Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics:

Arendt’s Reading of Plato’s Cave Allegory

Miguel Abensour

Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 74, Number 4, Winter

2007, pp. 955-982 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/527590/summary

Access provided by University Of Pennsylvania (16 Jul 2018 15:53 GMT)

Miguel Abensour
Against the Sovereignty of
Philosophy over Politics:
Arendt’s Reading of
Plato’s Cave Allegory

H A N N A H A R E N D T IS CELEBRATED AS ONE OF TH E GREAT PH ILO SO PH E R S

o f ou r tim e. But is such a celebration truly legitim ate? Indeed, as
surprising and as paradoxical as it m ay seem, H annah A rendt has
always dem onstrated a strong opposition to political philosophy and
to its tradition of thought. Despite alm ost unanim ous recognition of
Arendt, the idiom “political philosophy”—and the institutions th a t
are born of it—are highly problem atic. For the author of The Human
Condition, under the guise of a supposedly happy alliance betw een the
substantive and the qualifier, “political philosophy” willingly conceals
a conflict betw een philosophy and politics and bears the threat of the
sovereignty of one over the other. This conflict is extremely profound
since it represents opposition not only betw een two academic disci­
plines but betw een two modes of existence th at seek to establish a hier­
archy—excellence being attributed to one of them , in this case, the bios
theoretikos at the expense of th e bios politicos.
Little surprise, then, th a t a philosopher critical o f the concept
of sovereignty attacks th e general configuration o f political philoso­
phy. Indeed, A rendt is aware o f the necessity of rejecting the m odel
of competence in the political realm in order to better recognize the
inherent political capacity of all; her resolve is to struggle against the

social research Vol 74 : No 4 : Winter 2007 955

governm ent o f philosophers, of “those w ho know over those who do
not know.” In order to fully com prehend the “contra political philoso­
phy” th a t Arendt puts forth, w hat better vantage point th an th a t of her
critical interpretation of Plato’s thought? Did the author of the Republic
not edify or institute political philosophy away from and even against
the polis?
In a letter dated May 8,1954, in w hich she attem pts to explain to
Heidegger the broad outline of her work, Arendt writes,

Starting w ith the parable of the cave (and your interpreta­

tion o f it), a representation of the traditional relationship
betw een philosophy and politics, [we see] actually the atti­
tude of Plato and Aristotle toward the polis as the basis of
all political theories. (It seems to m e decisive th a t Plato
makes the agathon [the good] the highest idea—and not the
kalon [the beautiful]—for political reasons) (Hannah Arendt-
M artin Heidegger letter, 1925-1975).

Two years later, July 1, 1956, in a letter to Karl Jaspers, A rendt once
again speaks of Plato’s position:

It seems to me that in the Republic Plato wanted to “apply”

his own theory of ideas to politics, even though th at theory
had very different origins. Heidegger, it seems to me, is
particularly off base in using the cave simile to interpret
and “criticize” Plato’s theory of ideas, but he is right w hen
he says th at in the presentation o f the cave simile, tru th is
transform ed on the sly into correctness and, consequently,
ideas into standards (Arendt and Jaspers, 1992: 288).

From these letters, three essential points can be drawn:

►The im portance of the allegory of the cave, which is the heart of

Plato’s political philosophy. Arendt also adds the im portance of

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 Heidegger’s interpretation in “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.” Here we
m ust adm it th a t Arendt expresses a reserve concerning Heidegger’s
attem pt to interpret the Theory of Forms via the cave allegory
(Heidegger, 1998:155-182).
►The hypothesis th at Plato, in the Republic, sought to apply his Theory
of Forms to politics, even if this theory is of a different origin, inas­
m uch as its aim is to answer the philosophical question of the tru th
rather than the political question of the organization of the city. It
is during this problem atic application th a t Plato realizes the no less
problem atic passage from the idea of Beauty to the idea of Good.
►The hypothesis o f the passage from the idea o f Beauty to the idea of
Good is confirmed by Heidegger’s interpretation, w hich insists on
the ambiguity of the platonic concept of the essence of truth, that
would experience a transform ation of the tru th as “non-voilement
de l’étant” to the tru th as exactitude of view, a transform ation from
alèiheia to omoiosis.

By m aking the allegory o f th e cave the central aspect o f Plato’s politi­

cal philosophy, is A rendt n o t articulating a m ost profound critique
of th e idea o f political philosophy, a superior form o f critique, the
general principal o f w hich is expressed in a fragm ent o f th e in tro ­
duction to th e Politics: “Plato, th e fath e r o f political philosophy in
th e West, attem pted in various ways to oppose th e polis and w hat it
understood by freedom by positing a political theory in w hich politi­
cal standards w ere derived n o t from politics b u t from philosophy”
(Arendt, 2005:130-131). From this stem s a dom ination o f reason over
politics that, following Arendt, had a decisive effect on the destiny of
political philosophy in the W estern world. “Quelque chose de fondamen­
talement faux” w rites A rendt about political philosophy in the Journal
de pensée.
And so w hat is the Arendtian interpretation of the cave allegory?
How can we define its uniqueness? Even if it rests upon the strong certi­
tude th at the allegory represents the heart of Plato’s political philoso­
phy, this interpretation unfurls in m any different directions. Beyond

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this m ultiplicity, we find one overriding issue: Plato’s acceptance or
rejection of political philosophy.
This interpretation o f the cave allegory gives Arendt the oppor­
tunity to highlight Plato’s ambivalence toward hum an affairs and also
to respond to Pascal w ith a “yes, but.” It is true th a t Plato does not
give great philosophical im portance to the political realm and th at he
thought th a t we should n ot take it very seriously. It is nevertheless true
that, contrary to alm ost all of the philosophers th at followed him, Plato
“still took hum an affairs so seriously th at he changed the very center
of his thought to m ake it applicable to politics” (Arendt, 1961: 113).
Pascal’s Thought 331 (Pascal, 1968) only expresses h a lf of the truth.
Admittedly, we can compare Plato’s cave to Pascal’s insane asylum, but
Plato’s intervention aims at som ething m ore than the simple re-estab­
lishm ent of order by the psychiatrist (medetin alieniste). His desire to put
an end to the anom ie th at ravages the ship o f fools (nefdesfous) is trans­
form ed into a quest for th e best regime. This, in turn, gives b irth to
a well-adm inistered and well-ordered city. Hence, Plato modifies the
m ost proper philosophical elaboration, the theory o f Forms, in order
for it to serve his project. This ambivalence constitutes the fabric of the
cave allegory. Does it not hold to the ambiguity of the philosopher who,
following the paradox of the m em bership and the withdrawal, belongs
and does not belong to the city, finding him self both outside and inside
its walls?

