VirJen Shipping and Marine Services vs.

NLRC

125 SCRA 577 (1983)

Ma. Cristina Ramos (OAS)

Facts: Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month period. Some
three months after the

commencement of their employment, the seamen demanded a 50% increase of their salaries
and benefits. The

seamen demanded this increase while their vessel was on route to a port in Australia controlled
by the International

Transport Federation (ITP) where the ITF could detain the vessels unless it paid its season ITF
rates.

The agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to a 25% increase, but when the vessel arrived in
Japan shortly

afterwards, the seamen were repatriated to Manila and their contract terminated.

Two motions for reconsideration filed with Second Division were denied by said Division.
Another motion for

reconsideration was filed with the Supreme Court en banc which gave its due course, after
finding that there was a

need to reconcile the decision of the Second Division with that of the First Division with the
Wallen Decision. In that

decision, the First Division had ruled that the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Issue: Whether or not the termination of the seamen was illegal.

Held: The termination of the contract of the seamen was illegal. A manning contract involves the
interests not only

of the signatories thereto, such as the local Filipino recruiting agent, the foreign owner of vessel
and the Filipino

seamen in general as well as the country itself. Conformably to the power vested in the NSB, the
law requires that all

manning contracts shall be approved by said agency. The stringent rules governing Filipino
seamen abroad foreign
ships are dictated by national interest.

PNB vs Cabansag

CASE: PNB vs. Cabansag

Date: June 21, 2005

Ponente: J. Panganiban

Facts:

Florence Cabansag went to Singapore as a tourist. While she was there, she looked for a job and
eventually applied with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. PNB is a private
banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. She was eventually employed
and was issued an employment pass. In her job offer, it was stated, among others, that she was
to be put on probation for 3 months and termination of her employment may be made by either
party after 1 day notice while on probation, and 1 month notice or 1 month pay in lieu of notice
upon confirmation. She accepted the terms and was issued an OEC by the POEA. She was
commended for her good work. However, she was informed by Ruben Tobias, the bank
president, that she would have to resign in line with some cost cutting and realignment
measures of the company. She refused but was informed by Tobias that if she does not resign, he
will terminate her instead.
Issues:

W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction

W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue

W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed

Ruling:

Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-
employee relations including termination disputes involving all workers, including OFWs. Here,
Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA through the Philippine Embassy. The
OEC authorized her working status in a foreign country and entitled her to all benefits and
processes under our statutes. Although she may been a direct hire at the commencement of her
employment, she became an OFW who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon
certification by the POEA. When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA
employment certificate.

A migrant worker “refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to be used
interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.” Here, Cabansag was a Filipino, not a legal
resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. She is clearly
an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file her Complaint for illegal
dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch where she resides or the RAB
where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon
City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.
The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at
the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had
already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the Labor Code: “An employee
who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.”
Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one
month’s salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment
Contract.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. DRILON

G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988

Digested by: RL Lagundino

Facts:

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a recruitment

firm for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,

Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES

GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC

AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.” In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, PASEI, challenges

the validity of Department Order No. 1 (deployment ban) of the DOLE on the following grounds:

1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to female workers; 2) it is an invalid exercise of the

lawmaking power. The respondents invoke the police power of the Philippine State.

Issue: Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING:

Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. Police power has been defined as the "state

authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to

promote the general welfare." It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. However,

police power is not without its own limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or

unreasonably.

DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between the sexes. “Equality before the law" admits of classifications,

provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the

purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally

to all members of the same class. It is the avowed objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the

protection for Filipino female overseas workers. Discrimination in this case is justified.

Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority

may not be lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rulemaking powers in

the enforcement whereof. Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.

OSM SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. NLRC1

(Panganiban, 2003)

Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions of the CA

Facts:

• A complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay and vacation

pay was filed by Fermin Guerrero against OSM Shipping Phils. Guerrero was hired by

petitioner, in behalf of its principal Phil. Carrier Shipping Agency (PS-SLC) to board its vessel

MV Princess Hoa as Master Mariner for a contract of 10 months.

• He boarded the ship on July 21, 1994. Almost 7 months later, he was forced to disembark

the ship because he was never paid any compensation for his work since he boarded the

ship and as such, he could not even buy his basic necessities.

• OSM story:

o Concorde Pacific, the American company which owns the MV Princess Hoa,

appointed Phil. Carrier Shipping Agency Services Co. (PC-SASCO) as ship

manager, one of whose responsibilities was the selection or determination of

qualifications of Filipino Seamen.

o On the same date, OSM entered into a Crew Agreement with PC -SASCO for

the purpose of processing the documents of crew members of the vessel.

o The initial plan was to use the vessel for overseas trade. But Concorde

changed its plans for the vessel and decided to use it instead for coastwide

trade, thus the vessel never left the Philippines. It had the vessel converted to

Philippine registry by way of bareboat chartering it out to another entity

named PS-SLC.

o To do this, Concorde, through its representative had to terminate is crew

agreement with PS-SASCO. Consequently, the latter terminated its crew

agreement with OSM.

o PS-SLC, the bareboat charterer, is now the disponent owner/employer of the

crew and is thus responsible for the payment of the complainant’s wages.

• Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in favor of Guerrero, ordering OSM and PS-SASCO to

jointly and severally pay Guerrero’s claims. NLRC affirmed with modification.

• OSM filed with the CA a petition to set aside the NLRC judgment. This was dismissed

because petitioner did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 3 Rule 46 of the ROC by

failing to attach a duplicate original or certified true copy of the LA’s decision. They only

attached a mere machine copy.

• Hence this petition.

