiterate that the Secretary of Public Works has no jurisdiction over the case, since the dams and the body of water
in question were located inside registered private property.
Appellants' contentions are without merit. First of all, full trial was not needed. The issues raised before the court a
quo were all purely legal and thus could be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda filed and the
administrative records sent up to it. No necessity was there for further reception of evidence.
Anent the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works, this point has been squarely covered in Lovina v. Moreno, L-
17821, November 29, 1963.1 There We upheld the power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic Act 2056 to
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declare as a public navigable stream any alleged depression or bodies of water even inside titled properties. That
case involved a creek, located inside a titled land, which was alleged to be privately owned. The Public Works
Secretary declared it as part of a public stream which plaintiffs therein had blocked with their dams. In sustaining the
Secretary, We there ruled that such fact-finding power on his part was merely incidental to his duly to clear all
navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions and, hence, its grant did not constitute an unlawful delegation of
judicial power. And we remarked there that although the title was silent as to the existence of any stream inside the
property, that did not confer a right to the stream, it being of a public nature and not subject to private appropriation,
even by prescription.
Appellants would offer affidavits — which are hearsay2 — and testimonies aliunde to show that the alleged Cabatan
River inside their property is really a mere depression. As also enunciated in Lovina v. Moreno, supra, however,
there cannot be a trial de novo in cases of this nature, since a review of an administrative finding is limited to the
evidence already presented before the administrative body.3 This rule bars presentation of evidence aliunde and
limits the trial court's functions to determining whether there is evidence in the administrative records substantial
enough to support the findings therein. Here, the records of the administrative case were actually brought up and
submitted to the court a quo and it held that the administrative finding that the alleged depression was really a part
of the navigable Cabatan River was supported by substantial evidence. Said court fully did its duty, to have gone
further would have been exceeding its power.
Regarding the alleged second decision of the Secretary, its non-existence has been officially certified by the Chief of
the Records Division of the Department of Public Works, the official custodian.4 This alone is proof enough that
there is no such decision.5 But even granting that there is really such a decision, it would not help appellants' cause
any. Said decision would still be wanting of legal force and effect since Secretary Moreno had already lost
jurisdiction to revoke the former ruling because of the appeal then already taken by appellants themselves to the
Office of the President, which affirmed the former ruling. And even conceding jurisdiction, the second decision could
still affect nothing since it was actually revoked and reversed by the ruling of the Office of the President, dated
January 10, 1962, which denied the motion to reconsider filed by appellants wherein they invoked said new
decision. So, a full trial to prove the authenticity of the Moreno decision would be a pointless waste of the court a
quo's time.
It is recognized that the trial court may dismiss a petition for certiorari even after an answer is filed upon a motion to
dismiss, where said petition is found to be patently without merit.6 But the court a quo did not summarily dismiss the
petition. It conducted a pre-trial conference and even ordered the records in the administrative case to be elevated
to it. Now the Rules of Court7 authorizes the trial court to render judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment,
as justice may require, if at the pre-trial it finds that facts exist which would warrant such judgment. All the necessary
facts being already before the court a quo, no further trial was required. Its decision rendered at that stage was
therefore sanctioned by the Rules.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners-appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1See also Borja v. Moreno, L-16487, July 31, 1964.
2Ismael v Guanzon, 2 Phil. 347.
3See also Timbancaya v. Vicente, L-19100, Dec. 27, 1963.
4Records, p. 221.
5Sec. 29, Rule 132, Rev. Rules of Court; People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564.
6Arvisu vs. Vergara, 90 Phil. 621; Chan vs. Galang, L-21732, Oct. 17, 1966.
7Sec. 3, Rule 20, Rev. Rules of Court.
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10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-43653
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43653 November 29, 1977
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and DIEGO MORALES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45378 November 29, 1977
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES. INC. (RCPI), petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and PACIFICO INNOCENCIO, respondents.
Treñas & Aligaen for petitioner.
R. Mag. Bernardo for respondent Morales.
Silvestre T. de la Cruz for respondent Innocencio.
Primitivo C. Santos for respondent Board.
MARTIN, J.,
These two petitions (G.R. No. L-43653 and G.R. No. L-45378) for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Board
of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01-OC, entitled "Diego T Morales vs. Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)" and BC Case No. 75-08-OC, entitled "Pacifica Innocencio vs. Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)," have been Consolidated as per resolution of this Court dated March 21, 1977, as they
involve the same issue as to whether the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages
allegedly suffered by private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short.
In BC Case No. 75-01-OC (G.R. No. L-43653) complainant respondent Diego Morales claims that while he was in
Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of
his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to
be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the
trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted
from Santiago, lsabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio
signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of
the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional
expenses and prays for damages.
In BC Case No. 75-08-OC (G.R. No. L-45378) complainant respondent Pacifico Innocencio claim that on July 13,
1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at
Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was
never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said
address, the sender (Lourdes Innocencio has not been notified about its non-delivery, As a consequence Pacifica
Innocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI
to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he
visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal
inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages.
After hearing. the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and
unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of
Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. I and Letter of Implementation No. 1.
The main thrust of the argument of petitioner is that respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take
cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by
Article 1170 of the Civil Code 1 and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of the Civil Code 2 which
according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and not in the Board of Communications.
We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in
interest, the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such
jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute".3 The functions of
the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. 4 As successor in interest of the Public Service
Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the
Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public
Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But
this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters
not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to
promote public interest. But even assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power or jurisdiction over
petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of
fine under Section 21 of the Public Service Act, because this provision of the law subjects to a fine every public service that
violates or falls to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the
Commission. In the two cases before us petitioner is not being charged nor investigated for violation of the terms and
conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulations of the respondent Board of
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Communications. The complaint of respondents in the two case was that they were allegedly inconvenienced or injured by
the failure of the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives which according to
them constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. The charges however, do not
necessarily involve petitioners failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or regulation
of respondent Board of Communication. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not been charge of any violation or
failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of
the respondent Board. The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of
messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants
Diego Morales and Pacifica Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising
from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner
should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of
P200 upon the petitioner. In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-
29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled:
There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of
Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be
any clearer . The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates It could not
take to task a radio company for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority.
That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of validity.
In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the
required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it
to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion.
WHEREFORE. both decisions of respondent Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01 OC and BC Case
No. 75- 08-0C are hereby reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of
both cases. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 ART. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
2 ART. 2176, Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi- delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter.
3 Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil. Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860.
4 Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Public Service Commission, L-25994 and L-26004-26046,
August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 1111.
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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 142601 October 23, 2006
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE DEL MONTE,
BULACAN, SPS. ANGEL and ROSARIO CRUZ, RUFINO LAAN, RUFINO LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES
NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO and HERMINIA HAGOS, LEON GUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR and HAYDEE
BADILLO, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated November 16,
1999 and Resolution dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54495, entitled "NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
petitioner, versus, The Hon. Rufino V. Mijares, in his capacity as Commissioner, Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP), Municipality of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, represented by Hon. Eduardo V. Roquero,
in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, JOSEPH ELMER S. GUEVARRA, Sheriff IV of
the Ex-Officio Sheriff, Malolos, Bulacan, SPS. ANGEL A. CRUZ and ROSARIO C. CRUZ, RUFINO LAAN, RUFINA
LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO HAGOS and HERMINIA HAGOS, LEON GUILALAS,
SPS. OSCAR R. BADILLO and HAYDEE M. BADILLO, and LEONCIO LAAN, respondents."
The undisputed facts are:
Since 1968, there has been an existing boundary dispute between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan
(one of herein respondents) and the City of Caloocan. In order to resolve the long-challenged conflict, the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte passed and approved Resolution No. 20-02-943 on February 10, 1994.
This resolution recognizes the official boundary of respondent municipality and the City of Caloocan, described as
follows:
ON JOINT MOTION of all members present;
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved to recognize the official boundary of the Municipality of San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan and the City of Caloocan, Metro Manila as the true and correct line marking between the two
Local Government Units as shown by the attached certified true copy of the geographic position and plain grid
coordinates of Caloocan, Rizal per CAD-267 specifically from MBM (Municipal Boundary Monument) 22 to
MBM 33;
xxx
On August 8, 1995, another Resolution4 was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte recognizing
the geographic position and plane coordinates of Tala Estate, Caloocan City contained in BM No. 11-24 as the "lot
lines" delineating the boundary between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. This prompted
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region III to conduct a relocation survey.
On September 15, 1995, the survey team submitted a Comprehensive Report,5 some excerpts of which provide:
ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS
1. The geographic positions of MBM Nos. 22 to 33, Cad 267, Caloocan Cadastre was the basis for the
establishment of the true and correct boundary between the municipality and Caloocan City. However, during
the dialogue with concerned government agencies on May 12, 1995, the municipality of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, emphasized that the boundary between the two local government units is the imaginary straight line
between two boundary monuments, starting from MBM Nos. 22 to 33.
2. The FNSP-G surveying team plotted/drafted in a topographic map all pertinent records affecting boundary
disputes of the two locality, such as the geographic positions and coordinates of MBM Nos. 22 to 33 Cad 267
Caloocan Cadastre, BM Nos. 11 to 23 of Tala Estate lot lines. Tala Estate lot lines were plotted approximately
by scale, because there were no records on its geographic coordinates and incomplete cadastral maps. The
findings are the following:
a) The plotted positions of MBM Nos. 23 to 30, 32 and 33 Cad 267 Caloocan Cadastre are almost
identical or equivalent to BM Nos. 12 to 16, 18 to 20, 22 and 23 of Tala Estate.
b) The lot lines of Tala Estate traverses thru Marilao River.
c) The northern portion of the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3 SWO-41615 Tala Estate indicated that it
traverses thru Marilao River.
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3. In Municipal Resolution No. 06-08-95 dated August 8, 1995, it is requested that the geographic positions of
BM Nos. 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be recognized as the official lots lines which delineates the boundaries of
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and Caloocan City. Moreover, the resolution is opposed to the delineation of
Marilao River as the boundary of two localities, as embodied in SWO-41615.
4. If the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615 will be the basis for the boundaries of the two LGUs,
Marilao River will be the natural boundary between the two LGUs; if BM 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be the
basis for the boundaries, some northern portions of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615, portions of Bankers
Village and Pangarap Village belongs to the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan."
The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del Monte Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions contradict the
delineation embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala Estate, a 598-hectare property allotted by the government mainly
for housing and resettlement site under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA), pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.
Unsatisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a complaint with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),6 against petitioner NHA. Several residents of San Jose del Monte,
namely: spouses Angel and Rosario Cruz, Rufino Laan, Rufina Laan Santos, Andres Nepomuceno, spouses Alberto
and Herminia Hagos, Leon Guilalas, spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo, and Leoncio Laan (herein private
respondents) joined the municipality as complainants in the said case. They alleged that their properties are within
the Municipality of San Jose del Monte; that Presidential Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and
that the NHA’s Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their landholdings. They prayed that the NHA be
ordered to award them damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as a party in their complaint.
On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution ruling that the correct boundary between respondents San
Jose del Monte and Caloocan City is that specified in the twin Resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan of said
respondents. The COSLAP likewise held that all other issues, such as those raised by respondents, are mere
incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that the land covered by the NHA project, being within the
Municipality of San Jose del Monte, encroaches upon respondents’ properties.
On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (Bureau), attended a meeting held on January 26, 1999 between the
local officials of respondent municipality and Caloocan City. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an avenue
for the discussion of the territorial boundary between the two local government units. During the meeting, petitioner
NHA posed strong opposition to the COSLAP Resolution, contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the
boundary dispute. Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 30
days.
Instead of submitting a position paper, respondent municipality filed with the COSLAP a motion for execution of its
Resolution dated June 22, 1998. On May 17, 1999, the COSLAP granted the motion and issued a writ of execution.
Petitioner NHA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that in issuing the June 22, 1998
Resolution and the writ of execution, COSLAP acted without jurisdiction.
On November 16, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time and for
petitioner’s failure to avail of the remedy of appeal.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can
never become final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question.7
The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between
respondent municipality and Caloocan City.
COSLAP was created by Executive Order No. 561 issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. The Commission is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of land problems to avoid social unrest. Its objective is to settle land conflicts among small
settlers, landowners and members of cultural minorities.
The powers and functions of the COSLAP are laid down in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561, thus:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or
dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for
instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivisions of lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.
xxx
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as
are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes.8 In acting on a land dispute, the COSLAP may either
assume jurisdiction if the matter falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the matter to an agency having appropriate
jurisdiction.
There is no provision in Executive Order No. 561 that COSLAP has jurisdiction over boundary dispute between two
local government units. Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the respective legislative
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 142601
councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their boundary disputes. Sections 118 and
119 provide:
Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.
xxx
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the
date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute
shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above.
Section 119. Appeal. – Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate
the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area
in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof.
Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for all
legal purposes.
Rule III implementing the above provisions states:
Rule III
SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES
Art. 15. Definition and Policy. – There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of
an LGU is claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably.
Art. 16. Jurisdictional Responsibility. – Boundary disputes shall be referred for settlement to the following:
(a) Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan for disputes involving two (2) or more barangays
in the same city or municipality, as the case may be;
(b) Sangguniang panlalawigan for those involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province;
(c) Jointly, to the sanggunians of provinces concerned, for those involving component cities or
municipalities of different provinces; or
(d) Jointly, to the respective sanggunians, for those involving a component city or municipality
and a highly urbanized city or two (2) or more highly-urbanized cities. x x x
Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case, the COSLAP should have referred respondents’ complaint to
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Caloocan City and the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte. Their decision
may be appealed to the proper Regional Trial Court.
Consequently, we rule that the COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between San Jose del
Monte and Caloocan City. We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is
void.9 Such nullity is correctable only by certiorari.10 And certiorari cannot be dismissed for timeliness inasmuch as
a void judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its nullity does not prescribe.11 Having no legal
effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position
they were in before the trial.12
Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in disposing NHA’s petition for certiorari. It should have dismissed the petition,
not on the grounds that it was filed late and that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, but solely on the
ground that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject boundary dispute.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54495 are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. (retired)
3 Annex "C," Rollo, pp.30-31.
4 Kapasiyahan Blg. 06-08-95.
5 Annex "D," Rollo, pp.32-36.
6 COSLAP Case No. 98-038.
7 Longino v. General, et al., G.R. No. 147956, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 423.
8 Ibid.
9 Leonor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112597, April 2, 1996, 256 SCRA 69.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 142601
10 Cochingyan, Jr. v. Cloribel, et al., Nos. L-27070-71, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 361.
11 Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119193, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 672.
12 MWSS v. Sison, No. L-40309, August 31, 1983, 124 SCRA 394.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 147525
FIRST DIVISION
BONIFACIO ESPINOZA, G.R. No. 147525

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA* and
GARCIA, JJ.
PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF
THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION
OFFICE OF PAMPANGA and
MARIA QUIBULOY,
Respondents. Promulgated:
February 26, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
[1] [2]
Under review are the January 14, 1994 decision and June 01, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 502 UDK. The CA dismissed petitioner Bonifacio Espinozas petition
for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the provincial adjudicator of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Office (PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga in deciding DARAB Case
No. 203-P-90.
The events leading to this petition for review on certiorari stemmed from an agrarian dispute before
[3]
the PARAD, San Fernando, Pampanga. A complaint for ejectment was filed against petitioner by
private respondent Maria V. Quibuloy, as co-owner and administratrix of three parcels of land covered by
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/feb2007/147525.htm 1/7
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 147525
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3676. She alleged that petitioner had reneged on his obligations as tenant
to pay the rent and till the subject landholding.
Instead of answering the complaint, petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. He
cited Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules), providing for conciliation proceedings before the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) prior to initiating the case. He contended that presentation of a
certification from the BARC, attesting that the dispute had been submitted to it for mediation or
conciliation without any success of settlement, was a jurisdictional requirement. On that note, he
concluded that the provincial adjudicator could not take cognizance of the agrarian dispute due to
Quibuloys failure to present the required certificate.
[4]
The hearing on the motion to dismiss was set on November 7, 1990. On the said date, petitioner or his
[5]
counsel failed to appear, hence the motion was submitted for resolution.
Without issuing a ruling on petitioners motion, the provincial adjudicator set the case for hearing on May
22, 1991. Again, neither petitioner nor his counsel attended the hearing. Thus, Quibuloy was allowed to
[6]
present her evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the dispute was ordered submitted for decision.
Just before the decision was rendered, petitioner filed his answer assailing Quibuloys personality to bring
suit. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated denials of Quibuloys charges. As his defense, he denied
allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the land for lack of knowledge and information to
form a belief as to the veracity thereof.
The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that Quibuloys allegations were true and correct.
[7]
Accordingly, he decided the case against petitioner.
Instead of immediately appealing from the adjudicators decision, petitioner allowed the reglementary
period to lapse. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 147525
[8]
The appellate court dismissed the petition as unavailing and vacuous. It reiterated the well-settled rule
that certiorari lies only in cases of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It stressed that
certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Now, petitioner comes to us with practically a rehash of the issues already raised in the CA, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OF
PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN PROCEEDING WITH DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRST
COMPLYING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN SECTION 1, RULE III
OF THE [1989] DARAB REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE [PARAD] OF
PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRST
RESOLVING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS ANSWER TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT IN DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90 WAS FILED OUT OF TIME
AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE SAME.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-
90 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THE BASIS OF THE SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT OF
THE LATTER AND HER LONE WITNESS CONSIDERING HER FAILURE TO PRESENT THE TITLE
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION (TCT NO. 3676) OR ANY DOCUMENT TO SHOW HER AUTHORITY
TO ACT AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SAME.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CAs] DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND DENIAL
[9]
OF [PETITIONERS] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS PROPER.
We deny the petition.
A special civil action of certiorari is an independent action, raising the question of jurisdiction where the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
[10]
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The ultimate
purpose of such action is to keep an inferior tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve parties
[11]
from arbitrary acts of courts.
A petition for certiorari was never meant as a mode of reviewing errors of judgment committed by
an inferior tribunal. Thus, it has been settled that the remedy of certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 147525
[12]
lost by the party entitled thereto especially if the right of appeal was lost through negligence. When
the remedy of appeal is available but is lost due to petitioners own negligence or error in the choice of
remedies, resort to certiorari is precluded.
[13]
Under the 1989 DARAB Rules, an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of a provincial adjudicator
to the Adjudication Board within 15 days from receipt. In this case, petitioner allowed the appeal period to
lapse and instead filed a petition for certiorari in the CA roughly three months after the assailed decision
was rendered.
It is evident that the CA acted on the petition properly.
Even if, in the greater interest of substantial justice, certiorari may be availed of, it must be shown that the
adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that is, that the
adjudicator exercised his powers in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostilities, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
[14]
to act in contemplation of law.
As correctly found by the appellate court, there is no showing that errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion were committed by public respondent.
On the first assigned error, the 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in non-adjoining barangays
[15]
from presenting the BARC certification. Since it is undisputed that Quibuloy resided in San Nicolas
1st, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner stayed in San Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga, the former was not
required to present the BARC certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the agrarian
dispute. Needless to say, the provincial adjudicator did not err in entertaining the dispute notwithstanding
the absence of the BARC certification.
On the second issue, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are not bound by
technical rules followed in courts of law. The adjudicator is given enough latitude, subject to the essential
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requirements of administrative due process, to be able to expeditiously ascertain the facts of the agrarian
[16]
dispute.
While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in disposing of the
motion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion
justifying a writ of certiorari. Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators, the
order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion to dismiss. What would have been the prudent
recourse under the rules was to submit an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and appeal an
adverse decision. Sadly, petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for him to dispute the
adjudicators decision.
Moving on to the third assignment of error, we hold that petitioners answer was indeed filed out of time.
While the 1989 DARAB Rules provides that the non-answering respondent (petitioner) may be allowed to
belatedly file his answer, it also provides that the answer should be filed before the matter is submitted for
decision. Here, petitioner submitted his answer after the case was submitted for decision.
Lastly, on the fourth assignment of error, it cannot be overemphasized that only errors of jurisdiction may
be reviewed by the CA in a petition for certiorari. Where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom
or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is
[17]
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
In sum, the petition failed to prove that the CA committed any reversible error in denying petitioners
petition for certiorari as well as his motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
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WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras (retired) and Ramon Mabutas, Jr.
(retired) of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 75-80.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria (dismissed from the
service) and Jose L. Sabio, Jr. of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, p. 90.
[3]
Docketed as DARAB Case No. 203-P-90.
[4]
Order dated September 7, 1990 signed by Hearing Officer Jose V. Reyes of the PARAD, Pampanga, rollo, p. 34.
[5]
Order dated December 10, 1990 signed by Hearing Officer Jose V. Reyes of the PARAD, Pampanga, rollo, p. 35.
[6]
Order dated August 21, 1991 signed by Provincial Adjudicator Toribio E. Iloa, Jr. of the PARAD, Pampanga, rollo, p. 38.
[7]
Decision dated November 7, 1991, penned by Provincial Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. of the PARAD, Pampanga; rollo, pp. 43-48.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 147525
[8]
Supra note 1, at p. 78.
[9]
Petition, rollo, pp. 10-11.
[10]
Romero v. Tan, G.R. No. 147570, 27 February 2004, 424 SCRA 108.
[11]
II Justice Jose Y. Feria and Maria Concepcion S. Noche, CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, 456-457 (2001).
[12]
Alon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132431, 13 February 2004, 422 SCRA 550.
[13]
Under Section 1, Rule XXIV, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, [a]ll cases pending with the [DARAB] and the Adjudicators, prior to the date
of effectivity of these rules, shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing. When the complaint was filed in
1990, the rules prevailing at that time was the 1989 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
[14]
See Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164561, 30 August 2006.
[15]
Rule III of the 1989 DARAB Rules provides:
Section 1. BARC Certification Requirement. The Board or its Adjudicators shall not take cognizance of any agrarian dispute or
controversy, unless a certification is presented from the [BARC] of the Barangay where the land involved is located, attesting that
the dispute has been submitted to it for mediation or conciliation without any success of settlement, provided that:
a) The dispute does not fall under any of the exceptions enumerated in the succeeding section;
b) xxx;
c) xxx;
d) xxx.
Section 2. Exceptions. BARC Certification under these rules shall not be required in the following cases:
a) xxx;
b) where the parties reside in different barangays unless, they adjoin each other, in which case, the matter will be mediated
or conciliated in the Barangay where it is first brought;
c) xxx;
d) xxx;
e) xxx.
[16]
See Rule 1, Section 3 and Rule VIII, Section 1, 1989 DARAB Rules, December 26, 1988.
[17]
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142051, 24 February 2004, 423 SCRA 605.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 164763
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164763 February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review1 of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan2 for malversation of public
funds3 under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is not a big case but its implications are wide-ranging and the issues We resolve include the rights to speedy
trial and speedy disposition of a criminal case, the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment.
The Facts
On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, Provincial Auditor’s Office, Bohol,4
conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon,
Bohol.
Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his office on December 28, 1988. A radio message was sent to
Loon, the town where he resided, to apprise him of the on-going audit. The following day, the audit team counted the
cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was
found in the safe of petitioner.
The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination,5 which also contained an inventory of
cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36,
instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.6
The report also contained the Cash Production Notice7 dated January 4, 1989, where petitioner was informed and
required to produce the amount of P72,784.57, and the cash count sheet signed and acknowledged by petitioner
indicating the correctness of the amount of P21,331.79 found in his safe and counted in his presence. A separate
demand letter8 dated January 4, 1989 requiring the production of the missing funds was sent and received by
petitioner on January 5, 1989.
When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of
the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and
the rest for his medicine.9
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum10 dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the
Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol the amounts of
P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively. On February 14, 1989, petitioner again remitted to the Provincial
Treasurer an additional amount of P35,000.00, followed by remittances made on February 16, 1989 in the amounts
of P2,000.00 and P2,784.00.
An administrative case was filed against petitioner on February 13, 1989. He filed an Answer11 dated February 22,
1989 reiterating his earlier verbal admission before the audit team.
On April 17, 1989, petitioner again remitted the amount of P8,000.00 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol. Petitioner
had then fully restituted his shortage in the amount of P72,784.57. The full restitution of the missing money was
confirmed and shown by the following receipts:12
Official Receipt Date Issued and Amount

