Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 16

JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW


veralawclass@gmail.com -> before Friday, 12nn, indicate reason for absence
answer in 5 lines or less; write eligibly

Property -> ownership

Natural Rights Perspective (Labor Theory)


- John Locke
- Person: “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can considered
itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.”
- Theory of Appropriation:
o Nature was created for all to share; it is a common.
 “Whatsoever he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and
left it in, he hath mixed his labor with it, and joined to it something that is
his own…”
o We each own our body, and the labor it produces.
 This labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer.
 It is fundamental that these “belong” to the individual; no one has a
superior or conflicting claim.
o Mixing labor with the common yields a valid property claim.
o Subject to caveats and provisos; not an absolute claim.
o Sufficiency proviso: “No man but he can have a right to what [his labor] is once
joined to, at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.”
o “The same law of nature that does by this means give us property, does also bound
that property too.” –Second Treatise, par. 30; p.3
o 3 Lockean Provisos:
 Sufficiency (“as much and as good left over”)
 Spoliation Proviso: “As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage
of life before it spoils, so much by his labor he may fix his property in…”
p.3
 Charity Proviso: “Title to so much of another’s plenty as will keep him [or
her] from extreme want”
o Labor is far from an absolute claim to title:
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

 “He that had as good left for his improvement as was already taken up
needed not complain, ought not to meddle with what was already
improved by another’s labor; if he did it is clear he desired the benefit of
another’s pains…” – 2nd Treatise, par. 33
o Individual Autonomy
- However, natural right theory doesn’t cope with the temporal limitation of intellectual
property rights. Intellectual property is limited in time as to the protection, according to
the law. Thus, this theory is justifiable only for corporeal ownership. However, in
intellectual property, after some time, the work will be part of the public domain.

Personhood Perspective
- Relationship between property and personhood:
o Premise: To achieve proper self-development (to be a person), an individual needs
some control over resources in the external environment. The necessary assurances
of control take the form of property rights.
o An explicit source of values for making moral distinctions in property disputes.
o This theory attempts to clarify a third strand of liberal property theory that focuses
on personal embodiment or self-constitution in terms of “things” (personality
property theory of property).
- The role of the concept of person:
o Self-identification through object varies from person to person.
 But if property for personhood cannot be viewed as other than arbitrary
and subjective, then personal objects merely represent strong preferences.
o Person:
 “persona” -> Roman Law: an entity possessing legal rights and duties
 Kant: the person is free and rational agent whose existence is an end in
itself.
 Personhood has no component of individual human differences, but rather
by definition excludes the tastes, talents, and individual histories that
differentiate one from another.
o Property and Theories of the Person:
 Locke: “every Man has a Property in his own Person…” “the Labour of
his Body, and the Work of his hands are properly his.”
 Since we own our body (limbs), then it is property for personhood.
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

 Interference with my body is interference with my personal


property.
 However, there are paradoxes:
o Bodily parts can become fungible commodities; just as
other personal property can become fungible with a change
in its relationship with the owner. But, some bodily parts
may be too “personal” to be property at all.
 Property necessarily refers to something in the
outside world, separate from oneself.
 Thus, it may seem like it is only appropriate parts
of the body as property once they have been
removed from the system.
o Whether replacing any of one’s body parts with fungible
plastic makes one a different person, and whether said
plastic parts, once inserted, should be considered personal
property or something else.
o Kantian rationality cannot yield an objective theory of
personal property as if persons are bare abstract rational
agents, there is no necessary connection between persons
and property.
 If an object you now control is bound up in your future plans or in your
anticipation of your future self, and it is partly these plans for your own
continuity that makes you a person, then your personhood depends on the
realization of these expectations.
o Problem of Fetishism
 Personal Property: Healthy
- Hegel, Property, and Personhood
o Hegel’s person = Kant’s person
o The person becomes a real self only be engaging in a property relationship with
something external.
 “Property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in itself a
substantive end.”
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