Issue:

1) Procedural – WON CA was correct in dismissing the petition for failure to

comply with the said requirement? – NO

2) Substantive – WON OSM is jointly liable with PC-SASCO, as its agent. - YES

Held:

1) Sec. 3 rule 46 of the ROC requires that a duplicate original or certified true copy of
only the questioned decision should be attached to the petition and not all

supporting papers. Since the LA’s decision was not questioned ruling, a machine copy

of it would suffice. The duplicate original of the questioned decision of the NLRC should

be attached, and this was complied with. However, even if petitioner’s procedural

contention was correct, this Court still ruled for Guerrero on the merits. To remand this

case to the CA would further delay the recovery of wages.

2) On behalf of its principal, OSM does not deny hiring Guerrero as master mariner.

Petitioner was the legitimate manning agent of PS-SASCO and it was allowed to recruit,

hire and deploy seamen on board the vessel.

a. It argues that since Guerrero was never deployed overseas, his employment

contract became ineffective because its object was allegedly absent. –

Employment contract like any contract is perfected upon the concurrence of

essential elements such as consent of the parties, object certain (subject matter of the contract)
and the cause of the obligation. Contrary to

petitioner’s contention, the object of the contract was the rendition of

service by Guerrero on board the vessel. The non-deployment

overseas of the ship did not affect the validity of the perfected

employment contract.

b. OSM also contends that there was a novation of the contract when Concorde

decided to use the ship for coastwide trade. – A contract cannot be novated

solely by the will of one party.

3) Joint and solidary liability is meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and

sufficient payment of what is due them.

Decision of NLRC affirmed.

JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals

Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing
artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and
train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the
secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book
which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent
Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to
travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners
to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the
public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing
artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short
of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “high risk”
destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new
scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those
individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists
abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

Executive Secretary vs CA

Case: Executive Secretary vs CA

Date of Promulgation: May 25, 2004

Ponente: Callejo Sr., J.

Facts:

Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, took effect on July 15, 1995. Before the law took effect, ARCO-Phil filed a petition asking
the court to declare some provisions of the law unconstitutional. The law required that only
skilled workers were to be deployed for employed abroad. According to the respondent, the
right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented from finding
employment and earning a living abroad. It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune
from abuses by employers, while unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses. It was
pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by foreign
employers. Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would
only encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters. The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6,
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies
are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code
distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the
imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. The penalties in
Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the
equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section
19(1), Article III of the Constitution. 9 It was also pointed out that the penalty for
officers/officials/employees of recruitment agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage
or large-scale illegal recruitment under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8042 is valid

Held:
Section 6 of RA 8042 was previously upheld as valid. It provides that employees of recruitment
agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment.

Penalizing unlicensed and licensed recruitment agencies and their officers and employees and
their relatives employed in government agencies charged with the enforcement of the law for
illegal recruitment and imposing life imprisonment for those who commit large scale illegal
recruitment is not offensive to the Constitution. The accused may be convicted of illegal
recruitment and large scale illegal recruitment only if, after trial, the prosecution is able to prove
all the elements of the crime charged.

The respondent merely speculated and surmised that licensed and registered recruitment
agencies would close shop and stop business operations because of the assailed penal provisions
of the law. A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of penal laws cannot be
based on such conjectures or speculations. The respondent even failed to adduce any evidence
to prove irreparable injury because of the enforcement of Section 10(1)(2) of Rep. Act No. 8042.
Its fear or apprehension that, because of time constraints, its members would have to defend
foreign employees in cases before the Labor Arbiter is based on speculations. Even if true, such
inconvenience or difficulty is hardly irreparable injury.

Preliminarily, the proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people
anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the
enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording
greater protection to overseas Filipino workers, it is a significant improvement on existing laws in
the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment.

By issuing the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioners sans any evidence, the trial
court frustrated, albeit temporarily, the prosecution of illegal recruiters and allowed them to
continue victimizing hapless and innocent people desiring to obtain employment abroad as
overseas workers, and blocked the attainment of the salutary policies 52 embedded in Rep. Act
No. 8042.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction. It is for this reason
that the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. vs Estanislao Surio, et al

GR No. 154213

Facts:

MT Seadance is a vessel owned by Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd and manned and
operated by Agemar Manning Agency. The same was not in a good working condition and the
payment of wages, remittance of allotments, as well as the payment for extra work and extra
overtime work were delayed. As MT Seadance docked at a port in Sweden, representatives of
International Transport Federation boarded the same. They have found out that wages of its
crew members were below the prevailing rates. As a result, they have moved to increase the
wages of the said crewmembers. On Dec 23, 1993, the petitioners filed a complaint against the
crew members and claimed reimbursement for the increase of wages received.

Issue:

Whether or not it is under the jurisdiction of NLRC to review cases on appeal decided by POEA.

Held:

No, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to review an appeal case decided by POEA. According to Section
28 (b) of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, the POEA shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character,
involving employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers. Since RA No
8042 has been passed into a law after the filing of charges by the petitioner to the respondents,
the rule on retroactivity of the laws shall be observed.
As a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly provided, or
unless the law is procedural or curative in nature. Thus, such law stating that the POEA has the
jurisdiction to decide on disciplinary cases shall be observed in the case at bar.

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME DIGEST

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved
Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:

Duration of contract 12 months

Position Chief Officer

Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00

Hours of work 48.0 hours per week

Overtime US$700.00 per month

Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of
US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner
refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.

Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to
March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and
awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of
the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the
respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in
Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the
amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00),
representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the
aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the
salary period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months
and 23 days of petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause. However, the LA
applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation
leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the
finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary
awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00
because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven
to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge
against the subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA
eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the
petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.

The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA
skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this
Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with
applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant
worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of
limiting it to three (3) months.

Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and
vacation pay provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.

The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the
constitutional question raised therein.

