1

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
G.R. No. 186571
Petitioner, enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
Present:
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
CARPIO MORALES, J., [6]
Chairperson,
1982.
BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
*ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of

foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition)

Promulgated: with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR August 11, 2010
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the
GENERAL,
Respondents. -- - trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact,
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
DECISION financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be

BRION, J.: considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
for review on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse
petition).
can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,

2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with Where a marriage between a Filipino
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
remarry under Philippine law.
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later,

on January 8, 2006.[5]
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent

behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance
provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the

National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage

THE PETITION
 2
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks
for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing
to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might
be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in
their respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien
spouse can
claim no
right under
the second
paragraph
of Article
26 of the
Family
Code as the
substantive
right it
establishes
is in favor
of the
Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and
intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article
26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after
a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations
x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.[22]
 3

decree is
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the presumptiv
law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains e evidence
of a right
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer that clothes
the party
married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of
with legal
the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the interest to
petition for
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph its
of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a recognition
in this
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse jurisdiction

considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our
laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a
foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis
for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with
the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis
to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign

judgments. This Section states:

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
(a) In case of a judgment or final
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than
conclusive upon the title of the
that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity thing; and

are generally governed by his national law.[26] (b) In case of a judgment or final
order against a person, the
judgment or final order is
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
their successors in interest by a
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of subsequent title.

the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.
In either case, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

The foreign
divorce
 4

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of

judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina

institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the

judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign

divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by

provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27] proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or

clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as

judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res

notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the

rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a Rules of Court.[33]

judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This means that

the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the

our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,

show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. [29] The the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the

recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the

purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will

an integral aspect of his claim or defense. not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that

the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
Considerati
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a ons beyond
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, the
recognition
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, of the
foreign
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer
divorce
having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are decree

not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that

issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce

foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere

and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally

improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of what had been done.

the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its

authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees

divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil

petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees

appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity

divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations,

more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own

 5

will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or

not.[35] Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the

requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of

one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be 1982[37] both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine

recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered

specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
established for recording the civil status of persons, decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
in which shall be entered:
cannot produce any legal effect.
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages; Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces; recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does
(f) legitimations; not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
(i) naturalization; and
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in
(j) changes of name.
the civil registry.
xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars
shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing
for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be
entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in
detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or

correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment,
adoption, change of name and others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
naturalization register.
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read
in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing
must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed
and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
 6
decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No.
Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a
non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at
the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity
and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the
 7
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended
that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied
only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply
Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,
difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to
nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in
relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a
duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage"
and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial
court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept
of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of
the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as
a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did
not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of
this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the
Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack
such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification
and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition
under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on
the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial
court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also
affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
citizen.
 8
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the
Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry
of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a
void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with
the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment
in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in
the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to
the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does
not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the
status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that
"the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting
the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce
 9
involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted
by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation
of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse
to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality
to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.
The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not
only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a
real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare
a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.
Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the
entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied
on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as
a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
 10
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding
civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of
a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his
or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying
a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws
do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the
foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may
file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is
still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not
contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino
spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is
not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent
to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of
a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its
effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there
is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that
needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
 11
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of
the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011
and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014
EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the nullification of the Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011
issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch
45,1 City of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which
dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a
Japanese National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A
copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A' and
made an integral part hereof.
4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was
validly granted under Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage
with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the
Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part
hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of
the Civil Registry of Manila. A copy of the Certification dated 28 October
2005 is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and made an integral part hereof.
6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and
that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married
Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in
Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto
attached as Annex ‘D’ and made an integral part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27
December 2005. A copy of the JapaneseFamily Registry Record of
Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his remarriage with Ryo
Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and
made an integral part hereof.
8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport
to indicate her surname withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was
told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued
to her until she can prove bycompetent court decision that her marriage
with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
xxxx
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando musttherefore be honored, considered and
declared valid, until otherwise declared by a competent court.
Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be declared
entitled to the issuance of a Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina
Ando y Tungol.’ Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, which was later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and prayed for the
following reliefs before the lower court:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court
that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner
Edelina T. Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise
declared by a competent court;
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport
under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and
(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s
marriage to her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine
Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of
cause and action, as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to
Masatomi Y. Ando, herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a
Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and
that though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to
the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein
complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code –
that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute
divorce in our country.
 12
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein
petitioner does not have any causeof action and/or is entitled to the
reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same vein,
though there is other adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such
remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to
act upon and grant, as it isonly the family court which is vested with such
authority and jurisdiction.4
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated 15 November 2010. In anOrder dated
14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner in her petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls
within the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and
for the interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court dated
November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the
Clerk of Court for proper endorsement to the Family Court of this
jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or disposition.5 Thereafter, the case
was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court
dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no cause of
action. The Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared
as valid is already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article
35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly
terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never
recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as still
married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot
be honored and considered asvalid at this time.
Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced.
The fact that no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando
was rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration
under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable onlyin case of re-marriage.
More importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage is not even a requisite to make a marriage valid.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative.6
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration
of the Order dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in
open court on 8 February2011, considering that neither the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with copies of the
motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising
the sole issue of whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no
cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus,
as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not
collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory
relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even
one that is void or voidable – shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a
judicial decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code,
noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a
marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage,
such as with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the legality of
the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a petition
for declaratory relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for
Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time
of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to respondent; thus, it
had yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition.
The latter raised the following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly
verified, as the juratin the Verification thereof only stated that the affiant
had exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity," which proof was
not properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a
Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is
required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal
effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she had first
exhausted all available administrative remedies, such as appealing to the
Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine
Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of
declaratory relief; and (4) petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration before
the RTC was a mere scrap of paper and did not toll the running of the
period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now
final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment,
addressing the issues raised therein.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport,
petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC.
She should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
since her ultimate entreaty was toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a
passport to her under her second husband’s name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which
was adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional
documentary requirements before a married woman may obtain a
passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed
women shall be made inaccordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the
surname of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she
must present the original or certifiedtrue copy of her marriage contract,
and one photocopy thereof.
 13
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to
a foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a
Guidance and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying
for a passport for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified
true copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of
Registration and the Court Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must
present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by
the Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over the
place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign
diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of
Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must
present the original or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the
husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah
Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to use her
husband’s surname or resume the use of her maiden surname. From the
above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her
passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the
following: (1) the original or certified true copyof her marriage contract
and one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance
and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular
post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or
by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a
Philippine passport under her second husband’s name.1âwphi1 Should
her application for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her are
provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the
application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by
the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in
due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
ARTICLE 10
Appeal
In the event that an application for a passport is
denied, or an existing one cancelled or restricted, the
applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to
appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15)
days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.
Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in
the event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having
complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument that her
application "cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled or
restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to
appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told"8 that her passport cannot be
issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for
petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second
marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the
judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any
other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed
before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory
relief,11 we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the
RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on
record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the
validity of the divorce decree under that national law.12 Hence, any
declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her
complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the
national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to
petitioner's recourse to the proper remedies available.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
ART. 34: Marriage without license
Engracia Ninal et al vs Norma Bayadog Gr. No. 133778
DISSOLUTION OF MARITAL BONDS
A.M. NO. 02-11-10- SC, MARCH 4, 2003
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, G.R. No. 166738
Petitioner,
Present:
*CARPIO-MORALES, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
- versus - **CARPIO,
***CHICO-NAZARIO,
****LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
 14