THE A R E ND TIA N READING AS A PO LITICA L READING

A rendt deliberately and im m ediately turns h er interpretation to the
philosopher. For Arendt, as for Heidegger, the allegory tells a story:
it gives an account o f the p ath from the cave to the light of day and,
inversely, from the light of day to the darkness o f the cave. The m an
liberated from his chains, an uncertain figure for Heidegger, is the
philosopher and th e cave allegory presents “a concentrated biogra­
phy” of him in three steps, three turning points the whole o f w hich
represents a conversion o f hum an beings in their totality, the form a­
tion o f the philosopher, or, in Heideggerian term s, “leading the whole

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hum an being in the turning around of his or her essence” (Heidegger,
1998: 166). In the initial phase, the future philosopher freely turns in
the cave and discovers behind him an artificial fire th a t perm its him to
see things as they are in th eir reality. For Arendt, this first attitude is
th at of the learned who seeks to know things as they are in themselves,
w ithout taking into account the opinions o f the m ultitude. Indeed, the
shadows and images th at stream on the screen fixated by the prisoners
of the cave would be their opinions (doxai).
Unsatisfied w ith the light of the fire, the philosopher, “this soli­
tary adventurer,” discovers an exit th at leads, by stairway, to the open
sky, to a new area: the kingdom of Ideas or Forms, the eternal essence
o f perishable and changing things, illum inated by the sun, the Ideas of
ideas or the Super Good. Here is the peak of the life of the philosopher,
b ut here also begins his tragedy. Because he is m ortal, the philosopher
cannot rem ain indefinitely in the sky of pure Ideas. He m ust go back
down into the cave am ong his com panions of m isfortune. However,
this return to his origins is not a return home. It becomes an ordeal of
a strange malaise. In this th ird stage, the philosopher appears to be a
laughable figure to those w ho surround him. Worse, he is in danger. His
ascension to the kingdom o f Ideas makes him lose his sense o f orienta­
tion in the cave; he nurtures very dangerous ideas th a t oblige him to
contradict the obvious facts o f comm on sense.
This is a sketch th a t rests on an obvious sim plification o f the
platonic allegory. For example, the essential problem o f the relation­
ship to the line th at divides the interpreters is not dealt with. Nothing
is said regarding the identity o f those who exhibit the figurines behind
the walls. Even if Arendt, following Heidegger, insists on the optical and
orientation problems th a t accompany each of the passages recounted
in the m yth—th at is, the discovery of the artificial fire, the exit from
the cave, the ascent back to the cave—at no point does A rendt (and
here she differs from Heidegger) consider the fundam ental question
of paideia. Arendt attributes th e orientation problems to the difference
betw een philosophy and com m on sense, insofar as it is truly a ques­
tion of comm on sense betw een the prisoners o f the cave. It distinctly

Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 959

appears th at A rendt’s simplification, due to th e focus put on the person
of the philosopher, corresponds undoubtedly to a volition to insist on
th e political context of the cave allegory and on the central question
of th e m yth, w hich is to say th e relationship of th e philosopher to
the polis, the relationship o f philosophy and politics, all of which are
dimensions wrongly ignored by Heidegger.
In his political dialogues, but m ainly in the Republic, does Plato
not work at inventing a concept o f authority lacking in Greek thought
and histoiy? Does he not seek to introduce a new relation in the public
life o f the polis th at would be akin to a third way, inasm uch as it would
keep at an equal distance b oth persuasion, deemed insufficient after the
death of Socrates, and the external violence th a t is deemed to be destruc­
tive o f politics itself? How can we manage to obligate hum ans to obey
w ithout having recourse to violence? W hat new form of legitimacy can
be created? It is in this direction that, following Arendt, Plato discovers
th a t tru th or evident truths are liable to exert the type o f constraint on
the minds of m en and th at this constraint, “though it needs no violence
to be effective, is stronger th a n persuasion and violence” (Arendt, 1961:
107-108). The analysis of th e cave allegory cannot ignore the political
context th at the quest for a new form o f legitimacy arrives at, th a t is
to say the governm ent of reason, “d la coercition par la raison,” in such a
fashion th at the governm ent of the city ends up under the authority
of philosophers, of those who, thanks to their exit from the cave, were
able to have access to a reality of a superior order through the contem ­
plation o f Forms. It is w ith regard to the superiority of this order th at
we can apply the theory o f Forms to politics. This corresponds to Plato’s
“absolutist” phase of the theory o f Forms “th a t believes th at there is a
true science of things in general and of hum an things in particular and
th at consequently it is up to th e bearer o f this science to decide and
regulate the governm ent o f hum an things” (Castoriadis, 1999: 52). In
this organization, the cave allegory is directed to the few who are able
to obey in freedom whereas the m yth of the rewards and punishm ents
after death is directed to th e many, th e m ultitude. It is through the
invention of a relationship where the elem ent of constraint “lies in the

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relationship itself” on the m odel of the doctor-patient or master-slave
relationship th a t Plato is able to accomplish his design to “establish the
“authority” of the philosopher over the polis” (Arendt, 1961:109).
In this sense, the cave allegory, w ith its division betw een the sky
of pure ideas th a t the philosopher can access and hum an existence in
the cave im m ersed in illusions, in the fascinated vision o f shadows and
images, designates ideas as the instrum ents th at can precisely create
this freedom-oriented authority or obedience relationship. Still, Plato
m ust greatly modify the doctrine of Ideas in order to attain this goal.
The political context of the cave allegory is crucial since it symbolizes
the conflict opened betw een the philosopher and the polis. Arendt, in
different texts, never ceases to retu rn to this point by indicating the
perspective from w hich we m ust in terp ret the cave allegory. In this
sense, the Republic is first and forem ost a treaty of political philosophy,
because in Plato’s m ind political philosophy is the adequate response to
this conflict. But another question emerges: If the cave allegory repre­
sents the heart of the Republic as the institution of political philosophy,
is Plato’s solution the correct one w ith regard to the conflict betw een
philosophy and polis? That philosophy becomes “political” or the politi­
cal realm specifies the substantive or object “philosophy” does not entail
th a t it respects the logic of the polis. Perhaps this project of “political
philosophy” am ounts to the creation of a new nexus: a set of philosoph­
ical-political authorities th a t threatened to violate the polis and were
liable to harm the experience of isonomy w ithin the polis in such a way
as to put an end to it. To answ er this question, we m ust return to the
specificities of the A rendtian analysis o f the cave allegoiy.
For Arendt, th e cave described in the allegory is a social space
distinguished by an absence of politics. Following Plato’s description,
the prisoners are chained is such a way th a t they are forced to keep
their heads immobile. They therefore cannot see themselves or others
b u t only shadows. All conversations are forbidden. The only “shadow”
of an exchange possible is a com petition or rivalry about the shadows
and images th a t are projected on the walls of the cave: W ho will better
distinguish the passing shadows and images? Who will rem em ber the

A gainst the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 961

proper order of appearance? W ho will be able to accurately predict the
shadows to come? (Plato: 516 c-d) Moreover, Arendt takes pleasure in
pointing out th e lack of politics in the subterranean and prison-like
universe of the cave. In “Philosophy and Politics,” she writes:

It belongs to the puzzling aspects of the allegory of the

cave th a t Plato depicts its inhabitants as frozen, chained
before a screen, w ithout any possibility of doing anything
or com m unicating w ith one another. Indeed, the two polit­
ically m ost significant words designating hum an activity,
talk and action (lexis and praxis), are conspicuously absent
from the whole story (Arendt, 1990: 96).

