Hazop Sil Study Report For 6 Buy Back Gas Pipeline

Contractor: Engineering: Project: Company:
NAWARA PROJECT
(PIPELINE)
Contract n°: OTP/PP/189 OMV/BIMS EPCC PPL

Contractor doc. n°: Engineering doc. n°: Job n°: P13IT02472 Company doc. n°:
NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001 P13IT02472-SAF-RE-700-0001 Sheet: 1 1 of 32 Class: 1 NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001
NAWARA PROJECT (PIPELINE)
HAZOP / SIL STUDY REPORT FOR 6" BUY BACK GAS PIPELINE
000 25/07/2017 Issued for Use / Construction FSA ATA BFU

000 C01 21/06/2017 Issued for Review D’Appolonia ATA BFU D
Rev. Date REVISION TITLE PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED COMPANY
This document is the property of ETAP & OMV. It shall not be copied, reproduced and circulated without the Authorization of ETAP & OMV.
File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

Contractor doc. n°: Engineering doc. n°: Rev.: C01 000 Company doc. n°:
NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001 P13IT02472-SAF-RE-700-0001 Sheet: 2 of 32 Class: 1 NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001
INDEX
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................. 3
1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... 4
2 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 5
2.1 General............................................................................................................................. 5
2.2 Definitions ......................................................................................................................... 5
2.3 References ....................................................................................................................... 6
2.3.1 Company Standards .................................................................................................. 6
2.3.2 Project Documents .................................................................................................... 6
2.3.3 International Codes and Standards............................................................................ 7
3 SCOPE AND PURPOSE ......................................................................................................... 8
3.1 Scope ............................................................................................................................... 8
3.2 Purpose ............................................................................................................................ 8
4 HAZOP / SIL METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 9
4.1 General............................................................................................................................. 9
4.2 Study Basis....................................................................................................................... 9
4.2.1 Review Process ......................................................................................................... 9
4.2.2 Nodes ........................................................................................................................ 9
4.2.3 Parameters and Guidewords ..................................................................................... 9
4.2.4 Safety Integrated Functions ..................................................................................... 10
5 MEETING DETAILS .............................................................................................................. 11
5.1 Location and Timing ....................................................................................................... 11
5.2 Team Members .............................................................................................................. 11
6 HAZOP / SIL FINDINGS ........................................................................................................ 12
7 MANAGEMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... 12
8 APPENDIX A – RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY.............................................................. 13
9 APPENDIX B – HAZOP WORKSHEETS ............................................................................... 17
10 APPENDIX C – SIL WORKSHEETS...................................................................................... 25
11 APPENDIX D – MARKED-UP HAZOP / SIL MASTER P&IDs ................................................ 27
12 APPENDIX E – HAZOP / SIL SESSIONS ATTENDANCE SHEETS ...................................... 31

ABBREVIATIONS
API American Petroleum Institute
BBG Buy Back Gas
CPF Central Processing Facility
DBB Double Block and Bleed
ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve
F&G Fire & Gas
GTP Gas Treatment Plant
HAZOP Hazard & Operability
HSE Health, Safety & Environment
HSSE Health, Safety, Security & Environment
HV Hand Valve
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITT Instructions To Tender
LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas
NCMH Normal Cubic Meters for Hour
NG Natural Gas
OGP International Association of Oil & Gas Producers
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
SIF Safety Integrated Function
SIL Safety Integrated Level
SNDP Société Nationale de Distribution des Pétroles
STEG Société Tunisienne de l’Electricité et du Gaz
TOR Terms of Reference
TRAPSA Trans Saharan Pipeline Company

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document presents the findings of the HAZOP Study performed for the “Nawara
Project (Pipeline)”.
The HAZOP study has been updated considering the last modification of the Nawara
Project, which implies the installation of a pipeline to secure commissioning gas for its
facilities; The pipeline will transport high pressure gas from STEG terminal station in Gabès
to GTP via 6” pipeline (around 1 km length). This 6” pipeline is designed to run high
pressure commercial gas from 20” existing STEG pipeline to the GTP Pig Receiver area.
During the HAZOP session, a total of 10 Recommendations for Action were identified. The
record of the HAZOP session discussion is reported in Appendix B whereas the summary
of the Recommendations for Action is shown in Appendix A.

