THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 171579 November 14, 2012

LILY SY, Petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, BENITO FERNANDEZ
GO, BERTHOLD LIM, JENNIFER SY, GLENN BEN TIAK SY
and MERRY SY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on August 7, 2000,

petitioner Lily Sy (petitioner) claimed that in the morning
of December 16, 1999, respondents Benito Fernandez Go
(Benito) and Glenn Ben Tiak Sy (Glenn), together with
"Elmo," a security guard of Hawk Security Agency, went to
petitioner's residence at the 10th Floor, Fortune Wealth,
612 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila and forcibly opened the
door, destroyed and dismantled the door lock then replaced
it with a new one, without petitioner's consent.2 She,
likewise, declared that as a diversionary ruse, respondent
Jennifer Sy (Jennifer) was at the lobby of the same building
who informed petitioner’s helper Geralyn Juanites
(Geralyn) that the elevator was not working.3 Glenn and
Benito’s act of replacing the door lock appeared to be
authorized by a resolution of Fortune Wealth Mansion
Corporation’s Board of Directors, namely, respondents
Glenn, Jennifer, William Sy (William), Merlyn Sy (Merlyn),
and Merry Sy (Merry).4
 In the evening of the same date, petitioner supposedly
saw Benito, Glenn, Jennifer, Merry and respondent
Berthold Lim (Berthold) took from her residence numerous
boxes containing her personal belongings without her
consent and, with intent to gain, load them inside a family-
owned van/truck named "Wheels in Motion."5 The same
incident supposedly happened in January 2000 and the
"stolen" boxes allegedly reached 34,6 the contents of which
were valued at P10,244,196.00.7

Respondents Benito and Berthold denied the

accusations against them. They explained that petitioner
made the baseless charges simply because she hated their
wives Merry and Jennifer due to irreconcilable personal
differences on how to go about the estates of their deceased
parents then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 51.8 They also manifested their doubts on
petitioner’s capability to acquire the personal belongings
allegedly stolen by them.9

Merry, Glenn, and Jennifer, on the other hand, claimed

that petitioner’s accusations were brought about by the
worsening state of their personal relationship because of
misunderstanding on how to divide the estate of their
deceased father.10 They also pointed out that the whole
condominium building where the alleged residence of
petitioner is located, is owned and registered in the name of
the corporation.11 They explained that the claimed residence
was actually the former residence of their family (including
petitioner).12 After their parents’ death, the corporation
allegedly tolerated petitioner to continuously occupy said
unit while they, in turn, stayed in the other vacant units
leaving some of their properties and those of the
corporation in their former residence.13 They further stated
that petitioner transferred to the ground floor because the
10th floor’s electric service was disconnected.14They
explained that they changed the unit’s door lock to protect
their personal belongings and those of the corporation as
petitioner had initially changed the original lock.15 They
supported their authority to do so with a board resolution
duly issued by the directors. They questioned petitioner’s
failure to report the alleged incident to the police,
considering that they supposedly witnessed the unlawful
taking.16 They thus contended that petitioner’s accusations
are based on illusions and wild imaginations, aggravated by
her ill motive, greed for money and indiscriminate
prosecution.17

In the Resolution18 dated September 28, 2001, Assistant

City Prosecutor Jovencio T. Tating (ACP Tating)
recommended that respondents Benito, Berthold, Jennifer,
Glenn and Merry be charged with Robbery In An
Uninhabited Place; and that the charges against William
Go19 (the alleged new owner of the building), and "Elmo
Hubio" be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.20 ACP
Tating found that the subject condominium unit is in fact
petitioner’s residence and that respondents indeed took the
former’s personal belongings with intent to gain and
without petitioner’s consent. He further held that
respondents’ defenses are not only contradictory but
evidentiary in nature.21 The corresponding
Information22 was filed before the RTC of Manila, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 02-199574 and was raffled to Branch
19. On motion of Jennifer, Glenn and Merry, the RTC
ordered a reinvestigation on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit of the
witness.23 This notwithstanding, the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) sustained in a Resolution24 dated
September 23, 2002 its earlier conclusion and recommended
the denial of respondents’ motion for reconsideration.

When elevated before the Secretary of Justice, then

Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong (the Secretary) reversed
and set aside25 the ACP’s conclusions and the latter was
directed to move for the withdrawal of the Information
against respondents.26 The Secretary stressed that the
claimed residence of petitioner is not an uninhabited place
under the penal laws, considering her allegation that it is
her residence.27 Neither can it be considered uninhabited
under Article 300 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), since it
is located in a populous place.28 The Secretary opined that
the elements of robbery were not present, since there was
no violence against or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things, as the replacement of the door lock was
authorized by a board resolution.29 It is likewise his
conclusion that the element of taking was not adequately
established as petitioner and her helper were not able to see
the taking of anything of value. If at all there was taking,
the Secretary concluded that it was made under a claim of
ownership.30 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied on June 17, 2004.31

Aggrieved, petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals

(CA) in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. On December 20, 2004, the CA
rendered a Decision32 granting the petition and,
consequently, setting aside the assailed Secretary’s
Resolutions and reinstating the OCP’s Resolution with the
directive that the Information be amended to reflect the
facts as alleged in the complaint that the robbery was
committed in an inhabited place and that it was committed
through force upon things.33