ISSUES:

Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal
dismissal

Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of
his monetary award

The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not
disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all
three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at
the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his
employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31

Arguments of the Petitioner

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due
process.

The Arguments of Respondents

Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was
belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest
opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40

The Arguments of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its
provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No.
8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the
minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this
was not stipulated upon by the parties.

The Court’s Ruling:

First Issue

Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II
and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of
similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.

Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the
present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject
clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against,
and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

Second Issue

It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired
portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in
case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their
basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is
less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally
dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with
fixed-term employment.

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated
into his contract.

Petitioner is mistaken.

The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like
petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment
Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime,
leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on
designated rest days and holidays.

In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED
his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine
months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.

: SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY V. CABILES

Published by admin on February 21, 2015 | Leave a response

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement

agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal)
on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their
office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy
claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
 On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the
ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and
awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s
salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no

rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it
has not been passed at all.”

The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the

government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be
trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act.
No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as
well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that
would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.

VS

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

480 SCRA 146 (2006)

There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and
entered into a new and separate employment contract.

Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace

International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was
made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the
contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2
years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang,
and her Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She
alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges
that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of
Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National
Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence,
the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s employment was made with the
knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD:

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the
Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to
Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign “principal” (sic) and therefore
was aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced.
The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed
after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese
broker communicated regarding Montehermozo’s allegedly withheld savings does not
necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that
Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction
was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it
was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000,
to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozo’s filing of
the complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace]
cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
[Montehermozo’s] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a
misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-
year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its
“owner” cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-
year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency
relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new
and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the
agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing
directly with third persons.

People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis

GR No. L–58674–77, July 11, 1990

FACTS:

On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first
securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging
employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee
charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment
in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he
cannot be charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor
Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any
manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.”

Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders
dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private
respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this
article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On
the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed
only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to
such persons and always in consideration of a fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private
respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s Orders and reinstated all four information filed against
private respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to
impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto.

Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more

prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged
in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said
presumption.

Case Digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA

G.R. No. 121777 24 January 2001

FACTS:

Dela Piedra was charged with illegal recruitment in a large scale. In an information filed against
her, without any POEA license, she allegedly offered and promised for a fee employment in
Singapore to Modesto, Amanita and Timbol, such that Modesto had already advanced the
amount of Php2,000.00. Dela Piedra was arrested in her home after an investigation was made
by Atty. Erlina Ramos, a lawyer of the POEA, who pretended to be an applicant, which led to an
entrapment operation of the PNP-CIS for Region IX.

ISSUES:

Is Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement void for vagueness?

Whether herein appellant committed the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

RULING:
NO. Section 13(b) is not overbroad. It encompasses what appellant apparently considers as
customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral.

NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of
illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only
two persons, Amanita and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by the appellant.

G.R. No. 113161, August 29, 1995

People of the Phil., plaintiff-appellee

vs Loma Goce, et. al., accused-appellant

Ponente: Regalado

Facts:

On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large

scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the labor code as amended by PD 2018, filed
against Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila, alleging that in or about
during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive in the
City of Manila, the accused conspired and represent themsleves to have the capacity to recruit
Filipino workers for employment abroad.

January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was
arrested. Hence, on February 1989, the RTC prdered the case archived but issued a standing
warrant os arrest against the accused.

Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the
warrant of arrest and eventually Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque Police.
Agustin's counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested to set a hearing for purpose of
due process and for accused to immediately have her day in court. On the arraignment, Agustin
pleaded not guilty and the trial went on with four complainants testified for the prosecution and
reciepts of the processing fees they paid.
Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her
participation in the recruitment and denied knowledge of the receipts as well.

On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale with sentence of life imprisonment and pay
P100,000.00.

Issues:

Agustin appealed witht the follwing arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to
the couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article
13 in relation to Article 34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3) there is
no proof that appellant offered/promised overseas employment to the complainants.

Ruling:

The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of
illegal recruitment because, the complainants had a previous interview with Agustin (as
employee of the Goce couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral.
Agustin collected the payments of the complainants as well as their passports, trainning fees,
medical tests and other expenses.On the issue of proof, the court held that the receipts
exhibited by the claimants are clear enough to prove the payments and transaction made.G.R.
No. 113161, August 29, 1995

People of the Phil., plaintiff-appellee

vs Loma Goce, et. al., accused-appellant

Ponente: Regalado

Facts:

On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large

scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the labor code as amended by PD 2018, filed
against Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila, alleging that in or about
during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive in the
City of Manila, the accused conspired and represent themsleves to have the capacity to recruit
Filipino workers for employment abroad.

January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was
arrested. Hence, on February 1989, the RTC prdered the case archived but issued a standing
warrant os arrest against the accused.

Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the
warrant of arrest and eventually Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Paranaque Police.
Agustin's counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested to set a hearing for purpose of
due process and for accused to immediately have her day in court. On the arraignment, Agustin
pleaded not guilty and the trial went on with four complainants testified for the prosecution and
reciepts of the processing fees they paid.

Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her
participation in the recruitment and denied knowledge of the receipts as well.

On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale with sentence of life imprisonment and pay
P100,000.00.

Issues:

Agustin appealed witht the follwing arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to
the couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article
13 in relation to Article 34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3) there is
no proof that appellant offered/promised overseas employment to the complainants.

Ruling:

The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of
illegal recruitment because, the complainants had a previous interview with Agustin (as
employee of the Goce couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral.
Agustin collected the payments of the complainants as well as their passports, trainning fees,
medical tests and other expenses.On the issue of proof, the court held that the receipts
exhibited by the claimants are clear enough to prove the payments and transaction made.

