CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
bag6 and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline
Searches and Seizures, pt. 1
1. People vs. Bongcarawan
2. People vs. Salanguit
3. Soliven vs. Makasiar (Gutierrez, Jr., J concurring)
4. Microsoft Corp vs. Maxicorp Inc.
5. People vs. CA
6. People vs. Tiu Won Chua
7. People vs. Priscilla del Norte
8. Umil vs. Ramos
9. People vs. Nuevas
10. People vs. del Rosario
People vs. Bongcarawan
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated December 27, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-
7542, finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 64252 as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.1âwphi1.nêt
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an
Information which reads, thus:
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, without authority of law, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug
commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400
grams, without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended by RA 7659."3
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an
interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to
Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was
about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark
Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her
missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin
no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the
vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect
whom they later found at the economy section.4 The suspect was
identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was
informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106.
With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found.
He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy
section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase
and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security,
the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small
plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the
substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported
the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside
the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance.5 At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN
Aurelio Estoque, CD2 Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De
Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the
accused and the seized items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown
substance.7 When asked about the contraband articles, the accused
explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican "Alex"
Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan City. 8 The
accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast
guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
Chief Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to
the PAOCTF Headquarters,9 while the packs of white crystalline
substance were sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro
City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz
later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride,
commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams. 10
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11,
1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met
Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He
was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing
sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's
brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the
same night, carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or
"maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from
Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.11 He stayed at cabin
no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about
to dock at the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself
at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other
passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were
conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman
whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no. 106 came and
told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went
with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked.
Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to
the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's
Samsonite suitcase. He left the small "maleta" containing sunglasses
and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security
personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but
refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed
was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel
forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline
substance inside which they suspected to be "shabu." They took
pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn
over receipt which was later given to the Philippine Coast Guard, then
to the PAOCTF.12
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher
Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the offense of violation of Section 16,
Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13,
1999 until the present, the period of such preventive
detention shall be credited in full in favor of the accused in
the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the National Bureau of
Investigation for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED."13
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment
of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE
DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
1
 II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE
APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE
AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
HIM."14
On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that
the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his
consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to
such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in
evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti15 is not
applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed
to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution.16 Evidence acquired in violation of
this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.17 Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may
choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his
right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that protection is against transgression committed by the
government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v.
Marti,18 "[i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State."19 The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could
only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. 20
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was
searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found
"shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard
for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the
search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should
be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the
latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order.
The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police
officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of
enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them
and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends
that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no
knowledge that the same contained "shabu." He submits that without
knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be
convicted of the crime charged.21
We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that
the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug.22 The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and
were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,23 this
Court has ruled that to warrant conviction, the possession of
dangerous drugs must be with knowledge of the accused, or
that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control
of such articles.24 It has been ruled, however, that possession of
dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of
a satisfactory explanation of such possession.25 Hence, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge
or animus possidendi.26
In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony,
uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was not given credence
by the trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule
that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.27 Moreover, evidence must
be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in law. In this case,
the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his
baggage, he knew it would be inspected.28 Why he got the Samsonite
suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock
known only to the owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did
not present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents
consisting of expensive sunglasses and brushes would be
confiscated,29 but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his
and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even watches. 30
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be
owned by him.31 To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to
present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the
accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the
contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly
observed by the trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does
he really exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He
says that Alex Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow
businessman who has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi
City. But no witnesses were presented to prove that there is
such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex
Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused.
Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen
and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of
the accused."32
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at
bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories
can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to
convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner
and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-
appellant Basher Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Salanguit
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of §16 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing
him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P700, 000.00.
2
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425
were filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357,
the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a
regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or
prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW .2
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by
law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams
of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW ,3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty4 whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S.
Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector
Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a
field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant 5 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the
residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase
2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in
accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken
by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application
was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding
Judge Dolores L. Español.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of
accused-appellant to serve the warrant.6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellant’s door, but
nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently
panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house.7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house.8 They found 12
small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to
be marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams.10 A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with
them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the
items they had seized.12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated
evidence.13 The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77
grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37
grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425
grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. 14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His
testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as
they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the
gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian
attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof.15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a
piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-
appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn
and he had no chance to read it.16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of
the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening
cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber
firearm, jewelry , and canned goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and,
after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the
NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was
detained.18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his
testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house,
ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and
the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated
and condemned for disposition according to law. The
evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn
such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation
pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE(SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION §8, R.A. No.
6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE
THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
3
 THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING
THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First,
the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence
as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in
obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the
"plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by
the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure21 provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the
requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.22 Nothing can justify the
issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are
fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant
reads:
SEARCH WARRANT
NO.160 For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR,
PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that
there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT
SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his
premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in
Annex "A", the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search
anytime of the day/night of the premises above-described
and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be
dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995
at Imus, Cavite, Philippines. (SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAÑOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds:
(1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia;
(2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with
sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu
and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable
cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search
warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing
the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have
been ordered to be seized by the trial court.23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the
intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the
proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about
drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation
Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you were
assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A -Yes, sir.
Q – Of what particular assignment or area were you
assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A – Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house
without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose Quezon
City, Sir.
Q – Do You know the person who occupies the specific
place?
A – Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – Are you familiar with that place?
A – Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to
penetrate inside the area and established contract with
ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who
introduced me to the former.
Q – In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT
SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A – When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer
and drug pusher of shabu, sir .
Q – Were you able to buy at that time?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – How much if you can still remember the amount
involved?
A – I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu
in the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
(P2,750.00) pesos, sir .
Q – Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT
@ Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu) were being
kept?
A – Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q – How were you able to know the place where he kept the
stuff?
A – When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it
was done inside his room and I saw that the shabu was
taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q – Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A – Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q – How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from
ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A – After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @
Robert, I proceeded back to our office and reported the
progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him
4
 the 2.12, grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then
afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP
Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical
Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated
drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS
result No. D-414-95 dated 19 December 95.
Q – Do you have anything more to add or retract from your
statement?
A – Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @
Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu,
he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of
One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per
gram.
Q – Are you willing to sign your statement freely and
voluntarily?
A – Yes, sir.24
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is
that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented
showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior
Court,25 the warrant properly described two obscene books but
improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it
does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles,
even though proper if viewed separately, must be
condemned merely because the warrant was defective with
respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant
are severable from the authorization relating to the named
books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of
obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if
otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to
suggest that invalid portions "of a warrant will be treated as
severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger
that warrants might be obtained which are essentially
general in character but as to minor items meet the
requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures
might be made under them, in the expectation that the
seizure would in any event be upheld as to the property
specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of
course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on
probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on
the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search
warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an
undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part,
with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than
one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished
under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.27 It will suffice to quote
what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states
that it is in connection with "Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly
recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to
believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of
No.628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in
their session and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations
which is the subject of the offense stated above." Although
the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the "place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for
"Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying what provisions of the law
were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of "dried
marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld the validity of
the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question
was issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive.
He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since
illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana
and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by
different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1)
specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should
have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal
possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of
marijuana and the third for illegal possession of
paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and
"regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the
same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant
may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For
Violation of P .D. No.1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The
validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued
without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which
punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal
possession of firearms is penalized under §1 of P.D. No.1866 and
illegal possession of explosives is penalized under §3 thereof, the
decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related
as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of
firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was
necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the
said law.
Particularly of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate
the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
.....While the address stated in the warrant is merely
"Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City," the trial court took
note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case
No.160 contained several documents which identified the
premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search
warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was
located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San
Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which
described the premises as "a house without a number
located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the
pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched.
In fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house
under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo
5
 Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar
resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where
appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of
appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided
by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was
really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even
first ascertained through their informant that appellant was
inside his residence before they actually started their
operation.32
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if
the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended to be searched.33 For example, a search
warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83
Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there
were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the
ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on
each floor. However, the description was made determinate by a
reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was
occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street,
Malboro Mass."34 In this case, the location of accused-appellant's
house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no
doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity.1âwphi1.nêt
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from
accused-appellant's residence, Search Warrant No.160 was properly
issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing
witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However,
seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug
was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is
contested by accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view"
of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.35 For this
doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the
evidence before the police.36 The question is whether these requisites
were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this
case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and
thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the
police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no
longer provide any basis -for admitting the other items subsequently
found. As has been explained:
What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the
accused -and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where
it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object
to another until something incriminating at last emerges.37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the
conduct of a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for
possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is
limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control.18 The rationale for permitting such a search is to
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit
violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with,
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on
accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control.
Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after
the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by
SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no
apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People.
v. Musa39 in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered
by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic
bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag
hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to
its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they
opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v.
California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not
have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the
bag had they not forcibly opened it; Even assuming then,
that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the
plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may
be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the
plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature
of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or
otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer . 40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights
secured by the Constitution.41 In this case, the marijuana allegedly
found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two
bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the
contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible
as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items
were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove
that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in
accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the
confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force
was employed by the searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure42 provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer,
if refused admittance to the place of directed search after
giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open
any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully
detained therein.
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the
roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in
the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No
affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay
officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to
attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force
in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house,
especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact
that the searching party knocked on the door several times.
6
Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people
inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's
forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that
the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs
under §16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging
from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering
the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is
AFFIRMED .
