G.R. No.

L-28089 October 25, 1967

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections, 1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in
another province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill"? Comelec's answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in
dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said
municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as
the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in
Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,
Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the
Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of
which are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the
Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise
the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung
situated in the municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the
municipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should
be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of
the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act
4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and
those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill.
This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that
the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local application,
originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in
the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators. 6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the
following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the
purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by
the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 — projects the impression that solely the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is
that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform
the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution
of territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary"
of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away
"need not be expressed in the title of the law." This posture — we must say — but emphasizes the error of
constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one
province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the
title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not
in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment
that the provisions of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus
created, were not set forth in the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely,
an Act creating said provinces must be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" —
which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us
stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under
one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A
change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality and vice
versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648,
649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County
of Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the
following described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is
hereby constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as
void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and
control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State
Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The
Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold
the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and
that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the
words last quoted may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose
of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its
provisions."Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed
in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which
took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The
reasoning advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao
del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is
rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion
upheld. Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently,
then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, must fall with them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
 The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the
valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature
would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . .
Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.
. . . The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose
whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court
has no power to legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the
towns of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying
out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local
affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a
subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was
apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.
Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House
Bill 1247, now Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is
sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios — not
nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill
itself, thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the
municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the
observations as to progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an
independent municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to
assume that the inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a
municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they
stand on their own feet with the income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order,
sanitation, and other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing
questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule
on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton
was created upon the basic considerations of progressive community, large aggregate population and sufficient
income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create Dianaton with only nine — of the original twenty-
one — barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For, this unduly stretches judicial
interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line which
circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional separation of
powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the
originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the
function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality. 14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal
interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is
that petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the
subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial
rights or interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is
residing has been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain
that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is
recognized in this jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it
was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his
actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned
into the new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to
enjoy the rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may
express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the
town before dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for
the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the
constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to
challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission
from implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to give my
assent. Hence these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province
of Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in
the body of such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of another province were included does not of
itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be
free from the insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not in
the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.1This provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many
American States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against
surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.2Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the
members of the legislature as well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative
measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a
provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction must be
reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for
the accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the
title of the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which
relates to its subject find expression in its title.3
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938,
construing a provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section
11 of Act No. 4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the
Bureau of Banking may be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection
by the Bank Commissioner was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act.
Justice Laurel, however, vigorously dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was
reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with reorganization but with taxation. While the case of
Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare majority of four justices against three, the
present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the liberal test as indicated in the
majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by the majority headed by
Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,5 up
to and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion coming from Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No.
3836 was predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retirement Act for senators and
representatives was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As
we noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to
elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement
benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth
Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and
appointive officers, such as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to
the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which
provides for both retirement and insurance benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note
that there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there
has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision with reference to the subject
and title of the Act, liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment
that the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which should be expressed in his title
was not met. The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists
illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I
find the citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do
not deem controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be
doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao
del Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself would not have given rise to a
constitutional question considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial
and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that
such barrios in two municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created
municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such
barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the
statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was
created was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely
that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying precedents, which if
not precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8 certain provisions of the
Administrative Code were interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets
of the fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code
of Commerce must be applied in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above
principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re
Guariña:10 "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a
construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of
another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard
contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion that the
Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the argument may be in
favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on the
contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his
apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed
statutes "with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to [their] validity." 11 From the
pen of the articulate jurist, Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be
given the meaning that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional
adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious
constitutional questions avoided by another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above
pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our
duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303.
. . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine
then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,13 is that courts "have consistently sought an interpretation
which supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary favors
"that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality." 14
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in
the language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it is
reasonably open to construction free from such peril."15 Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such
risk and is free from the peril of nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly brought to light in
the opinion of the Court.