PEOPLE V. ORTIZ-MIYAKE

FACTS:

· Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale, following a complaint

filed by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. Marasigan had also

charged her with estafa by means of false pretenses.

· Only Marasigan was able to testify, however, as the other two complainants were abroad.

Marasigan said Ortiz-Miyake promised her a job as factory worker in Taiwan. The former gave

her P5,000 initially as placement fee, which amount subsequently became P23,000 paid in

installments upon the demands of the accused. Accused gave assurances that Marasigan would

have no problem getting a visa and a plane ticket. She was unable to go to Taiwan, as there was

no ticket booked for her and, in fact, the supposed agency did not even know Miyake.

· On the other hand, Generillo was represented by her mother, while del Rosario’s sister
testified

in court on the latter’s behalf. As they were not personally present, however, during the

transactions with Miyake, they could only claim they gave certain amounts that were supposed

to go to Miyake, and concluded that since their relatives had not been able to leave as promised

by Miyake, then they were necessarily victims of illegal recruitment by the accused. A POEA

representative also testified that Miyake had no authorization to recruit workers for overseas

employment. [Miyake claiming she only offered discounted plane tickets to the supposed

victims]

· TC convicted the accused, largely basing their decision on the previous decision rendered by

Paranaque MeTC, where the two complainants now absent had filed charges of estafa against

Miyake. The Court there had convicted Miyake.

ISSUE: won Miyake can be held liable for illegal recruitment on a large scale

HELD/RATIO: Ortiz-Miyake guilty only of simple illegal recruitment (and estafa).

· LC: RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT IS ". . . ANY ACT OF CANVASSING, ENLISTING,

CONTRACTING TRANSPORTING,

UTILIZING, HIRING OR PROCURING WORKERS AND INCLUDES REFERRALS, CONTRACT SERVICES,

PROMISING OR

ADVERTISING FOR EMPLOYMENT, LOCALLY OR ABROAD, WHETHER FOR PROFIT OR NOT;

BECOMES ILLEGAL IF

ONE HAS NO AUTHORIZATION FOR PERFORMING SUCH ACTS; BECOMES LARGE SCALE IF DONE
AGAINST THREE OR

MORE PERSONS WHETHER INDIVIDUALLY OR AS A GROUP

· Right of accused to confront del Rosario and Generillo was not afforded her. Testimonies of

sister and mother, respectively, mere hearsay. Although testimonies from the previous case

could have been used, the decision convicting the accused of another crime (in that previous

case, estafa) cannot be sustained for being violative of the accused’s right to confront witnesses.

Conviction of illegal recruitment does not preclude conviction for estafa. Burden of proof was

only successfully established as to victim Marasigan. Since “large scale” not established,

conviction is only for simple illegal recruitment (and estafa)

STOLT-NIELSEN AND CHUNG GAI SHIP MNGT vs. MEDEQUILLO DIGEST

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 177498 January 18, 2012

STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP MANAGEMENT,

Petitioners,

vs.

SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the
Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against the
petitioners for illegal dismissal under a first contract and for failure to deploy under a second
contract.

COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT STATES: On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-

Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as
Third Assistant Engineer on board the vessel “Stolt Aspiration” for a period of nine (9) months;
He would be paid with a monthly basic salary and a fixed OT pay, a total of $1,212.00 per month
during the employment period; for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while the
vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and
repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation;

Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioner’s office where he was
transferred employment with another vessel (Second Contract) named MV “Stolt Pride” under
the same terms and conditions of the First Contract; Despite the commencement of the Second
Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy him; He made a follow-up with the
petitioner but the same refused to comply with the Second Employment Contract.

Thereafter, he demanded for his passport, seaman’s book and other employment documents.
However, he was only allowed to claim the said documents in exchange of his signing a
document; He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily because without these
documents, he could not seek employment from other agencies.

The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION: respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners; first
contract entered into by and between the complainant and the respondents to have been
novated by the execution of the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held
liable for the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the second
contract.8 However, he ruled that there was no substantial evidence to grant the prayer for
moral and exemplary damages.
NLRC affirmed with modification, deleting the award of OT pay. Partial MR denied.

ISSUES: (1) WON there was novation of the first contract by the second contract; (2) WON the
alleged illegal dismissal under the 1st contract is barred by prescription; (3) WON respondent
was constructively dismissed.

HELD:

YES

It is evident that novation took place in this particular case. The parties impliedly extinguished
the first contract by agreeing to enter into the second contract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who
was unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila. The second contract would not have
been necessary if the petitioners abided by the terms and conditions of Madequillo, Jr.’s
employment under the first contract. The records also reveal that the 2nd contract extinguished
the first contract by changing its object or principal. These contracts were for overseas
employment aboard different vessels.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the first contract was a “previous valid contract” since it had
not yet been terminated at the time of Medequillo, Jr.’s repatriation to Manila. The legality of his
dismissal had not yet been resolved with finality. Undoubtedly, he was still employed under the
first contract when he negotiated with petitioners on the second contract. As such, the NLRC
correctly ruled that petitioners could only be held liable under the second contract

YES

Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which Medequillo Jr. may initiate
money claims under the 1st contract commenced on the date of his repatriation. xxx The start of
the three (3) year prescriptive period must therefore be reckoned on February 1992, which by
Medequillo Jr.’s own admission was the date of his repatriation to Manila. It was at this point in
time that Medequillo Jr.’s cause of action already accrued under the first contract. He had until
February 1995 to pursue a case for illegal dismissal and damages arising from the 1st contract.
With the filing of his Complaint-Affidavit on March 6, 1995, which was clearly beyond the
prescriptive period, the cause of action under the 1st contract was already time-barred.

NO (only breach of contract)

Even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of
petitioners.