EDWARD RUMBAUA,
Respondent. Promulgated: Summons was served on the respondent through substituted

August 14, 2009 service, as personal service proved futile.[5] The RTC ordered the

provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the

parties and to ensure that no fabrication or suppression of evidence would

take place.[6] Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the

presence of collusion between the parties.[7]

x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ x
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of
DECISION
the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition.[8] The OSG entered its

BRION, J.: appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to

assist in all hearings of the case.[9]

Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges,

through her petition for review on certiorari,[1] the decision dated June 25, The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary

2004[2] and the resolution dated January 18, 2005[3] of the Court of evidence to substantiate her charges.

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed

the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of The petitioner related that she and the respondent were

the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and childhood neighbors in Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in

void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The assailed 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondent’s

resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for family did not approve of their relationship. After graduation from college

reconsideration. in 1991, the respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he

ANTECEDENT FACTS found a job. The job came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL)

The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent

complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a “secret marriage” in order

before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; they were married

the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the respondent,

obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the however, never lived together; the petitioner stayed with her sister

respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his parents in

finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her Novaliches.

for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions;

and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the

with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City. first six months of their marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to

live with the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage

would affect his application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their
 15

marriage, the couple’s daily meetings became occasional visits to the psychological report[15] of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr.

petitioner’s house in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Tayag).

Later that year, the respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he lost

his employment with PAL.[10] Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered

the following tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a

In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a

marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to convince him to go to Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI. [16] She

the United States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued thereafter prepared a psychological report with the following findings:

living separately from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
petitioner during her birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her
Psychometric tests data reveal
greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent indicated as well in petitioner to operate in an average
intellectual level. Logic and reasoning
his visa application that he was single. remained intact. She is seen to be the type
of woman who adjusts fairly well into most
situations especially if it is within her
interests. She is pictured to be faithful to
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent
her commitments and had reservations
blamed the petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the from negative criticisms such that she
normally adheres to social norms,
discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity,
both intellectually and emotionally. Her
action, the petitioner severed her relationship with the respondent. They one fault lies in her compliant attitude
which makes her a subject for
eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioner’s father, although manipulation and deception such that of
respondent. In all the years of their
they still lived separately. relationship, she opted to endure his
irresponsibility largely because of the mere
belief that someday things will be much
better for them. But upon the advent of
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had
her husband’s infidelity, she gradually lost
hope as well as the sense of self-respect,
found a job in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother went to
that she has finally taken her tool to be
the respondent’s house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one assertive to the point of being aggressive
and very cautious at times – so as to fight
Cynthia Villanueva (Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about with the frustration and insecurity she had
especially regarding her failed marriage.
it, he denied having an affair with Cynthia.[11] The petitioner apparently
Respondent in this case, is
did not believe the respondents and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to revealed to operate in a very
self-centered manner as he believes that
recover from the pain and anguish that her discovery brought.[12] the world revolves around him. His
egocentrism made it so easy for him to
deceitfully use others for his own
advancement with an extreme air of
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that
confidence and dominance. He would do
actions without any remorse or guilt
communication between her and respondent had ceased. Aside from her
feelings towards others especially to that
oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their of petitioner.