G.R. No. L-22766 August 30, 1968

SURIGAO ELECTRIC, CO., INC. and ARTURO LUMANLAN, SR., petitioners, vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO and HON. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
On June 18, 1960, Congress further amended the Public Service Act, one of the changes introduced doing away
with the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for
"public services owned or operated by government entities or government-owned or controlled corporations," but
at the same time affirming its power of regulation, 1 more specifically as set forth in the next section of the law,
which while exempting public services owned or operated by any instrumentality of the government or any
government-owned or controlled corporations from its supervision, jurisdiction and control stops short of including
"the fixing of rates."2
In this petition for review, a case of first impression, petitioner Surigao Electric Co., Inc., a legislative franchise
holder, and petitioner Arturo Lumanlan to whom, on February 16, 1962, the rights and privileges of the former as
well as its plant and facilities were transferred, challenge the validity of the order of respondent Public Service
Commission, dated July 11, 1963, wherein it held that it had "no other alternative but to approve as [it did
approve] the tentative schedule of rates submitted by the applicant," the other respondent herein, the
Municipality of Surigao.3
In the above order, the issue, according to respondent Commission, "boils down to whether or not a municipal
government can directly maintain and operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the
purpose and without a certificate of public convenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service
Commission."4 Citing the above amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 2677, respondent Commission
answered the question thus: "A municipal government or a municipal corporation such as the Municipality of
Surigao is a government entity recognized, supported and utilized by the National Government as a part of its
government machinery and functions; a municipal government actually functions as an extension of the national
government and, therefore, it is an instrumentality of the latter; and by express provisions of Section 14(e) of Act
2677, an instrumentality of the national government is exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC except with
respect to the fixing of rates. This exemption is even clearer in Section 13(a)." 5
The above formulation of respondent Commission could be worded differently. There is need for greater precision
as well as further elaboration. Its conclusion, however, can stand the test of scrutiny. We sustain the Public
Service Commission.
The question involved is one of statutory interpretation. We have to ascertain the intent of Congress in introducing
the above amendments, more specifically, in eliminating the requirement of the certificate of public convenience
and necessity being obtained by government entities, or by government-owned or controlled corporations
operating public services. Here, the Municipality of Surigao is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
It cannot be said, however, that it is not a government entity.
As early as 1916, in Mendoza v. de Leon,6 there has been a recognition by this Court of the dual character of a
municipal corporation, one as governmental, being a branch of the general administration of the state, and the
other as quasi-private and corporate. A well-known authority, Dillon, was referred to by us to stress the
undeniable fact that "legislative and governmental powers" are "conferred upon a municipality, the better to
enable it to aid a state in properly governing that portion of its people residing within its municipality, such
powers [being] in their nature public, ..."7 As was emphasized by us in the Mendoza decision: "Governmental affairs
do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nor does the fact that
such duties are performed by officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state allows the municipality
to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and so
on is to administer government, whether it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a local
organization."8
It would, therefore, be to erode the term "government entities" of its meaning if we are to reverse the Public
Service Commission and to hold that a municipality is to be considered outside its scope. It may be admitted that
there would be no ambiguity at all had the term "municipal corporations" been employed. Our function, however,
is to put meaning to legislative words, not to denude them of their contents. They may be at times, as Cohen
pointed out, frail vessels in which to embark legislative hopes, but we do not, just because of that, allow them to
disappear perpetually from sight to find eternal slumber in the deep. It would be far from manifesting fidelity to
the judicial task of construing statutes if we were to consider the order under review as a failure to abide by what
the law commands.
The above construction gives significance to every word of the statute. It makes the entire scheme harmonious.
Moreover, the conclusion to which we are thus led is reinforced by a manifestation of public policy as expressed in
a legislative act of well-nigh contemporaneous vintage. We refer to the Local Autonomy Act, 9 approved a year
earlier. It would be to impute to Congress a desire not to extend further but to cut short what the year before it
considered a laudatory scheme to enlarge the scope of municipal power, if the amendatory act now under scrutiny
were to be so restrictively construed. Municipal corporations should not be excluded from the operation thereof.
There would be no warrant for such a view. Logic and common sense would be affronted by such a conclusion, let
alone the sense of esteem which under the theory of separation of powers is owed a coordinate branch. Again, this
is one instance where assuming the ambiguity of the words employed in a statute, its overriding principle, to
paraphrase Holmes, fixes the reach of statutory language.
With the view we thus take of the amendatory statute, the errors assigned by petitioner, which would seek to
fasten, mistakenly to our mind, an unwarranted restriction to the amendatory language of Republic Act No. 2677,
need not be passed upon.
An alleged error imputed to respondent Commission, however, needs further discussion. Petitioners seek refuge in
the legislative franchise granted them. 10 Whatever privilege may be claimed by petitioners cannot override the
specific constitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual or corporation except
under a condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress. 11 Such amendment or
alteration need not be express; it may be implied from a latter act of general applicability, such as the one now
under consideration.
Moreover, under a well-settled principle of American origin, one which upon the establishment of the Philippine
Government under American tutelage was adopted here and continued under our Constitution, no such franchise
or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of the police power. An early expression of this view is
found in the leading American case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,12 an 1837 decision, the opinion being
penned by Chief Justice Taney: "The continued existence of a government would be of no great value, if by
implications and presumptions it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation; and
the functions it was designed to perform, transferred to the hands of privileged Corporations. .. While the rights of
private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also have rights, and that the
happiness and well-being of every citizen depend on their faithful preservation." 13
Reference by petitioners to the statute providing the procedure for the taking over and operation by the
government of public utilities, 14 in their view "to further strengthen [their] contention", as to the commission of
this alleged error is unavailing, even if such statute were applicable, which it is not. In the language of their own
brief: "This Act provides for the procedure to be followed whenever the Government or any political subdivision
thereof decides to acquire and operate a public utility owned and operated by any individual or private
corporation." 15 What is to be regulated, therefore, by this enactment is the exercise of eminent domain, which is a
taking of private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. There is here no taking. There is
here no appropriation. What was owned before by petitioners continue to remain theirs. There is to be no transfer
of ownership.
Rather, a municipal corporation, by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 2677, may further promote community
welfare by itself engaging in supplying public services, without the need of a certificate of public convenience. If
at all then, the exercise of this governmental prerogative comes within the broad, well-nigh, undefined scope of
the police power. It is not here, of course, the ordinary case of restraint on property or liberty, by the imposition
of a regulation. What the amendatory act in effect accomplishes is to lend encouragement and support for the
municipal corporation itself undertaking an activity as a result of which, profits of a competing private firm would
be adversely affected.
Clearly, then, the relevancy of the statute providing for the taking or operation of the government of public
utilities, appears, to put it at its mildest, far from clear. Petitioners' contention as to this alleged error being
committed, therefore, far from being strengthened by such a reference, suffers from a fate less auspicious.
No other alleged error committed need be considered.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Public Service Commission of July 11, 1963, as well as the order of February
7, 1964, denying the motion for reconsideration, are affirmed. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. L-52179 April 8, 1991