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court
finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession
of prohibited drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the
confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as
ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Soliven vs. Makasiar
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K.
AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY
SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C.
VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35
of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR,
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and
THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF
JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA
JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at
Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R.
No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez
for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1)
whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations
for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of
a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice
and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause;
and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic.
On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of
Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On
appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16,
1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have
been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has
lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the
allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his
counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed,"
in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-
affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is
so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants
of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue
warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law,"
has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now
requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular
No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
7
The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the
prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative
disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying
on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions
free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office;
not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in
a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed
the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive
it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be
held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the
publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that
such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving
the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed
would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no
basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their
separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the
Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827
and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in
the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three
principal issues mentioned in its opening statement. However, as to the
more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the libel
case would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to
reserve my vote. I believe this is the more important issue in these
petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438
[1985]), the Court should not hesitate to quash a criminal prosecution
in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is
not alone the criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel
case which is involved but broader considerations of governmental
power versus a preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest
official of the Republic and one who enjoys unprecedented public
support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the
publisher and chairman of the editorial board, the managing editor and
the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be
limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead of observing
accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal attacks,
irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths
which tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
complainant. However, this case is not a simple prosecution for libel.
We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads
the investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of
appellate courts but who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken
the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of
freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of
leaving the matter to fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial
judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal
prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond the usual difficulties
encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media
to freely criticize government or to question government handling of
sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal
should draw the demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37
Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision
of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out
that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be expected and
should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own
or a person in authority of such exalted position
that the citizen must speak of him only with bated
breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws,
every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman,
and has equal rights with every other man." (at p.
900)
In fact, the Court observed that high official position, instead of
affording immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, would
actually invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It would
seem that what would ordinarily be slander if directed at the typical
person should be examined from various perspectives if directed at a
high government official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw this
fine line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448 [1977]) that a prosecution for libel lacks
justification if the offending words find sanctuary within the shelter of
the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should
not be allowed to continue, where after discounting the possibility that
the words may not be really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling
effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the willingness of newspapermen,
especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their critical
role in society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a
columnist writes in his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay
8
off certain issues or certain officials, the effect on a free press would be
highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered
by our resolution, I must call attention to our decisions which caution
that "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of
punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as
libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the
citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra).
The United States Supreme Court is even more emphatic, to wit:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither
precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet
"libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state law. N. A.
A. C. P. v. Button, 371 US 415, 429, 9L ed 2d 405, 415, 83 S
Ct 328. Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful
acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the other various other formulae for the
repression of expression that have been challenged in this
Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
Those who won our independence believed ... that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They
recognized the risk to which all human institutions are
subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that
hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies
in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsel is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. ...
Thus we consider this case against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. ... (at pp. 700-701)
Shunting aside the individual liability of Mr. Luis Beltran, is there
a prima facie showing that Messrs. Maximo Soliven, Antonio V. Roces,
Frederick K. Agcaoili, and Godofredo L. Manzanas knowingly
participated in a wilful purveying of falsehood? Considering the free
speech aspects of these petitions, should not a differentiated approach
to their particular liabilities be taken instead of lumping up everybody
with the offending columnist? I realize that the law includes publishers
and editors but perhaps the "chilling effect" issue applies with singular
effectivity to publishers and editors vis-a-vis newspaper columnists.
There is no question that, ordinarily, libel is not protected by the free
speech clause but we have to understand that some provocative
words, which if taken literally may appear to shame or disparage a
public figure, may really be intended to provoke debate on public
issues when uttered or written by a media personality. Will not a
criminal prosecution in the type of case now before us dampen the
vigor and limit the variety of public debate? There are many other
questions arising from this unusual case which have not been
considered.
I, of course, concur with the Court's opinion because it has decided to
limit the issues to narrowly drawn ones. I see no reason to disagree
with the way the Court has resolved them. The first issue on
prematurity is moot. The second issue discusses a procedure now
embodied in the recently amended Rules of Court on how a Judge
should proceed before he issues a warrant of arrest. Anent the third
issue, considerations of public policy dictate that an incumbent
President should not be sued. At the same time, the President cannot
stand by helplessly bereft of legal remedies if somebody vilifies or
maligns him or her.
The Court has decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for a later day.
To this, I take exception. I know that most of our fiscals and judges are
courageous individuals who would not allow any considerations of
possible consequences to their careers to stand in the way of public
duty. But why should we subject them to this problem? And why should
we allow the possibility of the trial court treating and deciding the case
as one for ordinary libel without bothering to fully explore the more
important areas of concern, the extremely difficult issues involving
government power and freedom of expression.
However, since we have decided to defer the "chilling effect" issue for
a later day, I limit myself to reiterating the dissenting words of Mr.
Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. Illinois (343 U.
S. 250) when he said:
If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal
history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws
are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty
only when applied with safeguards evolved to
prevent their invasion of freedom of expression.
In the trial of the libel case against the petitioners, the safeguards in
the name of freedom of expression should be faithfully applied.
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, Inc.
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Court of
Appeals’ Decision2 dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated
29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of Appeals
reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila
("RTC"), denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.’s ("Maxicorp") motion to
quash the search warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp.
Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section
29 of PD 49")4 and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code ("RPC").5
Antecedent Facts
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent
Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several
applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp for
alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC.
After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-
451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against
Maxicorp.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July
1996 a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the
description stated in the search warrants.
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search
warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance
and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." The RTC
denied Maxicorp’s motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied
Maxicorp’s motion for reconsideration.
The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after
examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and
computer technician Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on
what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI
9
Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they
have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using
petitioners’ products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. On 23 December 1998,
the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s
motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29
November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present
during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp
produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as
evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name
of a certain "Joel Diaz."
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF
LAW;
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY
TO FILE THE PETITION;
3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE
THE SEARCH WARRANTS;
4. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "GENERAL
WARRANTS."
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise
questions of law. Maxicorp insists that the arguments petitioners
presented are questions of fact, which this Court should not consider in
a Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues they
presented in this petition involve questions of law. Petitioners point out
that the facts are not in dispute.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover
questions of law.6 Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this
Court will not review them on appeal,7 subject to exceptions as when
the findings of the appellate court conflict with the findings of the trial
court.8
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is
settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers
on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if
the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this
delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the
distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to
presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically
involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being
resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the
evidence.9 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact.10 If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. 11 Our
ruling in Paterno v. Paterno12 is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should
be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble
or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the
other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.
Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party,
weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence
submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear
and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented
by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the
face of protests as to their spurious character by the other
side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of
a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said
proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by
petitioners. But this situation does not automatically
transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of
law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition – the legal
personality of the petitioners, the nature of the warrants
issued and the presence of probable cause – only the first
two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether
there was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a
question of fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve
a question of law since it does not concern itself with the
truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this
issue would require this Court to inquire into the probative
value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a
question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them.13
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising
arguments requiring an examination of the TSNs and the documentary
evidence presented during the search warrant proceedings. In short,
petitioners would have us substitute our own judgment to that of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals by conducting our own evaluation of the
evidence. This is exactly the situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise only questions
of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this court
to analyze or weigh evidence.14 When we give due course to such
situations, it is solely by way of exception. Such exceptions apply only
in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.15
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the
findings of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of the
RTC.16 Since petitioners properly raised the conflicting findings of the
lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this
petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office
of the Solicitor General as representative of the People of the
Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs
this case.17 We ruled in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals18 that the petitioner-complainant in a petition for
review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of
the Solicitor General if there is grave error committed by the lower
court or lack of due process. This avoids a situation where a
complainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a case
would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to
circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia
Pictures Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to
warrant the application of this doctrine.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC
based on the fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI
Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of Appeals
disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in
determining the existence of probable cause. Maxicorp counters that
the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC. Maxicorp
10
maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC
conducted was defective.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the
RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent
Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was
in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the fact that petitioners’
other witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not buy
counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC’s
findings.
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper."19 Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. 20
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally
examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath
required must refer to "the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause."21 The applicant must have personal
knowledge of the circumstances. "Reliable information" is
insufficient.22 Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must
depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses. 23
The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on
the fact that the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary
examination failed to prove conclusively that they bought counterfeit
software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted
to a failure to prove the existence of a connection between the offense
charged and the place searched.
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under
Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the
RPC. To support these charges, petitioners presented the testimonies
of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a
civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate
several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these
acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they
personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair
competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies
of the witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano
testified that he saw Maxicorp display and offer for sale counterfeit
software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software
were produced and packaged within Maxicorp’s premises. NBI Agent
Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the products were
counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving
the accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and
certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several
instances when Maxicorp installed petitioners’ software into computers
it had assembled. Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of
petitioners’ software within Maxicorp’s premises. Petitioners never
authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the
existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is
reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and
unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent
Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit
software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises,
they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable
cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man,24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after
a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of
evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists.25 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation.26 Thus, it was improper for the Court of
Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not
in his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not
the only proof that the sale of petitioners’ software occurred. During the
search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented
to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in
which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’
software.27 Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit.28 Pante, the computer technician,
demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners’ software on the
same computer unit.29 There was a comparison between petitioners’
genuine software and Maxicorp’s software pre-installed in the
computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased.30Even if we
disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of "Joel Diaz," which
petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the
operation, there still remains more than sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals’ ruling on Sacriz’s testimony.
The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software from
Maxicorp does not eliminate the existence of probable cause.
Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act
of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from
copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere
offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm
testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses on such other acts stand
untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that
the judge examine personally and thoroughly the applicant for the
warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The RTC
complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the
judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to
question the applicant and his witnesses.31 For this reason, the findings
of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn
such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts
before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.32 Nothing in the
records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal any
impropriety on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily
see, here the judge examined thoroughly the applicant and his
witnesses. To demand a higher degree of proof is unnecessary and
untimely. The prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation
if it were required to present all its evidence at such preliminary stage.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General
Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and
the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to
limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the
search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is
necessary to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable
searches and seizures be committed.33
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in connection with one
specific offense." The articles described must bear a direct relation to
11
the offense for which the warrant is issued.34 Thus, this rule requires
that the warrant must state that the articles subject of the search and
seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific
offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in
scope and lack the specificity required with respect to the objects to be
seized. After examining the wording of the warrants issued, the Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and reversed the RTC’s Order
thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the
petitioner’s store can be seized on the ground that it is "used
or intended to be used" in the illegal or unauthorized copying
or reproduction of the private respondents’ software and their
manuals.35
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of
paragraph (e) of the search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate
court found that similarly worded warrants, all of which noticeably
employ the phrase "used or intended to be used," were previously held
void by this Court.36 The disputed text of the search warrants in this
case states:
a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of
Microsoft software bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION
contained in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of
Microsoft instruction manuals and/or literature bearing the
Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by
MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers,
journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts
and documents used in the recording of the reproduction
and/or assembly, distribution and sales, and other
transactions in connection with fake or counterfeit products
bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
e) Computer hardware, including central processing
units including hard disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards,
monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying machines
and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended
to be used in the illegal and unauthorized copying or
reproduction of Microsoft software and their manuals, or
which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the
authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all
Microsoft trademarks and copyrights; and
f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order
to access all computer hard drives, data bases and other
information storage devices containing unauthorized
Microsoft software.37 (Emphasis supplied)
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow.38 The description of the property to
be seized need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature of
the description should vary according to whether the identity of the
property or its character is a matter of concern.39 Measured against this
standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The
articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically, they
were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense
charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or
intended for use in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners’
software. This language meets the test of specificity. 40
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those
cases, the Court found the warrants too broad because of particular
circumstances, not because of the mere use of the phrase "used or
intended to be used." In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the
warrants ordering the seizure of "television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x" were found too broad
since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video
tapes.41 The mere presence of counterfeit video tapes in the
defendant’s store does not mean that the machines were used to
produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is different.
Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co.
(Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants
because they authorized the seizure of records pertaining to "all
business transactions" of the defendant.42And in 20th Century Fox
Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the warrant
because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the
fact that such appliances are "generally connected with the legitimate
business of renting out betamax tapes."43
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in
particularity. Paragraph (c) states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other
paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property
used for personal or other purposes not related to copyright
infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description covers
property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or
its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the seizure of all
items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or
not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright
infringement or unfair competition.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially
defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular
with respect to the other items, should be nullified as a whole. A
partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically
described in the warrant.44 A search warrant is severable, the items not
sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole
warrant.45 The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of
the Constitution renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence
obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items
seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under
paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its
Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized
under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453
and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered
returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.
SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines vs. CA, et. al.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial
Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR
HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD
ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal
at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision
12
promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's petition
for certiorari to invalidate (i) the Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of
Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996. 2 as well
(ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for
reconsideration. 3 Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case
No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after the
accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by
Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995, 4
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized
under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to
the Court within five (5) days "to be released thereafter in
favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was
not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are
hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes
applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of
Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in
his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety
Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant
No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail
Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to)
Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4)
Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches,
pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and
travelling bags including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and
P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00 (receipted) which were
never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was
however returned to the respondents upon order of the court
on respondents' motion or request. Included allegedly are
one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives
C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the
items described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3)
Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting
caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for
explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and
ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was
served, a return was made without mentioning the personal
belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to
the private respondents. There was no showing that lawful
occupants were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon
arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; **"
and on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent
Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence
Obtained Inadmissible)," dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading
(consolidated comment on petition for certiorari **): On
January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises
searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the
following facts had been established as contained in the
order dated January 30.1996 ** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at
Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigail's
Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as "1207" found
in the building as it is correspondingly called only
as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the
Abigail's Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can
pass from Abigail's Variety Store to Apartment No.
1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No.
1 have its own respective doors used for ingress
and egress.
There being no objection on the said observation
of the Court, let the same be reduced on the
records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order
duly granting the motion to quash search warrant**; 5
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the
concomitant motion to dismiss** ;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Rolando Bulan filed a motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion on the order quashing the search
warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private
respondents filed opposition/comment and supplemental
opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration** ;
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order
denying the motion for reconsideration**; (and on) June 11,
1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated
motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996
above referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special
civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did not
prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the
Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996,
dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit: 6
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct
from the place described in the search warrant. This fact was
ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection,
the findings wherein, not objected to by the People, were
embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The place
searched, in which the accused (herein petitioners) were
then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than
and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit
adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in the
search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim — that the sketch submitted
to Judge Bacalla relative to the application for a search
warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched
— was effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed
out that said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the
person who made it and not even mentioned in the Search
Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who)
instead **directed them to search Abigail Variety Store
Apartment 1207** in the Order **dated December 15, 1995"
— this, too, being the address given "in the Application for
Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by
P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The
untenability of the claim is made more patent by the People's
admission, during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in
13
 the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not
attached to the application for search warrant ** (but) merely
attached to the motion for reconsideration." 7
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the
following observations of Judge Casanova contained in his
Order of May 28, 1996, viz.: 8
d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is
different from the place mentioned in the Search
Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP
Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and
SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all
EDUCATED CULTURED and ADEPT to their
tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all
STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to
OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say TAGALOG with
Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant
the words "KATABI", or "KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD
NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin
namin" or if they happen to be an ENGLISH
speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open
their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH
WORDS "RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND"
or "NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place
they are going to raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the
lawful occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or
any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed
and immobilized in the living room at the time. The search
was thus done in violation of the law. 9
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48
hours as required by the warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return
was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation
of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 10
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion
to quash search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid
down in Nolasco vs. Paño (139 SCRA 152) which
overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court
in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the
prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been
issued by one court or branch thereof and a criminal case is
initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of the
search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure.
The criminal case is more substantial than the search
warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal
case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to
exclude evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans
cases).
6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the
respondent Judge, in light of "Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an
appeal, not the special civil action of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict
ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of
disregarding the proceedings before the issuing Court and
overturning the latter's determination of probable cause and
particularity of the place to be searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch
was not attached to the application for warrant despite the
clear evidence** to the contrary;"
3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"
4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant
could be diminished by the tardiness by which the return is
made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be
made a substitute for appeal although the circumstances
attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to
that rule;" and
6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence
to prove the validity of the warrant when the petition before it
was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a
search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which
private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly,
whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the
Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal
knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It
claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously
enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of
four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they
were also the same police officers who eventually effected the search
and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be
searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they
knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be
so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind — the first of four (4)
separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store"
— was not what the Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind,
and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty
depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their application and in
the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the
place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in
the search warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt
1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more
particular — and more restrictive — by the Judge's admonition in the
warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein
described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at
least five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as
"Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and independent
residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and
are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors
through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of
the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and
may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the
police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only
one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that
immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical
configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the
police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to
pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the
warrant — which directs that the search be "limited only to the
premises herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207" — thus
literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store — they
did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have
simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched
— clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have
submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application — was
sufficient particularization of the general identification of the place in
the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned
by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 11allegedly to the effect that the
executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the
warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the
14
warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the
official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants
which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical
error. The application in said case was for seizure of subversive
material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued —
No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the execution
of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City" because both search warrants apparently
indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City)
as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden.
This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was
obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge
had issued two warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to
the fact that the application for the search warrants specified two (2)
distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, "784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening
paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently,
this was the address the Judge intended to be searched when he
issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity
caused by the "obviously typographical error," the officer executing the
warrant could consult the records in the official court file. 12
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an
"obvious typographical error" involving ambiguous descriptions of the
place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different
from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant.
In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately
perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case
there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside
the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to
the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and
the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for
the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises
that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been
done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place
actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and
had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant
itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented
in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all
four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would
have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the
premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application
for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place
to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open
wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers
executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has
precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of
the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police
officers conducting the search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a
review of Judge Bacalla's finding of probable cause, "as if he were an
appellate court." A perusal of the record however shows that all that
Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between
Judge Bacalla's Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as
regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge
Bacalla. 13In Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies, being quite
apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination
of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established
probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search
warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the
place described in the search warrant — which, of course, is the only
place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof — was not
that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind,
with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure
operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine,
while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as
regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 —
the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and
precisely the place in which the private respondents were then
residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,
providing that: 14
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
things to be seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid,
that it be based on probable cause, personally determined
by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be
searched, 15 the manifest intention being that the search be
confined strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional
requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be
searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the
concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in
violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 16
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such
other points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as
whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the
residential apartment units — the place to be searched being plainly
marked — was in fact attached to the application for the search
warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the
occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the
validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which
the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly
refused to receive "evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been
denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy
of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been
erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect
the correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure
proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant
is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the
speciousness of their argument that anyway the premises searched
were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally
and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office
opines that where a search warrant has been "issued by a
court other than the one trying the main criminal case," the "proper
recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before
the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case
involving the subject of the warrant is afterwards filed. 17 In support, it
cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this Court
in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals 18 concerning "possible conflicts of
jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where
the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is
issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to
15
be used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second guideline
reads: 19
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which
does not try the main criminal case) issues the search
warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and
shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party
aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds
and objections then available, existent or known shall be
raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed
waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is
issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the
search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that
a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized)
may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for
the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal
action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative.