No. Received
8266659 January 16, 1989 P10,000.00
8266660 January 16, 1989 P15,000.00
8266662 February 14, 1989 P35,000.00
8266667 February 16, 1989 P 2,000.00
8266668 February 16, 1989 P 2,784.00
8266675 April 17, 1989 P 8,000.00
TOTAL - P72,784.57
Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information that read:
That on or about the period covering from December 28, 1988 to January 5, 1989, and for sometime prior
thereto, in the Municipality of Tubigon, Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Zenon R. Perez, a public officer being then Acting Municipal
Treasury of the said Municipality, by reason of the duties of his official position was accountable for the public
funds collected and received by him, with grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully, unlawfully
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and feloniously misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and take away from the said funds the total amount of
SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR PESOS and 57/100 (P72,784.57), which
said fund was appropriated and converted by the said accused to his own personal use and benefit to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13 (Underscoring supplied)
On March 1, 1990, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of "not guilty."14
Pre-trial was initially set on June 4-5, 1990 but petitioner’s counsel moved for postponement. The Sandiganbayan,
however, proceeded to hear the case on June 5, 1990, as previously scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution
witness Arlene R. Mandin, who came all the way from Bohol.
On said date, the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to present its witness. Arlene
R. Mandin testified as narrated above.
The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself. He denied the contents of his first
Answer15 to the administrative case filed against him by the audit team. He claimed it was prepared without the
assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation and submission, he was not in peak mental and physical
condition, having been stricken with diabetes mellitus.16
He then revoked his Answer dated February 22, 1989 and filed his second Answer dated March 2, 1989.17 In the
latter, he vehemently denied that he incurred a cash shortage P72,784.57.
According to petitioner, the alleged shortage was in the possession and custody of his accountable personnel at the
time of the audit examination. Several amounts totalling P64,784.00 were remitted to him on separate dates by his
accountable officer, starting January 16, 1989 to February 16, 1989. The same were turned over by him to the Office
of the Provincial Treasurer, leaving an unremitted sum of P8,000.00 as of February 16, 1989.18 He remitted the
P8,000.00 on April 17, 1989 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol, fully restoring the cash shortage.
Petitioner further testified that on July 30, 1989, he submitted his Position Paper19 before the Office of the
Ombudsman, Cebu City and maintained that the alleged cash shortage was only due to oversight. Petitioner argued
that the government did not suffer any damage or prejudice since the alleged cash shortage was actually deposited
with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer as evidenced by official receipts.20
Petitioner completed his testimony on September 20, 1990. He rested his case on October 20, 1990.21
Sandiganbayan Disposition
On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ZENON R. PEREZ, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code and, there being one mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance
to offset the same, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual special disqualification. The accused Zenon R. Perez is
likewise ordered to pay a FINE equal to the total amount of the funds malversed, which is Seventy-Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P72, 784.57).
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On January 13, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration23 which the prosecution opposed on January 28,
2004.24 Petitioner replied25 to the opposition. On August 6, 2004, petitioner’s motion was denied with finality.
On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to the instant appeal26 raising the following issues, to wit:
I. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN BY UNDULY AND UNREASONABLY DELAYING THE DECISION OF THE
CASE FOR OVER THIRTEEN (13) YEARS VIOLATED THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE AND DUE PROCESS.
II. THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS
CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE
CONSTITUTION.27 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
Before addressing petitioner’s twin assignment of errors, We first tackle the propriety of petitioner’s conviction for
malversation of public funds.
I. Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation.
Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts punished as
malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting,
or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or property, and (4)
being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.28
There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are:
(a) That the offender be a public officer;
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.29
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the commission of the crime charged,
petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public
office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control.
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The question then is whether or not petitioner has appropriated, took or misappropriated, or consented or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take such funds.
We rule in the affirmative.
In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he
could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse
for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to
explain satisfactorily.30
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of
malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce
public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is
prima facie case of conversion.31
Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to
adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the
presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the
accused may be convicted under the said provision.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the
presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or
property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed.32
In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he
malversed the missing funds in his custody or control. What is extant in the records is that the prosecution, through
witness Arlene R. Mandin, was able to prove that petitioner malversed the funds under his custody and control. As
testified by Mandin:
Atty. Caballero:
Q: Was Mr. Zenon Perez actually and physically present during the time of your cash examination?
Witness:
A. Yes, Sir.
Q: From December 28, to January 5, 1989?
A: He was present on December 28, 1988 and January 4 and 5, 1989, Sir.
Q: Did he not make any verbal explanation as the reason why he was short of about P72,000.00,
after you conducted the cash count on January 5, 1989?
A: Yes, Sir, he did.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told us that he used some of the money to pay for the loan of his brother and the other
portion was spent for food of his family; and the rest for his medicine.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer filed at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol in the
administrative case filed against him.
In that Answer, petitioner narrated how he disposed of the missing funds under his custody and control, to wit: (1)
about P30,000.00 was used to pay the commercial loan of his late brother; (2) he spent P10,000.00 for the
treatment of his toxic goiter; and (3) about P32,000.00 was spent for food and clothing of his family, and the
education of his children. He there stated:
1. That the circumstances surrounding the cash shortage in the total amount of P72,784.57 during the
examination of the respondent’s cash accounts by the Commission on Audit on December 28-29, 1988 and
January 4-5, 1989 are as follows, to wit:
(a) That respondent paid the amount of about P30,000.00 to the Philippine National Bank,
Tagbilaran Branch as interests of the commercial loan of his late brother Carino R. Perez using
respondent’s house and lot as collateral thereof. If the interests would not be paid, the loan would be
foreclosed to respondent’s great prejudice and disadvantage considering that he and his family are
residing in said house used as collateral;
(b) That respondent spent the amount of P10,000.00 in connection with the treatment of his toxic
goiter;
(c) That the rest of the amount amounting to about P32,000.00 was spent by him for his family’s
foods, clothings (sic), and education of his children because his monthly salary is not enough for
the needs of his family.34
By the explicit admission of petitioner, coupled with the testimony of Arlene R. Mandin, the fourth element of the
crime of malversation was duly established. His conviction thus stands in terra firma.
True it is that petitioner filed another Answer on March 2, 1989 with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol,
substantially changing the contents of his earlier answer of February 22, 1989. His second Answer averred:
3. That the truth of the matter is that the alleged total cash shortage of P72,784.57 were still in the possession
and custody of his accountable personnel at the time of the examination held by the auditor of the
Commission on Audit;
4. That out of the alleged cash shortage of P72,784.57, almost all of said amount were already remitted to
him by his accountable personnel after January 5, 1989, and only the remaining amount of P8,000.00
remains to be remitted to him by his accountable personnel.35
The sudden turnaround of petitioner fails to convince Us. To Our mind, petitioner only changed his story to
exonerate himself, after realizing that his first Answer put him in a hole, so to speak.
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It is contended that petitioner’s first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not have been given probative weight
because it was executed without the assistance of counsel.36
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an
administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not
indispensable in administrative proceedings.
Walang batas, hurisprudensiya, o tuntunin na nagsasabi na ang isang kawani ay dapat may tulong ng
abogado sa isang kasong administratibo. Sa katunayan, ang hurisprudensiya ay iisa ang sinasabi na ang
pagtulong ng isang abogado ay hindi kailangang-kailangan sa kasong administratibo.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right
afforded a suspect or accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.37
Ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado, na hindi maaaring talikdan malibang ang waiver ay nakasulat at sa
harap ng abogado, ay karapatang ibinibigay sa suspek o nasasakdal sa isang custodial investigation. Ito ay
hindi lubos na karapatan at maaring hingin o tanggihan sa isang prosesong kriminal, at lalo na sa isang
administratibong pagsisiyasat.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.38
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.39
Kung gayon, ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado ay hindi sapilitan sa isang administratibong
imbestigasyon sapagkat ito ay ginagawa lamang upang malaman kung may sapat na batayan na patawan
ng disiplina ang nagkasalang opisyal o empleyado, para mapanatili ang dignidad ng paglilingkod sa
pamahalaan.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented
by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause
such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen
is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.40
More than that, petitioner’s first Answer may be taken against him, as he executed it in the course of the
administrative proceedings below. This is pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court which provides that
the "act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him." In People v. Lising,41 the
Court held:
Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule
that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him. This is based
upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were
true. A man’s act, conduct and declarations wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible
against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they
are not.
There is also no merit in the contention that petitioner’s sickness affected the preparation of his first Answer. He
presented no convincing evidence that his disease at the time he formulated that answer diminished his capacity to
formulate a true, clear and coherent response to any query. In fact, its contents merely reiterated his verbal
explanation to the auditing team on January 5, 1989 on how he disposed of the missing funds.
II. There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of the case and to due process of law.
We now discuss the right to a speedy trial and disposition, the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual
punishment.
Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of his case was violated because the
decision of the Sandiganbayan was handed down after the lapse of more than twelve years. The years that he had
to wait for the outcome of his case were allegedly spent in limbo, pain and agony.42
We are not persuaded.
Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to mean "a law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."43 Petitioner cannot complain that his
right to due process has been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to present his case, and the
Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after considering all the pieces of evidence presented before it.
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case must also fail.
The 1987 Constitution44 guarantees the right of an accused to speedy trial. Both the 1973 Constitution in Section 16
of Article IV and the 1987 Constitution in Section 16 of Article III, Bill of Rights, are also explicit in granting to the
accused the right to speedy disposition of his case.45
In Barker v. Wingo,46 the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first time with two "rigid approaches"
on speedy trial as "ways of eliminating some of the uncertainty which courts experience protecting the right."47
The first approach is the "fixed-time period" which holds the view that "the Constitution requires a criminal
defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time period."48 The second approach is the "demand-waiver rule"
which provides that "a defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he
has not demanded trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the consideration of
the speedy trial right."49
The fixed-time period was rejected because there is "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial can be
quantified into a specific number of days or months."50 The demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because
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aside from the fact that it is "inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights,"51 "it is
insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental."52
The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which "the conduct of both the prosecution
and defendant are weighed."53 Mr. Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We
can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a
particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways,
we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.
Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will
provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To
take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for
a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too,
different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as
negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the
defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. We
have already discussed the third factor, the defendant’s responsibility to assert his right. Whether and
how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of
his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and
most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he
experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant’s
assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the
defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult
for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of
the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has
identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety
and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these,
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is
also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory,
however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.54
(Emphasis supplied)
Philippine jurisprudence has, on several occasions, adopted the balancing test.
In 1991, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan,55 this Court ruled:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered. (Underscoring
supplied)
Subsequently, in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,56 this Court again enumerated the factors that should be considered
and balanced, namely: (1) length of delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused; and (4) prejudice caused by the delay.57
Once more, in Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,58 this Court reiterated that the right to speedy disposition of cases,
like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.59 In the determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.60 The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant, the length
of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.61
Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be based on a mere
mathematical reckoning of time.62
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of
his case.
More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want a speedy disposition of his
case.63 Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted for decision up to the time he was found guilty
by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation which could be construed
even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched without delay.
Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve
years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some
overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right.64
Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their
rights. Ang panahon ay hindi panig sa mga tamad at pabaya sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis sed non
dormientibus jura in re subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber in their rights. Ang batas ay
tumutulong sa mga mapagbantay at hindi sa mga humihimbing sa kanilang karapatan.
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Pending his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived in suspicion and anxiety for over
twelve years. However, any prejudice that may have been caused to him in all those years was only minimal. The
supposed gravity of agony experienced by petitioner is more imagined than real.
This case is analogous to Guerrero v. Court of Appeals.65 There, the Court ruled that there was no violation of
petitioner’s right to speedy trial and disposition of his case inasmuch as he failed seasonably to assert his rights:
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy
disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would
have just continued to sleep on his right – a situation amounting to laches – had the respondent judge not
taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so
he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years
between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was re-raffled, the accused
showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new Constitution took effect, or
at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to
transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as
a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and
although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights should not work
against and preclude the people’s equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three people
died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the
disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has
completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position
to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to
give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
III. The law relied upon in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does not violate Section 19,
Article III of the Bill of Rights.
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly defined.66 The Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution,67 the source of Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights68 of our own Constitution, has
yet to be put to the test to finally determine what constitutes cruel and inhuman punishment.69
Cases that have been decided described, rather than defined, what is meant by cruel and unusual punishment. This
is explained by the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court that "[t]he clause of the Constitution, in the
opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."70
In Wilkerson v. Utah,71 Mr. Justice Clifford of the United States Supreme Court opined that "[d]ifficulty would attend
the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, x x x and all others in the same
line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the constitution."72
In In Re: Kemmler,73 Mr. Chief Justice Fuller of that same Court stated that "[p]unishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies x x x something more inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life."74
Again, in Weems v. U.S.,75 Mr. Justice McKenna held for the Court that cadena temporal and its accessory
penalties "has no fellow in American legislation. Let us remember that it has come to us from a government of a
different form and genus from ours. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows
imprisonment. It is unusual in character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on
account of their degree and kind. And they would have those bad attributes even if they were found in a Federal
enactment, and not taken from an alien source."
In Echegaray v. Executive Secretary,76 this Court in a per curiam Decision held that Republic Act No. 8177,77 even
if it does not provide in particular the details involved in the execution by lethal injection, is not cruel, degrading or
inhuman, and is thus constitutional. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.78
The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.79
In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of
public funds "that ha[ve] been replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel and therefore
unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any damage."80
The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or
shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.81
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a
mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in
violation of, the Constitution.82 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.83 It is
presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that
every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.84
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He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to the
Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman,
like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
IV. On the penalty
The Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In imposing the
penalty, it found that petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of payment which is akin to voluntary
surrender.
Article 217 penalizes malversation in the following tenor:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than 12,000 but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification
and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses. (Underscoring supplied)
The amount malversed totalled P72,784.57. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua, which has a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
However, the commission of the crime was attended by the mitigating circumstance akin to voluntary surrender. As
correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner restituted the full amount even before the prosecution could
present its evidence. That is borne by the records.
It bears stressing that the full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused, as
payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum
misappropriated, even before the commencement of the criminal prosecution, does not exempt the guilty person
from liability for the crime.85 At most, then, payment of the amount malversed will only serve as a mitigating
circumstance86 akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 1387 in relation to paragraph
1088 of the same Article of the Revised Penal Code.
But the Court also holds that aside from voluntary surrender, petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
no intention to commit so grave a wrong,89 again in relation to paragraph 10 of Article 13.90
The records bear out that petitioner misappropriated the missing funds under his custody and control because he
was impelled by the genuine love for his brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the funds
to pay off a debt owed by his brother. Another portion of the misappropriated funds went to his medications for his
debilitating diabetes.
Further, as shown earlier, petitioner restituted all but Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) of the funds in less than
one month and a half and said small balance in three (3) months from receipt of demand of COA on January 5,
1999. Evidently, there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Of course, the end does not justify the means. To condone what petitioner has done because of the nobility of his
purpose or financial emergencies will become a potent excuse for malefactors and open the floodgates for more
corruption in the government, even from "small fry" like him.
The bottom line is a guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances and commensurate with
the gravity of the offense committed. Thus, a reduction in the imposable penalty by one degree is in order. Article 64
of the Revised Penal Code is explicit:
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. – In cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contains three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three
difference penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and
77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty, the following rules, according to whether there
are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
xxxx
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may
deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)
Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, the prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, to be imposed in any of its periods. The new penalty
has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,91 the maximum term could be ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, while the minimum term is again one degree lower92 and could be four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional maximum.
In the 1910 case of U.S. v. Reyes,93 the trial judge entered a judgment of conviction against the accused and meted
to him the penalty of "three years’ imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he failed to pay, which subsidiary imprisonment,
however, should not exceed one third of the principal penalty" and to be "perpetually disqualified for public office and
to pay the costs." This was well within the imposable penalty then under Section 1 of Act No. 1740,94 which is
"imprisonment for not less than two months nor more than ten years and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of
not more than the amount of such funds and the value of such property."
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused’s conviction was affirmed but his sentence was modified and reduced
to six months. The court, per Mr. Justice Torres, reasoned thus:
For the foregoing reasons the several unfounded errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been
fully refuted, since in conclusion it is fully shown that the accused unlawfully disposed of a portion of the
municipal funds, putting the same to his own use, and to that of other persons in violation of Act. No. 1740,
and consequently he has incurred the penalty therein established as principal of the crime of
misappropriation; and even though in imposing it, it is not necessary to adhere to the rules of the Penal Code,
the court in using its discretional powers as authorized by law, believes that the circumstances present in the
commission of crimes should be taken into consideration, and in the present case the amount
misappropriated was refunded at the time the funds were counted.95 (Underscoring supplied)
We opt to exercise an analogous discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification. He is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine of
P72,784.57, the amount equal to the funds malversed.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
*
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Vice Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. Justice Nazario is on official leave per Special Order No.
484 dated January 11, 2008.
1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court per A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, with Associate Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro
(now a member of this Court) and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 25-38.
3 Criminal Case No. 14230.
4 Pursuant to Office Order No. 88-55 dated December 22, 1988 issued by Provincial Auditor Fausto P. De La
Serna. (Annex "B")
5 Exhibit "C."
6 Exhibit "E."
7 Exhibit "D."
8 Exhibit "F."
9 TSN, June 25, 1990, p. 25.
10 Exhibit "E."
11 Exhibit "G."
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12 Exhibits "H" & "H-1" to "H-5."
13 Rollo, pp. 25-26.
14 Id. at 26.
15 Exhibit "G."
16 Exhibits "1" to "3."
17 Exhibit "5-B."
18 Exhibit "5."
19 Exhibit "7."
20 Exhibits "7-a" to "7-f."
21 Rollo, p. 26.
22 Id. at 37.
23 Id. at 39-44.
24 Id. at 45-48.
25 Id. at 49-52.
26 Id. at 11-24.
27 Id. at 17.
28 Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code (Book II), 15th ed., rev. 2001, pp. 393-394.
29 Id. at 394. See also Nizurtado v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 107838, December 7, 1994, 239 SCRA 33, 42;
Peñanueva, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 98000-02, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 86, 92.
30 De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. L-54288, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337, 347 (emphasis ours), citing
Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. II, 1976 ed., citing People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856 (1953); U.S. v.
Javier, 6 Phil. 334 (1906); U.S. v. Melencio, 4 Phil. 331 (1905). See also Quizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-
77120, April 6, 1987, 149 SCRA 108.
31 Quizo v. Sandiganbayan, supra at 113, citing U.S. v. Catolico, 18 Phil. 504 (1911).
32 Id.
33 TSN, June 5, 1990, p. 25.
34 Exhibit "G."
35 Exhibit "5."
36 TSN, September 20, 1990, pp. 37-39.
37 Lumiqued v. Exevea, G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 125, 138-139.
38 Id. at 140, citing Bancroft v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of Oklahoma, 210 P. 2d 666 (1949).
39 Id. at 141.
40 Nera v. The Auditor General, G.R. No. L-24957, August 3, 1988, 164 SCRA 1.
41 G.R. Nos. 106210-11, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 595, 624, citing Vicente, F., Evidence, 1990 ed., p.
305.
42 Rollo, p. 19. Petitioner claims that he had to wait for more than thirteen (13) years. However, this is
erroneous. The records would show that he rested his case on October 20, 1990, while the Sandiganbayan
handed down its questioned Decision on September 24, 2003, or after the lapse of twelve (12) years and
eleven (11) months.
43 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 946.
44 Bill of Rights of the Constitution (1987), Art. III, Sec. 14 provides:
(1) No person shall be heard to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witness face to
face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis
supplied)
45 "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies."
46 407 US 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).
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47 Barker v. Wingo, id. at 112.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 114.
50 Id. at 113.
51 Id. at 114.
52 Id. at 116.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 116-118.
55 G.R. No. 94750, July 16, 1991, 199 SCRA 298, 307.
56 G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 478.
57 Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 485, citing Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 136757-58, November
27 2000, 346 SCRA 108; Dansal v. Fernandez, Sr., G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 145, 153;
Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 101689, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 55, 63.
58 G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 423, 425-426.
59 Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, id., citing Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 28,
2004, 430 SCRA 121.
60 Id., citing Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141710, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 236.
61 Id., citing Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 143885-86, January 21, 2002, 374 SCRA 200, 203.
62 Id., citing Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83 & 128136, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 65.
63 See Barker v. Wingo, supra note 46.
64 See Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 56, at 488.
65 G.R. No. 107211, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 703, 715-716.
66 Weems v. U.S., 217 US 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L. Ed. 793, 19 Am. Ann. Cas. 705 (1910).
67 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted. (Emphasis supplied)
68 Bill of Rights of the Constitution (1987), Art. III, Sec. 19 provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee, or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman condition shall be
dealt with by law. (Emphasis supplied)
69 See note 43.
70 Weems v. U.S., supra note 66, citing Mackin v. U.S., 117 US 348, 350, 29 L. Ed. 909, 910, 6 S. Ct. Rep.
777; Ex parte Wilson, 114 US 417, 427, 29 L. Ed. 89, 92.
71 99 US 130.
72 Wilkerson v. Utah, id. at 135.
73 136 US 436, 10 S. Ct. 930, 34 L. Ed. 519.
74 In Re: Kemmler, id. at 524.
75 Supra note 66.
76 G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 754.
77 An Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection as the Method of Carrying Out Capital Punishment,
Amending For the Purpose Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, As Amended by Section 24 of Republic Act
No. 7659. Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 were,
however, declared INVALID: (a) Section 17 because it "contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659;" and (b) Section 19 because it "fails to provide for review
and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence, unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel."
78 Echegaray v. Executive Secretary, supra at 777.
79 Id. at 778-779, citing Ex Parte Granvel, 561 SW 2d 503, 509 (1978), citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 78 S.
Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958); Estella v. Gamble, 429 US 97, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 258-259
(1976).
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80 Rollo, p. 22.
81 See Revised Penal Code, Art. 217.
82 Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA
128, citing San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, G.R. No. L-39699, March 14, 1979, 89 SCRA 69; Phil. Long
Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 (1952); Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil.
634 (1945).
83 Id., citing In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
84 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 96(a).
85 U.S. v. Reyes, 14 Phil. 718 (1910). See also People v. Livara, 94 Phil. 771 (1954).
86 Estamos con el. Hon. Procurador General en que ha lugar a estimar la devolución hecha por e apelante
de la cantidad defraudada como circumstancia atenuante especial sin ninguna agravante que la compense.
Esto así, procede condenar al apelante a sufrir en su grado minímo la pena señalada por la ley. (People v.
Velasquez, 72 Phil. 98, 100 [1941]) (Italics supplied)
87 Revised Penal Code, Art. 13, Par. 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation
of the evidence for the prosecution.
88 Id., Sec. 10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above
mentioned.
89 Revised Penal Code, Art. 13, Par. 3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.
90 Supra note 88.
91 Act No. 4103, as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, provides:
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act. No. 4225)
92 Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41061, July 16, 1990, 187 SCRA 484.
93 14 Phil. 718, 721 (1910).
94 Enacted on October 3, 1907.
95 Id. at 725-726.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29169
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE
CITY JAIL OF MANILA, respondents.
Estanislao E. Fernandez and Fausto Arce for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court
is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which
resulted in his conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. There
is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the
two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the
said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
The indictment in the court below — the third amended information — upon which the judgment of conviction herein
challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-
143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. Accused were the
following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias
"Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses,
Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.2
Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November, 1962, in Quezon City, the
accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun
Hiok y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified nor apprehended, pleaded
not guilty.
1äwphï1.ñët
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Quezon City.
The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this case, is here reproduced:.
COURT:
The parties may proceed.
FISCAL GRECIA:
Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:
I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of the Fiscal in
presenting him as his witness. I object.
COURT:
On what ground, counsel? .
ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at this stage, without my being
notified by the Fiscal, my client is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that
it is only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal):
You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making [him a] state witness?.
FISCAL GRECIA:
I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.

I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.
ATTY. CARBON:
As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
COURT:
The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and explain to his client
about the giving of his testimony.
xxx xxx xxx