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-
BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIÑA, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction seeking
the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent Judge Romeo N.
Firme, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Second Judicial District,
Branch IV, Bauang, La Union in Civil Case No. 107-BG, entitled "Juana Rimando Baniña, et al. vs. Macario Nieveras,
et al." dated November 4, 1975; July 13, 1976; August 23,1976; February 23, 1977; March 16, 1977; July 26, 1979;
September 7, 1979; November 7, 1979 and December 3, 1979 and the decision dated October 10, 1979 ordering
defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs for
funeral expenses, actual damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney's fees and
costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Romeo N. Firme is impleaded in his
official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union.
While private respondents Juana Rimando-Baniña, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Montano Baniña,
Orja Baniña and Lydia R. Baniña are heirs of the deceased Laureano Baniña Sr. and plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 107-
Bg before the aforesaid court.
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven
by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose
Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died
as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario
Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was docketed
Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the
aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner.
Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge and was
subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private
respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were
impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack
of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following questioned orders, to wit:
(1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim against Bernardo Balagot;
(2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended Answer of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
Bislig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lack of jurisdiction;
(3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring there resolution of the grounds for the Motion to Dismiss until the
trial;
(4) Order dated February 23, 1977 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by
the Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time;
(5) Order dated March 16, 1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13,
1976;
(6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for decision it appearing that parties have
not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite the court's direction; and
(7) Order dated September 7, 1979 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or order to recall
prosecution witnesses for cross examination.
On October 10, 1979 the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL OF (sic) THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and defendants
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally, plaintiffs
Juana Rimando-Baniña, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Baniña Jr., Sor Marietta Baniña, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano,
Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia B. Baniña the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as
the lost expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,500.00 as
attorney's fees. Costs against said defendants.
The Complaint is dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to another motion which was
then pending. However, respondent judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the order of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time.
Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing that if defendants municipality
and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a
higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner maintains that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that while
appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that the petition is
devoid of merit, utterly lacking the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
(Rollo, p. 42.) In addition, the private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court,
including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice. (Rollo, p. 43.)
The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State
amounting to lack of jurisdiction until trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily
failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for
the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to
wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued exceptwhen it gives consent to be
sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued
in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be
passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the
Philippine Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182
SCRA 644, 654.)
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the
other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. (Ibid)
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1987 Edition, p. 39)
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to
be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable." (United States of America vs. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660)
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of
liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla (G. R. No. L-
29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo vs. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1916,
thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right
springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are
 political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them,
are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right,
arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the
performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and
not for the state or sovereign power." (112 N.E., 994-995) (Ibid, pp. 605-606.)
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show
that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. (Cruz, supra, p. 44.)
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." (Rollo, p. 29.)
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump
truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the
driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities."
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality
cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed
on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent judge's dereliction in failing to resolve the
issue of non-suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it
ruled on the issue of liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the
petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1Soon after the date last mentioned, or on
November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted
the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General,
to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent
maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties —
referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the
mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter
have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in the case.
Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as
amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of
this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of
an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of
the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the
municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of
the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five
hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board
"upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating
new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This theory overlooks,
however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential
authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned.
Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress
to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought
to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based,
provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or
boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required,
merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require:
Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be
obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided
into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in
accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative
officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation
and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory
of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may
be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to
an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36
Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a
new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another
municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel.
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and
definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts
of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does,
the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a
legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the
exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal
corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1aCongress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate2— and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 2aIndeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.2bHence, he
could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be
carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil
effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require"
qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government
may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section
1 of Act No. 1748,3which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare
requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the
change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of
said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code —
governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised;
whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the
government was to be transferred.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that
the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that
in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public
welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to
execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed
in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and
have no binding effect.4The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to
promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the
authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of
speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of
their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is
not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of
whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative
question "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a
political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized
it, "the question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically
a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state laws
granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be annexed to a
particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the
plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although
the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-
308); or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its
metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to
be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a
town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the
inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor
thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to
be included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and
to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the
laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the
law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and
fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case of Schechter
Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter case involved the
constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States
to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or
corporations which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly
representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress
small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said
Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no
standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to
particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no
standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in
Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the
government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the code
making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered."
and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public welfare," which has
even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in
Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the
President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of
authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about
a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege
of this Court to uphold.
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the
creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the
issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield
no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long
as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the
municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor.
Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no
matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or
take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials,
by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his
office would thereby become vacant.6Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he
had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more
than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its
officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or
bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which
he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of
giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as
part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment.7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the proper
parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been impleaded in this case," and
(b) that "the present petition is premature."
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the
officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor
General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and
represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the
creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local
officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar
has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive order &
in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is, however, a matter of common,
public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders
creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating,
without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or
passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that
respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence
of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive
Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 105746. December 2, 1996.