The CA held that petitioner had sufficiently shown that

the Secretary gravely abused her discretion in reversing the
OCP’s decision.34 While recognizing the mistake in the
designation of the offense committed because it should have
been robbery in an inhabited place, the CA held that the
mistake can be remedied by the amendment of the
Information.35 Indeed, since the element of violence against
or intimidation of persons was not established, the same was
immaterial as the crime was allegedly committed with force
upon things.36 Thus, it held that petitioner adequately
showed that at the time of the commission of the offense,
she was in possession of the subject residential unit and that
respondents should not have taken the law into their own
hands if they indeed had claims over the personal properties
inside the subject unit.37 It also did not give credence to the
newly-discovered evidence presented by respondents,
because the affidavit was executed two years after the filing
of petitioner’s complaint.38Lastly, the CA held that the
element of taking was shown with circumstantial
evidence.39

On motion of respondents, the CA rendered an

Amended Decision40 dated May 9, 2005, setting aside its
earlier decision and reinstating the DOJ Secretaries’
Resolutions.41 It concluded that as part-owner of the entire
building and of the articles allegedly stolen from the subject
residential unit, the very same properties involved in the
pending estate proceedings, respondents cannot, as co-
owners, steal what they claim to own and thus cannot be
charged with robbery.42 It continued and held that assuming
that the door was forced open, the same cannot be
construed as an element of robbery as such was necessary
due to petitioner’s unjustified refusal to allow the other co-
owners to gain access to the premises even for the lawful
purpose of allowing prospective buyers to have a look at the
building.43

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in

the assailed Resolution44 dated February 10, 2006.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

A GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT A
CORPORATION MAY ARBITRARILY TAKE THE LAW
INTO THEIR OWN HANDS BY MEANS OF A MERE
BOARD RESOLUTION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER IN
POSSESSION OF THE UNIT SIMPLY BECAUSE THE
PETITIONER WAS IN POSSESSION OF ANOTHER
UNIT.45

We find no merit in the petition.

At the outset, a perusal of the records of Criminal Case

No. 02-199574 in People of the Philippines v. Benito
Fernandez Go, et al., pending before the RTC where the
Information for Robbery was filed, would show that on
March 12, 2008, Presiding Judge Zenaida R. Daguna issued
an Order46 granting the Motion to Withdraw Information
filed by ACP Armando C. Velasco. The withdrawal of the
information was based on the alleged failure of petitioner to
take action on the Amended Decision issued by the CA
which, in effect, reversed and set aside the finding of
probable cause, and in order for the case not to appear
pending in the docket of the court. The propriety of the
determination of probable cause is, however, the subject of
this present petition. Besides, in allowing the withdrawal of
the information, the RTC in fact did not make a
determination of the existence of probable cause. Thus, the
withdrawal of the information does not bar the Court from
making a final determination of whether or not probable
cause exists to warrant the filing of an Information for
Robbery against respondents in order to write finis to the
issue elevated before us.47

From the time the complaint was first lodged with the
OCP, the latter, the Secretary of Justice and the CA had
been in disagreement as to the existence or absence of
probable cause sufficient to indict respondents of the
offense charged. After a thorough review of the records of
the case, we find no reason to depart from the CA
conclusion that the evidence presented was not sufficient to
support a finding of probable cause.

Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that

engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.48 There is no definitive
standard by which probable cause is determined except to
consider the attendant conditions.49

Respondents were charged with robbery in an

uninhabited place, which was later amended to reflect the
facts as alleged in the complaint that the robbery was
committed in an inhabited place and that it was committed
through force upon things.50

"Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any

personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using
force upon anything, is guilty of robbery."51 To constitute
robbery, the following elements must be established:

(1) The subject is personal property belonging to another;

(2) There is unlawful taking of that property;

(3) The taking is with the intent to gain; and

(4) There is violence against or intimidation of any person

or use of force upon things.52

Admittedly, the subject 10th floor unit is owned by the

corporation and served as the family residence prior to the
death of petitioner and respondents’ parents. The 10th floor
unit, including the personal properties inside, is the subject
of estate proceedings pending in another court and is,
therefore, involved in the disputed claims among the
siblings (petitioner and respondents). Respondents admitted
that armed with a Board Resolution authorizing them to
break open the door lock system of said unit and to install a
new door lock system, they went up to the subject unit to
implement said resolution. The said corporate action was
arrived at because petitioner had allegedly prevented
prospective buyers from conducting ocular inspection.

Petitioner, however, claims that on December 16, 1999

and sometime in January 2000, respondents brought out
from the unit 34 boxes containing her personal belongings
worth more than P10 million. We cannot, however, fathom
why petitioner did not immediately report the first incident
and waited for yet another incident after more or less one
month. If the value involved is what she claims to be, it is
contrary to human nature to just keep silent and not
immediately protect her right. Her general statement that
she was intimidated by Benito who was known to be
capable of inflicting bodily harm cannot excuse her
inaction. Petitioner, therefore, failed to establish that there
was unlawful taking.