Even if by the standard contract employment commences only “upon actual departure of the
seafarer”, this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment
without any valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor
performance of respondent while on board the first ship MV “Stolt Aspiration” cannot be
sustained to justify the non-deployment, for no evidence to prove the same was presented.

We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and
the commencement of the employer-employee relationship.

The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof,
occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest
of the terms and conditions therein.

Commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken

place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire.

Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the
perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach
of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had
happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be
liable for damages.

Further, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioners that the penalty is a mere
reprimand.
The breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law applicable at that time was the
1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The penalty for non-
deployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.

Now, the question to be dealt with is how will the seafarer be compensated by reason of the
unreasonable non-deployment of the petitioners?

We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act)
which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment. The law provides:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – xxxx the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Code provides that one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved.

Appeal Denied, respondent is awarded a actual damages equivalent to his salary for nine (9)
months as provided by the Second Employment Contract.

____________

NOTES:

Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation

by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or
principal conditions, or, by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third
person in the rights of the creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the
following requisites is indispensable:

There must be a previous valid obligation,

There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract,

There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and

There must be the validity of the new contract.

PP vs. OCDEN DIGEST

DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

PP vs. OCDEN

G.R. No. 173198

June 1, 2011

FACTS: The RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa.

(This is based from complaints of several persons accusing her of promising to the applicants
employment to a stuffed toy factory in Italy, wherein she asks for 70k from each as placement
fee. After the applicants pay, they will be sent to Zamboanga on the assurance that they will be
first sent to Malaysia for easier processing of their visas, and then to Italy, which never
materialized.

Ocden asserts that she was also just an applicant for overseas employment; and that she was
receiving her co-applicants’ job applications and other requirements, and accepting her co-
applicants’ payments of placement fees, because she was designated as the applicants’ leader by
Ramos, the real recruiter. )
Aggrieved by the above decision, Ocden filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. Ocden’s appeal
was sent to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its Decision, dismissing the
appeal and affirming Ocden’s conviction.

Hence, this appeal

ISSUE: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF ILLEGAL

RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE ALTHOUGH THE CRIME WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant Dolores Ocden is DENIED.

NO

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find nothing on record that would justify a
reversal of Ocden’s conviction.

Illegal recruitment in large scale

Ocden contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty
of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Other than the bare allegations of the
prosecution witnesses, no evidence was adduced to prove that she was a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. No
certification attesting to this fact was formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.

Ocden’s aforementioned contentions are without merit.

Article 13, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code defines and enumerates the acts which constitute
recruitment and placement:
(b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising for advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided,
That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

The amendments to the Labor Code introduced by RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, broadened the concept of illegal recruitment and
provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal
recruitment in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate. Pertinent provisions
of Republic Act No. 8042 are reproduced below:

SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not,
when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f)
of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It
shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-
licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:

xx

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment
does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a
syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

xxxx

**
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants
abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed. As testified to by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan, Ocden gave such an impression
through the following acts:

(1) Ocden informed Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan about the job opportunity in Italy and the list of
necessary requirements for application;

(2) Ocden required Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, to attend the
seminar conducted by Ramos at Ocden’s house in Baguio City;

(3) Ocden received the job applications, pictures, bio-data, passports, and the certificates of
previous employment (which was also issued by Ocden upon payment of P500.00), of Mana-a,
Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard;

(4) Ocden personally accompanied Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, for
their medical examinations in Manila;

(5) Ocden received money paid as placement fees by Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries
and Howard, and even issued receipts for the same; and (6) Ocden assured Mana-a, Ferrer, and
Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, that they would be deployed to Italy.

It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal
recruitment “whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or
holder of authority.” Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the
“[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually
take place without the worker’s fault.”
Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by a licensed
recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is inconsequential.
Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by receiving placement fees
from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two sons, Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by receipts Ocden
herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two sons the
amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their own.

NOTES:

Under the last paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is,
committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.

In People v. Hu, we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a
finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as a
group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial,
nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was
committed against three or more persons.

Section 7(b) of RA 8042 prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 if the illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage.

The very same evidence proving Ocden’s liability for illegal recruitment also established her
liability for estafa.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under
RA 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC.
It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of
the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation.

YAP vs. THENAMARIS SHIP’S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., G.R.
No. 179532 May 30, 2011 Sec. 10 of R.A. 8042

OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:

Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. The contract of employment
entered into by Yap and Capt. Francisco B. Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for
a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his
job as electrician. However, on or about 8 November 2001, the vessel was sold. The Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about the sale on 6 December 2001
in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento. Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by
the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus.
However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-
month basic wage. He insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of
his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for
immediate transfer but none was made. He then filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with
Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Labor Arbiter.

The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively
and illegally dismissed by respondents. The NLRC affirmed the decision but held that instead of
an award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for
three months as provided under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner however questions the
award of wages and assails Sec. 10 of R.A. 8042 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Is the 5th par. Sec 10 of R.A. 8042 violative of substantive due process?

RULING:

Yes.

The Court declared in Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime that the clause “or for three months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and
ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it
imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.

Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not just therein petitioner’s right to equal
protection, but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution.

Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion v Sps. Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (in behalf of
daughter

Jasmin), White Falcon Services, and Jaime Ortiz (Pres. Of White Falcon)

Sps. Cuaresma (in behalf of Jasmin) v White Falcon and Becmen

Facts:

Jan 1997 – Jasmin was deployed by Becmen to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in
Saudi under

a 3 year contract, for $247/mo.

June 1998 - she died. Jessie Fajardo, co-worker, found her dead inside her dormitory room with
mouth

foaming and smelling of poison. Medical report of Al-Birk Hosp stated that the cause of death
was

poisoning – halt in blood circulation, respiratory system and brain damage due to poisoning from

unknown substance.