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR., respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of
Oroquieta City, 1 affirming the legal existence of the Municipality of Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering
the relocation of its boundary for the purpose of determining whether certain areas claimed by it belong to it.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant
to § 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The full text of the Order reads:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 258

CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN, IN THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, there is hereby created, in the Province of Misamis Occidental, a municipality to be
known as the municipality of Sinacaban, which shall consist of the southern portion of the municipality of Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, more particularly described and bounded as follows:

On the north by a line starting from point 1, the center of the lighthouse on the Tabo-o point S. 84º 30'W, 7,250
meters to point 2 which is on the bank of Palilan River branch; thence following Palilan River branch 2,400 meters
southwesterly to point 3, thence a straight line S 87º 00' W, 22,550 meters to point 4, where this intersects the
Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; on the west, by the present Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary;
and on the south by the present Jimenez-Tudela boundary; and on the east, by the limits of the municipal waters
which the municipality of Sinacaban shall have pursuant to section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code,
(Description based on data shown in Enlarged Map of Poblacion of Jimenez, Scale 1:8:000).

The municipality of Sinacaban contains the barrios of Sinacaban, which shall be the seat of the municipal
government, Sinonoc, Libertad, the southern portion of the barrio of Macabayao, and the sitios of Tipan,
Katipunan, Estrella, Flores, Senior, Adorable, San Isidro, Cagayanon, Kamanse, Kulupan and Libertad Alto.

The municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus the portion thereof included in the municipality
of Sinacaban.

The municipality of Sinacaban shall begin to exist upon the appointment and qualification of the mayor, vice-
mayor, and a majority of the councilors thereof. The new municipality shall, however, assume payment of a
proportionate share of the loan of the municipality of Jimenez with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as may
be outstanding on the date of its organization, the proportion of such payment to be determined by the
Department of Finance.

Done in the City of Manila, this 30th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, and
of the Independence of the Philippines, the fourth.

(SGD.) ELPIDIO QUIRINO

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(SGD.) TEODORO EVANGELISTA

Executive Secretary

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, 2 dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of
Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, 3 based on the technical
description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of
Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of
Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77,
dated February 18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as follows: 4

From a point at Cagayanon Beach follow Macabayao Road until it intersects Tabangag Creek at the back of the
Macabayao Elementary School. Follow the Tabangag Creek until it intersect the Macabayao River at upper
Adorable. Follow the Macabayao River such that the barrio of Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will be a part of
Jimenez down and the sitios of San Vicente, Donan, Estrella, Mapula will be a part of Sinacaban. (Emphasis added)

In its decision dated October 11, 1989, 5 the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban.
It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void because the
Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in
Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Codeof 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), § 134. 6 The
Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking
reconsideration. 7

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court
of Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed against Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its
Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and
the Executive Secretary. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 8 the
power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an
executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it
remains part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision over the disputed
barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoined from assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that E.O.
No. 258 be declared null and void; that the decision dated October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the
Provincial Board be set aside for having been rendered without jurisdiction; that the Commission on Audit be
enjoined from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds by Sinacaban; that the Department of Budget and
Management be enjoined from allotting public funds to Sinacaban; and that the Executive Secretary be enjoined
from exercising control and supervision over said municipality.

During pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit the issues to the following:

A. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal juridical entity, duly created in accordance with law;

B. If not, whether it is a de facto juridical entity;

C. Whether the validity of the existence of the Municipality can be properly questioned in this action on certiorari;
D. Whether the Municipality of Jimenez which had recognized the existence of the municipality for more than 40
years is estopped to question its existence;

E. Whether the existence of the municipality has been recognized by the laws of the land; and

F. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board had acquired finality.

On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the finding of this Court that the petition must be denied and judgment is
hereby rendered declaring a STATUS QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban shall continue to exist and
operate as a regular municipality; declaring the decision dated October 11, 1989 rendered by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan fixing the boundaries between Sinacaban and Jimenez, Misamis Occi. as null and void, the same not
being in accordance with the boundaries provided for in Executive Order No. 258 creating the municipality of
Sinacaban; dismissing the petition for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs and damages. With respect
to the counterclaim, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

The Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct the relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban within 60
days from the time the decision shall have become final and executory and another 60 days within which to submit
their report from the completion of the said relocation survey.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even
prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for forty years before its existence was questioned; that
Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of Sinacaban, the same being reserved to the
State as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General in a quo warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was
estopped from questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into an agreement with it concerning their
common boundary; and that any question as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had been rendered moot by §
442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied by the RTC.
Hence this petition raising the following issues: (1) whether Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim, and (2)
if it has, whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental which should be used as the basis for adjudicating Sinacaban's territorial claim.