marriage contract;[13] and the testimony, curriculum vitae,[14] and REMARKS

 16

Love happens to everyone. It is

dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond SO ORDERED.[18]
the expectations people tagged with it. In
love, “age does matter.” People love in
order to be secure that one will share
his/her life with another and that he/she
will not die alone. Individuals who are in The CA Decision
love had the power to let love grow or let
love die – it is a choice one had to face
when love is not the love he/she expected.
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the
In the case presented by
CA.[19] The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTC
petitioner, it is very apparent that love
really happened for her towards the young decision, and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.[20]
respondent – who used “love” as a disguise
or deceptive tactic for exploiting the
confidence she extended towards him. He
made her believe that he is responsible, In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did
true, caring and thoughtful – only to reveal
himself contrary to what was mentioned. not mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic
He lacked the commitment, faithfulness,
and remorse that he was able to engage personality disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and
himself to promiscuous acts that made
petitioner look like an innocent fool. His thus failed to give the court an insight into the respondent’s
character traits reveal him to suffer
developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to
Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared
to be grave, severe and
the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was “deep-seated” and
incurable.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]
“incurable.”

The RTC Ruling

The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the

incapacity to be psychological, although its manifestations may be physical.

The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19,
Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party
2002. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr.
was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the
Tayag, and concluded as follows:
xxxx marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed

Respondent was never solicitous of the them. In other words, the illness must be shown as downright incapacity
welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed
limited or block [sic] out communication with his wife, or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential
forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s
birthdays and Valentine’s Day; going out only on obligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered
occasions despite their living separately and to go to
a motel to have sexual intercourse. because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her because of his

parents’ objection to their marriage.

It would appear that the foregoing
narration are the attendant facts in this case which
show the psychological incapacity of respondent, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage of the The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied
parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to
discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 her motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. [21]
to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is “declared grave,
severe and incurable.”

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the The Petition and the Issues
marriage between petitioner Rowena Padilla
Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby
declared annulled.
 17
The petitioner argues in the present petition that –
1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v.
Molina[22] (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with
because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the
requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding
the case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure
the defects in her testimony, as well as to present
additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her
psychiatric report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be
reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s
decision be set aside and the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after the promulgation
of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the
case for further proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed
to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.[23]
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the
memoranda they filed.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis
supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated
on March 15, 2003 and duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation
of the OSG certification that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial
regulation provides:
SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may
require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General,
to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with
or without the memoranda.
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19,
2002 should be vacated for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the
absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. According
to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which took effect only on March
15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of Molina that was
promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
 18

The amendment introduced under A.M. No. regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally

02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.

remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or

We do not find her arguments convincing.
confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural

laws may be given retroactive effect,[25] as we held in De Los Santos v. Vda. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of

de Mangubat:[26] a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides

Procedural Laws do not come within the that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general
rule against the retroactive operation of statues - order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an
they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds
passage and this will not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the

aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party
mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively
could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would
to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in any pending matter
probably alter the result if presented.
any procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. Our

rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the

confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did

the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article 48 mandates the not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition

appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between for declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel

the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the

in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify

perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and

lacks merit. prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the

petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro

A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:[29]

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of

the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel
do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were
remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases,
there would never be an end to litigation so long as a
permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the new counsel could be employed to allege and show
that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently
fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a
premium on the willful and intentional commission of
to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials
in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as
in the instant case.
 19
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested
remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the
respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on
Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court first declared
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b)
juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be
confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.”
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of
Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional
edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their “I
do's.” The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
 20

(7) Interpretations given by the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our as a husband.
courts…
a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity
(8) The trial court must order the and incurability of respondent’s condition
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the respondent: (a) reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b)
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such visited her occasionally from 1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992,
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
and did not send her greeting cards during special occasions; (d)
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
represented himself as single in his visa application; (e) blamed her for the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in Davao when in fact

he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the
established in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be
“psychological incapacity” that the law requires, and should be
characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in
incurability.[31] These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the
the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not enough that
must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality disorders
respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family Code does
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
not define “psychological incapacity,” fleshing out its terms is left to us to
integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations –
this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we
had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
explained:

It was for this reason that we found it necessary

In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit
to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly
with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven
and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony
own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of
tribunals.
antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on

her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we
acts of blaming petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing
find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove that the
himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to
 21

forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would

psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.