 Continuous occupancy is necessary to maintain a property relationship


between a person and any particular external thing, because the will to
possess something must express itself.
o A person would be more self-assertive when he/she owns the property. Thus, the
person must be given the right to decide when and how his work may be produced
or performed in public, and the right to prevent changes or mutilations.
- Two Kinds of Property:
o Fungible
o Personal
- Personhood Dichotomy:
o A general justification of property entitlements in terms of their relationship to
personhood could hold that the rights that come within the general justification
form a continuum from fungible to personal.
 Hierarchy of entitlements: the more closely connected with personhood,
the stronger the entitlement.
o Personhood perspective dictates a dichotomy in entitlements, and not a dichotomy
in property.
- There is a right to personal property that should be recognized. Property rights that are
not personal should not necessarily take precedence over stronger claims related to
personhood.
o Some conventional property interests in society ought to be recognized and
preserved as personal.
o If a given property right is personal, there is a prima facie case that the said right
should be protected to some extent against invasion by government and against
cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims of other people.
o If a given property right is fungible, there is a prima facie case that said right should
yield to some extent in the face of conflicting recognized personhood interests,
not embodied in property. It is strongest where without the claimed personhood
interests, the claimants’ opportunities to become fully developed persons in the
society would be destroyed or lessened.
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

Economic Incentives
- Economic Incentives: what motivates you to behave in a certain way, while preferences
are your needs, wants, and desires. Economic incentives provide you the motivation to
pursue your preferences.
o Extrinsic Incentives: come from outside of a person.
o Intrinsic Incentives: psychological incentives and are internal to the person.
- Intellectual Property Rights make the public good a private one. The laws create artificial
scarcity of knowledge. This is because creators do not have the necessary incentive unless
they have accorded some means to control their knowledge. Thus, unless this is done, they
lack the necessary economic incentive -> Utilitarian Theory of Intellectual Property
- Utilitarian Theory of Intellectual Property:
o We have intellectual property systems because it has the effect on the betterment
of the society. The betterment of the society is to be assessed in the economic
success of the countries.
- Incentive Theory:
o The protection given to intellectual property is an incentive to individuals, not only
to create works of the mind, but also to publicize and disseminate them into the
public. This is done to encourage creativity and publicity.
o These works require investment in terms of time, money, and effort. Thus, without
protection, people will not invest on them. However, if the work of a mind is not
made available to the public, it is not useful. Upon expiry of the period of
protection, the public will start to use the properties.
o The need to pay the rights owner a royalty or fee may increase the price of the
product or service to which intellectual property right relates. It can be seen as a
kind of tax on knowledge and information.
o Even if consumers are prepared to pay the prices charged by the right owners, the
latter may not meet the demands of the public in sufficient quantities. This will
lead to compulsory license.
o The grant of rights has little positive effect in promoting investment that is required
for the production of new inventions, technical innovation, literary and artistic
productions and the like.
o Whilst no monopolies in the strict sense are applied by economists, intellectual
property rights have the potential to be used to anti-competitive effect, particularly
where they are pooled together or used as a lever to obtain other ends.
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

o Intellectual property rights can be used to suppress free speech and access to
information.
<https://www.abyssinialaw.com/study-on-line/item/468-theories-of-intellectual-property>

New Civil Code:

Art. 414: All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either:
1. Immovable or real property; or
2. Movable or personal property.

Art. 417: The following are also considered as personal property:


1. Obligations and actions which have for their objects movables or demandable
sums; and
2. Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities, although
they may have real estate.

Art. 721: By intellectual creation, the following persons acquire ownership:


1. The author with regard to his literary, dramatic, historical, legal, philosophical,
scientific or other work;
2. The composer; as to his musical composition;
3. The painter, sculptor, or other artist, with respect to the product of his art;
4. The scientist or technologist or any other person with regard to his discovery
or invention.
Art. 722: The author and the composer, mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article, shall
have the ownership of their creations even before the publication of the same. Once their works
are published, their rights are governed by the Copyright laws.

The painter, sculptor or other artist shall have dominion over the product of his art even before it
is copyrighted.

The scientist or technologist has the ownership of his discovery or invention even before it is
patented.
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS:
U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, §8, par. 8: To promote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries;

- The power of Congress to provide for such.

