LCP v.
COMELEC Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
G.R. No. 176951 December 21, 2009
FACTS:
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent,[1] for what is within the spirit is
within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
The presumption of constitutionality of statutes. To doubt is to sustain.
BACKGROUND:
Decision[10] dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote,
granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being
violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the
equal protection clause.
First MR: By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Second MR: By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18
November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading
On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the
Resolution of April 28, 2009…Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further
Proceedings Thereon.
Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009
motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on
May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause
with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April
28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the
observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected before the Court
could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period
counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution.[12]
Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and petitioners-
in-intervention filed their respective comments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art.
VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the
subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is
called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like
issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing,
on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated groundthat the
basic issues have already been passed suffice to hurdle the voting
requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
cityhood laws in question?
HELD:
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of
the Members contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution
In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno,
in a separate opinion, expressed the view that a deadlocked vote of six (6)
is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with
precedential value.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e.,
Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC,
respectively, providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided.
Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again
be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no
decision is reached, the original action commenced in the
court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment
or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for
reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En
 Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a
majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may
be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the
motion.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is deemed denied.
To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the
cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolutiona 6-6
deadlock.
 first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set
in, the issuance of the precipitate[16] entry of judgment
notwithstanding,
 second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for
reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the
cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the
underlying decision.
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14,
2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the
November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second
motion for reconsideration.
11th Congress,
fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills
thirty-three (33) eventually became laws.
twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.
As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides
that [a] municipality x x x may be converted into a component city if it has
a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP
100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cityhood laws violate:
 Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution
 the equal protection clause.
The Court is disposed to reconsider.
The power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative
in character.[28] But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by
law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a
province, city, or municipality.
Art. X, Sec. 10 specifically provides for the creation of political
subdivisions in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, subject to the approval of the voters in the unit
concerned.
Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political
subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of
criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress
can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject
enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability.
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the
LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical.
The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent
requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the exemption clause of the
law.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of
contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less,
intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from
the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws,
which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final
analysis, to the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis[37] or
strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead
to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.[38] To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of
the law is the law itself,[39] resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the
law controls its letter.[40]
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the
logical inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering
legislative intent.[41]
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of
the pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying
municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-
income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally
noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then
Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping
short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill
No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills
 the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the
minimum income requirement of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No.
2159 proposes
 RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the
cityhood bills are concerned.
Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged
cityhood laws.
It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering
joint resolution were undertaken in the 11th and/or the 12th Congress.
Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly
those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain
municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic
aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the
13th Congress, Congress not being a continuing body.
What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of
Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the
cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its
legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the
interpretation of the law.
Equal Protection
Petitioners challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal
protection clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination.
Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to
be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.
Petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results
by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. It is presumptuous on the
part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it
were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated.
Equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed.
As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16)
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Years
before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had
already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of
1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their
conversion remained unacted upon by Congress.
To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they
have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair, to borrow from
Senator Lim.
While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a
privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the
exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing
existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense
an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the
respondent LGUs.
Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood
laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the
cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration
of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of
RA 9009.

The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating,

but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected
LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized
and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees.
Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine
provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood
laws in question.

By way of summing up the main arguments in support of this disposition,

the Court hereby declares the following:

1. Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA

9009 to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood
laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject
cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP
100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
2. The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from
the PhP 100 million income requirement;
3. The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills
or resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the
13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a
continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the
11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference
inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the
passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the
13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as
here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal
application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.
4. The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact
that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of
RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other
municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16
also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the
original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

Cityhood laws are presumed constitutional