Termination of the Leasehold
TEODORO vs. MACARAEG (G.R. No. L-20700)
FACTS
 Felix Macaraeg is a leasehold tenant and
cultivating a farmholding owned by Fidel Teodoro
for at least 7 years. On March 2, 1961, he received
a letter from Teodoro and his wife, advising him
that the landholding he occupies will be given to
another tenant, Jose Niegos. After such, Niegos
repeatedly forbade him from working on such
land.
 On June 7, 1961, Macaraeg then filed a petition
with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR)
praying that an interlocutory order be issued to
restrain Teodoro and Niegos from ejecting him
and he be maintained as Teodoro’s lawful tenant.
 Teodoro denied that Macaraeg was his tenant,
claiming that ever since he owned the land in
question, he had always leased it under civil lease
and that his wife verbally notified Macaraeg about
the expiration of their Contract of Lease, but
Macaraeg told them that he was not interested
from renewing it. He also claimed that he decided
to lease the land to Niegos after Macaraeg
abandoned it. Niegos, on the other hand, averred
that he entered the landholding in good faith,
clothed with the proper authority from Teodoro
and with conformity from Macaraeg.
 Before the case was submitted for decision,
Macaraeg filed a “supplemental petition,”
claiming for damages as a result of his
dispossession.
 The respondent court, CAR, rendered judgment in
favor of Macaraeg, but his claim for damages was
denied. Teodoro and Niegos filed separate
Motions for Reconsideration, but were also
denied. Upon Macaraeg’s Motion, his claim for
damages was granted.
 Hence, this petition. Teodoro averred that CAR
erred:
o in holding that Macaraeg became a tenant
of Teodoro by virtue of the Contract of
Lease (please refer sa full text, so that you
will know the contents of the Contract
(keri lang din naman kung hindi 😊))
they executed in April 1960 –
 the language and tenor of the
Contract of Lease clearly
manifest the intention of the
parties to enter into an ordinary
civil lease contract, not a
leasehold tenancy agreement,
as alleged by Macaraeg and
sustained by the Agrarian Court.
o in not finding Macaraeg guilty of
abandonment, assuming that he really was
a tenant of Teodoro –
 Macaraeg committed a positive
act of abandonment when he
offered to vacate his leasehold in
favor of Luciano Claus, and only
after he could not have his own
way of placing Claus as his
successor did he try to recover the
land holding; and
o in condemning Teodoro to pay damages
to Macaraeg for alleged dispossession.
ISSUE
 W/N there exists a leasehold tenancy agreement;
 W/N Macaraeg is guilty of abandonment, which
terminates the tenancy relation and justifies the
ejectment of the tenant.
HELD
 YES, there exists a leasehold tenancy agreement.
The leasehold tenancy contract entered into
between the parties is a pure and simple tenancy
contract as the term is understood under our
tenancy laws. The principal elements of a
leasehold tenancy contract or relation are:
1. The object or the relationship is an
agricultural land which is leased or
rented for the purpose of agricultural
production;
2. The size of the landholding must be
such that it is susceptible of personal
cultivation by a single person with
assistance from the members of his
immediate farm household;
3. The tenant-lessee must personally till,
cultivate, or operate said land, solely
or with the aid of labor from his
immediate farm household; and
4. The landlord-lessor, who is either the
lawful owner or the legal possessor of
the land, leases the same to the tenant-
lessee for a price certain or
ascertainable either in amount of
money or produce.
In this case, the Court firmly believed that the
Contract of Lease executed by the parties contains
such elements of a leasehold tenancy agreement.
 NO, Macaraeg is not guilty of abandonment. A
tenant’s offer or intention to surrender his hold on
the condition that the person named by him should
be accepted as his successor, does not itself
constitute abandonment of his farmland. In this
case, Macaraeg only intended to vacate his
leasehold possession on the condition that Claus
be taken as his successor. Hence, his act did not
constitute abandonment as it was a mere intended
surrender of the same. It was not an absolute
renunciation of his leasehold possession, as it was
in fact clearly conditional.
 The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned
decision of the CAR ordering Teodoro to reinstate
Macaraeg to his former landholding…and to keep
him as the true and lawful tenant in accordance
with the law and condemning him to pay
Macaraeg as damages 82 cavans of palay or its
equivalent in the amount of P820.00, plus interest
at 10% until fully paid.
