G.R. No.

97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. The petitioner courted and proposed
to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the
end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her
to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was 22 years old and a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result
of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision favoring
the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner appealed the
trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. On 18 February
1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

RULING:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from
the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.

In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together
with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry
is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because
of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a
victim of moral seduction.

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a
breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered if there be criminal or
moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the
EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral
damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened.

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Also, the pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the
purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral
seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that
the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that
she is merely in delicto.

G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978

LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R. MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO
MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in
1959, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA,
ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978

MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner, vs. ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA,
ERNESTO, NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and the Honorable COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

FACTS:

On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to
manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed
creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and
stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman.

The fiesta had a "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza". The troupe arrived in the evening of January 22 for the performance
and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with
some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was
reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was
taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day.

The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to recover
damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual
members of the Municipal Council in 1959.

After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the defendants exercised due
diligence 'm the construction of the stage. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10, 1962. The
Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31, 1968, the Court of Appeals through its
reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente
Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. 4

ISSUES:

1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's governmental or public function or
is it or a private or proprietary character?

2. Is the Municipality liable for damages?

RULING:

1. HOLDING OF A TOWN FIESTA IS AN EXERCISE OF PROPRIETARY POWERS. Under Philippine laws municipalities are
political bodies corporate and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through
their respective municipal governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and
be sued, and contract and be contracted with. The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or
political on the one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by the
corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial
public, and political. Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community
and include those which are ministerial private and corporate.

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This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in an injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental
function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter, nor
from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and
maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third
persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code gives authority to the municipality to
celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for
the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed
was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For
instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

2. YES. The facts as presented establish negligence as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise the due
diligence of a good father of the family. The Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence. It found that the
municipality failed to take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the participants in the stage
presentation prepared in connection with the celebration of the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing non participants or
spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not constructed to meet the additional weight- the
defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla . (pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993)

As to the person who built the stage, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the claim
that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg
as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted
merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or
liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they
are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of
their duties, can continue or remove the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if
those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest,
they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal
Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol IV, p. 2879)

As to the councilors, We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code against
them for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official duty; it does
not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an official duty.

Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it,
but because of some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury ... To
make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach
of duty as contributed to, or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act. ... (pp.
207-208, Ibid.)

We absolve the municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said
petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators
to go up the platform.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald
was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Atty.
Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal
in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

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ISSUES:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil
liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact
that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father,
was already legally married?

RULING:

1. NO.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.) Also, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.

Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt
or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.) In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as
a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence
that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. YES.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parent with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.

Accordingly, in our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.