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COURT: [after the recess]
Are the parties ready? .
FISCAL:
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
ATTY. CARBON:
As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to confer with my client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution this morning after I
have explained to him the consequences of what will transpire.
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the
accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection
and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witnessstand.
ATTY. CARBON:
I submit.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is something so sudden
that has come to the knowledge of this counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever testimony this witness
will bring about. I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this witness.
ATTY. CRUZ:
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal case are those only listed
in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the prosecution.
COURT:
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give them time within
which to prepare for their cross-examination of this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
Call the witness to the witness stand.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the Manila Police
Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law, declared as follows:
ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what the prosecution events
to establish by calling this witness to the witness stand.
ATTY. IBASCO:
I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3
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And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by the court below may be briefly
narrated as follows:
A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With
Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez
asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on
November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that
he had changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car
for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis
Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo
Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise
the money. His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a
buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car.
Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the
plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird. 1äwphï1.ñët
In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an appointment. Sometime in
the afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the
interested buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee agreed on
the purchase price (P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the
car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the
drafting of the deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun
Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then drove in the Thunderbird car to
that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was ready at the Dalisay
Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same
time he requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer.4
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the table to pose for pictures
with some fans and come back, again left never to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the
pretext of buying cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place
where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its loss to the police.
Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a
restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00
cash and a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the registration
of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in
Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio, may be condensed as
follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station. The latter informed him that
there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that
it could be held for him with a down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain Nena Hernaez de los Reyes
who wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a loan to Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and
Chavez then went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City Mayor, and Narsing
Cailles, Chief of the Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000-loan backed up by the P5,000.00-
check aforesaid on condition that it should not be cashed immediately as there were not enough funds therefor.
Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the money the nextday as long as the check would be left with them and
Sumilang would sign a promissory note for P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up the
money the next day. Four or five days afterwards, Chavez returned P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was
enough for the deposit. And so, Sumilang gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang for another P3,000.00.
Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note requesting that they accommodate him once more. He
also sent a check, again without funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car was ready if Sumilang was
ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his
aparador. He immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It
was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents
commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated. There, Sumilang, also saw a
friend, "Ging" Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction
thru Chavez. Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for
his money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt
already signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did.
This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the deed of sale, the registration
papers and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the
wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a film shooting at Bulacan. He
saw Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him
for P22,500.00. As the offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting what they
wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised
to pay the next day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was
impounded.
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The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that
he paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a
mere buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias
"Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in
court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of
fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."5 The trial court
branded him "a self-confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger Chavez tried to drag his co-
accused down with him by coloring his story with fabrications which he expected would easily stick together
what with the newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But Roger Chavez'
accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated. And coming, as it does, from a man who has
had at least two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this information, the Court would
be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his words even if they concerned a man no less notorious than
himself.7
The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his car, he had no one but Roger
Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez who was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
not less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the
costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who
was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the
balance of the contract price for the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for Roger Chavez, to show cause
within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason for
this is that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the period for the filing thereof lapsed
on January 27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also stated that if she were allowed
to file appellant's brief she would go along with the factual findings of the court below but will show however that its
conclusion is erroneous.8
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move
to reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution,
disposed to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez
is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid
Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for
execution of judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.
Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we now come to grips with the
main problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's assertion that he was compelled to
testify against himself. For indeed if this one question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in
which case, these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his right — constitutionally
entrenched — against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his
conviction; that he be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself,"9 fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court
where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against
himself." .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the fundamentals of a republican
government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of
political liberty and personal freedom."11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of this
constitutional inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the
continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even
in England. While the admissions of confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always
ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection
with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials,
notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give
rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be
founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a
popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American
jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the
American colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part
of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this
country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed.,
819, 821)." 12 Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in
the early days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks of this
constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States"; as having "its origin in a protest
against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the
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Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit
to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of
the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental to our
scheme of justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking
thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as
well as the innocent and foresighted." 16
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is
mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and substantive right. Tañada and Fernando (Constitution of
the Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the
constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy because it
would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to
extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. 17
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor
may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a
confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of
unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational
choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending
to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 18
2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was
called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof.
Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that
he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of
the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense
counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is
that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself.
The foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness
may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any
and all questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to
incriminate him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant
in a joint trial.23
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall not be compelled to furnish
evidence against himself "is not the probability of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it
was undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness-stand including the
accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to interpose his objection
and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer questions which would
incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p.
355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from
thence, and he is exposed" — to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object to have the accused called on the
witness stand" — wielded authority. By those words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived
him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to tell the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand.
Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a witness for the People is at once
apparent. The record discloses that by leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement
given to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this statement detailed the plan
and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car.
And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the
case. 27
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built primarily
around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution".
Indeed, the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution
witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that
"even accused Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez
"testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is "a self-
confessed culprit". 1äwphï1.ñët
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full
breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being
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accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is
not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings
before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he
escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be
taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became fruitless, no objections to
questions propounded to him were made. Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a
defendant's constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the
beginning is a continuing one. 1äwphï1.ñët
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal, and
intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully
accorded. After a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a
shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains
valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to the guilty. 30
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally
considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction 33 and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
34 That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas
corpus. 35 This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. 36
Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. 37 The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39 the
writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect 40 so as to protect well a person
whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another
constitutional right, in this wise:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of Counsel,
compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's
authority. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary element of
the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by
Counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment
stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his liberty. A court's
jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete
the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If
this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed.
The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder
may obtain release of habeas corpus. 41
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear
picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... " 42
6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid judgment of conviction for
another offense. We should guard against the improvident issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from
confinement. The position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with
respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was
prosecuted and convicted.
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent Warden of the City Jail of
Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311, entitled "People
of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody,
unless he is held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal
Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the discharge herein
directed shall be effected when such other cause or reason ceases to exist.
No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Castro, J., concurs
in a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J., dissenting :
In 1901, early in the history of constitutional government in this country, this Court reversed the conviction of an
accused who, having pleaded "not guilty," was required by the judge to testify and answer the complaint. The case
was that of United States v. Junio, reported in the first volume of the Philippine Reports, on page 50 thereof.
Resolution of the case did not require an extended opinion (it consumed no more than a page in the Reports). For
indeed the facts fitted exactly into the prohibition contained in The President's Instruction to the (Second) Philippine
Commission1 "that no person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.".
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There was no need either for a dissertation on the Rights of Man, though occasion for this was not lacking as the
predominant American members of the Court were under a special commission to prepare the Filipinos for self-
government. The privilege against self-incrimination was fully understood by the Filipinos, whose own history
provided the necessary backdrop for this privilege. 2
The Supreme Court simply said, "The judge had no right to compel the accused to make any statement whatever,"
and declared the proceedings void.
Nor was there a similar judicial error likely to be committed in the years to come, what with the constant reminder of
a Bill of Rights enshrined in successive organic acts intended for the Philippines.3 This is not to say that the
Philippine history of the privilege ended with the Junio case. To be sure, violations of the privilege took other, and
perhaps subtle, forms4 but not the form directly prohibited by the privilege. Even in the recent case of Cabal v.
Kapunan5 it was assumed as a familiar learning that the accused in a criminal case cannot be required to give
testimony and that if his testimony is needed at all against his co-accused, he must first be discharged.6 If Cabal,
the respondent in an administrative case, was required by an investigating committee to testify, it was because it
was thought that proceedings for forfeiture of illegally acquired property under Republic Act 13797 were civil and not
criminal in nature. Thus Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion could confidently say:
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer
incriminatory questions but also to take the witness stand. (3 Whartons Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98
C.J.S., p. 264). Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings before the
aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
Today, perhaps because of long separation from our past, we need what Holmes called "education in the obvious,
more than investigation of the obscure."8 The past may have receded so far into the distance that our perspectives
may have been altered and our vision blurred.
When the court in the case at bar required the petitioner to testify, it in effect undid the libertarian gains made over
half a century and overturned the settled law. The past was recreated with all its vividness and all its horrors: John
Lilburne in England in 1637, refusing to testify before the Council of the Star Chamber and subsequently
condemned by it to be whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take a legal oath;"9 the Filipino priests
Gomez, Burgos and Zamora in 1872 condemned by the Inquisition to die by their own testimony. 10
It is for this reason that I deem this occasion important for the expression of my views on the larger question of
constitutional dimension.
No doubt the constitutional provision that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself" 11 may, on
occasion, save a guilty man from his just deserts, but it is aimed against a more far reaching evil — recurrence of
the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of
more importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. 12 As Dean Griswold put the matter with eloquence:.
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself
civilized ... [W]e do not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own
grave, or pull the lever that springs the trap on which he stands. We have through the course of history
developed considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man
is a human being. 13
The Government must thus establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured; it can not by coercion
prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth. 14
This is not what was done here. What was done here was to force the petitioner to take the witness stand and state
his part in the crime charged as "star witness for the prosecution," to use the very words of the decision, and, by
means of his testimony, prove his guilt. Thus, the trial court said in its decision:
Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as a witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner has been variously described by the trial court as "a car agent ... well versed in this kind of chicanery"
"a self-confessed culprit," and "a man with at least two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in
[the] information." But if he has thus been described it was on the basis of evidence wrung from his lips. If he was
ultimately found guilty of the charge against him it was because of evidence which he was forced to give. In truth he
was made the "star witness for the prosecution" against himself.
But neither torture nor an oath nor the threat of punishment such as imprisonment for contempt can be used to
compel him to provide the evidence to convict himself. No matter how evil he is, he is still a human being.
The fact that the judgment of conviction became final with the dismissal of the appeal to the Court of Appeals for
failure of the petitioner's former counsel to file a brief,15 is of no moment. That judgment is void, and it is precisely
the abiding concern of the writ of habeas corpus to provide redress for unconstitutional and wrongful convictions.
Vindication of due process, it has been well said, is precisely the historic office of the Great Writ. 16
In many respects, this case is similar to that of Fay v. Noia. 17 Noia was convicted of murder in 1942 with Santo
Caminito and Frank Bonino in the County Court of Kings County, New York, in the killing of one Hemmeroff during
the commission of a robbery. The sole evidence against each defendant was his signed confession. Caminito and
Bonino, but not Noia appealed their convictions to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. These
appeals were unsuccessful but subsequent legal proceedings resulted in the releases of Caminito and Bonino upon
findings that their confessions had been coerced and their conviction therefore procured in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although Noia's confession was found to have been coerced, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that, because of Noia's failure to appeal, he must be denied reliefin
view of the provision of 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 that "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. ..." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the judgment of the District Court and ordered Noia's conviction set aside, with direction to discharge him
from custody unless given a new trial forthwith. From that judgment the State appealed.
As the Supreme Court of the United States phrased the issue, the "narrow question is whether the respondent Noia
may be granted federal habeas corpus relief from imprisonment under a New York conviction now admitted by the
State to rest upon a confession obtained from him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, after he was denied
state post-conviction relief because the coerced confession claim had been decided against him at the trial and Noia
had allowed the time for a direct appeal to lapse without seeking review by a state appellate court."
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In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Brennan,
spoke in enduring language that may well apply to the case of Roger Chavez. Said the Court: 1äwphï1.ñët
Today as always few indeed is the number of State prisoners who eventually win their freedom by means of
federal habeas corpus. These few who are ultimately successful are persons whom society has grievously
wronged and for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation. Surely no fair minded person will
contend that those who have been deprived of their liberty without due process of law ought nevertheless to
languish in prison. Noia, no less than his co-defendants Caminito and Bonino, is conceded to have been the
victim of unconstitutional state action. Noia's case stands on its own; but surely no just and humane legal
system can tolerate a result whereby a Caminito and a Bonino are at liberty because their confessions were
found to have been coerced yet Noia, whose confession was also coerced, remains in jail for life. For such
anomalies, such affronts to the conscience of a civilized society, habeas corpus is predestined by its historical
role in the struggle for personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy. If the States withhold effective remedy, the
federal courts have the power and the duty to provide it. Habeas Corpus is one of the precious heritages of
Anglo-American civilization. We do no more today than confirm its continuing efficacy.
A fitting conclusion of this separate opinion may perhaps be found in two memorable admonitions from Marjorie G.
Fribourg and Justice William O. Douglas.
Mrs. Fribourg, in her inimitable phrase, warns us that —
... Time has taught its age-old lesson. Well-meaning people burnt witches. Well-meaning prosecutors have
convicted the innocent. Well-meaning objectives espoused by those not grounded in history can lure us from
protecting our heritage of equal justice under the law. They can entice us, faster than we like to believe, into
endangering our liberties.18
And these are the unforgettable words of Justice Douglas:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
government, but from men of goodwill - good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact
that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
xxx xxx xxx
The motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of
liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be
a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness to infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment
makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one. 1äwphï1.ñët
xxx xxx xxx
The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a
group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the
less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must observe.19
Footnotes
1Criminal Case No. Q-5311, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX.
2The original information named only the accused Sumilang, Chavez, John Doe and Richard Doe. It was
amended by substituting Edgardo P. Pascual for John Doe. Then, another amendment included the rest of the
accused abovenamed.
3Tr., July 23, 1963, pp. 2-11; emphasis supplied.
4Chavez at this point testified on direct examination that the Chinese (Johnson Lee) handed the deed of sale
to Romeo Vasquez who, in turn, delivered it to the emissary. Tr., (Annex A), p. 39.
5Annex C, p. 7, Rollo, p. 101.
6Id., p. 14, Rollo, p. 108.
7Id., pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 108-109.
8Petitioner here submits the theory that the facts found by the trial court make out a case of estafa, not
qualified theft.
9Section 1 (18), Bill of Rights, Article III, Constitution of the Philippines.
10Villaflor vs. Summers. 41 Phil. 62, 68.
11U.S. vs. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143, 155.
12Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483, 495-496.
13Villaflor vs. Summers, supra at p. 68.
14U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, at p. 152, cited in Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, vol. II,
1962 ed., up. 278-279.
15III Martin, Rules of Court, 1964 ed., p. 262, citing 14 Am. Jur., 869.
16Marchetti vs. United States (U.S. Supreme Court), No. 2-October Term, 1967, January 29 1968.
17See also: III Martin, p. 262; Tañada and Carreon, op. cit., pp. 278-279.
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18State vs. Wolfe, 266 N.W. 116, 125; 104 ALR 464, 476; Anno., p. 479.
19Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, 94 Phil. 325, 326.
20Cabal vs. Kapunan, L-19052, December 29, 1962; 21 Am. Jur 2d., p. 383; 98 C.J.S., p. 265; 8 Wigmore,
Evidence 1961 ed., p. 406; 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., pp. 1959-1960.
21Navarro, Criminal Procedure, 1960; ed., p. 302.
22Bermudez vs. Castillo supra, at pp. 488-489.
234 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 160; 98 C.J.S., p. 274; 3 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence, 11th ed., pp. 1959-1960.
24Allen vs. State, 171 ALR 1138, 1143, citing Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 9 Am. Rep. 22.
25Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. vs. Macadaeg, 93 Phil. 995, 1000.
26Tr., pp. 11, 13-23.
27Tr., pp. 56-57.
2898 C.J.S., p. 314; emphasis supplied.
29304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. ed. 1461, 1466.
30Marchetti vs. United States, supra.
3125 Am. Jur., p. 150.
32See: Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 927, 930; Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, 78 Phil. 131;
Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 746; Parulan vs. Director of Prisons, 1968A Phild. 514, 516; see
also Counselman vs. Hitchcock (1867), 142 U.S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110, a case involving a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination and the writ of habeas corpus was allowed; Sunal vs. Large, 332 U.S. 174,
178-179, 91 L. ed. 1982, 1986-1987.
3339 C.J.S., pp. 449-450.
34Mitchell vs. Youell, 130 F. 2d. 880, 882; U.S. vs. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 677.
35Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 530, 534. See the dissenting opinion affirming the same view at pp. 538-
539. See also: Camasura vs. Provost Marshall, supra, at p. 137.
3625 Am. Jur., p. 155.
3739 C.J.S. p. 446, citing Johnson vs. Zerbst, supra.
38Abriol vs. Homeres, supra, at pp. 527, 534-535.
39Supra, at p. 1467: "True, habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities — not involving the question of jurisdiction — occurring during the course of trial; and the "writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error." These principles, however, must be construed and applied
so as to preserve — not destroy — constitutional - safeguards of human life and liberty.".
40III Martin, p. 267: "The prohibition against self-incrimination, in order that it may produce its desired purpose
and may not be rendered a dead letter, should be interpreted liberally in favor of the person invoking the
same." See: Bermudez vs. Castillo, supra, at p. 489.
41Cited in Abriol vs. Homeres, supra, at pp. 533-534; emphasis supplied.
42Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722, giving as authority Freeman on Judgments, see. 117 citing
Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush, 295; Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs.
Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sheed, 549; Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton
vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7
Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill. 35; Dawson and Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 899; Meyer vs.
Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs. Foote L. & M. Co, 29 W. Va. 385.
43Par. 2 (d).
CASTRO J.:, dissenting :
1 Pub. Laws lxiii, lxvi (1900).
2See United States v. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143 (1904). In his majority opinion, Mr. Justice McDonough said that
under the Spanish system of criminal procedure the privilege against self-incrimination was unavailing, a point
seriously disputed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Mapa. Are both Justices half right and half wrong?
Is it more accurate to say that while the Spanish system allowed no more than a comment on the failure of
the accused to testify, no unfavorable inference being drawn therefrom (as Justice Mapa said at p. 161), in
practice the accused was actually denied the privilege against self-incrimination (as Justice McDonough said
at p. 152)? See, e.g., T. Agoncillo & 0. Alfonso, A Short History of the Filipino People, 103-132 (1961).
3 Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 5, par. 3, 1 Pub. Laws 1056; Jones Act of August 29, 1916, sec. 3, par. 3, 12 Pub.
Laws 237; Act of March 24, 1934, ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456; see also General Orders 58, sec. 15(4), 1 Pub. Laws
1082 (1900).
4Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil. 570 (1929) (preliminary investigation; respondent required to give a specimen of
his handwriting); Bermudes v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483 (1937) (administrative investigation; person required to
copy certain letters to establish her authorship of the letters).
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5L-19052, Dec. 29, 1962.
6E.g., 4 M. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 160 (6th Ed., 1963).
710 Laws & Res. 345 (1955).
8O.W. Holmes, Law and the Court, in Speeches 98, 99 (1913).
9E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 3 (1955).
10T. Agoncillo & O. Alfonso, op. cit. supra note 2, at 156.
11Phil. Const. art. III, sec. 1(18).
12 Ullmann v. United States, 356 U.S. 422 (1956).
13Op. cit. supra note 9, at 7.
14Malley v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); accord, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
15Resolutions of May 14, 1968 and June 21, 1968, CA-G.R. 06776-CR.
16Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
17Id. For an account of a convict who served twenty-two years in prison before finally being released on
habeas corpus or a finding that he was denied due process, see Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 651 (1947).
18The Bill of Rights (1967), p. 233.
19A Living Bill of Rights (1961), pp. 61, 62, 64.
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985
SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES AUGUSTO
AMORES AND BIENVENIDO VERA CRUZ OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HONORABLE BERNARDO
FERNANDEZ, TANODBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GENERAL PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT.
PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT.
PROSPERO BONA AND AlC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 71212-13 August 30, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN), petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER, MAJOR GEN. PROSPERO OLIVAS, SGT. PABLO
MARTINEZ, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. PROSPERO
BONA AND AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO, respondents.
CUEVAS, JR., J.:
On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside the premises of
the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart
who was returning to the country after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death. The assassination rippled
shock-waves throughout the entire country which reverberated beyond the territorial confines of this Republic. The
after-shocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to all aspects of Philippine political, economic and social
life.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive
investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board
which later became more popularly known as the Agrava Board. 2 Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D. 1886,
the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced
documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the
Board Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein
private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, 3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas
Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. 4
UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the
other members of the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon.
Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action.
After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN 5 filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two
(2) Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 10010 and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the
airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private
respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate Respondents pleaded NOT GUILTY.
In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases, the Prosecution represented by the Office of the
petition TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of private
respondents before the Agrava Board. 6 Private respondents, through their respective counsel objected to the
admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen. Ver filed a formal "Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen.
Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board as Evidence against him in the above-entitled cases" 7 contending that
its admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity
granted by P.D. 1886. He prayed that his aforesaid testimony be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major
Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective
individual testimonies invoking the same ground. 8 Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed said motions contending that
the immunity relied upon by the private respondents in support of their motions to exclude their respective
testimonies, was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before
the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. 9 Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the TANODBAYAN and the private
respondents to submit their respective memorandum on the issue after which said motions will be considered
submitted for resolution. 10
On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been required to make its offer of
evidence in writing, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN, without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved,
issued a Resolution directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the opposition
thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the legal issues and arguments, raised therein
are to be considered jointly in the Court's Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other
documentary evidences.11 On June 3, 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of Evidence" which
includes, among others, the testimonies of private respondents and other evidences produced by them before the
Board, all of which have been previously marked in the course of the trial.12
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by
them in their respective motion for exclusion.
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On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two (2) petitions,
admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the
private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution having been DENIED, they now come before Us by
way of certiorari 14 praying for the amendment and/or setting aside of the challenged Resolution on the ground that it
was issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Private
prosecutor below, as counsel for the mother of deceased Rolando Galman, also filed a separate petition for
certiorari 15 on the same ground. Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically Identical
issues, the two (2) petitioners were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.
The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight (8) private
respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.
It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the petitioner TANODBAYAN, that said testimonies are
admissible against the private respondents, respectively, because of the latter's failure to invoke before the Agrava
Board the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Since private respondents did not invoke said privilege, the immunity did
not attach. Petitioners went further by contending that such failure to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a
waiver thereof. 16 The private respondents, on the other hand, claim that notwithstanding failure to set up the
privilege against self- incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot be used against them as
mandated by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886. They contend that without the immunity provided for by the second
clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886, the legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the same Section would suffer
from constitutional infirmity for being violative of the witness' right against self- incrimination. 17 Thus, the
protagonists are locked in horns on the effect and legal significance of failure to set up the privilege against self-
incrimination.
The question presented before Us is a novel one. Heretofore, this Court has not been previously called upon to rule
on issues involving immunity statutes. The relative novelty of the question coupled with the extraordinary
circumstance that had precipitated the same did nothing to ease the burden of laying down the criteria upon which
this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored area of judicial inquiry. In carrying
out this monumental task, however, We shall be guided, as always, by the constitution and existing laws.
The Agrava Board, 18 came into existence in response to a popular public clamor that an impartial and independent
body, instead of any ordinary police agency, be charged with the task of conducting the investigation. The then early
distortions and exaggerations, both in foreign and local media, relative to the probable motive behind the
assassination and the person or persons responsible for or involved in the assassination hastened its creation and
heavily contributed to its early formation. 19
Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal
intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible
therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. For indeed, what good will it be to the entire nation
and the more than 50 million Filipinos to know the facts and circumstances of the killing if the culprit or culprits will
nevertheless not be dealt with criminally? This purpose is implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential Decree,
the pertinent portion of which provides —
SECTION 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should the findings warrant the
prosecution of any person, the Board may initiate the filing of proper complaint with the appropriate got
government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or
determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as
safeguard, the P.D. guarantees "any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the
proceedings." 20 Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be denied that in the course of
receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as
authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or
produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation
for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of
the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents, suspects in the said assassination, all of whom
except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained (under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave
their testimonies before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right
to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave
them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they
failed or refused to do so. 21 The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before
their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are
sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. 21-a Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent
and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet
when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the
testimony given by them.
Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person undergoing custodial
interrogation? We find no categorical statement in the constitutional provision on the matter which reads:
... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain and
to counsel, and to be informed of such right. ... 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of jurisprudence 23 on this specific portion of the
subject provision. In all these cases, it has been categorically declared that a person detained for the commission of
an offense undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to an
admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be used against him. Significantly however, there
has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in any other that a person similarly undergoing investigation
for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is not entitled to the constitutional admonition mandated by said
Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between
the words "under" and investigation", as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person " goes to prove that
they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. 24 Neither are we impressed by petitioners'
contention that the use of the word "confession" in the last sentence of said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea
that it applies only to police investigation, for although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only
"confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. They are inadmissible against the source of
the confession or admission and against third person. 25
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable ordeal and graver trying
conditions than one who is at liberty while being investigated. But the common denominator in both which is sought
to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission
of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. This is the lamentable situation
we have at hand.
All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that escorted
Sen. Aquino while disembarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the
scene of the crime as such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General Ver on
the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so
with General Olivas, the first designated investigator of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to
have bungled the case. The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from uglywagging tongues, all point to
them as having, in one way or another participated or have something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that brought
about the assassination. Could there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify, was to determine
whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the said conspiracy? It is too
taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private respondents' being called to the witness stand was merely to elicit
from them facts and circumstances surrounding the tragedy, which was already so abundantly supplied by other
ordinary witnesses who had testified earlier. In fact, the records show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the
last witnesses called by the Agrava Board. The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by the
transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced purposes other than merely eliciting and
determining the so-called surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination. In the light of the examination
reflected by the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to the stand to determine their probable
involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have not been informed or at the very least even warned while
so testifying, even at that particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any statement
given by them may be used against them. If the investigation was conducted, say by the PC, NBI or by other police
agency, all the herein private respondents could not have been compelled to give any statement whether
incriminatory or exculpatory. Not only that. They are also entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to
remain silent, to counsel, and be informed that any and all statements given by them may be used against them. Did
they lose their aforesaid constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and not by
any police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued testifying. May that be construed as a waiver of their
rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they have
the option to do so. But in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome contempt power of
the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We are not persuaded that when they testified, they
voluntarily waived their constitutional rights not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their
right to remain silent.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the
product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be
sufficient. So is moral coercion 'tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. 26
Similarly, in the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel 27 Turley" citing Garrity vs. New Jersey" where certain police
officers summoned to an inquiry being conducted by the Attorney General involving the fixing of traffic tickets were
asked questions following a warning that if they did not answer they would be removed from office and that anything
they said might be used against them in any criminal proceeding, and the questions were answered, the answers
given cannot over their objection be later used in their prosecutions for conspiracy. The United States Supreme
Court went further in holding that:
the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits
use in subsequent proceedings of statements obtained under threat or removal from office, and that it
extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of the body politic. 385 US at 500, 17 L
Ed. 562. The Court also held that in the context of threats of removal from office the act of responding
to interrogation was not voluntary and was not an effective waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly hopeless cause, petitioners and amicus curiae
(Ex-Senator Ambrosio Padilla) assert that the "right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" applies
only in favor of an accused in a criminal case. Hence, it may not be invoked by any of the herein private
respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs. Kapunan 28 doctrine militates very heavily against this theory.
Said case is not a criminal case as its title very clearly indicates. It is not People vs. Cabal nor a prosecution for a
criminal offense. And yet, when Cabal refused to take the stand, to be sworn and to testify upon being called as a
witness for complainant Col. Maristela in a forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, this Court sustained Cabal's plea
that for him to be compelled to testify will be in violation of his right against self- incrimination. We did not therein
state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness
stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to
elicit an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved
but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or
not. 29 If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person
facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given
by him, hang on the balance. Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background of this
constitutional provision against self- incrimination. The privilege against self- incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the Philippines, the same principle obtains as a direct result of American
influence. At first, the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United States and was as
follows:
That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. 30
As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also
applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself"
applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its
strictest sense, a criminal case
No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-discussed sacred constitutional rights, but also
the right to "due process" which is fundamental fairness. 31 Quoting the highly-respected eminent constitutionalist
that once graced this Court, the former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, due process —
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action,
to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it has been
Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play
(Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, 1983, pp. 32-33). It exacts fealty "to those
strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
from considerations of fairness that reflect (democratic) traditions of legal and political thought."
(Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche 1960, 363 US 20, at 487). It is not a narrow or '"echnical conception
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."(Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy 1961, 367
US 1230) Decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society. (Bartkus vs. Illinois, 1959, 359 US 121). Questions of due process are not to
be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. (Pearson v. McGraw, 1939, 308 US
313).
Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments, manifestations and admissions of
both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies
were taken from private respondents fall short of the constitutional standards both under the DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in Section 20, Article IV. In the face of such grave constitutional
infirmities, the individual testimonies of private respondents cannot be admitted against them in ally criminal
proceeding. This is true regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant of
immunity by law. Nevertheless, We shall rule on the effect of such absence of claim to the availability to private
respondents of the immunity provided for in Section 5, P.D. 1886 which issue was squarely raised and extensively
discussed in the pleadings and oral arguments of the parties.
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity"; and the other, which
grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity"
prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution
of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony relates." 32 Examining Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section
5 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the
ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him
in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in
so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Emphasis supplied)
it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of
any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely
testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his
invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement
and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against
self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents
should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by
them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that
the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the petitioners that the right
against self-incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against
the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to
Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. It reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier
discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, 33 whether made by a
witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning in conflict with the Constitution
must be avoided. So much so that if two or more constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to, then
that one which will avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for this purpose to
disregard the more usual and apparent import of the language used. 34 To save the statute from a declaration of
unconstitutionality it must be given a reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental law. 35
Apparent conflict between two clauses should be harmonized. 36
But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against self- incrimination as a condition sine qua
non to the grant of immunity presupposes that from a layman's point of view, he has the option to refuse to answer
questions and therefore, to make such claim. P.D. 1886, however, forecloses such option of refusal by imposing
sanctions upon its exercise, thus:
SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate
penalties therefor. A person guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness or to
subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in
direct contempt by the Board. ...
Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no choice but to answer and
thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5. The absurdity of such application is apparent Sec. 5
requires a claim which it, however, forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings against anyone who makes
such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the
sanctions provided in Section 4,infringes upon the witness' right against self-incrimination. As a rule, such
infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot
be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. 37 Hence, under the
oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to
answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its
desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are
therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if
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IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal
to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed
immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made
to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the
witness.
With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the temper of the times, we run the risk of being
consigned to unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the frightening consequences that hover
before Us, we have strictly adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of law finding solace in the view very
aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and admired defender of human rights of this Court, Mr. Justice
Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs. Manalang 38 and we quote:
I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and
freedoms of the individuals. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in an situations which call
for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any
proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human
being. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest we be misunderstood, let it be known that we are not by this disposition passing upon the guilt or innocence of
the herein private respondents an issue which is before the Sandiganbayan. We are merely resolving a question of
law and the pronouncement herein made applies to all similarly situated, irrespective of one's rank and status in
society.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the instant petitions without merit, same are
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J., concurs (as certified by Makasiar, C.J.).
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, C.J., concurring:
To admit private respondents' testimonies and evidence before the Fact-Finding Board (FFB) against them in the
criminal prosecution pending before the Sandiganbayan, would violate their constitutional or human rights the right
to procedural due process, the right to remain silent, and the right against self- incrimination.
That their testimonies and other evidence they submitted before the FFB in these criminal cases are incriminatory, is
confirmed by the very fact that such testimonies and evidence were the very bases of the majority report of the FFB
recommending the prosecution of private respondents as accessories.
It should be stressed that the basic purposes of the right against self- incrimination are (1) humanity or humanitarian
reasons to prevent a witness or accused from being coerced, whether physically, morally, and/or psychologically,
into incriminating himself, and (2) to protect the witness or accused from committing perjury, because the first law of
nature is self- preservation.
The utilization in the prosecution against them before the Sandiganbayan of the testimonies and other evidence of
private respondents before the FFB collides with Section 1, Section 17 and Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17, No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this Section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The Bill of Rights constitutes the reservation of the sovereign people against, as well as the limitation on, the
delegated powers of government. These rights thus enshrined need no express assertion. On the contrary, the
police and prosecution officers of the country should respect these constitutional liberties as directed in the recent
decision in the Hildawa and Valmonte cases (G.R. Nos. 67766 and 70881, August 14, 1985). The established
jurisprudence is that waiver by the citizen of his constitutional rights should be clear, categorical, knowing, and
intelligent (Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949] and in Chavez vs.
CA, 24 SCRA 663, 682-683).
The use of testimonies and other evidence of private respondents before the FFB against them in the criminal cases
subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan would trench upon the constitutional guarantees that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law" and that (Section 17, Article IV, 1973 Constitution), that "no person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself. ..." and that " a person has the right to remain silent ..." (Section 20,
Article IV, 1973 Constitution).
There can be no implied waiver of a citizen's right against self-incrimination or of his right to remain silent.
Any such renunciation cannot be predicated on such a slender or tenuous reed as a dubious implication. Otherwise,
it would be easier to lose the human rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights than to protect or preserve them; it would
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be easier to enslave the citizen than for him to remain free. Such a result was never intended by the Founding
Fathers.
The first sentence of Section 20 of the Bill of Rights stating that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself," applies to both the ordinary witness and the suspect under custodial investigation.
In support of the rule that there can be no implied waiver of the right against self-incrimination and all other
constitutional rights by the witness or by the accused, is the fact that the right against double jeopardy can only be
renounced by the accused if the criminal case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated with his express
consent. Without such express consent to the dismissal or termination of the case, the accused can always invoke
his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
If Section 5 of P.D. 1886 were interpreted otherwise, said section would become a booby trap for the unsuspecting
or unwary witness, A witness summoned either by subpoena or by Invitation to testify before the FFB under Section
5, cannot refuse, under pain of contempt, to testify or produce evidence required of him on the ground that his
testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; because the same Section 5
prohibits the use of such testimony or evidence which may tend to incriminate him in any criminal prosecution that
may be filed against him. The law or decree cannot diminish the scope and extent of the guarantee against self-
incrimination or the right to remain silent or the right against being held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law, or against deprivation of his life, liberty or property without due process of law.
As a matter of fact, numerous decisions culled by American jurisprudence are partial to the rule that immunity
statutes which compel a citizen to testify, should provide an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as
total and as absolute as the guarantees themselves (Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-
1623; Kastigar vs. US 1972, 406 US 441).
Even if the witness testified pursuant to an invitation, the invitation does not remove the veiled threat of compulsion,
because as stated in the Chavez case, supra.
product of unintentional statements. Pressures which operate to overbear his will, disable him from
sufficient. So is moral coercion attending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant
(Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 679).
The summons issued to private respondents has been euphemistically called as an invitation, instead of a subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum, as a sign of respect for the important and high positions occupied by private
respondents. But the effect of such an invitation thus worded is the same as a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
Precisely, the phraseology of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 entices the unsuspecting private respondents to testify before
the FFB, by dangling in the same Section 5 the assurance that their testimony or the evidence given by them will not
be used against them in a criminal prosecution that may be instituted against them.
At the very least, their consent to testify was under such misapprehension. Hence, there can be no clear,
categorical, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent, against self-incrimination, against being held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and against being deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law under such misapprehension.
In any event, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 creates a doubt, which doubt is accentuated by the difference of opinion
thereon among the counsels in these cases and among members of this Court. And it is basic in criminal law that
doubts should be resolved liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the government.
The procedural due process both under Sections 1 and 17 of the Bill of Rights, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
simply means, in the language of Justice Frankfurter, the sporting Idea of fair play. The FFB and its counsel did not
inform the private respondents herein of their right to remain silent and their right against self-incrimination, and that
their testimonies may be utilized against them in a court of law, before they testified. This is not fair to them, and
hence, they were denied procedural due process.
It should be stressed that the FFB was merely a fact-finding agency for the purpose of gathering all the possible
facts that may lead to the Identity of the culprit. Such testimonies may provide leads for the FFB, its counsels and
agents to follow up. The FFB and its counsels cannot rely solely on such testimonies to be used against the private
respondents in these criminal cases. It should be recalled that the FFB had ample funds for the purpose of
accomplishing its object. As a matter of fact. it refunded several million pesos to the government after it concluded
its investigation. The Board and its counsel could have utilized the said amount to appoint additional agents to look
for witnesses to the assassination. In this respect, the FFB counsel could be faulted in not utilizing the funds
appropriated for them to ferret out all evidence that will Identify the culprit or culprits. The failure of the FFB's
counsel to use said funds reflects on the initiative and resourcefulness of its counsel. He could prosecute private
respondents on evidence other than their testimony and the evidence they gave before the FFB.
As heretofore stated, the private respondents were compelled to testify before the FFB whether by subpoena or by
invitation which has the effect of a subpoena as provided for in Section 5 of P.D. 1886; because private respondents
then believed, by reading the entire Section 5, that the testimony they gave before the FFB could not be used
against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan. Because the Board was merely a
fact-finding board and that it was riot conducting a criminal prosecution the private respondents were under the
impression that there was no need for them to invoke their rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination and
against being held for a criminal offense without due process of law.
It should be recalled that the counsel of the FFB after submitting the majority report, refused to cooperate with the
Tanodbayan in these cases with the pompous declaration that, after submitting their majority report, he automatically
became functus oficio. Was his refusal to cooperate with, and assist, the Tanodbayan in the prosecution of these
cases, born of the realization that the FFB majority report is as weak as it was precipitate? And when the
Tanodbayan has now his back to the wall, as it were, by the ruling of the respondent Sandiganbayan excluding the
testimonies and other evidence of private respondents herein on the ground that the use of their testimonies and
other evidence will incriminate them, the FFB counsel, without being requested by the Tanodbayan, now files a
memorandum in support of the position of the Tanodbayan. what is the reason for this turn-about to save his report
from the fire which they started with such enthusiasm?
As above emphasized, it is the duty of the police and the prosecuting authorities to respect their rights under the
Constitution as we stated in the recent Hildawa and Valmonte cases, supra.
The grant of immunity under Section 5 of P.D. 1886 would be meaningless if we follow the posture of petitioners
herein. Such a posture would be correct if the phrase "after having invoked his privilege against self- incrimination"
were transposed as the opening clause of Section 5 to read a follows "After having invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination, no person shall be excused from attending and testifying ... etc."
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Said Section 5 has two clauses and contemplates two proceedings. The first clause from "No person shall be
excused ... etc." up to "penalty or forfeiture refers to the proceeding before the FFB. The second clause after the
semi-colon following the word "forfeiture which begins with but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall
not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after
having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to testify . refers to a subsequent criminal proceeding against
him which second clause guarantees him against the use of his testimony in such criminal prosecution, but does not
immunize him from such prosecution based on other evidence.
The private respondents herein, if the contention of the prosecution were sustained, would be fried in their own fat.
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed.
CONCEPCION, JR., J., concurring:
1. Let me preface my opinion by quoting from my dissent in Pimentel. 1
1. We are committed to the mandate of the Rule of Law. We resolve controversies before Us without
considering what is or what might be the popular decision. No. We never do. We only consider the facts
and the law. Always the facts and the law.
2. The issue before Us is not I repeat not the guilt or innocence of Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Major Gen.
Prospero Olivas, and others for their alleged participation in the assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.
3. The issue is: Are the testimonies given by them before the Agrava Board admissible in evidence
against them in their trial before the Sandiganbayan?
4. The issue therefore is purely a question of law. It involves the interpretation of Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886
and calls for the application of the Rule of Law.
5. Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 reads:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled. after having
so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
6. This section means that any person who is invited or summoned to appear must obey and testify as to what he
knows. Even if the testimony tends to incriminate him he must testify. Even if he claims his constitutional right
against self-incrimination, he still must testify. However, his testimony cannot be used against him in any subsequent
proceeding, provided that at the time it is being presented, he invokes his privilege against self-incrimination. His
testimony, no matter what it may be, cannot in any way cause him harm.
The only exception is if the testimony he gave is false, in which case he can be prosecuted and punished for perjury.
He may also be demoted or removed from office.
7. The testimonies given by private respondents before the Agrava Board are therefore not admissible against them
in their trial before the Sandiganbayan, having invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.
PLANA, J., concurring:
I would like to underscore some considerations underlying my concurrence:
1. According to the Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. But the law (PD
1886) which created the Agrava Board decrees that no person shall be excused from testifying on the ground of
self- incrimination. If the law had stopped after this command, it would have been plainly at variance with the
Constitution and void. lt was to ward off such a Constitutional infirmity that the law provided for immunity against the
use of coerced testimony or other evidence, an immunity which, to be constitutionally adequate, must give at least
the same measure of protection as the fundamental guarantee against self-incrimination.
2. Presidential Decree 1886 was not intended either to restrict or expand the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination. On the one hand, a law cannot restrict a constitutional provision. On the other hand, PD 1886 was
adopted precisely to coerce the production of evidence that hopefully would unmask the killers of Senator Aquino,
although the compulsory process is accompanied by "use" immunity.
3. It is argued that the right against self- incrimination must have been invoked before the Agrava Board if the use of
evidence given therein against the witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution is to be barred. I did not agree.
I fail to see why to preserve pursuant to law (PD 1886) one's constitutional right against self-incrimination, one has
to offer resistance to giving testimony a resistance which the said law itself says is futile and cannot prevail, as no
witness by its specific injunction can refuse to testify.
4. The constitutional right against self-incrimination may be waived expressly. It may also be waived impliedly by
speaking when one has the option to hold his tongue. Waiver by implication presupposes the existence of the right
to keep silent. Thus, when one speaks because the law orders him to do so, his action is not really voluntary and
therefore his testimony should not be deemed an implied waiver of his constitutional right against self- incrimination.
5. Presidential Decree 1886 does not give private respondents absolute immunity from prosecution, It only bars the
use against them of the evidence that was elicited from them by the Agrava Board. If there are other evidence
available, private respondents are subject to indictment and conviction.
6. Moreover, the evidence given to the Agrava Board is not, in my view, completedly immunized. What PD 1886
bars from use is only the testimony of the witness who testified before the Agrava Board and whatever was
presented as part of his testimony, as such. PD 1886 could not have intended to convert non-confidential official
documents into shielded public records that cannot be used as evidence against private respondents, by the mere
fact that they were admitted in evidence as part of private respondents' testimony before the Agrava Board. In other
words, evidence otherwise available to the prosecution, such as official documents, do not become barred just
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because they have been referred to in the course of the testimony of private respondents and admitted in evidence
as part of their testimony They may still be subpoenaed and offered in evidence. Conceivably, some objections
might be raised; but the evidence will be unfettered by the exclusionary rule in PD 1886.
ESCOLIN, J., concurring:
I concur in the dismissal of the petitions. The admission in evidence of the testimonies of private respondents given
before the Agrava Board would constitute a violation of their right against self- incrimination guaranteed under
Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. I subscribe to the majority view that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 cannot be
constitutionally tenable, unless a grant of immunity is read into it vis-a-vis the compulsion it imposes upon a witness
to testify. Otherwise stated, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 should be interpreted as an immunity statute, which, while
depriving one of the right to remain silent, provides an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as total
and as absolute as the guarantees themselves. (Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-
1623, Kastigar v. U.S., 1972, 406 US 441).
Clearly, this is how the private respondents understood the legal provision under consideration. For ably assisted as
they were by counsel, they would not have allowed themselves to be deliberately dragged into what the Chief
Justice would call a "booby trap". Viewed from another angle, therefore, it could not be truly said that private
respondents had waived their right against self- incrimination in a manner that is clear, categorical, knowing and
intelligent. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 and Chavez v. CA, 24
SCRA 663).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion penned by Justice Serafin R. Cuevas and in the pithy separate opinion of Justice
Nestor B. Alampay but would like to add some personal observations.
This case furnishes an opportunity to appreciate the workings of our criminal justice system.
The prosecutions which led to this petition serve as a timely reminder that all of us-civilian or military, layman or
judge, powerful or helpless- need the Bill of Rights. And should the time ever come when like the respondents we
may have to invoke the Constitution's protection, the guarantees of basic rights must be readily available, in their full
strength and pristine glory, unaffected by what is currently popular or decreed and heedless of whoever may be
involved
In many petitions filed with this Court and lower courts, the military has often been charged with riding roughshod
over the basic rights of citizens. Officers and enlisted men in the frontlines of the fight against subversion or rebellion
may, in the heat of combat, see no need to be concerned over such ,niceties" as due process, unreasonable
searches and seizures, freedom of expression, and right to counsel. They are best reminded that these rights are
not luxuries to be discarded in times of crisis. These rights are the bedrock of a free and civilized society. They are
the reason why we fight so hard to preserve our system of government. And as earlier stated, there may come times
when we may have to personally invoke these basic freedoms for ourselves. When we deny a right to an accused,
we deny it to ourselves.
The decision of the Court underscores the importance of keeping inviolate the protections given by the Bill of Rights.
Acts which erode or sacrifice constitutional rights under seductive claims of preserving or enhancing political and
economic stability must be resisted. Any lessening of freedom will not at all increase stability. The liberties of
individuals cannot be preserved by denying them.
The dividing line between legitimate dissent or opposition on one hand and subversion or rebellion on the other may
be difficult to pinpoint during troubled times. The lesson of this petition is that those charged with suppressing the
rebellion and those who sit in courts of justice should ever be vigilant in not lumping legitimate dissenters and rebels
together in one indiscriminate classification.
An abiding concern for principles of liberty and justice is especially imperative in periods of crisis and in times of
transition. And all persons from the mighty to the lowy must be given the fullest measure of protection under the Bill
of Rights if our constitutional guarantees are to have any meaning.
In addition to the right against self- incrimination, of not being compelled to be a witness against one's self, so ably
discussed by Justice Cuevas in the Court's opinion, I am constrained by considerations of basic fairness to vote
against granting the petition.
The private respondents were called to testify before the Agrava Commission. The decree creating the commission
stated that no person may refuse to attend and testify or to produce evidence before it on the ground that what he
says or produces may incriminate him. But since the witness is compelled to give all he knows or possesses in
effect shorn by law of his right not to incriminate himself the decree states that the evidence wrung from that witness
may not be used against him later. This is, simply speaking, what the petition is all about.
The respondents may be prosecuted as indeed they have been prosecuted. They may eventually be convicted if the
evidence warrants conviction. however, they may not be convicted solely on the evidence which came from their
own mouths or was produced by their own hands. The evidence must come from other sources. It would be the
height of unfairness and contrary to due process if a man is required to state what he knows even if it would
incriminate him, is promised immunity if he talks freely, and is later convicted solely on the testimony he gave under
such a promise of immunity.
I believe that P.D. 1886 is the first Immunity Act to be enacted in the Philippines. It may be relevant, therefore, to
refer to American decisions expounding on immunity statutes, more so when a comparison of P.D. 1886 with such
statutes as the U.S. Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C.A. Section 3486, shows a similarity in the
protection given by the statutes.
The U.S. Immunity Act of 1954 was enacted to assist federal grand juries in their investigatins of attempts to
endanger the national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious
conspiracy, and violations of various laws on internal security, atomic or nuclear energy, and immigration and
nationality. The law stated that a witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or
other evidence on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. The statute
then provides:
But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
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against self- incrimination, to testify or produce evidence nor shall testimony so compelled be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding ... against him in any court.
The American statute provides immunity against prosecution, penalties, and use of the testimony. P.D. 1886 is of
more limited scope. Only the use of the compelled testimony is proscribed. The witness may still be prosecuted but
the prosecution will have to look for evidence other than the words of the accused given before the Agrava
Commission.
In Brown v. Walker (161 U.S. 591) the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the validity of the 1893 Immunity
Act. Brown was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating railroad anomalies. lie refused to testify on
grounds of self- incrimination, arguing that the Immunity Act compelling him to testify was unconstitutional. The
Court ruled that "(W)hile the constitutional provision in question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable
prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity and we are therefore of opinion
that the witness was compellable to answer." In other words, the statutory immunity takes the place of the invocation
of the constitutional guarantee. There is no need at the time of taking testimony to invoke the Fifth Amendment
because it would be denied any way and the witness would be compelled to testify. It would be absurd to invoke a
protection which cannot be availed of when compelled to testify. The time to invoke the immunity is when the
testimony is being used contrary to the granted immunity. Protected by the statutory immunity, a witness cannot
even insist on his right to remain silent when testifying.
In Ullmann v. United States (350 U.S. 422), the court interpreted the Immunity Act of 1954 and stated.
xxx xxx xxx
... Since that time the Court's holding in Brown v. Walker has never been challenged; the case and the
doctrine it announced have consistently and without question been treated as definitive by this Court, in
opinions written, among others, by Holmes and Brandeis, Justices. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein
226 U.S. 34, 42; Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142. The 1893 statute has become part of our
constitutional fabric and has been included in substantially the same terms, in virtually all of the major
regulatory enactments of the Federal Government.' Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6. For a
partial list of these statutes, see, Id., 335 U.S. at pages 6-7, note 4. Moreover, the States, with one
exception a case decided prior to Brown v. Walker have, under their own constitutions, enunciated the
same doctrine, 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, and have passed numerous statutes compelling
testimony in exchange for immunity in the form either of complete amnesty or of prohibition of the use
of the compelled testimony. For a list of such statutes, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, n. 11
(pp. 478-501) and Pocket Supplement thereto, 2281, n. 11 (pp. 147-157). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
It is interesting to note how the American Supreme Court in Ullmann treated the immunity not only against the use of
the testimony (as under P.D. 1886) but even against prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner, however, attempts to distinguish Brown v. Walker. He argues that this case is different from
Brown v. Walker because the impact of the disabilities imposed by federal and state authorities and the
public in general such as loss of job, expulsion from labor unions, state registration and investigation
statutes, passport eligibility and general public opprobrium-is so oppressive that the statute does not
give him true immunity. This, he alleges, is significantly different from the impact of testifying on the
auditor in Brown v. Walker, who could the next day resume his job with reputation unaffected. But, as
this Court has often held, the immunity granted need only remove those sanctions which generate the
fear justifying the invocation of the privilege 'The interdiction of the other Amendment operates only
here a witness may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been
taken away, the amendment ceased to apply.' Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43, 67. Here, since the Immunity
Act protects a witness who is compelled to answer to the extent of his constitutional immunity, he has
of course, when a particular sanction is sought to be imposed against him, the right to claim that it is
criminal in nature. (Emphasis supplied).
In United States v. Murdock (284 U.S. 141), the court ruled that "the principle established is that full and complete
immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection
furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination.
P.D. 1886, being an immunity statute should not be given a strained or absurd interpretation in order to achieve a
certain result. If the immunity given by the decree is equivalent to the protection furnished by the right against self-
incrimination, then, paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter in Ullmann, the same protection given by one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit,
xxx xxx xxx
... Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers.
They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming
the privilege. Such a view does scant honor to the patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a
condition to acceptance of the Constitution by the ratifying States. The Founders of the Nation were not
naive or disregard ful of the interest of justice ...
I, therefore, join the majority in dismissing the petition.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 1 This basic right against self-
incrimination, which supplanted the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused as practiced
during the Spanish regime, has become an indispensable part of our laws since 1900. Pursuant
thereto, an accused in a criminal case has the right not only to refuse to answer incriminating questions
but also to refuse to take the witness stand. He cannot be compelled even to utter a word in his
defense. 2 As stressed in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 3 the rule may otherwise be stated as the
constitutional right of the accused to remain silent. " The accused can forego testimony 4 without any
adverse implication drawn from his decision to do so, The burden is on the State to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution must look elsewhere for other "evidence
independently and freely secured," The rule forbids what has been considered as "the certainly
inhuman procedure of compelling a person 'to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction'." According to Justice Harlan, it was intended "to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as
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the innocent and foresighted." 5 Transplanted in this country with the advent of American sovereignty 6
and firmly imbedded in our fundamental law, 7 the said privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
which is predicated on grounds of public policy and humanity, 8 "is fundamental to our scheme of
justice" 9 and is one of the procedural guarantees of our accusatorial system.
1. As I see it, what the prosecution proposed to do in these cases was to present, as evidence of the alleged
accessorial acts of private respondents, the transcripts of their respective testimonies before the Agrava Board.
Confronted by the apparent unwillingness of said respondents to be called to the witness stand in subsequent
criminal proceedings, the prosecution sought to put into the record of these criminal cases (in lieu of private
respondents' testimonies) the said transcripts and other evidence given by them in the course of their testimony
before the Agrava Board. If allowed over and despite private respondents' objection, this would be a clear
infringement of the constitutional guarantee that they can invoke in said criminal proceedings, as all of them did.
Since the prosecution cannot require said respondents to testify in the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, it
stands to reason that it is equally disabled from indirectly compelling respondents to give evidence against
themselves by using their Agrava Board testimonies. The prosecution must present evidence "derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 10
2. It is contended, however, that these self- incriminatory testimonies were given voluntarily because they did not
claim the constitutional guarantee before or while giving testimony to the Agrava Board. Voluntariness, I think.
cannot be inferred simply from such failure to invoke the privilege. There was no fair warning or notice to the
declarant that his testimony would be used against him if incriminatory, unless the privilege is invoked beforehand or
during his testimony. If they were properly warned and still gave testimony without t invoking the privilege, then it
would be clear that they knowingly waived the privilege. Otherwise, it meant at the most a willingness on their part to
help the Agrava Board in its fact-finding investigation without waiving (a) the immunity granted by law, and (b) the
constitutional guarantee against self- incrimination in case of subsequent prosecution based on their self-
incriminatory testimony. For waiver, it is wellsettled, to be effective. "must be certain, unequivocal and intelligently,
understandably and willingly made. " 11 Mere submission to an illegal search or seizure "is not consent or waiver of
objection. 12 The prosecution has the burden to prove otherwise. The same standard should be observed in self-
incrimination cases.
PD No. 1886 (as amended), which created that "independent ad hoc fact-finding Board," vested it with "plenary
powers to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing [of former Senator Aquino] and to allow for
a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all aspects of said tragedy." In consonance with these objectives,
the law declared that the privilege was unavailable to an Agrava Board "witness", as follows: "No person shall be
excused from attending and testifying or from producing other evidence on the ground that his testimony or any
evidence requested of him may tend to incriminate him, " 13 etc. At the same time, the Board was empowered to
summarily hold and punish any person in direct contempt for "refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness," its
judgment being "final and unappealable."
Quite plainly, the constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination could not be invoked by Agrava Board
witnesses, The privilege was suspended or temporarily taken away for purposes of the investigation, in order that
the Board would have access to all relevant evidence and all sources of information, not excluding compelled
incriminatory statements of probable and possible or potential defendants. An Agrava Board witness was, under the
terms of the quoted provision, placed in a dilemma: (1) to answer truthfully all questions including those tending to
be self-incriminatory, since he cannot invoke the privilege; (2) to lie and become liable criminally for perjury; and (3)
to insist on his right to remain silent and be summarily punished by the Board for direct contempt. It is plain that
such a witness was under compulsion to give self-incriminatory testimony. It was not voluntary. Precisely because of
its coerced nature (an infringement of his constitutional right against self- incrimination), PD No. 1886 promised. in
exchange or as a substitute for the privilege, limited immunity (as provided in the next succeeding clause, same
section), to wit:
... but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he was compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self- incrimination, to testify or produce evidence. 14
Such immunity 15 would bar the prosecution's use against the witness of his said testimony in subsequent criminal
proceedings (wherein he is charged with offenses related to his testimony). Nevertheless, this would not operate to
change the involuntary nature of his self- incriminatory testimony. As far as the witness is concerned, it was
"coerced", not freely given, because he was not fully accorded the "liberty of choice." The law withheld his basic
freedom to choose between testifying and remaining silent without the risk of being punished for direct contempt to
forego testimony which could possibly be to his detriment.
3. I cannot agree with the proposition that the privilege should be invoked by the witness before or while giving
testimony to the Agrava Board. Section 5 should be reasonably construed and fairly applied to the cases at bar, in
the light of the accused's constitutional right against compulsory self- incrimination. The formula of limited-immunity
in-lieu-of-the-privilege contained in said section rendered unnecessary or superfluous, the invocation of the privilege
before the Board. Under said formula, the witness was deprived of the privilege to protect himself against
inquisitorial interrogation into matters that a targeted defendant or virtual respondent can keep to himself in ordinary
investigations or proceedings.
Even if the provision is susceptible of an interpretation in support of the petitioner's stand, it appears that the time for
invoking the privilege is not clear enough or certain from the language of the law. Equally plausible and logical is the
contrary view that it may be invoked later on when it became apparent that the prosecution intended to use the
testimony given before the Board to secure conviction of the declarant in the subsequent criminal proceedings. The
privilege cannot be deemed waived by implication merely as a consequence of failure to claim it before the Board. It
bears emphasis that the right of an accused "witnesses" against compulsory self-incrimination is predicated on the
constitutional guarantee, not on the special law in question.
3. In the United States, the generally accepted approach in Fifth Amendment Cases (involving the constitutional
guarantee under consideration) was stated as follows in Johnson vs Zerbst:" 16 It has been pointed out that 'courts
indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of the fundamental rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of such fundamental rights.'" Because, as Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School (later,
Solicitor General of the United States) eloquently puts it:
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmark,s in man's struggles to make
himself civilized ... [W]e do not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or
dig his own grave ... We have through the course of history developed a considerable feeling of the
dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human being. 17
In this jurisdiction, more than four decades ago, the late Justice Jose P. Laurela nationalist, constitutionalist and
eminent jurist, whose incisive and authoritative opinions on constitutional questions are often cited by the bench and
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18
the bar- voted to sustain a claim of the constitutional guarantee in Bermudez vs. Castillo. In his concurrence, he
said inter alia:
(1) As between two possible and equally rational constructions, that should prevail which is more in
consonance with the purpose intended to be carried out by the Constitution. The provision ... should be
construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be secured. ...
(2) I am averse to the enlargement of the rule allegedly calculated to gauge more fully the credibility of
a witness if the witness would thereby be forced to furnish the means for his own destruction. Unless
the evidence is voluntarily given, the policy of the constitution is one of protection on humanitarian
considerations and grounds of public policy...
(3) The privilege should not be disregarded merely because it often affords a shelter to the guilty and
may prevent the disclosure of wrongdoing. Courts can not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest and furthering the ends of justice, treat a sacred privilege as if it were mere excrescence in the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied; at page 493.)
In sum, considering the pertinent legal provisions and judicial pronouncements as well as the climate prevailing
when the private respondents testified before the Agrava Board, I find it unavoidable to reach the conclusion that
they did so under legal, moral and psychological compulsion. Their compelled testimonies before the Agrava Board
cannot thereafter be used against them in the cases at bar in view of the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886. They
were not obliged to invoke then and there the constitutional guarantee. If they did, that would have sufficed to afford
them adequate protection. If they did not, they could do so later on when the Government prosecutors (in spite of
the statutory grant of immunity) decided in the subsequent criminal proceedings, to use against them their Agrava
Board testimonies. For, as earlier stated, there was no intelligent and knowing waiver on their part of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Accordingly, and for other reasons well stated in the main separate concurring opinions, I vote to dismiss the
petitions.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases.
What appears to be the basic and principal issue to which the consideration of the Court is addressed to is the
singular question of whether testimonies adduced by the private respondents before the Ad Hoc Agrava Fact
Finding Board and sought to be introduced against them in the Sandiganbayan wherein they have been accused
were rightfully excluded as evidence against them.
I find untenable the insistence of the petitioner Tanodbayan that the private respondents should have claimed the
right against self-incrimination before the said Fact Finding Board and that having omitted doing so, the said
privilege afforded to them by law can no longer be invoked by them before the Sandiganbayan.
The right claimed by private respondents rests on the fundamental principle that no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself as so stated in our Constitution and from the fact that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 disallows the
use against him of such testimony or any evidence produced by him before the said Fact Finding Board, except for
perjury. Petitioner argues however, that there was a waiver of this right to self-incrimination when respondents
proceeded to give their testimonies on various dates before the Agrava Fact Finding Board without formally invoking
on said occasions their right against self-incrimination.
As private respondents could not have excused themselves from testifying before said Board as clearly emphasized
in the very first clause of Section 5 of P.D. 1886, and as at that point of time, there was no reason for the declarant
to anticipate or speculate that there would be any criminal charge or any proceeding instituted against them, it would
therefore, be unnatural and illogical to expect that private respondents would even contemplate the need of
prefacing their declarations with an invocation before the Fact Finding Board of their privilege against self-
incrimination.
In fact for a declarant to announce his claim of the aforestated privilege prior to or while testifying before said Fact
Finding Board, would irresistibly create an inference and convey an impression that said witness is burdened with
his own awareness that he stands already incriminated in some wrong. To insist therefore, even in the absence yet
of any proceeding against him, that the witness invoke the said privilege before the Agrava Fact Finding Board,
would be obviously self-demeaning. Such an effect could not have been intended by Section 5 of P.D. 1886, which
was even meant to grant to the witness a benefit rather than a burden. It is more reasonable therefore, to conclude
that the privilege against self-incrimination would be accorded to said witness after he has invoked the same in a
subsequent proceeding wherein he has been charged of a wrong doing, except in a case for perjury. It is only at
such time when the necessity of invoking the mantle of the privilege or the immunity afforded to him by law would
arise.
It cannot also be rightfully concluded that private respondents had intentionally relinquished or abandoned the said
right which they claimed before the Sandiganbayan. The fact that the issue of when and before what forum should
such claim to the right against self-incrimination be necessarily presented has provoked much discussion and
debate because of divergent views. This has even prompted the submissions to the Court of opinions of amicus
curiae or friends of the court as to how Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1886 should be construed and applied
which are however different from and contrary to the views expressed by the Justices of the Sandiganbayan and
other legal luminaries. These conflicting views negate the proposition that there was an effective waiver made by the
private respondents of their rights.
It has earlier been stated by this Court that to be effective, such waiver must be certain and unequivocal and
intelligently, understandably and willingly made. (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 24 SCRA 663). In the same
cited case, it has been stated that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights (Citing Johnson vs.
Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. ed. 1461, 1466). Furthermore, whether the alleged waiver is express or implied, it
must be intentional. (Davison vs. Klaess 20 N.E. 2d. 744, 748, 280 N.Y. 252; 92 CJS, 1058).
I find it difficult to accept that private respondents had at any time, ever intended to relinquish or abandon their right
against self-incrimination.
PATAJO, J., concurring:
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I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases. Said petitions do not merit being given due
course and should be dismissed outright.
I hold the view that the testimonies and evidence given before the Agrava Board are inadmissible as evidence
against those who testified or gave said evidence irrespective of whether said persons were subpoenaed or invited.
I believe it is not a condition sine quo non to the non-admissibility of said evidence that at the time they testified or
gave evidence before the Agrava Board that they had invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.
The Agrava Board was created as an independent ad hoc fact finding board to determine all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983. It was
given plenary powers to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all the aspects of said tragedy. It
was given the power to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum and "other compulsory processes" requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence relative to any matter under investigation
by said Board.
Those who have been subpoenaed to appear and testify or produce any documentary evidence before the Board
shall not be excused from testifying or presenting evidence before said Board on the ground that their testimony or
evidence may tend to incriminate them or subject them to penalty or forfeiture. I believe an invitation from the Board
is as much a compulsory process 1 to appear and testify before the Board as a subpoena and one receiving said
invitation cannot also excuse himself from appearing and testifying before the Board. Petitioners appear to share
this view when they said in subparagraph (c), paragraph 7 of their petition in G.R. No. L-71208-09.
(c) People were either invited or issued subpoenas, depending upon their rank and office, to give
testimony before the Board and among those invited were respondents General Fabian C. Ver and
Major General Olivas while the rest of the military respondents were issued subpoenas.
Unquestionably, it was the intention of the decree creating the Board to investigate the Aquino assassination to
encourage all who have some information on any "aspect of said tragedy" to furnish the Board said information
whether they are subpoenaed or issued other forms of compulsory process such as an invitation and to do so
without fear that what they will say may be used against them. It is in this context that Section 5 of PD No. 1886
should be viewed. When they testified before the Board, they were given full assurance that whatever they say
before the Board will not be used against them. Only if they testify falsely that they may be prosecuted for perjury.
This is to prevent people from preventing the Board from finding out the truth about the Aquino assassination by
giving false leads or information for ulterior reasons.
Actually Section 5 of PD No. 1886 falls under that category of statutes which do not pronounce an entire immunity