But it is not enough for Arendt to point out this lack of politics; she will
dig deeper by bringing into play her critical analysis of the conditions
o f possibility of politics. The cave suffers from an absence o f politics
because its inhabitants, w h eth er they be the philosopher back from
the sky of pure ideas or the prisoners still there, give excessive value to
seeing, preferring seeing over acting.
Similarly, in “W hat is Authority?” we find the same observation
of an absence of political conditions in the platonic cave (Arendt, 1961:
108-109). W hereas the life of the m ultitude is characterized by lexis, by
speech and by praxis, by action, it is not the case for the inhabitants
of the cave .1 They have for sole occupation to see and, m ore im por­
tant, this regardless o f all practical needs. A new teleological concep­
tion emerges: hum ans can realize their nature insom uch as they are
seeing and not acting beings, pure sight and not actus purus. From this
necessarily results a depreciation of the dom ain of hum an affairs, of
the three dim ensions of vita activa and, m ore specifically, o f all th at
concerns speech and action. If all hum ans share the same passion for
seeing, the interest o f the philosopher and th at of hum ans as such coin­
cide. Both “require th at hum an affairs, the result of speech and action,
do not aquire their own dignity, but th at they be subm itted to the domi­
nation of som ething else” Such is the result of a philosophy th at gives

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preference to the m ost spiritual of th e five senses, th a t is built upon
an “an absolute priority of seeing over acting, o f contem plation over
speech and action,” of bios theoretikos over bios politikos, o f a philosophy
anim ated by “a fundam ental conviction th a t w hat makes things hum an
is the need to see.” Moreover, this philosophy th at gives precedence to
the need to see over the “need for politics” (Feuerbach) consequently
justifies the intervention of the philosopher and the governm ent of the
philosopher-king. Is the philosopher n ot the “great seer,” the one who
can purely see since he has seen the Forms th at are of a superior nature
and perm it the true perception of all things? The stage is now set for
the dom ain of hum an affairs, ontologically depreciated, to fall under
the dom ination o f som ething exterior that, as such, acquires the legiti­
macy needed to rule. All is now in place for politics to fall under the
dom ination of philosophy. Arendt writes in conclusion:

The allegory of the cave is thus designed to depict not so

m uch how philosophy looks from th e view point o f poli­
tics b u t how politics, the realm o f hum an affairs, looks
from the view point of philosophy. And the purpose is to
discover in the realm o f philosophy those standards which
are appropriate for a city of cave dwellers, to be sure, but
still for inhabitants who, albeit darkly and ignorantly, have
formed their opinions concerning the same m atters as the
philosopher (Arendt, 1990: 96).

The second specificity o f A re n d t’s in te rp re ta tio n is th a t,

following Heidegger’s exam ple, she considers th a t th e last stage of
th e narration, w hen th e philosopher m ust re tu rn to th e cave, is of
great im portance. Heidegger will even anticipate a battle w ithin the
cave betw een the liberator and the prisoners opposed to all form s of
liberation.
As we have observed, Arendt will evoke a similar scenario, even
if it is in different term s. The one she calls the philosopher who goes
back to the cave is ill at ease since he is received as a ridiculous, even

Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 963

dangerous figure who seeks to attack the evidences o f comm on sense.
As such, he is seen as someone who could shatter the order w ithin the
cave. Once again, Arendt links this trying situation o f the philosopher
to his ambivalence. The retu rn to the cave, w ith the complications th a t
it entails, is one of the possible figures of the paradox of the appearance
and retreat. If the philosopher were only a philosopher, his adventure
w ould end w ith his exit from th e cave and the contem plation of the
Forms, the highest truth. The philosopher is a m ixed being, however.
A great part of him partakes in the com m only shared hum anity: he
is “a m an among m en, a m ortal am ong m ortals, and a citizen among
citizens” (Arendt, 1961: 114). But the philosopher also feels obligated
to com m unicate the tru th th a t his exit from the cave has revealed to
him. He feels the need to establish for the cave dwellers a codification
or a regulation of the whole o f society. At the same tim e, the philoso­
pher acquires, thanks to the authority conferred by his access to truth,
a new found legitim acy th a t perm its him to take charge o f hum an
affairs, to present him self as a philosopher-king. If the philosopher’s
m ission and am bition are to take charge of hum an affairs, of politics, it
is inasm uch as he has discovered—and it is a discovery—th a t the Forms
contem plated outside the cave are applicable, through transformation,
w ithin the cave. In Plato’s approach, following Arendt, the retu rn to
the cave is therefore closely related to the applicability o f the Forms and
to their usefulness in the political realm . In The Human Condition, Arendt
writes:

It is only w hen he returns to the dark cave of hum an affairs

to live once m ore w ith his fellow m en th a t he needs the
ideas for guidance as standards and rules by w hich to
m easure and under w hich to subsume the varied m ultitude
of hum an deeds and words w ith the same absolute, ‘objec­
tive’ certainty w ith w hich the craftsm en can be guided in
m aking and the layman in judging individual beds by using
the unw avering ever-present model, th e ‘idea’ o f bed in
general (Arendt, 1958: 226).

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 Before exam ining th e operations th a t Plato m ust undertake to
m ake his doctrine of Forms applicable to politics, let us attem pt to
propose a tentative response to the question at hand: are the institution
of political philosophy and th e subsequent creation of philosophical-
political authorities an appropriate response to the apparent conflict
betw een philosophy and th e polis?

