Republic of the Philippines Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of
SUPREME COURT the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case
No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in
Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per
month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action
since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after
hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed
the complaint.
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff
appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived
child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support
from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is
deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said
child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet
unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code,
and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of
a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such
child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children
may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator,
the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article"
(i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
1
become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th
Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points
this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en
el sentido tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30,
no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de
antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1
Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married
man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying,
plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the
complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to
this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a
medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted
2
his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to
get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated
their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of
the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his
Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless
and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into
court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-
Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon,
to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of
Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan
City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high
school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to
marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
3
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding
that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner
did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is
a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not
have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of
the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by
the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and
she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987,
on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to
"E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during
the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought
he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their
daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with
plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he
even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine
to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do
so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City.
Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry
plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties
at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors
for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It
is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and
certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court
that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must
have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would
not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so
(sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and
"E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a
4
nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate.
Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p.
50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother
who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have
left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go
to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind
of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must
indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites
Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where
defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the
reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had
accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that
he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to
marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust
on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and
to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women,
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art.
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages
and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in
its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March
1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public
policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic
and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry,
the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly
allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof,
the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As
to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that
even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the
private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent
and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view
of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due
5
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil
down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in
this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as
to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and
having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the
result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the
function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court
took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan,
142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New
Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is
set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code,
from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in
the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
6
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family
have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would
have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness
or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a
civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine
legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New
Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to
be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite
spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion,
and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind
it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust
but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission
in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a
breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:
7
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied
because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S.
vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species
of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire
of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female
sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had
she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and
wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to
fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
8
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses
for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when
the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be
the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient
to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would
deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act
and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect
that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private
respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code
and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent
cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in
their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a
mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988)
in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp.
51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise
to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault;
in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could
be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of
the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where
9
his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides
is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or
intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it
not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in
letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of
morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed
by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration
and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only
create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in
default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner,
and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment
and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved
to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
10
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the
following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution
on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility
of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court
had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had
failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of
July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956.
This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid
petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955
in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no
answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating
facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated:
"That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his
failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event
and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating
mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun
Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800,
December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set
aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the
clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30,
1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court
as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33)
of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the
same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had
no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts
that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is
that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil
Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for
a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1).
Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-
to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion
were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two
days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a
note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only
11
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite Republic of the Philippines
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which SUPREME COURT
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 Manila
aforesaid.
THIRD DIVISION
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What G.R. No. 163794 November 28, 2008
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Romeo T. Acosta
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally
(formerly Jose D. Malvas), Director of Forest Management Bureau,
eliminated.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,petitioners,
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral vs.
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. HON. NORMELITO J. BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge, Branch 41,
As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be Regional Trial Court, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro and DANILO
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the REYES, respondents.
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
DECISION
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit
as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly NACHURA, J.:
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
award.
Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated June 4, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52261, which
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower affirmed the Joint Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pinamalayan,
court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs. Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, dated December 28, 1998.

The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Sometime in 1970, [private respondent Danilo] Reyes bought the subject

182,941-square-meter land at Bgy. Banus, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro
[subject land] from one Regina Castillo (or Castillo) in whose name it was titled
under Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-2388 issued pursuant to Free
Patent No. V-79606. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements
and planted the land with fruit trees, including about a thousand mango[es],
more than a hundred Mandarin citrus, and more than a hundred guyabanos.
He also had the title transferred in his name and was issued TCT No. 45232.