Assuming that respondents indeed took said boxes

containing personal belongings, said properties were taken
under claim of ownership which negates the element of
intent to gain.

x x x Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal

act which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender. The unlawful taking of another’s property gives
rise to the presumption that the act was committed with
intent to gain. This presumption holds unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator x x x.53

Taking as an element of robbery means depriving the

offended party of ownership of the thing taken with the
character of permanency. The taking should not be under a
claim of ownership. Thus, one who takes the property
openly and avowedly under claim of title offered in good
faith is not guilty of robbery even though the claim of
ownership is untenable.54 The intent to gain cannot be
established by direct evidence being an internal act. It must,
therefore, be deduced from the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the offense.55

In this case, it was shown that respondents believed in

good faith that they and the corporation own not only the
subject unit but also the properties found inside. If at all,
they took them openly and avowedly under that claim of
ownership.56 This is bolstered by the fact that at the time of
the alleged incident, petitioner had been staying in another
unit because the electric service in the 10th floor was
disconnected. We quote with approval the CA conclusion
in their Amended Decision, thus:

Indeed, on second look, We note that what is involved

here is a dispute between and among members of a family
corporation, the Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation.
Petitioner Lily Sy and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and
Glenn, all surnamed Sy, are the owners-incorporators of
said corporation, which owns and manages the Fortune
Wealth Mansion where petitioner allegedly resided and
where the crime of robbery was allegedly committed. As
part-owners of the entire building and of the articles
allegedly stolen from the 10th floor of said building … the
very same properties that are involved between the same
parties in a pending estate proceeding, the respondents
cannot, as co-owners, be therefore charged with robbery.
The fact of co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as
they cannot steal properties which they claim to own.
 Hence, even if we are to assume that private
respondents took the said personal properties from the 10th
floor of the Fortune Wealth Mansion, they cannot be
charged with robbery because again, the taking was made
under a claim of ownership x x x57

Respondents should not be held liable for the alleged

unlawful act absent a felonious intent.1âwphi1 "Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. A crime is not committed if the
mind of the person performing the act complained of
is 58 innocent.

The Court adheres to the view that a preliminary

investigation serves not only the purposes of the State, but
more importantly, it is a significant part of freedom and fair
play which every individual is entitled to. It is thus the duty
of the prosecutor or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve
the accused of going through a trial once it is determined
that there is no sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of
probable cause to form a sufficient belief that the accused
has committed a crime. In this case, absent sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of
respondents for the crime of robbery, the filing of
information against respondents constitute grave abuse of
discretion.59

WHEREFORE,- premises considered, the petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION1âwphi1 ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ**
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Endnotes:

* Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Raffle dated
January 26,2012.
** Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1299 dated August 28, 2012.

1 OCP records, pp. 127-130.

2 Id. at 129.

3 Id. at 129.

4 Id.

5 Id. at 128

6 Id.

7 Id. at 127.

8 Id. at 103.

9 Id. at 102.

10 Id. at 100.

11 Id. at 100.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 99.

15 Id. 98.

16 Id. at 95.

17 Id.

18 Id. at 145-149.

19 Also referred to as William Yao in the records.

20 OCP records, p. 145.

21 Id.

22 Id. at 150-151.

23 Id. at 163.

24 Id. at 186.
25 Embodied in a Resolution dated September 24, 2003.
26
OCP records, p. 189.
27
Id. at 192.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 190.
30
Id. at 188-189.
31
Id. at 196-197.
32
Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 138-165.
33
OCP records, p. 156.
34
Rollo, pp. 147-148.
35 Id. at 148.

36
Id. at 149-150.
37
Id. at 151-152.
38 Id. at 152.

39 Id. at 153-154.

40 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and

Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 159-165.

41 Rollo, p. 165.

42 Id. at 163.

43 Id. at 164.

44 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza and Arturo

G. Tayag, concurring, id. at 51-57.

45 Rollo, p. 38.

46 RTC records, Vol. II, p. 000255.

47 See Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 164268, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 599.

48 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank), represented by Rosella A. Santiago v. Antonino O.

Tobias III, G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012.

49 Id.

50 OCP records, p. 156.

51 Bernal v. Court of Appeals, 247-A Phil. 92, 97 (1988).

52 De Guzman v. People, G.R. No. 166502, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 452, 457.

53 Id. at 457.

54 Bernal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 51; United States v. Manluco, 28 Phil. 360, 361 (1914).

55 Bernal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 51. at 98.

56 United States v. Manluco, supra note 51, 361.

57 Rollo, pp. 162-163.

58 De Guzman v. People, supra note 52, at 458.

59 Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Mendoza, 494 Phil. 391, 416 (2005).
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200922 July 18, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs. CESAR CONCEPCION y BULANIO, Appellant,

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a criminal case filed against the accused Cesar

Concepcion y Bulanio (Concepcion) for the crime of
robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2004, in Quezon

City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating with his co-accused ROSENDO
OGARDO, JR. Y VILI.H1AS, with intent to gain, by means
of !(nee, violence and intimidation of person, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one
JENNIFER ACAMPADO Y QUIMPO, in the following
manner, to wit: While complainant was walking along
Panay Avenue corner Timog Avenue, Barangay Paligsahan,
this Cit), accused suddenly appeared from behind riding in a
Suzuki motorcycle with Plate no. RCi-7037 and forcibly
took, robbed and carried away con1plainant 's shoulder bag
containing wrist watch, earring, brochure, bracelet and
wallet all valued at P3,000.00, Philippiine Currency, and
that on the occasion of the said robbery, accused ROSENDO
OGARDO, JR. Y VILLEGAS died due to vehicular accident;
to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in
the aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law.1

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81,

in its Decision dated 1 August 2006 (RTC Decision),2found
Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all accessory penalties
provided by law, and to reimburse private complainant
Jennifer Q. Acampado (Acampado) the amount of ₱ 3,000
representing the cash, jewelry and other personal items
taken from her. On appeal, the Fourth Division of the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

Prosecution’s Version of Facts

The RTC Decision provided the prosecution’s version of

facts, as supported by the records:

At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while private

complainant Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of
Mother Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at another street
which she could not remember and seemed to be deserted
at that time, a male person riding at the back of the driver
of a motorcycle whom she later identified in open court as
accused Cesar Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag
with black strap which at that time, was placed on her left
shoulder. The black motorcycle with white covering at the
back side and with plate number which is not visible to the
eye, came from behind her. As the motorcycle sped away,
the accused even raised and waved the bag that he snatched
from Jennifer who was unable to do anything but just cry
and look at the snatcher so much so that she recognized
him in the process.