 TALAVERA vs. CA (G.R. No. 77830)
FACTS
 Private respondent Jose Laxamana was a bonafide
tenant of a parcel of agricultural land at Sto.
Domingo 11, Sitio Tambo, Capas, Tarlac since
1958. He filed an action for recovery of possession
before the RTC B66 – Capas, Tarlac on July 10,
1984, after petitioners Talavera took possession of
such land. He alleged that he had been in
continuous possession and cultivation of the said
landholding but Talavera, for unknown reasons
and without Laxamana’s knowledge, planted
palay through force and intimidation. With these
acts, he further alleged that he suffered damages
in the amount of P500.00 and the price equivalent
to 65 cavans of palay per agricultural year from
the time of dispossession until his reinstatement.
 Petitioners Talavera counter-alleged that their
tenancy relationship with Laxamana was
terminated pursuant to a “Casunduan” document
executed on March 30, 1973 whereby the latter
sold his rights and interests over the agricultural
landholding for a consideration of P1,000.00, and
that Laxamana was not actually a tenant of
petitioners.
 The RTC B66 rendered judgment in favor of
Laxamana from which Talavera appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals. However, the CA
affirmed the lower court’s decision holding that
the “Casunduan,” even if assumed to be valid did
not constitute “valid surrender” under the law.
 Hence, this petition. Talavera bolster their claim
that Laxamana is no longer their tenant over the
landholding by invoking the rule on parol
evidence with respect to theprobative value of
“Casunduan” executed by both parties, and that
the execution of such showed Laxamana’s
intention to surrender whatever rights he had as
tenant over the land.
ISSUE
 W/N Laxamana’s voluntarily surrender of the
subject landholding to Talavera wherein the
tenancy relationship between the parties was
terminated by virtue of the “Casunduan,” is valid.
HELD
 NO, the voluntary surrender made by Laxamana
is invalid. The grounds for extinguishment of
agricultural leasehold relation, as enunciated by
Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844, are as follows:
1. Abandonment by landholding
without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
2. Voluntary surrender of the land
holding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be
served 3 months in advance; or
3. Absence of the persons under Section
rune to succeed to the lessee, in the
event of death or permanent
incapacity of the lessee.
A Voluntary surrender does not require any court
authorization considering that it involves the
tenant’s own volition, however, it must be shown
that the surrender was voluntary through
convincing and sufficiently proved by competent
evidence. Otherwise, the right of a tenant to
security of tenure becomes an illusory one. In the
first place, the agreement was prepared by
petitioner Visitacion A. Talavera. Laxamana
could hardly sign his own name. He was clearly at
a disadvantage in the execution of the contract and
the wording of the agreement. The intention to
give up the landholding must be gleaned from
evidence in addition to the document which was
signed by an ignorant and illiterate peasant in an
hour of emotional stress and financial need.
Laxamana also continued working on the land
until 1984 even after the “Casunduan” was made
while the Talaveras claimed that they cultivated
the land themselves. Exhibits presented as
evidence showed that Talaveras did not cultivate
the land and actually resides in another barangay.
The circumstances showed that Laxamana was
forced to sign the “Casunduan” without fully
understanding it and continued cultivating the land
after.
 Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away
except for the strong reasons provided by law
which must be convincingly shown by evidence in
line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified
existence for the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices
(Sec. 2 [2], Code of Agrarian Reforms). The Court
therefore ruled that, except for compelling reasons
clearly proved the determination that a person is a
tenant-farmer, a factual conclusion made by the
trial court on the basis of evidence directly
available to it, will not be reversed on appeal and
will be binding.
Lawful Consideration/Determination of Lease Rentals
TAN vs. POLLESCAS (G.R. No. 145568)
FACTS
 Petitioners Tan Heirs are the co-owners of a
coconut farm land, originally owned by Enrique
Tan, located at Labo, Ozamis City. Esteban
Pollescas was their original tenant who, upon his
death, was succeeded by his son, Enrique
Pollescas, after being appointed by Enrique Tan.