2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 General
The objective of the Nawara Development Project is to recover the associated and non-
associated gas reserves from the Nawara Concession, separate and pretreat the fluids
from 9 wells, gather them in Central Processing Facility (CPF), convert them into a
commercial condensate and pre-treated gas, export the condensate via a new pipeline into
the existing TRAPSA pipeline, and export the gas via a new pipeline to Gabès. At Gabès,
the gas will be treated in a dedicated Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) extraction facility to
commercial specification required for end user consumption. In Gabès, the gas will be
conditioned in a Gas Treatment Plant (GTP) into commercial products, and sold to the end
users: STEG and SNDP.
The “NAWARA Project - Pipelines” main characteristics and facilities are as follows:
- A 24” pipeline which will deliver the raw gas from Nawara CPF to a Gas Treatment
Plant (GTP) located at Gabès (L=374km);
- A 6” pipeline which convey to TRAPSA the separate condensate extracted at CPF
(L=12km);
- The export lines for Sales Products for delivery to customers at Gabès selected
custody transfer points. The 20” sales gas is delivered at STEG (L=1 km) while 6”
Propane and 4” Butane are delivered at SNDP (L=1,6 km). The condensate that
may form at GTP is exported by road Tanker.
- The pipeline for secure commissioning of gas to its facilities. The pipeline transports
high pressure gas from STEG terminal station in Gabès to GTP via 6” pipeline (L =
1 km). This 6” pipeline is designed to run high pressure commercial gas from 20”
existing STEG pipeline to the GTP Pig Receiver area
2.2 Definitions
Company: OMV (Tunisien) Production GmbH.
Project: Nawara Project (Pipeline).
Contractor: Party which carries out all or part of the Procurement, Construction,
Installation and Commissioning for the Project, i.e. BI&MS.
Subcontractor: Party which carries out the Detail Design Engineering for the Project,
i.e. Enereco.
Vendor: Selected provider of the Elements, Equipment, Subsystems or

Systems. This term also includes “Manufacturer”.
Shall: Is to be understood mandatory.
Should: Is to be understood as strongly recommended.


May be: Is to be understood as giving freedom of choice.
The work: All activities for the construction of the defined elements as detailed in
the scope of work.
Approved: Agreed and approved by Company in writing.
2.3 References
A detailed list of all legislations, Company’s Procedures, Company’s Standards and
Philosophies and International Standards that is to be used for HSSE Management and
Design are listed in the Project document “Pipelines Project Codes & Standards” (Ref. [6]).
Company standards, Project Documents and International Codes and Standard that can be
specifically referenced to for HAZOP execution are listed below:
2.3.1 Company Standards
Ref. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REV. DATE

Hazard and Operability Study
[1]. HSSE-R-017 2.0 -
(HAZOP)
Philosophy for Safety Integrity Levels
[2]. TO-HQ-02-023-00 00 03.06.2005
Onshore
Hazard Identification & Hazard
[3]. HSEQ-HQ-04-05-00 - 29.05.2008
Management
2.3.2 Project Documents

NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[4]. HSSE Plan for Engineering Activities 001 28.06.2016
000-HS-SPE-00001
NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[5]. Pipeline HSSE Philosophy 000 31.03.2015
000-HS-PHI-00001
NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[6]. Pipelines Project Codes & Standards 000 22.12.2015
000-MD-SPE-00001
NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[7]. HSSE Action Close Out Report 000 24.03.2017
000-HS-REP-00009
NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[8]. HAZOP Study Terms of Reference 000 25.02.2015
000-HS-REP-00003
NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[9]. HAZOP Study Report 001 15.12.2015
000-HS-REP-00004
NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[10]. SIL Assessment Terms of Reference 000 25.02.2015
000-HS-REP-00005