IS THE PLATONIC IN S TITU TIO N O F PO LITICA L

PHILOSOPHY A GO OD SOLUTION?
We can legitim ately doubt th a t this solution is satisfactory inasm uch
as the cave allegory is a m ain source of the dichotomy betw een those
who, thanks to their retreat from the cave, have vision and tru th and
those who rem ain prisoners of relationships th at exist in the cave and
are hostage to the illusions th at dom inate the hum an condition. This
dichotom y necessarily engenders, under the nam e “political philoso­
phy,” a nexus of philosophical-political authorities whose existence is
a negation o f the isonom ical structure of the polis, of the equality in
principle of citizens th at is reinforced by philia, a negation of the city’s
im m anent rationality. Indeed, is the end result of this institution not
th e creation of a com m andm ent and obedience relationship, taken
from a nonpolitical model, and th at rests upon the hierarchy betw een
the theoretical life (bios theoretikos) and the political life (bios politikon)?
But even more disturbing, to use Arendt’s expression, is the underlying
assum ption th a t the institution of political philosophy rests upon this
am ounts to a defeat and a subjection of the polis.
If we are to judge by the cave allegory th at symbolizes the hum an
condition, the philosopher, a seer, actually suffers from a strange type
of blindness: he sees n othing precisely w here there is som ething to
see. This blindness is somewhat akin the blindness of classical political
anthropology, w hich saw an absence of the state in prim itive societies
w hen it should have seen, as Pierre Clastres has shown, a complex social
organisation directed “against the state.” Arendt, in her analysis o f the
cave allegory, correctly insisted on the fact that, in his representation
o f the hum an condition, Plato ignores all th at can encourage the birth

A gainst the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 965

of politics, the conditions o f possibility o f politics, speech, and action.
It is therefore from an apolitical hum an condition, or even an unpo­
litical hum an condition th a t Plato bases his project of political philoso­
phy, w hch is thereby greatly m ortgaged because of this absence. The
philosopher, after having contem plated the Forms and the Super Good,
reenters the cave in order to codify the behavior of its inhabitants and
subm it them to norm s outside the cave. Following Arendt, the unsaid
[Vimplicite] o f platonic political philosophy is doubly problem atic: on
the one hand, it rests upon a prim ary absence of politics by proposing
an apolitical vision of the hum an condition reduced to a purely social
condition: on the other, it is because o f this initial lack of politics th at
the political philosophy m ust have recourse to a set of exterior norms.
There is a necessary link betw een this degree zero of politics and the
exterior nature of the norm s. It is because o f this absence of politics
th at the philosopher turns outward, toward philosophy, to impose new
criteria on hum an affairs. The reader will easily agree th a t a vision of
the hum an condition th at allows, at the outset, the conditions of the
possibility of politics, speech, and action, could only give rise to a differ­
ent type of political philosophy. If politics is always already there, if it
is coeval w ith the hum an condition, political philosophy would seek to
dem onstrate how speech and action contain w ithin themselves, in the
inherent logic of their unfolding, the possibility of im m anently institut­
ing a political bond, of unveiling the fragile netw ork of hum an relations.
Quite obviously, such a political philosophy would be diam etrically
opposed to a political philosophy th a t attem pts to impose from the
exterior, th at is from itself, norm s th at would wrest the hum an condi­
tion from its supposedly nonpolitical character and reach, through the
m ediation of philosophy, to a particular form of politics from above.
The debt that, through the allegory of the cave, burdens platonic
political philosophy is all th e m ore heavy because the inhabitants of the
cave are prisoners in chains and w ithout freedom. Even those w ithout
chains, who regain their freedom to move, still do not know true free­
dom. This situation reinforces the apolitical condition of the inhabit­
ants of the cave and keeps th em well away from politics, whose reason

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for being is, as we all know, freedom. W hat does it m ean to th in k the
“invention o f politics” well away from freedom?
To answer more thoroughly the question, we should tu rn to the
operations undertaken by Plato; notably, to the m ovem ent th a t made
the doctrine of Forms applicable to the political realm, a doctrine th at
was not destined for such an application. As we have noted, this appli­
cation could only occur th ro u g h a series o f transformations. We can
enum erate three th at are closely linked.
First, the transform ation of th e original function of the Forms.
It is only during the th ird stage of this trajectory, the retu rn to the
cave, th at the philosopher, a t the mercy of the obscurity and the latent
hostility of his com panions, attem pts to liberate th em despite th eir
resistance. It is at this point th a t he changes the way of understand­
ing the tru th as it appears outside of the cave. W hy not transform this
outside tru th into norm s applicable to hum an conduct in the cave,
norm s th at would perm it m easuring and regulating this conduct? Here
A rendt is correcting, w ith th e help of Heidegger, Jaeger’s interpreta­
tion in Paideia; while it is true th a t Plato’s philosophy produces an art
of m easuring, this art only appears w ith the political philosophy of
the Republic and cannot define the totality of his work. At this level, an
antinom y appears betw een two concepts of the Forms: the Forms as
true essences th at m ust be contem plated and the Forms as m easures
th at m ust be applied. It is betw een these two conceptions of the Forms
th a t the transform ation of th eir original function will play out, w hen
the forms are transferred from the philosophical to the political realm.
In order to bring to light this antinom y, A rendt will explicitly have
recourse to the Heideggerian interpretation of the cave allegory found
in “Plato’s Doctrine of the Truth.”2
For Heidegger, the true object of the allegory is a presentation of
the essence of truth, or o f Plato’s doctrine of truth. Proof of this can be
found in the distinction betw een the four different areas in the allegory
and the passage from one to another th a t occurs by way of the question
of the truth, altetheia, or nonveiling in Heidegger’s term s, preoccupied
as he is w ith giving life to th e Greek concept o f the essence of truth.

Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 967

Each area corresponds to a “dom inant m ode of tru th ” and the trajec­
tory of the cave allegory retraced the passage from one mode o f tru th
to another. Thus from Heidegger’s interpretation emerges, even if it
does not explicitly say so, a first ambiguity in Book VII o f the Republic:
Is it concerned w ith the essence o f the form ation or the essence of the
truth? A second ambiguity is articulated by Heidegger in these terms:

For this reason there is a necessary am biguity in Plato’s

doctrine. This is precisely w hat attests to th e heretofore
unsaid b u t now sayable change in th e essence of truth.
The am biguity is quite clearly m anifested in th e fact
th a t w hereas aletheia [nonveiling] is w hat is nam ed and
discussed, it is ortholes [exactitude o f seeing or even exac­
titude of perception and language] th a t is m eant and th at
is posited as norm ative—and all this in a single train of
thought (Heidegger: 1998:177).