Meanwhile, while prosecution witness Joemar de Felipe was

driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity, he witnessed
the subject snatching incident. As the accused was waving
the bag at Jennifer, he blew his horn. Ogardo drove faster so
that de Felipe gave a chase and kept on blowing his horn.
Eventually, Ogardo lost control of the motorcycle and it
crashed in front of his taxi, sending its two occupants to the
pavement. De Felipe immediately alighted from the taxi
with the intention to arrest the snatchers. At that juncture,
some policemen from the Kamuning Police Station 10,
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, arrived. Seeing that the
snatchers were badly injured, the policemen brought them
to the East Avenue Medical Center, Quezon City where
Ogardo later expired.3

Defense’s Version of Facts

The RTC Decision likewise summarized the defense’s

version of facts, as follows:

For the defense, the accused testified. He denies

participation in the snatching incident and contends that at
around 11:00 a.m. of May 25, 2004, he and his companion,
Rosendo Ogardo, were riding in a motorcycle when
suddenly there was this chasing by another motorcycle. A
taxi bumped their motorcycles and Rosendo was thrown to
the gutter. Rosendo was severely injured. The police
brought them to the East Avenue Medical Center where
Rosendo died. Thereafter, he was brought to the police
station where a woman pointed to him as snatcher. A case
for robbery with homicide was filed against him on the
same day.4

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC declared Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused CESAR

CONCEPCION y BULANIO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
described and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 in relation to Article
61 of the RPC and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessory penalties
provided by law and to reimburse private complainant
Jennifer Acampado the amount of P3,000 representing the
cash, jewelry and other personal items taken from her.5

The RTC declared that all elements of the crime of robbery

were duly proven. The prosecution sufficiently established
the identity of Concepcion as the person who snatched
Acampado’s bag because Concepcion was positively
identified by the victim Acampado and Joemar de Felipe (de
Felipe), who both had no ill-motive to falsely testify against
Concepcion.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the conviction of Concepcion. The

dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 81 of the

RTC of Quezon City, dated August 1, 2006 is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.6

The CA declared that robbery with homicide was

committed. The CA held that, for as long as the homicide
resulted during, or because of, the robbery, even if the
killing was by mere accident, robbery with homicide was
committed. It is immaterial that death supervened by mere
accident or that the victim of homicide was a person other
than the victim of robbery or that two or more persons
were killed. What is essential is that there is a direct
relation or intimate connection between the robbery and
the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the
former or whether both crimes be committed at the same
time.7

The Issues

Concepcion, in his brief, raised the following issues:

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING

WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.8

Concepcion discussed the issues jointly, claiming that the

CA erred because: (a) it gave credence to the inconsistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the date
and manner of the commission of the crime; (b) even
assuming that he snatched Acampado’s shoulder bag,
Concepcion should be held liable for simple theft only; and
(c) the prosecution failed to establish that Ogardo’s death
was by reason or on the occasion of the alleged robbery.9

The Ruling of the Court

Inconsistent Testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses

Concepcion claims that Acampado and de Felipe, both

prosecution witnesses, made inconsistent testimonies. First,
de Felipe testified that the snatching incident happened on
26 May 2004, when the information states that the alleged
crime was committed on 25 May 2004.10 Second, Acampado
testified that Concepcion was on board the motorcycle,
sitting at the back of Ogardo, when Concepcion snatched
Acampado’s shoulder bag from behind. In contrast, de
Felipe testified that Concepcion alighted from the
motorcycle and forcibly took Acampado’s shoulder
bag.11 Lastly, de Felipe, on direct examination, claimed that
the motorcycle slid and Ogardo and Concepcion fell on the
street. On cross examination, however, de Felipe admitted
that his taxi bumped the motorcycle, causing Concepcion
and Ogardo to be thrown off the motorcycle.12

It is a general principle of law that factual findings of the

trial court are not disturbed on appeal unless the court a quo
is perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood or
misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight,
which, if properly considered, would have materially
affected the outcome of the case.13 We find no compelling
reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, in this case.

Robbery vs. Theft

On the second and third issues, Article 293 of the RPC

defines robbery as a crime committed by "any person who,
with intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything."
Robbery with homicide occurs when, by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have
been committed.14 In Article 249 of the RPC, any person
who shall kill another shall be deemed guilty of homicide.
Homicide, as used in robbery with homicide, is to be
understood in its generic sense to include parricide and
murder.15 The penalty for the crime of robbery with
homicide is reclusion perpetua to death.16

Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who,

with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the
personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.17 The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods is imposed upon persons
guilty of theft, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
P200 but does not exceed P6,000.18

By definition in the RPC, robbery can be committed in

three ways, by using: (a) violence against any person; (b)
intimidation of any person; and/or (c) force upon anything.
Robbery by use of force upon things is provided under
Articles 299 to 305 of the RPC.