The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the
exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the
Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is
clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly
applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in
or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may
move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the
suppression as evidence of the personal property seized
under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash
a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent
forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in
the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the
court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to
any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by,
Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return
was made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in
connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in
Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a
motion to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal
property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been
presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only
after the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that
the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the
latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted
within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals of September 11, 1996 — which dismissed the Peoples
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of
the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in
Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 — is, for the reasons set out in the
foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines vs. Tiu Won Chua aka. “Timothy Tiu”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff–appellee,
vs.
TIU WON CHUA a.k.a. "Timothy Tiu" and QUI YALING y CHUA
a.k.a. "Sun Tee Sy y Chua," accused–appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 27, convicting appellants Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy
Tiu (Tiu Won) and Qui Yaling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua (Qui
Yaling) for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.
Appellants were charged with the crime of illegal possession of a
regulated drug, i.e., methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
as "shabu," in an information which reads:
The undersigned accuses TIU WON CHUA aka "Timothy Tiu" and QUI
YALING Y CHUA aka "Sun Tee Sy Y Chua" of violation of Section 16,
Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and as further
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1998, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being
authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly and jointly have
in their possession and under their custody and control the
following, to wit:
A sealed plastic bag containing two three four point five
(234.5) grams of white crystalline substance;
Four (4) separate sealed plastic bags containing six point
two two four three (6.2243) grams of white crystalline
substance;
Sixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags containing twenty
point three six seven three (20.3673) grams of white
crystalline substance; or a total of 261.0916 grams, and;
An improvised tooter with traces of crystalline substance
known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.1
During arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered. Appellants, with
the assistance of counsel, and the prosecution stipulated on the
following facts:
1. The authenticity of the following documents:
a. The letter of Police Senior Inspector Angelo
Martin of WPD, District Intelligence Division,
United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, dated
October 12, 1998, to the Director of the NBI
requesting the latter to conduct a laboratory
examination of the specimen mentioned therein;
b. The Certification issued by Forensic Chemist
Loreto Bravo of the NBI, dated October 13, 1998,
to the effect that the specimen mentioned and
enumerated therein gave positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, Exhibit "B"; and
c. Dangerous Drug Report No. 98-1200 issued by
Forensic Chemist Bravo, dated October 13, 1998,
to the effect that the specimen mentioned therein
gave positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride;
2. The existence of one plastic bag containing 234.5 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, Exhibit "D"; four (4)
plastic sachets also containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride with a total net weight of 6.2243 grams,
Exhibits "E", "E-1", "E-2" and "E-3"; additional 16 plastic
sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride with a
total net weight of 20.3673 grams, Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-
16
 15", and one improvised tooter with a length of 8 inches
more or less and with a red plastic band, Exhibit "G";
3. Forensic Chemist Loreto Bravo has no personal
knowledge as to the source of the regulated drug in
question; and
4. Tiu Won Chua and Qui Yaling y Chua as stated in the
information are the true and correct names of the two
accused.2
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO1 Anthony de
Leon, PO2 Artemio Santillan and PO3 Albert Amurao. Their
testimonies show that the police authorities, acting on an information
that drug-related activities were going on at the HCL Building, 1025
Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila, surveyed the place on October 2, 3,
4 and 5, 1998. At about 10 p.m. of October 6, they conducted a test-
buy operation, together with a Chinese-speaking asset. They were able
to buy P2,000.00 worth of substance from appellants, which, upon
examination by the PNP crime laboratory, proved positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.3 Nonetheless, they did not
immediately arrest the suspects but applied for a warrant to search
Unit 4-B of HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Their
application to search the unit supposedly owned by "Timothy Tiu" was
granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila
on October 9.4 Armed with the warrant, they proceeded to the place
and learned that Tiu Won was not inside the building. They waited
outside but Tiu Won did not come. After several stakeouts, they were
able to implement the warrant on October 12. Failing to get the
cooperation of the barangay officials, they requested the presence of
the building coordinator, Noel Olarte, and his wife, Joji, who acted as
witnesses.
During the enforcement of the warrant, there were three (3) persons
inside the apartment, namely, appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling, and
a housemaid. The search was conducted on the sala and in the three
(3) bedrooms of Unit 4-B. On top of a table inside the master’s
bedroom, one (1) big pack, containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was
found inside a black leather man’s handbag supposedly owned by Tiu
Won, while sixteen (16) small packs of shabu weighing 20.3673 grams
were found inside a lady’s handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling.
Also contained in the inventory were the following items: an improvised
tooter, a weighing scale, an improvised burner and one rolled tissue
paper.5 The authorities also searched a Honda Civic car bearing Plate
No. WCP 157, parked along Masangkay Street, registered in the name
of the wife of Tiu Won and found four (4) plastic bags containing
6.2243 grams of shabu, which were likewise confiscated. A gun in the
possession of Tiu Won was also seized and made subject of a
separate criminal case.
The defense presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They
denied that Timothy Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same
person. They presented papers and documents to prove that appellant
is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant.
Tiu Won also claimed that he does not live in the apartment subject of
the search warrant, alleging that he is married to a certain Emily Tan
and is a resident of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila.
Nonetheless, he admitted that his co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his
mistress with whom he has two children. Qui Yaling admitted being the
occupant of the apartment, but alleged that she only occupied one
room, while two other persons, a certain Lim and a certain Uy,
occupied the other rooms. Both appellants denied that they were
engaged in the sale or possession of shabu. They asserted that they
are in the jewelry business and that at the time the search and arrest
were made, the third person, whom the prosecution identified as a
housemaid, was actually a certain Chin, who was there to look at some
of the pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied that a gun
was found in the possession of Tiu Won.
Qui Yaling recalled that upon asking who was it knocking at the door of
her apartment on October 12, the police authorities represented that
they were electric bill collectors. She let them in. She was surprised
when upon opening the door, around ten (10) policemen barged inside
her unit. She, together with Tiu Won and Chin, was asked to remain
seated in the sofa while the men searched each room. Tiu Won alleged
that after a fruitless search, some of the policemen went out, but came
back a few minutes later with another person. Afterwards, he was
made to sign a piece of paper. Appellants also claimed that the
policemen took their bags which contained money, the pieces of
jewelry they were selling and even Qui Yaling’s cell phone. They both
denied that shabu was discovered in the apartment during the search.
Appellants were arrested and brought to the police station.
In a decision, dated August 15, 2001, the RTC found proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellants and sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.00
each.6
Thus, appellants interpose this appeal raising the following assignment
of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
LEGAL DEFECTS OF THE SEARCH WARRANT USED BY
THE POLICE OPERATIVES AGAINST BOTH ACCUSED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION EVIDENCES (sic) WHICH SHOULD
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AND DISREGARDED WHICH
RESULTED IN THE ERRONEOUS CONVICTION OF BOTH
ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH
ACCUSED DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF BOTH
ACCUSED WERE SERIOUSLY VIOLATED BY THE
POLICE OPERATIVES.7
These issues can be trimmed down to two i.e., the legality of the
search warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant thereto,
and the correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by the RTC.
As regards the propriety of the search warrant issued in the name of
Timothy Tiu, which did not include appellant Qui Yaling, appellants
contend that because of this defect, the search conducted and
consequently, the arrest, are illegal. Being fruits of an illegal search,
the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.
We beg to disagree. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant,
i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause"; (2) probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge must
examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.8 As
correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the name of the
person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant,9 especially
since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-
related activities of the accused. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies
the requirements so long as it contains a descriptio personae such as
will enable the officer to identify the accused.10 We have also held that
a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not
invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched is properly
described.11
Thus, even if the search warrant used by the police authorities did not
contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that
defect did not invalidate it because the place to be searched was
described properly. Besides, the authorities conducted surveillance
and a test-buy operation before obtaining the search warrant and
subsequently implementing it. They can therefore be presumed to have
personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the place to be
17
searched although they may not have specifically known the names of
the accused. Armed with the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-B was
conducted.
We affirm, however, the illegality of the search conducted on the car,
on the ground that it was not part of the description of the place to be
searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for the search
to be valid, it must be directed at the place particularly described in the
warrant.12 Moreover, the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful
arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must be limited to that
point within the reach or control of the person arrested, or that which
may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of
escaping.13 In this case, appellants were arrested inside the apartment,
whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) appellants were in possession of an item or an object
identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is
not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.14 We also note
that the crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of
criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal
liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.15
In the case at bar, the prosecution has sufficiently proved that the
packs of shabu were found inside Unit 4-B, HCL Building, 1025
Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Surveillance was previously
conducted. Though no arrest was made after the successful test-buy
operation, this does not destroy the fact that in a subsequent search,
appellants were found in possession of shabu. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are consistent in that after the test-buy
operation, they obtained a search warrant from Judge Makasiar,
pursuant to which, they were able to confiscate, among others, several
packs of shabu from a man’s handbag and a ladies’ handbag inside a
room in the unit subject of the warrant. Furthermore, the seizure of the
regulated drug from Unit 4-B is proven by the "Receipt for Property
Seized"16 signed by SPO1 de Leon, the seizing officer, Noel, the
building administrator, and Joji Olarte, his wife, who were also present.