Hence, the ambiguity is found in the reliance upon the changing

essence of the truth. It is precisely its fruit. W hat th en is this transfor­
m ation of the essence of the truth? It is preceded by a transform ation of
the nonveiling w hen access to the nonveiled takes place thanks to the
lum inosity of the Form, and m ore specifically the Form o f the Good—of
w hich Plato writes, in this decisive passage o f Book VI of the Republic,
about seeing, the act o f seeing, and th at w hich binds them : “Thus w hat
provides unhiddenness to the thing know n and also gives the power (of
knowing) to the knower, this, I say, is the idea of the good” (Book VI,
508 e as quoted in Heidegger, 1998: 173-174). From here the displace­
m ent to vision, to the gaze th at looks up to the Form: “W hoever wants
to act and has to act in a w orld determ ined by ‘the ideas’ needs, before
all else, a view o f the ideas,” judges Heidegger (Heidegger, 1998: 176).
We could therefore th ink th a t the change in the essence o f the tru th
intervened—m uch as, during the transform ation o f the nonveiling,
the Form trium phs over the truth. It is through an analysis of the idea
o f the Good th a t Heidegger manages to bring forth the interm ediary

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link th a t allows understanding o f the ambiguity o f Plato’s doctrine; it
is nothing else but the victory of Form over truth. Relying on a decisive
passage (517 c)—the idea o f Good “is the mistress who bestows unhid­
denness as well as apprehension”—Heidegger draws an argum ent from
the sovereignty o f the Form of the Good in order to put forth an event
th at Plato does not m ention: the fact th at the idea gains the upper hand
over aletheia. “Aletheia”—writes Heidegger—’’comes under the yoke of
the Idea. W hen Plato says of th e Idea th a t she is the mistress th at allows
for unhiddenness, he points to som ething unsaid, namely, th at hence­
forth the essence of tru th does not, as the essence o f unhiddenness,
unfold from its proper and essential fullness but rath er shifts to the
essence of the Idea. The essence of tru th gives up its fundam ental trait
of unhiddenness (Heidegger, 1998:176).
It is in this abandonm ent th at resides the source o f the ambigu­
ity denounced by Heidegger. At the m om ent w hen w hat counts, in our
relationship to things, is th e idein of the idea, the seeing of the Form—
”la saisie de Te-vidence’parle regard”—the task at hand is to make possible
such a vision in a m anner th a t seeing and knowledge become correct.
In the cave allegory,

th e m ovem ent of passage from one place to th e other

consists in the process w hereby the gaze becomes m ore
correct. Evejything depends on the orthotes, the correctness
of the gaze__ W hat results from this conform ing of appre­
hension, as an idein, to the idea, an agreem ent of the act
of knowing w ith the thing itself. Thus, the priority of idea
and o f idein over aletheia results in a transform ation in the
essence o f truth. Truth becomes orthotes, the correctness of
apprehension and asserting (Heidegger, 1998:177).

A rendt’s developm ent is certainly less complex and subtle. It is

as if she was hastily seeking to arrive at the heart o f the m atter in her
eyes—th at is, th e political question. A rendt certainly recognizes her
debt to Heidegger, notably in the unveiling of the ambiguity regarding

Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 969

the essence of the truth. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement of her
debt, A rendt does not assum e the denunciation of this ambiguity per
se and does not invite us to cross the same landscape. The scene th at
she builds is different and w ithout doubt results from a voluntary and
justifiable simplification of Heidegger’s undertaking since she does not
seek to recover th at same experience.
The opposition is no longer found betw een tru th and Form;
opposition th a t ends w ith a victory o f the form er over the latter th a t
entails an am biguity regarding the conception of th e essence of truth.
Rather, Arendt seeks to tu rn to th e result of th e change in the concep­
tion of the essence of tru th in order to harvest the effects of this ambi­
guity and in order for the opposition to find itself w ithin the Form, a
sort of internal opposition or, better yet, im m anent to the Form. The
conflict also intervenes betw een th e Form as a speculative contem ­
plation of th e essences and th e Form as an art o f m easurem ent. For
Arendt, the transform ation undertaken by Plato to institute political
philosophy derives precisely from a modification of the functions of Forms.
It is no longer Form th at trium phs over tru th b ut it is the function of
m easurem ent of th e Form th a t trium phs over its function of contem ­
p lation of th e essences. Hence, in A rendt’s text, th e am biguity is
displaced since it now concerns the doctrine of the Forms and not th at
o f the tru th , even if we can easily imagine a passage from one am bigu­
ity to another. The Form as an art of m easure is n ot inconsistent w ith
the tru th understood as precision of sight. This preferred function of
m easure allows for, at the th ird stage, th a t o f the retu rn to the cave,
th e consideration of the applicability o f th e Forms to th e realm of
h u m an affairs, to politics. It is because th e Forms are liable to give
b irth to an art of m easurem ent th a t th e philosopher can conceive of
th eir applicability to the realm o f politics. But this applicability does
not go w ithout saying, since it inevitably entails violent effects. In this
perspective, is politics n ot thought and “treated ” w ith a logic th a t is
not its own, a logic th a t is exterior, th e logic of the Forms as authori­
ties needed to guide hum an affairs? It is as if politics was vacuity, a
void th a t the im position o f th e Forms w ould seek to fill, or a chaos

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th a t the im print or the hold of Forms would suppress by substituting
an intelligible form.
A pplicability and change in th e function o f th e Forms go
together. Following Arendt, the ambiguity betw een the Form as true
essence th at m ust be contem plated and Form as an art of m easurem ent
is surm ounted, in the cave allegory, inasm uch as the Forms are consid­
ered as possible m easures of hum an conduct. The Forms, because of
th eir transcendent nature—the sky of Ideas—in th eir relationship to
hum an affairs, can serve as m easure of the more or less suitability, the
m ore or less correctness o f concrete hum an behavior w ith regards to
the Form of Good (defined as the m easure of all things). Regarding this
m atter, Arendt compares th e Form to the m aster benchm ark that, in
its invariable and abstract nature, perm its to m easure a m ultitude of
concrete objects. In a sim ilar fashion, the Forms allow us to take the
m easure of a m ultitude of concrete situations. The Form is a m easuring
instrum ent th at is so capable as to perm it the subsuming of a m ultiplic­
ity of objects by reducing th e other to the same and by including the
same in a rule th a t applies to all. It is at the end of these two operations
th a t the Form, as an instru m en t of m easure, transform s itself into a
norm destined to regulate hum an behavior and hence perm it to appre­
ciate the conformity of acts and judgm ents. It is up to the philosopher
to judge, in function of the Form, if society rem ains in a state of anomie
or if it falls under the grip of a Nomos. The norm ativity th at is exerted
from outside of the social, th e sky of Ideas, can thus be considered as
an instrum ent of dom ination in the hands of philosophers. Arendt also
strongly insists on the transform ation, on the unforeseen change in
function, of the new role given to the Forms.
It is as if Plato, such a philosopher returning to the cave, in the face
o f the conflict betw een philosophy and polis had discovered a new field
in w hich to apply his doctrine o f Forms and the unsuspected efficiency
o f the Forms in this field. W hen the philosopher leaves the cave in his
quest for the true essence of Being, he nurtures no “second thought to
the practical applicability o f w hat he is going to find” (Arendt, 1961:
112) contends Arendt. That is why she seeks to reinforce the qualitative

A gainst the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 971

gap betw een the Forms and the political realm, in order to better high­
light Plato’s strange design th a t offers the Forms a new fate.