Reyes so prized this land which he bought in good faith. Unfortunately, it

turned out that about 162,500 square meters of this land is part of the
12
timberland of Oriental Mindoro and, therefore, cannot be subject to any
disposition or acquisition under any existing law, and is not registrable.
Thus, in the Complaint (Annex "A", pp. 15 to 21, rollo) for "Cancellation of Title
and/or Reversion" filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (or OSG) in behalf
of the Republic [petitioner], as represented by the Bureau of Forest
Development (or BFD), it was explained that the source[,] Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. P-2388 of Castillo, issued pursuant to Free Patent No.
V-79606, is spurious, fictitious and irregularly issued on account of:
a) ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (162,500)
SQUARE METERS, more or less, of the land covered by OCT No. P-2388
was, at the time it was applied for patent and or titling, a part of the timberland
of Oriental Mindoro, per BFD Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 and 1715.
Copy of said maps are attached hereto as Annexes "B" and "C";
b) The 162,500 square meters covered by OCT No. P-2388 are entirely inside
the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of
Atty. Augusto D. Marte4 [Atty. Marte], copy of the Map of AFFLA No. 175 and
AFFLA No. 175 are attached hereto as Annexes "D" and "E";
c) Neither the private defendant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property because the rightful occupant is Atty. Augusto D.
Marte by virtue of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement [AFFLA] No. 175,
issued to him by the Ministry of Natural Resources in 1986 to expire on
December 21, 2011;
d) Since the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 45232, in the name of
defendant Danilo Reyes, is a part of the timberland of Oriental Mindoro, per
BFD Land Classification Map Nos. 2319 & 1715, the same cannot be the
subject of any disposition or acquisition under any existing law (Li Hong Giap
vs. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Veno vs. Gov't of P.I. 41 Phil. 161; Director
of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5). (pp. 18 to 19, rollo)
Aside from the documentary evidence presented to support these allegations,
the Republic presented as well and called to the witness stand:
a) Armando Cruz, the supervising cartographer of the DENR, who explained
that based on Land Classification Map No. 1715 (Exh. "A") which was later
amended to LC Map No. 2319 (Exh. "B"), the plotting shows that the 162,000
square meters covered by OCT No. 2388 are entirely inside the 140 hectares
of the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Marte
and the alienable and disposable area of Castillo's land is only around two (2)
hectares;
b) Alberto Cardiño, an employee of the DENR who conducted the survey on
the land under litigation, corroborated the testimony of Cruz that only two
hectares is alienable and disposable land; and
c) Vicente Mendoza, a Geodetic Engineer, who expounded on the procedure
before the title could be issued to an applicant for a disposable and alienable
public land. He clarified that he did not make the survey for Castillo but upon
presentation to him of the carpeta in open court he noticed that, while it
appears to be valid, it however has no certification of the Bureau of Forestry -
an essential requirement before title could be issued.
For his side, Reyes presented evidence showing his extensive development of
and investment in the land, but however failed to traverse squarely the issue
raised by the Republic against the inalienability and indisposability of his
acquired land. His lame argument that the absence of the Certification by the
Bureau of Forestry on his carpeta does not necessarily mean that there was
none issued, failed to convince the court a quo.
Hence, Judge Edilberto Ramos, the then Presiding Judge of Branch 41 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, held5 that:
The defendants in this case did not assail the evidence of the plaintiff but
concentrated itself to the expenses incurred in the cultivation and in the
planting of trees in that disputed areas. Aside thereto, the plaintiff cited that it is
elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration
their inclusion in a certification of ownership or confer title on the registrant.
(Republic of the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Judge Jaime de los Angeles of the
Court of First Instance of Balayan, Batangas, et al., G.R. No. L-30240) It is
also a matter of principle that public forest [are non-alienable public lands.
Accession of public forests] on the part of the claimant, however long, cannot
convert the same into private property. (Vano v. Government of PI, 41 Phils.
161)
13
In view thereof, it appears that the preponderance of evidence is in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants and therefore it is hereby
declared that Free Patent No. V-79606 issued on July 22, 1957 with Psu
No. 155088 and OCT No. P-2388 in the name of Regina Castillo and its
derivative TCT No. 45232 in the name of Danilo Reyes is hereby declared
null and void; and the defendant Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered to
surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 45232 and to vacate the
premises and directing the defendant Register of Deeds of Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, to cancel the title as null and void ab initio; and
declaring the reversion of the land in question to the government subject
to the Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175, to form part of the
public domain in the province of Oriental Mindoro.
The two-hectare lot, which appears disposable and alienable, is declared
null and void for failure to secure certification from the Bureau of Forest
Development.
The counter-claim of the defendant is hereby denied for lack of merit,
with cost against the defendant.6
Reyes appealed the aforementioned RTC Decision to the CA. In its
Decision7 dated September 16, 1996, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. His
motion for reconsideration was denied.8
Thus, Reyes sought relief from this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
But in our Resolution9dated June 23, 1997, we resolved to deny his petition for
failure to sufficiently show that the CA had committed any reversible error in
the questioned judgment. On November 24, 1997, this Court denied with
finality Reyes' motion for reconsideration.10
On February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion11 to Remove Improvements
Introduced by Defendant Danilo D. Reyes on the Property which is the Subject
of Execution in Accordance with Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (motion).12 There he averred that: he occupied
in good faith the subject land for around thirty years; he had already spent
millions of pesos in planting fruit-bearing trees thereon; and he employed many
workers who regularly took care of the trees and other plants. Reyes prayed
that he and/or his agents be given at least one (1) year from the issuance of
the corresponding order to remove his mango, citrus and guyabano trees, and
that they be allowed to stay in the premises within that period to work on the
cutting and removal of the said trees. He also asked the RTC that in the
meantime that these trees are not yet removed, all the unharvested fruits be
appropriated by him, as provided for by law, to the exclusion of all other
persons who may take advantage of the situation and harvest said fruits.
Petitioner opposed the motion, citing the principle of accession under Article
44013 of the Civil Code. It further argued that the subject land, being timber
land, is property of public dominion and, therefore, outside the commerce of
man and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of any contract.
This being the case, there are no improvements to speak of, because the land
in question never ceased to be a property of the Republic, even if Reyes
claimed that he was a purchaser for value and in good faith and was in
possession for more than thirty (30) years. Moreover, petitioner averred that,
assuming Reyes was initially a planter/sower in good faith, Article 448 of the
Civil Code cannot be of absolute application since from the time the reversion
case was filed by the petitioner on May 13, 1987, Reyes ceased to be a
planter/sower in good faith and had become a planter/sower in bad faith.14
Meanwhile, on March 2, 1998, Atty. Marte filed a Complaint for Injunction With
an Ancillary Prayer for the Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order against Reyes for allegedly encroaching upon and taking possession by
stealth, fraud and strategy some 16 hectares of his leased area without his
permission or acquiescence and planted trees thereon in bad faith despite the
fact that the area is non-disposable and part of the public domain, among
others.
But the respondent RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed Joint
Order and ruled in favor of Reyes, finding Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d)
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable. The RTC ratiocinated:
Under the circumstance, it is but just and fair and equitable that Danilo Reyes
be given the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of his labor on the land which he
honestly believes was legally his. He was not aware that his certificate of title
which was derived from OCT No. P-2388 issued in 1957 by the government
itself in the name of Regina Castillo contained legal infirmity, otherwise he
would not have expoused (sic) himself from the risk of being ejected from the
14
land and losing all improvements thereon. Any way, if the court will grant the
motion for the defendant's (sic) Danilo Reyes to remove his improvements on
the disputed property, it will not prejudice Augusto Marte, otherwise, as the
court sees it, he will immensely [benefit] from the toils of Danilo Reyes.
and then disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion to remove improvements filed
by defendant Danilo Reyes dated January 28, 1998 is hereby GRANTED
pursuant to the provisions of section 10, paragraph (d) of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure and he is given a period of one (1) year from the
issuance of this ORDER to remove, cut and appropriate the fruit-bearing trees
which he had planted in the property in disputes (sic).
The COMMENT filed by the Office of the Solicitor General dated August 11,
1998 is hereby denied for lack of merit.
The [C]omplaint for Injunction filed by Augusto D. Marte on March 2, 1998
against Danilo Reyes is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed its Motion for Reconsideration15 which was
denied by the RTC.16Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA via Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure17ascribing to the RTC grave abuse of
discretion and acting without jurisdiction in granting Reyes' motion to remove
improvements.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, and affirmed the ruling of
the RTC, in this wise:
It is notable that in the course of the suit for "Cancellation of Title and/or
Reversion" there was not an iota of evidence presented on record that Reyes
was in bad faith in acquiring the land nor in planting thereon perennial plants.
So it could never be said and held that he was a planter/sower in bad faith.
Thus, this Court holds that Reyes sowed and planted in good faith, and that
being so the appropriate provisions on right accession are Articles 445 and
448 also of the Civil Code.18
Hence, this Petition based on the sole ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT HOLDING THAT THE MOTION TO REMOVE
IMPROVEMENTS FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS BUT AN INCIDENT
OF THE REVERSION CASE OVER WHICH THE TRIAL COURT STILL HAS
JURISDICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DECISION IN THE
REVERSION CASE HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.19
The OSG posits that Reyes' assailed motion is barred by prior judgment under
Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because said motion
merely sprang from the civil case of reversion tried and decided on the merits
by the RTC, and the decision is already final, after it was duly affirmed by the
CA and by this Court. The OSG stresses that one of Reyes' assigned errors in
the reversion case before the CA was that the RTC "erred in not granting his
(Reyes') counterclaims as well as his claims for improvements." The OSG
claims that such assigned error was duly resolved by the CA when it held, to
wit:
The non-award of appellant's "counterclaims" is understandable.
To begin with, no evidence whatsoever was presented by the appellant to
sustain his plea for damages. In fact, appellant never testified to prove his
allegations as regards his counterclaims.
Then, too, there is no showing that appellant paid the docket fees for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over his purported counterclaims (Metal Engineering
Resources Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 273).
Lastly, the allegations made in the Answer in support of the so-called