The main issue is whether the snatching of the shoulder bag

in this case is robbery or theft. Did Concepcion employ
violence or intimidation upon persons, or force upon things,
when he snatched Acampado’s shoulder bag?

In People v. Dela Cruz,19 this Court found the accused guilty

of theft for snatching a basket containing jewelry, money
and clothing, and taking off with it, while the owners had
their backs turned.

In People v. Tapang,20 this Court affirmed the conviction of

the accused for frustrated theft because he stole a white
gold ring with diamond stones from the victim’s pocket,
which ring was immediately or subsequently recovered
from the accused at or about the same time it was stolen.

In People v. Omambong,21 the Court distinguished robbery

from theft. The Court held:
Had the appellant then run away, he would undoubtedly
have been guilty of theft only, because the asportation was
not effected against the owner’s will, but only without his
consent; although, of course, there was some sort of force
used by the appellant in taking the money away from the
owner.

xxxx

What the record does show is that when the offended party
made an attempt to regain his money, the appellant’s
companions used violence to prevent his succeeding.

xxxx

The crime committed is therefore robbery and not theft,

because personal violence was brought to bear upon the
offended party before he was definitely deprived of his
money.22

The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used

violence, intimidation or force in snatching Acampado’s
shoulder bag. Acampado herself merely testified that
Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which was hanging
on her left shoulder. Acampado did not say that Concepcion
used violence, intimidation or force in snatching her
shoulder bag. Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of
Acampado’s shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not
robbery. Concepcion’s crime of theft was aggravated by his
use of a motorcycle in committing the crime. Under Article
14(20) of the RPC, the use of a motor vehicle as a means of
committing a crime is a generic aggravating circumstance.
Thus, the maximum period of the penalty for the crime of
theft shall be imposed upon Concepcion due to the presence
of a generic aggravating circumstance and the absence of
any mitigating circumstance.

Based on the RTC Decision’s statement of facts which was

affirmed by the CA, Concepcion’s co-conspirator, Rosendo
Ogardo, Jr. y Villegas (Ogardo), who was driving the
motorcycle, died because he lost control of the motorcycle
and crashed in front of de Felipe’s taxi. Since Concepcion, as
passenger in the motorcycle, did not perform or execute any
act that caused the death of Ogardo, Concepcion cannot be
held liable for homicide.

Indeterminate Sentence Law

Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (The Indeterminate Sentence

Law) provides:

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by

the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense x x x

xxxx

This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses

punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those
convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of
piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to
those who having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to
those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not
exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as
provided in Section 5 hereof.

Since Concepcion is guilty of the crime of theft of property

valued at P3,000, the penalty shall be the maximum period
imposed by the RPC due to the presence of the generic
aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle in the
commission of the crime. The maximum penalty to be
imposed upon Concepcion is prision correccional in its
medium period. However, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum period of Concepcion’s penalty
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the offense, which is arresto
mayor in its maximum period. For this reason, we impose
upon Concepcion the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period, which is 6 months, to prision
correccional in its medium period, which is 4 years and 2
months.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 6 September 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
04200 affirming the judgment of conviction of robbery with
homicide of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81 of Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. 04-127163 dated 1 August 2006.
We find appellant Cesar Concepcion y Bulanio GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT with the
presence of a generic aggravating circumstance of use of
motor vehicle in the commission of the crime and impose
upon him the indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period, or 6 months, to prision correccional in its
medium period, or 4 years and 2 months.

We DIRECT the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to

implement this Decision and to report to this Court the
action taken within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Footnotes
1 CA rollo, p. 11.
2 Id. at 13-16.
3
Id. at 13-14.
4
Id. at 15.
5
Id. at 16.
6
Rollo, p. 11.
7
Id. at 10.
8
CA rollo, p. 41.
9
Id. at 41-44.
10 Id. at 41.

11
Id. at 42.
12
Id.
13 People v. Mendoza, 324 Phil. 273, 285 (1996); People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 187730, 29 June 2010, 622

SCRA 439, 460.

14
Revised Penal Code, Art. 294(1).
15 People v. Manalang, 252 Phil. 147, 163 (1989).

16 Revised Penal Code, Art. 294(1).

17 Revised Penal Code, Art. 308.

18 Revised Penal Code, Art. 309(3).

19 76 Phil. 601 (1946).

20 88 Phil. 721, 722 (1951).

21 34 O.G. 1853 (1936).

22 Id. at 1853-1854.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 188775 August 24, 2011

CENON R. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and DANILO R.BONGALON, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21

January 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City in
Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision2 found
petitioner Cenon R. Teves guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.

THE FACTS

On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized

between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves
(Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Metro Manila.3

After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She

would only come home to the Philippines for vacations.
While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her
husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita
Calderon (Edita). To verify the information, she went to the
National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the
Certificate of Marriage4 indicating that her husband and
Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 at the
Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan.

On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of

Thelma, filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint5 accusing petitioner of
committing bigamy.

Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy

defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in an Information6 which reads:

That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to

the present, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously
united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with
Thelma B. Jaime and without the said marriage having
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Edita
T. Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused
Cenon R. Teves to marry her and in concurrence thereof,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cooperate in the execution of the offense by marrying
Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the existence of the
marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.