For the original function o f the ideas was not to rule or

otherwise determ ine the chaos of hum an affairs, but, in
‘shining brightness,’ to illum inate their darkness. As such,
th e ideas have no th in g w hatsoever to do w ith politics,
political experience, and the problem of action, but pertain
exclusively to philosophy, the experience of contem plation,
and the quest for the ‘true being o f things.’ It is precisely
ruling, m easuring, subsum ing, and regulating th a t are
entirely alien to the experiences underlying the doctrine of
ideas in its original conception (Arendt, 1961:112-113).

At the origin of the platonic institution of political philosophy is a trans­

fer of the Forms from the philosophical realm to the political realm and
a gamble on the relevance o f the Forms and their possible contribu­
tion to a theory of politics. If Hannah Arendt does not cover the same
ground as Heidegger, does her reading not invite us to question the
parallel nature of both situations, on the one hand, the victory o f Form
over tru th and, on the other hand, the subjection o f politics to Forms?
Second, this change in orientation o f the function o f the Forms
can only be accom plished at th e price o f a second operation, the
displacem ent o f the Form o f Beauty to the Form of Good w ith regard
to the determ ination of the Form of all forms, the Supreme Form. It is
precisely this displacem ent, this assignm ent of the good as Supreme
Form th a t A rendt observes in The Human Condition and in the essay
“W hat is Authority?” “W hen Plato was not concerned w ith political
philosophy (as in the Symposium and elsewhere), he describes the ideas
as w hat ‘shines forth m ost’ (ekphanestaton) and therefore as variations
of the beautiful. Only in th e Republic were the ideas transform ed into
standards, m easurem ents, and rules of behavior, all of which are varia­
tions or derivations of the idea of the ‘good’ in the Greek sense o f the
word, th at is, of the ‘good for’ or ‘of fitness’” (Arendt, 1958: 225-226).

972 social research

Yet we m ust still m ake clear th a t A rendt’s rem ark operates w ithin
the fram ew ork o f th e philosopher-king or th e king-philosopher, the
famous hypothesis contained in Book V o f the Republic th a t envisages
the chance encounter, w ithin the same person, betw een political power
and philosophy. To these conditions Arendt adds th a t the Good m ust be
chosen as suprem e Form: “The good is the highest idea of the philoso-
pher-feing, who wishes to be the ruler o f hum an affairs because he m ust
spend his life am ong m en and cannot dwell forever under the sky of
ideas” (Arendt, 1958: 226). The hypothesis confirmed, Arendt takes the
tim e to note th a t the philosopher—and only the philosopher is as yet
defined, even in the Republic as a lover of beauty and not of good—only
the philosopher-king, anxious to apply the Forms to hum an affairs, can
bring about the displacem ent from Beauty to Good since only the Form
of Good contains an art of m easurem ent and thus applicability.
It is in light of the antinom y betw een two types of Forms revealed
by A rendt—the Forms as tru e essences th a t m ust be contem plated
and the Forms as measures th a t m ust be applied—th a t we can under­
stand the displacem ent o f th e Form o f Beauty to the Form o f Good.
This displacement, in certain ways, reproduces this antinom y but also
resolves it in favor of the Form of Good inasm uch as the Form o f Beauty
is m ore aligned w ith contem plation and th a t of Good w ith application.
In the Banquet, love as eros is praised because its object is beauty. The
highest idea is th a t of Beauty since it leads to the truth. The dialogue
describes, notably the discussion betw een Diotime and Socrates, “le
vaste océan du beau" and the degrees of initiation th at leads to the sudden
revelation of w hat is beauty itself alone, th at is, the essence of beauty,
beauty as an intelligible form. The Form of Beauty is presented as the
suprem e idea or form because if the essence of the idea is to shine, to
bring its luminance, beauty is th at w hich shines the m ost and illumi­
nates all the rest. Hence th e m ovem ent in the Banquet th a t stages the
erotic ascension of the soul to attain the contem plation of beauty itself,
th a t which participates in th e beauty of things. But, for Arendt, it is only
w ithin the political context of the Republic th a t the twofold operation
of repudiation of the idea o f the beauty occurs, at least for the philos­

Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 973

opher-king, and the choice of th e Good as Supreme Form. However,
while the Form o f Beauty leads to the contem plation of being, to the
nonveiling o f being due to an ascending movem ent, the Form o f Good
generates a double m ovem ent, a rise toward the contem plation o f the
Supreme Form and a descent back to hum an affairs to w hich it is neces­
sary to apply the m easure of all things, th a t is to say, the Form of Good,
“good” (agathon) m eaning in Greek, “good for,” “apt at,” “adequate to.”
Also A rendt is able to conclude, because o f th e affinity she perceives
betw een the Form o f Good and utility:

If the highest idea, in w hich all other ideas m ust partake in

order to be ideas at all, is th at o f fitness, then the ideas are
applicable by definition, and in the hands o f the philoso­
pher, the expert in ideas, they can become rules and stan­
dards or, as later in th e Laws, they can become laws (Arendt,
1961:113).

In a certain sense, we can be all the m ore amazed by Plato’s oper­

ation that, as Arendt points out, he was in all likelihood attached to the
constant ideal of kalon and o f agathon, o f good and beauty. But, in the
Republic, pressed by the “need for absolutist politics,” he breaks w ith
this ideal in order to retain only the agathon by unseating the kalon.
This displacem ent becomes all th e m ore im portant because it
ends up being the displacem ent of an experience, the transition from
one type of experience to another. The Form of Good substitutes itself
to th a t of Beauty w hen the philosopher turns away from the original
philosophical experience, the quest for the contem plation o f the truth,
understood as nonveiling, in order to consider the scene of hum an
affairs and a different type o f experience th a t is political. The displace­
m ent o f the Form o f Beauty by the Form of Good accompanies the trans­
fer o f the philosopher’s atten tio n to th e philosophical experience of
aletheia to the political experience or to th at of praxis. For Arendt, Plato’s
coup or stroke o f genius is to have been the first (its seems) to conceive
and to open a new field of relevance for the theory o f Forms and, at the

