G.R. No.

79416 September 5, 1989

ROSALINA BONIFACIO, surviving wife; and children GABRIEL, PONCIANO, TIBURCIO,

BEATRIZ, GENEROSA, SILVERIA, LEONARDO, FELOMENA, ENCARNACION and LEONILA,
all surnamed BONIFACIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch
XIII, Malolos, Bulacan and PASTORA SAN MIGUEL, respondents.

FACTS: A complaint was filed on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio before the then Court of
Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch I-A of Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of
private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at
Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. The ground relied
upon therefor was personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR Case No. 2160-B'68).

After trial on the merits,granted authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant
PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in question situated at Patubig, Marilao,

On appeal by private respondent Pastora San Miguel, the Court of Appeals 4 modified said judgment
respect to with her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the amount of P 1,376.00.
The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. 5

Still dissatisfied, private respondent Pastora San Miguel sought another relief during the pendency of
her petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As no notice of such death was given to the
Court, no order for the substitution of his heirs was made. On July 31, 1985, the Court En
Banc resolved to deny private respondent's petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Subsequently, the children and heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the decision in
CAR. A writ of execution was issued.

Thereafter, private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution. This was
opposed by petitioners who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order declaring
Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for allegedly re-entering the subject land.

After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986, declaring
the implementation of the writ of execution of the Decision made by the Sheriff, per directive contained
hereby declared null and void; as well as the "Motion for Demolition" filed by plaintiff is hereby denied;
and, the "Petition for Contempt" likewise denied.

Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals
contending that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 can no longer be executed as said
action is purely personal in character and therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be
inherited by his heirs.

Private respondent (Argument) places stress on the fact that the action under consideration is not
an ordinary ejectment case but an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. She
theorizes that the right being asserted in the action is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily
died with him. She further contends that the non-substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered
the proceedings taken after his death null and void. She also points to certain supervening events
which allegedly prohibit execution of the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68, to wit: the amendment
of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 can no longer be executed as
said action is purely personal in character and therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's
death, be inherited by his heirs?

HELD: No. Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B'68 as more than an
ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee,
which in the light of the public policy involved, is more closely and strictly regulated by the State. This
factor, however, does not operate to bar the application to the instant case of the general rule that an
ejectment case survives the death of a party.

Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for ejectment under
Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other
opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving use to a bigger misconception that the right of
cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right alone. A
reading of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 however readily demonstrates the fallacy of this interpretation.
Said section provides:

Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement

as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will personally
cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into
residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes . .
..

Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-
lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired.
In so providing, the law clearly did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to
the landowner but to extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly
then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the
landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred
upon the landowner's immediate family members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members evidently to place
the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the
land with the aid of his farm household. In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee
who cultivates the landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation
of the law engaged in "personal cultivation."

Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation"
cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or
lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family
members.

Private respondent's challenge against the proceedings held after Olimpio Bonifacio's death cannot
therefore be heeded.

Neither can private respondent derive comfort from the amendment of Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 by
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6389 11 and the promulgation of P.D. No. 27. 12 In Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-34586, April 2, 1984,128 SCRA 519, we categorically ruled that both R.A. No. 6389 and P.D.
No. 27 cannot be applied retroactively under the general rule that statutes have no retroactive effect
unless otherwise provided therein.

G.R. No. L-14697 January 28, 1961

SILVINO LASTIMOZA and HONORATA GONZALES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. RAMON BLANCO, Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Eighth Regional District,
Iloilo City and NESTOR PANADA, respondents.

FACTS: On September 22, 1956, the CFI of Iloilo in Land Registration Case No. N.341 (G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. N.10795) adjudicated in favor of Silvino Lastimoza and his wife Honorata Gonzales, herein
petitioners, a parcel of land identified as Lot No.14 of Plan PSU-87977. On April 12, 1957, Original
Certificate of Title No. 01204 covering the same was issued by the Register of Deeds of the province
in their names. They were, subsequently, or on July 29, 1958, placed in possession of the land by writ
of possession, the sheriff of the province ejecting therefrom Perfecto, Rosalina, Encarnacion, Lucila
and Lydia, all surnamed Gallego.

On September 13, 1958, herein respondent Nestor Panada, claiming to be a tenant since the start
of the 1956-57 agricultural year of Perfecto Gallego, one of those ousted by the writ of
possession, filed against herein petitioners a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations
praying, among other things, that he be maintained as tenant on about 2 hectares of the land
in question (Case No. 724. Iloilo). As prayed for in the petition, the Agrarian Court issued an
interlocutory order directing the JAGO officer or his authorized representative to supervise the harvest
and threshing of the palay crops standing on the landholding, and to deposit, after deducting the
expenses therefor, the net produce in a bonded warehouse.