Phil. Const. Art. XIV, §13: The State shall protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists,
inventors, artists, and other gifted citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly
when beneficial to the people, for such period as may be provided by law.

17 US §102: Copyright Act of 1976:

§102 · Subject matter of copyright: In general


(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.

Philippine Laws
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

Civil Code of the Philippines:


Sec. 1624: An assignment of creditors and other incorporeal rights shall be perfected in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 1475.

Sec. 1625: An assignment of a credit, right, or action shall produce no effect as against third person,
unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is recorded in the Registry of Property
in case the assignment involves real property.

RA 8293: IP Code of the Philippines Part IV. Sec 1-5, 171, 172
- Check laws

CASES

Santos v. McCullough Printing Company


FACTS:
Plaintiff Santos designed for former Ambassador Felino Neri, for his personal Christmas
Card greetings for the year 1959, the artistic motif in question. The following year, McCullough
Printing Company, without the knowledge and authority of plaintiff, displayed the very design in
its album of Christmas cards and offered it for sale, for a price. As such, plaintiff suffered moral
damages, because it placed his professional integrity and ethics under serious question and caused
him grave embarrassment before Ambassador Neri.
Defendant moved for the dismissal, claiming that the design does not contain a clear notice
that it belonged to Santos and that he prohibited the use of such by others; that the design in
question has been published, but it doesn't contain a notice of copyright; and that the complaint
does not state a cause of action.
The documentary evidence submitted showed the original design by plaintiff that he
printed for Amb. Neri, and the subsequent reprints by McCullough.
The lower court dismissed the case, explaining that the plaintiff did not choose to protect
his intellectual creation by a copyright. Unless satisfactorily explaining the delay of such application
of more than 30 days from its publication, converts the property to one of public domain.
Furthermore, Santos’ name appears on the alleged infringing copies of the intellectual creation.

ISSUES:
1. W/N plaintiff is entitled to protection, despite not having copyrighted the said design?
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

2. W/N publication is limited, so as to prohibit its use by others, or it is general publication?


3. Whether the provisions of the Civil Code or Copyright Law should apply?

HOLDING:
1. NO. Par. 33 of Patent Office Administrative Order No. 3 provides that an intellectual
creation should be copyrighted thirty days after its publication, if made in Manila, and
within sixty days if made elsewhere. Failure to do such renders such creation public
property. In the case at bar, there is no copyright for the design in question. Furthermore,
the contention that the publication of the design was a limited one nor that Amb. Neri was
the only one authorized to use it is not acceptable. If Amb. Neri was the sole person who
had the absolute right to use the same, then it should have been him who would be the
aggrieved party and not Santos.
2. NO. If there was such a limited publication or prohibition, it was not shown on the face
of the design. When the purpose is a limited publication, but the effect is general
publication, irrevocable rights thereupon become vested in the public, in consequence of
which enforcement of the restriction becomes impossible. The effect of offering for sale
a dress manufacture with an original design not protected by a copyright nor a patent is to
divest the owner of his common law rights, and thus, anyone is free to copy the design of
the dress.
When Amb. Neri distributed the design, the plaintiff lost control of his design and
the necessary implication was that there had been a general publication, there having been
no showing of a clear indication that a limited publication was intended. The right to
determine whether a work can be published belongs to the author, but this exclusive right
is confined to the first publication. Once published, it is dedicated to the public, and he
loses the exclusive right to control subsequent publication by others.
3. NONE of the provisions are applicable.