First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exists, then it has
standing to bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling
in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases 9 later decided. However, we have since held that where a
municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal
validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 10 this
Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been
challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity
of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a
fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district
in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever
doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), § 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24,
1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for
its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, § 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit
against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act
complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have
recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court,
as reiterated by § 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part,
Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed, Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of
Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., § 442(d)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.
This provision states:

Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160, § 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities. 11

This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously explained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at
the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement.
This requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the
requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, § 3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on
January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the
Municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.

Third. Finally, Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban
because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in
1950 the parties entered into an agreement whereby the barangays in question were considered part of the
territory of Jimenez.

E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now called barangays) therein mentioned.
What it says is that "Sinacaban contains" those barrios, without saying they are the only ones comprising it. The
reason for this is that the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of its territory, is controlling.
The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of determining the boundaries of the
municipality and consequently the question to which the municipality the barangays in question belong.

Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities agreed that certain barrios belonged to Jimenez, while
certain other ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement was subsequently approved by the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental. Whether this agreement conforms to E.O. No. 258 will be determined by the result of the
survey. Jimenez contends, however, that regardless of its conformity to E.O. No. 258, the agreement as embodied
in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban. This raises the question whether the
Provincial Board had authority to approve the agreement or, to put it in another way, whether it had the power to
declare certain barrios part of one or the other municipality. We hold it did not if the effect would be to amend
the area as described in E.O. No. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban.

At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77 on February 18, 1950, the applicable law was § 2167 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:

SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. — How settled. — Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal governments
over places or barrios shall be decided by the provincial boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are
situated, after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the
provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior [now the
Office of the Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios in dispute are
claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces, the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall
come to an agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an appeal shall be had to the
Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary], whose decision shall be final.

As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, 12 the power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an
administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating
said municipalities." It is a power "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is obvious
that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying
into effect of that law but its amendment. 13 If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as
basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.

Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decision of October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the
Provincial Board. Its action is in accordance with the Local Government Codeof 1983, § 79 of which provides that in
case no settlement of boundary disputes is made the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province. In
1989, when the action was brought by Jimenez, this Code was the governing law. The governing law is now the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), § 118-119.

Jimenez's contention that the RTC failed to decide the case "within one year from the start of proceedings" as
required by § 79 of the Local Government Codeof 1983 and the 90-day period provided for in Article VIII, § 15 of
the Constitution does not affect the validity of the decision rendered. For even granting that the court failed to
decide within the period prescribed by law, its failure did not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but
only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction. 14

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr., G.R. No. 105746, [December 2, 1996], 333 PHIL 1-19)

[G.R. No. 103702. December 6, 1994.]

MUNICIPALITYOFSANNARCISO, QUEZON, petitioners,vs. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR., respondents.

DECISION
 On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district ofSan Andres,
Quezon, by segregating from the municipalityofSanNarcisoof the same province, the barrios ofSan Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios. Cdpr
Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through the
Provincial Board ofQuezon, of the municipal council ofSanNarciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 of 24 May
1959. 1
By virtue ofExecutive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the
municipal district ofSan Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class
municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation ofSection 2 ofRepublic Act No. 1515. 2 The executive order
added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed in House Bill No. 4864
was approved by the House of Representatives."
On 05 June 1989, the MunicipalityofSanNarciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the MunicipalityofSan Andres. Docketed Special
Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity ofExecutive Order No. 353 and prayed that
the respondent local officials of the MunicipalityofSan Andres be permanently ordered to refrain from performing
the duties and functions of their respective offices. 3 Invoking the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 4 the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in violation of the constitutional principle of separation
of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District ofSan
Andres had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that rightfully belonged to the
corresponding officials of the MunicipalityofSanNarciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and
special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the MunicipalityofSan Andres
was given life with the issuance ofExecutive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be deemed
estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality; 5 that because the MunicipalityofSan Andred had
been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and that, considering the
petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that
prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the Solicitor General. 6
On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the trial court resolved
to defer action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on the pleadings. LexLib
On 27 November 1991, the MunicipalityofSan Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the case
had become moot and academic with the enactment ofRepublic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality cited Section 442(d)
of the law, reading thusly:
Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .
"(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate
as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law was inapplicable
to the MunicipalityofSan Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those
whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. 7
In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court 8 finally dismissed the petition 9 for lack of cause of
action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were) present in
the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and executive orders,
(were) cured by the enactment of R. A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991." In an order,
dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners 1 0 argue that in issuing the orders of 02
December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or in excess of jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality created by a null and void
presidential order may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by anyone whose interests or rights are
affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is inoperative such as though its has
never been passed. 11
Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under Rules 42 and 45 of the
Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been issued
with "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other plain ,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct said Orders, to
protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal issues involved." 12 Evidently,
then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance under Rule 65. We shall disregard the
procedural incongruence.
The special civil action ofquo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any
person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise." 13 When the inquiry is
focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo
warranto or any other credit proceeding. 14It must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the Philippines"
15 and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . .
." 16Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an action "at the request and upon the relation
of another person" with the permission of the court. 17The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence
an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another." 18 While the quo warranto
proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the MunicipalityofSan
Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal
District ofSan Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the MunicipalityofSan
Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition. Cdpr
While petitioners would grant that the enactment ofRepublic Act No. 7160 may have converted the
MunicipalityofSan Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition for quo
warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to
seek the nullification ofExecutive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 ofRepublic Act 7160 to
the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause ofthe Constitution.
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district ofSanAndres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after
almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipalityofSanNarciso finally decided to challenge the
legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, ofSan Andres,
began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same
manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within
one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, 19 so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness,
must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. 20
Public interest demands it.
Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice
other than to consider the MunicipalityofSan Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot
allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue ofExecutive Order No. 353, the MunicipalityofSan Andres had
been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality
ofExecutive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed
to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the MunicipalityofSan Andres. Thus, after more than five
years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the MunicipalityofSan Andres as a fifth class
municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 ofBatas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal
circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that
 comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this
Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the MunicipalityofSan Andres had
been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court ofSan Francisco-San Andres for the province ofQuezon. Cdpr

