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1. FLORES V DRILON designation in any capacity to any public office or

position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by
FACTS law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This
the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.” is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work
ISSUES for his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor
government posts. without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be
appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
circumstance. (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the
subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an example, an elective official who may be appointed to a
elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX- cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to
B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
another post. (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
authority of the President. Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when
allowances and other emoluments which he may have received Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint
pursuant to his appointment. an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
HELD effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he

must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an HELD:

abuse of congressional authority to prescribe CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages,only
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for histerm upon his replacement, trhere is no longer any remaining term
appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during
to beserved.Administrative Code of
his incumbency, he may however resign first from his
elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached 1987Book VTitle ISubtitle AChapter 5Section 27. Employment Status. –
disqualification before he may be considered fit for Appointment in the career service shall bepermanent or
appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an temporary.(1)Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for be issued to a personwho meets all the requirements for the position to
appointment to another public office. which he is beingappointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed,
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is in accordance
ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman withthe provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuanc
and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
ethereof.(2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his actsas SBMA official are not and itbecomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a tempa
necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto ppointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the
officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled requirementsfor the position to which he is being appointed except the
to such benefits. appropriate civilservice eligibility: Provided, that such temporary
appointment shall notexceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be
2. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. ENGR. DARANGINA replaced sooner if a qualifiedcivil service eligible becomes available

Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in
4. Liban v. Gordon
theOffice of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary
G.R. 175352July 15, 2009
promotionalappointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC a
pproved thetemporary appointment.New OMA Executive Director FACTS:
terminated the appointment, ground: Not CareerExecutive Service Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court
to declare Richard J. Gordon as “having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The
Eligible.CSC diaprroved the appointment of the replacement who was al
petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
so noteligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the PhilippineNational Red
backwages until theexpiration of his 1 yr temporary appointment.CA Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During Gordon’s incumbency as a member
reinstated Darangina. of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during
the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors,in which the
petitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed
ISSUE/S: ceased tobe a member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of
Whether Darangina should be reinstated. the Constitution:Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office ore mployment in the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,including government-

owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term workers to their former positions without loss of seniority
without forfeiting his seat….
and other rights and privileges, and ordering them to jointly
Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation of a constitutional
provision had no basis, since PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled and severally pay the latter their full back wages, benefits,
corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec.13, Art. VI of the Constitution did
not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer and moral damages.
service to which is neither an office nor an employment

ISSUE: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat? Petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and
No. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing controlled corporation, on the other hand is Petitioner
public functions. Itdoes not have government assets and does not receive
any appropriation from the PhilippineCongress. The PNRC is financed primarily
METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization, Inc., was a
by contributions from private individuals and privateentities obtained through
solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apartfrom that,
qualified transportation corporation duly organized in
PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral
accordance with the provisions of the Corporation Code,
andindependent to be able to conduct its activities in accord to
their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI,
Section 13 could not apply to Gordon’s case, in accepting the position in the and existing under Philippine laws.
PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit

Petitioner LRTA constructed a light rail transit system

5. LRTA vs. Venus
from Monumento in Kalookan City to Baclaran in
Gr. 163782 24 march 2006 Parañaque, Metro Manila. To provide the commuting public
with an efficient and dependable light rail transit system,
petitioner LRTA, after a bidding process, entered into a ten
Facts: (10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation of

This is a consolidated petitions of Light Rail Transit the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System from June 8,

Authority (LRTA) and Metro Transit Organization, Inc. 1984 until June 8, 1994 with petitioner METRO

(METRO), seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court Pursuant to the Agreement, petitioner METRO hired
of Appeals directing them to reinstate private respondent its own employees, including herein private respondents.

Petitioner METRO thereafter entered into a collective the Union picketed the various substations. They completely
bargaining agreement with Pinag-isang Lakas ng paralyzed the operations of the entire light rail transit
Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. – National Federation of system. As the strike adversely affected the mobility of the
Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-METRO, INC. – NFL commuting public, then Secretary of Labor Bienvenido E.
– KMU (Union), the certified exclusive collective Laguesma issued on that same day an assumption of
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of jurisdiction order directing all the striking employees "to
petitioner METRO. return to work immediately upon receipt of this Order and
for the Company to accept them back under the same terms
On June 9, 1989 LRTA and METRO executed a Deed
and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike.
of Sale where petitioner LRTA purchased the shares of
stocks in petitioner METRO. However, petitioners LRTA Despite the issuance, posting, and publication of the
and METRO continued with their distinct and separate assumption of jurisdiction and return to work order, the
juridical personalities. Hence, when the above ten (10)-year Union officers and members, including herein private
Agreement expired on June 8, 1994, they renewed the same, respondent workers, failed to return to work. private
initially on a yearly basis, and subsequently on a monthly respondents, Perfecto Venus, Jr., Bienvenido P. Santos, Jr.,
basis. Rafael C. Roy, Nancy C. Ramos, Salvador A. Alfon, Noel
R. Santos, Manuel A. Ferrer, Salvador G. Alinas, Ramon D.
July 25, 2000, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with
Lofranco, Amador H. Policarpio, Reynaldo B. Gener, and
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board – National
Bienvenido G. Arpilleda, were considered dismissed from
Capital Region against METRO on account of a deadlock in
employment. Meanwhile the agreement between LRTA and
the collective bargaining negotiation. On the same day, the
METRO expired and was not renewed and the LRTA
Union struck. The power supply switches in the different
management instead took over the operations the private
light rail transit substations were turned off. The members of

respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the appellate court filed by LRTA and METRO which this
NLRC Court eventually consolidated.

Petitioner LRTA argues that it has no employer-

employee relationship with private respondent workers as
Labor Arbiter Luis D. Flores rendered a consolidated
they were hired by petitioner METRO alone pursuant to its
judgment in favor of the private respondent workers
ten (10)-year Agreement for the Management and Operation
declaring that the complainants were illegally dismissed
of the Metro Manila Light Rail Transit System with
from employment and ordering their reinstatement to their
petitioner METRO. Private respondent workers recognized
former positions without loss of seniority and other rights
that their employer was not petitioner LRTA when their
and privileges.
certified exclusive collective bargaining representative,
On appeal, the NLRC found that the striking workers failed the Pinag-isang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa METRO, Inc. –
to heed the return to work order and reversed and set aside National Federation of Labor, otherwise known as PIGLAS-
the decision of the labor arbiter. The suit against LRTA was METRO, INC. – NFL – KMU, entered into a collective
dismissed since "LRTA is a government-owned and bargaining agreement with petitioner METRO. Piercing the
controlled corporation created by virtue of Executive Order corporate veil of METRO was unwarranted, as there was no
No. 603 with an original charter"10and "it ha[d] no competent and convincing evidence of any wrongful,
participation whatsoever with the termination of fraudulent or unlawful act on the part of METRO, and, more
complainants’ employment."11In fine, the cases against the so, on the part of LRTA. LRTA further contends that it is a
LRTA and METRO were dismissed, respectively, for lack government-owned and controlled corporation with an
of jurisdiction and for lack of merit. Hence, twin petitions original charter, Executive Order No. 603, Series of 1980, as
for review on certiorari of the decision of public respondent amended, and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction only of
the Civil Service Commission, not the NLRC.

"[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,

instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
On the other hand Private respondent workers,
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
however, submit that petitioner METRO was not only fully-
charters." Corporations with original charters are those
owned by petitioner LRTA, but all aspects of its operations
which have been created by special law and not through the
and administration were also strictly controlled, conducted
general corporation law. In contrast, petitioner METRO is
and directed by petitioner LRTA. And since petitioner
covered by the Labor Code despite its later acquisition by
METRO is a mere adjunct, business conduit, and alter ego
petitioner LRTA, SC holds that the employees of petitioner
of petitioner LRTA, their respective corporate veils must be
METRO cannot be considered as employees of petitioner
pierced to satisfy the money claims of the illegally dismissed
LRTA. The employees hired by METRO are covered by the
private respondent employees.
Labor Code and are under the jurisdiction of the Department
of Labor and Employment, whereas the employees of

Issue: petitioner LRTA, a government-owned and controlled

corporation with original charter, are covered by civil
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over
service rules. Herein private respondent workers cannot
LRTA’s employees or is it the CSC?
have the best of two worlds, e.g., be considered government
Whether or not private respondents were illegally employees of petitioner LRTA, yet allowed to strike as
dismissed? private employees under our labor laws. Petitioner LRTA
cannot be held liable to the employees of petitioner
The SC agrees with petitioner LRTA. Section 2 (1),
With regard the issue of illegal dismissal, petitioner
Article IX – B, 1987 Constitution, expressly provides that
METRO maintains that private respondent workers were not

illegally dismissed but should be deemed to have abandoned

their jobs after defying the assumption of jurisdiction and
return-to-work order issued by the Labor Secretary. Private
respondent workers, on the other hand, submit that they
could not immediately return to work as the light rail transit
system had ceased its operations. The contention of the
petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their
position is also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith
takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said
to have abandoned his work.

For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for

termination of employment there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. This refusal must be clearly established. As we
stressed in a recent case, mere absence is not sufficient; it
must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to
the fact that the employee simply does not want to work