NAWPPL-BIMS-NPPL-
[11]. SIL Assessment Report 000 16.04.2015
000-HS-REP-00006
2.3.3 International Codes and Standards
Ref. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION DATE

Petroleum and natural gas industries --
Offshore production installations -- Guidelines
[12]. ISO 17776:2002 2002
on tools and techniques for hazard
identification and risk assessment
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP

[13]. IEC 61882 2001
Studies) – Application Guide
Functional safety - Safety instrumented

[14]. IEC 61511 2003
systems for the process industry sector
OGP – Risk Assessment Data Directory –

[15]. Report No. 434 – 4 2010
Riser & Pipeline Release Frequencies
[16]. API RP 581 Risk-Based Inspection Technology 2008

3 SCOPE AND PURPOSE
3.1 Scope
The scope of the HAZOP / SIL study included the last modification of the Nawara
Development Project – Pipelines Facilities, which implies the installation of a pipeline to
secure commissioning gas for its facilities; The pipeline will transport high pressure gas
from STEG terminal station in Gabès to GTP via 6” pipeline (around 1 km length). This 6”
pipeline is designed to run high pressure commercial gas from 20” existing STEG pipeline
to the GTP Pig Receiver area.
3.2 Purpose
The purpose of the HAZOP / SIL Study was to review the new items associated to the
installation of the pipeline to secure commissioning gas for Nawara GTP facilities (i.e.
pipeline transport high pressure gas from STEG terminal station in Gabès to GTP via 1 km
and 6” pipeline) in order to systematically identify all hazards and potential operability /
maintenance problems associated to the system considering the current status of the
design development.

4 HAZOP / SIL METHODOLOGY
4.1 General
The HAZOP / SIL Study was carried out in agreement with the guidelines provided in the
applicable International Standards (Ref. [12], [13], [14], [15] and [16]) and in compliance
with the requirements of the Company Standards (Ref.[1], [2] and [3]) as incorporated in the
Project Documents (Ref. [4] and [5]).
4.2 Study Basis
4.2.1 Review Process

The chairman led discussion within the team by presenting guidewords from a set list for
consideration for that node. Aspects of the discussion relating to hazards and their
safeguards were recorded in the worksheets. The review was based on the guidewords
presented in Section 4.2.3.
During the workshop, the HAZOP / SIL worksheets were continuously projected onto a
display screen to ensure that the worksheets were complete and readily understood.
HAZOP / SIL recording was in full.
Actions recommended by the HAZOP / SIL team were noted on the worksheets together
with those responsible for closing-out the actions.
4.2.2 Nodes
A total of 1 Node was chosen for the study. Node identification was driven by considering
the composition of the main process stream involved and its operating conditions, in order
to allow a manageable field of analysis.
In general, utility stream lines were not considered as individual nodes, since their credible
failure modes were included in the study directly as causes of deviation in the process
parameters.
The node used is shown in Table 4.2-1.
Table 4.2-1 - List of Nodes
Title Ref. P&ID No

(Prefix NAWPPL-BIMS-)
0F01-321-PR-PID-00003-005
1. 6” Buy Back pipeline for secure 0F03-320-PR-PID-00003-006
commissioning gas to Nawara GTP facilities
0F03-320-PR-PID-00004-C02
The extent of each HAZOP node is shown highlighted on the relevant P&ID, in Appendix
D.
4.2.3 Parameters and Guidewords

For guidewords and parameters, and their relevant combinations, reference was made to
Table 4.1-1 of HAZOP Study Terms of Reference, Doc. No. NAWPPL-BIMS- NPPL-000-
HS-REP-00003 (Ref. [8]), reported also here below.