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same tim e, im print the torsion necessary in order to extract a political
philosophy: “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” clears the way [travaille en creux]
for Arendt’s text to the point of even clarifying the process itself—the
transition from the Form o f Beauty to the Form of Good—beyond its
apparent simplicity. Of course, Arendt can rightly blam e Heidegger for
ignoring the political context of the Republic, and notably the displace­
m ent o f Book VI. But her debt is perhaps m ore im portant than she is
prepared to admit. Indeed, is not the complexity of Heidegger’s analysis
better equipped to understand the conditions of possibility, even of the
internal m echanism of the substitution of the Form of Good over the
Form o f Beauty? We m ust rem em ber th a t in order to clarify the transi­
tion from a certain notion o f the essence of tru th to another—th at is,
the passage from aletheia to orthotes—Heidegger gives rise to a middle
link th at is the victory of the Form over the tru th th a t follows the trans­
form ation of the nonveiled, w hen access to the nonveiled occurs thanks
to the lum inosity of the Form, notably the Form of Good. It follows th at
the essence of the tru th is no longer deployed from its own plenitude
th a t another essence of tru th seeks to supplant the nonveiling and that,
in the end, “the essence of tru th gives up its fundam ental trait of unhid­
denness” (Heidegger, 1998:176).
Third, beyond the resolve to transform th e theory o f Forms,
originally unfam iliar w ith all political preoccupations, into a necessary
application to politics, Plato’s political philosophy is distinguished by a
substitution o f action by fabrication, of action by work.
Let us retu rn to our initial question: does the institution of polit­
ical philosophy, w ith all th e complex detours th a t it entails, notably
th e detour by the cave allegory, bring a satisfactory solution to the
conflict betw een philosophy and the polis, betw een philosophy and
politics? The issue at stake in this question is all the m ore im portant
since, following Arendt, the platonic solution is the basis of all political
theory in the W estern world. As we said earlier, we are dealing w ith a
m ost profound critique o f th e idea of political philosophy. We have also
already observed that, tentatively at least, Plato’s solution, which takes
th e form of political philosophy, is highly problem atic. If, in effect,

A gainst the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 975

Plato reaches his goal by devising a new form of authority unknow n to
the Greek world, he imposes, w ith the institution o f political philoso­
phy, a new nexus, a set of philosophical-political authorities capable of
destroying the isonomic and egalitarian logic o f the polis, to do violence
to the im m anent rationality of the city.
Even worse, this political philosophy is based on an im plicit
postulate, notably through the cave allegory: a social state at risk to
illusion and confusion, an apolitical hum an condition or reduced to a
degree zero of politics th at ends up, because it ignores the characteris­
tics o f action and the creativity of praxis, codifying hum an society w ith
transcendental norm s brought down from the sky o f ideas and th a t
derive their legitimacy from philosophy and th at aim at establishing a
governm ent of philosophers, experts in ideas, in order to place the city
under the yoke of philosophy. It follows a disastrous or impoverishing
reduction of the political question; it is no longer a question of letting
a political bond or relationship come to be through concerted action. It is
now only a question of a well-administered city, a city on w hich m ust
be imposed an order that finds its support elsewhere, in the sky of ideas.
The city, instead of being tho u g h t of positively as th e b irth of a rela­
tionship betw een free hum ans, is only seen negatively as the advisable
suppression of a state of anom y and chaos.
But the update of the three operations undertaken by Plato to make
the theory of Forms applicable to the political realm obliges Arendt to go
even further in her critique. It is no longer sufficient to measure the effects
of the philosopher’s authority over the polis; she m ust judge political
philosophy as an institution and also the essence of political philosophy.

THE ESSENCE O F PO LITIC A L PHILOSOPHY

Our in terest in A rendt’s position has to do w ith her breaking
strength (force de rupture). She clearly breaks w ith the dom inant concep­
tion of political philosophy th a t understands it as a m anifestation or a
doctrine of freedom in th at she teaches how to distinguish, by furnish­
ing criteria of judgm ent, the free political regime from the tyrannical or
despotic political regime: in our times, betw een democracy and totali­

976 social research

tarianism . For Arendt, however, political philosophy, far from being
essentially a child bom of freedom, would, surprisingly enough, be tied
to domination; from its birth, it is a theory of dom ination. “The Platonic
separation of knowing and doing has rem ained at the root of all theo­
ries of dom ination, which are not m ere justifications of an irreducible
and irresponsible will to pow er” (Arendt, 1958: 225).3 Of course, Plato
teaches the distinction betw een a free political regime and tyranny; he
nevertheless dem onstrates a certain attraction to tyranny. Also, to the
type o f happy conscience th a t pleads, w ithout nuance, today more than
before, for a “restoration” of political philosophy, A rendt opposes an
insurm ountable worry (inquietude) th at pushes her to em ancipate our
minds from tradition; she even goes so far as to directly attack the insti­
tution th at gave birth to this tradition.
In this sense, her stm ggle m eets th at o f Cornelius Castoriadis.
Contrary to Arendt, he sought to ascribe the birth of political philosophy,
not to the condemnation of Socrates, but to the defeat of Athenian democ­
racy.4 Notwithstanding this divergence, his harsh diagnosis of political
philosophy meets that of Arendt’s. “Plato’s ontology,” writes Castoriadis,

and his political philosophy rest upon . . . the conceal­

m ent and the closure of the political question. W ith Plato
begins som ething else: a political philosophy w hich is no
longer political thought, because it is imm ediately missing
th e question. . . . Its condition o f possibility is indeed an
unawareness of the fundam ental fact th a t defines the possi­
bility of political thought: the self-institution of society. The
self-instituting activity of the polis explicitly erupted in the
face of the world for three centuries. Plato’s philosophy is
possible only w ith th e blocking out of this experience—
blocking out conditioned by w hat is considered to be its
failure” (Castoriadis, 2004: 288; also 274).

“Overturn Platonism” could be A rendt’s comm andment. In her

case, to overturn Platonism means, first of all and essentially, to reject

Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 977

the cave allegory and all political philosophy that considers Plato’s fiction
as a founding myth with the disastrous consequences that it entails. The
question is to put an end to the paradox of a political philosophy that is
created solely to compensate for an absence of politics and that is blind to
the existence of a political bond; a political philosophy that is motivated
by the desire to create or to fabricate an order that, through the command­
m ent and obedience relationship, creates a bond missing among humans.
Further, it entails an opposition to Plato’s modifications of the theory of
Forms and the most im portant of all modifications: the substitution of the
Form of Beauty by the Form o f Good. Here, it is necessary to denounce the
surreptitious metamorphosis of the tru th into accuracy, from aletheia to
orthotes, that has conferred to philosophy and to philosophers sovereignty,
a new power to guide from which emanate norms and rules destined to
order and to control hum an conduct. In this sense, do we not deprive poli­
tics of all relationship to truth, to the nonveiling, since politics now only
has to do w ith exactitude and convenience?
Finally, o v ertu rn in g Platonism im plies fully accepting th e
fragility of hu m an things and th e resistance to th e desire to confer
on th e m th e solidity o f fabricated objects, of work. We m u st also
refuse th e platonic analogy betw een th e Form and th e practice o f
th e artisan th a t builds a bed or a table follow ing a m odel th a t, in
his m ind, preexists fabrication. O verturning P latonism dem ands
the rejection of th e idea o f a model, th e rejection o f th e willingness
to substitute fabrication for action and thus breaking w ith th e idea
th a t th e m ission of political action is to apply a prelim inary theory.
O verturning Platonism entails a re tu rn to h u m an praxis, th e full
pow er o f unveiling, to tru s t th e “political capacity” o f hum ans by
relying on th e inventiveness and on th e creativity o f th e “all ones”
(“tous uns”). Is this not a way to put an end to a twofold forgetfulness,
th a t of being and th a t of action?