Filipino Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers Inc. v. Tan


FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant is a non-profit organization duly-organized under the Corporation Law
of the Philippines and is registered with the SEC. Said association is also the owner of certain
musical compositions entitled: “Dahil sa Iyo”, “Sapagkat Ikaw ay Akin”, “Sapagkat Kami ay Tao
Lamang”, and “The Nearness of You.”
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

Defendant-appellee is the operator of a restaurant known as “Alex Soda Foundation and


Restaurant”, where a combo with professional singers, hired to play and sign musical compositions
were playing and singing the said compositions without any license or permission from the
appellant to play or sing the same. Accordingly, the appellant demanded from the appellee payment
of the necessary license fee for the playing and singing of said compositions, but the demand was
ignored.
Plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint for infringement of copyright against defendant-
appellee for allowing the playing in defendant-appellee’s restaurant of said songs copyrighted in
the name of the former. Tan did not deny, but maintains that the mere singing and playing of
tunes, even if they are copyrighted, do not constitute an infringement under the Copyright Law
(Act 3134).
The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaints. The CA, finding
that the case involves pure questions of law, certified the same to the SC for final determination.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the playing and singing of musical compositions, which were copyrighted, inside the
establishment constitute a public performance for profit within the meaning of the
Copyright Law of the Philippines?
a. If so, can the appellee be held liable therefor?
HOLDING:
1. NO. Appellant bases it claims that playing or singing a musical composition is universally
accepted as performing the musical composition and that the playing and singing in the
establishment for the entertainment of the customers, despite the latter not paying for
music but only for the food, on Sec. 3c of the Copyright Law.
While there was indeed “public performances for profit”, as it has been held that
the playing of music in dine and dance establishments which was paid for by the public in
purchases of food and drink constituted ‘performance for profit’ within the Copyright Law,
however, the appellee cannot have been said to have infringed the Copyright Law. The
composers of the said compositions have waived their right in favor of the general public
when they allowed their intellectual creations to become property of the public domain
before applying for the corresponding copyrights for the same.
The Supreme Court ruled that an intellectual creation must be copyrighted thirty
days after its publication, if made in Manila, and within sixty days, if elsewhere. Failure of
such renders such creation as public property. Thus, if the general public has made use of
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

the object prior to the copyright application, the law deems the object to have been
donated to the public domain and the same can no longer be copyrighted.
The songs have only been registered after its release to the public. And thus, it is
beyond question that they had become public property and thus, beyond the protection of
the Copyright Law.

Bayanihan Music v. BMG


FACTS:
On July 16, 1976, private respondent Jose Mari Chan entered into a contract with
petitioner, Bayanihan Music Philippines, Inc., where the former assigned to the latter all his rights,
interests, and participation over his musical composition “Can We Just Stop and Talk A While”.
On March 11, 1976, they entered into a similar contract over another composition written by Chan
entitled “Afraid for Love to Fade.”
On the strength of such contracts, Bayanihan applied for and was granted by the National
Library a Certificate of Copyright Registration for the two musical compositions.
However, without the knowledge of petitioner Bayanihan, Chan had authorized his co-
respondent BMG Records to record and distribute the aforementioned musical composition in a
then-recently released album of Lea Salonga.
In separate letters, Bayanihan informed Chan and BMG of its existing copyrights over the
said compositions and the alleged violation of such right by the two. Demands were made on both
to settle the matter with Bayanihan, but no settlement was reached by the parties.
Petitioner filed with the QC RTC a complaint against Chan and BMG for violation of Sec.
216 of RA 8293, also known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. They also filed
for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin BMG from further recording and
distributing the subject compositions in whatever form.
BMG contended that: 1) the acts of recording and publication sought to be enjoined had
already been consummated thus the TRO is rendered moot; and 2) there is no clear showing that
Bayanihan would be damaged by the refusal.
Chan also answered that it was never his intention to divest himself of all his rights and
interest over the said compositions, and that the contracts that he entered into were mere music
publication agreements giving Bayanihan, the power to administer Chan’s copyright over his two
songs and to act as the exclusive publisher; and that he was not cognizant of the application made
and granting of copyrights to Bayanihan, and that Bayanihan remised in its obligations under the
contracts because it failed to advertise his compositions for almost over twenty years.
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