by forbidding punishment or prosecution for any testimony or evidence given in connection with the investigation of
certain offenses more widely known as immunity statutes, but merely prohibit in any criminal prosecution the use of
the testimony of the witness. Immunity statutes as well as statutes prohibiting the use of testimony in any
subsequent criminal prosecution have been the expedients resorted for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly
those whose proof or punishment were otherwise impracticable because of the implication in the offense itself of all
who could bear useful testimony.
The expediency and practical utility of this mode of obtaining evidence may as a measure of legislation,
be open to argument. But the tradition of it as a lawful method of annulling the privilege against self-
incrimination is unquestioned in English history." ignore on Evidence, Vol. III, p. 469.
Speaking of this kind of privilege of non-admission of testimony given by the witness in subsequent prosecutions as
allowed by the common law and modified by subsequent statutes, State vs. Quarles 13 Ark 307, 311, said:
The privilege in question, in its greatest scope, as allowed by the common law and no one, be he
witness or accused, can pretend to claim it beyond its scope at the common law never did contemplate
that the witness might not be proved guilty of the very crime about which he may be called to testify;
but only that the witness should not be compelled to produce the evidence to prove himself guilty of
that crime. His privilege, therefore, was not an exemption from the consequences of a crime that he
might have committed; but only an exemption from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to
establish his own crime ... So long as it might be lawful to produce in evidence against an accused
party whatever he might before have voluntarily said as a witness on a prosecution against another,
there were no means by which the privilege could be made available short of a claim by the witness to
be silent; and as that was the rule of the common law, this was the common-law mode of making the
privilege available. And that silence was but a mode of making the privilege available, and was not of
the essence of the privilege itself, is conclusively proven by all that current of enlightened authority, to
which we yield our fullest assent, which holds that the privilege has ceased when the crime has been
pardoned, when the witness has been tried and acquitted, or is adjudged guilty, or when the
prosecution, to which he was exposed, has been barred by lapse of time ... But the Legislature has so
changed the common-law rule, by the enactment in question in the substitution of a rule that the
testimony required to be given by the act, shall never be used against the witness for the purpose of
procuring his conviction for the crime or misdemeanor to which it relates, that it is no longer necessary
for him to claim his privilege as to such testimony, in order to prevent its being afterwards used against
him. And the only question that can possibly arise under the present state of the law, as applicable to
the case now before us, is as to whether our statutory regulations afford sufficient protection to the
witness, responsive to this new rule and to his constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-
accusation ...
Considering the objectives sought to be achieved by PD No. 1886 the provision thereof making testimony and
evidence given before the Board inadmissible in evidence against the ones giving the same, provides protection
beyond that granted by the Constitutional provision against self- incrimination, otherwise it will be constitutionally
suspect. Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 142 US 547, 35 L Ed 1110.
Of relevance are the observations of the District Court, N.D. Illinois, in United States vs. Armour & Co., 112 Fed 808,
821, 822:
All of these immunity acts are relied upon by the individual defendants, and, while expressed in, slightly
varying language, they all mean the same thing, and each of them is a substitute for the privilege
contained in that clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution, reading:
'Nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'
This fifth amendment deals with one of the most cherished rights of the American citizen, and has been
construed by the courts to mean that the witness shall have the right to remain silent when questioned
upon any subject where the answer would tend to incriminate him. Congress by the immunity laws in
question, and by each of them, has taken away the privilege contained in the amended it is conceded
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in argument that this cannot be done without giving to the citizen by way of immunity something as
broad and valuable as the privilege thus destroyed We are not without authority on this question. By a
previous act, Congress undertook to take away the constitutional privilege by giving the citizen an
equivalent, and the Supreme Court held in the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup.
Ct. 195, 35 I Ed., 1110, that the substitution so given was not an equivalent. Then, at various times, the
immunity acts in question were passed by Congress with full knowledge that in furnishing a substitute
for this great right of the citizen, it must give something as broad as the privilege taken away. It might
be broader, but it could not be narrower.
Now, in my judgment, the immunity law is broader than the privilege given by the fifth amendment,
which the act was intended to substitute. The privilege of the amendment permits a refusal to answer.
The act wipes out the offense about which the witness might have refused to answer. The privilege
permits a refusal only as to incriminating evidence. The act gives immunity for evidence of or
concerning the matter covered by the incident and the evidence need not be self-incriminating. The
privilege must be personally claimed by the witness at the time. The immunity flows to the witness by
action of law and without any claim on his part. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L.
Ed. 819; Hale vs. Henkel (recently decided) 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. -; State v. Quarles 13 Ark. 307,
quoted in 142 U.S. 567, 12 Sup. Ct. 199 (35 L. Ed. 1110); People Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319, 1
Am. St. Rep. 851; Brown v. Walker approved in Lamson v. Boyden, 160 I11. 613, 620, 621, 43 N.E.
781: People v. Butler, St. Foundry, 201 I11. 236, 248, 66 N.E. 349.
I am further of opinion that the immunity given by the act must be as broad as the liabilities imposed by
the act. The act calls upon the citizen to answer any 'lawful requirement' of the Commissioner. 'Require'
means to ask of right and by authority. Webster's Dictionary. Tenn. Coal Co. v. Saller (C.C.) 37 Fed.
545, 547. Anything is a requirement by a public officer which brings home to the person called upon
that the officer is there officially and desires compliance. 'Demand' and' require' are synonymous. Miller
v. Davis, 88 Me. 454, 34 Atl. 265. The citizen may be punished for refusal to answer such lawful
requirement. I am of opinion that when the Commissioner of Corporations, who has power to compel,
makes his demand, it is the duty of the witness to obey.
The contention has been made that in order to get immunity the citizen shall wait until the compulsion
becomes irresistible. That is the effect of the government contention. I am not able to bring my mind to
accept that doctrine. If I am right in saying that immunity flows from the law l, without any claim on the
part of the defendant and at different times that has been conceded here in argument then no act of
any kind on his part which amounts to a claim of immunity, which amounts to setting up a claim of
immunity is demanded by the law. The law never puts a premium on contumacy. A person does not
become a favored citizen by resistance to a lawful requirement. On the contrary, the policy of the law
favors the willing giving of evidence whenever an officer entitled to make a demand makes it upon a
citizen who has no right to refuse. And it would be absurd and un-American to favor the citizen who
resists and places obstacles in the way of the government as against the citizen who, with a full
knowledge of the law, obeys without resistance the demand of an officer who has the legal right to
make the demand for something which the citizen has no legal right to refuse. This, then, is the
proposition to which we are led. When an officer, who has a legal right to make a demand, makes such
demand upon a citizen who has no legal light to refuse, and that citizen answers under such conditions,
he answers under compulsion of the law.
There is no merit then to the contention that private respondents should be invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board for precisely PD No. 1886 had explicitly provided that the testimony of those
who testified before the Board can not be used against them. It will be a meaningless act of supererogation to
require that said witnesses before answering any question addressed to them must invoke their privilege against
self-incrimination. The phrase "after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination" in Section 5 of PD No.
1886 to be consistent with the intention of said decree, should refer to the time that the testimony of the witness will
be used against him in another proceeding, such as the cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. It could not
refer to the proceedings before the Agrava Board because no one is being accused before said Board and no
matter how self-incriminating the testimony of said witness is, he runs no risk of being prejudiced, much less
convicted by the Agrava Board. It is in the prosecution of cases based on the report of said Board that the witness
should invoke his right against self-incrimination. These private respondents did just that when they moved for the
exclusion in evidence of their statement before the Agrava Board. Any other interpretation would defeat the very
purpose of PD No. 1886.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The majority decision is based on erroneous premises, viz. what the case at bar presents a "novel question;" that
"this Court has not been previously called upon to rule on issues involving immunity statute" and is burdened with
the monumental task" of "laying the criteria ... (to) build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored area of
judicial inquiry." 1 The fact is that we have a wealth of settled jurisprudence and precedents, Philippine and foreign,
that control the determination of the simple issue at bar and call for the setting aside of the exclusion order issued by
respondent court (Sandiganbayan) which wrongly rules as totally and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies given
by private respondents General Ver and Olivas and their six co- respondents (all charged as accessories) as well as
all the documents, records and other evidence produced by them before the Fact-Finding Board, notwithstanding
that all were represented by counsel 2 and none of them invoked the privilege or right against self- incrimination or
made any claim or objection at the time of his testimony before the Board that any question propounded to him and
which he willingly answered called for an incriminating answer against himself.
The following vital considerations based on settled jurisprudence and precedents show that respondent court acted
with gross error and misconception of the applicable principles of the right against self-incrimination:
1. Respondent court grossly disregarded the settled guidelines laid down for trial courts by this Court of Appeal vs.
Paylo 3 thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for a unanimous Court, Chat
By so doing [ordering the exclusion of the proferred confessions of the two accused upon a ground not
raised by counsel but motu proprio by the trial court, i.e. lack of independent proof of conspiracy] the
[trial] court overlooked that the right to objection is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if
the ground for objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the
[trial] court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1)
... Suffice it to say that the lower court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at
least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy,
in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal
to probe the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial court
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should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded.
Trial courts should be liberal in the matter of admission of proof and avoid the premature and precipitate exclusion of
evidence on doubtful objections to its admissibility, citing the Court's long-standing basic ruling and policy in Prats &
Co. vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. 4 that reception and admission of evidence objected to on doubtful or technical grounds is
ultimately the less harmful course to either litigant, since the Supreme Court upon appeal would then have all the
materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment (instead of returning the case for a new trial which only
prolongs the determination of the case); and
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no
longer appeal 5
2. The right against self-incrimination is found in the first sentence of section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution stating that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." This single sentence
constituted the whole text of section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the 19,7,5 Constitution. This right against self-
incrimination has a settled meaning in jurisprudence which is fully applicable here since the right against self-
incrimination was first enforced here as an inviolable rule" in U.S. President McKinley's instructions under date of
April 7, 1900 to the Taft Commission. 6 As recounted by the late Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez as ponente for a
unanimous Court in the leading 1968 case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals 7, "Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive
language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days 'in a revolt against the thumbscrew
and the rack.' An old Philippine case [1904] speaks of this constitutional injunction as 'older than the Government of
the United States;' as having 'its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused
person;' and as having been adopted in the Philippines 'to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these
Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the
offenses will which they were charged.' " But Mr. Justice Sanchez equally stressed that "(an) accused occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the
witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, 8 an
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions." 9
As restated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for a unanimous Court in Suarez vs. Tengco, 10 "No legal impediment exists
against a litigant calling any of the adverse parties to be his witness. ... True, an accused in a criminal case may not
be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word, even for his own defense (U.S. vs, Junio, 1 Phil. 50; U.S. vs.
Luzon, 4 Phil. 344: U.S. vs. Binayoh 35 Phil. 23; Sec. l(c), Rule 111, Rules of Court). But while the constitutional
guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or administrative
(Art. 111, Sec. 1, No. 18, Phil. constitution: Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil, 483), said privilege in, proceedings other
than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option of refusal to answer incriminating question,
and not a prohibition of inquiry.
Except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant from utilizing his adversary as
witness. As a matter of fact, section 83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court expressly authorizes a party to call
an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule is, of course, subject to the
constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify against himself. But it is established that the
privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it
is when a question calling for a incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before
a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the
witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person
who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a
witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a incriminating answer is
asked, at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be
interposed.' (Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, L-6409, February 5, 1954, 11 cit. in Navarro, Criminal
Procedure, p. 302.)'
Suarez was cited with favor and reaffirmed in Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 12 wherein once again the Court, with the
concurrence in the result of the now Chief Justice, under similar facts held that the petitioner (provincial treasurer)
could not refuse to take the stand as an adverse party in a civil case since the privilege against self-incrimination "in
proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option to refuse to answer
incriminating questions, and not a prohibition of inquiry" and "must be invoked when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded, because before a question is asked, there would be no way of telling whether
the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not." The Court therein denied "the petition to
prohibit respondent judge from directing petitioner to take the witness stand and testify ... without prejudice to
petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against self-incrimination when questions are propounded to him on the
stand. Costs against the petitioner."
3. All the respondents at bar were in this category of ordinary witnesses in the hearings of the Fact-Finding Board.
They were not accused in any criminal case nor were they persons under custodial interrogation who under the
second part of section 20 of the Bill of Rights (consisting of three additional sentences 13) were given additional
rights to silence and counsel and to be informed of such rights and to the out-lawing of any confession obtained in
violation of the rights guaranteed in the cited section, by virtue of the incorporation into the Bill of Rights of the rights
granted in the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases. As noted by former Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, "(I)t amounts to an acceptance of the applicability in this jurisdiction of the epochal American
Supreme Court decision in Miranda vs. Arizona, the opinion being rendered by Chief Justice Warren. It is thus now
a part of our fundamental law. Such doctrine was promulgated in response to the question of the admissibility of
statements obtained from an individual interrogated under police custody, considering that such a time and under
the stress of such conditions, his right against self-incrimination could be rendered futile." 14 The Miranda
pronouncements thus became necessarily a part and parcel of the additional rights granted in the cited section 20,
as made by the late U.S. Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case thus: "The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. " 15 These additional Miranda rights could not
be invoked by respondents, as the members of the Fact-Finding Board were not law enforcement officers nor were
respondents under custodial interrogation.
As ordinary witnesses before the Fact-Finding Board and under the settled jurisprudence above-cited, they could
not invoke the right to silence and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right and privilege (which is not self-
executory or automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntarily or by subpoena, to invoke the privilege
and refuse to answer as and when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke
the privilege which is personal does automatically result in its loss ipso facto. The law, usage and settled
jurisprudence uniformly require that the privilege must be asserted or else is lost. The court or board upon its
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invocation still has to pass upon and rule upon the proper application of the privilege. As restated by Francisco, the
rule and exceptions are: "Certainly, where the witness, on oath declares his belief that the answer to the question
would criminate or tend to criminate him, the court cannot compel him to answer, unless it is clear perfectly, from a
careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case, that the witness is mistaken, or is acting in bad faith, and
that the answer cannot possibly have any such tendency. " 16
4. The view that withal, it is best, although not required, that a warning to the witness of his option to refuse an
answer to incriminating questions as advanced even by the Tanodbayan at the hearing dates back to a century ago
and has been long discarded as "witnesses are usually well enough advised beforehand by counsel as to their
rights when such issues impend" and "as general knowledge spread among the masses and the preparation for
testimony became more thorough." Thus, "ignore, the bible on the law of evidence so remarks and adds that "there
is no reason for letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule." —
It is plausible to argue that the witness should be warned and notified, when a incriminating fact is
inquired about, that he has an option to refuse an answer; and this view was often insisted upon, a
century ago, by leaders at the Bar,
xxx xxx xxx
But there are opposing considerations. In the first place, such a warning would be an anomaly; it is not
given for any other privilege; witnesses are in other respects supposed to know their rights; and why
not here? In the next place, it is not called for by principle, since, until the witness refuses, it can hardly
be said that he is compelled to answer; nor is it material that he believes himself compelled; for the
Court's action, and not the witness' state of mind, must be the test of compulsion. Again, the question
can at any rate only be one of judicial propriety of conduct, for no one supposes that an answer given
under such an erroneous belief should be struck out for lack of the warning. Finally, in practical
convenience, there is no demand for such rule; witnesses are usually well enough advised beforehand
by counsel as to their rights when such issues impend, and judges are too much concerned with other
responsibilities to be burdened with the provision of individual witnesses' knowledge; the risk of their
being in ignorance should fall rather upon the party summoning than the party opposing.
Nevertheless, it is plain that the old practice was to give such a warning, when it appeared to be
needed. But, as general knowledge spread among the masses, and the preparation for testimony
became more thorough, this practice seems to have disappeared in England, so far at least as any
general rule was concerned.
In the United States, both the rule and the trial custom vary in the different jurisdictions. No doubt a
capable and painstaking judge will give the warning, where need appears, but there is no reason for
letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule. 17
But from the environmental facts and circumstances of the Fact-Finding Board hearings, to require such a warning
to the witness of his option of refusal to answer incriminatory questions would have been an exercise in absurdity
and futility, As is a matter of public knowledge, respondents had concluded in their investigation that Galman was
the assassin of the late Senator Aquino. As observed by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla as amicus curiae at the
hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, they were all too eager to testify and make a strong effort to gain support
from the Fact-Finding Board and the public for the military version and report that the assassin was Galman who
was forthwith gunned down by the military escorts and guards at the tarmac. It would have been ridiculous, if not
bordering on officiousness and impropriety, to warn them as the highest ranking military officers of their option of
refusal to answer incriminatory questions and also as the majority holds, 18 of their right to remain silent. When
respondents generals appeared before the Board, respondent Ver precisely made the opening statement that
GENERAL VER:
I welcome this opportunity, Madame Justice, members of this Honorable Board, Dean,
Gentlemen this opportunity to assist ... this Honorable Board in the quest for truth and
justice, We all deplore this tragic incident which is now the subject of inquiry, This Board,
this Honorable Board is mandated to conduct a free, full and exhaustive investigation into
the matter under investigation We all hope that my testimony, madame, will somehow
dispel any misconception, or any misinformation surrounding this tragic incident. I am now
ready to answer your questions.
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Now, General, at the outset, we give the right and the privilege for every witness to be
assisted by counsel Do you have your counsel with you this morning?
GENERAL VER:
I did not bring any counsel, madame, but ... if I need a counsel, madame, I could probably
look for... probably ...
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes?
GENERAL VER:
I may call Fiscal Parena or the Public Coordinator. I was talking to Atty. Tan to assist me,
in the protection of my constitutional rights ...
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes.
GENERAL VER:
... if it is necessary:
ATTY. TAN:
Your Honor, please, it is part of the function of this office to help the witness if he doesn't
have counsel, and so, if the General is willing to have me, I will happily serve as counsel,
Your Honor.
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JUSTICE AGRAVA:
All right.
GENERAL VER:
Thank you. 19
Respondent Olivas likewise testified before the Board in response to its invitation to assist it in determining the true
facts and circumstances surrounding the double killing.
6. The majority decision would go around this by asserting without basis in the record that "(A)ll the private
respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino
while embarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime
as such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General Ver on the other hand,
being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so with General
Olivas, the first designated investigator of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have
bungled the case. The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from ugly wagging tongues, all point to
whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the said conspiracy?" In fact, the
respondent court's decision and separate opinions as well as the majority decision at bar and the separate
concurring opinions all fail to specify the particular portions of the testimonies of respondents or any specific
question and answer that can be in any way deemed to be self-incriminating. Indeed, even if we assumed arguendo
that they were warned of their right against self-incrimination and tried absurdly to invoke the same, there is no
specific question and answer by way of testimony that could be pointed to them as having been made under
compulsion for the simple reason that their testimony was in full support of their own military report that Galman was
Aquino's killer and for which they were trying to gain the Board's acceptance. In the all too brief and inadequate
deliberations held on August 20 and 21, 1985 after the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, without reaching a
definite conclusion, the ponente reported and I share this view from a cursory examination, for want of material time,
of the excluded testimonies only since the excluded documents, records and other evidence produced by them were
not before the Court that there is nothing in the excluded testimonies that could in any way be deemed self-
incriminatory perse. So there would be no legal basis whatever for their exclusion. But the ponente circulated only
last August 26th at noon his draft for dismissal of the petitions which were filed only last month. And its release has
been set for August 30th.
7. There has not been enough time to weigh and ponder on the far-reaching consequences of the decision at bar.
The decision orders the total and unqualified exclusion of the testimonies and evidence produced before the Fact-
Finding Board by the eight respondents charged as accessories "even though (they) failed to claim (their) privilege
before giving the incriminating testimony" (citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 218). But the cited compilation of American State
and Federal Law expressly cautions that "The question whether a witness must claim exemption . on from self-
incrimination to be entitled to immunity from subsequent prosecution must in each case be determined in the light of
constitutional and statutory provisions in the jurisdiction where the question arises" (21 Am. Jur. 2d. 151). It recites
on the same cited page that "Under a statute granting immunity to persons who have been compelled to testify, one
who has appeared voluntarily and testified without claiming his privilege against self-incrimination or one who has
appeared and testified pursuant to a void subpoena or one addressed to another person, without claiming the
privilege, cannot say he has been compelled to testify, and therefore, he is not entitled to immunity." And the
necessity of claiming the privilege against self-incrimination before an administrative officer or board such as the
Fact Finding Board is recognized to be essential, thus:
This is not only equally true as for the case of testimony in a judicial trial, but the explicitness is here
even more essential, and particularly where the administrative officer makes a general demand for
documents or testimony upon a broad class of topics. The reason is clear. The officer has testimonial
powers to extract a general mass of facts, or which some, many, or most will certainly be innocent and
unprivileged, some may be privileged communications (e.g., between attorney and client) whose
privilege remains unaffected by the statute defining his powers, and some may be privileged as self-
incriminating but liable to become demandable by overriding this privilege with a grant of immunity.
Among these mass of facts, then, the officer will seek those which are relevant to his administrative
inquiry; he cannot know which of them fall within one or another privilege in particular, which of them
tend to criminate at all, or to criminate a particular person; if such facts are there, he may not desire or
be authorized to exercised the option of granting immunity so as to obtain them; his primary function
and power is to obtain the relevant facts at large, and his power to obtain a special and limited class of
facts by grant of immunity is only a secondary one, and one which he will not exercise till a cause
arises, if even then.
For these reasons of practical sense, then, as well as for the inherent requirements of principle already
noticed for judicial officers, it is particularly true for an inquiry by an administrative officer that the
witness must explicitly claim his privilege, and specifically the privilege against self- incrimination, and
must then be overridden in that claim, before immunity can take effect. (VII Wigmore on Evidence,
2282, pp. 517-518)
The concurrence of Justice Vera Cruz sounds even more ominous thus:
I believe that where evidence is produced by a witness in accordance with the conditions of the statute
granting immunity such as P.D. No. 1886, as amended, its immunity provisions attach instantly and it is
entirely immaterial what use the investigation authority makes of it (People ex rel. Massarsky v. Adams,
47 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 62 N.E. 2d 244).
Consequently, the evidence, given before the Agrava Board by the accused in the instant cases
namely, Generals Fabian Ver and Prospero Olivas, and Sergeants Pablo Martinez, Tomas Fernandez,
Leonardo Mojica, Pepito Torio, Prospero Bona and Aniceto Acupido cannot be used against them and
this proscription did attach instantly when they testified before the same Board. Verily, the prohibition
stands, irrespective of the purpose for which the prosecution would like to use this evidence.
The total and unqualified exclusion of the testimony and evidence granted by respondent court and sustained by the
majority decision herein refers expressly to the eight respondents charged as accessories. Would not this
unprecedented grant of immunity and exclusion of testimony be now claimed by the rest of the twenty-two accused
charged as principals except for the lone civilian? As reported by the press, respondent court has suspended its trial
and placed the pressure on the Court to rush its decision, as "(T)he so-called 'trial of the century' has been delayed
since last week on motion of the defense panel which had argued that the high court's decision on the admissibility
of Ver's testimonies was a vital prerequisite to the presentation of witnesses for the defense. " 20 Would this not
result in the People holding an empty bag of excluded testimonies and evidence, since to all intents and purposes
all respondents-accused testified before the Fact-Finding Board? Would their testimonies be inadmissible for
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
purposes even of impeaching such testimony as they may now give before respondent court? These ponderous
questions need not confront us had we but required respondent court to hew to the settled procedure and doctrine
of Yatco (supra, par. I hereof) of giving the prosecution a chance to get into the record its relevant evidence until the
final determination and consideration of the case, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence of the prosecution may
lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer
appeal.
8. The alleged "ambiguous phraseology" of section 5 of P.D. 1886 cited in respondent court's questioned order and
bolstered by the majority decision's "novel" conclusion and ruling that the cited section quoted therein 21 requires a
claim from the witness of the privilege against self-incrimination but "forecloses under threat of contempt
proceedings [under section 4] against anyone who makes such a claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion
imposed by section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light, of the actions provided in section 4, infringes upon the
witness' right against self- incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative
the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive
protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity
must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred
constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents
had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are, therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure
the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We
hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under
Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law.
The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness. " Emphasis supplied).
It bears emphasis that none of respondents made any such claim against self-incrimination. The "oppressive
compulsion" if it may be so-called, consists of a maximum penalty of P200. fine and/or 30 days imprisonment for
direct contempt. As indicated, it would be ridiculous for any respondent to 1 make such claim when his testimony
was but in full support of their own military theory and report that Galman killed Aquino.
The language of the cited section 22 is plain and simple. It excuses no one from testifying and producing books and
records but grants him immunity from prosecution (except for perjury) after having invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination " There is nothing oppressive about such compulsion in exchange for immunity provided the witness
invokes his and aims his privilege a against self-incrimination.
In the Court's Resolution of July 9, 1985, Mr. Justice Aquino, voting to dismiss outright the petitions. opined that The
clause 'concerning which lie is compelled to testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination' is
surplusage. It is in conflict with the first clause which, as already stated, gives immunity to the witness except in
case of perjury. So, section 5 should be read as if that clause were not there.This is contrary to the rules of statutory
construction that there is no room for construction when tile text is plain and simple, i.e. requires invocation and that
the provisions must be taken in context and all the words taken into account and given their full meaning. The Anti-
Gambling Law, Act No. 1757, enacted on October 9, 1907 by the Philippine Commission (probably the first
Philippine immunity statute) granted such absolute immunity and does not contain the conditional clause requiring
that the witness invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. Section 10 of the cited Act reads:
Sec. 10. Upon any investigation or proceeding for violation of this Act no person shall be excused from
giving testimony upon the ground that such testimony would tend to convict him of a crime, but such
testimony cannot be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding; Provided,
however, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury
committed in the course of any proceeding or investigation had by virtue of [his Act. (1 CPS [Rev. Ed.],
190)
But when the statute grants conditional immunity (and not absolute as in the above-quoted section 10 of the Anti-
Gambling Act.), then it explicitly contains the cited conditional clause in section 5 of P.D. 1886 granting immunity
only when "he is compelled to testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. "
This is but in accord with long-settled Philippine jurisprudence cited above (supra. paragraph 2 hereof), that the
witness has an option of refusal to answer incriminatory questions, which he loses ipso facto if he does not invoke
the privilege and nevertheless answers the questions. Here, in review of the national and international importance of
the case with the country's very prestige at stake, the P.D. added the incentive of offering immunity: "The purpose of
immunity provisions is to aid prosecuting officers by inducing criminals or their confederates to turn state's evidence
and tell on each other, to enable prosecuting officers to procure evidence which would otherwise be denied to them
because of the constitutional right against self-incrimination, and at the same time to protect every person from
gluing testimony which directly or indirectly would be helpful to the prosecution in securing an indictment or a
conviction. The provisions for immunity are or should be as broad as or co-extensive with the constitutional
provisions granting the privilege against self-incrimination." (21 Am. Jur. 2d. Criminal Law, sec. 148). It is bad
enough that no state's evidence turned up to tell on his confederates in exchange of immunity. But to call the cited
section " a booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness" unless it was construed as granting absolute and
unconditional immunity from the very fact of merely testifying as a witness before the Board without claiming
immunity nor giving any incriminatory information that would aid the state to determine the true facts about Aquino's
assassination would be a sell-out. It would make a shambles of the letter and spirit as well as the salutary intent and
objective of the Decree to ferret out the truth and obtain state witnesses.
9. The truncated and distorted reading of the cited section 5 which consists of a single integrated paragraph and
splitting it into two isolated parts so as to allow the privilege against self-incrimination (which was already lost for
failure to claim it in the Board hearings) to be resurrected and raised in a much later time frame and "subsequent
criminal proceeding" is against all usage and rules of statutory construction, not to mention the long line of above-
cited jurisprudence to the contrary. And if there still be doubt, we need only reproduce hereunder the similar wording
of Senate Joint Resolution 137 (Public Law 88-202) after which section 5 of P.D. 1886 was patterned. Said law was
enacted by the U.S. Congress in December 1963 to empower the Warren Commission to issue subpoenas requiring
the testimony of witness and the production of evidence relating to any matter under its investigation. The Report of
the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in its foreword on page X stated
that "In addition, the resolution authorized the Commission to compel testimony from witnesses claiming the
privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution by providing for the grant of
immunity to persons testifying under such compulsion." (Emphasis supplied). The cited Public Law reads:
(e) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the
testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except
demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction matter, or thing concerning which
he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce
evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. (Emphasis supplied).
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10. As already indicated above, none of the respondents, public and private, has indicated the specific portions of
their testimony that they have been "oppressively compelled" to glue, in alleged violation of their privilege against
self-incrimination. The reason for this is that they all testified voluntarily and eagerly to support the military report
and version that Galman killed Senator Aquino. The Board unanimously rejected the military report and found that
the killings were the product of criminal conspiracy. A brief flashback is herein appropriate: Within 60 seconds from
his being led away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on Sunday,
August 21, 1983 at past one p.m., former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. who was coming home after three years of
self-exile in the U.S. laid dead face down on the tarmac, with his brain smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin. 23 Also lying dead on the tarmac, face up, near the senator was another
man, to be Identified much later as Rolando Galman, whom the soldiers admittedly gunned down. The military
pointed to him as Aquino's assassin, who had somehow allegedly penetrated the air-tight security of close to 2000
men ringing the airport. The military version met with great public disbelief and skepticism. The first fact-finding
commission created under Administrative Order No. 469 dated August 24, 1983 and P.D. 1879 dated August 27,
1983 was the object of several suits charging bias and that the President "had already prejudged the case, by
rejecting the version of foreign media that it is one of the soldiers, supposed to guard Aquino, who fatally shot him."
24
The said commission was dissolved per P.D. 1886, dated October 14, 1983 (later amended by P.D. 1903 dated
February 8, 1984) which created the ad hoc Fact-Finding Board with plenary powers to investigate "the treacherous
and vicious assassination (which) has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame ... (and) to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive
investigation into all the aspects of said tragedy." The Board after extensive hearings, submitted to the President
their majority report on October 24, 1984, while the chairman former Court of Appeals Justice Corazon Agrava
submitted her minority report one day earlier on October 23, 1984. All five members of the Board unanimously
rejected the official military version that Galman was the assassin and instead found that there was criminal
conspiracy. Their main difference of opinion is that the four-member majority found twenty-five military men (headed
by respondents Generals Ver, Olivas and Luther Custodia) and one civilian "indictable for the premeditated killing of
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983." The chairman's report
confined the conspiracy to seven men headed by General Custodia. The Tanodbayan, after conducting the
preliminary investigation, adopted the Board's majority report recommending the indictment of the accused as
"involved in this conspiracy, either as principals, upon the theory that the act of one is the act of all, or as
accessories, for attempting to hide the corpus of the offense." The eight accessories so indicted are the private
respondents herein named headed by respondents Ver and Olivas. (The chairman in her minority report had found
that "(T)he indications are that the plotters had agreed that only one would be the assassin; that the others can
either point to Galman as the killer; or they can state that they did not see the shooting; and that they will give false
testimony to mislead and confuse.
11. Only the former lawyers of the Fact-Finding Board created under P.D. No. 1886, consisting of Messrs. Andres R.
Narvasa, Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko and Francisco A. Villa have given us the answer that there is
nothing incriminatory per se in the testimonies of the respondents, in the Memorandum submitted by them, to wit:
I. The so-called 'Galman Theory that it was Rolando Galman who killed Senator Aquino is either true or
untrue, a matter the SANDIGANBAYAN will have to resolve.
II. If the 'Galman Theory' be true as advocated by the military officers concerned then the testimony of
Ver, et al. is true. It is not self-incriminatory. There would then be no reason to exclude it.
If, on the other hand, the theory be untrue as the prosecution in turn advocates then the testimony of
Ver, et al. is untrue. It is incriminatory of them, because by giving it and thereby seeking to hide the
crime, they incriminated themselves. Withal there would also be no reason to exclude it. Surely, after
their plot to deceive the Board had been exposed, they should not now be allowed to use the law to
bring about exclusion of the very proof of their deception.
In short, the testimonies of respondents could only be deemed incriminating if it be found that they sought thereby to
hide or cover up the crime and thus incriminate themselves, as accessories to the murder of Senator Aquino. The
former Fact-Finding Board lawyers amplify their theory, as follows:
5. The plain language of Section 5, PD 1886 precludes its interpretation as extending immunity to all testimony or
evidence produced before the Board in obedience to subpoena regardless of whether the witness giving such
evidence invokes the privilege against self-incrimination or not. —
6. The fact is, the invocation by Ver, et al. of such right would have been self-defeating first, it would have prevented
them from presenting evidence in substantiation of the 'Galman Theory,' which they wished the Board to accept; and
second, it might have exposed to some extent their real objective, which was to deceive the Board.
7. It would have been incongruous for Ver, et al. to have claimed that their testimony would incriminate them as
accessories to the murder of Aquino when they were, by testifying, actually in process of committing that precise
crime, becoming accessories.
8. Neither PD 1886 nor the Constitution should be used as a shield for crime, fraud or trickery.
9. The foregoing propositions were ignored by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Instead, with all due respect, it has —
a. given Section 5, PD 1886 a strained construction not justified by and contrary to its plain language;
b. given Section 20, Article IV, Constitution, a meaning at odds with its plain terms and contrary to
relevant decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court; and
c. sanctioned the use of legal provisions to shield persons from criminal liability arising from their
perfidious testimony before the Fact-Finding Board.
There is no legal ground nor justification for the exclusion order. It is for respondent court, upon consideration of the
evidence for the People, without any exclusion, and of the evidence for the defense in due course, to render its
verdict of guilty or not guilty.
With a word of commendation for the former Fact-Finding Board lawyers and former Senator Ambrosio Padilla and
Atty. Ramon Gonzales, whose memoranda as amid curiae, have been of great assistance, I vote, accordingly, to
grant the petitions at bar and to set aside the questioned exclusion order.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I vote to grant the Petitions and to reverse the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
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The resolution of the issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to Sec. 5 of PD No. 1886, reading as
follows:
grounds that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him
to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against
him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such an
As I read the law, Section 5 does not require that the person testifying before the Agrava Fact Finding Board (the
Board, for short) shall first invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Under said statute it is obvious that he has
no such privilege.
But what is the effect of the second part providing that his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be
used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except in case of perjury?
To my mind, the above portion does not grant to a person who has testified before the Board absolute or total
immunity. It should not operate as a shield against criminal liability specially since, under Section 12 of the same
Decree, the Board may initiate the filing of the proper complaint if its finding so warrant. Thus,
SEC. 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should the findings warrant the prosecution
of any person the Board may initiate the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate government
agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The inquiry before the Board was a general one. It was not directed against any particular individual or individuals.
Private respondents did not testify therein as suspects or as accused persons. There should therefore be no
hindrance to a criminal prosecution.
It has been held that where an inquiry by a grand jury is a general one and is not directed against a
particular individual the fact that on the basis of the information elicited, grounds for a criminal
prosecution may evolve against a witness, may not serve as a bar to such prosecution (U.S. v. Okin
D.C.N.J., 154 F. Supp. 553; Benson v. Goldstein, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 452) even though he testified before
the grand jury without being warned of his constitutional privileges against self- incrimination. (U.S. v.
Okin supra) (Emphasis supplied)
The right against self incrimination is not a prohibition of inquiry but an option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 [1962]). The kernel of the privilege is testimonial compulsion. Whether
or not any specific portion of the testimonies of private respondents is incriminating should be determined by the
Sandiganbayan itself. The claim against self-incrimination should be invoked when a specific question, which is
incriminating in character, is put to a witness in the subsequent proceeding. There should be no automatic "immunity
bath" of the entire testimony before the Board for immunity does not extend to such of the evidence as is not
privileged.
... But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time,
and the proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.
This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the
information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence
(Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can
be decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim or privilege can be made until a question calling for
a incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of
privilege may be interposed. (Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, 326 [19541).
Moreover, the issue actually addresses itself to a question of admissibility or competency of evidence and not to its
credibility. Whether the evidence so admitted is to be given any probative weight or credence is best addressed to
the Sandiganbayan. It should be recalled that the Board was not unanimous in its assessment of the testimonies
given.
There are additional considerations. While the right against self-incrimination is indubitably one of the most
fundamental of human rights, Section 5 of PD No. 1886 should be construed so as to effect a practical and
beneficent purpose and not in such a manner as to hinder or obstruct the administration of criminal justice.
... Any statute which, while it compels him to testify, protects the witness if he does disclose the
circumstances of his offense and the sources from which or the means by which evidence of its
commission or of his connection with it may be obtained or made effectual for his subsequent
prosecution and conviction is sufficient to comply with the constitutional requirements. Such a statute,
however should be construed to effect a practical and beneficent purpose, namely, at the same time to
secure the witness in his constitutional rights and to permit the prosecuting officer to secure evidence
of a crime. It should not be construed so as to unduly impede, hinder, or obstruct the administration of
criminal justice." Brown v. Walker 161 US 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819. (People ex rel. Hunt vs.
Lane, 116 N.Y.S. 990, 132 App. Div. 406)
The objective in all this exercise is to arrive at the truth. "Though the constitutional provisions for the protection of
one who appears ... must be liberally and fairly applied, the interests of the people are also entitled to consideration"
(Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 609; People vs. Coyle 15 N.Y.S. 2d 441, 172 Mis 593). Specially
so since, in the language of PD No. 1886 itself, the "treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983, has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame. "
In the interest of eliciting the truth, the excluded testimonies should be admitted, leaving it to the Sandiganbayan to
determine which specific questions and answers are to be excluded because they are incriminatory, and which
should be given credibility, in found to be competent and admissible.
RELOVA, J., dissenting:
The issue raised in these two petitions is whether the testimonies and other evidence produced by the private
respondents before the Agrava Board may be used as evidence against them before the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Sandiganbayan rejected their testimonies on the ground that "under statutes providing in substance
that no person shall be excused from testifying or furnishing evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence
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may tend to incriminate him, but that no person shall be subject to indictment or prosecution for anything concerning
which he may testify or furnish evidence, it has been held that one who testifies concerning criminal offenses when
required to do so is entitled to immunity from prosecution even though he fails to claim his privilege before giving the
incriminating testimony (21 Am Jur 2d 218). He could not be required, in order to gain the immunity which the law
afforded, to go though the formality of an objection or protest which, however made, would be useless (VIII Wigmore
516)." (p. 4, Resolution of Sandiganbayan)
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886 provides that:
invoked his privilege against self- incrimination to testify or produce evidence ... (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the above Presidential Decree no one can refuse to testify or furnish evidence before the Fact Finding
Board. However, his testimony or any evidence produced shall not be used against him after he invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination. Stated differently, the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked when
the question at the hearing before the Board, calling for an incriminating answer is propounded; otherwise, before
any question is asked of the witness, he would not know whether the information to be elicited from him is
incriminating or not.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, this Court held that "the privilege against self-
incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when question calling for a
incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be no way
of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on
Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he
decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a incriminating
answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be
interposed.'" And, since it is a personal right to be exercised only by the witness, this privilege against self-
incrimination may be waived by him and, when so waived, cannot thereafter be asserted. The privilege is waived by
his voluntary offer to testify by, answering questions without objecting and/or claiming the privilege.
When private respondents gave testimonies before the Board they were not defendants but witnesses invited and/or
subpoenaed "to ventilate the truth thorougly free, independent and dispassionate investigation." They could not
refuse or withhold answers to questions propounded to them unless the inquiry calls for an incriminating answer and
a timely objection is raised.
In the case at bar, since the private respondents answered questions from the Fact Finding Board without claiming
the privilege against self-incrimination they cannot now be allowed to invoke the immunity clause provided in
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886.
I vote to grant the petitions.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, C.J., concurring:
To admit private respondents' testimonies and evidence before the Fact-Finding Board (FFB) against them in the
criminal prosecution pending before the Sandiganbayan, would violate their constitutional or human rights the right
to procedural due process, the right to remain silent, and the right against self- incrimination.
That their testimonies and other evidence they submitted before the FFB in these criminal cases are incriminatory, is
confirmed by the very fact that such testimonies and evidence were the very bases of the majority report of the FFB
recommending the prosecution of private respondents as accessories.
It should be stressed that the basic purposes of the right against self- incrimination are (1) humanity or humanitarian
reasons to prevent a witness or accused from being coerced, whether physically, morally, and/or psychologically,
into incriminating himself, and (2) to protect the witness or accused from committing perjury, because the first law of
nature is self- preservation.
The utilization in the prosecution against them before the Sandiganbayan of the testimonies and other evidence of
private respondents before the FFB collides with Section 1, Section 17 and Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17, No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates
the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this Section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The Bill of Rights constitutes the reservation of the sovereign people against, as well as the limitation on, the
delegated powers of government. These rights thus enshrined need no express assertion. On the contrary, the
police and prosecution officers of the country should respect these constitutional liberties as directed in the recent
decision in the Hildawa and Valmonte cases (G.R. Nos. 67766 and 70881, August 14, 1985). The established
jurisprudence is that waiver by the citizen of his constitutional rights should be clear, categorical, knowing, and
intelligent (Johnson vs. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949] and in Chavez vs.
CA, 24 SCRA 663, 682-683).
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The use of testimonies and other evidence of private respondents before the FFB against them in the criminal cases
subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan would trench upon the constitutional guarantees that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... that "no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law" and that (Section 17, Article IV, 1973 Constitution), that "no person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself. ..." and that " a person has the right to remain silent ..." (Section 20,
Article IV, 1973 Constitution).
There can be no implied waiver of a citizen's right against self-incrimination or of his right to remain silent.
Any such renunciation cannot be predicated on such a slender or tenuous reed as a dubious implication. Otherwise,
it would be easier to lose the human rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights than to protect or preserve them; it would
be easier to enslave the citizen than for him to remain free. Such a result was never intended by the Founding
Fathers.
The first sentence of Section 20 of the Bill of Rights stating that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself," applies to both the ordinary witness and the suspect under custodial investigation.
In support of the rule that there can be no implied waiver of the right against
self-incrimination and all other constitutional rights by the witness or by the accused, is the fact that the right against
double jeopardy can only be renounced by the accused if the criminal case against him is dismissed or otherwise
terminated with his express consent. Without such express consent to the dismissal or termination of the case, the
accused can always invoke his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
If Section 5 of P.D. 1886 were interpreted otherwise, said section would become a booby trap for the unsuspecting
or unwary witness, A witness summoned either by subpoena or by Invitation to testify before the FFB under Section
5, cannot refuse, under pain of contempt, to testify or produce evidence required of him on the ground that his
testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; because the same Section 5
prohibits the use of such testimony or evidence which may tend to incriminate him in any criminal prosecution that
may be filed against him. The law or decree cannot diminish the scope and extent of the guarantee against self-
incrimination or the right to remain silent or the right against being held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law, or against deprivation of his life, liberty or property without due process of law.
As a matter of fact, numerous decisions culled by American jurisprudence are partial to the rule that immunity
statutes which compel a citizen to testify, should provide an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as
total and as absolute as the guarantees themselves (Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-
1623; Kastigar vs. US 1972, 406 US 441).
Even if the witness testified pursuant to an invitation, the invitation does not remove the veiled threat of compulsion,
because as stated in the Chavez case, supra.
product of unintentional statements. Pressures which operate to overbear his will, disable him from
sufficient. So is moral coercion attending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant
(Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 679).
The summons issued to private respondents has been euphemistically called as an invitation, instead of a subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum, as a sign of respect for the important and high positions occupied by private
respondents. But the effect of such an invitation thus worded is the same as a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
Precisely, the phraseology of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 entices the unsuspecting private respondents to testify before
the FFB, by dangling in the same Section 5 the assurance that their testimony or the evidence given by them will not
be used against them in a criminal prosecution that may be instituted against them.
At the very least, their consent to testify was under such misapprehension. Hence, there can be no clear,
categorical, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent, against self-incrimination, against being held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and against being deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law under such misapprehension.
In any event, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 creates a doubt, which doubt is accentuated by the difference of opinion
thereon among the counsels in these cases and among members of this Court. And it is basic in criminal law that
doubts should be resolved liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the government.
The procedural due process both under Sections 1 and 17 of the Bill of Rights, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
simply means, in the language of Justice Frankfurter, the sporting Idea of fair play. The FFB and its counsel did not
inform the private respondents herein of their right to remain silent and their right against self-incrimination, and that
their testimonies may be utilized against them in a court of law, before they testified. This is not fair to them, and
hence, they were denied procedural due process.
It should be stressed that the FFB was merely a fact-finding agency for the purpose of gathering all the possible
facts that may lead to the Identity of the culprit. Such testimonies may provide leads for the FFB, its counsels and
agents to follow up. The FFB and its counsels cannot rely solely on such testimonies to be used against the private
respondents in these criminal cases. It should be recalled that the FFB had ample funds for the purpose of
accomplishing its object. As a matter of fact. it refunded several million pesos to the government after it concluded
its investigation. The Board and its counsel could have utilized the said amount to appoint additional agents to look
for witnesses to the assassination. In this respect, the FFB counsel could be faulted in not utilizing the funds
appropriated for them to ferret out all evidence that will Identify the culprit or culprits. The failure of the FFB's
counsel to use said funds reflects on the initiative and resourcefulness of its counsel. He could prosecute private
respondents on evidence other than their testimony and the evidence they gave before the FFB.
As heretofore stated, the private respondents were compelled to testify before the FFB whether by subpoena or by
invitation which has the effect of a subpoena as provided for in Section 5 of P.D. 1886; because private respondents
then believed, by reading the entire Section 5, that the testimony they gave before the FFB could not be used
against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan. Because the Board was merely a
fact-finding board and that it was riot conducting a criminal prosecution the private respondents were under the
impression that there was no need for them to invoke their rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination and
against being held for a criminal offense without due process of law.
It should be recalled that the counsel of the FFB after submitting the majority report, refused to cooperate with the
Tanodbayan in these cases with the pompous declaration that, after submitting their majority report, he automatically
became functus oficio. Was his refusal to cooperate with, and assist, the Tanodbayan in the prosecution of these
cases, born of the realization that the FFB majority report is as weak as it was precipitate? And when the
Tanodbayan has now his back to the wall, as it were, by the ruling of the respondent Sandiganbayan excluding the
testimonies and other evidence of private respondents herein on the ground that the use of their testimonies and
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other evidence will incriminate them, the FFB counsel, without being requested by the Tanodbayan, now files a
memorandum in support of the position of the Tanodbayan. what is the reason for this turn-about to save his report
from the fire which they started with such enthusiasm?
As above emphasized, it is the duty of the police and the prosecuting authorities to respect their rights under the
Constitution as we stated in the recent Hildawa and Valmonte cases, supra.
The grant of immunity under Section 5 of P.D. 1886 would be meaningless if we follow the posture of petitioners
herein. Such a posture would be correct if the phrase "after having invoked his privilege against self- incrimination"
were transposed as the opening clause of Section 5 to read a follows "After having invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination, no person shall be excused from attending and testifying ... etc."
Said Section 5 has two clauses and contemplates two proceedings. The first clause from "No person shall be
excused ... etc." up to "penalty or forfeiture refers to the proceeding before the FFB. The second clause after the
semi-colon following the word "forfeiture which begins with but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall
not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after
having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination to testify . refers to a subsequent criminal proceeding against
him which second clause guarantees him against the use of his testimony in such criminal prosecution, but does not
immunize him from such prosecution based on other evidence.
The private respondents herein, if the contention of the prosecution were sustained, would be fried in their own fat.
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed.
CONCEPCION, JR., J., concurring:
1. Let me preface my opinion by quoting from my dissent in Pimentel. 1
1. We are committed to the mandate of the Rule of Law. We resolve controversies before Us without
considering what is or what might be the popular decision. No. We never do. We only consider the facts
and the law. Always the facts and the law.
2. The issue before Us is not I repeat not the guilt or innocence of Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Major Gen.
Prospero Olivas, and others for their alleged participation in the assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.
3. The issue is: Are the testimonies given by them before the Agrava Board admissible in evidence
against them in their trial before the Sandiganbayan?
4. The issue therefore is purely a question of law. It involves the interpretation of Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886
and calls for the application of the Rule of Law.
5. Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 reads:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled. after having
so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
6. This section means that any person who is invited or summoned to appear must obey and testify as to what he
knows. Even if the testimony tends to incriminate him he must testify. Even if he claims his constitutional right
against self-incrimination, he still must testify. However, his testimony cannot be used against him in any subsequent
proceeding, provided that at the time it is being presented, he invokes his privilege against self-incrimination. His
testimony, no matter what it may be, cannot in any way cause him harm.
The only exception is if the testimony he gave is false, in which case he can be prosecuted and punished for perjury.
He may also be demoted or removed from office.
7. The testimonies given by private respondents before the Agrava Board are therefore not admissible against them
in their trial before the Sandiganbayan, having invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.
PLANA, J., concurring:
I would like to underscore some considerations underlying my concurrence:
1. According to the Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. But the law (PD
1886) which created the Agrava Board decrees that no person shall be excused from testifying on the ground of
self- incrimination. If the law had stopped after this command, it would have been plainly at variance with the
Constitution and void. lt was to ward off such a Constitutional infirmity that the law provided for immunity against the
use of coerced testimony or other evidence, an immunity which, to be constitutionally adequate, must give at least
the same measure of protection as the fundamental guarantee against self-incrimination.
2. Presidential Decree 1886 was not intended either to restrict or expand the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination. On the one hand, a law cannot restrict a constitutional provision. On the other hand, PD 1886 was
adopted precisely to coerce the production of evidence that hopefully would unmask the killers of Senator Aquino,
although the compulsory process is accompanied by "use" immunity.
3. It is argued that the right against self- incrimination must have been invoked before the Agrava Board if the use of
evidence given therein against the witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution is to be barred. I did not agree.
I fail to see why to preserve pursuant to law (PD 1886) one's constitutional right against self-incrimination, one has
to offer resistance to giving testimony a resistance which the said law itself says is futile and cannot prevail, as no
witness by its specific injunction can refuse to testify.
4. The constitutional right against self-incrimination may be waived expressly. It may also be waived impliedly by
speaking when one has the option to hold his tongue. Waiver by implication presupposes the existence of the right
to keep silent. Thus, when one speaks because the law orders him to do so, his action is not really voluntary and
therefore his testimony should not be deemed an implied waiver of his constitutional right against self- incrimination.
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5. Presidential Decree 1886 does not give private respondents absolute immunity from prosecution, It only bars the
use against them of the evidence that was elicited from them by the Agrava Board. If there are other evidence
available, private respondents are subject to indictment and conviction.
6. Moreover, the evidence given to the Agrava Board is not, in my view, completedly immunized. What PD 1886
bars from use is only the testimony of the witness who testified before the Agrava Board and whatever was
presented as part of his testimony, as such. PD 1886 could not have intended to convert non-confidential official
documents into shielded public records that cannot be used as evidence against private respondents, by the mere
fact that they were admitted in evidence as part of private respondents' testimony before the Agrava Board. In other
words, evidence otherwise available to the prosecution, such as official documents, do not become barred just
because they have been referred to in the course of the testimony of private respondents and admitted in evidence
as part of their testimony They may still be subpoenaed and offered in evidence. Conceivably, some objections
might be raised; but the evidence will be unfettered by the exclusionary rule in PD 1886.
ESCOLIN, J., concurring:
I concur in the dismissal of the petitions. The admission in evidence of the testimonies of private respondents given
before the Agrava Board would constitute a violation of their right against self- incrimination guaranteed under
Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. I subscribe to the majority view that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 cannot be
constitutionally tenable, unless a grant of immunity is read into it vis-a-vis the compulsion it imposes upon a witness
to testify. Otherwise stated, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 should be interpreted as an immunity statute, which, while
depriving one of the right to remain silent, provides an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as total
and as absolute as the guarantees themselves. (Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-
1623, Kastigar v. U.S., 1972, 406 US 441).
Clearly, this is how the private respondents understood the legal provision under consideration. For ably assisted as
they were by counsel, they would not have allowed themselves to be deliberately dragged into what the Chief
Justice would call a "booby trap". Viewed from another angle, therefore, it could not be truly said that private
respondents had waived their right against self- incrimination in a manner that is clear, categorical, knowing and
intelligent. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 and Chavez v. CA, 24
SCRA 663).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion penned by Justice Serafin R. Cuevas and in the pithy separate opinion of Justice
Nestor B. Alampay but would like to add some personal observations.
This case furnishes an opportunity to appreciate the workings of our criminal justice system.
The prosecutions which led to this petition serve as a timely reminder that all of us-civilian or military, layman or
judge, powerful or helpless- need the Bill of Rights. And should the time ever come when like the respondents we
may have to invoke the Constitution's protection, the guarantees of basic rights must be readily available, in their full
strength and pristine glory, unaffected by what is currently popular or decreed and heedless of whoever may be
involved
In many petitions filed with this Court and lower courts, the military has often been charged with riding roughshod
over the basic rights of citizens. Officers and enlisted men in the frontlines of the fight against subversion or rebellion
may, in the heat of combat, see no need to be concerned over such ,niceties" as due process, unreasonable
searches and seizures, freedom of expression, and right to counsel. They are best reminded that these rights are
not luxuries to be discarded in times of crisis. These rights are the bedrock of a free and civilized society. They are
the reason why we fight so hard to preserve our system of government. And as earlier stated, there may come times
when we may have to personally invoke these basic freedoms for ourselves. When we deny a right to an accused,
we deny it to ourselves.
The decision of the Court underscores the importance of keeping inviolate the protections given by the Bill of Rights.
Acts which erode or sacrifice constitutional rights under seductive claims of preserving or enhancing political and
economic stability must be resisted. Any lessening of freedom will not at all increase stability. The liberties of
individuals cannot be preserved by denying them.
The dividing line between legitimate dissent or opposition on one hand and subversion or rebellion on the other may
be difficult to pinpoint during troubled times. The lesson of this petition is that those charged with suppressing the
rebellion and those who sit in courts of justice should ever be vigilant in not lumping legitimate dissenters and rebels
together in one indiscriminate classification.
An abiding concern for principles of liberty and justice is especially imperative in periods of crisis and in times of
transition. And all persons from the mighty to the lowy must be given the fullest measure of protection under the Bill
of Rights if our constitutional guarantees are to have any meaning.
In addition to the right against self- incrimination, of not being compelled to be a witness against one's self, so ably
discussed by Justice Cuevas in the Court's opinion, I am constrained by considerations of basic fairness to vote
against granting the petition.
The private respondents were called to testify before the Agrava Commission. The decree creating the commission
stated that no person may refuse to attend and testify or to produce evidence before it on the ground that what he
says or produces may incriminate him. But since the witness is compelled to give all he knows or possesses in
effect shorn by law of his right not to incriminate himself the decree states that the evidence wrung from that witness
may not be used against him later. This is, simply speaking, what the petition is all about.
The respondents may be prosecuted as indeed they have been prosecuted. They may eventually be convicted if the
evidence warrants conviction. however, they may not be convicted solely on the evidence which came from their
own mouths or was produced by their own hands. The evidence must come from other sources. It would be the
height of unfairness and contrary to due process if a man is required to state what he knows even if it would
incriminate him, is promised immunity if he talks freely, and is later convicted solely on the testimony he gave under
such a promise of immunity.
I believe that P.D. 1886 is the first Immunity Act to be enacted in the Philippines. It may be relevant, therefore, to
refer to American decisions expounding on immunity statutes, more so when a comparison of P.D. 1886 with such
statutes as the U.S. Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C.A. Section 3486, shows a similarity in the
protection given by the statutes.
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The U.S. Immunity Act of 1954 was enacted to assist federal grand juries in their investigations of attempts to
endanger the national security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious
conspiracy, and violations of various laws on internal security, atomic or nuclear energy, and immigration and
nationality. The law stated that a witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or
other evidence on the ground that it may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. The statute
then provides:
But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
against self- incrimination, to testify or produce evidence nor shall testimony so compelled be used as
evidence in any criminal proceeding ... against him in any court.
The American statute provides immunity against prosecution, penalties, and use of the testimony. P.D. 1886 is of
more limited scope. Only the use of the compelled testimony is proscribed. The witness may still be prosecuted but
the prosecution will have to look for evidence other than the words of the accused given before the Agrava
Commission.
In Brown v. Walker (161 U.S. 591) the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the validity of the 1893 Immunity
Act. Brown was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating railroad anomalies. lie refused to testify on
grounds of self- incrimination, arguing that the Immunity Act compelling him to testify was unconstitutional. The
Court ruled that "(W)hile the constitutional provision in question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable
prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity and we are therefore of opinion
that the witness was compellable to answer." In other words, the statutory immunity takes the place of the invocation
of the constitutional guarantee. There is no need at the time of taking testimony to invoke the Fifth Amendment
because it would be denied any way and the witness would be compelled to testify. It would be absurd to invoke a
protection which cannot be availed of when compelled to testify. The time to invoke the immunity is when the
testimony is being used contrary to the granted immunity. Protected by the statutory immunity, a witness cannot
even insist on his right to remain silent when testifying.
In Ullmann v. United States (350 U.S. 422), the court interpreted the Immunity Act of 1954 and stated.
xxx xxx xxx
... Since that time the Court's holding in Brown v. Walker has never been challenged; the case and the
doctrine it announced have consistently and without question been treated as definitive by this Court, in
opinions written, among others, by Holmes and Brandeis, Justices. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein
226 U.S. 34, 42; Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142. The 1893 statute has become part of our
constitutional fabric and has been included in substantially the same terms, in virtually all of the major
regulatory enactments of the Federal Government.' Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6. For a
partial list of these statutes, see, Id., 335 U.S. at pages 6-7, note 4. Moreover, the States, with one
exception a case decided prior to Brown v. Walker have, under their own constitutions, enunciated the
same doctrine, 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, and have passed numerous statutes compelling
testimony in exchange for immunity in the form either of complete amnesty or of prohibition of the use
of the compelled testimony. For a list of such statutes, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, n. 11
(pp. 478-501) and Pocket Supplement thereto, 2281, n. 11 (pp. 147-157). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
It is interesting to note how the American Supreme Court in Ullmann treated the immunity not only against the use of
the testimony (as under P.D. 1886) but even against prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner, however, attempts to distinguish Brown v. Walker. He argues that this case is different from
Brown v. Walker because the impact of the disabilities imposed by federal and state authorities and the
public in general such as loss of job, expulsion from labor unions, state registration and investigation
statutes, passport eligibility and general public opprobrium-is so oppressive that the statute does not
give him true immunity. This, he alleges, is significantly different from the impact of testifying on the
auditor in Brown v. Walker, who could the next day resume his job with reputation unaffected. But, as
this Court has often held, the immunity granted need only remove those sanctions which generate the
fear justifying the invocation of the privilege 'The interdiction of the other Amendment operates only
here a witness may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been
taken away, the amendment ceased to apply.' Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43, 67. Here, since the Immunity
Act protects a witness who is compelled to answer to the extent of his constitutional immunity, he has
of course, when a particular sanction is sought to be imposed against him, the right to claim that it is
criminal in nature. (Emphasis supplied).
In United States v. Murdock (284 U.S. 141), the court ruled that "the principle established is that full and complete
immunity against prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection
furnished by the rule against compulsory self-incrimination.
P.D. 1886, being an immunity statute should not be given a strained or absurd interpretation in order to achieve a
certain result. If the immunity given by the decree is equivalent to the protection furnished by the right against self-
incrimination, then, paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter in Ullmann, the same protection given by one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized must not be interpreted in a hostile or niggardly spirit,
xxx xxx xxx
... Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers.
They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming
the privilege. Such a view does scant honor to the patriots who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a
condition to acceptance of the Constitution by the ratifying States. The Founders of the Nation were not
naive or disregard ful of the interest of justice ...
I, therefore, join the majority in dismissing the petition.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 1 This basic right against self-
incrimination, which supplanted the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused as practiced
during the Spanish regime, has become an indispensable part of our laws since 1900. Pursuant
thereto, an accused in a criminal case has the right not only to refuse to answer incriminating questions
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but also to refuse to take the witness stand. He cannot be compelled even to utter a word in his
defense. 2 As stressed in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 3 the rule may otherwise be stated as the
constitutional right of the accused to remain silent. " The accused can forego testimony 4 without any
adverse implication drawn from his decision to do so, The burden is on the State to establish the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution must look elsewhere for other "evidence
independently and freely secured," The rule forbids what has been considered as "the certainly
inhuman procedure of compelling a person 'to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction'." According to Justice Harlan, it was intended "to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as
the innocent and foresighted." 5 Transplanted in this country with the advent of American sovereignty 6
and firmly imbedded in our fundamental law, 7 the said privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
which is predicated on grounds of public policy and humanity, 8 "is fundamental to our scheme of
justice" 9 and is one of the procedural guarantees of our accusatorial system.
1. As I see it, what the prosecution proposed to do in these cases was to present, as evidence of the alleged
accessorial acts of private respondents, the transcripts of their respective testimonies before the Agrava Board.
Confronted by the apparent unwillingness of said respondents to be called to the witness stand in subsequent
criminal proceedings, the prosecution sought to put into the record of these criminal cases (in lieu of private
respondents' testimonies) the said transcripts and other evidence given by them in the course of their testimony
before the Agrava Board. If allowed over and despite private respondents' objection, this would be a clear
infringement of the constitutional guarantee that they can invoke in said criminal proceedings, as all of them did.
Since the prosecution cannot require said respondents to testify in the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, it
stands to reason that it is equally disabled from indirectly compelling respondents to give evidence against
themselves by using their Agrava Board testimonies. The prosecution must present evidence "derived from a
legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony." 10
2. It is contended, however, that these self- incriminatory testimonies were given voluntarily because they did not
claim the constitutional guarantee before or while giving testimony to the Agrava Board. Voluntariness, I think.
cannot be inferred simply from such failure to invoke the privilege. There was no fair warning or notice to the
declarant that his testimony would be used against him if incriminatory, unless the privilege is invoked beforehand or
during his testimony. If they were properly warned and still gave testimony without t invoking the privilege, then it
would be clear that they knowingly waived the privilege. Otherwise, it meant at the most a willingness on their part to
help the Agrava Board in its fact-finding investigation without waiving (a) the immunity granted by law, and (b) the
constitutional guarantee against self- incrimination in case of subsequent prosecution based on their self-
incriminatory testimony. For waiver, it is wellsettled, to be effective. "must be certain, unequivocal and intelligently,
understandably and willingly made. " 11 Mere submission to an illegal search or seizure "is not consent or waiver of
objection. 12 The prosecution has the burden to prove otherwise. The same standard should be observed in self-
incrimination cases.
PD No. 1886 (as amended), which created that "independent ad hoc fact-finding Board," vested it with "plenary
powers to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing [of former Senator Aquino] and to allow for
a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all aspects of said tragedy." In consonance with these objectives,
the law declared that the privilege was unavailable to an Agrava Board "witness", as follows: "No person shall be
excused from attending and testifying or from producing other evidence on the ground that his testimony or any
evidence requested of him may tend to incriminate him, " 13 etc. At the same time, the Board was empowered to
summarily hold and punish any person in direct contempt for "refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness," its
judgment being "final and unappealable."
Quite plainly, the constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination could not be invoked by Agrava Board
witnesses, The privilege was suspended or temporarily taken away for purposes of the investigation, in order that
the Board would have access to all relevant evidence and all sources of information, not excluding compelled
incriminatory statements of probable and possible or potential defendants. An Agrava Board witness was, under the
terms of the quoted provision, placed in a dilemma: (1) to answer truthfully all questions including those tending to
be self-incriminatory, since he cannot invoke the privilege; (2) to lie and become liable criminally for perjury; and (3)
to insist on his right to remain silent and be summarily punished by the Board for direct contempt. It is plain that
such a witness was under compulsion to give self-incriminatory testimony. It was not voluntary. Precisely because of
its coerced nature (an infringement of his constitutional right against self- incrimination), PD No. 1886 promised. in
exchange or as a substitute for the privilege, limited immunity (as provided in the next succeeding clause, same
section), to wit:
... but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he was compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self- incrimination, to testify or produce evidence. 14
Such immunity 15 would bar the prosecution's use against the witness of his said testimony in subsequent criminal
proceedings (wherein he is charged with offenses related to his testimony). Nevertheless, this would not operate to
change the involuntary nature of his self- incriminatory testimony. As far as the witness is concerned, it was
"coerced", not freely given, because he was not fully accorded the "liberty of choice." The law withheld his basic
freedom to choose between testifying and remaining silent without the risk of being punished for direct contempt to
forego testimony which could possibly be to his detriment.
3. I cannot agree with the proposition that the privilege should be invoked by the witness before or while giving
testimony to the Agrava Board. Section 5 should be reasonably construed and fairly applied to the cases at bar, in
the light of the accused's constitutional right against compulsory self- incrimination. The formula of limited-immunity
in-lieu-of-the-privilege contained in said section rendered unnecessary or superfluous, the invocation of the privilege
before the Board. Under said formula, the witness was deprived of the privilege to protect himself against
inquisitorial interrogation into matters that a targeted defendant or virtual respondent can keep to himself in ordinary
investigations or proceedings.
Even if the provision is susceptible of an interpretation in support of the petitioner's stand, it appears that the time for
invoking the privilege is not clear enough or certain from the language of the law. Equally plausible and logical is the
contrary view that it may be invoked later on when it became apparent that the prosecution intended to use the
testimony given before the Board to secure conviction of the declarant in the subsequent criminal proceedings. The
privilege cannot be deemed waived by implication merely as a consequence of failure to claim it before the Board. It
bears emphasis that the right of an accused "witnesses" against compulsory self-incrimination is predicated on the
constitutional guarantee, not on the special law in question.
3. In the United States, the generally accepted approach in Fifth Amendment Cases (involving the constitutional
guarantee under consideration) was stated as follows in Johnson vs Zerbst:" 16 It has been pointed out that 'courts
indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of the fundamental rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of such fundamental rights.'" Because, as Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School (later,
Solicitor General of the United States) eloquently puts it:
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[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmark,s in man's struggles to make
himself civilized ... [W]e do not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or
dig his own grave ... We have through the course of history developed a considerable feeling of the
dignity and intrinsic importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human being. 17
In this jurisdiction, more than four decades ago, the late Justice Jose P. Laurela nationalist, constitutionalist and
eminent jurist, whose incisive and authoritative opinions on constitutional questions are often cited by the bench and
the bar- voted to sustain a claim of the constitutional guarantee in Bermudez vs. Castillo. 18 In his concurrence, he
said inter alia:
(1) As between two possible and equally rational constructions, that should prevail which is more in
consonance with the purpose intended to be carried out by the Constitution. The provision ... should be
construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of the individual intended to be secured. ...
(2) I am averse to the enlargement of the rule allegedly calculated to gauge more fully the credibility of
a witness if the witness would thereby be forced to furnish the means for his own destruction. Unless
the evidence is voluntarily given, the policy of the constitution is one of protection on humanitarian
considerations and grounds of public policy...
(3) The privilege should not be disregarded merely because it often affords a shelter to the guilty and
may prevent the disclosure of wrongdoing. Courts can not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest and furthering the ends of justice, treat a sacred privilege as if it were mere excrescence in the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied; at page 493.)
In sum, considering the pertinent legal provisions and judicial pronouncements as well as the climate prevailing
when the private respondents testified before the Agrava Board, I find it unavoidable to reach the conclusion that
they did so under legal, moral and psychological compulsion. Their compelled testimonies before the Agrava Board
cannot thereafter be used against them in the cases at bar in view of the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886. They
were not obliged to invoke then and there the constitutional guarantee. If they did, that would have sufficed to afford
them adequate protection. If they did not, they could do so later on when the Government prosecutors (in spite of
the statutory grant of immunity) decided in the subsequent criminal proceedings, to use against them their Agrava
Board testimonies. For, as earlier stated, there was no intelligent and knowing waiver on their part of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Accordingly, and for other reasons well stated in the main separate concurring opinions, I vote to dismiss the
petitions.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases.
What appears to be the basic and principal issue to which the consideration of the Court is addressed to is the
singular question of whether testimonies adduced by the private respondents before the Ad Hoc Agrava Fact
Finding Board and sought to be introduced against them in the Sandiganbayan wherein they have been accused
were rightfully excluded as evidence against them.
I find untenable the insistence of the petitioner Tanodbayan that the private respondents should have claimed the
right against self-incrimination before the said Fact Finding Board and that having omitted doing so, the said
privilege afforded to them by law can no longer be invoked by them before the Sandiganbayan.
The right claimed by private respondents rests on the fundamental principle that no person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself as so stated in our Constitution and from the fact that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 disallows the
use against him of such testimony or any evidence produced by him before the said Fact Finding Board, except for
perjury. Petitioner argues however, that there was a waiver of this right to self-incrimination when respondents
proceeded to give their testimonies on various dates before the Agrava Fact Finding Board without formally invoking
on said occasions their right against self-incrimination.
As private respondents could not have excused themselves from testifying before said Board as clearly emphasized
in the very first clause of Section 5 of P.D. 1886, and as at that point of time, there was no reason for the declarant
to anticipate or speculate that there would be any criminal charge or any proceeding instituted against them, it would
therefore, be unnatural and illogical to expect that private respondents would even contemplate the need of
prefacing their declarations with an invocation before the Fact Finding Board of their privilege against self-
incrimination.
In fact for a declarant to announce his claim of the aforestated privilege prior to or while testifying before said Fact
Finding Board, would irresistibly create an inference and convey an impression that said witness is burdened with
his own awareness that he stands already incriminated in some wrong. To insist therefore, even in the absence yet
of any proceeding against him, that the witness invoke the said privilege before the Agrava Fact Finding Board,
would be obviously self-demeaning. Such an effect could not have been intended by Section 5 of P.D. 1886, which
was even meant to grant to the witness a benefit rather than a burden. It is more reasonable therefore, to conclude
that the privilege against self-incrimination would be accorded to said witness after he has invoked the same in a
subsequent proceeding wherein he has been charged of a wrong doing, except in a case for perjury. It is only at
such time when the necessity of invoking the mantle of the privilege or the immunity afforded to him by law would
arise.
It cannot also be rightfully concluded that private respondents had intentionally relinquished or abandoned the said
right which they claimed before the Sandiganbayan. The fact that the issue of when and before what forum should
such claim to the right against self-incrimination be necessarily presented has provoked much discussion and
debate because of divergent views. This has even prompted the submissions to the Court of opinions of amicus
curiae or friends of the court as to how Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1886 should be construed and applied
which are however different from and contrary to the views expressed by the Justices of the Sandiganbayan and
other legal luminaries. These conflicting views negate the proposition that there was an effective waiver made by the
private respondents of their rights.
It has earlier been stated by this Court that to be effective, such waiver must be certain and unequivocal and
intelligently, understandably and willingly made. (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 24 SCRA 663). In the same
cited case, it has been stated that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights (Citing Johnson vs.
Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. ed. 1461, 1466). Furthermore, whether the alleged waiver is express or implied, it
must be intentional. (Davison vs. Klaess 20 N.E. 2d. 744, 748, 280 N.Y. 252; 92 CJS, 1058).
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I find it difficult to accept that private respondents had at any time, ever intended to relinquish or abandon their right
against self-incrimination.
PATAJO, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases. Said petitions do not merit being given due
course and should be dismissed outright.
I hold the view that the testimonies and evidence given before the Agrava Board are inadmissible as evidence
against those who testified or gave said evidence irrespective of whether said persons were subpoenaed or invited.
I believe it is not a condition sine quo non to the non-admissibility of said evidence that at the time they testified or
gave evidence before the Agrava Board that they had invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.
The Agrava Board was created as an independent ad hoc fact finding board to determine all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983. It was
given plenary powers to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all the aspects of said tragedy. It
was given the power to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum and "other compulsory processes" requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence relative to any matter under investigation
by said Board.
Those who have been subpoenaed to appear and testify or produce any documentary evidence before the Board
shall not be excused from testifying or presenting evidence before said Board on the ground that their testimony or
evidence may tend to incriminate them or subject them to penalty or forfeiture. I believe an invitation from the Board
is as much a compulsory process 1 to appear and testify before the Board as a subpoena and one receiving said
invitation cannot also excuse himself from appearing and testifying before the Board. Petitioners appear to share
this view when they said in subparagraph (c), paragraph 7 of their petition in G.R. No. L-71208-09.
(c) People were either invited or issued subpoenas, depending upon their rank and office, to give
testimony before the Board and among those invited were respondents General Fabian C. Ver and
Major General Olivas while the rest of the military respondents were issued subpoenas.
Unquestionably, it was the intention of the decree creating the Board to investigate the Aquino assassination to
encourage all who have some information on any "aspect of said tragedy" to furnish the Board said information
whether they are subpoenaed or issued other forms of compulsory process such as an invitation and to do so
without fear that what they will say may be used against them. It is in this context that Section 5 of PD No. 1886
should be viewed. When they testified before the Board, they were given full assurance that whatever they say
before the Board will not be used against them. Only if they testify falsely that they may be prosecuted for perjury.
This is to prevent people from preventing the Board from finding out the truth about the Aquino assassination by
giving false leads or information for ulterior reasons.
Actually Section 5 of PD No. 1886 falls under that category of statutes which do not pronounce an entire immunity
by forbidding punishment or prosecution for any testimony or evidence given in connection with the investigation of
certain offenses more widely known as immunity statutes, but merely prohibit in any criminal prosecution the use of
the testimony of the witness. Immunity statutes as well as statutes prohibiting the use of testimony in any
subsequent criminal prosecution have been the expedients resorted for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly
those whose proof or punishment were otherwise impracticable because of the implication in the offense itself of all
who could bear useful testimony.
The expediency and practical utility of this mode of obtaining evidence may as a measure of legislation,
be open to argument. But the tradition of it as a lawful method of annulling the privilege against self-
incrimination is unquestioned in English history." ignore on Evidence, Vol. III, p. 469.
Speaking of this kind of privilege of non-admission of testimony given by the witness in subsequent prosecutions as
allowed by the common law and modified by subsequent statutes, State vs. Quarles 13 Ark 307, 311, said:
The privilege in question, in its greatest scope, as allowed by the common law and no one, be he
witness or accused, can pretend to claim it beyond its scope at the common law never did contemplate
that the witness might not be proved guilty of the very crime about which he may be called to testify;
but only that the witness should not be compelled to produce the evidence to prove himself guilty of
that crime. His privilege, therefore, was not an exemption from the consequences of a crime that he
might have committed; but only an exemption from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to
establish his own crime ... So long as it might be lawful to produce in evidence against an accused
party whatever he might before have voluntarily said as a witness on a prosecution against another,
there were no means by which the privilege could be made available short of a claim by the witness to
be silent; and as that was the rule of the common law, this was the common-law mode of making the
privilege available. And that silence was but a mode of making the privilege available, and was not of
the essence of the privilege itself, is conclusively proven by all that current of enlightened authority, to
which we yield our fullest assent, which holds that the privilege has ceased when the crime has been
pardoned, when the witness has been tried and acquitted, or is adjudged guilty, or when the
prosecution, to which he was exposed, has been barred by lapse of time ... But the Legislature has so
changed the common-law rule, by the enactment in question in the substitution of a rule that the
testimony required to be given by the act, shall never be used against the witness for the purpose of
procuring his conviction for the crime or misdemeanor to which it relates, that it is no longer necessary
for him to claim his privilege as to such testimony, in order to prevent its being afterwards used against