Table 4.2-2 – HAZOP Deviations

Example of Guidewords
No High
More (of) Low
Less (of) Change
Reverse Contamination
Misdirected Wrong Material
Loss of Failure
Example of Parameters
Flow Phase
Containment Utilities
Temperature Corrosion / Erosion
Pressure Start Up
Level Shutdown
Composition Maintenance
Example of Deviations
Deviations are the Combination of Guidewords and Parameters (e.g. "No Flow" or
"Less Pressure"). Typically, for the main parameters:
GW
More Less No Reverse Change As well as
Parameter
Flow High Flow Low Flow No Flow Backflow -- --
High Temp. Low Temp.
Temperature -- -- -- --
Overtemp. Freezing
High Pressure
Pressure Low Pressure Vacuum -- -- --
Overpressure
High Level
Level Low Level No Level -- -- --
Overfilling
High Low Change of Wrong Conc.
Composition -- Contaminants
Concentration Concentration State Off-spec
As foreseen in the TOR, additional parameters and guidewords were considered where
appropriate.
4.2.4 Safety Integrated Functions

It is to be noted that a total of two (2) Safety Integrated Functions (SIFs) were identified
within Node 1 in order to perform the detailed SIL assessment. The identified SIF were:
Table 4.2-3 - List of SIFs

SIFs definition Ref. P&ID No
(Prefix NAWPPL-BIMS-)
1. High High pressure at BBG pipeline Outlet 0F03-320-PR-PID-0004-C02
2. High High pressure at BBG pipeline Inlet 0F03-320-PR-PID-0004-C02

5 MEETING DETAILS
5.1 Location and Timing

Date:
Tuesday 13th June of 2017,
Venue:
Enereco offices, Fano (PU), Italy.
5.2 Team Members

The HAZOP / SIL Sessions were chaired by Mr Marco Pontiggia, a 3rd party HAZOP and
SIL Chairman provided by D’APPOLONIA S.p.A., an HSE consultancy company based in
Genoa.
Participants attending the review are shown in the daily attendance sheets included in
Appendix E.

6 HAZOP / SIL FINDINGS

The HAZOP findings are shown in the worksheets in Appendix B.
There were 10 Recommendations for Action raised in the review.
A summary of the Recommendations for Action is shown in Appendix A and for further
details refer to the HAZOP study worksheets.
In addition, two (2) Safety Integrated Functions were analysed in detail, having a resultant
Safety integrated Level equal to SIL a. The detailed discussion regarding the SIL
assessment is gathered and reported in Appendix C. It is to be noted that no actions were
identified as a result of the SIL assessment.
All Recommendations for Action should be reviewed by responsible parties for suitability for
inclusion into the design or operating procedures.
7 MANAGEMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Enereco will update the Project document “HSSE Action Close Out Report” (Ref. [6]) to
ensure that all actions are comprehensively identified and resolved. The HSSE Action
Close Out Report shall be maintained and updated for all identified issues raised from the
Safety Studies.
Enereco will incorporate agreed actions into the design that are practicable for the Detailed
Design Engineering stage of the Project.
At the end of the Detailed Design, Enereco will transfer all actions that have not been fully
resolved to the ITT package for final resolution in the next phase of the Project.

8 APPENDIX A – RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARY

Action Items
Company: OMV (Tunisien) Production GmbH Page: 13
Facility: Nawara Pipeline
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Node: (1) Buyback pipeline
Intention: Design pressure 92 barg - Design Temp -10°C up to 8 5°C - Design flow rate 10000 NCMH
Drawings: NAWPPL-BIMS-0F01-321-PR-PID-00003-005
NAWPPL-BIMS-0F03-320-PR-PID-00003-006
NAWPPL-BIMS-0F03-320-PR-PID-00004-C02
Parameter: Flow
Ref # DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
1 No Flow 2. Human error 2.1. Stop of GTP hot 2.1.1. PAL-0525 alarm 1. Ensure that alignment of Manual valves on CONTRACTOR
closing manual commissioning in control room the 6" buyback pipeline from STEG is
valve at STEG tie-in activities with no included in the Operating procedures
(HV-0595) impact on asset or 2.1.2. PAL-0340 alarm
safety in control room
2 Misdirected flow 15. Generic random 15.1. Release of NG 15.1.1. Proper desing 2. Consider to verify F&G system in STEG COMPANY
rupture with potential covers properly tie-in area and new
fire/explosion event 15.1.2. Periodic installation
inspection and
maintenance
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Temperature
3 Lower 2. Malfunction of 2.1. Offspec NG to 2.1.1. TAL-0392 alarm 1. Define requirement for automatic action to COMPANY
Temperature Electrical Heater GTP (low in control room close ESDV-0392 for Low Low Temperature
NPO-HE-321-0001 temperature); in case on TT-0392
control system of Blowdown of GTP,
4 risk of exceeding 2. If required by company (ref. to Action #1 CONTRACTOR
minimum design Temperature parameter), implement
temperature of the automatic action to close ESDV-0392 for Low
GTP inlet facilities Low Temperature on TT-0392
PHAWorks 3.0 by Primatech Inc.