"counterclaims" clearly negate the nature of the claims as compulsory
counterclaim like that of reimbursement of the useful expenses (Cabangis vs.
Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 414).20
Thus, the OSG posits that the issue of the improvements cannot be made the
subject of the assailed motion on the pretext that such removal of
improvements is merely incidental to the reversion case. The OSG submits
that the consideration of the issue is now barred by res judicata. Lastly, the
OSG argues that: the RTC and CA cannot vary a decision which has already
attained finality; for purposes of execution, what is controlling is the dispositive
portion of the decision; the RTC, except to order the execution of a decision
15
which had attained finality, had long lost jurisdiction over the case; and the
RTC erred and acted without jurisdiction when it granted Reyes' motion to
remove the improvements when the dispositive portion of the decision in the
reversion case did not provide for the removal of the same.21
In his Comment22 on the OSG petition, Reyes avers that the points raised by
the OSG are merely rehashed arguments which were adequately passed upon
by the CA. He fully agrees with the ruling of the CA that: he is a planter/sower
in good faith, as such, Articles 445 and 448 of the New Civil Code are
applicable; his motion is not entirely a new case, but merely an incident to the
reversion case, a consequence of its grant and a legal solution to an important
issue overlooked, if not ignored by the State and by the courts in their
decisions in the reversion case; under Section 10, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, he is allowed to remove the improvements; and the instant
Petition failed to abide with the proper manner as to the "proof of service"
required under Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Most
importantly, Reyes avers that the land on which about 1,000 mango trees, 100
mandarin citrus trees and 100 guyabano trees are planted, was leased by the
government to Atty. Marte, who entered into the possession of the subject land
when the trees were already bearing fruits. Thus, if said trees are not removed,
Atty. Marte would be unduly enriched as the beneficiary of these fruits without
even spending a single centavo, at the expense of Reyes. Reyes posits that it
is a well-established fact, unrebutted by the petitioner, that he planted these
trees and to deny him the right to remove them would constitute a grave
injustice and amount to confiscation without just compensation which is
violative of the Constitution.
The OSG counters that copies of the instant Petition were properly served as
shown by the photocopies of the registry return cards. Moreover, the OSG
avers that granting, without admitting, that another person would stand to be
benefited by the improvements that Reyes introduced on the land is beside the
point and is not the fault of the petitioner because the particular issue of the
improvements was already resolved with finality in the reversion case. The
OSG claims that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders
of a superior court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts
and nullify the essence of review - a final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding
on the whole world.23
The instant Petition lacks merit.
In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land.24 Indeed, the ownership over the
subject land reverted to the State by virtue of the decisions of the
RTC and CA and our Resolution on the matter. But these decisions simply
ordered the reversion of the property to the State, and did not consider the
improvements that Reyes had introduced on the property or provide him with
any remedy relative thereto. Thus, Reyes was left out in the cold, faced with
the prospect of losing not only the land which he thought he owned, but also of
forfeiting the improvements that he painstakingly built with his effort, time and
money.
We cannot agree with the OSG that the denial by the CA of Reyes'
counterclaim in the reversion case had the effect of completely foreclosing
whatever rights Reyes may have over these improvements. We note that the
counterclaim was denied because Reyes failed to prove that it was in the
nature of a compulsory counterclaim, and he did not pay docket fees thereon,
even as the CA found that Reyes "never testified to prove his allegations as
regards his counterclaims." Yet, the records of the reversion case reveal that
Reyes adduced ample evidence of the extent of the improvements he
introduced and the expenses he incurred therefor. This is reflected in the
findings of the CA in the case at bench, and we concur with the appellate court
when it said:
But this Court notes that while Reyes was half-hearted in his opposition to the
reversion, he instead focused on proving the improvements he has introduced
on the land, its extent and his expenses. Despite these proofs, the Decision of
April 13, 1992 made no mention nor provision for the improvements on the
land. With this legal vacuum, Reyes could not exercise the options allowed the
sower and planter in good faith. This thus left him no other alternative but to
avail of Paragraph (d) of Section 10 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in order to collect or get a return of his investment as allowed to a
sower and planter in good faith by the Civil Code.
Correlatively, the courts in the reversion case overlooked the issue of whether
Reyes, vis-à-vis his improvements, is a builder or planter in good faith. In the
16
instant case, the issue assumes full significance, because Articles 44825 and
54626 of the Civil Code grant the builder or planter in good faith full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made. A builder or planter in good faith is one who builds or
plants on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof, unaware of any flaw
in his title to the land at the time he builds or plants on it. 27
On this issue, we are disposed to agree with the CA that Reyes was a planter
in good faith. Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the subject
land; in fact, a TCT over the property was issued in his name. He tilled the
land, planted fruit trees thereon, and invested money from 1970. He received
notice of the Republic's claim only when the reversion case was filed on May
13, 1987. The trees are now full-grown and fruit-bearing.
To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of
the State -- because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land
is part of inalienable forest land and belongs to the State is already final and
immutable -- would inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the State at the
expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.
Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.28 This basic doctrine on
unjust enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or
enrich himself inequitably at another's expense.29 There is unjust enrichment
when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles
of justice, equity and good conscience.30 Article 22 of the Civil Code states the
rule in this wise:
ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense
of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant
case. There is enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State would
come into possession of -- and may technically appropriate -- the more than
one thousand fruit-bearing trees planted by the private respondent. There is
impoverishment on the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the
improvements he had painstakingly planted and invested in. There is lack of
valid cause for the State to acquire these improvements, because, as
discussed above, Reyes introduced the improvements in good faith. Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not commit any error in ruling that Reyes is entitled to the
benefits of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Thus, even if we accept the OSG's submission that Reyes' entitlement to these
benefits is not absolute because he can no longer claim good faith after the
filing of the reversion case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying that prior to that
― all the way back to 1970 ― he had possessed the land and introduced
improvements thereon in good faith. At the very least, then, Reyes is entitled to
these benefits for the 17 years that he had been a planter in good faith.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the subject land is currently covered
by Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 issued by the
Ministry of (now Department of Environment and) Natural Resources in favor
of Atty. Augusto D. Marte, which will expire on December 21, 2011. By the
terms of the AFFLA, the lessee shall, among others, do all in his power to
suppress fires, cooperate with the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) in the
protection and conservation of the forest growth in the area and undertake all
possible measures to insure the protection of watershed and environmental
values within the leased area and areas adjacent thereto. This obligation to
prevent any damage to the land subject of the lease is consonant with
fundamental principles and state policies set forth in Section 16,31 Article II and
Section 4,32 Article XII of the Constitution.
To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject
land, even if he is legally entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage
to the land. It would negate the policy consideration underlying the AFFLA -- to
protect and preserve the biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any
damage to the land. Further, it would violate the implicit mandate of Article 547
of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the
principal thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them unless the
person who recovers the possession exercises the option under paragraph 2
of the preceding article.
17
In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code have been restricted. It is no longer feasible to permit him to
remove the trees he planted. The only equitable alternative would be to order
the Republic to pay Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the
property. This is only fair because, after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon
the expiration of the lease or upon its cancellation if there be any violation or
breach of its terms, all permanent improvements on the land shall pass to the
ownership of the Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify the
lessee.
However, the AFFLA is not due to expire until December 21, 2011. In the
interim, it is logical to assume that the lessee, Atty. Augusto D. Marte, will
derive financial gain from the fruits that the trees planted by Reyes would yield.
In fact, Atty. Marte may already have profited therefrom in the past several
years. It is, therefore, reasonable to grant the Republic the right of subrogation
against the lessee who may have benefited from the improvements. The
Republic may, thus, demand reimbursement from Atty. Marte for whatever
amount it will have to pay Reyes for these improvements.
As to the OSG's insistent invocation of res judicata and the immutability of final
judgments, our ruling in Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees Union
(TSIEU)-FFW, et al. v. Federation of Free Workers (FFW), et al.33 is
instructive:
It is axiomatic that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court in the land. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be
struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is
not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as
courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been
conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of a final judgment are: (1)
the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity,34 we rule in
favor of Reyes pro hac vice. We reiterate that this Court is not precluded from
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for
technicality.35Indubitably, to order the reversion of the subject land without
payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard of the rights of Reyes
over the improvements which he, in good faith, introduced therein, would not
only be unjust and inequitable but cruel as well.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4,
2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:
1) The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 41, is
hereby DIRECTED to determine the actual improvements introduced on the
subject land, their current value and the amount of the expenses actually spent
by private respondent Danilo Reyes for the said improvements thereon from
1970 until May 13, 1987 with utmost dispatch.
2) The Republic, through the Bureau of Forest Development of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, is DIRECTED to pay private
respondent Danilo Reyes the value of such actual improvements he introduced
on the subject land as determined by the Regional Trial Court, with the right of
subrogation against Atty. Augusto D. Marte, the lessee in Agro-Forestry Farm
Lease Agreement No. 175.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
18