However, Reynalda Pollescas, Esteban’s wife,
demanded that Tan recognize her as her husband’s
successor, to which Tan did not accede.
 Reynalda filed with the DARAB Ozamis City a
complaint for Annulment of Compromise
Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship,
and damages. DARAB declared her as the lawful
tenant of the land and apportioned the harvests
between the Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on the
customary sharing system which is 2/3 to the
landowner and 1/3 to the tenant.
 On the harvest dates, Reynalda failed to deliver to
the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests amounting to
 P3,656.70. the Tan Heirs demanded such but
Reynalda ignored them.
 The Tan Heirs filed a complaint for Estafa against
Reynalda before MTCC Ozamis, which found the
latter guilty. For Reynalda’s continued failure to
deliver their share, the Tan Heirs also filed an
ejectment case with the DARAB-Misamis
Occidental, which ruled in favor of Tan. Reynalda
appealed such decision to DARAB-Quezon City,
which reversed the decision of the latter Board.
 Tan Heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of DARAB-Quezon City.
 Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
 W/N there is no exception on the grounds for
extinguishment of leasehold relation under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 3844; and
 W/N the CA correctly ruled that Reynalda is
obliged to pay only ¼ or 25% of the normal
harvest and not 2/3 when the subject land was not
yet placed under the leasehold system pursuant to
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657.
HELD
 The Court declared that R.A. No. 6657 is the
governing statute in this case.
 NO. The Court held that there is no ground for
extinguishment of leasehold relation in this case.
Only in the instances stated in Sections 8 and 34
of R.A. No. 3844 as amended can leasehold
relation be terminated. (Please just read these
provisions.)
 YES. In the instant case, the Tan Heirs seek
Reynaldas ejectment from the Land on the ground
of non-payment of lease rental. The Court agrees
with the Court of Appeals that for non-payment of
the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess
the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the
amount of the lease rental must first of all be
lawful. If the amount of lease rental claimed
exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of
lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding.
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates
that not x x x more than 25% of the average
normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair
rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs
demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest
as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the 25%
maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore,
the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda
of the landholding for non-payment of rental
precisely because the lease rental claimed by the
Tan Heirs is unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of
the harvest as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged
to pay such lease rental for being unlawful. There
is no legal basis to demand payment of such
unlawful lease rental. The courts will not enforce
payment of a lease rental that violates the law.
There was no validly fixed lease rental
demandable at the time of the harvests. Thus,
Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a
lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the DAR must
first fix the provisional lease rental payable by
Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as
amended. Until the DAR has fixed the provisional
lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in default in the
payment of lease rental since such amount is not
yet determined. There can be no delay in the
payment of an undetermined lease rental because
it is impossible to pay an undetermined amount.
That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment
of the lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot
be lawfully ejected from the Land for non-
payment of rental.
Share tenancy, abolition
HIDALGO vs. HIDALGO (G.R. No. L-25326-25327)
FACTS
 Policarpio Hidalgo owned several lots. The
petitioners in these cases have been working for
years in such lands as his share tenants.
 The 22, 876-square meter parcel of land, with two
other parcels of land were sold by him for
P4,000.00. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales,
the petitioners in L-25326, seek by way of
redemption, P1,500.00 – alleging that such
amount is fairly worth of their work as tenants in
the said lots.
 After Policarpio sold his 7, 638-square meter
parcel of land for P750.00. The petitioners in L-
25327, Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo, also
seek by way of redemption, P750.00.
 The petitioners in both cases alleged that they did
not receive from Policarpio a 90-day notice of
intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the
right of pre-emption and that Policarpio did not
execute an affidavit required and prescribed by the
law.
 The agrarian court dismissed the petitions
pursuant to the provisions of section 12 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code.
ISSUE
 W/N the petitioners are entitled to redeem the
parcel of land they are working from the purchases
thereof, when no notice was previously given to
them by Policarpio of his intention to sell the
properties.