Sep 1998 – her body was repatriated to Manila. The City Health Officer of Cabanatuan found
that Jasmin
died under violent circumstances not poisoning – abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated
wounds

and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her
elbows;

abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior
chest; rib

fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora.

Mar 1999 – Jasmin’s body was exhumed by NBI. Toxicology report tested negative ffor non-
volatile,

metallic poison and insecticides.

Sps. Cuaresmas received from OWWA the following: 50k death benefits, 50k loss of life; 20k
funeral

expenses; 10k medical reimbursement.

Nov 1999 – Sps. Filed complaint against Becmen and Rajab & Silsilah Co (principal in Saudi)
claiming

death and insurance benefits. Sps. Claim that Jasmin’s death was work-related having occurred
at the

employer’s premises; their entitled to iqama insurance; compensatory damages amounting to

$103k

which is the sum of her monthly salary 35 years (she was 25 yo when she died, assuming she
would

survive until 60 yo).

Becmen and Rajab claim that Jasmin committed suicide and relied on the medical report of Al
Birk. They

deny liability since the Sps. Had already received their benefits from OWWA. Later, Becmen
manifested

that Rajab had terminated their agency, and impleaded White Falcon as the new agency of
Rajab.

Summary of Rulings

· LArb – dismissed for lack of merit, giving credence to Al Birk medical report
· NLRC – reversed, found Jasmin a victim of compensable work-connected criminal aggression;

both agencies are solidarily liable to pay $113; later reduced to $80k

· CA – affirmed; later reduced the award to $8k (monthly salary x remaining contract period)

Issues

· WON entitled to insurance – NO

· WON death is compensable – NO

· WON death was by suicide – NO

· WON Becmen and Falcon are liable – YES, solidary liability

Ratio

1. NOT entitled to insurance.

The terms and conditions of Jasmin’s 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her employer

Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in an

employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the

force of law between the contracting parties. An examination of said employment agreement

shows that it provides for no other monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:

1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at

the end thereof, as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;

3. Transportation to and from work;

4. Free living accommodations;

5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic

surgery charges and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;

6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the

exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,

sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;

7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty

four-months of continuous service;

8. Eight days public holidays per year;

9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as

per labor laws of KSA.

Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or other

benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate court

granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.

Absence for provisions on social security and other benefits does not make the contract infirm

under PH laws since under Saudi law, foreign employer is not obliged to provide her these

benefits.

2. Death NOT WORK RELATED, therefore not compensable (i.e., not liable for lost earnings)

At time of death, Jasmin was not on duty but at her dormitory room on personal time. Court

stated that the foreign employer cannot be expected to ensure her safety even while she is not

on duty. What an employee does on free time is beyond the employer’s sphere of inquiry.

The dormitory room also cannot be considered as “employer’s premises”.

3. Jasmin DID NOT COMMIT SUICIDE

Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her

employment contract. This is beyond human comprehension for a 25 yo Filipina especially since

suicide is contrary to Christian belief. Court cited Filipina’s resilience despite abuse and

maltreatment. Based on past OFW experiences, Filipina’s do not simply commit suicide but

rather endure.

Court also found that Saudi police and autopsy reports are patently inconclusive. Their report is

contradicted by the City Health Officer and by NBI. Even the toxicology report tested negative

for poisonous substances.

All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to death.

4. Rajab, Becmen, White Falcon solidarily liable for moral and exemplary damages

Court admonished Becmen and Falcon for simply dismissing Jasmin’s case as one of suicide

instead of fighting for her rights. The Agencies prioritized their corporate interest over that of

Jasmin.

RA 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act provides that the State shall at all times

uphold the dignity of its citizens, whether in the country or overseas. The rights and interest of

distressed overseas Filipinos are adequately protected and safeguarded.

Becmen and Falcon, both licensed recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by RA 8042.

Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to deployed OFWs, be the first to come

the rescue of our distressed OFWs; and have the primary obligation to protect the rights and

ensure the welfare of our OFWs. It should have been them who sought justice for Jasmin.

Instead, it was the parents who requested an autopsy in the Ph to confirm the Saudi report.

Court stated that the parents have done all that was within their power to investigate Jasmin’s

case on their own.

Art 19 CC – every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,

act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art 21 CC – any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary

to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the later for the damage.

Art 24 CC – in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a

disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,

tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Rajab, Becmen and Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy because they

undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs.

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Fil workers enjoy the protective mantel of PH labor
and social laws, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This is in keeping with the

Consti provision for the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employement, ensure

equal work opportunities.

All labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent

living for the laborer.

As a result of their misconduct, Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages for which Becmen and

Falcon are solidarily liable. Grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct

on the part of the employer is sanctioned by Art 2219 (10) CC.

Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-basd

employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employement. This is

meanth to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment. If the agency is a

juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners are also solidarily liable.

Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not absolve Becmen.

CA decision set aside. Awarded P2.5M as moral damages, P250k as exemplary damages.

G.R. No. 117056 February 24, 1998

ABD OVERSEAS MANPOWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MARS INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER, INC. and

MOHMINA MACARAYA, respondents.

FACTS:

· Dec. 1989 - Mohmina Macaraya applied for an overseas job as a dressmaker and, accordingly,

paid recruitment/placement fee to MARS International Manpower. She signed up for a 2-yr

contract stipulating she would earn $250.

· MARS submitted her papers to POEA stating, however, that she would be employed as
domestic
helper with monthly salary of $200

· Jan. 1990 – Macaraya was deployed to Saudi where she worked as DH for three months (over

her objections), after which she was paid only 700Riyals by her employer and then repatriated

to Manila à filed case for illegal dismissal and underpayment/nonpayment against MARS, M.S.