Action Items
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Pressure
5 Higher 1. Start-up or Re 1.1. Potential internal 1. Propose alternative solutions (e.g. CONTRACTOR
Differential start-up damage to HV valves installation of new 6" globe valve at STEG
Pressure across tie-int) to allow pressurization of 6" buyback
HV valves pipeline in order to avoid any damage to HV
valves
6 2. Confirm solution proposed by Contractor COMPANY

(ref. to Action #1 in Pressure parameter) to
allow pressurization of 6" buyback pipeline in
order to avoid any damage to HV valves
7 Higher pressure 3. High pressure 3.1. Pressure in 6" 3.1.1. According to 3. Include in operating manual to disconnect CONTRACTOR
from Raw Gas buyback pipeline Note 21 in P&ID 0003 6" buyback pipeline after use to avoid any
pipeline during GTP exceeding design 6" buyback pipeline potential high pressure form Raw gas
normal operation pressure leading to will be disconnected pipeline during GTP normal operation
(6" buyback release of NG with before normal
pipeline out of fire/explosion event operation in GTP
service) starts
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Maintenance
8 Difficult 1. Impossibility to 1.1. Depressurization 1. Consider to add manual valve and drain CONTRACTOR
Maintenance properly isolate the of the whole 6" valve downstream Allocation Metering
Allocation Metering buyback pipeline is package NG0-PK-320-0005 to allow proper
NG0-PK-320-0005 required to maintain DBB for maintenace purposes
(missing DBB the Allocation
downstream Metering package
Allocation metering) NG0-PK-320-0005

Action Items
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion
9 More Corrosion / 1. Potential 1.1. Increased 1.1.1. Permanent 1. Include in the operating manual a CONTRACTOR
Erosion interaction with corrosion rate in the cathodic protection of statement to maintain the permanent
parallel 20" Sales parallel 20" Sales gas 6" buyback pipeline is cathodic protection of 6" buyback pipeline
gas pipeline pipeline foreseen to avoid even after pipeline disconnection to avoid
inteactions with inteactions with parallel 20" Sales gas
parallel 20" Sales gas pipeline
pipeline
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Purging / Inerting
10 Difficult Purging / 1. Missing nitrogen 1.1. Imposibility to 1.1.1. HV-0598 (10") 1. Include in the operating manual that CONTRACTOR
Inerting connection tu purge carry out or HV-0581 (2", drain temporary connection to nitrogen system for
the 6" buyback commissioning/decom valve) at STEG tie-in purging 6" buyback pipeline can be achieved
pipeline during missoning activities area can be used for through either HV-0598 (10") or HV-0581 (2",
commissioning/dec temporary connection drain valve) at STEG tie-in area
ommissioning to nitrogen system

9 APPENDIX B – HAZOP WORKSHEETS

Worksheet
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Flow
GW DEVIATION CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMENTS
No No Flow 1. No flow from STEG plant 1.1. Stop of GTP hot 1.1.1. PAL-0525 alarm in
commissioning activities control room
with no impact on asset or
safety 1.1.2. PAL-0340 alarm in
control room
2. Human error closing 2.1. Stop of GTP hot 2.1.1. PAL-0525 alarm in 1. Ensure that alignment of CONTRACTOR
manual valve at STEG commissioning activities control room Manual valves on the 6"
tie-in (HV-0595) with no impact on asset or buyback pipeline from
safety 2.1.2. PAL-0340 alarm in STEG is included in the
control room Operating procedures
3. Spurious closure of 3.1. Stop of GTP hot 3.1.1. PAL-0525 alarm in