On September 18, 1958, petitioners filed a motion to lift the interlocutory order, and on the following
day, moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being
alleged that there was no tenancy relationship between them and respondent Nestor Panada. Both
motions, however were denied and reconsideration of the orders of denial having been also denied,
the petitioners filed the present petition for certiorariand prohibition.

ISSUE: Wether or not there was no tenancy relationship between the petitioners and
respondent Nestor Panada?

HELD: Yes. There is no tenancy relationship.

It is not disputed that respondent Nestor Panada worked on a portion of the land in question
by virtue of a so called oral contract of tenancy with Perfecto Gallego who was then in possession of
the land. The latter, however, was ejected from the land after the same had been adjudicated in a land
registration proceeding to herein petitioners by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and title hereto
issued in their names. Since that court has, in effect, ruled that Perfecto Gallego, the supposed
former landholder, was an unlawful, possessor and intruder, respondent Nestor Panada cannot
now invoke the security of tenure guaranteed in section 9 of the Tenancy Law (Republic Act
No. 1199) and claim that petitioners, as the prevailing party in the land registration proceeding,
are duty bound to maintain him as their tenant. Said section 9 of the Tenancy Law — in providing
that " sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the tenancy relationship," for in
such cases, the "the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former
landholder in relation to the tenant," obviously assumes the existence of a valid tenancy relation
between the former landholder and his tenants, and contemplates privity of contract or alienation of
valid title be it of ownership or possession, between the old landholder and the new. In the instant
case, there can be no question that there is no privity of contract or alienation in the sense
contemplated by section 9 of the Tenancy Law between Perfecto Gallego, the alleged former
landholder and herein petitioners. Neither can it be pretended that there was a valid tenancy relation
between said Perfecto Gallego and respondent Panada. Tenancy relationship can only be created
with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the "owner, lessee, usufructuary or
legal possessor of the land" (sec. 5[b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed
landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. Perfecto Gallego, the alleged former
landholder, having been ousted by writ of possession issued by a competent court and
virtually declared a usurper or intruder, respondent Panada, as his tenant, can have no better
right and claim security of tenure, a guarantee afforded only to tenants de jure. To rule otherwise,
would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true
and lawful landholder. Such anomalous and absurd result certainly could not have been the intention
of Congress.

JAIME SANCHEZ, JR., Petitioner,

Vs.

ZENAIDA F. MARIN, JESUS NICASIO F. MARIN, JOSE DAVID F. MARIN,

MARIA BERNADETTE F. MARIN, PAUL PETER F. MARIN and PHILIP LUIS F.
MARIN,Respondents.

DECISION

FACTS:

In 1977, the petitioner was instituted as a tenant of the subject fishpond by

its previous registered owner David Felix. The sharing agreement was on a
50/50 basis after deducting the expenses from the gross harvest. A few years
thereafter, David Felix sold and transferred ownership of the subject fishpond
to respondents Jesus Nicasio, Jose David, Maria Bernadette, Paul Peter and
Philip Luis, all surnamed Marin, to whom a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-43289,5 covering the subject fishpond, was issued. The aforesaid respondents, as
the new owners of the fishpond, entered into a civil law lease agreement dated 24
June 1985 with their mother and co-respondent Zenaida F. Marin, which was
renewable yearly.
Subsequently, Zenaida F. Marin, as a lessee of the subject fishpond, made an
arrangement with the petitioner wherein the latter would receive a regular salary
and a 20% share in the net profit of the fishpond from January 1985 to June 1986.
The reason why the agreement was with a period was to be consistent with the lease
agreement entered into between respondent Zenaida F. Marin and her children,
herein respondents Jesus Nicasio, Jose David, Maria Bernadette, Paul Peter and Philip
Luis, all surnamed Marin.6 However, after the expiration of the first lease agreement
between respondent Zenaida F. Marin and her children, and before a new lease
agreement could be made, the petitioner was ordered by Zenaida F. Marin to vacate
the premises but he refused to do so. He asserted that he was a tenant of the
fishpond and not a mere contractual worker; hence, he had the right to its
peaceful possession and security of tenure.