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE,
ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO
CATIBOG, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the
Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter
Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of
the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she
engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida)
who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village, Quezon City1 reading: "Send
check money Mommy hospital." For RCPI’s services, Grace paid P10.502 for
which she was issued a receipt.3
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no
response was received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru
JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, along with her husband
Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at
Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.
In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother Editha
left for Quezon City on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the Veterans
Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where she was confined from January 30,
1991 to March 21, 1991.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15,
1991.4 On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of
RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was
another messenger who previously was assigned to deliver the same but the
address could not be located, hence, the telegram was resent on February 2,
1991, and the second messenger finally found the address on February 15,
1991.
Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter of March 5,
1991,5 demanded an explanation from the manager of the Service Quality
Control Department of the RCPI, Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, by letter
of March 13, 1991,6 as follows:
Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly
processed in accordance with our standard operating procedure. However,
delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of circumstances
which were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI. Among others, during
the transmission process, the radio link connecting the points of
communication involved encountered radio noise and interferences such that
subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in the receiving teleprinter
machine.
Our internal message monitoring led to the discovery of the above. Thus, a
repeat transmission was made and subsequent delivery was effected.
(Underscoring supplied)
Verchez’s lawyer thereupon wrote RCPI’s manager Fabian, by letter of July 23,
1991,7 requesting for a conference on a specified date and time, but no
representative of RCPI showed up at said date and time.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida
and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the
19
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the telegram contributed
to the early demise of the late Editha to their damage and prejudice,8 for which
they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages9 and attorney’s
fees.10
After its motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue11 was denied12 by
Branch 5 of the RTC of Sorsogon, RCPI filed its answer, alleging that except
with respect to Grace,13 the other plaintiffs had no privity of contract with it; any
delay in the sending of the telegram was due to force majeure, "specifically,
but not limited to, radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the
transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message";14 the clause in the
Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace absolved it from liability for any
damage arising from the transmission other than the refund of telegram
tolls;15 it observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees; and at all events, any cause of action had been barred by
laches.16
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed delivery of the questioned
telegram was not apparently the proximate cause of the death of Editha," ruled
out the presence of force majeure. Respecting the clause in the telegram relied
upon by RCPI, the trial court held that it partakes of the nature of a contract of
adhesion.
Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the telegram
to the addressee at the earliest possible time but that it did not in view of the
negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter and the concomitant
delay in delivering the telegram on time, the trial court, upon the following
provisions of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being at fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the "omission
of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, or the place."
In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram to
the addressee is of an urgent nature. Its essence is the early delivery of the
telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its employees,
the defendant failed to discharge of its obligation on time making it liable for
damages under Article 2176.
The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer.17 (Underscoring supplied),
rendered judgment against RCPI. Accordingly, it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, to wit:
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the following amount:
1. The amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as moral
damages;
2. The amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees;
and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.18
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February 27, 2004,19 affirmed
the trial court’s decision.
Hence, RCPI’s present petition for review on certiorari, it raising the following
questions: (1) "Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court
found that there was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged
negligent acts?"20 and (2) "Are the stipulations in the ‘Telegram Transmission
Form,’ in the nature "contracts of adhesion" (sic)?21
RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal connection between
its delay in transmitting the telegram and Editha’s death.22
20
RCPI’s stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa
contractual or breach of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard
to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. (Underscoring supplied)
Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained:
In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and
the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to
be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract
confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may
have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the
promissee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed, or his "reliance
interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance
on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his
interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the
other party. Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or
for society, unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every
infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who
has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual
obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his
exercise of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to
excuse him from his ensuing liability.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest
possible time. It took 25 days, however, for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and
interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the
telegraphic message. Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate
the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to
deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that
may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have concurred with an
act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing
that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous
event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be
partly the result of a person’s participation – whether by active
intervention, neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
xxxx
Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a
fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or, though foreseen, was
inevitable. In other words, there must be an exclusion of human
intervention from the cause of injury or loss.24 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from
delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time, it should have at least
informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she could
have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it did not. There lies the fault or
negligence.
In an earlier case also involving RCPI, this Court held:
Considering the public utility of RCPI’s business and its contractual obligation
to transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to ascertain that
messages are delivered to the persons at the given address and
should provide a system whereby in cases of undelivered messages the
sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages sent by cable or wireless
21
means are usually more important and urgent than those which can wait for
the mail.25
xxxx
People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep
emotional stress or pressing financial needs. Knowing that messages
about the illnesses or deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a family,
important business transactions, and notices of conferences or meetings as in
this case, are coursed through the petitioner and similar corporations, it is
incumbent upon them to exercise a greater amount of care and concern than
that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to inform senders of the non-
delivery of messages should be undertaken.26
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI argues, however, against the presence of urgency in the delivery of the
telegram, as well as the basis for the award of moral damages, thus:27
The request to send check as written in the telegraphic text negates the
existence of urgency that private respondents’ allegations that ‘time was of the
essence’ imports. A check drawn against a Manila Bank and transmitted to
Sorsogon, Sorsogon will have to be deposited in a bank in Sorsogon and pass
thru a minimum clearing period of 5 days before it may be encashed or
withdrawn. If the transmittal of the requested check to Sorsogon took 1 day –
private respondents could therefore still wait for 6 days before the same may
be withdrawn. Requesting a check that would take 6 days before it could be
withdrawn therefore contradicts plaintiff’s claim of urgency or need.28
At any rate, any sense of urgency of the situation was met when Grace
Verchez was able to communicate to Manila via a letter that she sent to the
same addressee in Manila thru JRS.29
xxxx
As far as the respondent court’s award for moral damages is concerned, the
same has no basis whatsoever since private respondent Alfonso Verchez did
not accompany his late wife when the latter went to Manila by bus. He stayed
behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week before he proceeded to Manila. 30
When pressed on cross-examination, private respondent Alfonso Verchez
could not give any plausible reason as to the reason why he did not
accompany his ailing wife to Manila.31
xxxx
It is also important to consider in resolving private respondents’ claim for moral
damages that private respondent Grace Verchez did not accompany her ailing
mother to Manila.32
xxxx
It is the common reaction of a husband to be at his ailing wife’s side as much
as possible. The fact that private respondent Alfonso Verchez stayed behind in
Sorsogon for almost 1 week convincingly demonstrates that he himself knew
that his wife was not in critical condition.33
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is,
it bears repeating, anchored. Since RCPI breached its contract, the
presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut this
presumption.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-respondents following Article
2176 of the Civil Code which provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (Underscoring
supplied)
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that
it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Article
2180 of the Civil Code so provides:
22
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a determination of the
presence of the following requisites to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or
omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of damages sustained by the claimant;
and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.34
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the plaintiffs-herein
respondents was correctly appreciated by the CA in this wise:
The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the message of
appellees on time, disturbed their filial tranquillity. Family members blamed
each other for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency that involved the life
of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes.35
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and third requisites are
present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly
due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace
of the non-delivery thereof and waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it
again, knowing – as it should know – that time is of the essence in the delivery
of telegrams. When its second long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram
again failed, it, again, waited for another 12 days before making a third
attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation indicates gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite is thus also present.
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has awarded moral
damages in cases of breach of contract where the defendant was guilty of
gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation.36
As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and
35. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxxx
23
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another. opportunity to bargain on equal footing.38 (Emphasis and underscoring
(Emphasis supplied) supplied)

RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly
disturbed the peace of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As
observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among them
as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The
tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore,
analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are
among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may award moral damages
under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of moral damages is in
order, as is the award of attorney’s fees, respondents having been compelled
to litigate to protect their rights.
Clutching at straws, RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the
"Telegram Transmission Form" is not a contract of adhesion. Thus it argues:
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and unenforceable, since it
is construed strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to any
ambiguity therein, it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or subversive
of public policy when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the
dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or
leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.39
This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the parties’ contract is
one of adhesion which is void is, given the facts and circumstances of the
case, thus well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

Neither can the Telegram Transmission Form be considered a contract of SO ORDERED.

adhesion as held by the respondent court. The said stipulations were all written
in bold letters right in front of the Telegram Transmission Form. As a matter of
fact they were beside the space where the telegram senders write their
telegraphic messages. It would have been different if the stipulations were
written at the back for surely there is no way the sender will easily notice them.
The fact that the stipulations were located in a particular space where they can
easily be seen, is sufficient notice to any sender (like Grace Verchez-Infante)
where she could manifest her disapproval, leave the RCPI station and avail of
the services of the other telegram operators.37 (Underscoring supplied)

RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. Neither the

readability of the stipulations nor their physical location in the contract
determines whether it is one of adhesion.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a

ready-made form of contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but
which the latter cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the
contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion"
thereto, giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the
24
 she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she would
not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it.
Republic of the Philippines Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public
SUPREME COURT Schools.
Manila
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966
THIRD dIVISION which provided:
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988 Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers
of this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization; that pursuant
vs.
to Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA
Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to
DELMO (as private respondents), respondents.
student for financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance
The Solicitor General for petitioner. with said resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended
loans to some officers and members of the Club upon proper application duly
Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent. approved by the majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that
upon receiving the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the
Club, that Office conducted an investigation on the matter and having been
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and members of
the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals that Office's order or decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of
which afirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its effectivity and
petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the Club had no valid
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which
graduate a student with honors. was passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any force and
effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some officers
The facts are not disputed. and members of the Club pursuant thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the
other students involved are deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some
Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo,
students of the West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as
President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the
the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the
Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October
club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said
3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws, the
act of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the
majority of the members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2,
petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that
which resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some
officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its
25
Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the superintendent because
the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club
that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the
Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on
October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise
allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the
Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and
members thereof by dropping them from membership therein. However, this
Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her
capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members of
the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer
to discharge finds to students in need of financial assistance and other
humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse
Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser of
the Club and extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside from
misleading the officers and members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had
unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws of
the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the Club
president that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on the part of the
Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties as such,
this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the
questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any
award or citation from this school or any organization in this school." Violeta
Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and she
alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question would,
therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating
with honors in this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby
directs that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club
members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any award,
citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo,
pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director
and all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a
telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly
mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the
same day, he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director
to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order
him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a
night letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision
back and that he had not retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another
telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors
due her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the
program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain
student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director
for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo
should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the
petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to
enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action
for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action,
however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental
Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in
favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:
26
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per
investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the
Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the defendant who inducted the
officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club
was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the
defendant he not approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did
he induct the officers into office and allow the Club to sponsor the Education
Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that the students were misled
to do as they did. Coupled with the defendants tacit recognition of the Club
was the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the
students believe that he was acting as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's
personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although,
he kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he
was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told
the Court that he knew that the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to
deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has not
finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to
give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp.
.33-35). It could not be true that he has not finished reading the letter-decision,
Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion
which directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or
honor from the school, if otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last
paragraph of the same. How did he know the last paragraph if he did not read
the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and
prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to
the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as
April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss Delino by Director
Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently
dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director Bernardino
cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead
of informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed back the
decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director
Bernardino, informing the latter that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"),
together with the record. Why a night letter when the matter was of utmost
urgency to the parties in the case, because graduation day was only four days
ahead? An examination of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he
had been sending ordinary telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit
"7"). At least, if the defendant could not furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh.
"L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's
honors and citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr.
Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home
out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his decision to deprive
Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director Bernardino, he on
his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she did not deserve
those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the
telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant received hours before the
commencement executory on May 3-4,1966, he did not obey Director
Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he would be embarrassment
. Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not
that of r Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly
disregarded by bim And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's
embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of
mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged by Miss
Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of
contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it.
He refused to obey the directive of Be o and instead, chose to feign ignorance
of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and
P10,000.00 to her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages
to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00
attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
27
court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New
Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be
reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful
ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the
case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon,
129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to
inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish
her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was
nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have
done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even
though he sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the
whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should
have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the
latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do,
and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly
pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the
decision, he could have used his discretion and plain common sense by
informing her about it or he could have directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's
honor in the printed commencement program or announced it during the
commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours
before the commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his
superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse
that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and in complete
disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico
Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his
office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and
due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of
his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director
Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . .
(Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the
same case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p.
450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies,
to provide an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan
American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo
damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately
from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the
deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral
damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the
preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
28
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL
ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL
MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS,
ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH
OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN,
BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and
REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO
ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR,
1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO,
1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95),
Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by
this Court. It poses the question whether the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be
maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military
personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other
violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports
about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among
others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several
places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants;
that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were
arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period
after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs
were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military
men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions
and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights
were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish
them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00;
moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of
P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00
each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less
than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then
Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a
judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action,
defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their
official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the
defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco
Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos
and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel
Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara,
Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex
Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a
Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.
29
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the
Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants'
contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising,
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8,
them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that 1983, issued an order, as follows:
assuming that the court can entertain the present action, defendants are
It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio
immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties;
Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty.
and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since
Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez represented by counsel, Atty. Augusta
there is no allegation that the defendants named in the complaint confiscated
Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights,
represented by counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented
and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant
by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented by
Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or that the
counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of
defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their
November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal
subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article
therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said
2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a careful study of
Order is now final against said plaintiffs.
defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must,
therefore, be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for
opposition are lacking in merit." reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it was not true that plaintiffs
Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin
motion for reconsideration was filed by the plaintiffs on November 18, 1983,
failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8, 1983 dismissing
and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants
the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion
filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof
to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for
to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio
reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of
Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L.
the lawyers.
Rosales, Pedro B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo,
Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino. In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both
motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting
to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become
himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the
final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the
motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any
defendants' motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the order of
suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion
September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs
assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said (1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
pending motion." This order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de
motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo,
30
la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio- 1984. Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on
Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit; November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986.