The TRO was denied, as well, as the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The MR
of the same order were both denied. The petition for certiorari was also denied before the CA.
ISSUE: W/N CA committed error when it dismissed the petition for certiorari when the
petitioner was the assignee of the copyrights over the musical compositions in question, and thus,
he has a clear legal right to a writ of preliminary injunction as BMG and Chan violated its
copyrights over the said composition and still, they continue to distribute the same?
HOLDING:
NO. There is only manifest abuse of discretion in the issuance of an injunctive writ when
the following requisites are not present:
1. There must be a right in esse or the existence of the right to be protected;
2. The act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.
Thus, the trial court was correct in denying said prayer.
Furthermore, respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyric
of the two songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof, conformably
with RA 8293, under Sec. 172.2, that works are protected by the sole fact of their creation. An
examination of the complaint shows that the two contracts yields not the existence of the requisite
right protectable by the provisional relief, but rather a lingering doubt on whether or not there is
such a right.
The said contracts stipulated that the two contracts would expire two years after if
publisher fails to use in any manner the said two compositions. Anent the copyrights obtained by
petitioner on the basis of the two contracts, such purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist
because Chan had put in issue the existence thereof. It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated
such contracts on July 30, 1997 or almost two years after Bayanihan wrote its letter regarding the
songs, three years prior to the filing of the complaint. Thus, petitioner had no more right that is
protectable by injunction.

Kho v. CA
FACTS:
Kho filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against Summerville and Ang Tiam Chay. Petitioner alleges that petitioner, doing
business under the name of KEC Cosmetics, is the registered owner of the copyrights Chin Chun
Su and Oval Facial Cream Container/Case. She also has the patent rights on Chin Chun Su &
Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream after purchasing it from Quintin Cheng, the
registered owner thereof in the Supplemental Register of the Philippine Patent Officer. She further
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

alleged that Summerville advertised and sold petitioner’s cream products under the brand name,
Chin Chun Su, in similar containers, thereby misleading the public and resulting in the decline of
sales and income. And thus, respondents should be enjoined from infringing on the copyrights
and patents of the petitioner.
Respondent alleged as their defense that Summerville is the exclusive and authorized
importer, repacker, and distributor of Chin Chun Su Products manufactured by Shun Yi Factory
of Taiwan, and that the said company authorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun
Su Medicated Cream with the PPO, and that KEC’s obtaining of copyrights was through
misrepresentation and falsification; and that Cheng’s authority has been terminated already by the
Taiwanese company.
The trial court granted the application for preliminary injunction, which prompted for
respondents to file an MR, but it was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari in the CA for the
nullification of the writ of preliminary injunction, which was granted by the CA. They ruled that
the registration of the trademark by KEC with the supplemental register of the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology Transfer cannot be equated in the principal register, which is duly
protected by the Trademark Law.
In La Chemise Lacoste, SA vs. Fernandez, the Court ruled that “registration in the
Supplemental Register serves as notice that the registrant is using or has appropriated the
trademark. But the very fact that the trademark cannot as yet be on guard and there are certain
defects and obstacles, which the use must still overcome vindicates one’s claims of an exclusive
right to use it. Thus, it would be deceptive for a party with nothing more than a registration in the
Supplemental Register to posture before courts of justice as if it the registration is in the Principal
Register. This runs counter to the precept embodied in Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Practice
before the PPO in Trademark Cases.
Petitioner filed for an MR on the decision made by the CA.
The trial court went on to hear petitioner’s complaint for final injunction on damages.
They ruled in favor of respondents, holding that petitioner is barred from using the trademark
Chin Chun Su, and upholding the right of respondents to use the trademark, but also recognized
the copyright of petitioner over the container.
The MRs were denied.
ISSUE:
1. W/N CA erred in ruling in favor of respondents upon its failure to:
a. Rule on petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss?
b. Refusing to promptly resolve the MR?
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

c. Failure to cite the private respondents in contempt?