On 21 July 1986, the petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lucena City, he asked the in which court to declare him as a tenant of the
subject fishpond. On 20 July 1987, the RTC of Lucena City rendered a Decision7 in
favor of the petitioner, declaring the [herein petitioner] as the agricultural tenant,
not a hired contractual worker on the [subject fishpond], and therefore, entitled to
the security of tenure under Section 78 of Republic Act No. 11999 and to continue
possession of the premises and shall enjoy the rights and privileges accorded by law.

The said Decision of the Court of Appeals later became final

Having been declared as an agricultural tenant on the subject fishpond, the

petitioner, filed before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Region IV
a Petition for the fixing of the leasehold rentals for his use of the subject fishpond
at P30,000.00 per annum. It was alleged therein by the petitioner that under Section
12 of Republic Act No. 665712 and Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1989, he had the option to convert his status
as share-crop tenant into an agricultural lessee by paying a fixed lease rental on the
fishpond. He further claimed that the respondents posited no objection to the amount
of P30,000.00 as a yearly lease rental. Yet, in an Answer filed by the respondents,
they insisted that fishponds, like the subject matter of this case, were not yet within
the purview of the law on leasehold. They likewise refuted the fact that they agreed
to fix the lease rental at P30,000.00 per annum. Although they admitted that the
petitioner was indeed declared as an agricultural tenant of the fishpond,
they, however, argued that the petitioner should already be ejected
therefrom for his failure to pay the rent.

Thus, on 17 April 1991, respondent Zenaida F. Marin filed a Complaint, primarily to

eject the petitioner from the fishpond because of the latter's failure to pay the rent
She also sought to compel the petitioner to pay the total amount of P650,000.00
representing the lease rentals from 1 July 1985 to 30 June 1991

The petitioner denied having any liability to respondent Zenaida F. Marin in the
amount of P650,000.00 as rental arrears. He stressed that he failed to pay the lease
rentals from July 1987 to July 1989 because he failed to harvest anything from the
fishpond during the said period due to respondent Zenaida F. Marin's refusal to
defray the expenses of production. Accordingly, he cannot be evicted on the basis
of non-payment of rent because his obligation to pay the same merely depends on
the actual harvest made. Similarly, the petitioner emphasized that from March 1989
to September 1990, he deposited the rent due respondent Zenaida F. Marin in
Philippine National Bank (PNB) Account No. 6637513 under the name of the Deputy
Sheriff of the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 53, and respondent Zenaida F. Marin
withdrew the said amount.

The Provincial Adjudicator consolidated the same. On 2 March 1993, he rendered a

Decision14 in favor of the petitioner. Ordering that [petitioner] be maintained in the
peaceful possession of subject farm-holding.

Aggrieved, respondents appealed the PARAD Decision dated 2 March 1993 to the
DARAB, reiterating their position that the fishpond was excluded from the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The DARAB rendered a Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator dated 2 March 1993.

Still refusing to admit defeat, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Review of the aforesaid DARAB Decision maintaining that the DARAB grossly erred
in not finding that substantial evidence exists to warrant the dispossession of the
petitioner from the subject fishpond.

The appellate court rendered its assailed Decision wherein it granted in part the
Petition of the respondents by annulling and setting aside the DARAB Decision dated
25 September 2000 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court ruled
that Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881,17amending Section 10 of Republic Act No.
6657, excluded private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms
and fishponds from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);
clearly then, the operation of a fishpond is no longer considered an
agricultural activity, and a parcel of land devoted to fishpond operation is
not anymore an agricultural land. Consequently, the disputes involved in DARAB
Cases No. 3799 and No. 3800 were not agrarian disputes, and since the DARAB,
et al. then acted without jurisdiction when they heard and adjudicated the
aforesaid cases, their decisions and orders therein were null and void.

ISSUE:

I. Whether the subject fishpond is exempted/excluded from the coverage of the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government by virtue of the
amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7881 to R.A. No. 6657.

II. Granting that the subject fishpond is exempted/excluded from the coverage of the
CARL, whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: The Petition is meritorious. The Court of Appeals grounded its Decision on this
Court's pronouncements in Romero v. Tan.18 In the said case, this Court traced the
classification of fishponds for agrarian reform purposes. Section 166(1) of
Republic Act No. 384419 defined an agricultural land as land devoted to any growth,
including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned
land. Thus, it is beyond cavil that under this law, fishponds were considered
agricultural lands. Even when Republic Act No. 6657 entitled, "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," took effect on 15 June 1988, fishponds were still
considered as agricultural land. However, when Republic Act No. 7881 was passed
by Congress on 20 February 1995, it amended several provisions of Republic Act No.
6657. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of Republic Act No.
6657 by expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL.
Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, now defines agricultural land as
land devoted to agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. As to what constitutes an agricultural
activity is defined by Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, as the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed
by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether
natural or juridical. By virtue of the foregoing amendments, the operation of
fishponds is no longer considered an agricultural activity, and a parcel of
land devoted to fishpond operation is no longer an agricultural land.20