During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy,

the Regional Trial Court , Branch 130, Caloocan City,
rendered a decision7 dated 4 May 2006 declaring the
marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the
ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of
a Certification of Finality8 issued on 27 June 2006.

On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed

decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is

hereby rendered finding the accused Cenon R. Teves, also
known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to the provisions
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.9

Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the

decision before the Court of Appeals contending that the
court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or
liability had already been extinguished. He also claimed
that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy
despite the defective Information filed by the prosecution.10

On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision,

the dispositive portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the
Decision dated August 15, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 2070-
M-2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.11

On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration of the decision.12 This however, was denied
by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July 2009.13

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was

declared null and void, "there is in effect no marriage at all,
and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of."14 He differentiates
a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null
and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a
judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second
marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need
not be judicially determined.

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court

in Mercado v. Tan15 is inapplicable in his case because in the
Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated
before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In
petitioner’s case, the first marriage had already been legally
dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA.

There is nothing in the law that would sustain petitioner’s
contention.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:

 The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.

The elements of this crime are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in

case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the

essential requisites for validity.16

The instant case has all the elements of the crime of

bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the
conviction of petitioner.

Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26

November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent
marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his
marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that
the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of his first
marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about
five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the
second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has
all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact
not disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.17

It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the

crime charged. His contention that he cannot be charged
with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled
once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.18

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil

Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the
Family Code of the Philippines took the position that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again.19

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute

nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse
who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of
his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.20

In numerous cases,21 this Court has consistently held

that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.

If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person

who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint
was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It
was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken
by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following
petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a complaint has
been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still
escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his
earlier marriage precedes the filing of the Information in
court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the
crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of
the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in court.
Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its
simple letter.
 Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from
that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only
for determining prescription.22 The crime of bigamy was
committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he
contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27
June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his
previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to
the date of the bigamous marriage.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is

DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21 January 2009 of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Per Special Order No. 1067 dated 23 August 2011.
** Per Special Order No. 1066 dated 23 August 2011.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato. Jr., and Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
(now a member of this Court) and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 75-86.
2 Records, pp. 156-162.

3
Id. at 13.
4
Id. at 11.
5 Id. at 6.

6
Id. at 2.
7
Id. at 82-90.
8 Id. at 91-92.

9 Id. at 162.

10 CA rollo, p. 25. Appellant’s Brief.

11 Id. at 85.

12 Id. at 89-99.

13 Id. at 114-115.

14 Rollo, p. 24

15 G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

16 Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004 423 SCRA, 272, 279 citing Reyes,

L.B., the Revised Penal Code, Book II, 14th Ed., 1998, p. 907.
17 CA rollo, p. 62.

18 Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572, 579.

19 Id. at 579-580.

20 Id. at 582, citing J.A.V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook of the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 46

(1988).
21 A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA 186, 198-199, Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S.

Salvador against Sps. Noel and Amelia Serafico citing Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, 6 February
2004, 422 SCRA 376; Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 194818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA
572; Terre v. Terre, A.C. No. 2349, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 7; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, No. L-53703, 19
August 1986, 143 SCRA 499; Vda. De Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, No. L-
28093, 30 January 1971, 37 SCRA 315; Gomez v. Lipana, No. L- 23214, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 614.
22 De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101630, 24 August 1992, 212 SCRA 823, 830.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the

identification of the perpetrator of the crime by an
eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the
perpetrator was reliable and positive enough to support the
conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).

Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing
of AAA,1 a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and
sentenced him to death in its decision dated August 19,
2002.2 The appeal of the conviction was brought
automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005,3 the Court
transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
intermediate review pursuant to the ruling in People v.
Mateo.4 On October 26, 2007,5 the CA, although affirming
the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua
and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before us in a
final bid to overturn his conviction.

Antecedents
The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with
rape with homicide perpetrated in the following manner:

That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan,

Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a
mentally retarded girl, against her will and consent; that on
the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the accused’s
criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon said AAA by mauling her, pulling her towards a
muddy water and submerging her underneath, which
caused the death of said AAA soon thereafter.

CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the

Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, otherwise
known as the "Heinous Crimes Law".6

At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded

not guilty to the charge.

The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around

11:00 am in the river located in Barangay Tiacongan,
Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the immediate cause of
her death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to
smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad
Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when
she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for mercy:
Please stop noy, it is painful noy!;8 that the cries came from
an area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for
Amegable to see what was going on; that Amegable
subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon
ended the girl’s cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get
a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a
cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from
there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the
number "11" mark, who dragged a girl’s limp body into the
river, where he submerged the girl into the knee-high
muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted
the limp body and tossed it to deeper water; that he next
jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole
time, Amegable could not have a look at his face because he
always had his back turned towards her;9 that she
nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose
physical features she was familiar with due to having seen
him pass by their barangay several times prior to the
incident;10 that after the man fled the crime scene,
Amegable went straight to her house and told her husband
what she had witnessed; and that her husband instantly
reported the incident to the barangay chairman.

It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in

an affidavit11 that upon his station receiving the incident
report on AAA’s death at about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he
and two other officers proceeded to the crime scene to
investigate; that he interviewed Amegable who identified
the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants);
that based on such information, he traced Caliso as AAA’s
killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial admission of the
killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit
remained worthless because the Prosecution did not present
SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.

Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente,

Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested that on the occasion of
Caliso’s arrest and his custodial interrogation, he heard
Caliso admit to the investigating police officer the
ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime
scene; that the admission was the reason why SPO3
Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the curious
onlookers that had gathered in the area; that Amegable,
who saw SPO3 Pancipanci’s arrest of Caliso at the crime
scene, surmised that Caliso had gone home and returned to
the crime scene thereafter.12

Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla

conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of
AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the following injuries, to
wit:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily

soiled old sleeveless shirt and garter skirts.

2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both
nostrils and mouth was filled with mud.
3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in
appearance.

4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).

5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck

area.

6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter

epigastric area of abdomen.

7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).

8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the

inferior angle of both scapula extending downwards.

9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear

with the garter vertically oriented to the right stained with
moderate amount of yellowish fecal material.

10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with

labia majora contracted and retracted.

11. There’s no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood

hematoma formation in the vulva. There were old healed
hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 o’clock position.

12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body

recovered (sic).

13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest

diameter anterior surface middle 3rd left thigh.

14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size

medial aspect left knee.13
Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on
the body of Caliso and summed up his findings thusly:

P.E. FINDINGS:

1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear

erythematus contusion left side of neck (Post ▲).

2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch

mark) from the left midclavicular line extending to the left
anterioraxillary line.

3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in

average size dorsal surface (probably a scratch mark) middle
3rd left arm.

4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.

5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a

scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in average size lateral boarder of
scapula extending to left posterior axillary line.

6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion

(probably a scratch mark) 14x022 cm. and 5x0.2 cm. in size
respectively at the upper left flank of the lower back
extending downward to the midline.

7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to

each other with an average 5 cm left flank area.14

In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed

an alibi, insisting that on the day of the killing, he plowed
the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.
Yangyang corroborated Caliso’s alibi, recalling that Caliso
had plowed his rice field from 8 am to 4 pm of June 5, 1997.
He further recalled that Caliso was in his farm around 12:00
noon because he brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded,
however, that he was not aware where Caliso was at the
time of the killing.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19,

2002, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,

accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby sentenced to death and
to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs the
amount of ₱50, 000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.15

The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the
killing of AAA because the old-healed hymenal lacerations
of AAA and the fact that the victim’s underwear had been
irregularly placed could not establish the commission of
carnal knowledge; that the examining physician also found
no physical signs of rape on the body of AAA; and that as to
the killing of AAA, the identification by Amegable that the
man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was
no other than Caliso himself was reliable.

Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the

testimony of Bering on Caliso’s extrajudicial admission of
the ownership of the short pants because the pants were not
presented as evidence and because the police officers
involved did not testify about the pants in court.16 The RTC
cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength to raise the crime from homicide to murder,
regarding the word homicide in the information to be used
in its generic sense as to include all types of killing.

Ruling of the CA

On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in

the brief for the accused-appellant,17 namely:

i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-

appellant of the crime of murder despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and

credence to the incredible and inconsistent testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.

iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the

qualifying aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength and the generic aggravating circumstance
of disregard of sex[; and]

iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death

penalty.

As stated, the CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder

based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered.
The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of
Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the
commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she made a
positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the
killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when
the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that
Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at
the time that AAA’s body had been submerged in the water;
that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and
straightforward and worthy of credence; that no reason
existed why Amegable would falsely testify against Caliso;
that Caliso did not prove the physical impossibility for him
to be at the crime scene or at its immediate vicinity at the
time of the incident, for both Barangay San Vicente, where
AAA’s body was found, and Barangay Tiacongan, where the
rice field of Yangyang was located, were contiguous; that
the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength
qualified the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of sex
should not have been appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance due to its not being alleged in the information
and its not being proven during trial; and that the death
penalty could not be imposed because of the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its imposition in the
Philippines.

The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court

dated August 19, 2002, finding appellant guilty of Murder,
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant Delfin Caliso is sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
and is directed to pay the victim’s heirs the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages, as well as the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by
the trial court.

SO ORDERED.18

Issue

The primordial issue is whether Amegable’s identification

of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July 5, 1997
was positive and reliable.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender,

like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution
is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be
established, there can be no conviction without proof of
identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.19

The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the

reliability of his identification as the culprit by Amegable in
the following manner:20

As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the

testimony of Soledad Amegable was replete with
discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that Soledad
failed to see the assailant’s face. Moreover, considering the
distance between where Soledad was supposedly hiding and
where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was
inconceivable for her to have heard and seen the incident.
According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even
remember if at that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or
a coconut tree.

At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was

at its brightest. Soledad could very well recognize appellant.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that it was his back
that was facing her, she asserted being familiar with the
physical features of appellant, considering that he
frequented their barangay. Even during her cross-
examination by the defense counsel, Soledad remained
steadfast in categorically stating that she recognized
appellant:

Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination

that you saw Delfin Caliso, the accused in this case, several
times passed by your barangay, am I correct?

A: Several times.

Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?

A: No, sir.

Q: Are you acquainted with him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Even if he is in his back position?

A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)

Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even
probable that Soledad caught glimpses of the profile of the
appellant at the time of the incident. She related, in
addition, that when the victim was being submerged in the
water, there was no object obstructing her view.