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to
the 1987 Constitution, the MunicipalityofSan Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the province ofQuezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) ofthe
Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of
the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of
unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) ofthe Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether
such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective, 21 and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. 22
All considered, the de jure status of the MunicipalityofSan Andres in the province ofQuezon must now be
conceded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., G.R. No. 103702, [December 6, 1994])

No. 116702. December 28, 1995.]

THE MUNICIPALITYOF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through its Sangguniang Bayan and Mayor, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITYOF ALICIA, BOHOL, respondents.

DECISION

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on June
28, 1994, reversing the judgment 2of the Regional Trial Court (Branch I) of the City of Tagbilaran, Bohol.
The lower court's decision, among other things declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipalityof Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its
territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality," and further permanently enjoined defendant
municipalityof Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and
never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio" (RTC decision, p. 4; Rollo, p.
86).
On appeal, the respondent Court stated that "(S)crutinyof the conflicting claims and the respective
evidence of the parties lead to the conclusion that the trial court committed an error in declaring that Barrio
Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee (municipalityof Candijay)." Said Court rejected
the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place
"practically all of Barrio Pagahat . . ., part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La
Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee
Candijay." Added the respondent Court, "As aptly pointed out by defendant-appellant in its appeal brief, 'the
plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam,
Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipalityof Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of
territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of
controversies over boundaries, including with Mabini.'" (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court
concluded that "the trial court erred in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for petitioner], because, in
effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay
when said barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265 creating
the latter" (Decision, p. 6, Rollo, p. 37).
The respondent Court also found, after an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and
respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the
boundary line between [petitioner] and the Municipalityof Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared
by the Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong,
mentioned in the afore-quoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are actually located."
(Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court, after weighing and considering the import of certain official
acts, including Executive Order No. 265 dated September 16, 1949 (which created the municipalityof Alicia from
out of certain barrios of the municipalityof Mabini), and Act No. 968of the Philippine Commission dated October
31, 1903 (which set forth the respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay),
concluded that "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios
constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipalityof Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms
part of plaintiff-appellant Municipalityof Candijay."
On that basis, the respondent Court held that:
"Clearly, from the foregoing, there is equiponderance of evidence. The Supreme Court has ruled:
'Equiponderance of evidence rule states:
'When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to
one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
'Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no
preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause ofaction .
(Sapu-an, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 701, 705-706 .)
"WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside. Another judgment is hereby entered
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402. No costs." (Decision. p. 6, Rollo, p. 37.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been rejected by the respondent Court, petitioner came to
this Court, alleging (i) improper application by the respondent Court of Appeals of the so-called principle of
"equiponderance of evidence," for having based its ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence which,
petitioner claims, are void, (ii) the respondent municipality's purported lack of juridical personality, as a result
of having been created under a void executive order, and (iii) that the challenged Decision "does not solve the
problem of both towns but throws them back again to their controversy." (Petition, p. 6, Rollo, p. 21.)
After deliberating on the petition, comment and reply, this Court is not persuaded to grant due course to
the petition.
With respect to the first and third grounds, we find that the issues of fact in this case had been
adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision, which is well-supported by the evidence on record.
The determination of equiponderance ofevidence by the respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence
by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here,
there has been no such showing.
In connection with the foregoing, that the assailed Decision, in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
2402, may leave the parties where they are or may not resolve their problem one way or the other, is of no
moment. The fact remains that, as correctly evaluated by the respondent Court, neither party was able to make
out a case; neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no
better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them
as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.
On the second issue, we noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality
of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first came
into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a quo. It appears that, after presentation of its
evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on
the ground that it had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by
President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue
delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared unconstitutional,
per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General. 3
In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in MunicipalityofSanNarciso, Quezon vs. Mendez,
Sr., 4 which will be found very instructive in the case at bench. Therein we stated:
"While petitioners would grant that the enactment ofRepublic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code of 1991]
may have converted the MunicipalityofSan Andres into a de factomunicipality, they, however, contend that
since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had
acquired a vested right to seek the nullification ofExecutive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section
442 ofRepublic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection
clause ofthe Constitution.
"Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. Executive
Order No. 353 creating the municipal district ofSan Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after
almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipalityofSanNarciso finally decided to challenge the
legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the MunicipalityofSan Andres,
began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same
manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within
a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness,
must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public
interest demands it.

"Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice
other than to consider the MunicipalityofSan Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own
closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom
cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue ofExecutive Order No. 353, the MunicipalityofSan
Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General
was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality
ofExecutive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed
to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the MunicipalityofSan Andres. Thus, after more than
five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the MunicipalityofSan Andres as a fifth
class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31
ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as
municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities
that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued
by this court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the MunicipalityofSan
Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court ofSan Francisco-San Andres for the province of
Quezon.
"At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to
the 1987 Constitution, the MunicipalityofSan Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442(d) ofthe
Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time
of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of
unconstitutionality per seof Section 442(d) ofthe Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether
such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in
 essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been complied with," are
validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
"All considered, the de jure status of the MunicipalityofSan Andres in the province of Quezon must now be
conceded."
Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the municipalityofSan
Andres. Respondent municipalityof Alicia was created by virtue ofExecutive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years
ahead of the municipalityofSan Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez
vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the
State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No.
33 above-mentioned, the Municipalityof Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for
the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipalityof
Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.
Inasmuch as respondent municipalityof Alicia is similarly situated as the municipalityofSan Andres, it
should likewise benefit from the effects ofSection 442(d) ofthe Local Government Code, and should henceforth
be considered as a regular, de juremunicipality.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005.]

SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, respondents.

DECISION

This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon 1 — the municipality of
Andong, Lanao del Sur — which like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is
anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly
or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative
municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in
spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given judicial
affirmation. We disagree.

The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 in 1965. As
discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders 3 creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive
Order No. 107. 4

These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case
had failed to pass Congress. 5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his
powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special
civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68
having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370, 6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative
power. 7

After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A
majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section
68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch, 8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the
consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over
local governments. 9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently
restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any
disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered. 10

Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment
of the Municipality of Andong. EDIaSH

Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong, 11 suing as a private
citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the
Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur." 12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-
blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and
its constituents," 13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified
to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong. 14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has
its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen
(17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen. 15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public
officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic)
honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of
Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim
Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means." 16

In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by the
Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive
Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964." 17 He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics
Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine
(14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly
recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong. 18

The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government Supervision
of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). 19 The Certification enumerates eighteen (18)
municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the
thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These municipalities
are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del
Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur;
Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela
Valley. 20

Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing
municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular
municipality." 21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong,
especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason
of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003;
direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full
recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to
immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG,
to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong. 22

Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already
been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is our
Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, 23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the
municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation." 24 Similar to Andong, the municipality
of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared
as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The provision reads:
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . .

(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. 25

There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of
the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any
municipality. This point shall be further explained further on.

Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is
not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation
of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camid's astonishing factual allegations
pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No
trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is
beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.

The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles
governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may
exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough
to afford title by prescription. 26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long period
without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they
were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost. 27 They are especially common in
England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the
development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long before the Roman
conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the
absence of a national legal authority.

In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when no
charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers
of a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a
period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right. 28

What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its
corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not
have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed,
the factual deficiencies aside, Camid's plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once
that was done, should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to
make the necessary factual determinations. Camid's seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition,
cannot be countenanced.

It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camid's present action. The assailed issuance is the
Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or
revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camid's
ultimate cause — the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that
Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps
the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing
habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of
the Certification to Camid's central argument is forlornly strained. TAESDH

These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was
previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.
Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did
to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the
residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who may
comport themselves as the municipality's "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening.

The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing
out that the Municipality of Andong never existed. 29Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was
declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive
orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning," 30 "at first," 31 "from the inception." 32 Pelaez was
never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v.
Siva, 33 Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 34 and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. 35 No subsequent ruling by
this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965
creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not
exist as a duly constituted municipality.

This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its
sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and
our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations.

To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to
the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez.

The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to
create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has, for many
years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and in
actual operation . . . ." 36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities,
including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner
Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other
municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed
unlawful. aDHCEA

Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. 37 The
Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the
municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the
executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The
trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring
Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already been
squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to Lawigan's
validity. 38

In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of
the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order, 40 and which, similar to
Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de
facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that its
status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action
for quo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response,
the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation. 41

Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been
organized prior to the Court's decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan
and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions. 42 It cited conflicting
American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is
unconstitutional. 43 But the Court's final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de facto
corporation.
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute
creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was
some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that
Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation. 44

The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate
powers were not necessarily a nullity. 45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point, 46 yet the
relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of
Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to
the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential
promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. CTcSIA

This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. 47 The municipality of
Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who
challenged Santo Tomas's legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by
prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now then,
as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no
legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action. . . ." 48

Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso 49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the
jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of
San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P.
Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal
status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for quo warranto filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority. 50 The RTC dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court.