another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be

equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s

evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a

inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who “believes that the

was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after world revolves around him”; and who “used love as a…deceptive tactic for

their marriage; their problems only came in later. exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.” Dr. Tayag

then incorporated her own idea of “love”; made a generalization that

To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some
respondent was a person who “lacked commitment, faithfulness, and
character flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does not
remorse,” and who engaged “in promiscuous acts that made the
necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the
petitioner look like a fool”; and finally concluded that the respondent’s
time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties
character traits reveal “him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
and obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[35]
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. incurable.”
Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
marital obligations or “ill will” on the part of the spouse is
different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule. respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed

at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating

b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really

incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s

respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered “Narcissistic

to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder

cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the declared to be grave and incurable” – is an unfounded statement, not a

psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of

deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner

the manner we discussed above.[36] For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological

diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the

respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the

 22
respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent
testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological
report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to
establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent
was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the
ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage.
Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that
respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To directly quote from
the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I would like to call your attention to the
Report already marked as Exh.
“E-7”, there is a statement to
the effect that his character
traits begin to suffer narcissistic
personality disorder with traces
of antisocial personality disorder.
What do you mean? Can you
please explain in layman’s word,
Madam Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic
personality disorder cannot
accept that there is something
wrong with his own behavioral
manifestation. [sic] They feel
that they can rule the world;
they are eccentric; they are
exemplary, demanding financial
and emotional support, and this
is clearly manifested by the fact
that respondent abused and
used petitioner’s love. Along the
line, a narcissistic person cannot
give empathy; cannot give love
simply because they love
themselves more than anybody
else; and thirdly, narcissistic
person cannot support his own
personal need and gratification
without the help of others and
this is where the petitioner set
in.
Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic]
disorder?
A: Clinically, considering that label, the
respondent behavioral
manifestation under personality
disorder [sic] this is already
considered grave, serious, and
treatment will be impossible
[sic]. As I say this, a kind of
developmental disorder wherein
it all started during the early
formative years and brought
about by one familiar
relationship the way he was
reared and cared by the family.
Environmental exposure is also
part and parcel of the child
disorder. [sic]
Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years]
up to the present?
A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner
was [present] long before he
entered marriage.
[Un]fortunately, on the part of
the petitioner, she never
realized that such behavioral
manifestation of the respondent
connotes pathology. [sic]
xxxx
Q: So in the representation of the petitioner
that the respondent is now lying
[sic] with somebody else, how
will you describe the character
of this respondent who is living
with somebody else?
A: This is where the antisocial personality trait
of the respondent [sic] because
an antisocial person is one who
indulge in philandering activities,
who do not have any feeling of
guilt at the expense of another
person, and this [is] again a
buy-product of deep seated
psychological incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on
this particular deep seated [sic],
 23
how would you describe the
psychological incapacity? [sic]
A: As I said there is a deep seated
psychological dilemma, so I
would say incurable in nature
and at this time and again [sic]
the psychological pathology of
the respondent. One plays a
major factor of not being able to
give meaning to a relationship in
terms of sincerity and
endurance.
Q: And if this psychological disorder exists
before the marriage of the
respondent and the petitioner,
Madam Witness?
A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted
from the early formative years
and so if it takes enough that
such psychological incapacity of
respondent already existed long
before he entered marriage,
because if you analyze how he
was reared by her parents
particularly by the mother, there
is already an unhealthy
symbiosis developed between
the two, and this creates a major
emotional havoc when he
reached adult age.
Q: How about the gravity?
A: This is already grave simply because from
the very start respondent never
had an inkling that his
behavioral manifestation
connotes pathology and second
ground [sic], respondent will
never admit again that such
behavior of his connotes again
pathology simply because the
disorder of the respondent is not
detrimental to himself but, more
often than not, it is detrimental
to other party involved.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q: You were not able to personally examine
the respondent here?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but
unfortunately, the respondent
never appeared at my clinic.
Q: On the basis of those examinations
conducted with the petitioning
wife to annul their marriage with
her husband in general, what
can you say about the
respondent?
A: That from the very start respondent has no
emotional intent to give
meaning to their relationship. If
you analyze their marital
relationship they never lived
under one room. From the very
start of the [marriage], the
respondent to have petitioner to
engage in secret marriage until
that time their family knew of
their marriage [sic]. Respondent
completely refused, completely
relinquished his marital
obligation to the petitioner.
xxxx
COURT:
Q: Because you have interviewed or you have
questioned the petitioner, can
you really enumerate the
specific traits of the respondent?
DR. NEDY TAYAG:
A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the
respondent and the dependent
attitude of the respondent.
Q: Even if he is already eligible for
employment?
A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother.
He is a happy-go-lucky simply
because he never had a set of
responsibility. I think that he
finished his education but he
never had a stable job because
he completely relied on the
support of his mother.
Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am
asking you something specific?
A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly
dependent attitude on the part
of the mother merely because
respondent happened to be the
only son. I said that there is a
unhealthy symbiosis relationship
[sic] developed between the son
and the mother simply because
 24

the mother always pampered

completely, pampered to the disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent
point that respondent failed to
develop his own sense of exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence
assertion or responsibility
particularly during that stage requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely, gravity, incurability,
and there is also presence of
existence at the time of the marriage, psychological incapacity relating to
the simple lying act particularly
his responsibility in terms of
marriage – and in her own limited way, related these to the medical
handling emotional imbalance
and it is clearly manifested by condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her
the fact that respondent refused
to build a home together with report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.
the petitioner when in fact they
are legally married. Thirdly,
respondent never felt or
completely ignored the feelings First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
of the petitioner; he never felt
guilty hurting the petitioner respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her
because on the part of the
petitioner, knowing that testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
respondent indulge with another
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be
woman it is very, very traumatic
on her part yet respondent
suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent
never had the guts to feel guilty
or to atone said act he the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at
committed in their relationship,
and clinically this falls under the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the
antisocial personality. [37]
respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and