The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between

Soledad Amegable’s declaration in court and her affidavit,
such as the tree or plant from where she was hiding behind
at the time of the incident, are insignificant and cannot
negate appellant’s criminal liability. Her whole attention
was riveted to the incident that was unfolding before her.
Besides, any such inconsistencies are minor. Slight
contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony
and could even serve to strengthen the witness’ credibility.
A witness who is telling the truth is not always expected to
give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory.

In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to

support a conviction, so long as such testimony is found to
be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the
trial court. Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no
reason to testify falsely against appellant.

Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is

a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and
to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude.lawphi1 Findings of the trial court on such matters
are binding and conclusive on the appellate court.

Contrary to the CA’s holding that the identification of

Caliso based on Amegable’s recognition of him was reliable,
the Court considers the identification not reliable and
beyond doubt as to meet the requirement of moral
certainty.

When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive

and reliable enough for establishing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and

sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct
evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will
be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses.
Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally
confirm the identification and overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus,
the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification in People v. Gallarde,21 to wit: (a) that by
direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial
evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the
victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court
said:

xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of

identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the
very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or
accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the crime as
an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may,
however, be instances where, although a witness may not
have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he
may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as
the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is
the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the
crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when
taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable
conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual
eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly
positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of
others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an
eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can
be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively
identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because
it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to
circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove
identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence,
then felons would go free and the community would be
denied proper protection.22

Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because

she had seen him pass by in her barangay several times
prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was
obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso.
As matters stand, therefore, Caliso’s conviction hangs by a
single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegable’s
identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But
that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere
scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral
certainty is required in establishing the identity of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification
of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable
reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be
positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral
certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to
skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such
distinctiveness, the identification evidence should
encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like
the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks
or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other
physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of
humanity.

A witness’ familiarity with the accused, although accepted

as basis for a positive identification, does not always pass the
test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.
No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have
been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back
for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough
to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the
perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable
circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer. Her
identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of
exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her
being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other
individuals in the community where the crime was
committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso’s
back. Moreover, many factors could have influenced her
perception, including her lack of keenness of observation,
her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to
suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency
to assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the
records; hence, the trial court and the CA could not have
taken them into consideration. But the influence of such
varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for
granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the
members of the same family, whose familiarity with one
another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify
one another through a sheer view of another’s back.
Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a
reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force.23

Amegable’s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short

pants bearing the number "11" did not enhance the
reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants
were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they
were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been
admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could
have been linked to Caliso without proof of his ownership
or possession of them in the moments before the crime was
perpetrated.

Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of
Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso guarantee the
reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The
dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the
possibility of any human error in Amegable’s identification
of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive
irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere person
could easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons
involved in startling occurrences such as the crime
committed against AAA. It is neither fair nor judicious,
therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the
part of Amegable raise her identification to the level of
moral certainty.

The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr.

Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical certificate dated
June 9, 1997,24 did not support the culpability of Caliso. The
injuries, which were mostly mere scratch marks,25 were not
even linked by the examining physician to the crime
charged. Inasmuch as the injuries of Caliso might also have
been due to other causes, including one related to his doing
menial labor most of the time, their significance as evidence
of guilt is nil.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the

identity of the culprit, the accused’s constitutional right to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal,26 though his
innocence may be doubted.27 The constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is
of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but
on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.28

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26,

2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of
evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is
ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa

City is directed to forthwith release Delfin Caliso from
confinement, unless there is another lawful cause
warranting his further detention.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
The real name of the victim and her immediate family are withheld per R.A. No. 7610 and R.A.
No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) and its implementing
rules. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
2
Records, pp, 174-191.
3 CA rollo, p. 122.

4
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004,433 SCRA 640.
5
CA rollo, pp. 125-133; penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, with Associate Justice
TeresitaDy-Liacco Flores (retired) and Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim concurring.
6 Records, p. 1.

7 Id., p. 25.

8 TSN, July 8, 1998, p. 4.

9 TSN, September 2, 1998, p. 11.

10 Id, p. 3.

11 Records, p. 3.

12 TSN, September 2, 1998, p. 12.

13 Records, p. 73.

14 Id., p. 74.

15 Id., p. 191.

16 Id., p. 186.

17 CA rollo, pp. 54-68.

18 Id., p. 133.

19 People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478; People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos.

102981-82, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 578; Tuason v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113779-80,
February 23, 1995, 241 SCRA 695.
20 CA rollo, pp. 129-130.

21 G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000, 325 SCRA 835.

22 Id., at pp. 849-850; bold emphasis supplied.

23 People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000; 328 SCRA 185; Natividad v. Court of Appeals,

98 SCRA 335, 346 [1980]; People v. Beltran, L-31860, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 246, 250; People
v. Manambit, G.R. No. 1274445, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 344, 377; People v. Maongco, G.R. No.
108963-65, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 562, 575.
24 Records, p. 74.

25 TSN, June 16, 1999, pp. 11.

26 See Natividad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40233, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346.

27 Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, September 27, 1996, 262 SCRA 518, 533, Perez v.

Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 76203-04, December 6, 1989, 180 SCRA 9; People v. Sadie, No. L-66907,
April 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 240; U.S. v. Gutierrez, No. 1877, 4 Phil. 493 April 29, [1905].
28 People v. Pidia, G.R. No. 112264, November 10, 1995, 249 SCRA 687, 702.