De Leon attested to the truth and genuineness of the receipt which was
not contradicted by the defense.
Be that as it may, we cannot sustain the trial court’s decision attributing
to both appellants the illegal possession of the same amount of shabu.
We note that nowhere in the information is conspiracy alleged. Neither
had it been proven during the trial. As such, we need to look at the
individual amounts possessed by each appellant.
In his testimony, Tiu Won admitted ownership of the man’s handbag
where 234.5 grams of shabu were found, viz:
Q: During those ten to 20 minutes, what were those
policemen doing inside that unit?
A: They went inside the rooms and started ransacking
the drawers and everything. As a matter of fact, even
handbags were searched by them.
Q: Whose handbags were searched?
A: My bag, the one I was carrying that day, with jewelry
and checks and others were taken by them.17(emphasis
supplied)
Qui Yaling, in her appellant’s brief, denied owning the handbag where
20.3673 grams of shabu were discovered. However, during her
testimony, she admitted its ownership, viz:
Q: Now, the police testified before this court that you
has (sic) a bag and when they searched this bag, it yielded
some sachets of shabu(.) (W)hat can you say about that?
A: That is an absolute lie, sir. What they saw in my bag
were my cosmetics.18 (emphasis supplied)
An admission is an act or declaration of a party as to the existence of a
relevant fact which may be used in evidence against him.19 These
admissions, provided they are voluntary, can be used against
appellants because it is fair to presume that they correspond with the
truth, and it is their fault if they do not.20
Qui Yaling likewise argues that the lower court erred in attributing
ownership of the handbag to her considering that there was another
girl present at the apartment during the search. She contends that
since the prosecution was not able to establish the ownership of the
bag, then such could have also been owned by Chin.
We do not subscribe to this argument. The defense failed to bring Chin
to court, although during the course of the presentation of their
evidence, they manifested their intention to present her testimony.
Furthermore, a visitor does not normally leave her bag lying anywhere,
much more in the master’s bedroom. Being the occupant of the
apartment, it is more logical to presume that the handbag belongs to
Qui Yaling. The failure of the prosecution to present the bags and
proofs that the bags belong to the appellants is immaterial because the
bags, the license of Tiu Won found inside the man’s handbag and the
passport of Qui Yaling found inside the ladies’ handbag are not illegal.
Having no relation to the use or possession of shabu, the authorities
could not confiscate them for they did not have the authority to do so
since the warrant authorized them to seize only articles in relation to
the illegal possession of shabu.21 Not within their control, they could
not have been presented in court.
We now come to the penalties of the appellants. R. A. No. 6425, as
amended by R. A. No. 7659, applies. Thus, since 234.5 grams of
shabu were found inside the man’s handbag, deemed to be owned by
Tiu Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
while Qui Yaling, whose handbag contained only 20.3673 grams of
shabu is guilty of violating Section 20 thereof. Section 16, in connection
with Section 20 (1st paragraph), provides the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos where the amount of shabu involved is 200 grams
or more. Where the amount is less than 200 grams, Section 20
punishes the offender with the penalty ranging from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of RTC Br. 27, Manila as to the
penalty of appellant Tiu Won is affirmed, while that of appellant Qui
Yaling is modified. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in
accordance with Section 16 and Section 20 (1st paragraph) of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Qui Yaling y Chua is sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of prision correccional as minimum to
prision mayor as maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Priscilla del Norte
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , appellee , vs . PRISCILLA DEL
NORTE , appellant .
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 28, finding appellant Priscilla del Norte
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of drugs, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
Pricilla (sic) Del Norte (g)uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime for
(sic) Violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, R.A. 6425, and hereby sentences her to
suffer imprisonment of Reclusion (P)erpetua and a fine
of P1,000,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The marijuana subject matter of this case is confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government. The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn-
18
over the subject marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposal/destruction.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to transfer the
accused Priscilla del Norte to the Correccion (sic) Institution for
Women, Mandaluyong City for the service of her sentence.
SO ORDERED.[1]
A search warrant was served on a certain Ising Gutierrez Diwa,
on August 1, 1997, by SPO1 Angel Lumabas, SPO3 Celso de Leon,
Maj. Dionisio Borromeo, Capt. Jose, SPO3 Malapitan, PO2 Buddy
Perez and PO2 Eugene Perida.
As a result of the search, an information against appellant
Priscilla del Norte was filed with the trial court, viz:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PRISCILLA DEL
NORTE Y DIWA AND JANE DOE, true name, real identity and present
whereabouts of the last accused still unknown(,) of the crime of
VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II, R.A. (No.) 6425, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 1st day of August 1997(,) in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with (sic)
one another, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and
control(,) MARIJUANA weighing 6748.37 gms. knowing the same to be
a prohibited drug under the provisions of the above-entitled law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1, 1997, their group was
tasked to serve a search warrant[3] against a certain Ising Gutierrez
Diwa residing at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St.,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation of Republic Act No.
6425. They were ordered to forthwith seize and take possession of an
undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves. They
coordinated with the barangay officials and proceeded to the house
pointed out to them by the local officials. Upon reaching the house, its
door was opened by a woman. SPO3 De Leon introduced themselves
as policemen to the woman who opened the door, whom they later
identified in court as the appellant.[4] They informed her they had a
search warrant, but appellant suddenly closed and locked the door. It
was only after some prodding by the barangay officials that she
reopened the door. The authorities then conducted the search. They
found a bundle of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under the bed
and inside the room.[5] They asked appellant who owned the
marijuana. She cried and said she had no means of
livelihood.[6] Appellant was brought to the police headquarters for
further investigation. Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon
identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of marijuana[7] in court.
Mrs. Grace Eustaquio, a forensic chemist testified that pursuant
to a letter request[8]from the Chief of the Caloocan City Police, she
conducted an examination on a specimen consisting of five bundles of
suspected marijuana. She found that each of the bundles was positive
for marijuana. This finding was reduced to a Laboratory Report. [9] The
report also contained a finding on the supposed weight of each bundle
in grams, i.e., (A) 973.45, (B) 1,840.31, (C) 472.99, (D) 1,678.8, and
(E) 1,782.82.[10]
SPO2 Florencio Ramirez, a police officer in the Intelligence
Branch of the Caloocan Police Station, testified that on August 1, 1997,
the appellant was brought before him by SPO3 De Leon and SPO1
Lumabas. They also submitted two weighing scales, five bricks of
marijuana leaves, and two bunches of marijuana leaves wrapped in an
old newspaper.[11]He apprised appellant of her constitutional rights
before investigating her. After the laboratory test showed that the
evidence yielded was marijuana, he sent a referral slip[12] to Prosecutor
Zaldy Quimpo for inquest.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search warrant against
her. She contended that she lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay
Baesa, Caloocan City,[13] and that on August 1, 1997, she was merely
visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner
Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to Marlyns
house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she waited. While
appellant was seated near the door, several people introduced
themselves as policemen, made her sign a white paper and entered
the house. She heard them say we already got Ising, and was
surprised why they suddenly arrested her. She saw Ising, her sister, at
a house two steps away from the house where she was
arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the policemen
brought her to the police station.[14]
Appellants daughter, Christine also took the witness stand. She
testified that she is one of the eight children of the appellant. Since
June 1997, she recalled that they had lived at 376 Dama de Noche St.,
Caloocan City, as proved by the address stated in her school
identification card,[15] and a receipt evidencing payment for the rental of
their house at Dama de Noche St. from July 18 to August 18, 1997.[16]
The trial court convicted appellant. In this appeal, she raises the
lone error that the lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant
of the crime charged, when her guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.[17]
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish who
owned the house where the search was conducted, and avers that her
mere presence therein did not automatically make her the owner of the
marijuana found therein. She likewise argues that the search warrant
specified the name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the house to be
searched, and that since she is not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court
erred in admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence against her.[18]
The Solicitor General contends that the totality of the evidence
demonstrates appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[19] He cites the
case of United States vs. Gan Lian Po,[20] that when illegal drugs are
found in the premises occupied by a certain person, such person is
presumed to be in possession of the prohibited articles. It then
becomes the accuseds burden to prove the absence of animus
possidendi.[21]
We reverse the trial courts decision. The prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the
accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[22]
We first rule on the validity of the search warrant. Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (emphases supplied)
Appellant argues that the marijuana seized as a result of the
search is inadmissible due to the irregularity of the search warrant
which contained the name Ising Gutierrez Diwa and not Priscilla del
Norte. She alleges that Ising is her sister. During her arrest, she
claimed she saw Ising nearby and pointed her to the authorities, but
her efforts were futile the authorities arrested her.
The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly
describe not only the place to be searched, but also the persons to be
arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in the name of
the person subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant,
provided the place to be searched is properly described. In People v.
19
Tiu Won Chua,[23] we upheld the validity of the search warrant despite In fact, it seems that the authorities had difficulty looking for the
the mistake in the name of the persons to be searched. In the cited drugs which were not in plain view, viz:
case, the authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation
before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing Atty. Yap to witness
it. They had personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and the
place to be searched although they did not specifically know the names Q: You made mention about the bricks found?
of the accused.
A: Yes, sir.
The case at bar is different. We cannot countenance the
irregularity of the search warrant. The authorities did not have personal Q: And you said further that it was inside the room?