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881, explicitly provides:

SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.'

x x x x.

b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed
and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory
acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the
exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree
to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the workers-
beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage the same

In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, the consent of the farm workers shall no longer be necessary; however, the provision of
Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the afore-quoted provision, it is crystal HAT clear that fishponds are
excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

Even as we recognize that the fishpond is not covered by the CARL, pursuant
to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No.
7881, this Court, nonetheless, does not agree in the conclusion arrived at by the
Court of Appeals that since the subject fishpond is no longer an agricultural land, it
follows then that there can be no tenurial arrangement affecting the parties in this
case. And in view of the fact that there is no agrarian dispute cognizable by the
DARAB, then the DARAB had no jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's case.

It bears emphasis that the status of the petitioner as a tenant in the subject
fishpond and his right to security of tenure were already previously settled
in the Decision dated 20 July 1987 of the RTC of Lucena City in Agrarian Case
No. 86-8, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 11
September 1989. Having been declared as a tenant with the right to security of
tenure as provided in Section 3522 of Republic Act No. 3844 in relation to Section 7
of Republic Act No. 1199, the law enforced at the time of the filing of the Complaint
before the RTC of Lucena City, the petitioner has acquired a vested right over the
subject fishpond, which right or interest has become fixed and established and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy.23 Therefore, even if fishponds, like the subject
matter of this case, were later excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL as
expressly provided in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7881, and despite the fact that no CLOA has been issued to the petitioner,
the same cannot defeat the aforesaid vested right already granted and acquired by
the petitioner long before the passage of Republic Act No. 7881. And being in the
nature of a substantive law, the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7881
to Republic Act No. 6657 in the year 1995 cannot be given a retroactive application
as to deprive the petitioner of his rights under the previous agrarian legislation.24

Verily, DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1995, expressly respects and
acknowledges the tenancy relationship that existed between the parties prior to the
amendments made to Republic Act No. 6657 by Republic Act No. 7881, that is, before
fishponds and prawn farms were exempted/excluded from the coverage of the CARL.

II. POLICY STATEMENT

D. Acts of harassment by landowners intended to eject or remove the workers or

tenants or the loss of their rights, benefits and privileges to which they are entitled
shall be sanctioned and dealt with under existing laws, rules and regulations.

E. Fishpond or prawn farmworkers affected by exemption/exclusion have the option

to remain as workers or become beneficiaries in other agricultural lands.

A worker who chooses to remain in the exempted area shall remain therin and shall
be entitled to such rights, benefits and privileges granted to farmworkers under
existing laws, decrees, and executive orders. (Emphasis supplied.)

Indubitably, despite the amendments to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, the
petitioner's right to tenancy and security of tenure over the subject fishpond must
still be honored.

This Court likewise affirms that the DARAB correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case, contrary to the declaration made by the appellate court in its Decision. Notably,
the present case was instituted as early as 1991 when the petitioner filed a Petition
before the PARAD for the fixing of his lease rental on the subject fishpond.
Respondents subsequently filed a countercharge against the petitioner for the
accounting, collection of sums of money, and dispossession. At such point, the law
applicable was Republic Act No. 6657, wherein fishponds and prawn farms were not
yet exempted/excluded from the CARL coverage. Evidently, there was an agrarian
dispute existing between the petitioner and the respondents, cognizable by the
PARAD at the time it rendered its Decision on 2 March 1993 in favor of the petitioner.
On 20 February 1995, however, Republic Act No. 7881 came into being which
expressly exempted/excluded fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage of the
CARL. In effect, cases involving fishponds and prawn farms are no longer considered
agrarian disputes as to make the case fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB or its
Adjudicators. Nevertheless, considering that prior to the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7881, this case was already pending appeal before the DARAB, the aforesaid
amendments then cannot be made to apply as to divest the DARAB of its jurisdiction
over the case. It is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it
remains with it until the full termination of the case.25

LUZ FARMS, Petitioner

v.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, Respondent.

FACTS:rtual 1aw library

On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage

On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines

and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in
Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).

Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly
stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b),
Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No.
6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A.
No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989
(Rollo, pp. 2-36).

Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be
declared unconstitutional.