In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the
legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at bar — that San Andres was in
existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the executive
order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was a complete
nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the
unique status of a "de facto municipal corporation." 51 It noted that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to
those executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well
extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well. 52 This statement squarely contradicts Camid's reading of
San Narciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same
ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez. 53

The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d) 54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified
the implication of the provision as follows:

Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular
municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is
preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the
Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would
have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied) 55
The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals 56 and
Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz. 57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a
1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge,
but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the
situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should likewise
"benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular,
de jure municipality." 58

The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues raised in
Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule.

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative matter and
therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling
in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a
municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal
validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court
considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the
Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor
General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been
challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity
of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a
fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district
in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever
doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R A. No. 7160), §442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal
corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially.
Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24,
1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years
later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for
its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, §16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit
against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act
complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have
recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court,
as reiterated by §31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part,
Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. aESIHT

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution,
apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of
Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. . . .59

From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled
that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order
but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was
recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal
defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent
differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the
fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to
affirm Andong's de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in
effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due
to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

It bears noting that based on Camid's own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by
executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never
elected its municipal officers at all. 60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in
1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of
Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void
municipality.

The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four
decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications
relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose
of attesting to Andong's legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the
request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur," 61 thus
obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.

We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied
upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to
the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by
the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any
other province for that matter. 62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are
mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon, 63 Bohol, 64 and Misamis Occidental, 65 respectively. THcaDA

How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILG
Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation
was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities. 66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence
of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly
then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18)
municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen
(18) other municipalities.

We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code — that it does not serve to
affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by
presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities
such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet
were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially
dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific
legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities
derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them
or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.

And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a
hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios
of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and
Tubaran. 67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur, 68 and presumably continue to
exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong.
If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature and
not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not
by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and
legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andong's legal personality
solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence
despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their
blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Plato's famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to
seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28113 March 28, 1969

THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, petitioners, vs. PANGANDAPUN BENITO, respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the respondent
Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of
Balabagan of the same province. Balabagan was formerly a part of the municipality of Malabang, having been
created on March 15, 1960, by Executive Order 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, out of barrios and sitios 1
of the latter municipality.
The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the respondent
municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective office relying on the ruling of this Court in
Pelaez v. Auditor General 2 and Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva. 3
In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section 23 of Republic
Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial
board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the
bigger power to create municipalities," and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the
President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power and (b) because it offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits
the President's power over local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion: "In
short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as
part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the
subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment."
On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition, nevertheless argue that
the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in
Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a
statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the
municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this
action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it
may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual
like the petitioner Balindong.
It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person
exercise this function of government. 4 But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal
corporation is at least a de factocorporations. 5 For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a
nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any
one whose rights or interests ate affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they
are estopped by their conduct from doing so. 6
 And so the threshold question is whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation. As earlier
stated, the claim that it is rests on the fact that it was organized before the promulgation of this Court's decision
in Pelaez. 7
Accordingly, we address ourselves to the question whether a statute can lend color of validity to an attempted
organization of a municipality despite the fact that such statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional.\
This has been a litigiously prolific question, sharply dividing courts in the United States. Thus, some hold that a
de facto corporation cannot exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional because there can be
no de facto corporation where there can be no de jure one, 8 while others hold otherwise on the theory that a
statute is binding until it is condemned as unconstitutional. 9
An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis:
It appears that the true basis for denying to the corporation a de facto status lay in the absence of any
legislative act to give vitality to its creation. An examination of the cases holding, some of them
unreservedly, that a de facto office or municipal corporation can exist under color of an unconstitutional
statute will reveal that in no instance did the invalid act give life to the corporation, but that either in other
valid acts or in the constitution itself the office or the corporation was potentially created....
The principle that color of title under an unconstitutional statute can exist only where there is some
other valid law under which the organization may be effected, or at least an authority in potentia by the
state constitution, has its counterpart in the negative propositions that there can be no color of authority in
an unconstitutional statute that plainly so appears on its face or that attempts to authorize the ousting of a
de jure or de facto municipal corporation upon the same territory; in the one case the fact would imply the
imputation of bad faith, in the other the new organization must be regarded as a mere usurper....
As a result of this analysis of the cases the following principles may be deduced which seem to reconcile
the apparently conflicting decisions:
I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be:
1. A valid law enacted by the legislature.
2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time by the courts
or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid
law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state.
II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure
corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat.
III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent
on its face.
IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jurecorporation, as such
organization would clearly be a usurper.10
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute
creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was
some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that
Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de
facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, 11 this Court
granted a similar petition for prohibition and nullified an executive order creating the municipality of Lawigan in
Iloilo on the basis of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that the municipality was created in 1961, before section
68 of the Administrative Code, under which the President had acted, was invalidated. 'Of course the issue of de
facto municipal corporation did not arise in that case.
In Norton v. Shelby Count, 12 Mr. Justice Field said: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed." Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of commissioners created
under an invalid statute were unenforceable.
 Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of
Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is
"an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage
District v. Baxter State Bank: 13
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the
most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating
Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of
that municipality. 14
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby
permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. No pronouncement as
to costs.