HELD
 YES, they are entitled to redeem the subject
landholdings. The Code intended to afford the
farmers' who transitionally continued to be share
tenants after its enactment but who inexorably
would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the
Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same
priority and preferential right as those other share
tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or
soon thereafter were earlier converted by
fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees,
to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the
event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of
 their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by
the Land Authority. Under these circumstances,
since the agrarian court did not rule upon
conflicting claims of the parties as to what was the
proportionate worth of the parcel of land in the
stated price of P4,000.00 — whether P1,500.00 as
claimed by petitioners or a little bit more,
considering the proportionate values of the two
other parcels, but the whole total is not to exceed
the stated price of P4,000.00, since the vendor is
bound thereby — and likewise, what was the
additional proportionate worth of the expenses
assumed by the vendees, assuming that petitioners
are not willing to assume the same obligation, the
case should be remanded to the agrarian court
solely for the purpose of determining the
reasonable price and consideration to be paid by
petitioners for redeeming the landholding, in
accordance with these observations. In Case L-
25327, there is no question as to the price of
P750.00 paid by the vendees and no additional
consideration or expenses, unlike in Case L-25326
assumed by the vendees. Hence, petitioners
therein are entitled to redeem the landholding for
the same stated price.
GUERRERO vs. CA (G.R. No. L-44570)
FACTS
 Private respondent, Antonio Benitez, was hired by
defendant-spouses, Manuel and Maria Guerrero to
take care of their 60 heads of cows situated at
Aurora, Quezon, was also allowed to put up a hut
where he and his family stayed, made to clean
fruit-bearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and
grass, made to pick coconuts, husk and split it then
process its meat into copra, and to do such other
similar chores. The parties also agreed that
Benitez would receive 1/3 of the proceeds from
the copra he processed and sold to the market.
 In the early part of 1973, Benitez was refrained
from gathering nuts from the portion of the part of
the plantation where he used to gather such.
Because of this, he brought the matter to the
attention of the Office of the Special Unit in the
Office of the President in Malacañang which led
to an execution of an agreement whereby the
parties agreed to let Benitez work in the plantation
as a tenant.
 In July 1973, he was refrained again from
gathering nuts from the plantation with threats of
bodily harm if he persists to gather fruits
therefrom.
 The Guerreros assigned Rogelio and Paulino
Latigay to do the gathering of nuts and the
processing thereof into copra. They also caused
the demolition of Benitez’s cottage.
 Upon Benitez’s petition, the lower and appellate
courts rendered judgment in his favor. Hence, this
petition filed by the Guerreros. They contend that
Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer who was
dismissed as an employee from the landholding in
question and not ousted as a tenant and that no
cause of action exists and the lower courts
committed grave error in upholding Benitez’s
status as share tenant in their landholding.
ISSUE
 W/N Benitez is a tenant on the coconut
landholding in question and was dispossessed of
such.
HELD
 YES, Benitez is a tenant on the coconut
landholding. The Court stated that the fact that
Benitez, together with his family, handles all
phases of farmwork from cleaning the landholding
to the processing of copra, although at times with
the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the
land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm
laborer. Further indicating the existence of a
tenancy relationship between petitioners and
respondent is their agreement to share the produce
or harvest on a "tercio basis" that is, a 1/3 to 2/3
sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners.
Though not a positive indication of the existence
of tenancy relations perse the sharing of harvest
taken together with other factors characteristic of
tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar,
strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he
is a tenant. The respondent's status as agricultural
tenant should be without question.
Once a tenancy relationship is established, the
tenant has the right to continue working until such
relationship is extinguished according to law.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic
Act 1199), the Agricultural Land Reform Code of
1963 (Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian
Reforms (Republic Act 6389) and Presidential
Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security of
Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn
Producing Agricultural Lands) all provide for the
security of tenure of agricultural tenants.
Ejectment may be effected only for causes
provided by law, to wit:
l) Violation or failure of the tenant to
comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the tenancy contract or any
of the provisions of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act;
2) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed
rental or to deliver the landholder's share
unless the tenant's failure is caused by a
fortuitous event or force majeure;
3) Use by the tenant of the land for
purposes other than that specified by the
agreement of the parties;
4) Failure of the tenant to follow proven
farm practices:
5) Serious injury to the land caused by the
negligence of the tenant;
6) Conviction by a competent court of a
tenant or any member of his immediate
family or farm household of a crime
against the landholder or a member of his
 immediate family. (Section 50, Rep. Act
1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar.