(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit: We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.

1. Gen Fabian Ver At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which
provides:
2. Col. Fidel Singson
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.
latter for damages:
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
(1) Freedom of religion;
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
(2) Freedom of speech;
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the
(7) of law;
present action or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so
far as it affects and refers to defendants, to wit: (8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public
use;
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated
unreasonable searches and seizures;
November 3, 1983 is granted and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this
respect, reconsidered and modified. (11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 (12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court's resolution of November
8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, (13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law;

31
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government
for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity
or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless
the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act
or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right
to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance
of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his
act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a
sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred
rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress,
when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it
is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious
demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will
perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law
compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression
of the will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be
a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him
who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a
maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the
matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment
which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents
postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of
state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or
function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their
primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less
provides that the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof."
(Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting
martial law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the
nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion
and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-
emptive strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro
Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by
elements of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights
against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to
32
silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the
named members of the task force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists,
respondent members of the armed forces merely performed their official and
constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way
of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to
the policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue
interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of hability
(Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634),
and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and
public functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by
private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil.
819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of
their duties is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308;
Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780,
16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed.
2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco
Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the
President and his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners
enjoy such immunity from Suit.3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit
totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts
done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their
powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a
legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the
Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the
defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of
carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the
exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere
in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of
the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government,
then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring
that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting
of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to
launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground
houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving
commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in
and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law
of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience
and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents
from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said
article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their
assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with
their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the
right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic
institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is
that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards
must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In
the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as
the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the
rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
33
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action
is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of
the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same
purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the
main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged
damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the
same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the
habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the
petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what
the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President,
petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their
action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations
of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of
the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for
damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article
1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-
delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer
involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought
within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot
suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of
respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right
to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed
upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question
therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer
under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly
and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights
and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to
the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally
limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e.
employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between
superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the
language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person
'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights
and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to
the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the
Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No
longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the
constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors
that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception
that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for,
the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to
34
expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect
of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms
that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col.
Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo
Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt.
Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates.
Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept
as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically mentioned
and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the
plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that
gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the record,
nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19.
to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article
32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated
therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity
or reward to make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes
a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and
details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32
of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint
speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation,
without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and
other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by
the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several
undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and
subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading
and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements.
The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the
plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within
the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for
its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set
forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine
the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint,
and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for
lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major
Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint
contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted
hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action
against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the
complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco
Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said
plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of
November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
35
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8,
1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only
by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio
Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B.
Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad,
counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer;
and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on
behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of
defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he
furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to
all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene
Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr.,
Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon
Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing
attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority
to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party
can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the
party concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse
on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to
set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed
only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended
to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent
judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal
of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs
whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted
with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the
respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and
its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the
respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public
officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or private
individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner
impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person,
stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the
Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages
filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted
by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and
liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle
of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior
officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and
exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such transgressions.
However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not
abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of
being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited
provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
the tortfeasor.
36
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a
government of laws, existence of the government be imperilled following it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent
teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for
the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy.
To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means
... would bring terrible retribution." 1
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the
operations of the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a
democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to what
they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The
Supreme Court stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights
of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic role under the
Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and letter
of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights
and freedom that a person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split
second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto — unless it was caned for as an
act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of
the NPA which have infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed their
despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police officers
constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must
be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government
under President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office in February,
1986 was to file our government's ratification and access to all human rights
instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring
thereby the government's commitment to observe the precepts of the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More than
this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively ratified on
February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights
hats been created and organized with ample powers to investigate human
rights violations and take remedial measures against all such violations by the
military as well as by the civilian groups.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be they public
officers or employees, or members of the military or police force or private
individuals who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner
impede or impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person,
stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art. 32 of the
Civil Code.
The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates the civil action for damages
filed in the court below by petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted
by military personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and
liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of the principle
of respondeat superior or command responsibility that would hold a superior
officer jointly and severally accountable for damages, including moral and
exemplary, with his subordinates who committed such transgressions.
However, the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not
abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he runs the risk of
being held responsible for gross negligence and of being held under the cited
provision of the Civil Code as indirectly and solidarily accountable with
the tortfeasor.
The rationale for this rule of law was best expressed by Brandeis in wise: "In a
government of laws, existence of the government be imperilled following it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent
teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes the law breaker, it breeds contempt for
the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy.
To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means
... would bring terrible retribution." 1
As the writer stress in Hildawa vs. Enrile 2 Which Was an action to enjoin the
operations of the dreaded secret marshals during the past regime, 'In a
democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to what
37
they do, then we're no better than they ... there would be no difference. ... The
Supreme Court stands as the guarantor of the Constitutional and human rights
of all persons within its jurisdiction and cannot abdicate its basic role under the
Constitution that these rights be respected and enforced. The spirit and letter
of the Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human rights
and freedom that a person's life be snuffed out without due process in a split
second even if he is caught in flagrante delicto — unless it was caned for as an
act of self-defense by the law agents using reasonable means to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
Needless to say, the criminal acts of the "Sparrow Units" or death squads of
the NPA which have infutrated the cities and suburbs and performed their
despicable killings of innocent civilians and military and police officers
constitute an equally perverse violation of the sanctity of human life and must
be severely condemned by all who adhere tothe Rule of the Law.
It need only be pointed out that one of the first acts of the present government
under President Corazon C. Aquino after her assumption of office in February,
1986 was to file our government's ratification and access to all human rights
instruments adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, declaring
thereby the government's commitment to observe the precepts of the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More than
this, pursuant to our Constitution which the people decisively ratified on
February 2, 1987, the independent office of the Commission on Human Rights
hats been created and organized with ample powers to investigate human
rights violations and take remedial measures against all such violations by the
military as well as by the civilian groups.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 184315 November 28, 2011
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, NOEL
CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA,
RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN JUAN and ROBERT COYIUTO,
JR.,Respondents.
R E S O L U T I ON
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated January 15, 2010, filed
by the respondents, and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration2 of
respondent Robert Coyiuto, Jr., dated March 17, 2010, from the Decision
rendered in favor of petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco, dated November 25,
2009.
At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that
transpired and led to the filing of the motions is in order.
The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several
allegedly defamatory articles against petitioner were published in The Manila
Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation. Consequently, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 136, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1114, under three separate
causes of action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous publication against
Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry
Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the
editorial staff and writers of The Manila Chronicle, and Chronicle Publishing;
(2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and
Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for attorney’s fees and costs against all the
respondents.
On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision3 in favor of
petitioner.
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA). On
March 18, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision4 affirming in toto the decision of
the RTC.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration5 praying that the CA
reconsider its earlier decision and reverse the decision of the trial court. On
38
August 28, 2008, the CA rendered an Amended Decision6 reversing the earlier Coyiuto, Jr.’s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration11 dated 17 March
Decision. 2010.

Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court which puts In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents moved for a reconsideration of
forth the following assignment of errors: the earlier decision on the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE 1. MALICE-IN-FACT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN.
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL,
ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., CITED BY RESPONDENTS IN 2. PETITIONER IS A "PUBLIC FIGURE."
THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WARRANTED THE REVERSAL
3. THE SUBJECT OF THE PUBLICATIONS CONSTITUTES FAIR
OF THE CA DECISION DATED MARCH 18, 2008.
COMMENTS, ON PUBLIC ISSUES, ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND NATIONAL CONCERN.
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE
4. RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT IN A RECKLESS MANNER OR IN
COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGED
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE TRUTH OF THE MATTERS COVERED
COMMUNICATION.
BY THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
5. THE PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC
COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTS THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE.7
6. THERE IS NO LEGAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO HOLD DONNA
On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting the
GATDULA, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, LIABLE FOR THE SUBJECT
petition.
PUBLICATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE EDITORS AND STAFF OF THE
Respondents later filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 15, 2010, NEWSPAPER.
which the Court denied in the Resolution8 dated March 3, 2010.
7. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO HOLD THELMA SAN JUAN RESPONSIBLE
Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for Leave to File FOR THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Attached Supplemental Motion,
8. THE "QUICK NOTES" COLUMN OF MR. RAUL VALINO ARE BASED ON
both dated March 17, 2010.
FACTS; THUS, NOT LIBELOUS.
On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution9 resolving to recall the
9. ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. IS NOT IMPLEADED WITH THE EDITORS AND
Resolution dated March 3, 2010; grant Coyiuto, Jr.’s motion for leave to file
STAFF MEMBERS OF THE MANILA CHRONICLE, BUT IS SUED IN "HIS
supplemental motion for reconsideration; note the supplemental motion for
PERSONAL CAPACITY" FOR AN "ABUSE OF RIGHT" AND NO EVIDENCE
reconsideration; and require petitioner to comment on the motion for
LINKS HIM TO THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration.
10. THE AWARDED DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE, EQUITABLE AND
On June 22, 2010, petitioner filed his Comment on the Motion for
UNJUSTIFIED.12
Reconsideration10 dated January 15, 2010 and Comment on respondent