ESDV 0505 commissioning activities control room
safety 3.1.2. PAL-0340 alarm in
control room
3.1.3. Periodic inspection

and maintenance
4. Human error closing 4.1. Stop of GTP hot 4.1.1. PAL-0340 alarm in
manual valves across commissioning activities control room
Allocation Metering with no impact on asset or
NG-PK-320-0005 safety
5. Spurious closure of 5.1. Stop of GTP hot 5.1.1. PAL-0340 alarm in

ESDV 0392 commissioning activities control room
safety 5.1.2. Periodic inspection
and maintenance
6. Malfunction of 6.1. Stop of GTP hot 6.1.1. Periodic inspection

self-regulating pressure commissioning activities and maintenance
control valve PCV-0390 with no impact on asset or
(fail close valve) safety

Worksheet
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Flow
7. Human error closing 7.1. Stop of GTP hot
manual valves across commissioning activities
electrical heater with no impact on asset or
NPO-HE-321-0001 safety
8. Human error closing 8.1. Stop of GTP hot

manual valve at GTP tie-in commissioning activities
(HV-5006) with no impact on asset or
safety
9. Blocked outlet in GTP 9.1. Stop of GTP hot

dowstream facilities commissioning activities
safety
Less Less Flow 10. Partial blockage of the 10.1. Reduced flow may 10.1.1. Self-regulating
strainer lead to sto of GTP hot pressure control valve
commissioning activities PCV-0390 can compensate
minor variation in
pressure/flow
10.1.2. Strainer will be

used for a limited period of
time (1 year max.) and for
clean gas service
More More Flow 11. No causes identified
Other Misdirected flow 12. Human error leaving 12.1. Release of NG in 12.1.1. Double block and
Than open branch to mobile flare GTP receiving area with bleed on mobile flare
connection potential fire/explosion connection
(2"-EG-321-0003-C41Y-V) event
12.1.2. Blind flange on
mobile flare connection
12.1.3. F&G system in GTP

receiver area
Worksheet
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Flow
13. Human error leaving 13.1. Release of NG in 13.1.1. Blind flange on

open drain valve HV-0599 STEG site with potential drain valve
fire/explosion event
14. Human error leaving 14.1. Release of NG in 14.1.1. Blind flange on

open drain valve HV-0311 GTP receiving area with drain valve
potential fire/explosion
event 14.1.2. F&G system in GTP
receiver area
15. Generic random 15.1. Release of NG with 15.1.1. Proper desing 2. Consider to verify F&G COMPANY
rupture potential fire/explosion system in STEG covers
event 15.1.2. Periodic inspection properly tie-in area and
and maintenance new installation
Rever Reverse Flow 16. During Buyback

se pipeline lifetime the only
source of gas to GTP will
be STEG pipeline.
Therefore no credible
scenarios of backflow can
be identified
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

More Higher Temperature 1. Malfunction of Electrical 1.1. High temperature in 1.1.1. High High
Heater NPO-HE-321-0001 NG potentially exceeding temperature trip of
control system design temperature (thus Electrical Heater
leading to release of NG NPO-HE-321-0001