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the search. They did not
conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It was only when A: Yes, sir.
they implemented the warrant that they coordinated with the barangay
officials. One of the barangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that
Q: Now, when you entered the room, was it locked?
Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one and the same
person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. The
A: No, sir.
authorities based their knowledge on pure hearsay.
Q: As a matter of fact, there was no padlock of that room,
On the merits, we believe the prosecution failed to discharge its
is it correct?
burden of proving appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecutions witnesses failed to establish appellants ownership of the
house where the prohibited drugs were discovered. Except for their A: I did not notice, sir, but it was open.
bare testimonies, no other proof was presented.
Q: And this alleged marijuana was protruding under the
This is in contrast to appellants proof of her residence. The bed?
prosecution did not contest the punong barangays
certification,[24] Christinas school ID[25] and the rental receipt,[26] all of A: No, sir but it was under the bed, dulong-dulo.
which show that appellant and her family live at 376 Dama de Noche
St. There being no substantial contrary evidence offered, we conclude Q: Was it also the same plastic bag?
that appellant does not own the house subject of the search.
A: No, sir.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove that appellant was in
actual possession of the prohibited articles at the time of her Q: Was it also already wrapped in newspaper?
arrest. This is shown by the testimony of the prosecutions witness:
A: No, sir, only plastic tape. We were not able to notice
Fiscal Lomadilla to Witness that it was marijuana because it is (sic) wrapped in a
plastic tape.
Q: What did you find in that house at No. 275?
Q: How long did you search?
A: We found marijuana.
A: Half an hour, sir.[29]
Q: What is the quantity of the marijuana you found?
The prosecutions weak evidence likewise shows from the
A: Five bunch (sic) or bricks of marijuana and two weighing following testimony:
scale(s), sir.
Atty. Yap to witness
Q: Mr. Lumabas, you mentioned a search warrant issued
by Judge Rivera. What was the result of the Q: Were you able to search the personal effects?
execution of that search warrant?
A: Yung iba.
A: We were able to find marijuana inside the house of
Priscilla del Norte. Q: Did you find any I.D. (of the persons) who occupy this
room?
Q: What is the quantity?
A: No, sir.
A: More or less six kilos.
Q: In other words, your assumption is because Priscilla del
Q: Was it arranged? How was it placed? Norte was around so (sic) it follows that she was the
possessor of that illegal drugs?
A: It was wrapped inside the plastic tape and it looks (sic)
like in bricks form.[27] A: Yes, sir because it is their house.

xxxxxxxxx Q: Was there a picture or photograph taken inside the

room of that particular person?
Q: What part of the house did you discover these five
bricks of marijuana? A: None, sir.

A: Inside the room, sir, under the bed. Q: So a family lived thereat?

Q: You said you found the accused Priscilla del Norte, A: None, sir.
where was she when you found her?
Q: Was there a separate picture of Ising Gutierrez?
A: Inside the sala, sir.[28]
A: I did not see any.
20
 Q: There was no incriminating evidence except this
(sic) drugs taken by Police Officer de Leon and
the barangay tanod, no other incriminating
evidence?
A: None, sir. (emphases supplied)
In all criminal cases, it is appellants constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.[30] In the case at bar, we hold that the prosecutions evidence
treads on shaky ground. We detest drug addiction in our
society. However, we have the duty to protect appellant where the
evidence presented show insufficient factual nexus of her participation
in the commission of the offense charged.[31] In People vs. Laxa,[32] we
held:
The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys
support. But it cannot be pursued by ignoble means which are violative
of constitutional rights. It is precisely when the governments purposes
are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these
rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning
without understanding.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City is reversed. Appellant is acquitted based
on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Umil vs. Ramos
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA,
MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON
MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO
T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE
TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-
INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA,
P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT.
MALTRO AROJADO,respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No.
83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the
above-entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's
decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except
that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for
petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the
statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to
do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New
People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.
Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual
situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th
outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly).
It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the
thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected
representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal,
change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum,
maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the
questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying on
the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of
Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests
violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1
and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions
made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and
their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
subversive documents found in their possession at the time
of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with
the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation
of facts;
21
 5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be
deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of
Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the
function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the
detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners
was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July
1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant
were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from
such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or
person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of
arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law
expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid
arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando
Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that,
within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for
being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion
is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other
crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on
the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all
in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially
involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which
includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government,
Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one
of several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at
the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their
patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City
as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there
and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion
(or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other
so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion
by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest
was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will
be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said,
under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls
under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that
the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second,
that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one
who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted,
refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of
facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without
warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other
cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988,
were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon
City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their
office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted
to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further
disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the
five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols
the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name
was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-
two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan,
Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the
effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a
gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with
cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances
sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the
said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first —
the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were
actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows"
including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital
records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St.
Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this
case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the
hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality
Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers
merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found
to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the
arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St.
Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and
hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
22
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with
acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court
notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are
presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show
that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in
arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant,
of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after
Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information charging double murder
with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against
Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No.
C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as
distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988,
he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this
Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-
82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84)
and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are
also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued
by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives
and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught
in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant,
under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant,
informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing
them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra
mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in
detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information
imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the CPP
and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied
by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of
this information, the said house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was
conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then
confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the
firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications
equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member
of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house
of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988,
and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with
him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the
rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a
consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his
possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque;17
that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found
subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she
admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they
were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they
arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the
evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the
latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess
them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without
warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be
the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of
a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her
arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents
in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military
agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given
to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by
Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used
by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact
location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as
residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances
surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the
information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested
were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search
warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine
safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named
Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of
the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and
communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their
membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they
were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization
as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the
corresponding informations were filed in court against said arrested
persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the
arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino
safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have
been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after
the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque,
Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would
have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and
made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of
official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace
officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order
to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon
whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged
violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21
An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The
power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the
requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on
an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in
accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this
Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of
guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the
peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of
public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law
requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later
found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the
arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or
for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested
without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses:
that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
23
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila,
Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he
said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa
magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press
conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November
1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus
drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without
warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering
the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting
officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and
regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during
the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to
free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was
uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest,
without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter,
is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which
obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted
the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest(not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made
the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had before
arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense
asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the
case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of
14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the
morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as
one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the
same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while
Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December
1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113,
since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities
came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the
killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without
warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of
fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding
the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events
surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without
warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil
Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye
II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No.
731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post
bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order
dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail,
earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed
with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the
case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of
the respondents by reason of an information filed against
him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact,
denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno
(presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests
of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them
were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They
complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They
were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been
convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the
contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he
was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque,
she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest,
belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested
persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the
records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon
which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are
supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were
probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance
with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these
admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested
are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests
were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of
persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas
corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan
vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling
reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of
prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still
directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist
rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested
as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will
promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do
the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the
conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in
this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be
ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee
shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly
tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the
least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of
being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a
ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court
predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in
24
these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules
of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable
cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on
the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity
or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be
right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated
9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Nuevas
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and
FERNANDO INOCENCIO y ABADEOS,Appellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged1 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75, with illegal possession
of marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No.
64252 as amended.
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos
(Inocencio) were likewise charged3 with the same crime, before the
same court.
Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the
charges.4 As the evidence in the cases was common and the
prosecution would utilize the same witnesses, the cases were
consolidated. After a joint trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a
Decision5 dated 4 April 2002, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences them to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and each to pay [a] fine of
₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in
accordance with existing regulations.
SO ORDERED.6
To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication
of this case hinges, there is need to recall the factual assertions of the
witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense.
PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27
September 1997, he and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted
a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking along
Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They had
received information that a certain male person, more or less 5’4" in
height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand,
and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery
of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male
person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as
Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted
Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked
Nuevas where he was going. Nuevas answered arrogantly but
afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in the Waray
dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the
possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male
persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a
plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and
bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges,
Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make
the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.7
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12,
Old Cabalan, Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas was where
his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, could be located. From
there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National
Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a
light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag
belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection
found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped
therein."8 After confiscating the items, Fami and Cabling brought
Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper
documentation.9Fami further testified that a receipt for the property
seized was issued by Cabling and that a field test was duly conducted
on the confiscated items. All three accused were likewise physically
examined on the basis of which corresponding medical certificates
were issued. The corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were
also accomplished. Fami stated that he and Cabling executed a joint
affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the accused and the
confiscation of the items.10
On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of
evidence seized was prepared, all three (3) accused were not
represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one
who escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He
also escorted all three to the Fiscal’s office where the latter were
informed of the charges against them.11
Cabling corroborated Fami’s testimony. He, however, testified that after
he and Fami had introduced themselves as police officers, Din and
Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami the marijuana dried leaves.12
On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was
the result of a tip from Fami’s informant, conceding though that the
name of Nuevas was not included in the list of persons under
surveillance. Fami then relayed the tip to Cabling.13 Cabling restated
that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was holding
and that after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of law
attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to cooperate and point to
his other cohorts.14 When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified
location of Nuevas’s cohorts, they chanced upon Din and Inocencio
along the road. Din was holding a bag while Inocencio was looking into
its contents.15 Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic
bag he was holding to the police officers.16
For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September
1997, he was walking along Perimeter Street, on his way home from
the Barangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas approached Fami,
who was then in front of his house, and asked why Fami had called
him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the
room where Fami handcuffed Nuevas’s hands, got Nuevas’s wallet,
took out ₱1,500.00 and put it in his (Fami’s) wallet. Fami then
confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge.