39
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Coyiuto, Jr. raises the
following arguments:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE COURT OBVIOUSLY
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT IN PETITIONER’S AMENDED COMPLAINT
(DATED OCTOBER 17, 1994), RESPONDENT ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. WAS
NOT SUED FOR DAMAGES ALLEGEDLY DUE TO "LIBELOUS
PUBLICATIONS" (FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION). HE WAS SUED, HOWEVER,
IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY FOR "ABUSE OF RIGHT" (SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION) ALLEGEDLY, AS "CHAIRMAN" OF THE BOARD, "OFFICER,"
"PRINCIPAL OWNER," OF THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING
CORPORATION UNDER ARTICLES 19 AND 20 OF THE CIVIL CODE. AS
SUCH, THE IMPOSITION OF MORAL (₱25 MILLION PESOS) AND
EXEMPLARY (₱10 MILLION PESOS) DAMAGES AGAINST RESPONDENT
COYIUTO, JR. HAS NO BASIS IN LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 2219 AND 2229, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE
2233, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE CIVIL CODE AS WILL BE ELUCIDATED
HEREUNDER.
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, APART FROM THE SELF-
SERVING/UNILATERAL ALLEGATION IN PARAGRAPH 3.11 OF THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT (ANNEX "C" OF PETITION FOR REVIEW), NO
IOTA OF EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED ON TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF THE
ALLEGATION THAT RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. WAS "CHAIRMAN",
"PRINCIPAL OWNER" AND "OFFICER" OF RESPONDENT MANILA
CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION. SEC DOCUMENTS SHOW THE
CONTRARY, AS WILL BE DISCUSSED HEREUNDER. SO HOW COULD
RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. BE IMPLEADED TO HAVE "ABUSED HIS
RIGHT AS A NON-CHAIRMAN, NON-STOCKHOLDER, NON-OFFICER OF
RESPONDENT MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION? IT IS
FUNDAMENTAL THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF RESTS ON THE PARTY
ASSERTING A FACT OR ESTABLISHING A CLAIM (RULE 131, REVISED
RULES OF COURT).13
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the motion for reconsideration generally
restates and reiterates the arguments, which were previously advanced by
respondents and does not present any substantial reasons, which were not
formerly invoked and passed upon by the Court.
However, from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that
Coyiuto, Jr. raises a new matter which has not been raised in the proceedings
below. This notwithstanding, basic equity dictates that Coyiuto, Jr. should be
given all the opportunity to ventilate his arguments in the present action, but
more importantly, in order to write finis to the present controversy. It should be
noted that the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration was later
recalled by this Court in the Resolution dated March 3, 2010, and therein,
petitioner was given the opportunity to refute Coyiuto, Jr.’s arguments by filing
his comment on the motion for reconsideration and the supplemental motion
for reconsideration, which petitioner complied with.
From these Comments and contrary to Coyiuto, Jr.’s contention, it was
substantially established that he was the Chairman of Manila Chronicle
Publishing Corporation when the subject articles were published. Coyiuto, Jr.
even admitted this fact in his Reply and Comment on Request for
Admission,14 to wit:
4. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. ADMITS that he was the Chairman of the
Board but not President of the Manila Chronicle during the period Novemeber
(sic) to December 1993.
5. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. DENIES paragraph 11. He has already
conveyed such denial to plaintiff in the course of the pre-trial. It was The
Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation, of which he is, admittedly
Chairman of the Board, that published the items marked as plaintiff’s Exhibits
A, B, C, D, E, F, and G.
xxxx
12. This case, based on plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, is limited to the
publications in The Manila Chronicle marked plaintiff’s Exhibits "A" to "G",
consecutively, published by defendant Manila Chronicle. Thus, only the
question of whether Mr. Robert Coyiuto, Jr. was Chairman and President of
defendant Manila Chronicle, during these publications and whether he caused
40
these publications, among all of plaintiffs’ queries, are relevant and material to
this case. And defendant Robert Coyiuto, Jr. has answered that: "Yes", he was
Chairman of the Board. "No", he was never President of The Manila Chronicle.
"No", he did not cause the publications in The Manila Chronicle: it was the
Manila Chronicle that published the news items adverted to.15
Both the trial court and the CA affirmed this fact. We reiterate that factual
findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding
and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.
While this Court has recognized several exceptions16 to this rule, none of these
exceptions exists in the present case. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason
to depart from the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA.
More importantly and contrary again to Coyiuto, Jr.’s contention, the cause of
action of petitioner based on "abuse of rights," or Article 19, in relation to
Article 20 of the Civil Code, warrants the award of damages.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of
one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with
justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.17
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals,18 it was
elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government
of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification
of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON
THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect
of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw
out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed
to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and
which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run
as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost
among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does
not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.19
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully
or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be responsible.20 Thus, if the provision does not provide a
remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
41
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of
law, depends on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, it was
found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila
Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous articles in the said
newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to
Article 20.
Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to
petitioner. Such damages may be awarded when the transgression is the
cause of petitioner’s anguish.21 Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.’s argument,
although petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, still such violations directly resulted in the publication of the
libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground for
the recovery of moral damages under (7) of Article 2219.22
However, despite the foregoing, the damages awarded to petitioner appear to
be too excessive and warrants a second hard look by the Court.
While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and
reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty
to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant.23
Even petitioner, in his Comment24 dated June 21, 2010, agree that moral
damages "are not awarded in order to punish the respondents or to make the
petitioner any richer than he already is, but to enable the latter to find some
cure for the moral anguish and distress he has undergone by reason of the
defamatory and damaging articles which the respondents wrote and
published."25 Further, petitioner cites as sufficient basis for the award of
damages the plain reason that he had to "go through the ordeal of defending
himself everytime someone approached him to ask whether or not the
statements in the defamatory article are true."
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (People’s Journal) v. Thoenen,26 citing Guevarra
v. Almario,27 We noted that the damages in a libel case must depend upon the
facts of the particular case and the sound discretion of the court, although
appellate courts were "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase
them." So it must be in this case.
Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant’s
grief and suffering. Moral damages should be reasonably approximate to the
extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.28 The Court,
therefore, finds the award of moral damages in the first and second cause of
action in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 and ₱25,000,000.00, respectively, to be
too excessive and holds that an award of ₱1,000,000.00 and ₱10,000,000.00,
respectively, as moral damages are more reasonable.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.
Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.29 On this basis, the award of
exemplary damages in the first and second cause of action in the amount of
₱500,000.00 and ₱10,000,000.00, respectively, is reduced to ₱200,000.00 and
₱1,000,000.00, respectively.
On the matter of attorney’s fees and costs of suit, Article 2208 of the same
Code provides, among others, that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation
may be recovered in cases when exemplary damages are awarded and where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. In any event, however, such award must be
reasonable, just and equitable.30 Thus, the award of attorney’s fees and costs
is reduced from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱200,000.00.
One final note, the case against respondent was one for damages based on
the publication of libelous articles against petitioner; hence, only civil in nature.
The rule is that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must
establish his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. Thus,
respondents’ liability was proven only on the basis of preponderance of
evidence, which is quite different from a criminal case for libel where proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established.
Corollarilly, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the person who
"caused the publication" of a defamatory article shall be responsible for the
42
same. Hence, Coyiuto, Jr. should have been held jointly and solidarily liable 2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Robert Coyiuto, Jr.
with the other respondents in the first cause of action under this article and not and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
on the basis of violation of the principle of abuse of rights founded on Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Because of the exclusion of Coyiuto, Jr. in the first a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
cause of action for libel, he cannot be held solidarily liable with the other
b. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;
respondents in the first cause of action. Nonetheless, since damage to
petitioner was in fact established warranting the award of moral and exemplary 3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff
damages, the same could only be awarded based on petitioner’s second Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
cause of action impleading Coyiuto, Jr. for violation of the principle of abuse of Pesos (₱200,000.00) as attorney’s fee and legal costs.
right.
Costs against respondents.
It did not escape the attention of the Court that in filing two different causes of
action based on the same published articles, petitioner intended the liability of SO ORDERED.
Coyiuto, Jr. to be different from the other respondents. It can be inferred that if
Coyiuto, Jr. was impleaded in the first cause of action for recovery of the civil
liability in libel, petitioner could not have prayed for higher damages,
considering that the other respondents, who are jointly and severally liable with
one another, are not in the same financial standing as Coyiuto, Jr. Petitioner, in
effect, had spared the other respondents from paying such steep amount of
damages, while at the same time prayed that Coyiuto, Jr. pay millions of pesos
by way of moral and exemplary damages in the second cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration are PARTIALLY GRANTED.1âwphi1 The Decision of this
Court, dated November 25, 2009, is MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil

H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza,
Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola, to pay plaintiff Yuchengco,
jointly and severally:

a. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

b. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) as exemplary

damages;

43
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court,
dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with
the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of
One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during
her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
44
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the
right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's
Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286,
49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but
these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE,
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE
OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also
no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in
New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed
school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State
of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed
there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in,
and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
45
again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April
1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December,
1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly
after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which
he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the
St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that
he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of
California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed
his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he
has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The
man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business
in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as
well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is
a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one
use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.
46
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of
the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not
denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of
the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of
the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to
the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the
foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept
the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the
matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in
the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal
law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems
no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal
law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids
going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory
avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at
that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit
more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead
that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And
still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both
courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to
land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged.
In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile
of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce,
47
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises
as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule
of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an
application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds
thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution
to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to
it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate
succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow
the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws
rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in
turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to
the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is
a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them
as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many
cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The
theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the
question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may
be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale
Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article
are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws
are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of
the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well.
According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of
foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the
law of the place where the act in question occurred.
48
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain
that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal
estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with
the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would
distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance
with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves
a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state
where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding
legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile
are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the
point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at
the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application.
It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of
civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws
rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California
as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code,
then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national
law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
49
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at
bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear
to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of
which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of

California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against
appellees.

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