Worksheet
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

with potential fire events)
1.1.2. TAH-0392 alarm in
control room
Less Lower Temperature 2. Malfunction of Electrical 2.1. Offspec NG to GTP 2.1.1. TAL-0392 alarm in 1. Define requirement for COMPANY
Heater NPO-HE-321-0001 (low temperature); in case control room automatic action to close
control system of Blowdown of GTP, risk ESDV-0392 for Low Low
of exceeding minimum Temperature on TT-0392
design temperature of the
GTP inlet facilities 2. If required by company CONTRACTOR
(ref. to Action #1
Temperature parameter),
implement automatic action
to close ESDV-0392 for
Low Low Temperature on
TT-0392
3. Human error leaving 3.1. Offspec NG to GTP 3.1.1. TAL-0392 alarm in

open manual valve (low temperature); in case control room
HV-0310 (bypass to of Blowdown of GTP, risk
Electrical Heater of exceeding minimum
NPO-HE-321-0001) design temperature of the
GTP inlet facilities
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Pressure
More Higher Differential 1. Start-up or Re start-up 1.1. Potential internal 1. Propose alternative CONTRACTOR
Pressure across HV valves damage to HV valves solutions (e.g. installation
of new 6" globe valve at
STEG tie-int) to allow

Worksheet
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Pressure
pressurization of 6"
buyback pipeline in order to
avoid any damage to HV
valves
2. Confirm solution COMPANY

proposed by Contractor
(ref. to Action #1 in
Pressure parameter) to
allow pressurization of 6"
buyback pipeline in order to
avoid any damage to HV
valves
Higher pressure 2. High pressure from 2.1. Potential to exceed 2.1.1. Rating of 6" buyback
STEG design pressure thus pipeline is equal to STEG
leading to release of NG pipeline rating
with fire/explosion event
2.1.2. PAHH-05625 closes
ESDV-0505
2.1.3. PAHH-0340 closes

ESDV-0392
3. High pressure from Raw 3.1. Pressure in 6" buyback 3.1.1. According to Note 21 3. Include in operating CONTRACTOR
Gas pipeline during GTP pipeline exceeding design in P&ID 0003 6" buyback manual to disconnect 6"
normal operation (6" pressure leading to release pipeline will be buyback pipeline after use
buyback pipeline out of of NG with fire/explosion disconnected before to avoid any potential high
service) event normal operation in GTP pressure form Raw gas
starts pipeline during GTP normal
operation
Less Lower Pressure 4. Refer to No/Less flow

deviation in this node

Worksheet
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Maintenance
Difficu Difficult Maintenance 1. Impossibility to properly 1.1. Depressurization of the 1. Consider to add manual CONTRACTOR
lt isolate the Allocation whole 6" buyback pipeline valve and drain valve
Metering is required to maintain the downstream Allocation
NG0-PK-320-0005 (missing Allocation Metering Metering package
DBB downstream package NG0-PK-320-0005 to allow
Allocation metering) NG0-PK-320-0005 proper DBB for maintenace
purposes
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion
More More Corrosion / Erosion 1. Potential interaction with 1.1. Increased corrosion 1.1.1. Permanent cathodic 1. Include in the operating CONTRACTOR
parallel 20" Sales gas rate in the parallel 20" protection of 6" buyback manual a statement to
pipeline Sales gas pipeline pipeline is foreseen to maintain the permanent
avoid inteactions with cathodic protection of 6"
parallel 20" Sales gas buyback pipeline even
pipeline after pipeline disconnection
to avoid inteactions with
parallel 20" Sales gas
pipeline

Worksheet
Session: (1) 13/06/2017

Parameter: Purging / Inerting
Difficu Difficult Purging / Inerting 1. Missing nitrogen 1.1. Imposibility to carry out 1.1.1. HV-0598 (10") or 1. Include in the operating CONTRACTOR
lt connection tu purge the 6" commissioning/decommiss HV-0581 (2", drain valve) manual that temporary
buyback pipeline during oning activities at STEG tie-in area can be connection to nitrogen
commissioning/decommissi used for temporary system for purging 6"
oning connection to nitrogen buyback pipeline can be
system achieved through either
HV-0598 (10") or HV-0581
(2", drain valve) at STEG
tie-in area

10 APPENDIX C – SIL WORKSHEETS

Company: OMV (Tunisien) Production GmbH SIL Worksheet Page: 25
SIF# High High pressure at BBG pipeline Outlet
P&ID No. NAWPPL-BIMS-0F03-320-PR-PID-0004
Initiator Tag NP0-321-PAHH-0340
Logic Solver tag NP0-321-I-870-0393
Final Element Tag NP0-321-ESDV-0392
Demand Risk Parameters