Al Babtain Recruitment Office and Times Surety and Insurance Co.

· MARS moved that ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. be impleaded because in Sept. 1990, it

became the accredited local recruitment agency of Al Babtain Recruitment Office

· POEA rendered decision ordering ABD and Al Babtain to jointly and severally pay Macaraya
her

salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract and salary differentials due her

(totaling ~$4,700), ruling that ABD being a transferee agency of Al Babtain stands to be liable

with it solidarily (as transferee agency, shall assume full and complete responsibility to all

contractual obligations of the principals to its workers originally recruited and processed by its

former agency)à NLRC likewise dismissed appeal made by ABD

ISSUE:

Can an accredited transferee recruitment agent of a foreign employer/recruitment office be held

liable

under POEA Rules and Regulations (POEA Rules) for the illegal dismissal of an overseas worker
who filed

the case prior to the transferee agent's accreditation?

HELD/RATIO:

· Accreditation was established in order to protect interests of the Filipino workers, such that:

Principals may be accredited in this country only through licensed local

agencies. The transfer, however, as in this case, should not work to allow MARS to evade

liability.

· MARS impleaded petitioner in the case after it had been submitted for decision and one-and-
ahalf
years after it had filed its answer. During this hiatus, the case lay dormant in the POEA. It

should be noted that petitioner became the accredited recruitment agency on September 3,

1990, two months after MARS had filed its answer to the complaint. The POEA's inaction ad

interim provided MARS with an opportunity to escape liability.

· Basic principles of justice and equity, however, dictate that MARS should not be totally cleared

of its liability to Macaraya under the peculiar circumstances of this case. POEA Rules may not be

used as a shield against liability by a recruitment agency that has been substituted by a foreign

principal as its local recruitment agency after it has clearly incurred liability in favor of an

overseas worker. Consequently, considering that it was MARS with whom Macaraya entered

into a contract and that it had been accorded due process at the proceedings before the POEA,

it is but just that MARS be the one to be held accountable for her claims.

· In so ruling, the Court is not in any way invalidating Section 6, Rule II, Book III of the POEA
Rules.

The presumption of its validity remains. Its application in this case should, however, be an

exception to the rule. Petitioner shall pay Macaraya the amount due her under the assailed

POEA decision, without prejudice to its right to be reimbursed by MARS under the provision of

the Civil Code that "(w)hoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has

paid."

· NLRC decision thus affirmed, subject to the modification that respondent MARS shall
reimburse

petitioner ABD the amount awarded therein to respondent Mohmina Macaraya.

Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, NO DIGEST FOUND

G.R. No. 152214 September 19, 2006

EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by the HON. DOMINGO L.

SIAZON, JR.,

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), represented by HON.

BIENVENIDO

LAGUESMA, respondents.

Facts:

On September 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of Lemery, Batangas and an
overseas Filipino worker, died

of acute cardiac arrest while asleep (bangungot) at the dormitory of the Samsong
Textile Processing Factory in

South Korea. Informed thereof, the Philippine Overseas Labor Office (POLO) at South
Korea immediately relayed

the incident to the Philippine Embassy in South Korea. Forthwith, the [Labor] Attaché
of the Philippine Embassy

dispatched a letter to Eleuterio Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas Workers

Welfare Administration (OWWA),

telling him about what happened and to inform the relatives of Razon.

In turn, the OWWA indorsed the matter, for appropriate action, to Director R. Casco of
the Welfare Employment

Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (WEO-POEA).

Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was discovered that Manny
Razon was recruited and

deployed by Equi-Asia Placement, and was sent to South Korea in April 2000 to work-
train at Yeongjin Machinery,

Inc. Thereupon, POEA addressed the first assailed telegram-directive to the

President/GM of the petitioner. We

quote the telegram:

"PLEASE PROVIDE PTA [Prepaid Ticket Advice] FOR THE REPATRIATION OF REMAINS
AND

BELONGINGS OF OFW MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE

EMBASSY, KOREA, YOU ARE GIVEN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT HEREOF WITHIN
WHICH

TO PROVIDE SAID TICKET AND ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CONSTRAIN US

TO
IMPOSE APPROPRIATE SANCTION UNDER OUR RULES"

Responding thereto, petitioner, thru its President Daniel Morga, Jr., faxed the following
message to the Assistance

and Welfare Division of the POEA:

"In connection with your telegram, this is to report to your good office the following:

2. He violated his employment/training/dispatching contracts on June 25, 2000 by

unlawfully

escaping/running away (TNT) from his company assignment without prior KFSMB
authorization and

working/staying in unknown company/place;

In view thereof, we cannot heed your requests as embodied in your telegram.

However, his relatives

can avail of the benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving

undocumented/illegal Filipino

workers abroad.

On the same date, Director Casco of the WEO-POEA sent to the petitioner the second
assailed letter-directive,

which pertinently reads:

"Mmay we remind you that pursuant to Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the
Implementing Rules

Governing RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino
Act of

1995, the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal effects is
the primary

responsibility of the principal or agency and to immediately advance the cost of plane
fare without

prior determination of the cause of worker's repatriation. The Rules further provide
for the procedure

to be followed in cases when the foreign employer/agency fails to provide for the cost
of the

repatriation, compliance of which is punishable by suspension of the license of the

agency or such

sanction as the Administration shall deem proper. Hence, you are required to provide
the PTA for
the deceased OFW in compliance with the requirement in accordance with R.A. 8042.
You are given

forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt hereof within which to provide said ticket. Failure
in this regard

will constrain us to impose the appropriate sanction under our rules.