In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the

inconclusive, thus: petitioner’s case.

xxxx

ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis
Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?
because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the
DR. NEDY TAYAG
doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the
A: Clinically, if persons suffering from
respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence
personality disorder curable, up
to this very moment, no requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically
scientific could be upheld to
alleviate their kind of personality incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or
disorder; Secondly, again
respondent or other person psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[39] If
suffering from any kind of
disorder particularly narcissistic a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
personality will never admit that
they are suffering from this kind exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given
of disorder, and then
again curability will always be a credit.[40] No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to
question. [sic][38]
have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early

life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the
marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report
general characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality
appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the
 25
one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all
slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the
nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities
of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of these
qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his
focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through
studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage,
among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and
qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the
respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the
respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this
allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a
few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of
either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and
marital developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never
appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples have
likewise permanently separated simply because they have “fallen out of
love,” or have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their
younger years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to
secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of
additional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is
woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioner’s
marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament.
The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital
obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse.
Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact
that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled
in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must
be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological
illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception
of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to
assume.[41]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
75095.
SO ORDERED.
ART. 35: VOID MARRIAGES
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14,
1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and
its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed
Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of
bigamy as follows:
 26
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado
a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon
him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to
eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused.[2]
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts
judgment, as follows: From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is
no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br.
7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was
duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the
status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of
the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a
married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B.
Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection
therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur
Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church,
Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and
complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991
officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod
City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium,
Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr.
was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before
this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993
in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City,
and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant
Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously
united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at
Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As
shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential
elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been
previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused
posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially
declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of
the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into
with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated
or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first
marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is
clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second
marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991.He was still at the time
validly married to his first wife.[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not
before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case
for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what
constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract
a second subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved.[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order
to convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and
40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of
reasonable doubt.[6]
The Courts Ruling
 27
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.[7]
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the
elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married
Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City.While that marriage was
still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with
Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for
bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages which
are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a
void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.[8] Thus, he
concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes
the commentaries[9] of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that
if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy
charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points
out that that declaration came only after the Information had been
filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She
argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been characterized as
conflicting.[10] In People v. Mendoza,[11] a bigamy case involving an accused
who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such
declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during
the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the
third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him,
the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had
been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the
second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there
was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did
not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was
affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,[12] which involved substantially
the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,[13] Jose Consuegra
married for the second time while the first marriage was still
subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of
his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second
wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second
marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,[14] however, the Court again held that judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a
man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second wife was named as
his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said
entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife,
holding that the second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for such
declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground
that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that
she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first
husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that
there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is
likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the ruling
in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for such declaration
of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,[17] the issue raised was whether a judicial
declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and the
separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative,
the Court declared: The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing
that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[18]
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases
herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of
 28
the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the
promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No.
3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or the absentee being generally considered as dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as
contracted being valid in either case until declared null
and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly
makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages.[19]
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article
83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However,
Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment
declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code
and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel.Thus, a Civil Law authority
and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a
judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again;
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,
Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This
provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void
from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033).[20]
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling
in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family
Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second
marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with
and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v.
Terre,[21] which involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for
marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that he was free to
enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the
Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free
to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the
said rule was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code.
Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was bigamous and
criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier
work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of
Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first
obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before
contracting a subsequent marriage:[22]
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage,
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before
contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that
x x x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the
fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage
before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging
him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been
consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in
the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the
charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the
ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages
and attorneys fees.[23]
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA
against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this
Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the
pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case
that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was
well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses
prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxxxxxxxx
 29
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr.
Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took
the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer
return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was
fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known
that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out,
as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there
are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful
making.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on
the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability
for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’
penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed
by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption
until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The
Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of
the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the
subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from
1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he
and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that
he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. 8 He further
testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in
Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch
54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR
IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME
OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason
to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
 30
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which
he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2)
argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to
the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence,
petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are
absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary
and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner
and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a
copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated
November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel,
and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a
certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7,
1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico
B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately
assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been
sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and
the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable
to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. –
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by
a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of
its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and
it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by
the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the
City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that
neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially
considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no
record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by
the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving
testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are
Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of the
existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which
would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the
non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother
to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997,
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s
marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by
the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of
bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that,
since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the
crime of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s
penal laws are concerned.
 31

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal Appeals.
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is
valid marriage.
a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When
an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step
10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of in.
bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent
reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for
void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years
subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period.
State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of
prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day
the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly
to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
done.
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s mayor, as maximum.
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal
21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27 SO ORDERED.

