July 07, 2013

GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February
1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter
the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired
to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration
of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February
1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half
years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or
Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of
First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied
the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat
them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no
such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen
to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise
a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the
situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Facts

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.He then embraced
and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines.
Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made it
appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability
extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for
his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true
relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however,
subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’
eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at
the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she
was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked
the visa previously granted to her.

Issue

Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary to
permanent resident legal.
Ruling

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the country and
the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such privileges
were obtained through misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the
public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent
resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a
Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter
of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.

Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship Requirement

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be
allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant –
a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under
prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within 7 years after
reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935
Constitution was in place).

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14
years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule
be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with
the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s way beyond the
allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was
extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be
considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional
and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t
give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because
he never thought he’s Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector
is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado
on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of
their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By
declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some
act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

July 07, 2013

GR No. 161434, March 3 2004

FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of
candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the
Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who
in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11,
1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence
of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person
at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of
petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the
“en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe
father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on
August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the
Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ
on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie
Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack
of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion
was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a
writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the
COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434
and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President
of the Philippines.

Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August
1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
- naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus
sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on
the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20
August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4)
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody
of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of
the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and
to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.

o v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents.

En Banc

Doctrine: citizenship

Date: July 30, 1991

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

 The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

 The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

 On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

 Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

 Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.

 The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:

 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

 The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

 A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

 WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

 The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

 As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration.

 The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the
province of Samar.

 As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the
years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

 The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.

 Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

 The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up
in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in
an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

 On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring
the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.

 Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private
respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.
  After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

 Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent
looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.

 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

 The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

 SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

 SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph
3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

 The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question
was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born
  Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they
elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

 To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship

when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

 He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement
in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since
1957.

 In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years
old

 In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship

 The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.

 Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

 SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of
his citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the
principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

Thursday, September 23, 2010

Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he
is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli.
However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection
therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was
elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that
Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to
an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces
of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

Facts:

Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the following items:

Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections]... and

Tambunting's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2004 elections

No. 6 - I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen

No. 9 - No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.

36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;

No. 12 - I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting
lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.

Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances,
Tambunting claimed that he is an American

Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of... a Filipino
mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American
citizen.

Tambunting's possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen.
Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance... pursuant to

R.A. No.

9225

To refute Cordora's claim that the number of years of residency... is false because Tambunting lost his
residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the
residency requirement is not the... same as citizenship.

COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora's complaint

COMELEC En Banc affirmed... was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against
Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.

Issues:

Cordora's petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambunting's failure to meet
citizenship and residency requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare Tambunting
a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present petition seeks to prosecute

Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit.

Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.

Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by
cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and...
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born
Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public... office to file his certificate of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is
brought about by the individual's active participation in the naturalization process.

under R.A. No. 9225, a

Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship
by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of
allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen's... foreign citizenship.

Section

5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run
for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the... time of filing the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath"

The twin requirements of... swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship... involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and
thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently... become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

Tambunting's residency

Cordora's reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for
the purpose of election laws, includes the twin... elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the
intention to return there permanently,... and is not dependent upon citizenship.

we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false entries in his
certificates of candidacy.

Tambunting is eligible for the... office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and
residency requirements prescribed by law.

Principles:

January 17, 2017

GR No. 129118. July 19, 2000

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic
Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996".

SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of
this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality
shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to different stations by
the COMELEC.

Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of
the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4)
years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials,
and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:

No.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing
them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none".

This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all
the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be
addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the
noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of
corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189,
election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or
municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters can hardly be carried out.

The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Azucena Saavedra Batu(i)gas (DIGEST)

GR No. 183110

7 October 2013

TOPIC:
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife, Naturalization, Citizenship

FACTS:

This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that
granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).

On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
She stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,
and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the
filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the
Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s
claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country.
Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.

Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never
departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her
primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in
education, she then practiced her teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao.

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen.
They have five children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all
professionals.

After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena
submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005.
During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law to
become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines.

RULING:

Yes.

Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien
women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:

“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization.

Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason
of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set
aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen,
as only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As the records before this
Court show, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding,
Santiago submitted his birth certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also
submitted voter’s registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records.

Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an
alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members, thus:

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other.

Azucena has clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to
compliance with the period and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the
Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA
BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien
Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.

Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor-Santiago et al.,

Express renunciation or expatriation

Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor-Santiago et al.,

G.R. No. L-83882

January 24,1989
Facts:

Petitioner Willie Yu is a Portuguese National who acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization on

February 10,1978. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese
Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that
his Portuguese passport expired on July 20, 1986. Being a naturalized Filipino, he signed commercial
documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the authentication of an appropriate Philippine
consul. He was then detained by the CID for obtaining a foreign passport while having a Filipino
citizenship. Yu then filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en Banc. The Court en Banc denied the petition. He then filed a motion
for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order but it was denied. After denial, he filed a motion for
clarification with prayer for restraining order. On December 7,1988, the temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) was issued. The respondent filed a motion to lift the said TRO, contending that Yu was in full
knowledge and Legal capacity when he applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization he
consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce “absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty” and pledged
to maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, petitioner then knows
the limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said oath and its succeeding consequences should they
be violated.
Issue:

Was the petitioner’s act constituted a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship?

Ruling:

Yes, considering the facts stated, the court ruled that the Petitioner’s acts constitute an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship through naturalization. Express naturalization means
renunciation made known distinctly and explicitly, and not that which is implied. After acquiring
Philippine citizenship, with full knowledge, he resumed his prior status as a Portuguese citizen by
applying for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and representing himself as a Portuguese in official
and commercial documents. The court found that such acts are grossly inconsistent with the
maintenance of his Philippine citizenship.

REPUBLIC VS DELA ROSA

Posted by kaye lee on 12:16 AM

G.R. No. 104654, 6 June 1994 [Citizenship; Naturalization; Naturalization Proceedings; C.A. No. 473]

FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63
before the RTC Manila.

October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation,
for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the
said hearing.

January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24,
1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion
and the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.

February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.

February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February
27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered
to vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once
this decision becomes final and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of
the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
Categories: Citizenship, Constitutional Law 1

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Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections

174 SCRA 245 – Law on Public Officers – Citizenship of a Public Officer

In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of
Municipalities of Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and
proclamation because apparently, Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense,
Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized because the then President Marcos was after him; but
that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost his American citizenship pursuant to
American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a quo warranto
which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.

HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a
Filipino. He lost his citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his
US citizenship, that did not restore his being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or
repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the 1988 elections restore his Philippine
citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he owes allegiance to a
foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country.
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.

176 SCRA 1 – Law on Public Officers – Election Laws – Citizenship of a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship –
Labo Doctrine

In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for
quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that
he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino;
that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was
lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality
which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.

2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace
Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.

HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of
Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980;
and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino
citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or
repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.

Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by
electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The
electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at
least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest
number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election.

Case Digest: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC et. al.

September 11, 2017sheyiligan

Case Title: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC et. al.
Petitioner: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares

Respondents: COMELEC et. al.

Ponente: Perez, J:

FACTS:

The petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares also known as Grace Poe- Llamanzares wishes
to run as the President of the Republic of the Philippines. However, petitions were made by Estrella
Elamparo to deny due course or cancel the COC of Poe-Llamanzares for the reason that the latter is not
a natural-born citizen on the account of the fact that she is a foundling. In addition, Elamparo stated that
Poe-Llamanzares even assuming that the latter is a natural-born citizen she has deemed to lost the same
when the she became a naturalized American citizen, according to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship
must be continuous from birth.

ISSUE: For the purpose of Civil Law-

Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe- Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

HELD:

The presumption of a natural-born citizenship of the foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines. Adopting the legal principles of international laws from 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on stateliness is rational and reasonable and consistent in
the Philippine Constitution’s regime of Jus saguinis. Moreover, the SC clearly stated that the COMELEC
cannot reverse the judicial precedent as it was reserved to the court. In line with this, the Supreme
Court ruled that Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President on May 2016. The court likewise stated
that Poe-Llamanzares, being a foundling is a natural-born citizen based on 1. Circumstantial evidence, 2.
Legislation and 3. Generally Accepted principle of other laws.

Political Law – Election Laws – Right of Suffrage – Extension of Voters Registration

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of
the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on
December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day
registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that
there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC
invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days
before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act
8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-
election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension
of the voters registration.

HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8,
RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the
regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration
which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may
then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that
even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day
and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision
is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.

Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its
pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters
because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered
into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized
voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute
it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy
processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still,
the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s
pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience
arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-
Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register
on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those
who slumber on their rights.
Political Law – Election Laws – Absentee Voters Act – Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among
others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to
the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election;

2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is
Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in
election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his
domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the
intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return
to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a
voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.

2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential
race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power.
The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged
in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.