Before leaving the house with Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag
and told Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they boarded a red owner—
type jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas was put in jail.
Nuevas further stated that he did not know Din or Inocencio. 17
Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 o’clock in the morning of
27 September 1997, while his ‘compare’ Inocencio was visiting, two (2)
men entered his house looking for a woman. The two (2) introduced
themselves as police officers. Then, Din and Inocencio were
immediately handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for their
arrest and were told that the reason will be explained to them in court.
Next, they were brought to the Cabalan precinct where the investigator
asked for their names, and subsequently to Station B where they were
ordered to stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first
met in jail. Inside the room where they had their fingerprints taken, he
saw marijuana placed on top of the table.18
Inocencio testified that he went to his ‘compadre’ Din’s house in the
morning of 27 September 1997 to sell his fighting cocks as he needed
money to redeem his driver’s license. While there, he and Din were
arrested by two persons, one of whom pointed a gun at them while the
other searched the house for a lady named Vangie. Afterwards, he and
25
Din were brought to the Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B
where he first came to know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag
containing marijuana was recovered from them and claimed that he
only saw such evidence on the day he gave his testimony. He also
stated that when a photograph was taken of the three of them, he and
Din were ordered to point to a "wrapped thing." When the photograph
was taken, they were not assisted by counsel. He also does not recall
having signed a receipt of property seized. Afterwards, they were
brought to a detention cell. And when they asked the police what they
did wrong, the police replied that they will just explain it in court. 19
All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction
was elevated to the Court for automatic review. However, on 14 July
2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw
appeal.20 The Court granted Nuevas’s withdrawal of appeal and
considered the case closed and terminated as to him, in a
Resolution21dated 25 August 2003.
In a Resolution22 dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos.
153641-42,23 the cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v. Efren Mateo.24
Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued
that the trial court erred: (1) in finding them guilty of the crime charged
on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting officers; and (2) n not
finding that their constitutional rights have been violated.25
The Court of Appeals in a Decision26 dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R.
CR No. 00341, affirmed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is
DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.27
The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the
credibility of a witness, the trial court’s assessment is entitled to great
weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with
arbitrariness or there was an oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight or influence. The appellate court found Fami and Cabling’s
version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and
clear. Din, at the time of his apprehension, was seen holding a plastic
bag containing marijuana leaves. On the other hand, Inocencio’s
possession of the marijuana leaves was established by the fact that he
was seen in the act of looking into the plastic bag carried by Din. 28
With respect to appellants’ claim that their constitutional rights have
been violated, the appellate court stated that the search in the instant
case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as
appellants themselves waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling
and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants
never presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case,
the exclusionary rule does not apply.29
Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution
the same matters argued before the Court of Appeals. Through their
Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief)30 dated 22 March 2006,
appellants stated that all the arguments necessary to support their
acquittal have already been discussed in the brief they had submitted
before the appellate court; thus, the filing of a supplemental brief would
be a mere reiteration of the arguments discussed in said brief. 31 The
Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is no longer filing a
supplemental brief.32
The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the
warrantless searches and seizure made by the police officers and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by virture thereof.
In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial
court ruled as follows:
While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused
Jesus Nuevas was without a search warrant, it was not bereft of a
probable cause. The police team received informations [sic] from an
asset that on that day, a male person whom he sufficiently described
will deliver marijuana at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t].,
Pag-asa, Olongapo City, a known drop point of illegal drugs. They went
to the said area upon that information. Their waiting was fruitful
because not long afterwards they saw the accused Jesus Nuevas
alighting from a tricycle carrying a bag and after confronting him, he
voluntarily gave the bag containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves.
With respect to the confiscation of 2 ½ kilos of marijuana and the
apprehension of accused Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, it
was a result of a continued operation by the team which this time was
led by accused Nuevas to get some concession from the team for his
own earlier apprehension. As the apprehension of Nuevas was upon a
probable cause, in the same vein was the apprehension of Reynaldo
Din and Fernando Inocencio and the recovery from them [of] 2½ kilos
of dried marijuana leaves. The propriety of this conclusion is necessity
[sic] because of the impossibility of getting first a warrant in so short a
time with such cumbersome requirements before one can be issued.
Before getting a warrant, the culprits shall have already gone into
hiding. These situations are not distant to the case of People v[.] Jean
Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13 Feb. 1995) where we learned that
expediency and practicality are some of the justification[s] in the
warrantless arrest.33 [Emphasis supplied]
Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and
the subsequent inspection of the plastic bags of Nuevas and Din, as
they were not doing anything illegal at the time.34
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried
through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.35 The constitutional
proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions,
namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a)
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.36
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except
without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured.37
The courts below anchor appellants’ conviction on the ground that the
searches and seizure conducted in the instant case based on a tip
from an informant fall under one of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and
26
Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags
containing marijuana to the police officers.38
We differ.
First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not
fall under the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful
arrests.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of
Court.39 Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the
search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the
search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 40
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and
Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely
incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient
to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense."41
Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view
doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the
object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However,
if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In
other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the
police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.42
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic
bags that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent
or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas’s case, the dried
marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a
blue cloth.43 In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the
plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." 44 It
cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have
justified mere seizure of the articles without further search. 45
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in
Nuevas’s case was made with his consent. In Din’s case, there was
none.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be waived. However, it must be
seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that
no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and
that it was freely and voluntarily given.46
In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily
surrendered the incriminating bag to the police officers. Fami testified
in this wise:
FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q Now, when you saw this accused carrying this Exhibit "D,"47 for your
part, what did you do?
A I just talked to him and asked him where he was going and according
to him, he acted arrogantly, sir.
Q This arrogant action of the accused Jesus Nuevas, when you
confronted him did he resist?
A How did he show his elements, [sic] he said, "So what if you are
policeman[?]"
Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do next?
A Later on he kept calm by saying [sic] in Waray dialect, sir.
xxxx
Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?
A "Sir Famir[sic], don’t charge me, sir[.] I am planning to go home to
Leyte. I was just earning enough money for my fare, sir."
xxxx
Q So when the accused speak [sic] to you in Waray, what else did you
do if you did anything?
A I pretended that I agree in his [sic] offer but I also asked him where
are the other staffs[sic] sir. 48
xxxx
Q With respect to the bag that you confiscated from him, what did you
do?
A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for
verification, sir.49
Cabling likewise testified as follows:
Q When Fami got this from the accused, he opened this thing that he
got?
A The subject voluntarily submitted the same, sir.
Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?
A Nobody ordered it, sir.50
There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the
plastic bag with the incriminating contents to the police officers. It can
be seen that in his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any
criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave them the
plastic bag and even revealed his ‘associates,’ offering himself as an
informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human
inclination to find excuses, blame others and save oneself even at the
cost of others’ lives. Thus, the Court would have affirmed Nuevas’s
conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.
However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the
Court finds that no such consent had actually been given. Fami
testified as follows:
FISCAL BELTRAN
27
Q Now, what did you do when you saw Din with that Exhibit "C," the
plastic bag?
A Din said that "Oo, Sir, that is owned by Nuevas" [sic] and I took the
said plastic bag.
Q When you took this plastic bag from Din….
Was the accused Jesus Nueva [sic] present when Din told you that?
A Yes, sir. Nuevas alighted also [from] the vehicle with Cabling.
Q And what was the reaction of Nuevas when Din told you that the bag
belongs to him?
A I did not react, sir.
Q After getting that plastic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did you do
with it?
A I inspected the bag and I found out that there is still marijuana
packed in newspaper and wrapped therein, sir.51[Emphasis supplied.]
Cabling, however, gave a different testimony, viz.:
FISCAL BELTRAN
Q And upon siting [sic] the two subject persons you have just indicated
in your earlier testimony, what did you do?
A We approached them and introduced ourselves as police officers,
and pinpointed by Nuevas as the ones who kept suspected prohibited
drugs, sir.
Q After you approached these two people, what happened?
A These two people, upon introducing ourselves, [sic] voluntarily
surrendered to Fami those marijuana dry leaves, sir.52
The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding
the manner by which they got hold of the bag. This already raises
serious doubts on the voluntariness of Din’s submission of the plastic
bag. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or
waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had
an actual intention to relinquish the right.53
The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. While it may not
be contrary to human nature for one to be jolted into surrendering
something incriminating to authorities, Fami’s and Cabling’s
testimonies do not show that Din was in such a state of mind or
condition. Fami and Cabling did not testify on Din’s composure—
whether he felt surprised or frightened at the time—which fact we find
necessary to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There was no
mention of any permission made by the police officers to get or search
the bag or of any consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is
worthy to note that in cases where the Court upheld the validity of
consented search, the police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And
the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive
proof.
Neither can Din’s silence at the time be construed as an implied
acquiescence to the warrantless search. In People v. Burgos,54 the
Court aptly ruled:
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving
his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful
submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law.55
Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Din’s conviction
cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. The Court has
repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest not on
the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution.1awphi1.net56 As such, Din deserves an acquittal.
In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecution’s
insistence that the appellants have effectively waived any defect in
their arrest by entering their plea and by their active participation in the
trial of the case. Be it stressed that the legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Inspite of
any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in
evidence against the appellants, Din more specifically, as they were
seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of
an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.57
Turning to Inocencio’s case, the Court likewise finds that he was
wrongly convicted of the crime charged. Inocencio’s supposed
possession of the dried marijuana leaves was sought to be shown
through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was
carrying.58 Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into
a bag while held by another, is not the same as taking possession
thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio
is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even
conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to
show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the
bag and that he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items.
Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that he had no
part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Court’s dated but
nevertheless current exhortation:
x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have
no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist
on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and
judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long
as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless
of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude
condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it
only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the
eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish
them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.59
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 458-97 and
No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants Reynaldo Din y
Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED.
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the
immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are
being held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Del Rosario
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding
accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to
pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages
and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.1
28
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio
Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John Doe alias"Dodong" were charged
with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00
in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.2
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, 3 Virgilio "Boy"
Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun"
Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario
was tried.
These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness
account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996
between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by
the side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when
three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half
(1 1/2) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito
del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman
grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of
the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to
help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending
her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken
by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where
someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the
driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped
away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the
tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the
nearest police headquarters and reported the incident.4
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At
around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired for P120.005 by a certain
"Boy" Santos,6 his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he
would drive him to a cockpit at the Bias Edward Coliseum. 7 However
despite their earlier arrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed
to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He
(del Rosario) acceded.8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the
parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market.9 Subsequently,
he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General
Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette.
The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with
her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the
tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya. 10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave
and seek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle
prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but
before boarding the tricycle "Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim
on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the
shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while
"Jun" Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him to start the
engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del
Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the
bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. 11 Upon arriving at
Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to
inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his
family would be harmed. 12 Del Rosario then went home. 13 Because of
the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the
tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. 14
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario
guilty as charged and sentenced him to death. He now contends in this
automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the
presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-
accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong"
Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the
conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and
"Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3)
Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an
accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful warrantless
arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. 15
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for
exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal
Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be
sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when
he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime
scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only
forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime. 16
But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful
and remote, hence, could not be considered uncontrollable; and that a
gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because it fell
short of the test required by law and jurisprudence. 17
We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he
does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.
An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force
contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-
defense in equal combat. 18
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened
with weapons, even those less powerful than a gun, such as knives
and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an
armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant
case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be
expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the
same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal
welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only
saw for the first time that day. 19
Corollary with the defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court
erred when it said that it was "Boy" Santos who left the tricycle to
chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the
head, instantly killing her. 20 A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the
transcripts and records of the testimonies of witness Alonzo and del
Rosario himself, reveals that it was "Jun" Marquez who ran after the
victim's helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct
examination —
Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that
place at that time?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of
a bag,
sir . . . .
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by
the two men?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir . . . .
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already
taken by the two men who grappled the same from her?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to
the scene while the other man was then kicking the lady who
in turn fell to the ground, sir.
Q: What happened to the lady who fell to the ground?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and
then shot the woman who was then lying on the ground, sir .
...
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?
A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.
29
 Q: Will you please state before the the Court what you xxx xxx xxx
noticed from the tricycle which was at a distance of about
one and a half meter? Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which
tricycle was used by the assailants?
A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir . . . .
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man
who grappled for the possession of the bag? Q: Then what did you do?

A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir. A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.

Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman Q: When you said "they" to whom are you referring?
what else happened?
A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
A: They went away, sir . . . .
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle
did these men sit in the tricycle? A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the Q: And what about Jun Marquez?
driver while the other man entered the sidecar, sir.21
A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic)
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection the bag of the victim.
on the crime scene conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo
categorically Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
stated —
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the
accused who was then holding the gun fired at the victim? Q: And after that what happened?

A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
his other companion holding a gun chased the helper of the
deceased going towards Burgos Avenue, sir. Court: Did you not see any shooting?
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards? A: There was, sir.
A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim Q: Who was shot?
was lying down in this spot the man holding a gun shot the
victim, sir. 22
A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir . . . .
On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified —
Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you
know that what was transpiring was wrong and illegal?
Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the
tricycle?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not try to leave?
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the
A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle
tricycle?
prevented me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms
did you see?
Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the
handbag was given.
A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?)
Marquez and one in the possession of Boy Santos . . . .
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was
Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was Boy Santos?
the person with the gun?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
A: Yes, sir. 23
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the
On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct tricycle and when you tried to escape that was the time when
examination that —
Boy Santos threatened you if you will escape something will
happen to your family?
Q: . . . . On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver
of the tricycle as testified to by Eduardo Nalagon? A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir. Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy
(Jun?) Marquez or Dodong Visaya?
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the
Cathedral and the Nita's Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.? A: Dodong Visaya, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
30
 Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your
tricycle sitting at your back?
A: Yes, sir. 24
On cross-examination, accused further stated —
Q: After stopping in that place for one minute what else
happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they
doing while Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the bag of the
woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong
Bisaya?
A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down . . . .
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or
any private persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed
his gun to me, sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that
is used in shooting the old woman?
A: No, sir . . . .
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun
Marquez were grappling for the possession of the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir . . . . 25
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just
cannot leave the area where the incident occurred is
because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos and he
was telling you that you should not do anything against their
will, they will kill you and your family will be killed also, is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your
tricycle which was loaded by your other three co-accused in
this case, all of them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a
helper of the victim going towards the public market along
Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.
Court: Are you quite sure of that?
A: Yes, sir. 26
Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that
the latter pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to
escape. He also asserts that it was "Jun" Marquez who shot the victim
and sat behind him in the tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after
the bag of the victim was grabbed, her male helper was chased by a
man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot the victim
and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, that the bag was
given to a person who was inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of
witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can
be deduced that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was
referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased
"by the other man," and that this "other man" could not be "Boy" Santos
who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over.
This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that "Boy"
Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that "Boy" Santos
stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and to
prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible
reason for "Boy" Santos to stay in the tricycle if the accused was
indeed a conspirator; that "Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle
and helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw
the victim grappling with "Dodong" Bisaya and resisting the attempts to
grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos opted to remain inside the tricycle
to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring
that he would not escape and leave them behind. 27
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half
(1-1/2) in front of the tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not
have totally seen and was not privy to events that were transpiring
inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by "Boy" Santos at del
Rosario simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the victim.
From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the
sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent. 28
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of
the gun directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear
rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making
him for the moment an automaton without a will of his own. In other
words, in effect, he could not be any more than a mere instrument
acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt from
criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was
compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the
crime scene.
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosario's
conviction on his participation in the orchestrated acts of "Boy" Santos,
"Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. According to the trial court, del
Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime
scene and conspiracy between accused and his passengers was
evident because "while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the
helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia
Bernas were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on
his tricycle and the engine of the motor was running;" 29 that the
"accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his
control was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the
crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the
incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the
crime." 30
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language
exists when two or more concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an
act or omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is
need for "concurrence of wills" or "unity of action and purpose" or for
"common and joint purpose and design." Its manifestation could be
shown by "united and concerted action." 31
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since
by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be
proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred
from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be
inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is
proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy. 32 Nevertheless,
mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but
by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof
necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the
presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt. 33
31
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus
criminis as he was the driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless
rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had no
inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since
he was not given any briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy
Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at
gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to
help them escape.
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the
accused came to an agreement concerning the commission of the
felony and decided to commit the same." 34 Therefore, in order to
convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the fact that del
Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is
insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not
establish conspiracy. 35 The only incriminating evidence against del
Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply
explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been
successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for
his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused
that he would be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be
deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused
directly participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting although
he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim. 36
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to
the authorities, to his employer or to the barangay captain does not
affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get
involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. 37 It must be recalled
that del Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a family to look after.
Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want
to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he
was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to
remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as
enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 38 As testified to by
SPO4 Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who was the team
leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during
his cross-examination —
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle,
they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of
the barangay captain where the owner of the
tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed
the driver's name and was invited for interview.
The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who
volunteered to name his passengers on May 13,
1996. On the way to the police station, accused
informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location
and the place where the hold-uppers may be
found and they reported these findings to their
officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch,
they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15
armed men where a shoot-out transpired that
lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
After a brief encounter, they went inside the house
where they found Marquez dead holding a
magazine and a gun. While all of these were
happening, accused del Rosario was at the back
of the school, after which they went back to the
police station. The investigator took the statement
of the accused on May 14, 1996, and was only
subscribed on May 22, 1996. All the while, he was
detained in the police station as ordered by the
Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May
16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his
detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done
with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. 39
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the
encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was handcuffed by
the police because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he
might attempt to escape. 40
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated
by law enforces after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprive of his freedom of action in any significant
way. 41 This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by
RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that —
. . . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under
his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates
any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known and understood by him, of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall
at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such
person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he
must be provided with a competent and independent counsel
by the investigating officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his
rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for
questioning at the house of the baranggay captain, he was already
under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor
made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already
knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a
suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since
the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right
to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime
even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the
same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of
Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no
warrant therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of provides: 43
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon
during the police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma
on 14 May 1996. In People vs. Sucro 44 we held that when a police
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec.
5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught
immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del
Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since
he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery
with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2)
stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1)
an offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time
32
of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the
arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be
secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that
the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain
facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed
the crime. 45 Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with
these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day
after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As
such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused
was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual
eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as
the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot

affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not
allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and
any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to
arraignment without any objection, as in this case. 46

A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent

person lost her life and property in the process. Someone therefore
must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del
Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a
hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious
designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-
accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the
prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime
charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan

City convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVISED and
SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
His immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for
some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is
directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5)
days from receipt hereof.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

33