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made
to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in
the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity." virtua1aw library
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
library

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing

plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform
the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for
lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in

Section 13 —

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular
and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently
receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five
million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.

In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net
profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90)
days of the end of the fiscal year . . ." library

law library
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Art XIII. Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right
of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation.
In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its
entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the
case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in
enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including
land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage Livestock
or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary
resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the
total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are
many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in
their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-
growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial
livestock and poultry raisers . Lands support the buildings and other amenities
attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but
not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including
backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry
production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate
farms (Rollo, p. 11).

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising
is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under
Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster’s International
Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:

"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and
harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of
livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.

It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .

Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.

Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals."
HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are

ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the
constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself,
but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the
Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the
terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes
a long way toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it
(Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the

meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under

Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."
Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind
of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and
residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the
word "agricultural." This proposal, however, was not considered because the
Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable
agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner
Tadeo, quoted as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan.

Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural
worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry
at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry
and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered
by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p.
21).

Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms’ argument that the requirement in Sections 13
and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry
raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from
three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to
their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory,
and therefore violative of due process

Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing
Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED
null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
is hereby MADE permanent.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I agree that the petition be granted.

It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its
Implementing Rules and Guidelines insofar as they include the raising of livestock,
poultry, and swine in their coverage can not be simplistically reduced to a question
of constitutional construction.

it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly situated and hence, cannot be
treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for the inclusion of
livestock and poultry industry within the coverage of the agrarian reform program
constitute invalid classification and must accordingly be struck down as repugnant
to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

G.R. No. 191538 December 11, 2013

WELLER JOPSON, Petitioner,

vs.
FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR. and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS: Spouses Laura S. Pascual (Laura) an~ Jose H. Mendoza (Jose) owned a parcel ofland
situated at Naga City, Camarines Sur. The property had an aggregate area of one hundred one
thousand forty-five (101,045) square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 687. On 26 December 1961, the said property was subdivided into sixty-three (63) lots
through a judicially approved subdivision and became part of Laura Subdivision. Thus, TCT
No. 687 was cancelled and, in its stead, TCT No. 986 (covering 31 lots), TCT No. 987 (covering
31 lots) and TCT No. 988 (covering 1 lot) were issued.

On 4 January 1992, spouses Laura and Jose conveyed to respondent Development Bank
of the Philippines (respondent DBP), by way of dacion en pago, the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 986 (subject landholding) which has an area of eight thousand nine hundred
forty-six (8,946) square meters.

Sometime in the year 1990, respondent DBP published an Invitation to Bid for the
conveyance of the subject landholding covered by TCT No. 1149. On 28 December 1990,
the said property was sold for ₱1.2M to petitioner Fabian O. Mendez, Jr. x x x as the highest
bidder.

Sometime in 1991, a Complaint was filed by Weller Jopson with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur. It was directed against respondent DBP,
[respondent Mendez] and Leonardo Tominio (Leonardo) for annulment of sale,
preemption/redemption and reinstatement with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order with damages.

In essence o, [petitioner] alleged that he is a bona fide tenant-farmer of the parcel of land
subject of the sale between respondent DBP and [respondent Mendez]; his father Melchor
Jopson (Melchor), was the original tenant f subject landholding appointed as such by the
spouses Laura and Jose in 1947; in 1967, he succeeded his father in cultivating the subject
landholding now covered by the present TCT No. 21190 when his father became ill; from
1967 up to December 1990, he laboriously tilled and cultivated the parcel of land and
religiously shared the harvest with respondent DBP through its representatives or
employees; on 20 December 1990, a certain Leonardo, acting upon the instructions of
[respondent Mendez], unlawfully entered the subject landholding and ejected him from the
same; the sale of the subject landholding by respondent DBP to petitioner is void because the
latter is not qualified to acquire the same under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657; the sale of the
parcel of land is also violative of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 360, series of 1989, in relation to
Section 1 of E.O. No. 407 dated 14 June 1990; he was deprived of his preferential right to buy
the parcel of land he tenanted under reasonable terms and conditions as provided for by Section
11, R.A. No. 3844; in the alternative, he also has the right to redeem the parcel of land from
petitioner at a reasonable price pursuant to Section 12, R.A. No. 3844; the forcible entry by
Leonardo upon the instructions of [respondent Mendez] desecrated his right to security of tenure
and deprivation of his livelihood;