Rate Overall Existing Comments &
Design Intent Demand Scenario Consequence Scenario (Safety, SIL
SIL Safeguard Actions
W C F P
Avoid High pressure in 6" Safety: C0 FB PA -
No impact, since design pressure of 6" buyback
buyback pipeline and High pressure from STEG W1 Environment: C0 FB PA - a
pipeline is equal to STEG pipeline Asset: CC FB PA a
downstream GTP facilities
SIF# High High pressure at BBG pipeline Inlet
P&ID No. NAWPPL-BIMS-0F03-320-PR-PID-0004
Initiator Tag NP0-320-PAHH-0525
Logic Solver tag NP0-320-I-870-0508
Final Element Tag NP0-320-ESDV-0505
Demand Risk Parameters

Rate Overall Existing Comments &
Design Intent Demand Scenario Consequence Scenario (Safety, SIL
SIL Safeguard Actions
W C F P
Avoid High pressure in 6" Safety: C0 FB PA -
No impact, since design pressure of 6" buyback
buyback pipeline and High pressure from STEG W1 Environment: C0 FB PA - a
pipeline is equal to STEG pipeline Asset: CC FB PA a
downstream GTP facilities
11 APPENDIX D – MARKED-UP HAZOP / SIL MASTER P&IDS

12 APPENDIX E – HAZOP / SIL SESSIONS ATTENDANCE SHEETS

Hazop Sil Study Report For 6 Buy Back Gas Pipeline

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Hazop Sil Study Report For 6 Buy Back Gas Pipeline

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Contractor: Engineering: Project: Company:

Contract n°: OTP/PP/189 OMV/BIMS EPCC PPL

NAWARA PROJECT (PIPELINE)

000 25/07/2017 Issued for Use / Construction FSA ATA BFU

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

BBG Buy Back Gas

CPF Central Processing Facility

DBB Double Block and Bleed

ESDV Emergency Shut Down Valve

F&G Fire & Gas

GTP Gas Treatment Plant

HAZOP Hazard & Operability

HSE Health, Safety & Environment

HSSE Health, Safety, Security & Environment

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

ISO International Organization for Standardization

ITT Instructions To Tender

LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas

NCMH Normal Cubic Meters for Hour

OGP International Association of Oil & Gas Producers

P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

SIF Safety Integrated Function

SIL Safety Integrated Level

SNDP Société Nationale de Distribution des Pétroles

STEG Société Tunisienne de l’Electricité et du Gaz

TOR Terms of Reference

TRAPSA Trans Saharan Pipeline Company

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

Project: Nawara Project (Pipeline).

Vendor: Selected provider of the Elements, Equipment, Subsystems or

Shall: Is to be understood mandatory.

Should: Is to be understood as strongly recommended.

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

May be: Is to be understood as giving freedom of choice.

Approved: Agreed and approved by Company in writing.

2.3.1 Company Standards

Ref. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REV. DATE

2.3.2 Project Documents

Ref. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REV. DATE

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

Ref. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REV. DATE

2.3.3 International Codes and Standards

Ref. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION DATE

Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP

Functional safety - Safety instrumented

OGP – Risk Assessment Data Directory –

[16]. API RP 581 Risk-Based Inspection Technology 2008

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

3 SCOPE AND PURPOSE

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

4 HAZOP / SIL METHODOLOGY

4.2 Study Basis

4.2.1 Review Process

Table 4.2-1 - List of Nodes

Title Ref. P&ID No

4.2.3 Parameters and Guidewords

File name: NAWPPL-BIMS-OF03-320-HS-REP-00001-000

Table 4.2-2 – HAZOP Deviations

4.2.4 Safety Integrated Functions

Table 4.2-3 - List of SIFs

1. High High pressure at BBG pipeline Outlet 0F03-320-PR-PID-0004-C02