CONCLUSION
At the end of this trajectory, we can clearly see the distinctiveness of
Arendt’s gesture: she invites us to break w ith political philosophy and

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its tradition since this tradition is situated closer to a theory of dom ina­
tion than to a theory of freedom. W hen confronted w ith the imposing,
and seemingly w ithout shadow, corpus of political philosophy, Arendt
gave birth to a nagging doubt: Given its platonic origins, does political
philosophy offer the possibility of reflecting upon freedom or does it
seek, inversely, to subm it freedom and its exercise to the authority of a
group o f experts in Forms, th e philosophers, th at will give to the expan­
sion of freedom only w hat philosophy deems appropriate for the city?
It is from this type of critical, heteredox questioning th at Arendt invites
us to take our distance w ith political philosophy, to subm it it w ithout
respite and rem orse to the question instead of naively adhering to it, as
if the legitimacy o f political philosophy was beyond debate, and w ent
w ithout saying. This is why it is necessary, following Arendt, to refuse,
in term s of politics, the status of an expert in ideas, th at is to say, the
status of philosopher. Arendt’s gesture is indeed distinctive. The order
to “overturn Platonism ” is only half o f the invitation. In fact, it is not
sim ply a call to liquidate once and for all political philosophy in the
nam e o f opposing the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition in order to install
in its place a positivistic—or not—theory o f politics.
Hannah Arendt, “a sort of phenom enologist,” is concerned w ith
the retu rn to political things them selves, beyond all psychologism,
beyond all sociologism, b u t also beyond all “philosophicalism ”—politi­
cal philosophy tends so m uch to strangle politics and ends up obscuring
praxis. And she practices a twofold approach. Indeed, her resolutely crit­
ical exam ination o f political philosophy is perm anently accompanied
by an in-depth interrogation on the chances of another political philosophy
th a t would, instead of projecting over action and imposing its laws on
it, be able to give free range to praxis and let itself be guided w ithout
restraint by its reason for being which is freedom, far from all transac­
tional or strategic compromise w ith any theory of domination. Hence,
the interpretation o f A rendt’s critical gesture m ust be concerned w ith
the necessity of going beyond the critique, to the turning th at she invites
us to take, in order to open the m ore or less explored realm of a politi­
cal philosophy that, far from the cave allegory, would have as its task

Against the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 979

to describe the articulation of the hum an condition and, at the same
tim e, its reinforcement. Contrary to Plato, who, by displacing the Form
of Beauty w ith th e Form o f Good, dem eans politics by reducing it to
suitability in the quest for accuracy (which is orthos and therefore cut
from all relationship to truth), A rendt’s task is to rehabilitate politics
by offering the possibility o f a relationship to nonveiling, to aletheia.
Not so m uch by returning to the platonic displacement, w hich would
signify that, despite the reversal, we rem ain w ithin the continuity by
subscribing to the authority of the theory of Forms, but by keeping in
m ind th a t Beauty, even if it knows of the victory o f Form over truth,
retains a privileged relationship w ith nonveiling, w ith truth.
Can we not see here th a t there is, for Arendt, an echo “of the
Heideggerian radicalization o f Aristotle practical philosophy” at the
end of which praxis no longer indicates a particular action but a modal­
ity o f being? In Franco Volpi’s words: “In the absence of a dom ain w here
it can constitute itself, praxis m ust constitute itself by itself and on itself;
hence becoming the original ontological determ ination, autarkic; th at
is, in itself its own goal” (Volpi, 1988: 24). Does praxis not participate, in
its positive dimension, in th e lifting of the concealment, to the nonveil­
ing that, as Heidegger rem inds us at the end of his text on Plato, is a
fundam ental feature of being itself?
Translated from the French by Martin Breaugh.

N OTES
1. We are faced here w ith an interpretive problem: in order to define
the life of the multitude, Arendt speaks of the cave. Evidently, she is
not speaking of the Platonic cave, but of a more general sense that
refers to the domain of hum an affairs, to w hat philosophers tend to
call the “cave of hum an affairs,” precisely the expression that Arendt
will use on the same page, as if to dissolve the initial ambiguity.
2. In “W hat is Authority?” Arendt acknowledges her debt: “This presen­
tation is indebted to M artin Heidegger’s great interpretation of the
cave parable in Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, Bern, 1947. Heidegger
demonstrates how Plato transforms the concept of tru th (aletheia) until

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 it became identical w ith correct statem ents (orthotes). Correctness
indeed and not truth, would be required if the philosopher’s knowl­
edge is the ability to measure.” Having said this, Arendt will critique
Heidegger for ignoring th e political dimension needed to understand
the transform ation of th e concept of truth. “Although he explicitly
m entions the risks the philosopher runs when he is forced to return
to the cave, Heidegger is not aware of the political context in which
the parable appears. According to him, the transform ation comes to
pass because the subjective act of vision (idein, idea) takes precedence
over objective tru th ” (Arendt, 1961: 291 n. 16).
3. See also Between Past and Future, where the government of the philos­
opher-king is defined as “the domination of hum an affairs by some­
thing outside its own realm ” (Arendt, 1961:114).
4. “This defeat of Athens, w hich is the equivalent of the historical defeat
of democracy, has had incalculable historical consequences [...] it has
fixed the course of political philosophy for twenty-five centuries [...].
Plato and his political philosophy [...] are the result of the defeat of
Athenian democracy” (Castoriadis, 2004: 286).

REFERENCES
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958.
-------- . “W hat is Authority?” Between Past and Future. New York: Viking
Press, 1961.
-------- . “Philosophy and Politics.” Social Research 57:1 (Spring 1990):
73-103.
-------- . The Promise of Politics. Ed. Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books,
2005.
A rendt, H annah, and Karl Jaspers. Correspondence, 1926-1969. Ed. E.
Kaufholz. Paris: Payot-Rivages, 1995.
A rendt, H annah, and M artin Heidegger. Lettres et autres documents
1925-1975. Ed. P. David. Paris: Gallimard, 2001.
Castoriadis, Cornelius. Sur Le Politique de Platon. Paris: Seuil, 1999.--------- .
Ce quifait la Grèce. 1 D’Homère àHéraclite. Paris: Seuil, 2004.

A gainst the Sovereignty of Philosophy over Politics 981

Heidegger, Martin. “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.” Pathmarks. Trans. Thomas
Sheehan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Pascal, Biaise. Pensées. Ed. L. Brunschwicg. Paris: Hachette, 1968.
Volpi, Franco. “Dasein comm e praxis: L’assimilation et la radicalisation
heideggeriene de la philosophie pratique d’Aristote.” Heidegger
et l’idée de la phenomenology. Eds. Franco Volpi et al. Dordrecht,
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