him. And the only question that can possibly arise under the present state of the law, as applicable to
the case now before us, is as to whether our statutory regulations afford sufficient protection to the
witness, responsive to this new rule and to his constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-
accusation ...
Considering the objectives sought to be achieved by PD No. 1886 the provision thereof making testimony and
evidence given before the Board inadmissible in evidence against the ones giving the same, provides protection
beyond that granted by the Constitutional provision against self- incrimination, otherwise it will be constitutionally
suspect. Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 142 US 547, 35 L Ed 1110.
Of relevance are the observations of the District Court, N.D. Illinois, in United States vs. Armour & Co., 112 Fed 808,
821, 822:
All of these immunity acts are relied upon by the individual defendants, and, while expressed in, slightly
varying language, they all mean the same thing, and each of them is a substitute for the privilege
contained in that clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution, reading:
'Nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'
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This fifth amendment deals with one of the most cherished rights of the American citizen, and has been
construed by the courts to mean that the witness shall have the right to remain silent when questioned
upon any subject where the answer would tend to incriminate him. Congress by the immunity laws in
question, and by each of them, has taken away the privilege contained in the amended it is conceded
in argument that this cannot be done without giving to the citizen by way of immunity something as
broad and valuable as the privilege thus destroyed We are not without authority on this question. By a
previous act, Congress undertook to take away the constitutional privilege by giving the citizen an
equivalent, and the Supreme Court held in the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup.
Ct. 195, 35 I Ed., 1110, that the substitution so given was not an equivalent. Then, at various times, the
immunity acts in question were passed by Congress with full knowledge that in furnishing a substitute
for this great right of the citizen, it must give something as broad as the privilege taken away. It might
be broader, but it could not be narrower.
Now, in my judgment, the immunity law is broader than the privilege given by the fifth amendment,
which the act was intended to substitute. The privilege of the amendment permits a refusal to answer.
The act wipes out the offense about which the witness might have refused to answer. The privilege
permits a refusal only as to incriminating evidence. The act gives immunity for evidence of or
concerning the matter covered by the incident and the evidence need not be self-incriminating. The
privilege must be personally claimed by the witness at the time. The immunity flows to the witness by
action of law and without any claim on his part. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L.
Ed. 819; Hale vs. Henkel (recently decided) 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. -; State v. Quarles 13 Ark. 307,
quoted in 142 U.S. 567, 12 Sup. Ct. 199 (35 L. Ed. 1110); People Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319, 1
Am. St. Rep. 851; Brown v. Walker approved in Lamson v. Boyden, 160 I11. 613, 620, 621, 43 N.E.
781: People v. Butler, St. Foundry, 201 I11. 236, 248, 66 N.E. 349.
I am further of opinion that the immunity given by the act must be as broad as the liabilities imposed by
the act. The act calls upon the citizen to answer any 'lawful requirement' of the Commissioner. 'Require'
means to ask of right and by authority. Webster's Dictionary. Tenn. Coal Co. v. Saller (C.C.) 37 Fed.
545, 547. Anything is a requirement by a public officer which brings home to the person called upon
that the officer is there officially and desires compliance. 'Demand' and' require' are synonymous. Miller
v. Davis, 88 Me. 454, 34 Atl. 265. The citizen may be punished for refusal to answer such lawful
requirement. I am of opinion that when the Commissioner of Corporations, who has power to compel,
makes his demand, it is the duty of the witness to obey.
The contention has been made that in order to get immunity the citizen shall wait until the compulsion
becomes irresistible. That is the effect of the government contention. I am not able to bring my mind to
accept that doctrine. If I am right in saying that immunity flows from the law l, without any claim on the
part of the defendant and at different times that has been conceded here in argument then no act of
any kind on his part which amounts to a claim of immunity, which amounts to setting up a claim of
immunity is demanded by the law. The law never puts a premium on contumacy. A person does not
become a favored citizen by resistance to a lawful requirement. On the contrary, the policy of the law
favors the willing giving of evidence whenever an officer entitled to make a demand makes it upon a
citizen who has no right to refuse. And it would be absurd and un-American to favor the citizen who
resists and places obstacles in the way of the government as against the citizen who, with a full
knowledge of the law, obeys without resistance the demand of an officer who has the legal right to
make the demand for something which the citizen has no legal right to refuse. This, then, is the
proposition to which we are led. When an officer, who has a legal right to make a demand, makes such
demand upon a citizen who has no legal light to refuse, and that citizen answers under such conditions,
he answers under compulsion of the law.
There is no merit then to the contention that private respondents should be invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board for precisely PD No. 1886 had explicitly provided that the testimony of those
who testified before the Board can not be used against them. It will be a meaningless act of supererogation to
require that said witnesses before answering any question addressed to them must invoke their privilege against
self-incrimination. The phrase "after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination" in Section 5 of PD No.
1886 to be consistent with the intention of said decree, should refer to the time that the testimony of the witness will
be used against him in another proceeding, such as the cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. It could not
refer to the proceedings before the Agrava Board because no one is being accused before said Board and no
matter how self-incriminating the testimony of said witness is, he runs no risk of being prejudiced, much less
convicted by the Agrava Board. It is in the prosecution of cases based on the report of said Board that the witness
should invoke his right against self-incrimination. These private respondents did just that when they moved for the
exclusion in evidence of their statement before the Agrava Board. Any other interpretation would defeat the very
purpose of PD No. 1886.
The majority decision is based on erroneous premises, viz. what the case at bar presents a "novel question;" that
"this Court has not been previously called upon to rule on issues involving immunity statute" and is burdened with
the monumental task" of "laying the criteria ... (to) build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored area of
judicial inquiry." 1 The fact is that we have a wealth of settled jurisprudence and precedents, Philippine and foreign,
that control the determination of the simple issue at bar and call for the setting aside of the exclusion order issued by
respondent court (Sandiganbayan) which wrongly rules as totally and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies given
by private respondents General Ver and Olivas and their six co- respondents (all charged as accessories) as well as
all the documents, records and other evidence produced by them before the Fact-Finding Board, notwithstanding
that all were represented by counsel 2 and none of them invoked the privilege or right against self- incrimination or
made any claim or objection at the time of his testimony before the Board that any question propounded to him and
which he willingly answered called for an incriminating answer against himself.
The following vital considerations based on settled jurisprudence and precedents show that respondent court acted
with gross error and misconception of the applicable principles of the right against self-incrimination:
1. Respondent court grossly disregarded the settled guidelines laid down for trial courts by this Court of Appeal vs.
Paylo 3 thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for a unanimous Court, Chat
By so doing [ordering the exclusion of the proferred confessions of the two accused upon a ground not
raised by counsel but motu proprio by the trial court, i.e. lack of independent proof of conspiracy] the
[trial] court overlooked that the right to objection is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if
the ground for objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the
[trial] court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1)
... Suffice it to say that the lower court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at
least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy,
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in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal
to probe the charges. At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case, the trial court
should be able to distinguish the admissible from the inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of
evidence, should be excluded.
Trial courts should be liberal in the matter of admission of proof and avoid the premature and precipitate exclusion of
evidence on doubtful objections to its admissibility, citing the Court's long-standing basic ruling and policy in Prats &
Co. vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. 4 that reception and admission of evidence objected to on doubtful or technical grounds is
ultimately the less harmful course to either litigant, since the Supreme Court upon appeal would then have all the
materials before it necessary to make a correct judgment (instead of returning the case for a new trial which only
prolongs the determination of the case); and
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to
admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no
longer appeal 5
2. The right against self-incrimination is found in the first sentence of section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution stating that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." This single sentence
constituted the whole text of section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the 19,7,5 Constitution. This right against self-
incrimination has a settled meaning in jurisprudence which is fully applicable here since the right against self-
incrimination was first enforced here as an inviolable rule" in U.S. President McKinley's instructions under date of
April 7, 1900 to the Taft Commission. 6 As recounted by the late Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez as ponente for a
unanimous Court in the leading 1968 case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals 7, "Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive
language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early days 'in a revolt against the thumbscrew
and the rack.' An old Philippine case [1904] speaks of this constitutional injunction as 'older than the Government of
the United States;' as having 'its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused
person;' and as having been adopted in the Philippines 'to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these
Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the
offenses will which they were charged.' " But Mr. Justice Sanchez equally stressed that "(an) accused occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the
witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, 8 an
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions." 9
As restated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for a unanimous Court in Suarez vs. Tengco, 10 "No legal impediment exists
against a litigant calling any of the adverse parties to be his witness. ... True, an accused in a criminal case may not
be compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word, even for his own defense (U.S. vs, Junio, 1 Phil. 50; U.S. vs.
Luzon, 4 Phil. 344: U.S. vs. Binayoh 35 Phil. 23; Sec. l(c), Rule 111, Rules of Court). But while the constitutional
guaranty against self-incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or administrative
(Art. 111, Sec. 1, No. 18, Phil. constitution: Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64 Phil, 483), said privilege in, proceedings other
than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option of refusal to answer incriminating question,
and not a prohibition of inquiry.
Except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant from utilizing his adversary as
witness. As a matter of fact, section 83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court expressly authorizes a party to call
an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule is, of course, subject to the
constitutional injunction not to compel any person to testify against himself. But it is established that the
privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it
is when a question calling for a incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before
a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the
witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person
who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a
witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a incriminating answer is
asked, at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be
interposed.' (Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, L-6409, February 5, 1954, 11 cit. in Navarro, Criminal
Procedure, p. 302.)'
Suarez was cited with favor and reaffirmed in Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 12 wherein once again the Court, with the
concurrence in the result of the now Chief Justice, under similar facts held that the petitioner (provincial treasurer)
could not refuse to take the stand as an adverse party in a civil case since the privilege against self-incrimination "in
proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option to refuse to answer
incriminating questions, and not a prohibition of inquiry" and "must be invoked when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded, because before a question is asked, there would be no way of telling whether
the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not." The Court therein denied "the petition to
prohibit respondent judge from directing petitioner to take the witness stand and testify ... without prejudice to
petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against self-incrimination when questions are propounded to him on the
stand. Costs against the petitioner."
3. All the respondents at bar were in this category of ordinary witnesses in the hearings of the Fact-Finding Board.
They were not accused in any criminal case nor were they persons under custodial interrogation who under the
second part of section 20 of the Bill of Rights (consisting of three additional sentences 13) were given additional
rights to silence and counsel and to be informed of such rights and to the out-lawing of any confession obtained in
violation of the rights guaranteed in the cited section, by virtue of the incorporation into the Bill of Rights of the rights
granted in the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases. As noted by former Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, "(I)t amounts to an acceptance of the applicability in this jurisdiction of the epochal American
Supreme Court decision in Miranda vs. Arizona, the opinion being rendered by Chief Justice Warren. It is thus now
a part of our fundamental law. Such doctrine was promulgated in response to the question of the admissibility of
statements obtained from an individual interrogated under police custody, considering that such a time and under
the stress of such conditions, his right against self-incrimination could be rendered futile." 14 The Miranda
pronouncements thus became necessarily a part and parcel of the additional rights granted in the cited section 20,
as made by the late U.S. Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case thus: "The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. " 15 These additional Miranda rights could not
be invoked by respondents, as the members of the Fact-Finding Board were not law enforcement officers nor were
respondents under custodial interrogation.
As ordinary witnesses before the Fact-Finding Board and under the settled jurisprudence above-cited, they could
not invoke the right to silence and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right and privilege (which is not self-
executory or automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntarily or by subpoena, to invoke the privilege
and refuse to answer as and when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke
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the privilege which is personal does automatically result in its loss ipso facto. The law, usage and settled
jurisprudence uniformly require that the privilege must be asserted or else is lost. The court or board upon its
invocation still has to pass upon and rule upon the proper application of the privilege. As restated by Francisco, the
rule and exceptions are: "Certainly, where the witness, on oath declares his belief that the answer to the question
would criminate or tend to criminate him, the court cannot compel him to answer, unless it is clear perfectly, from a
careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case, that the witness is mistaken, or is acting in bad faith, and
that the answer cannot possibly have any such tendency. " 16
4. The view that withal, it is best, although not required, that a warning to the witness of his option to refuse an
answer to incriminating questions as advanced even by the Tanodbayan at the hearing dates back to a century ago
and has been long discarded as "witnesses are usually well enough advised beforehand by counsel as to their
rights when such issues impend" and "as general knowledge spread among the masses and the preparation for
testimony became more thorough." Thus, "ignore, the bible on the law of evidence so remarks and adds that "there
is no reason for letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule." —
It is plausible to argue that the witness should be warned and notified, when a incriminating fact is
inquired about, that he has an option to refuse an answer; and this view was often insisted upon, a
century ago, by leaders at the Bar,
xxx xxx xxx
But there are opposing considerations. In the first place, such a warning would be an anomaly; it is not
given for any other privilege; witnesses are in other respects supposed to know their rights; and why
not here? In the next place, it is not called for by principle, since, until the witness refuses, it can hardly
be said that he is compelled to answer; nor is it material that he believes himself compelled; for the
Court's action, and not the witness' state of mind, must be the test of compulsion. Again, the question
can at any rate only be one of judicial propriety of conduct, for no one supposes that an answer given
under such an erroneous belief should be struck out for lack of the warning. Finally, in practical
convenience, there is no demand for such rule; witnesses are usually well enough advised beforehand
by counsel as to their rights when such issues impend, and judges are too much concerned with other
responsibilities to be burdened with the provision of individual witnesses' knowledge; the risk of their
being in ignorance should fall rather upon the party summoning than the party opposing.
Nevertheless, it is plain that the old practice was to give such a warning, when it appeared to be
needed. But, as general knowledge spread among the masses, and the preparation for testimony
became more thorough, this practice seems to have disappeared in England, so far at least as any
general rule was concerned.
In the United States, both the rule and the trial custom vary in the different jurisdictions. No doubt a
capable and painstaking judge will give the warning, where need appears, but there is no reason for
letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule. 17
But from the environmental facts and circumstances of the Fact-Finding Board hearings, to require such a warning
to the witness of his option of refusal to answer incriminatory questions would have been an exercise in absurdity
and futility, As is a matter of public knowledge, respondents had concluded in their investigation that Galman was
the assassin of the late Senator Aquino. As observed by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla as amicus curiae at the
hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, they were all too eager to testify and make a strong effort to gain support
from the Fact-Finding Board and the public for the military version and report that the assassin was Galman who
was forthwith gunned down by the military escorts and guards at the tarmac. It would have been ridiculous, if not
bordering on officiousness and impropriety, to warn them as the highest ranking military officers of their option of
refusal to answer incriminatory questions and also as the majority holds, 18 of their right to remain silent. When
respondents generals appeared before the Board, respondent Ver precisely made the opening statement that
GENERAL VER:
I welcome this opportunity, Madame Justice, members of this Honorable Board, Dean,
Gentlemen this opportunity to assist ... this Honorable Board in the quest for truth and
justice, We all deplore this tragic incident which is now the subject of inquiry, This Board,
this Honorable Board is mandated to conduct a free, full and exhaustive investigation into
the matter under investigation We all hope that my testimony, madame, will somehow
dispel any misconception, or any misinformation surrounding this tragic incident. I am now
ready to answer your questions.
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Now, General, at the outset, we give the right and the privilege for every witness to be
assisted by counsel Do you have your counsel with you this morning?
GENERAL VER:
I did not bring any counsel, madame, but ... if I need a counsel, madame, I could probably
look for... probably ...
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes?
GENERAL VER:
I may call Fiscal Parena or the Public Coordinator. I was talking to Atty. Tan to assist me,
in the protection of my constitutional rights ...
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes.
GENERAL VER:
... if it is necessary:
ATTY. TAN:
Your Honor, please, it is part of the function of this office to help the witness if he doesn't
have counsel, and so, if the General is willing to have me, I will happily serve as counsel,
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Your Honor.
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
All right.
GENERAL VER:
Thank you. 19
Respondent Olivas likewise testified before the Board in response to its invitation to assist it in determining the true
facts and circumstances surrounding the double killing.
6. The majority decision would go around this by asserting without basis in the record that "(A)ll the private
respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino
while embarking from the plane that brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime
as such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General Ver on the other hand,
being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored under the same suspicion and so with General
Olivas, the first designated investigator of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have
bungled the case. The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from ugly wagging tongues, all point to
whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the said conspiracy?" In fact, the
respondent court's decision and separate opinions as well as the majority decision at bar and the separate
concurring opinions all fail to specify the particular portions of the testimonies of respondents or any specific
question and answer that can be in any way deemed to be self-incriminating. Indeed, even if we assumed arguendo
that they were warned of their right against self-incrimination and tried absurdly to invoke the same, there is no
specific question and answer by way of testimony that could be pointed to them as having been made under
compulsion for the simple reason that their testimony was in full support of their own military report that Galman was
Aquino's killer and for which they were trying to gain the Board's acceptance. In the all too brief and inadequate
deliberations held on August 20 and 21, 1985 after the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, without reaching a
definite conclusion, the ponente reported and I share this view from a cursory examination, for want of material time,
of the excluded testimonies only since the excluded documents, records and other evidence produced by them were
not before the Court that there is nothing in the excluded testimonies that could in any way be deemed self-
incriminatory perse. So there would be no legal basis whatever for their exclusion. But the ponente circulated only
last August 26th at noon his draft for dismissal of the petitions which were filed only last month. And its release has
been set for August 30th.
7. There has not been enough time to weigh and ponder on the far-reaching consequences of the decision at bar.
The decision orders the total and unqualified exclusion of the testimonies and evidence produced before the Fact-
Finding Board by the eight respondents charged as accessories "even though (they) failed to claim (their) privilege
before giving the incriminating testimony" (citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 218). But the cited compilation of American State
and Federal Law expressly cautions that "The question whether a witness must claim exemption . on from self-
incrimination to be entitled to immunity from subsequent prosecution must in each case be determined in the light of
constitutional and statutory provisions in the jurisdiction where the question arises" (21 Am. Jur. 2d. 151). It recites
on the same cited page that "Under a statute granting immunity to persons who have been compelled to testify, one
who has appeared voluntarily and testified without claiming his privilege against self-incrimination or one who has
appeared and testified pursuant to a void subpoena or one addressed to another person, without claiming the
privilege, cannot say he has been compelled to testify, and therefore, he is not entitled to immunity." And the
necessity of claiming the privilege against self-incrimination before an administrative officer or board such as the
Fact Finding Board is recognized to be essential, thus:
This is not only equally true as for the case of testimony in a judicial trial, but the explicitness is here
even more essential, and particularly where the administrative officer makes a general demand for
documents or testimony upon a broad class of topics. The reason is clear. The officer has testimonial
powers to extract a general mass of facts, or which some, many, or most will certainly be innocent and
unprivileged, some may be privileged communications (e.g., between attorney and client) whose
privilege remains unaffected by the statute defining his powers, and some may be privileged as self-
incriminating but liable to become demandable by overriding this privilege with a grant of immunity.
Among these mass of facts, then, the officer will seek those which are relevant to his administrative
inquiry; he cannot know which of them fall within one or another privilege in particular, which of them
tend to criminate at all, or to criminate a particular person; if such facts are there, he may not desire or
be authorized to exercised the option of granting immunity so as to obtain them; his primary function
and power is to obtain the relevant facts at large, and his power to obtain a special and limited class of
facts by grant of immunity is only a secondary one, and one which he will not exercise till a cause
arises, if even then.
For these reasons of practical sense, then, as well as for the inherent requirements of principle already
noticed for judicial officers, it is particularly true for an inquiry by an administrative officer that the
witness must explicitly claim his privilege, and specifically the privilege against self- incrimination, and
must then be overridden in that claim, before immunity can take effect. (VII Wigmore on Evidence,
2282, pp. 517-518)
The concurrence of Justice Vera Cruz sounds even more ominous thus:
I believe that where evidence is produced by a witness in accordance with the conditions of the statute
granting immunity such as P.D. No. 1886, as amended, its immunity provisions attach instantly and it is
entirely immaterial what use the investigation authority makes of it (People ex rel. Massarsky v. Adams,
47 N.Y.S. 2d 375, 62 N.E. 2d 244).
Consequently, the evidence, given before the Agrava Board by the accused in the instant cases
namely, Generals Fabian Ver and Prospero Olivas, and Sergeants Pablo Martinez, Tomas Fernandez,
Leonardo Mojica, Pepito Torio, Prospero Bona and Aniceto Acupido cannot be used against them and
this proscription did attach instantly when they testified before the same Board. Verily, the prohibition
stands, irrespective of the purpose for which the prosecution would like to use this evidence.
The total and unqualified exclusion of the testimony and evidence granted by respondent court and sustained by the
majority decision herein refers expressly to the eight respondents charged as accessories. Would not this
unprecedented grant of immunity and exclusion of testimony be now claimed by the rest of the twenty-two accused
charged as principals except for the lone civilian? As reported by the press, respondent court has suspended its trial
and placed the pressure on the Court to rush its decision, as "(T)he so-called 'trial of the century' has been delayed
since last week on motion of the defense panel which had argued that the high court's decision on the admissibility
of Ver's testimonies was a vital prerequisite to the presentation of witnesses for the defense. " 20 Would this not
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result in the People holding an empty bag of excluded testimonies and evidence, since to all intents and purposes
all respondents-accused testified before the Fact-Finding Board? Would their testimonies be inadmissible for
purposes even of impeaching such testimony as they may now give before respondent court? These ponderous
questions need not confront us had we but required respondent court to hew to the settled procedure and doctrine
of Yatco (supra, par. I hereof) of giving the prosecution a chance to get into the record its relevant evidence until the
final determination and consideration of the case, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence of the prosecution may
lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer
appeal.
8. The alleged "ambiguous phraseology" of section 5 of P.D. 1886 cited in respondent court's questioned order and
bolstered by the majority decision's "novel" conclusion and ruling that the cited section quoted therein 21 requires a
claim from the witness of the privilege against self-incrimination but "forecloses under threat of contempt
proceedings [under section 4] against anyone who makes such a claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion
imposed by section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light, of the actions provided in section 4, infringes upon the
witness' right against self- incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative
the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive
protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity
must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred
constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents
had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are, therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure
the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We
hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under
Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law.
The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness. " Emphasis supplied).
It bears emphasis that none of respondents made any such claim against self-incrimination. The "oppressive
compulsion" if it may be so-called, consists of a maximum penalty of P200. fine and/or 30 days imprisonment for
direct contempt. As indicated, it would be ridiculous for any respondent to 1 make such claim when his testimony
was but in full support of their own military theory and report that Galman killed Aquino.
The language of the cited section 22 is plain and simple. It excuses no one from testifying and producing books and
records but grants him immunity from prosecution (except for perjury) after having invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination " There is nothing oppressive about such compulsion in exchange for immunity provided the witness
invokes his and aims his privilege a against self-incrimination.
In the Court's Resolution of July 9, 1985, Mr. Justice Aquino, voting to dismiss outright the petitions. opined that The
clause 'concerning which lie is compelled to testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination' is
surplusage. It is in conflict with the first clause which, as already stated, gives immunity to the witness except in
case of perjury. So, section 5 should be read as if that clause were not there.This is contrary to the rules of statutory
construction that there is no room for construction when tile text is plain and simple, i.e. requires invocation and that
the provisions must be taken in context and all the words taken into account and given their full meaning. The Anti-
Gambling Law, Act No. 1757, enacted on October 9, 1907 by the Philippine Commission (probably the first
Philippine immunity statute) granted such absolute immunity and does not contain the conditional clause requiring
that the witness invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. Section 10 of the cited Act reads:
Sec. 10. Upon any investigation or proceeding for violation of this Act no person shall be excused from
giving testimony upon the ground that such testimony would tend to convict him of a crime, but such
testimony cannot be received against him upon any criminal investigation or proceeding; Provided,
however, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury
committed in the course of any proceeding or investigation had by virtue of [his Act. (1 CPS [Rev. Ed.],
190)
But when the statute grants conditional immunity (and not absolute as in the above-quoted section 10 of the Anti-
Gambling Act.), then it explicitly contains the cited conditional clause in section 5 of P.D. 1886 granting immunity
only when "he is compelled to testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. "
This is but in accord with long-settled Philippine jurisprudence cited above (supra. paragraph 2 hereof), that the
witness has an option of refusal to answer incriminatory questions, which he loses ipso facto if he does not invoke
the privilege and nevertheless answers the questions. Here, in review of the national and international importance of
the case with the country's very prestige at stake, the P.D. added the incentive of offering immunity: "The purpose of
immunity provisions is to aid prosecuting officers by inducing criminals or their confederates to turn state's evidence
and tell on each other, to enable prosecuting officers to procure evidence which would otherwise be denied to them
because of the constitutional right against self-incrimination, and at the same time to protect every person from
gluing testimony which directly or indirectly would be helpful to the prosecution in securing an indictment or a
conviction. The provisions for immunity are or should be as broad as or co-extensive with the constitutional
provisions granting the privilege against self-incrimination." (21 Am. Jur. 2d. Criminal Law, sec. 148). It is bad
enough that no state's evidence turned up to tell on his confederates in exchange of immunity. But to call the cited
section " a booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness" unless it was construed as granting absolute and
unconditional immunity from the very fact of merely testifying as a witness before the Board without claiming
immunity nor giving any incriminatory information that would aid the state to determine the true facts about Aquino's
assassination would be a sell-out. It would make a shambles of the letter and spirit as well as the salutary intent and
objective of the Decree to ferret out the truth and obtain state witnesses.
9. The truncated and distorted reading of the cited section 5 which consists of a single integrated paragraph and
splitting it into two isolated parts so as to allow the privilege against self-incrimination (which was already lost for
failure to claim it in the Board hearings) to be resurrected and raised in a much later time frame and "subsequent
criminal proceeding" is against all usage and rules of statutory construction, not to mention the long line of above-
cited jurisprudence to the contrary. And if there still be doubt, we need only reproduce hereunder the similar wording
of Senate Joint Resolution 137 (Public Law 88-202) after which section 5 of P.D. 1886 was patterned. Said law was
enacted by the U.S. Congress in December 1963 to empower the Warren Commission to issue subpoenas requiring
the testimony of witness and the production of evidence relating to any matter under its investigation. The Report of
the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in its foreword on page X stated
that "In addition, the resolution authorized the Commission to compel testimony from witnesses claiming the
privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution by providing for the grant of
immunity to persons testifying under such compulsion." (Emphasis supplied). The cited Public Law reads:
(e) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records,
correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the
testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except
demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction matter, or thing concerning which
he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or produce
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evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. (Emphasis supplied).
10. As already indicated above, none of the respondents, public and private, has indicated the specific portions of
their testimony that they have been "oppressively compelled" to glue, in alleged violation of their privilege against
self-incrimination. The reason for this is that they all testified voluntarily and eagerly to support the military report
and version that Galman killed Senator Aquino. The Board unanimously rejected the military report and found that
the killings were the product of criminal conspiracy. A brief flashback is herein appropriate: Within 60 seconds from
his being led away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on Sunday,
August 21, 1983 at past one p.m., former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. who was coming home after three years of
self-exile in the U.S. laid dead face down on the tarmac, with his brain smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin. 23 Also lying dead on the tarmac, face up, near the senator was another
man, to be Identified much later as Rolando Galman, whom the soldiers admittedly gunned down. The military
pointed to him as Aquino's assassin, who had somehow allegedly penetrated the air-tight security of close to 2000
men ringing the airport. The military version met with great public disbelief and skepticism. The first fact-finding
commission created under Administrative Order No. 469 dated August 24, 1983 and P.D. 1879 dated August 27,
1983 was the object of several suits charging bias and that the President "had already prejudged the case, by
rejecting the version of foreign media that it is one of the soldiers, supposed to guard Aquino, who fatally shot him."
24
The said commission was dissolved per P.D. 1886, dated October 14, 1983 (later amended by P.D. 1903 dated
February 8, 1984) which created the ad hoc Fact-Finding Board with plenary powers to investigate "the treacherous
and vicious assassination (which) has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame ... (and) to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive
investigation into all the aspects of said tragedy." The Board after extensive hearings, submitted to the President
their majority report on October 24, 1984, while the chairman former Court of Appeals Justice Corazon Agrava
submitted her minority report one day earlier on October 23, 1984. All five members of the Board unanimously
rejected the official military version that Galman was the assassin and instead found that there was criminal
conspiracy. Their main difference of opinion is that the four-member majority found twenty-five military men (headed
by respondents Generals Ver, Olivas and Luther Custodia) and one civilian "indictable for the premeditated killing of
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983." The chairman's report
confined the conspiracy to seven men headed by General Custodia. The Tanodbayan, after conducting the
preliminary investigation, adopted the Board's majority report recommending the indictment of the accused as
"involved in this conspiracy, either as principals, upon the theory that the act of one is the act of all, or as
accessories, for attempting to hide the corpus of the offense." The eight accessories so indicted are the private
respondents herein named headed by respondents Ver and Olivas. (The chairman in her minority report had found
that "(T)he indications are that the plotters had agreed that only one would be the assassin; that the others can
either point to Galman as the killer; or they can state that they did not see the shooting; and that they will give false
testimony to mislead and confuse.
11. Only the former lawyers of the Fact-Finding Board created under P.D. No. 1886, consisting of Messrs. Andres R.
Narvasa, Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko and Francisco A. Villa have given us the answer that there is
nothing incriminatory per se in the testimonies of the respondents, in the Memorandum submitted by them, to wit:
I. The so-called 'Galman Theory that it was Rolando Galman who killed Senator Aquino is either true or
untrue, a matter the SANDIGANBAYAN will have to resolve.
II. If the 'Galman Theory' be true as advocated by the military officers concerned then the testimony of
Ver, et al. is true. It is not self-incriminatory. There would then be no reason to exclude it.
If, on the other hand, the theory be untrue as the prosecution in turn advocates then the testimony of
Ver, et al. is untrue. It is incriminatory of them, because by giving it and thereby seeking to hide the
crime, they incriminated themselves. Withal there would also be no reason to exclude it. Surely, after
their plot to deceive the Board had been exposed, they should not now be allowed to use the law to
bring about exclusion of the very proof of their deception.
In short, the testimonies of respondents could only be deemed incriminating if it be found that they sought thereby to
hide or cover up the crime and thus incriminate themselves, as accessories to the murder of Senator Aquino. The
former Fact-Finding Board lawyers amplify their theory, as follows:
5. The plain language of Section 5, PD 1886 precludes its interpretation as extending immunity to all testimony or
evidence produced before the Board in obedience to subpoena regardless of whether the witness giving such
evidence invokes the privilege against self-incrimination or not. —
6. The fact is, the invocation by Ver, et al. of such right would have been self-defeating first, it would have prevented
them from presenting evidence in substantiation of the 'Galman Theory,' which they wished the Board to accept; and
second, it might have exposed to some extent their real objective, which was to deceive the Board.
7. It would have been incongruous for Ver, et al. to have claimed that their testimony would incriminate them as
accessories to the murder of Aquino when they were, by testifying, actually in process of committing that precise
crime, becoming accessories.
8. Neither PD 1886 nor the Constitution should be used as a shield for crime, fraud or trickery.
9. The foregoing propositions were ignored by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Instead, with all due respect, it has —
a. given Section 5, PD 1886 a strained construction not justified by and contrary to its plain language;
b. given Section 20, Article IV, Constitution, a meaning at odds with its plain terms and contrary to
relevant decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court; and
c. sanctioned the use of legal provisions to shield persons from criminal liability arising from their
perfidious testimony before the Fact-Finding Board.
There is no legal ground nor justification for the exclusion order. It is for respondent court, upon consideration of the
evidence for the People, without any exclusion, and of the evidence for the defense in due course, to render its
verdict of guilty or not guilty.
With a word of commendation for the former Fact-Finding Board lawyers and former Senator Ambrosio Padilla and
Atty. Ramon Gonzales, whose memoranda as amid curiae, have been of great assistance, I vote, accordingly, to
grant the petitions at bar and to set aside the questioned exclusion order.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
I vote to grant the Petitions and to reverse the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
The resolution of the issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to Sec. 5 of PD No. 1886, reading as
follows:
grounds that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him
to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against
him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such an
As I read the law, Section 5 does not require that the person testifying before the Agrava Fact Finding Board (the
Board, for short) shall first invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Under said statute it is obvious that he has
no such privilege.
But what is the effect of the second part providing that his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be
used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except in case of perjury?
To my mind, the above portion does not grant to a person who has testified before the Board absolute or total
immunity. It should not operate as a shield against criminal liability specially since, under Section 12 of the same
Decree, the Board may initiate the filing of the proper complaint if its finding so warrant. Thus,
SEC. 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should the findings warrant the prosecution
of any person the Board may initiate the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate government
agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The inquiry before the Board was a general one. It was not directed against any particular individual or individuals.
Private respondents did not testify therein as suspects or as accused persons. There should therefore be no
hindrance to a criminal prosecution.
It has been held that where an inquiry by a grand jury is a general one and is not directed against a
particular individual the fact that on the basis of the information elicited, grounds for a criminal
prosecution may evolve against a witness, may not serve as a bar to such prosecution (U.S. v. Okin
D.C.N.J., 154 F. Supp. 553; Benson v. Goldstein, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 452) even though he testified before
the grand jury without being warned of his constitutional privileges against self- incrimination. (U.S. v.
Okin supra) (Emphasis supplied)
The right against self incrimination is not a prohibition of inquiry but an option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 [1962]). The kernel of the privilege is testimonial compulsion. Whether
or not any specific portion of the testimonies of private respondents is incriminating should be determined by the
Sandiganbayan itself. The claim against self-incrimination should be invoked when a specific question, which is
incriminating in character, is put to a witness in the subsequent proceeding. There should be no automatic "immunity
bath" of the entire testimony before the Board for immunity does not extend to such of the evidence as is not
privileged.
... But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time,
and the proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded.
This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether the
information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence
(Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can
be decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim or privilege can be made until a question calling for
a incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of
privilege may be interposed. (Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, 326 [19541).
Moreover, the issue actually addresses itself to a question of admissibility or competency of evidence and not to its
credibility. Whether the evidence so admitted is to be given any probative weight or credence is best addressed to
the Sandiganbayan. It should be recalled that the Board was not unanimous in its assessment of the testimonies
given.
There are additional considerations. While the right against self-incrimination is indubitably one of the most
fundamental of human rights, Section 5 of PD No. 1886 should be construed so as to effect a practical and
beneficent purpose and not in such a manner as to hinder or obstruct the administration of criminal justice.
... Any statute which, while it compels him to testify, protects the witness if he does disclose the
circumstances of his offense and the sources from which or the means by which evidence of its
commission or of his connection with it may be obtained or made effectual for his subsequent
prosecution and conviction is sufficient to comply with the constitutional requirements. Such a statute,
however should be construed to effect a practical and beneficent purpose, namely, at the same time to
secure the witness in his constitutional rights and to permit the prosecuting officer to secure evidence
of a crime. It should not be construed so as to unduly impede, hinder, or obstruct the administration of
criminal justice." Brown v. Walker 161 US 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819. (People ex rel. Hunt vs.
Lane, 116 N.Y.S. 990, 132 App. Div. 406)
The objective in all this exercise is to arrive at the truth. "Though the constitutional provisions for the protection of
one who appears ... must be liberally and fairly applied, the interests of the people are also entitled to consideration"
(Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 609; People vs. Coyle 15 N.Y.S. 2d 441, 172 Mis 593). Specially
so since, in the language of PD No. 1886 itself, the "treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983, has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame. "
In the interest of eliciting the truth, the excluded testimonies should be admitted, leaving it to the Sandiganbayan to
determine which specific questions and answers are to be excluded because they are incriminatory, and which
should be given credibility, in found to be competent and admissible.
RELOVA, J., dissenting:
The issue raised in these two petitions is whether the testimonies and other evidence produced by the private
respondents before the Agrava Board may be used as evidence against them before the Sandiganbayan
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
Respondent Sandiganbayan rejected their testimonies on the ground that "under statutes providing in substance
that no person shall be excused from testifying or furnishing evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence
may tend to incriminate him, but that no person shall be subject to indictment or prosecution for anything concerning
which he may testify or furnish evidence, it has been held that one who testifies concerning criminal offenses when
required to do so is entitled to immunity from prosecution even though he fails to claim his privilege before giving the
incriminating testimony (21 Am Jur 2d 218). He could not be required, in order to gain the immunity which the law
afforded, to go though the formality of an objection or protest which, however made, would be useless (VIII Wigmore
516)." (p. 4, Resolution of Sandiganbayan)
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886 provides that:
invoked his privilege against self- incrimination to testify or produce evidence ... (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the above Presidential Decree no one can refuse to testify or furnish evidence before the Fact Finding
Board. However, his testimony or any evidence produced shall not be used against him after he invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination. Stated differently, the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked when
the question at the hearing before the Board, calling for an incriminating answer is propounded; otherwise, before
any question is asked of the witness, he would not know whether the information to be elicited from him is
incriminating or not.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, this Court held that "the privilege against self-
incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it is when question calling for a
incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be no way
of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on
Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he
decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a incriminating
answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege may properly be
interposed.'" And, since it is a personal right to be exercised only by the witness, this privilege against self-
incrimination may be waived by him and, when so waived, cannot thereafter be asserted. The privilege is waived by
his voluntary offer to testify by, answering questions without objecting and/or claiming the privilege.
When private respondents gave testimonies before the Board they were not defendants but witnesses invited and/or
subpoenaed "to ventilate the truth thorougly free, independent and dispassionate investigation." They could not
refuse or withhold answers to questions propounded to them unless the inquiry calls for an incriminating answer and
a timely objection is raised.
In the case at bar, since the private respondents answered questions from the Fact Finding Board without claiming
the privilege against self-incrimination they cannot now be allowed to invoke the immunity clause provided in
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886.
I vote to grant the petitions.
Footnotes
1 SECOND WHEREAS.
2 Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava being the appointed Chairman of this ad hoc Fact Finding Board.
3 Gen. Fabian C, Ver & Major Gen. Prospero Olivas both appeared and testified in response to an
invitation-p. 6, COMMENT.
4 The other private respondents appeared and testified pursuant to subpoenas.
5 Petitioner in G. R. Nos. -71212-13.
6 Exh. VVV, tsn, April 6, 1984-Gen. Ver (1-97); Exh. VVV-1, tsn, April 6, 1984-Gen. Ver (1-54); Exh.
VVV-2, tsn, April 10, 1984-Gen. Ver (1- 150); Exh. VVV-3, tsn, April 23, 1984- Gen. Ver (1-135): Exh.
VVV-4, tsn, April 23, 1984 -Gen. Ver (1-43, 90); Exh. WWW, tsn, June 27, 1984-Gen. Olivas (1-87);
Exh. WWW-1, tsn, June 27, 1984-Gen. Olivas (1-81, 93); Exh. XXX, tsn, Dec. 22, 1983-Martinez (1-
93); Exh. XXX-1, Dec. 22, 1983- Martinez (1-82); Exh. XXX-2, tsn, Jan. 12, 1984-Martinez (1-20, 91);
Exh. YYY, tsn, Dec. 28, 1983- Fernandez (1-60); Exh. YYY-1, tsn, April 25, 1984-Fernandez (18-86,
104 with page 48); Exh. YYY-2, tsn, April 30, 1984- Fernandez (1-27, 80); Exh. ZZZ, tsn, Jan. 17, 1984-
Mojica (1- 83); Exh. ZZZ-1, tsn, Jan. 17, 1984-Mojica Exh. ZZZ-2, no date-Mojica (57-106); Exh. ZZZ-3,
tsn, March 23, 1984- Kavinta and Mojica (1-7); Exh. ZZZ-4, tsn, April 2, 1984- Mojica and Kavinta (1-
43, 112); Exh. AAAA, tsn, Dec. 27, 1983-Torio (1-79); Exh. AAAA-1, tsn, Dec. 27, 1983-Torio (1-25, 62):
Exh. AAAA-2, tsn, no date-Torio (36- 54); Exh. AAAA-3, tsn, June 21, 1984-Torio (43153); Exh. BBBB,
tsn, no date-Bona (80-93): Exh. BBBB-1, tsn, June 28, 1984-Bona (1- 36, 83 without page 15); Exh.
BBBB-2 no date-Bona (84-110); Exh. CCCC, tsn, April 25, 1984-Acupido (87104); Exh. CCCC-1, tsn,
April 30,1984- Acupido (1-46).
7 Annex "B", Petition.
8 Annexes "B" & "C", Petition.
9 Annex "E", Petition.
10 Annex "F", Petition.
11 Annex "J", Petition.
12 Petition. page 9.
13 Annex "N", Petition.
14 G.R. Nos. 71212-13.
15 G.R. Nos. 71208-09.
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
16 Petition, pages 14-18. 17
17 Comment, pages 8-11.
18 Ad Hoc Board,
19 Whereas-P.D. 1886.
20 Sec. 10, 3rd par., P.D. 1886.
21 Section 4, P.D. 1886.
21-A Art. IV, Sec. 20, 1973 Constitution.
22 Art. IV, Sec. 20, 1973 Constitution.
23 Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 (1975); People vs. Jimenez, 71 SCRA 186 (1976); People vs.
Buscato, 74 SCRA 30 (1976); People vs. Pena, 80 SCRA 589 (1977); People vs. Page, 77 SCRA 348
(1977); Draculan vs. Donato, 85 SCRA 266 (1978); People vs. Molleda 86 SCRA 667 (1978); People
vs. Saldua 87 SCRA 169 (1978); People vs. Beralde, 91 SCRA 125 (1979); People vs. Tampus 96
SCRA 624 (1980); People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155 (1980); People vs. Hipolito, 106 SCRA 610
(1981); People vs. Matilla, 105 SCRA 768 (1981); People vs. Umali, 116 SCRA 23 (1982); Morales, Jr.
vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 (1983); People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312(1983); People vs. Jose, 124
SCRA 89 (1983); People vs. Colana, 126 SCRA 23 (1983); People vs. Tuvera, 130 SCRA 168 (1984);
People vs. Pizarro, 131 SCRA 624 (1984); People vs, Lachica, 132 SCRA 230 1984); People vs.
Pizarro, 131 SCRA 624 (1984).
24 Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436.
25 Bernas, the 1973 Philippine Constitution, Cases & Materials, Part II, 1974 Ed., p. 745 citing Session
of November 25, 1972; Session of November 27, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
26 Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663, citing State vs. Wolfe, 266 N.W. 11 6,125; 104 ALR 464.
27 414 U.S. 70,38 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1973).
28 6 SCRA 1059.
29 70 C.J. Sec. 875, page 722; Wigmore on Evidence, Volume 8, Section 2252, pages 834- 835.
30 President's Instructions to the Philippine Commission; Philippines Bill of July 1, 1902, Section 5, par.
3-cited in Francisco's Revised Rules of Court in Criminal Procedure, pages 390-391.
31 Pinkerton v. Farr W., Va., 220 S.E. 2d 682,687.
32 Black Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, 1979.
33 Proceedings of the Convention, Session of November 29, 1972, cited in BERNAS The 1973
Philippine Constitution Notes and Cases, Part 11, 1974 ed., page 745.
34 In Re Guarina 24 Phil. 375; Paredes v. Executive Secretary, 128 SCRA 6 (1984).
35 Yu Cong vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385; Automotive Parts & Equipment, 30 SCRA 248 (1969).
36 Araneta vs. Concepcion, 52 O.G. 151.
37 Lefkowitz vs. Turley, 414 US 70, at 85.
38 123 SCRA 583, 603 (1983).
Concepcion, J.
1 G.R. No. 68113, Aquilino Q. Pimentel , Jr., versus Commission on Elections, et al., promulgated
December 19, 1984.
Dela Fuente, J.
1 Section 20, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution.
2 Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 SCRA 906.
3 24 SCRA 663.
4 Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiner, 28 SCRA 344, at 350, citing Chavez.
5 Marchetti vs. United States, mentioned also in Chavez at page 678.
6 President McKinley's Instructions, under date of April 7, 1900.
7 Section 1(18), Art, III. 1935 Constitution: Section 20, Art. IV, 1 973 Constitution.
8 "... of policy because it would place the witnesses against the strongest temptation to commit perjury,
and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress species and
degree of which the law abhors." (Chavez at page 679)
9 Ibid, at page 678.
10 Kastigar vs. US, 406 US 441, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212.
11 Chavez, at page 682.
12 Passion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locson, 65 Phil. 689. 695.
13 Section 5, PD No. 1886.
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
14 "except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office."
15 which is not an immunity against prosecution as that found in RA No. 1379.
16 304 U.S. 458, 464, cited in Chavez at p. 683.
17 E. Griswold, the Fifth Amendment Today, 1955, cited by Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in his separate
opinion in Chavez, at page 689, emphasis supplied.
18 64 Phil. 483.
Patajo, J.
1 Section 3, PD No. 1886 empowers the Board to issue subpoena and "other compulsory processes."
An invitation is such a compulsory process. The use of the word invitation is a mere euphemism used
instead of subpoenas in deference to the exalted position of those "invited." As this Court had occasion
to say in Babst vs. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316, under certain circumstances and
invitation to appear for interview are in fact "thinly veiled commands," in short summons or subpoena to
appear.
In States vs. Sacks, 116 Kan. 148, 225 Pac. 738, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
"The State contends that appellant cannot take advantage of this statute for the reason that no
subpoena was issued for him. No subpoena was necessary. 4 Wigmore on Evidence 960; U.S. vs.
Armour (DC) 142 Fed 808; Atkinson vs. State, 190 Ind. 1, 128 N.E. 433. The purpose of issuing a
subpoena is to get a witness into court. If he appears by request of attorney for either side, it is no
longer material whether a subpoena has been issued for him. His testimony is subject to the same
objections and should be given the same weight and he is entitled to immunity to the same extent as
though he had been served with a subpoena." See also Atkinson vs. State, 190 Ind. 1, 128 N.E. 433.
We may assume that if the one invited will not appear in response to said invitation, he would be issued
a subpoena. The Board will be remiss of its duty if it does not do so. Those invited certainly know this
to be so and, therefore, regard the invitation to be as much a compulsory process as an invitation.
Teehankee, J.
1 At page 6.
2 Except respondent General Olivas. who as a member of the bar, represented himself.
3 97 Phil. 940 (1955); emphasis supplied.
4 52 Phil. 807, 816-817 (1929).
5 Emphasis supplied.
6 Vol- 1, Public Laws of the Phil., p, 1 XIII
7 24 SCRA 663 (1968).
8 Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, 94 Phil. 325, 326.
9 Cabal vs. Kapunan, L-19052, December 29, 1962; 21 Am. Jur. 2d p. 383; 98 C.J.S., p. 265; 8
Wigmore, Evidence 1961 ed., p. 406: 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., pp. 1959- 1960.
10 2 SCRA 71 (1961); emphasis supplied.
11 94 Phil. 325.
12 94 SCRA 906 (Dec. 28, 1979), First Division, per Pacifico de Castro, J.
13 "... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
14 Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Ed., p. 710.
15 Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16 VIII Francisco's Revised Rules of Court, Evidence, Part II, p. 226.
17 VIII Wigmore on Evidence, 2268, sec. 398-400.
18 Separate opinion of the Chief Justice at page 4.
19 Petition in G.R. No. 71208-09, p. 9.
20 Metro Manila Times issue of Aug. 28, 1985.
21 Quoted in full at page 14, majority decision.
22 At page 14, majority decision.
23 Par. 1.0.0., Board members' Majority Report, composed of Messrs. Luciano S. Salazar, Amado C.
Dizon, Dante G. Santos and Ernesto F. Herrera.
24 Petition in G.R. No. 64969, Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Fernando Commission, page 5; G.R. No.
64983, LABAN vs, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, and G.R. No. v4993, Demetrio G. Demetria vs.
Hon. E. M. Fernando, etc., et al. The three cases were eventually dismissed as moot and academic by
joint Resolution of the Court dated October 20, 1983 "considering that the respondent Chairman and
Our members of the respondent Commission created by Administrative Order No. 469 had already
tendered their resignations, which the President of the Philippines accepted with deep regret; and that
the respondent Commission had been dissolved and superseded by the Commission created by P.D.
No. 1886.
10/2/2018 G.R. Nos. 71208-09
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 89914
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO
GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN
ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN,
HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief,
to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce
evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-
six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35)
entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein.
Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or
in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage
of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices,
schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people,
among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho,
Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose
Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando
V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI
Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon,
Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business
enterprises in the Philippines, such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and
the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing devious financial schemes and
techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with
minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by
chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S.
Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors
Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with
Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable
Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with
Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2 Billion as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986
People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed
lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez,
Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series
of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the
inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein
Defendant's individual and collective funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he
instant Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and
some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant
Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A
& E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and
its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported
incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3,
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1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government on
February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the
PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his
ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by
Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers
who still control and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the
said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented
by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio
Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the
amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned
to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the
Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration
of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only
P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to
rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of
the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB, and this development
(which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse
for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the
30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a
fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30%
ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire
stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial
expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo
Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C.
Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose
F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten
wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in
the names of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to
surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts in getting hold of
the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm
Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of
a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly owned by them
although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin
Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6
August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were
carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not
been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers
of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or
shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without
PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's
brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the
corporations, for the same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by
Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo
Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the
"sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the
publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of
the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their
memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989
rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue
its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance
and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in
clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice
and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning
order and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, 8
which the
Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional question
raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the
lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and
special commitees — like what petitioners seek — from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
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The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not hrough
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power
to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and
interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution.
Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affirs in purported aid of legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or
disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14
Thus, Section 21, Article VI
thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation
or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future
legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it,
must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate
or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech
or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In
order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was
published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken
over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on
4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that
former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran
on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated
allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of
the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a
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Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he
(Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18
Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received,
Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa,
wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of
Companies which includes SOLOIL Incorporated.
xxx xxxx xxx
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential
Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose
Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated
July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to
serve a sequestration order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials
assured him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr.
Ricardo A. Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because
they said another representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our
sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were
personally discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be
lifted. While we attempted to carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and
vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact
it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on doing normally
our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we
decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical stand of this
Commission in view of the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not
to continue our work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I
quote Mr. President:
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant
Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now
saying that there have been divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who
according to them, is the brother-in-law of the President. They even went further by telling us that
even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is also interested in the
ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which will
indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to
submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted directly to this Commission. To
our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to the
President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were
personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988
issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the
appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never
been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious
statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the
case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative,
by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the
Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the Government: Provided, that this section shall not apply to any person who
prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been
already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction,
contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the
officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act
lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its
own conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called
upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent
Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo
Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved.
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The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to
be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D.
Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-
governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the
charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a
"get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of
Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that
the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid
itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered
the PCGG to answer charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a
"get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organization
had made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the
charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when
the EDSA revolution took place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects
which will benefit our people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels
reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private
lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become
disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true
freedom, democratic participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be
investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article
XVIII of the Constitution. 19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the
three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII
of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly,
Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are
connected with the government but are private citizens.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction
of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the
"Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial
notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20
it was held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is
broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or
possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for
the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it
is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without
justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his
argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of
the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related
to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis
supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that
complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is
the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in
said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought
to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the
possibility of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the
Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence
being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before
the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had
much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into
those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are
within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial
power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the
Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of
the Bill of Rights'." 22
In another case —
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight
to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional
investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the
Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech,
press, religion or assembly. 23
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One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. 24
Thir right constured as the right to
remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other
witnesses only as questions are asked of them.
25
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.
thus —
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an
ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness
stand and refuse to answer any all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran,
26
the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to
invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit
It was held that:
We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal
cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-
incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is
propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the
proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings
sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether
a party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation
of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance
that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves
issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor
to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the
Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of
Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are
stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative — investigations in aid
of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither can we
substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of
the legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior
capable of regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the
acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the past regime and their sudden sale
to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual grant. As
stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the framers of our Constitution
having drawn largely from American institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly draw
also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have
done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not
infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or implied.
The power is now expressed as follows:
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 89914
Sec. 21 — The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three queries
which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of
another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed
in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial relations
between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and
Co, Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the Committee and to
produce certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an
action for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final action
by Congress on the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the
House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of remedying the wrong or
securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless
investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House of Representatives had no power
or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the
government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the
subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era. The
same court which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a
private contract may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these
and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express terms of the
Senate resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and
malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the
information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected
that the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the
duties of his assitants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation, and that the
department is maintained and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations as in the judgment
of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating,
and we think the subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have been better;
but in view of the particular subject matter was not indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler,
99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals of New york sustained an
investigation order by the House of Representatives of that state where the resolution contained no
avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of public office the duties of which
were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public institutions under the
control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some legislative
action respecting them, and the same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again "We are
bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of
being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v.
Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared
that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing resolution recites
it is in aid of legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system, rulings
from the decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation might ensue from
information derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the
power of inquiry, since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which the indictment
arose was not in furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure to have
specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 89914
an absence of legislative purpose. This argument is patently unsound. The investigative power of
Congress is not subject to the limitation that hearings must result in legislation or recommendations for
legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited powers. The
Congress, being the legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited
legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers into effect successfully, it has
always been held that Congress has the power to secure information concerning matters in respect to
which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would seem that Congress must secure information in
order to legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure information in order to
determine whether or not to legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional
powers to act. — (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member of the
Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for establishing
the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy
becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative power is shared by the United State Congress
and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is possessed by the Congress nad its
legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject
matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every
question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In other words, the
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not
by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum
total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be seen that the
phrase contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation can
be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent
what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as "roving commissions" or what
Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure.
(Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an
area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to
amass great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged
attempts o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation
becomes more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution for the
Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our
power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate
constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not
keep any of the three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar to each
department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is
everything legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez — Lopa transactions is more appropriate for the
Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before courts of
justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to
arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or
courts of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence
any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the
Committee can recommend to Congress how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish
may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not
restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different
from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil companies
were investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action
was recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually
exclusive. They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the purpose of
aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it Committees,
to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own consitutional power is not abridged because the
information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits... It is plain that investigation of the
matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the
institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action...
(Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a legislative
committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on the ground
that the Committee went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the functions
of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 89914
legislate, and the information sought might aid the congressional consideration, in such a situation a
legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by themselves, half
the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation violates the
liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because
he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses,
but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative
investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate was trying
to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused
to answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain
the Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the
Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and
the situation in Congress had changed was he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would
incriminate the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is
also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private
transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated.
Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also
secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action of the
legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot
assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49;
2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far
as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an
implied of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being
claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and
how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the
disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money
is na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law may be
useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no suggestions
of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of
R.A. No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to serve as an aid in
legislation. Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed legislation.
However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms expressly
state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation. It is enough that such
purpose appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings or one in which legislation could be
had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.
An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their defense in the
cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they
cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA
663, where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the
questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They
are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke
the right against self-incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of the
legislative and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we
unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is
available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at
bar.
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Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
# Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the
Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of
Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are
stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative — investigations in aid
of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither can we
substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of
the legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or corporate behavior
capable of regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the
acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the past regime and their sudden sale
to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual grant. As
stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the framers of our Constitution
having drawn largely from American institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly draw
also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have
done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not
infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or implied.
The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 — The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three queries
which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive domain of
another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is expressed
in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial relations
between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and
Co, Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him by the Committee and to
produce certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an
action for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention of final action
by Congress on the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the
House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of remedying the wrong or
securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless
investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House of Representatives had no power
or authority in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the
government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid legislation on the
subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era. The
same court which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a
private contract may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed itslef on these
and many other questions.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 89914
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express terms of the
Senate resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and
malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the
information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when it is reflected
that the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the
duties of his assitants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation, and that the
department is maintained and its activitites are carried on under such appropriations as in the judgment
of Congress are needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating,
and we think the subject was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have been better;
but in view of the particular subject matter was not indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler,
99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals of New york sustained an
investigation order by the House of Representatives of that state where the resolution contained no
avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of public office the duties of which
were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public institutions under the
control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is generally with the view of some legislative
action respecting them, and the same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again "We are
bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of
being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v.
Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared
that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing resolution recites
it is in aid of legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system, rulings
from the decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation might ensue from
information derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the
power of inquiry, since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which the indictment
arose was not in furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure to have
specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished
an absence of legislative purpose. This argument is patently unsound. The investigative power of
Congress is not subject to the limitation that hearings must result in legislation or recommendations for
legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited powers. The
Congress, being the legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited
legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers into effect successfully, it has
always been held that Congress has the power to secure information concerning matters in respect to
which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would seem that Congress must secure information in
order to legislate intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure information in order to
determine whether or not to legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional
powers to act. — (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member of the
Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element for establishing
the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy
becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative power is shared by the United State Congress
and the states legislatures, the totality of legislative power is possessed by the Congress nad its
legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject
matter of its inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every
question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In other words, the
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not
by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum
total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be
gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be seen that the
phrase contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation can
be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress. The limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent
what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as "roving commissions" or what
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 89914
Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure.
(Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is investigating an
area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to
amass great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we tack on the alleged
attempts o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation
becomes more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution for the
Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our
power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate
constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care that we do not
keep any of the three great departments of government from performing functions peculiar to each
department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is
everything legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez — Lopa transactions is more appropriate for the
Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before courts of
justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is to
arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation. Referral to prosecutors or
courts of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence
any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the
Committee can recommend to Congress how the situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish
may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not
restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different
from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil companies
were investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action
was recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on the other, are not mutually
exclusive. They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the purpose of
aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it Committees,
to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own consitutional power is not abridged because the
information sought to be elicited may also be of use in such suits... It is plain that investigation of the
matters involved in suits brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the
institution of suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action...
(Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a legislative
committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on the ground
that the Committee went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the functions
of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is one concerning which Congress can
legislate, and the information sought might aid the congressional consideration, in such a situation a
legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by themselves, half
the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation violates the
liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of
investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because
he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses,
but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail legislative
investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate was trying
to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused
to answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir refusal. The Court did not restrain
the Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the
Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and
the situation in Congress had changed was he released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would
incriminate the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is
also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely private
transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth would be negated.
Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements which are not only private but also
secret and hidden.
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I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action of the
legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot
assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y. 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49;
2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far
as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as an
implied of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now being
claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and
how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right to investigate the
disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money
is na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a possible violation of a law may be
useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no suggestions
of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of
R.A. No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to serve as an aid in
legislation. Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed legislation.
However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an investigation should in terms expressly
state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation. It is enough that such
purpose appears from a consideration of the entire proceedings or one in which legislation could be
had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.
An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their defense in the
cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they
cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA
663, where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the
questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to them. They
are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke
the right against self-incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of the
legislative and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we
unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of powers. That power is
available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at
bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Footnotes
1 Annex "A", Rollo, p. 38.
2 Annexes "B", "C" and "D", Rollo, pp. 98, 114 and 128.
3 Rollo, pp. 219-220.
4 Annex "E-1", Rollo, p. 143.
5 Annex "E", Rollo, p. 142.
6 Annex "H-1", Rollo, p. 162.
7 Annex "H-2", Rollo, p. 189.
8 Rollo, p. 264.
9 Ibid., p. 263.
10 Ibid., p. 284.
11 63 Phil. 139, 156, 157, 158-159.
12 Neptali A. Gonzales, et al. vs. Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 87636, 19 November
1990, 191 SCRA 452, 463.
13 Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
14 In Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court held that although there was no express provision in
the 1935 Constitution giving such power to both houses of Congress, it was so incidental to the
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legislative function as to be implied.
15 This was taken from Section 12(2), Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
16 No. L-3820, July 18, 1950, 87 Phil. 29.
17 Questions of privilege are those affecting the rights, privileges, reputation, conduct, decorum and
dignity of the Senate or its Members as well as the integrity of its proceedings." (Sec. 8, Rule XXXIX,
Rules of hte Senate.)
18 Annex — 2, Rollo, p. 242.
19 Sec. 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution provides: The authority to issue sequestration or freeze
orders under Proclamation No. 3, dated March 24, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
shall remain operative for not more than eighteen months after the retification of this Constitution.
However, in the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may extend said period.
20 354 U.S. 178, 1 L. ed. 1273 (1957).
21 360 U.S. 109, 3 L ed. 2d 1115, S CT 1081 (1959).
22 Maurice A. Hutcheson vs. U.S., 369 US 599.
23 Watkins vs. US, 354 USS 178 citing US vs. Rumely, 345 US 41.
24 Sec. 17, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
25 G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663.
26 G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985, 138 SCRA 294.
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10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-46496
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado
para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con
ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso
en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo
fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que
cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion
penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que
dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser
empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and
avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite
the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always
been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National
Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of
the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of
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the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed
in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the
Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel
have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted
to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by
the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose,
or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court
of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan
v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in
Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part
of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the
evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R.
No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."
(Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct.
648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985,
989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law.
ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185,
187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But
this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without
a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206,
83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S.
88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to
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the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in
any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public
official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such
board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section
10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to
appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible
to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition.
By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and
such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations,
with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
SECOND DIVISION
DR. CASTOR C. DE JESUS, G.R. No. 171491