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and
marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over Azcuna, JJ., concur.
eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
witnesses. Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of G.R. No. 159218 March 30, 2004
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among vs.
these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital DECISION
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
 32
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed
with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San
Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S.
Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa
Arceño at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa
left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she
learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left
their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting
with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989,
Salvador contracted a second marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas
before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against
Narcisa.4 On May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against
Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955
before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four
children with her prior to their separation in 1966. It appeared however
that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida
remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the
purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the
military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of
bigamy and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum.
Petitioner Zenaida Biñas was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the
penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the
mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the
bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have
been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions
complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the
Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in
the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense
contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every
element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the
Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in
the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and
essential elements of the specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely,
that he contracted a subsequent marriage with another woman while his
first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the
Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally married
to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on
January 10, 1989which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or
about and sometime in the month of January, 1995," was an obvious
typographical error, for the same information clearly states that petitioner
contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January
10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission, therefore, that the information was
defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a
judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during
the trial and no objection appears to have been raised.12 It should be
remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its
elements concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of these have
been sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably,
petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information during
the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the
Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to
Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of
complainant when he entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was
likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a
pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action
considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of
Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person
affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to
know the same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of
nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in
the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the
 33
annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal
case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had
already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence
or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 19 In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could
be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum
term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be
based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of
the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the
sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of
the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it
might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age, 21 which is a
mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken
from prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be
taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and
ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case
of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that
pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated August 17,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its
subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen.
Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice
– initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in
Cotabato City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own
behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with
Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration
of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married
Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
 34
remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint
likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.
Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage
entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio
because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced"
has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so
because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that
the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never
deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim
law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and
Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then
asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be
counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until
February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as
had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083,
or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code),
questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under
the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over
the case for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995
a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion
to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the
CA14 which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try
the case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was
allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the
hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance
until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings 16 in
view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996,
enjoining it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in
its Decision dated September 30, 1996.18Estrellita then elevated the
appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered
Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was
indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997. 21 The day
before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib
moved to submit the case for decision,23reasoning that Estrellita had long
been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not
yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon
City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated
under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In
our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for
reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC
rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage
with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were
never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita
as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of
the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that
the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into
during the subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders
the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the
late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way
affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this
jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable
method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially,
where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or
Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard
as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the
Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the
RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her
motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to
marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is
governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of
legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004, 32 the CA
held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was
given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for
numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It
also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition
for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and original
action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
 35
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s
marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning
that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil
Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their
first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim
celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had
the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and,
hence, the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion
for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it
debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the
allegation of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the existence of
collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial
court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been
adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues
have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s
allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior
to our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R.
No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss,
and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues
that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was
prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and
to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of
her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36laid down the rule
that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the
period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to
suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she
merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s
assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever
action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s
jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an
adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R.
No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further
proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late
senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code
at the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies
to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering
their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose
marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen.
Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the
affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to
file suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s
reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be
heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the
proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is
collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the
vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack
of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal standing
to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen.
Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or
collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file
the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even
though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment
was rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of
her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her
answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did
not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s
marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right
to answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts
does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before
the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to
due process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively
participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the
period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion
to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her
argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’
instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion
suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until
said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved
the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits.
The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the
‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997
 36
Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of
the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than
five (5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x
x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is
that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the
motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt
states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue
of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before
the appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due
process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied
the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue
haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to
file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period
earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of
time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it
should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before
the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the
RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari
does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application
for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation
of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained
of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case." 43 In
fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and
only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to
present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we
never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the
principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements,
Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present
her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court
should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an
answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to
herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court
correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it
deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story.
Neither should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to
become final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be
remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the
propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of
marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the
Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in
cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to
submit his investigation report to determine whether there is collusion
between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month
after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating
whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the
parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the
basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments
on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the
report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall
set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public
prosecutor to submit the required report,45 which we find to have been
sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua
in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that
there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of
evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even
assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation
by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals,47 the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the
proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage
and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed
or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the
parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances,
we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the
validity of the proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated
in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of
the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda
has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, 52 the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
 37
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party
is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No.
126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former
explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time
of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically
provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws
operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article
186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and
effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect
of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2)
which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this
Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one
contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual
desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the
registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still
be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil
Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage
which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file
the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits
to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is
prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from
filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55 Estrellita
relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003
claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife,
to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the
validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this
interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file
the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s
interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from
filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from
impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity.
Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under
the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to
cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s
marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect
to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source
of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
 38
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property
rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in
the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they
should be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights
which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA
Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its
subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution
dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of
the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria
Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of
a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to
the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9,
1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in
December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F.
Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men.
He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was
not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and
that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein
the marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil
Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003
to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage
License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR
ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there
was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a
letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967,
which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses
and that the numbers are issued chronologically. 10 He testified that the
certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying
that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued
any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any
other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend
Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the
Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
 39

marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9,
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization
of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
The Ruling of the RTC
and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage
license with that office.17
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had
of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact
and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that
that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
he did not know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He attended
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract
Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the
as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the
license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January
9, 1993 was void ab initio.
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the
marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and
male person went to their house with the application for marriage against the respondent declaring as follows:
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who 1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that
she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She 2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.26
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding
photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and
SO ORDERED.34
(c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented
the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her
decision to the Court of Appeals.
mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license,
and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their
house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after The Ruling of the CA
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to
sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, errors:
the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on
January 9, 1993 at their residence.28 I