Petitioner wrote back Director Casco, thus:

"Please be informed that under the provisions of Section 53 as well as, and in relation
to,

Section 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers
and Overseas

Filipinos Act of 1995, the action to be imposed by POEA for non-compliance therewith
within 48

hours are violative of due process and/or the principle on due delegation of power.

This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior notice and hearing
before

responsibility thereunder could be established against the agency that sets up the
defense of sole

fault – in avoidance of said responsibility. Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the powers

to require advance payment of the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension in

case of non-compliance therewith, when the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of

such powers.

Nonetheless, and apprehensive of the adverse repercussions which may ensue on account of its non-
compliance

with the directive, petitioner advanced under protest the costs for the repatriation of the remains of
Razon.

CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.CA stated that petitioner was mainly accusing the POEA of
grave

abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioner to pay, in advance, the costs for the repatriation of the
remains of

Razon.CA ruled that POEA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its directives to petitioner were
issued

pursuant to existing laws and regulations. It likewise held that a petition for certiorari, which was the
remedy availed
of by petitioner, is not the proper remedy as the same is only available when "there is no appeal, or any
plain,

speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations

Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or Republic Act 8042 ("Omnibus
Rules")

states that "the Labor Arbiters of NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all

claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for

overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to
the rules

and procedures of the NLRC." There is, therefore, an adequate remedy available to petitioner.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that it could not strike down as unconstitutional Sections 52, 53, 54,
and 55 of

the Omnibus Rules as the unconstitutionality of a statute or rules may not be passed upon unless the issue
is

directly raised in an appropriate proceeding.

Issue: W/N CA erred in dismissing the petition.

Held: No

Ratio:

At the center of this petition are the following provisions of the omnibus rules:

Section 52. Primary Responsibility for Repatriation. – The repatriation of the worker, or his/her remains,

and the transport of his/her personal effects shall be the primary responsibility of the principal or agency

which recruited or deployed him/her abroad. All costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal or
the

agency concerned.

Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. – The primary responsibility to repatriate entails the obligation on the

part of principal or agency to advance the cost of plane fare and to immediately repatriate the worker
should

the need for it arise, without a prior determination of the cause of the termination of the worker's
employment. However, after the worker has returned to the country, the principal or agency may recover
the

cost of repatriation from the worker if the termination of employment was due solely to his/her fault.

Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the primary responsibility of agency to advance

the cost of plane fare, and the obligation of the worker to refund the cost thereof in case his/her fault is

determined by the Labor Arbiter.

Section 54. Repatriation Procedure. – When a need for repatriation arises and the foreign employer fails to

provide for it cost, the responsible personnel at site shall simultaneously notify OWWA and the POEA of

such need. The POEA shall notify the agency concerned of the need for repatriation. The agency shall

provide the plane ticket or the prepaid ticket advice (PTA) to the Filipinos Resource Center or to the

appropriate Philippine Embassy; and notify POEA of such compliance. The POEA shall inform OWWA of the

action of the agency.

Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. – If the employment agency fails to provide the ticket or PTA

within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or impose
such

sanctions as it may deem necessary. Upon notice from the POEA, OWWA shall advance the costs of

repatriation with recourse to the agency or principal. The administrative sanction shall not be lifted until
the

agency reimburses the OWWA of the cost of repatriation with legal interest.

Said provisions, on the other hand, are supposed to implement Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 which
provides:

SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency Repatriation Fund. – The repatriation of the worker and the

transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which, recruited or

deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the
agency

concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal
belongings

of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local
agency.

However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the
principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former
and/or

his belongings.

It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and
the

quasi-judicial. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, we discussed the nature of these powers to be –

In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it,
in

accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as

basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this

function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as enumerated in Ang

Tibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation

of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of

certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and

hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no
determination

of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and
hearing

are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.

In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However, these rules were clearly

promulgated by DFA and DOLE the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to
promulgate rules

and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an
original

action for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects thereof. If only for
these, the

petition deserves outright dismissal. Be that as it may, we shall proceed to resolve the substantive issues
raised in

this petition for review in order to finally remove the doubt over the validity of Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55
of the
Omnibus Rules.

It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is
allowed in

the face of increasing complexity of modern life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as
the

principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to
promulgate rules

and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid
exercise of

this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law;

and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law. Under

the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it

leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce
it. The

second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the

law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Basically, petitioner is impugning the subject provisions of the Omnibus Rules for allegedly expanding the
scope of

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 by: first, imposing upon it the primary obligation to repatriate the
remains of

Razon including the duty to advance the cost of the plane fare for the transport of Razon's remains; and
second, by

ordering it to do so without prior determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship

between itself

and Razon.

Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be primarily responsible for the
repatriation of a

deceased OFW is specious and plain nitpicking. While Republic Act No. 8042 does not expressly state that

petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport back here to the Philippines the remains of Razon,
nevertheless,

such duty is imposed upon him as the statute clearly dictates that "the repatriation of remains and
transport of the

personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal
and/or the

local agency." The mandatory nature of said obligation is characterized by the legislature's use of the word
"shall."

That the concerned government agencies opted to demand the performance of said responsibility solely
upon

petitioner does not make said directives invalid as the law plainly obliges a local placement agency to bear
the

burden of repatriating the remains of a deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal abroad.

Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for allegedly contravening
Section

15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation
should the

termination of the employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the
statute merely

states the general principle that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's own
undoing,

it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act
No.

8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances
surrounding an

OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such determination would most likely take
some

time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest possible time lest
he remains

stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for
repatriation. As aptly

pointed out by the Solicitor General –

Such a situation is unacceptable.

24. This is the same reason why repatriation is made by law an obligation of the agency and/or its
principal

without the need of first determining the cause of the termination of the worker's employment.
Repatriation is

in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an

investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a foreign land

without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a
violation

of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.

As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following:

"public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and
welfare."