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
RAFAEL D. GUERRERO III,
CESARIO R. PAGDILAO, AND Promulgated:
FORTUNATA B. AQUINO,
Respondents. September 4, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
[1]
Before us is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
[2]
September 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779, and its Resolution
dated February 9, 2006 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine
Research and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable to himself and drawn against
the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-assisted project being implemented by PCAMRD. To
avoid being caught, Bareza stole Land Bank Check No. 070343 from the trust fund of the
PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check
for the amount of P385,000.00, forged the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it
appear that the check was endorsed to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the
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check that was drawn against the PCAMRD Trust Fund. Then, he deposited part of the money to
[3]
the Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.
Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing on the third week of February
1999 while preparing the Report of Checks Issued and Cancelled for the Trust Fund for the
month of January. Not finding the check anywhere in her office, Atienza called the bank to look
for the same. She was shocked to learn from a bank employee that the check had been issued
payable in her name. When Atienza went to the bank to examine the check, she noticed that her
signature and the signature of Dir. Rafael D. Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive
Director, were forged. She also found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed
[4]
the check.
Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about the incident,
but begged that he be not reported to the management. Bareza also promised to return the money
in a few days. Against her good judgment, Atienza acquiesced to Barezas request, seeing
Barezas remorse over his transgressions. But Atienza also felt uneasy over her decision to keep
silent about the whole thing, so Atienza persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino
(Aquino), PCAMRD Director of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did.
Bareza, however, decided to confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD Accountant III, instead.
[5]
When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to report the
matter to Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and threatened to commit suicide if his
misdeeds were ever exposed. Due to his fervent pleading and his promise to repay the amount he
[6]
took, Bosque, like Atienza, assented to his plea for her to remain silent.
True to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD account on
[7]
February 25, 1999.
On July 27, 2001, following rumors that an investigation will be conducted concerning
irregularities in the said project, Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD Records Section in order to
[8]
clear his tracks.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD Memorandum Circular