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15,
1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE
OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS ONE.
 40
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A
VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF
LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN
THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It
held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been
validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition
after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the
same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS
DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993,
Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular
case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2
of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family
Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing
officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage
one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus,
hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The
CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of
her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
 41
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It
was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed,
as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office
or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to
the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued,
and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy
of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no
marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been
conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located
as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification
was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license
do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records
of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither
could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona,
Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents
of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty.
Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached
for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the
license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured
and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as
well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have
simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However,
Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there
was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was
held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had
no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity
of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued.
It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have
been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of
the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion
that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was
even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties
herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature
above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
 42
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer,
the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held
after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic]
one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It
took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003
his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been
instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated
10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or
subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura.
We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is
clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be
characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may
well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a
bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure
of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given
the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took
steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage
license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM
annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is
hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ART. 36: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY(IN RELATION TO ART. 68)
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding
no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on November 29,
1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage
Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued
at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983
when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up
to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to
come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month
annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to
the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon
her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her
one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about
this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her
attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to
turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the
time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated
no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
 43
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by
a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under
the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage contracted by
respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in
explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no
property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only after
trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application
of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as
to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria
denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15)
days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It
explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance
in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases
dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case
prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of
marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of
the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of
suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that
private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage
such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the
Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have
been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People
v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be
dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his
own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for
purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition
should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage,
but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the
properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of
their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on
these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during
the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of
the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need
for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action
for that purpose."
 44
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra
v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the
first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained
that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning
and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
13
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy the Court
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the
following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was
discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only
void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for
himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is
needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified
to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice
Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment,
they still have to produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid,
does it include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the
marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in
the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require
first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages,
with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to
annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if
this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result
in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they are
referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea
in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not
the marriage is void, while the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa
added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on
the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability
because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they
cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of
the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not
be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw
the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be
invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
 45
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis
of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will
not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one
enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the
original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage
before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The
Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged
with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior
marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is
for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is
meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise
intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely"
would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one
can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence
needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where
a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it
"shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to
the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so,
this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would
rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying
marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and
fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of
marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.
 46
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned
from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when
and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of
the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed
to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of
the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to
"for purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a
final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term
"solely" instead of "only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality,
the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and ownership.
In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to separate or
partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with
private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised
together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation
of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of
the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if
such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall
be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and
intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage
and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are
revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to
be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose
is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a
first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March
20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994
JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon
City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioner.
Yolanda, Quisumbing-Javellana & Associates for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman
Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their
 47
union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently, Erwin
sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity.
The issue before us however is not the scope nor even the interpretation
of Art. 36 of the Family Code. 1 Rather, the issue is the sufficiency of the
allegations in the petition for annulment of marriage and the subsequent
bill of particulars filed in amplification of the petition.
The petition for annulment was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that "[s]ometime in
1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although
the same became manifest only thereafter." 2 Dissatisfied with the
allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which the
trial court granted. 3 Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin
specified that —
. . . at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita Salita) was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and
accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly qualified
Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother,
whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still Joselita was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that
the "assertion (in the Bill of Particulars) is a statement of legal conclusion
made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as
required by the Rules of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly
be inferred . . . ." 4 But finding the questioned Bill of Particulars adequate,
the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing
Joselita to file her responsive pleading.
Joselita was not convinced. She filed a petition for certiorari with us.
However, we referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution.
On 21 July 1992, the Court of Appeals denied due course to her petition
thus —
In the case under consideration, Espinosa has amplified Salita’s alleged
psychological incapacity in his bill of particulars . . .
In our view, the aforesaid specification more than satisfies the Rules’
requirement that a complaint must allege the ultimate facts constituting a
plaintiff’s cause of action. To require more details thereof, to insist on a
specification of Salita’s particular conduct or behavior with the
corresponding ‘circumstances of time, place and person’ indicating her
alleged psychological incapacity would be to ask for information on
evidentiary matters. To obtain evidentiary details, Salita may avail herself
of the different modes of discovery provided by the Rules of Court
(Rules 24 to 28).
Whether Espinosa’s averments in his bill of particulars constitute
psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code is a
question that may be resolved in a motion to dismiss or after trial on the
merits of the case, not in a motion for bill of particulars. And certainly,
that matter cannot be resolved in the present petition. 5
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita Salita
questioning the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying due course to
her petition.
Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a
legal conclusion, not an averment of facts, and fail to point out the specific
essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and
thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her
husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her insistence on the
specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding
circumstances of time, place and person does not call for information on
evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot adequately
and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the
Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate facts which the Rules of Court
requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as —
. . . important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of
the primary right and duty, or which directly make upon the wrongful acts
or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material
elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate facts
upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests. 6
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary
facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from
reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts
which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts
essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the
evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be
required to prove the existence of those facts . . . 7
Private respondent further argues that "[c]onclusions of law and
evidentiary matters need not be stated in the complaint. The rules of
pleading limit the statement of the cause of action only to such operative
facts as would give rise to the right of action of the plaintiff to obtain relief
against the wrongdoer. The details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence, statements of law, inferences and arguments need not be
stated." 8
In a nutshell, the ultimate question is whether the Bill of Particulars
submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or
particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial.
A complaint only needs to state the "ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause or causes of action." 9 Ultimate facts has been defined as
"those facts which the expected evidence will support." 10 As stated by
private respondent, "[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative
matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to
be established." It refers to "the facts which the evidence on the trial will
prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence
of those facts." And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if
the complaint, while not very definite, nonetheless already states a
sufficient cause of action. 11 A motion for bill of particulars may not call for
matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial.
Such information may be obtained by other means. 12
 48
We sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of
Particulars filed by private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of
action, and to require more details from private respondent would be to
ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already
been adequately apprised of private respondent’s cause of action against
her thus —
. . . . (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand
and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that
she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her
mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
On the basis of the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner
can already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. Private
respondent has already alleged that "she (petitioner) was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession . . . upon his
time and efforts . . . " Certainly, she can respond to this. To demand for
more details would indeed be asking for information on evidentiary facts
— facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. 13 For sure, the
additional facts called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary matters is not
the function of a motion for bill of particulars. 14
We distinguish the instant case from Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic 15 where we
said —
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names
of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals
and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would
support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not
evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those particulars are material facts
that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that
the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against
him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The aforementioned pronouncement cannot apply to the instant case.
That ruling involves alleged "misappropriation and theft of public funds,
plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement, and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power." The respondents therein pray for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. There, the alleged illicit
acts should be fully documented. The instant case, on the other hand,
concerns marital relationship. It would be unreasonable, if not unfeeling,
to document each and every circumstance of marital disagreement. True,
the complaining spouse will have to prove his case, but that will not come
until trial begins.
Consequently, we have no other recourse but to order the immediate
resumption of the annulment proceeding which have already been
delayed for more than two years now, even before it could reach its trial
stage. Whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated should be
immediately determined. There is no point in unreasonably delaying the
resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple
who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed
blissful life either alone or in the company of each other.
A word on Art. 36 of the Family Code. 16 We do not see the need to define
or limit the scope of the provision. Not in this case, at least. For, we are
not called upon to do so, the actual controversy being the sufficiency of
the bill of particulars. To interpret the provision at this juncture would be
to give an obiter dictum which is ill-timed. Besides, it appears that
petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what
Art. 36 actually covers. Suffice it to say that Mme. Justice Sempio-Diy,
formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family code, explains —
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 17
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the instant petition is
DENIED and the questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals
dated 21 July 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the
Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved
to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
 49
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo
City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days
with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work
as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after
her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first
time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program
under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up
to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding
of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it
was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of
their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in
its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of
the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the
import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment.
He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage
null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not
for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in
insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is
a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor
Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee
used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under
the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages
 50
Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot
be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that
insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack
or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is
not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of
the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity
a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not
and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did
not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a
loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there
is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground
for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized
that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they
do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if
they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is
a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the
marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated
but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue
can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he
has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of
children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a
lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist,
who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval
in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply
if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of
the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate
among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in
some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is
only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy
stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine.
Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough
to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at
the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that
after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but
later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
 51
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning
even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although."
On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it
may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of
their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological
or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the
reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even
under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law
and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to
the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive
or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their
answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still
valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at
least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm
was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because
of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem)
are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon,
novus);
 52
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then
the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not
be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of
incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract.
This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding
contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort,
obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is
due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved
not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of
the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of
the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases").
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is
that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
 53
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of
our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we
still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare
marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present
case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most
liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging
the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on
the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the
San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend
more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent
quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that
in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature
and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to
be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared
to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as
of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
 54
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code)
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding
that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct
in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage.
If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion
in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court
of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to
be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing
of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there
was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows
love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
 55
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to
our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also
be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
 56
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in
its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over
time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of
Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court
to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied
the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the
South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's
mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing
happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his
mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period,
there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant
avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on
a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same
room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between
them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual
as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the
defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of
his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it
can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will
be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their
differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether
he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
 57
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without
costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as
proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed
by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public
policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court
on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in
the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What
said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings.
When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since
their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by
the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion
between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife
(private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he
must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant
portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with
his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is
not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
 58
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that
the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He
points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to
physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,
— i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, —
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent
court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent
refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however,
that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even
the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex
with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show
that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity.
Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent;
that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological
but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed
with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks
and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had
tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be.
What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is
no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection. 5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon
him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage."
Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that
the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I
Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to
public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved
is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that
the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his
wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within
the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and
private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband
and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time
it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting
adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects
and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
59