In his Answer dated 5 November 1991, [respondent Mendez] denied [petitioner]’s allegations and
asseverated that the latter has no cause of action against him; [petitioner] is guilty of laches (or
estoppel) for not having questioned the auction sale of the parcel of land; the PARAD had no
jurisdiction over the case because the parcel of land subject of the sale is no longer
classified as agricultural and it is not located in an agricultural zone; Leonardo, in his Answer
dated 24 January 1992, denied [petitioner]’s allegations and averred that he was already in
possession of the parcel of land even before 20 December 1990, long before he knew [respondent
Mendez]; it was [petitioner], claiming to be respondent DBP’s caretaker, who placed him in the
subject landholding;

In a Decision4 dated August 25, 1995, the PARAD declared the sale of the subject property
between respondents as a nullity and ordered respondent DBP to execute the necessary
Deed of Transfer of the parcel of land in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. It held that
while the subject landholding is situated within a district classified as secondary commercial zone
and its subdivision was judicially approved, the same was not duly converted to non-agricultural
use as prescribed by law. Resultantly, the Register of Deeds of Naga City was ordered to cancel
TCT No. 21190.

In a Resolution6 dated February 26, 1996, the PARAD reversed its earlier ruling and declared
that the parcel of land in question is duly classified and zonified as non-agricultural land
in accordance with pertinent laws and guidelines.

Petitioner, thereafter, filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB.

In a Decision7 dated January 25, 2000, the DARAB reversed the PARAD’s ruling and held
that there is a tenancy relationship between respondent DBP and petitioner as evidenced
by the sharing of harvest between them. Thus, petitioner is not a mere caretaker but a bona
fide tenant. It, however, did not sustain petitioner’s claim for redemption of the subject landholding
since he failed to consign with the PARAD a reasonable amount to cover the price of the land.
Directing Fabian Mendez and all other persons in his behalf or under his authority to maintain
petitioner-appellant in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject-landholding as
agricultural lessee thereof.

Respondent Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration against said decision, while petitioner filed
a Petition for Review with the CA advancing the argument that the PARAD and the DARAB erred
and gravely abused their discretion in denying his right of redemption of the parcel of land. In a
Decision dated November 29, 2001, the CA denied petitioner’s petition.

In a Decision dated July 9, 2009, the CA nullified and set aside the decision and resolution of the
DARAB.

Unfazed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 12, 2010.

ISSUES:

(1) whether petitioner is a bona fide tenant of the subject property, and

(2) whether the PARAD and DARAB have jurisdiction over the present case.

HELD:

(1). No. The petitioner is not a bonafide tenant.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that in order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential
to establish all its indispensable elements, viz.: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.

In this case, however, the facts substantiating a de jure tenancy are missing.

First, besides petitioner’s bare assertion that a tenancy relationship exists between him and
respondent DBP, no other concrete proof was presented by petitioner to demonstrate the
relationship of petitioner and respondent DBP as tenant and landowner. In fact, respondent DBP
resolutely argued that petitioner is not a tenant but a mere caretaker of the subject landholding.

Second, the subject matter of the relationship is not an agricultural land but a commercial land.
Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,13 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL), states that "an agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity
as defined therein and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."

As per Certification by the Office of the Zoning Administrator of Naga City, the subject landholding
covered by TCT No. 21190 is classified as secondary commercial zone based on Zoning
Ordinance No. 603 adopted on December 20, 1978 by the City Council and approved by the
National Coordinating Council for Town Planning and Zoning, Human Settlements Commission
on September 24, 1980. Thus, the reclassification of the subject landholding from
agricultural to commercial removes it from the ambit of agricultural land over which
petitioner claims a tenancy relationship is founded.

As extensively discussed by the CA –

Indeed, the subject landholding is no longer an agricultural land despite its being planted
with palay. It had long been reclassified as a commercial land and it even forms part of Laura
Subdivision. Whatever the landowner does to the subject landholding, like plant it with palay, does
not convert it to an agricultural land nor divest it of its actual classification. x x x

Third, the essential element of consent is absent. In the present case, no proof was presented
that respondent DBP recognized or hired petitioner as its legitimate tenant. Besides petitioner’s
self-serving assertions that he succeeded his father in tilling the subject landholding, no other
concrete evidence was presented to prove consent of the landowner.

(2). No.the PARAD and the DARAB have no jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim.

Specifically, the PARAD and the DARAB have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
the CARL under R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited
to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of
agrarian laws.15 Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this wise:

(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner
and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

From the foregoing, it is clear that no agrarian dispute exists in the instant case, since what is
involved is not an agricultural land and no tenancy relationship exists between petitioner and
respondent DBP.

AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LITO CECILIA AND

LEONOR LIM, Petitioners,

v.

SPOUSES MARCIANO DELA CRUZ, SR. AND OFELIA DELA CRUZ, Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Automat Realty and Development Corporation (Automat) is the registered
owner of two parcels of land located in Barangay Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, covered
by TCT Nos. T-210027 and T-209077.

Automat acquired the 49,503-square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-

209077 from El Sol Realty and Development Corporation in 1990.� In the same year,
Automat also acquired the 24,562-square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No.�
T-210027 from Ofelia Carpo. Petitioner Leonor Lim (petitioner Lim) was the real
estate broker behind Automat�s purchase of the property.� Respondent spouses
sometimes referred to petitioner Lim some Sta. Rosa real estate properties available
for sale.� They received a share in the broker's fees either from the seller or buyer.

The land was not occupied in 1990 when it was purchased by Automat. Respondent
Ofelia dela Cruz volunteered her services to petitioner Lim as caretaker to prevent
informal settlers from entering the property. Automat agreed, through its authorized
administrator, petitioner Lim, on the condition that the caretaker would voluntarily
vacate the premises upon Automats demand.

Respondent spouses family stayed in the property as rent-paying tenants.They

cultivated and improved the land.They shared the produced palay with Automat
through its authorized agent, petitioner Lito Cecilia (petitioner Cecilia). He also
remitted the rentals paid by respondent Ofelia Dela Cruz to petitioner Lim in Makati
and to Automat's office in Quezon City.

Sometime in August 2000, Automat asked respondent spouses to vacate the

premises as it was preparing the groundwork for developing the property

Respondent spouses refused to vacate unless they were paid compensation. They
claimed they were agricultural tenants [who] enjoyed security of tenure under the
law.

On October 19, 2000, respondent spouses filed a petition for maintenance of peaceful
possession with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order against Automat before the PARAD for Laguna.

Automat had recovered possession of the property before respondent spouses filed
their petition, and it continues to have possession at present.

On August 28, 2001, the PARAD dismissed the complaint. It declared, among other
things, that no agricultural tenancy can be established between [the parties] under
the attending factual circumstances. The PARAD found it undisputed that when
petitioners entered the property in 1990, it was already classified as residential,
commercial, and industrial land. Thus, it is legally impossible for [the property] to be
the subject of an agricultural tenancy relation[ship].

On February 8, 2005, the DARAB reversed and set aside the PARAD's decision. It
declared respondent spouses as de jure tenants of the landholding, thus, protected
by security of tenure. It ordered Automat to maintain [the spouses] in peaceful
possession and cultivation of the landholding.

Automat, petitioner Lim, and petitioner Cecilia appealed with the Court of
Appeals,20 arguing that (a) the DARAB had no jurisdiction since the property is not
agricultural land, (b) the boards finding that respondent spouses are de jure tenants
was not supported by evidence, and (c) the essential requisites for a valid agricultural
tenancy relationship are not present.

On August 19, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB without prejudice to
petitioners right to seek recourse from the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary
on the other issues.
The Court of Appeals, like the DARAB, gave more weight to the following
documentary evidence:23 (a) Municipal Agrarian Reform Offices Job H. Candinados
October 18, 2000 certification stating that respondent spouses are the actual tillers
of the land;24 (b) sworn statements by Norma S. Bartolozo, Ricardo M. Saturno, and
Resurrection E. Federiso who are residents and owners of the adjoining lots;25(c)
Irrigation Superintendent Cesar C. Amadors certification on the irrigation service fee
paid by respondent spouses;26 and (d) checks paid by respondent spouses as proof
of rental. Petitioners filed for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region IV-A CALABARZON

issued two orders, both dated March 30, 2010, exempting the property from coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

On April 16, 2010, petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration

informing the Court of Appeals of these exemption orders.

Two days earlier or on April 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals had denied
reconsideration. On May 4, 2010, it noted without action the supplemental motion
for reconsideration.

Hence, petitioners Automat, Leonor Lim, and Lito Cecilia appealed before this court.

Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Sta. Ana v. Carpo32 in
support of its ruling that the parcels of land are agricultural in nature and that an
agricultural tenancy relationship existed between Automat and respondent spouses.
They also argue that the DAR exemption orders confirmed their consistent position
that the DARAB never had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.

a tenancy relationship existed between Automat and respondent spouses.35� They

argue that an implied contract of tenancy was created when they were allowed to till
the land for 10 years.36 Consequently, they are entitled to security of tenure as
tenants.37� They add that the �subsequent reclassification of agricultural lands into
non-agricultural [land] after the effectivity of the (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law) CARL does not automatically remove the land from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [as a] valid certificate of exemption o[r]
exclusion, or a duly approved conversion order, must first be secured.