HOLDING:
NO. Pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is a proof that applicant is entitled to
the relief demanded, and that the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained thereof, either for a limited period or perpetually.
Thus, it may only be granted when the application for the issuance of the same shows facts entitling
the applicant to the relief demanded. Thus, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought
to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable,
and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Thus, the real question is whether the copyright and patent over the name and
container of a beauty cream product would entitle the registrant to the use and ownership
over the same to the exclusion of others?
NO.
Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name
and its container. The name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a
trademark inasmuch as the same falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to
exclusively use the same in the sale of the product, the user must sufficiently prove that she
registered or used it before anyone else did. The petitioner’s copyright and patent registration
would not guarantee the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not
appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights.
Trademark, copyright, and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be
interchanged with one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods
(trademark) or services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked
container of goods. A trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an
enterprise. The scope of a copyright is limited to literary and artistic works which are original
intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
creation. Patentable inventions refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human
activity which is new, involves an inventive step, and is industrially applicable.
At the same time, the trial court ruled that petitioner does not have trademark rights on
the name and container of the beauty cream product, thus rendering the issuance of the writ of a
preliminary injunction moot and academic, notwithstanding that it was appealed in the CA.
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

Unilever Philippines v. CA and Procter and Gamble

FACTS:
In 1982, a P&G subsidiary in Italy used a key visual in the advertisement of its laundry
detergent and bleaching products. This visual is known as the “double-tug” or “tac-tac”
demonstration, which shows the fabric being held by both hands and stretched sideways. This was
used in an ad entitled “All aperto” to demonstrate the effects on fabrics by a liquid bleach called
“Ace.” Since then, P&G used the said visual on the advertisement of its products, even in the
Philippines.
Unilever aired a 60-s television commercial of its “Breeze Powerwhite” laundry product
called “Porky”. The said TVC included a stretching visual presentation and sound effects almost
identical or substantially similar to P&G’s “tac-tac” key visual. The following year, after Unilever
aired the said commercial, P&G used the same old television commercial from Italy, dubbing the
Italian language to Filipino for the same product as it was now available in the Philippines. Unilever
filed a complaint with the Advertising Board of the Philippines to prevent P&G from airing the
“Kite” television advertisement.
Procter and Gamble, PH filed a complaint for injunction with damages and a prayer for
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner, Unilever.
Judge Gorospe issued an order granting the TRO, and settled a hearing for Unilever to
show cause why the writ of preliminary injunction should not issue. Unilever gave an Answer with
opposition to the preliminary injunction, which prompted P&G to file a reply. Unilever gave a
rejoined to reply, and P&G filed its surreply to the rejoinder.
The writ of preliminary injunction was issued with a bond of Php100,000.00. Petitioner
appealed to the CA finding errors in the judgment, when the public respondent issued the writ of
preliminary injunction when it violated the Rules on Evidence and Procedure, specifically Sec. 3a
of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court and of prevailing jurisprudence.
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the writ of preliminary injunction that was issued by the trial court and affirmed by
the CA lacked any evidence of private respondent’s clear and unmistakable right to the
writ?
HOLDING:
1. NO.
JYCHAN: Intellectual Property Law

Despite petitioner’s submission that P&G is not entitled to the relief demanded
due to petitioner’s ownership of Certificates of Copyright Registration for which
advertisements, while P&G has none to its “double-tug” or “tac-tac” key visual, the Court
disagreed, ruling that Sec. 2 of PD49 stipulates that the copyright of a work or intellectual
creation subsists from the moment of its creation. Thus, the creator acquires such
copyright upon its creation.
The intellectual creator’s exercise and enjoyment of copyright for his work and the
protection given by law is not contingent or dependent on any formality or registration.
The writ of preliminary injunction is not to be taken as a prejudgment of the merits
of the case due to its nature of being tentative and that it may be dissolved during or after
trial, if the court finds that the plaintiff is not entitled to such. The determination made by
the Court is merely for the purposes of the preliminary injunction without passing upon
the merits of the case.
A preliminary injunction is to be taken as a provisional remedy intended to provide
protection to parties for the preservation of their rights or interests during the pendency
of the principal action. Its sole purpose is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard fully. It is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The
issuance of such is based on the discretion of the court and generally cannot be interfered
with except in cases of manifest abuse. There was no abuse when the petitioner was given
all the opportunity to oppose the application for injunction.

NOTES:
Copyright – set of rights that are for the protection of literary and artistic works.
Patent – solution
Trademark – any visible sign