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LOJERO, MARK DENNIEL J L.L.B.

II ADMINISTRATIVE AND ELECTION LAW

[G.R. No. 122636. March 15, 2000]


MILTIADES C. SPANDONIS vs. DOJ, et al.

FACTS:
In a Complaint Rollo, p. 63. dated April 18, 1995, petitioner Miltiades C. Spandonis filed two criminal cases
for falsification of public documents under Article 172, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code against respondents
Eduardo L. Rama, Ma. Angelica Amante and Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., for allegedly altering two "Certificates
of Nomination and Acceptance" for the positions of governor and congressman during the 1995 local
elections in Agusan del Norte.

On May 24, 1995, the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal of the
complaints for insufficiency of evidence.

On June 9, 1995, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice, who in turn, remanded
the case to the Regional State Prosecutor pursuant to Department Order No. 223, which provides that
appeals from resolutions of city prosecutors where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged does not
exceed prision correccional (the penalty for falsification of public documents under Article 172, pars. 1 and 2
of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods), shall be made to the
Regional State Prosecutors who shall resolve the appeals with finality.

On October 16, 1995, the Regional State Prosecutor issued a letter-resolution denying the petition.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari with this Court.

On January 15, 1996, we required the respondents to file their Comments. In his Comment, the Solicitor
General contends that pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 223, appeal to the Secretary of Justice is the proper
remedy, hence the present special civil action of certiorari will not lie. Further, the complaint for falsification
of public documents was without legal and evidentiary basis, and therefore, was properly dismissed on the
merits.

Petitioner filed his reply to the Comment raising the following arguments: first, the right of appeal to the
Secretary of Justice from the Regional State Prosecutor is limited to cases "where the penalty prescribed for
the offense charged does not exceed prision correccional." In this case, where the imposable penalty is
only prision mayor (should be correccional) or less, the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutors shall be
deemed final, thereby rendering as unavailing appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The administrative remedy
ends at the Regional State Prosecutor whose decision is deemed by operation of law as that of the
Department itself or the Secretary himself. Second, DOJ Circular No. 359, amending DOJ Order No. 223
providing for the automatic review of the resolutions of the Regional State Prosecutor even in cases where
the penalty does not exceed prision correccional by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to his residual
authority to supervise the prosecutors of the Department of Justice, does not apply to the present case
because DOJ Circular No. 359 took effect only after the issuance of the subject resolution by respondent
Regional State Prosecutor. Further, the DOJ rule on appeal in preliminary investigation involving crimes
where the penalty does not exceed prision correccional remains vague for failure to provide for the manner,
time, form and grounds of appeal to the Secretary. Moreover, under the attendant circumstances, appeal to
the Secretary of Justice, even if allowed, does not offer adequate remedy considering the political affiliations
of the then incumbent Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice. Lastly, the principle of exhaustion of
remedies does not apply to the present petition since the controverted act was patently illegal.

ISSUES:

I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY AVAIL OF THE PRESENT SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, RULES OF COURT IN LIEU OF AN ADEQUATE REMEDY OF APPEAL TO
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS PROVIDED UNDER DOJ ORDER NO. 223, DATED JUNE 30, 1993.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF ASSISTANT
CITY PROSECUTOR ABUGHO AND REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR ZOZOBRADO IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.

RULING:

In this case, the propriety of the present petition for certiorari to assail a resolution of the Regional State
Prosecutor affirming the decision of the City Prosecutor dismissing a complaint is far from self-evident. In
our view, this petition is not the proper remedy nor is the Court the proper forum.

The rule on appeals from resolutions in preliminary investigations/reinvestigations is governed by


Department Order No. 223 of the Department of Justice dated August 1, 1993. Section 1 of said Circular
provides -

Section 1. What May Be Appealed. - Only resolutions of the Chief State


Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a
criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
excepts as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
Appeals from the resolutions of provincial/city prosecutors where the penalty
prescribed for the offense charged does not exceed prision correccional, regardless of
the imposable fine, shall be made to the Regional State Prosecutor who shall resolve
the appeals with finality, pursuant to Department Order No. 318 dated August 28,
1991 as amended by D.O. No. 34 dated February 4, 1992, D.O. No. 223 dated August
11, 1992 and D.O. No. 45 dated February 2, 1993. Such appeals shall also be governed
by these rules."

Department Order No. 359 dated October 17, 1995, which took effect on October 17, 1995, added the
following paragraph to Section 1 of DOJ Circular 223-

"THE PROVISION OF THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH ON THE FINALITY OF THE


RESOLUTION OF THE REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SHALL NOT PRECLUDE THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FROM ORDERING, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND PURSUANT
TO HIS RESIDUAL AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE THE PROSECUTORS TO THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY HIS OFFICE OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS IN THE CASES APPEALED TO THEM."

Department Order No. 359 clarified that the Secretary of Justice can review all criminal cases resolved by
the Regional State Prosecutor regardless of the penalty imposed, as in this case. Petitioner, however, claims
that Department Order No. 359 should not be applied to his case since it was promulgated after the
Regional State Prosecutor issued the assailed resolution.

We find no merit in this argument. For, whether under D.O. No. 223 or D.O. No. 359, a resolution of the
Regional State Prosecutor dismissing an appeal was still subject to further appeal to the Secretary of Justice,
who has the power to review the decision of his subordinates.

Even without the aforementioned Orders, the power of supervision and control by the Secretary of Justice
over all prosecutors has statutory and legal basis. As we explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,8 278
SCRA 656, 676-677 (1997). and reiterated in Dimatulac v. Villon -9 297 SCRA 679, 707-708 (1998).

"Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice


who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
their rulings.

Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of
the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecutor Offices. The scope of his power of
supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of
the Code:

"(1) Supervision and Control - Supervision and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; ...."

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power of authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors
finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should
be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed."

Necessarily, therefore, the proper recourse from the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutor
denying the appeal should be an invocation of the power of review of the Secretary of Justice.

In the interest of justice and public service and effective immediately, any and all petitions for
review/appeals to the Department of Justice from the resolution of the Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial
and City Prosecutors together with the Motions for Reconsideration arising therefrom, shall be referred to,
resolved and acted upon only by the undersigned.

This Department Circular supersedes any and all prior orders inconsistent herewith until further
orders."Petitioner cannot short circuit the appeal process by going directly to this Court via a petition
for certiorari. Certiorari will only lie if there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.12 Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, had the decision of the Secretary of
Justice been adverse to petitioner, the correct remedy should have been a petition for certiorari to the Court
of Appeals, and not this Court, following the principle of hierarchy of courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit

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