ISSUE:

1. Whether an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between Automat and

respondent spouses?

2. Wether or not subject properties are never subject of DARAB

HELD: No. Sps. are not lawful tenant.

No agricultural tenancy relationship

The elements to constitute a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the
relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.

There must be substantial evidence on the presence of all these requisites; otherwise,
there is no de juretenant.Only those who have established de jure tenant status are
entitled to security of tenure and coverage under tenancy laws.

Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove. Respondent spouses filed
the petition before the PARAD, praying to be maintained in peaceful possession of
the property. They were the ones claiming they had a tenancy relationship with
Automat. Thus, they had the burden of proof to show that such relationship existed.

I.Actual tillers

On the first requisite, respondent spouses contend that the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) Officer Job A. Candanido issued a certification on October 18, 2000
that respondent spouses are the actual tillers of the land.

Petitioners counter with MARO Officer Candanido March 23, 2001 amended
certification.This later certification states that there are No Records of Tenancy or
written Agricultural Leasehold Contract to any farmer/tiller in relation to the property.

This court has held that a MARO certification concerning the presence or the absence
of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is considered merely
preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary.
MARO certifications are limited to factual determinations such as the presence of
actual tillers. It cannot make legal conclusions on the existence of a tenancy
agreement.

Thus, petitioners reliance on the amended MARO certification fails to persuade.

Nevertheless, the finding in the original MARO certification on the presence of actual
tillers is closely related to the nature of the land. This brings us to the second requisite
that the property must be agricultural land.

I. Not agricultural land

The land in this case cannot be considered as agricultural land.

First, it is undisputed that the DAR Region IV-A CALABARZON had already issued
two orders, both dated March 30, 2010, exempting the property from CARP coverage.

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 ruled that Lands already
classified as commercial, industrial or residential use and approved by the HLURB
prior to the effectivity of RA No. 6657 on June 15, 1988 no longer need any
conversion clearance. Moreover, the term agricultural lands as defined in Section 3
(c) of RA 6657 do not include those lands already classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial. The case at hand shows that the subject
property is within the non-agricultural zone prior to 15 June 1988.

Further, said lands reclassified to non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988

ceased to be considered as agricultural lands and removed from the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

I.Consent; nature of relationship

Respondent spouses allege that petitioners never contest[ed] nor refute[d]

[respondents] cultivation and occupation of residence in the land (since 1990) for the
past ten (10) years or so. This brings us to the third requisite on consent.

This court has ruled that [t]enancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land [but] is also a
legal relationship. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. The allegation of its
existence must be proven by evidence, and working on anothers landholding raises
no presumption of an agricultural tenancy. Consequently, the landowners
consent to an agricultural tenancy relationship must be shown.

While this court agrees with the conclusion that no agricultural tenancy relationship
can exist in this case, we find that the element of consent in establishing a
relationship, not necessarily of agricultural tenancy, is present.
This court finds that Automat consented to a relationship with respondent spouses
when (a) through petitioner Lim, it constituted respondent Ofelia dela Cruz as
caretaker of the property with the understanding that she would vacate when asked
by Automat, and (b) it accepted rental payments from respondent spouses.

I.Civil lease

Automat is considered to have consented to a civil lease.

Respondent spouses were allowed to stay in the property as caretakers and, in
turn, they paid petitioners rent for their use of the property. Petitioners acceptance
of rental payments may be considered as ratification8of an unwritten lease
agreement whose period depends on their agreed frequency of rental payments.

I.C.2
Builder, planter, sower

In the alternative, if the facts can show that the proper case involves the Civil Code
provisions on builders, planters, and sowers, respondent spouses may be
considered as builders, planters, or sowers in good faith, provided such is proven
before the proper court.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if the landowner opts to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, he must pay indemnity to the builder,
planter, or sower in good faith in accordance with the relevant provisions of the

II DARAB jurisdiction

The DAR exemption orders have determined with certainty that the lands were
reclassified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988. Consequently, the petition
filed by respondent spouses in 2000 before the PARAD did not involve lands
devoted to agriculture and, necessarily, it could not have involved any controversy
relating to such land. Absent an agrarian dispute,the instant case cannot fall
under the limited jurisdiction of the DARAB as a quasi-judicial body.