[9]
No. 30 to investigate the burning incident and forgery of checks by Bareza. After
investigation, the fact-finding committee found sufficient evidence to charge Bareza with
[10]
dishonesty, grave misconduct and falsification of official document. The fact-finding
committee likewise found sufficient evidence to charge Atienza with inefficiency and
[11]
incompetence in the performance of official duties and Bosque with simple neglect of duty.
[12]
Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation committee to

[13]
conduct formal investigations on the charges filed against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque. The
investigation committee found Bareza guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and
recommended his dismissal from the service. It also found sufficient basis to uphold the charge
filed against Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a minimum penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day suspension for Atienza, and a maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for
[14]
Bosque.
On September 10, 2001 the PCAMRD adopted the findings of the investigation
committee but imposed only the penalty of six (6) months suspension on Atienza and only three
[15]
(3) months suspension on Bosque.
Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed on Bareza,
Atienza and Bosque, petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the complete records of the
proceedings had. Upon reading the same, petitioner was of the opinion that the investigation
conducted by the fact-finding committee and investigation committee was perfunctorily and
superficially done, and made only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues because the report
exonerated other persons involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to
him, these circumstances led to partiality in deciding the charges. Hence, petitioner filed with
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) a complaint against Guerrero,
Cesario R. Pagdilao (Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy Executive Director, and Aquino, among
[16]
others, for incompetence and gross negligence. The case was docketed as OMB Case No. L-
A-02-0209-D.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
[17]
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious Prosecution dated July
9, 2002, the respondents argued that the complaint is wanting in material, relevant and
substantive allegations and is clearly intended only to harass them. Furthermore, they contended
that petitioner failed to identify the persons he claims were exonerated, and worse, petitioner
[18]
failed to state with particularity their participation in the crimes.
[19]
In his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit dated July 25, 2002, petitioner
belied the allegation of the respondents that his complaint was lacking in substance. He stressed
that the report of the investigation committee that was submitted by the respondents reinforced
his claim that the investigation relative to the forgery and arson case was indeed perfunctory and
superficial, designed only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues. To bolster his contention,
he pointed out that the sworn affidavit of Bareza revealed that the latter was able to use certain
funds of the Asean-Canada Project by encashing blank checks that were previously signed by
Pagdilao. Thus, he averred that the failure to implicate Pagdilao as a conspirator to the crime of
forgery shows that the investigation was just a farce. Petitioner also claimed that Atienza and
Bosque were not charged with the proper administrative offense to avoid their dismissal from
the service. Petitioner pointed to the command responsibility of respondents over Bareza,
Atienza and Bosque. He maintained that had they been prudent enough in handling PCAMRDs
finances, the forgery of checks and the arson incident could have been avoided. Furthermore,
petitioner alleged that being the head of PCAMRD, Guerrero should have pursued investigations
on the criminal aspect of the cases of forgery and arson because a huge amount of government
money was involved therein. His act, therefore, of declaring the cases closed after the conduct of
the investigations in the administrative aspect only is contrary to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) because its object is to conceal more big anomalies and
[20]
issues.
[21]
In a Decision dated August 5, 2002, the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of
the administrative case filed against the respondents for lack of merit. It agreed with the
respondents that the complaint was couched in general terms that contains no material, relevant
and substantial allegation to support the theory of cover-up or whitewash. The Ombudsman also
held that there is nothing to sustain petitioners allegation that Pagdilao should be implicated in
the forgery because petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the check that was signed in blank
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
by Pagdilao was Land Bank Check No. 070343, or the subject check encashed by Bareza. Even
assuming that the forged check was the one signed in blank by Pagdilao, the Ombudsman
opined that the latter still cannot be said to have participated in the forgery because the check
was in the custody and safekeeping of Atienza, the cashier, when it was stolen. In the same vein,
the Ombudsman found no adequate basis in the petitioners allegation that Guerrero charged
Atienza and Bosque with erroneous administrative infractions to lessen their liability, noting that
Guerrero merely adopted the recommendation of the fact-finding and investigation committees
as to what they should be charged with. The Ombudsman added that Guerrero cannot be
indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 or be held administratively liable for
his failure to initiate criminal cases against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque because he had no
[22]
personal knowledge of the commission of the crimes allegedly committed by them.
[23]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an Order dated
November 25, 2003. According to the Ombudsman, nowhere in petitioners complaint did he
allege that respondents should be blamed for arson and forgery because of command
responsibility. It held that petitioners averment of the same only in his reply-affidavit and in his
motion for reconsideration should be disregarded altogether since it materially and belatedly
[24]
alters his original cause of action against the respondents, which cannot be allowed.
[25]
Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a petition for review
under Rule 43 before the appellate court. Petitioner claimed that the Ombudsman gravely erred
when it recommended the dismissal of the charges against the respondents and denied his
motion for reconsideration despite the existence of a prima facie case against them for
incompetence and gross negligence.
On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the August 5,
2002 Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. L-A-02-
0209-D. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman correctly dismissed the complaint
against the respondents. The appellate court held that petitioner questioned the handling of the
PCAMRD finances without specifying the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross
negligence of the respondents. The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely
[26]
speculative, cannot, by their nature, constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution dated February 9, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED IN ITS DECISION PETITIONERS
PETITION AND AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMANS DECISION OF AUGUST 5, 2002 IN
OMB-L[-A]-02-020[9]-D, RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY RELYING
SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE GENERAL RULE/PRINCIPLE THAT THE
COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IGNORING THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE
PRESENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE
EXERCISE THEREOF.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND
MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO PRIMA
FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENTS, [THAT] IF CONSIDERED,
WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT
[27]
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.
Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court erred in affirming the
dismissal of the complaint. We hold that it did not.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is

substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and
suppositions, and fails to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be
[28]
dismissed for lack of merit.
Mainly, petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to respondents because

according to him, the fraudulent use of PCAMRD funds and arson would not have happened had
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
they not been remiss in the performance of their duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero,
being the head of PCAMRD, should have seen to it that all the resources of the government are
managed and expended in accordance with laws and regulations, and safeguarded against loss
and waste; Pagdilao should have ensured that the signed blank checks were used for what they
were intended; and that anomalies would have been avoided had Aquino supervised Bareza,
Atienza and Bosque, her subordinates, properly and efficiently. In sum, petitioner argues that
[29]
they are accountable because of command responsibility.
We agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint against the
respondents should be dismissed. A perusal of petitioners allegations clearly shows that they are
mere general statements or conclusions of law, wanting in evidentiary support and
substantiation. It is not enough for petitioner to simply aver that respondents had been derelict in
their duties; he must show the specific acts or omissions committed by them which amount to
incompetence and gross negligence. This, he failed to do. Hence, the complaint was correctly
dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioners allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of respondents which
show that they are guilty of dishonesty and falsification lacks merit. Aside from the fact that
nowhere in the records does it appear that he has indeed shown the particular acts or omissions
of respondents constituting dishonesty or which amounted to falsification of whatever nature, it
must be emphasized that the case he filed before the Ombudsman was an administrative
complaint for incompetence and gross negligence. Hence, these are the two charges he needed to
prove by substantial evidence, not any other crime or administrative infraction. At the very least,
petitioner should have shown how his accusations of dishonesty and falsification constituted
incompetence and gross negligence on the part of the respondents.
To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed, petitioner argues that he
had in his petition established the existence of probable cause to hold respondents liable for
[30]
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
He then concludes that if there is sufficient basis to indict the respondents of a criminal offense
then with more reason that they should be made accountable administratively considering the
fact that the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial
[31]
evidence.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
This argument likewise has no merit. It is worthy to note that petitioner is merely
proceeding from his own belief that there exists sufficient basis to charge respondents
criminally. This is not within his province to decide. He could not arrogate unto himself the
power that pertains to the proper authorities enjoined by law to determine the absence or
existence of probable cause to indict one of a criminal offense.
More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may
[32]
proceed independently thereof. Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a
crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present administrative complaint, the same
will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.
[33]
As we have said in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza and which
[34]
we have reiterated in a host of cases, a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents
acquittal will not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in
[35]
the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the
time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of
[36]
criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. To state it simply, petitioner erroneously
equated criminal liability to administrative liability.
Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the
respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the respondents,
[37]
administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility.
Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may attach.
Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence
[38]
of evidence of the latters own negligence. While it may be true that certain PCAMRD
employees were sanctioned for negligence and some other administrative infractions, it does not
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
follow that those holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case, are likewise
negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.
WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient showing of grave and reversible error in the
assailed decision and resolution, the petition is DENIED. Said Decision dated September 30,
2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779
are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 25-32. Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Jose Catral
Mendoza concurring.
[2]
Id. at 34.
[3]
Id. at 57.
[4]
Id. at 85.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id. at 87.
[7]
Id. at 90.
[8]
Id. at 78.
[9]
Id. at 70-71.
[10]
Id. at 67.
[11]
Id. at 68.
[12]
Id. at 69.
[13]
Id. at 91.
[14]
Id. at 65.
[15]
Id. at 42-43.
[16]
Id. at 37.
[17]
Id. at 49-52.
[18]
Id. at 50.
[19]
Id. at 150-158.
[20]
Id. at 151-154.
[21]
Id. at 159-165.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. 171491
[22]
Id. at 161-162, 164.
[23]
Id. at 171-176.
[24]
Id. at 174-175.
[25]
CA rollo, pp. 7-21.
[26]
Rollo, p. 31.
[27]
Id. at 208.
[28]
Manalabe v. Cabie, A.M. No. P-05-1984, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 582, 589; See also Adajar v. Develos, A.M. No. P-05-2056,
November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 361, 376-377; Ong v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1538, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 150, 160;
Datuin, Jr. v. Soriano, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1640, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 1, 5.
[29]
Rollo, pp. 218-219.
[30]
Id. at 211-217.
[31]
Id. at 217.
[32]
Miralles v. Go, G.R. No. 139943, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 596, 609; See also Barillo v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 155088, August
31, 2006, 500 SCRA 561, 572; J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Hontanosas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004, 438
SCRA 525, 552, citing Bejarasco, Jr. v. Buenconsejo, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1417, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 212, 221; Paredes v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169534, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 577, 587.
[33]
A.C. No. 4017, September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 406.
[34]
Miralles v. Go, supra at 609; Office of the Court Administrator v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370, April 25, 2003, 401 SCRA
583, 591; Saludo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121404, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 14, 19.
[35]
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, supra at 413.
[36]
Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 141336, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 88, 99.
[37]
Principe v. Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 145973, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 460, 468.
[38]
Nicolas v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154668, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 154, 167; Soriano v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 167743, November
22, 2006, 507 SCRA 571, 591-592.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
Custom Search

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and
FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando
Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents
[petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private
respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,1 the President of
the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive
Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and
responsibilities:3
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling
(physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and
gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed
wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the
acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper
charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating
committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon
witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent
Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding
him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents
[petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private
respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the
fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity.6
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the
organization and the analysis of evidence.7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general
policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out
what if anything should be done.8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information
upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings
of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions. 10
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings
of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in
the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents
would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all
these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the
very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the
civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no
distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to
depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of
Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the
right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum
or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial
proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in
a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing
or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial
subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that
an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a
judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To
an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable
or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not
adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a
complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be
pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to
make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony
sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed
witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if
not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an
administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original
inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in
order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it
wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In
sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the
authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements
implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the
Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas,
of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in
scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative
charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the
respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative
proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the
medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing
any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to
the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30
Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to
disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the
Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the
validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately,
for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and
effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the
court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35
Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to
respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of
no force and effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current
state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this
jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of
Davis1 and that of Jaffe.2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion.3 A similar
approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz,4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt.5 A concurrence is thus
called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved
in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative
process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that
the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind
that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.
1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad
sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it
meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt
Co.,7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case by
Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a
sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal
Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the
requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.""8 It has been given approval
in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two
paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now
permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined
literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated
associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the
name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public
attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the
request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned
against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited
in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its
compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if
he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.
2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the
only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost
deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized
it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent
Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a
witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it
offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas
doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for
me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may
be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the
Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness
and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is
not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.
I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside
respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent
Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to
comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn
statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers."1
While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO,2 on the basis
whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely
cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City
Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file
the corresponding charges",3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that
respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly
implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself
initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation."4
Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on
the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the
detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and
unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos
Montañez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise
narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to
whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."
All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which
were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5)
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality
respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)
Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan,6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of
the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such
proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial
and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a
blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against
him.
Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction
against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case
(wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse
"not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand."8 The Court therein stressed that "the
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according
to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line
with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes
is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions
stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or
compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the
right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment."
That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal
in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of
record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos
Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air
compressor) purchased for the City.
The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-
incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact
being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged
in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening
(and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill
of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession
obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.
Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing
the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a
party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not
be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a
general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect,
as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar
and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal
prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such
criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-
finding investigation" and subpoenas.
The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out
and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the
individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and
seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the
corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the
evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the
corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear
responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other
cases." 13
There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive
charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going
further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was
unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and
accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-
incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.
I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current
state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this
jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of
Davis1 and that of Jaffe.2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion.3 A similar
approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz,4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt.5 A concurrence is thus
called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved
in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative
process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that
the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind
that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad
sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it
meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt
Co.,7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case by
Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a
sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal
Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the
requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.""8 It has been given approval
in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two
paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now
permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined
literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated
associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the
name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public
attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the
request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy
themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned
against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited
in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its
compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if
he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.
2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the
only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost
deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized
it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent
Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a
witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it
offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas
doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for
me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may
be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the
Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness
and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is
not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.
I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside
respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent
Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to
comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn
statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers."1
While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO,2 on the basis
whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely
cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City
Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file
the corresponding charges",3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that
respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly
implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself
initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation."4
Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on
the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the
detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and
unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos
Montañez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise
narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to
whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."
All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which
were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5)
show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality
respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)
Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan,6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of
the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such
proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial
and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a
blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against
him.
Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction
against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case
(wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse
"not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand."8 The Court therein stressed that "the
constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according
to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line
with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes
is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions
stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or
compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the
right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment."
That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal
in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos
Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air
compressor) purchased for the City.
The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-
incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact
being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged
in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening
(and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill
of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession
obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.
Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing
the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a
party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not
be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a
general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect,
as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar
and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal
prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such
criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-
finding investigation" and subpoenas.
The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out
and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the
individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and
seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the
corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the
evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the
corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear
responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other
cases." 13
There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive
charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going
further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was
unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and
accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-
incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.
I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.
Footnotes
1 "Sec. 64 (c). To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation
of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted."
2 Executive Order No. 208, dated February 9, 1967, converted the Agency into a division under the
Executive Office and is now known as "Complaints and Investigating Office".
3 Executive Order No. 88, dated September 25, 1967, amending in part Executive Order No. 4.
4 Executive Order No. 4, para. (5). "The Agency is hereby vested with all the powers of an investigating
committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to
summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant
to the investigation.
5 Resolution of the Court on November 28, 1969 excluded Ramon D. Bagatsing as petitioner in the
case.
6 See Matute v. Court of Appeals, 31 Jan. 1969, 26 SCRA 799, 800; Central Bank v. Cloribel,
L-26971, 11 April 1972, 44 SCRA 314.
7 Administrative Law, Jaffe and Nathanson, 1961 ed., 491.
8 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Smith, 340 P. 2d 964, citing 1 Davis Administrative Law Treatise, 160.
9 See Notes on 27 ALR 2d 1208, 1209, and cases cited.
10 Marchitto v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 160 A 2d 832.
11 Section 71, Revised Administrative Code.
12 Section 580, Revised Administrative Code.
13 See Sections 1 and 3, Rule 23, Rules of Court.
14 Answer, Respondents, at 43, 45 Case Records.
15 See Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court.
16 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 171.
17 NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 197 F. 2d 447 (5th Cir. 1952).
18 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 US 185 (1946).
19 SEC v. Vacuum Can Co., 157 F. 2d 530, cert den 330 US 820 (1947).
20 See Marchitto, ante.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
21 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 US 632 (1950), abandoning the Harriman, 211 US 407; (1908)
and American Tobacco, 264 US 298; (1924) doctrine against "fishing expedition".
22 Adams v. FTC 296 F, 2d 861, cert den 369 US 864 (1962).
23 Petition, at 6, Case Records; See Annexes B, B-1, Petition; at 17-24, Case Records.
24 Petition, at 7, Case Records.
25 Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1214.
26 L-19052, 29 Dec. 1962, 6 SCRA 1064, per Concepcion, J.
27 L-25018, 26 May 1969, 28 SCRA 345, per Fernando, J.
28 Memorandum, Petitioners, at 154, Case Records.
29 Idem; Petition, at 8, Case Records.
30 Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, ante.
31 Memorandum, Respondents, at 160, 161, Case Records.
32 US v. Borja, 191 F. Supp 563, 566; Farkas vs. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F. 2d 629, 632, dert den
389 US 977.
33 San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, L-21879, 29 Sept. 1967, 21 SCRA 297.
34 Idem; also 2 Modern Constitutional Law, Antieau 1969 ed., 648.
35 Petite vs. United States, 361 US 529 (1960).
FERNANDO J., concurring.
1 Cf. I Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 159-232 (1958).
2 Cf. Jaffe Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 115-119 (1965).
3 Cf. Parker, Administrative Law, 135-143 (1952). .
4 Cf. Katz Cases and Materials in Administrative Law, 175-221 (1947).
5 Cf. McFarland and Vanderbilt, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials, 83-86 (1952).
6 According to Article IV, Section 3 of the present Constitution:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
7 338 US 632 (1950).
8 Ibid, 652-653.
9 Cf. F. T. C. v. Browning, 435 F2d 96 (1970); Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Worker's International
Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 439 F2d 237 (1971); United States v.
Newman 441 F2d 165 (1971);Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Security Bank of Utah, 447
F2d 166(1971); Modine Manufacturing Company v. National Labor Relations, 453 F2d 292(1971);
United States v. Litton Industries, Inc., 462 F2d 14 (1972); Burlington Northern Inc. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 462 F2d 280 (1972); Wilmoth v. Hansel, 25 A 86 (1892); Flanagan v. New
York LE & W.R. Co., 32 S. 84 (1895); Mobil Oil Corporation v. Durkin, 278 A2d 477 (1971); Fred Depkin
& Son, Inc. v. Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation, 276 A2d 161 (1971); Appeal of Ohio Radio,
Inc., 266 NE 2d 575 (1970); Mckay v. Stewart & Cecire v. Stewart, 272 NE 2d 887 (1971); McKay v.
Cecire 324 S2d 302 (1971); Koch v. Kosydar 290 NE 2d 847 (1972); State Real Estate Commission v.
Roberts, 271 A2d 246 (1970).
10 338 US 632, 651-652 (1950).
11 Cf. U.S. v. Navarro, 3 Phil, 143 (1904); Ocampo v. Jenkins, 14 Phil. 681 (1909); Worcester v.
Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912); U.S. v. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530 (1914); Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886
(1920); People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925); Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33 (1937);
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 (1937); Yee Sue Kay v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940); Moncado v.
Peoples Court, 80 Phil. 1 (1948).
12 At 9.
13 According to Article IV, Section 20 of the present Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
14 Cf. Magtoto v. Manguera, L-37021, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4.
15 At 9.
16 67 Phil. 62 (1939).
17 Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., L-19052, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 1064. .
18 Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, L-25018, May 26, 1969,28 SCRA 345.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-29274
1 Petition, p. 11, prayer (b).
2 Now known as Complaints and Investigating Office (CIO) under Ex. Order No. 208, dated Feb. 9,
1967.
3 Main opinion at p. 9 thereof, citing petitioners' Memorandum at p. 154, Rollo, emphasis supplied.
4 Petition, p. 3, par. 5.
5. Answer, Rollo, p. 40.
6 6 SCRA 1064.
7 28 SCRA 344, per Fernando, J.; emphasis supplied.
8 Idem. at p. 348; citing Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663.
9 L-33877-79, 41 SCRA 260 (Sept. 30, 1971).
10 At page 2 hereof.
11 At page 9.
12 Ex. Order No. 88, dated Sept. 25, 1967, amending Ex. Order No. 9 which created petitioner "as the
executive instrumentality in the Office of the President" thus provides that petitioner shall "receive and
evaluate, and (to) conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or
behavior of any public official or employee and (to) file aid prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency." Petition, Annexes A and A-1. (Emphasis supplied). .
13 Petition, at page 8.
14 Vide Harriman vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 and Federal Trade Commission
vs. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, where Justice Holmes in the first case ruled out a federal
commission's application to require witness to testify before it except in connection with specific
complaints for violation of the Interstate Commerce Act or with its investigation of specific subjects that
might have been the object of complaint. In the second case, Justice Holmes likewise ruled against a
federal commission's fishing expeditions into private papers on the mere possibility that they may
disclose evidence of crime in view of the Constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-13827
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13827 September 28, 1962
BENJAMIN MASANGCAY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Godofredo A. Ramos and Ruby Salazar-Alberto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General and Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the Commission on Election
with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official
and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission
embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957,
inasmuch as he opened said boxes not the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the
provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens'
Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code
and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the
Commission in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody of
the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of
the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to appear and show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the
Commission on October 21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by both the
prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay
and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment
and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the
provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5 of the
Revised Election Code which grants the Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts
of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish
for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among
the three departments of our constitutional form of government. In other words, it is contended that, even if petitioner
can be held guilty of the act of contempt charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of
the Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of powers. There is merit in
the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to
petitioner in the decision subject of review. We had occasion to stress in the case of Guevara v. The Commission on
Elections 1 that under the law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may
be submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the Commission, although it cannot be
classified a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an
administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation line between the duty which
inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of
the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial
function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature, as can
be clearly gleaned from the following doctrine we laid down therein:
. . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such
power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice
(Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v. Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570;
In Re Kelly, Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the
exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held
invalid (Langenberg v. Lecker, 31 N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 SW., 810). 1awphîl.nèt
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for
contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial
function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the
one designated to take charge of the receipt, custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was
charged with having opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in
violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except in the presence
of the division superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the
Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and distribution not in
accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions. And because of such violation he was
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1962/sep1962/gr_l-13827_1962.html 1/2
10/2/2018 G.R. No. L-13827
dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void.
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the question of constitutionality raised
by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the
Commission on Elections the power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay is concerned, as well as the
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredez, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J. B. L., J., took no part.
Footnotes
1G. R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1962/sep1962/gr_l-13827_1962.html 2/2

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10/2/2018 G.R. No.

Today is Tuesday, October 02, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961

BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee,

G.R. No. L-15377 July 31, 1961

NUMERIANA RAGANAS, plaintiff-appellant,

G.R. No. L-16660 July 31, 1961

VICENTE ROMERO, petitioner-appellee,

G.R. No. L-16781 July 31, 1961

CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY, and LAO KANG SUY, petitioners-appellees,

G.R. No. L-17056 July 31, 1961

FRED WILSON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,

R. L. Resurreccion for petitioner-appellee.

(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;

4 Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) p. 76, et seq.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[A.C. No. 4634. September 24, 1997]

JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant, vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS,

Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:

[1] Rollo, p.2.

Today is Tuesday, October 02, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-24281 May 16, 1967

ROSITA C. TALEON and MIGUEL SOLIS, petitioners appellants,

Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners-appellants.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

1See also Borja v. Moreno, L-16487, July 31, 1964.

2Ismael v Guanzon, 2 Phil. 347.

3See also Timbancaya v. Vicente, L-19100, Dec. 27, 1963.

7Sec. 3, Rule 20, Rev. Rules of Court.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, October 02, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-43653 November 29, 1977

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

G.R. No. L-45378 November 29, 1977

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES. INC. (RCPI), petitioner,

BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS and PACIFICO INNOCENCIO, respondents.

Treñas & Aligaen for petitioner.

R. Mag. Bernardo for respondent Morales.

Silvestre T. de la Cruz for respondent Innocencio.

Primitivo C. Santos for respondent Board.

3 Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil. Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, October 02, 2018

G.R. No. 142601 October 23, 2006

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,

The undisputed facts are:

ON JOINT MOTION of all members present;

ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS

b) The lot lines of Tala Estate traverses thru Marilao River.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.

Rule III implementing the above provisions states:

SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Puno, J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

4 Kapasiyahan Blg. 06-08-95.

5 Annex "D," Rollo, pp.32-36.