The respondent has been unlawfully deprived of
his right to security of tenure and the Court of
Agrarian Reforms did not err in ordering the
reinstatement of respondent as tenant and granting
him damages therefor.
Statute of Limitations
RAYMUNDO CODERIAS vs. ESTATE OF JUAN
CHICO (G.R. No. 180476; June 26, 2013)
FACTS
 Raymundo Coderias was a tiller in the 4-hectare
farm of deceased Juan O. Chioco. In 1980,
individuals connected with the latter threatened to
kill the former if he did not leave the farm. His
standing crops and house were bulldozed. Because
of this, he was constrained to left the farm.
 When Juan Chioco died, he came back in the farm
and filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board against Chioco’s estate
praying that his possession and cultivation of the
farm be respected; that the corresponding
agricultural leasehold contract between them be
executed; that he be awarded actual damages for
the destruction of his house, his standing crops,
unrealized harvest from 1980 up to 1993,
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. Respondent
contended that Coderias’ cause of action has
prescribed under Section 38 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 3844, as amended, since the alleged
dispossession took place in 1980 but the Petition
was filed only in 1995, or beyond the statutory
three-year period for filing such claims.
 The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
ruled dismissing the Petition on the ground of
prescription. Upon appeal, the DARAB ruled in
Coderias’ favor, ordering the respondent to
respect and maintain the Petitioner-Appellant in
his peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject landholding; and to reimburse him of the
money equivalent representing the latter’s
unrealized harvest. However, the Court of Appeals
set aside the judgment of DARAB and ruled in
favor of the respondent on the ground of
prescription.
ISSUE
 W/N the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
prescription has set when Coderias filed an action.
HELD
 YES, the CA erred in finding that prescription has
set when Coderias filed an action. The farm has
been placed under the coverage of RA 3844. It is
also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed
between Chioco and petitioner. Since the farm is
considered expropriated and placed under the
coverage of the land reform law, Chioco had no
right to evict petitioner and enter the property.
More significantly, Chioco had no right to claim
that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed. To
strengthen the security of tenure of tenants,
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that the
agricultural leasehold relation shall not be
extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding. With
unyielding consistency, we have held that
transactions involving the agricultural land over
which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting
in change of ownership, such as the sale or transfer
of legal possession, will not terminate the rights of
the agricultural lessee who is given protection by
the law by making such rights enforceable against
the transferee or the landowner's successor in
interest. The CA has failed to recognize this
vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that exists
between the petitioner and Chioco, which the
latter is bound to respect.
Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural
leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under
any of the following three circumstances, to wit:
"(1) abandonment of the landholding without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary
surrender of the landholding by the agricultural
lessee, written notice of which shall be served
three months in advance; or (3) absence of the
persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee x x
x." None of these is obtaining in this case. In
particular, petitioner cannot be said to have
abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that
Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property
through threats and intimidation. His house was
bulldozed and his crops were destroyed. Petitioner
left the farm in 1980 and returned only in 1993
upon learning of Chioco’s death. Two years after,
or in 1995, he filed the instant Petition.
Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically
provides that "an action to enforce any cause of
action under this Code shall be barred if not
commenced within three years after such cause of
action accrued." In this case, the Court deemed it
proper to reckon petitioner’s cause of action to
have accrued only upon his knowledge of the
death of Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he
was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980.
For as long as the intimidation and threats to
petitioner’s life and limb existed, petitioner had a
cause of action against Chioco to enforce the
recognition of this juridical tie. Since the threats
and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death,
petitioner’s obligation to file a case to assert his
rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian
laws within the prescriptive period commenced.
These rights, as enumerated above, include the
right to security of tenure, to continue in
possession of the land he works despite the
expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of
the land to third persons, the pre-emptive right to
buy the land, as well as the right to redeem the
land, if sold to a third person without his
knowledge.
Petitioner may not be faulted for acting only after
Chioco passed away for his life and the lives of
members of his family are not worth gambling for
a piece of land. The bulldozing of his house – his
castle – is only an example of the fate that could
befall them. Under the circumstances, it is
therefore understandable that instead of fighting
for the farm, petitioner opted to leave and keep his
family safe. Any man who cherishes his family
more than the most valuable material thing in his
life would have done the same.