CHAPTER 4

Theoretical Concepts

l,

l~(~io1irm admits a variety of theoretical concepls into the science of behavior. T/,ese
-~ n.'?J?'ts differ in how closely they are linked to the behavioral data language. Trans-
'}1J'fttions within the behavioral data lang1,1age are securely linked and pose no prob-
;i ~.'.~i?tate, ~i~posittonal, and op~rational.ly de.fined ~oncepts, however, provide_ ~1:ly
. .f;4Ji/ftl defit11t1ons smce they a1·e rndeterm1nate and, in the case of the .first two, open
::J(jff.f!l.~ I n li"c~'> even. ope1'ationally de.fin~d concepts ~re a/so open. . .
:. }ltíJerve ung var19bles t,e together a set of mterrelated independent variables wtth a
¡ l/J.~f~n~ rm~ependent _variab~es. Behavioris:s differ a.s to whether the b~nefi,ts of
¡ ...• en,ng variables outweigh their dangers. This debate centers on the tact,ca/ issue
:. ·f/JfJüthe: co11cepts fa:i~it.ate ~r inhib~t resea~ch and explqnat~ rather than on the
: i:A1f.í)soph1cal respectabzl,ty of interve111ng variables. r ( '\
:·-1{,'.i similar. debate ~:ises over the admission of ,h_Ypotk.~!J.:_~'!.,rútructs, theoretical
'. = ¡ti,J_p.ts wh1ch explicitly refer to unobserved entities. Proponents argue that hypo-
·:((f¡az constructs are n..:,:..~ssary 1f the science of behavior is to be reducible, explana-
.r,~JB:·and Jertile. Opponents see these constructs as diluting .,the objective and empirical
~,lre of thescie11ce. Although none of these arguments i~ conclusive and many de-
1,~~;on individual intu~tions about ho~ rese.arch is .best performed, most behaviorists
(fp.~orporate hypothettcal constructs m the,r theorres. Nfvertheless, they implicitly
. ·I~:~;~e
' restrictions on the postulated features of these constructs so that the dangers are
.· /leed .
.~· ~:i~t • 1
. ~ l""'
.···1;.¡~::. .
fgifhhe
··a,ñ:i
reasons discussed in the preceding chapter, the boundaries of the be-
·a[~fo.ral data language are not sharply defined. Yet, wherever they are drawn,
l"'l\'¡d'
~:f~tudy of beha:7ior must exceed them t~ establ~sh a science.. It must tran-
~ ~)l the immed1ate momentary observat1on to 1m·p ose or d1scover coher-
~ f in its subject matter. Therefore, concepts must ;be introduced which do
;:qualify as terms in the behavioral data language. ·
·. · ·s r equirement, however, raises serious problems for the behaviorist
· "ram. By tying the behavioral data language to observation and intersub-

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 56 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

jective agree111.ent, b~haviorists ensure that terms within this language ~

\ the twin críteria of en1.piricalness and objectivity. To introduce tenns ou~
\ this language is to risk including subjective and speculative notions. Th;
fore, behaviorists ins.ist that theoretical concepts be linked securely to the ·
havioral data langua~e. They disagree, however, on the nature of this r ·
age, differing on how loase a linkage is permissible. 1 This issue forrns ·
next major node of ~he behaviorist conceptual tree diagram.

.,&
FIRST-ORDER CONCEp '.
Trari.sformations Within the B.ehavioral Data Langu~
,- ".
--...~ Man y theoretical concepts ~.E..I:. unproblematic because they represent m~ · ..
{ ~~formations within. the beha~-i o.r:i.1 dat[_la1·rg~ge. "Rate of ~esponse': is.
example of a concept which Ífltegrates over multiple observat1ons but 1s ~ , :
the equivalent of the -set of them. Similarly, the "average nu1nber of subj~ :
turning right," wheti not a whole number, represents a datu1n that canq
possibly be observed1• t
Because none of these concepts refers to any entity or process existing4 · ·; • 1
son1.e unobserved realm and because they can ali be defined solely by te( ;
within the behavioral data language, they pose no methodological problerr(
lndeed, by son1e definitions of the behavioral data lan guage, these concep ··
are included in it. Under the other definitions, their unproblematic nature ~- -
their proxinlity to the data language should admit the1n to what might : · :
labeled the "extended behavioral data·language."

States and Dispositi~ . -:

In the sin1plest case, behavioral laws permit the inference of statements abo '
responses from state1nents about the external environment. The form of su¡
laws would be: "Given stimuli a, b, e, . . . t~en responses x, y , z, . . . "~; .
is clear from elemen~ary considerations about behavior, however, that la'Yl :
of this form are inadequate. _More often than_ ~ot, the response is not uniqu~lf ·
determined by externa! env1ronn1ental cond1t1ons alone. Consider a few sinf :
ple examples: a dog's response when food is placed befare it depends o~ .
whether it is hungry;. a female rafs respo.n~e to.ª male rat depends on its es{
trous cycle; whether ?- tap to the knee ehc1ts a Jerk depends on the subjecú
health. In all thesc illustrations, the res oq~e depends on factors other than ~ ·
externa! stimulus. These factors a é..cícst:i:te~.., of the organism and in.elude ~i
age, health, species, hunger, w~kefu 1 , a emotion. -J
A st_a~_e__E.~~~9-. j.$ a vari~J;2!~.c!!?_t_~_r_xp.igjng~hi~p_sti~nulus-response laws are i~ ·
effcct. 3 The functions served by state variables can be de1nonstrated b y -:a~
idealizcd model. Assu.me a universe consi~ting of only one organism, A, only ;

._i.

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 FIRST-ORDER CONCEPTS 57 •
'•

f . uli,
and S2 , and only two responses, R1 and Rz. Suppose it is found
$1
\times S1 produces R 1 , but on othcr occasions it pr'Odueies R2, Likewise
. hnd that S2 occasionally produces R 1 and at other times it produces R 2 •
'\ 1glance, no lawfulne:ss is apparent. However, assume further t~at it is
. . .·that A's response to a stim.ulus depends on its state, T(A), wh1ch can
·~.two possible values, T 1(A) or T 2 (A). La wfulness nlight be introduced
, 1

Tl(A): S1-----R1
T1(A): S-----Rz

T2(A): Sl===========R2 ·
l· :~e
? ...
'¡i,s of this form are :·::m~. 2 1

O ften T is ref:r red to as the ~

equation relating stii.nulus and response. Note, however, tliat-t~_t.erin
,, ••; 1 : . ... :9ered the parameter is n1erely a matter of convention, and there is noth-

; _ .. · . ;riherently "param.etric''' about a state. A stimulus, too, can function as a

1
. ~ . c.,• •._ •
i:;:. . '1eter m the above mo del:
S1.: T 1 (A)- - - - - - + R 1
Si: T2(A) R2
S2: T1(A) Rz
S2: T2(A) R1
,.
" !variables thus serve the function of restoring lawfulness to stimulus-re-
'-.~:ie connections when a simple one-to-one correspondence between stin1-
: ' ·~and response is lacking. 4
_·..~,1 · )ites are not observable in the sam.e way as sti1nuli and responses. For
..:·,r · .;~··p le, the dog is thought of as hungry even when no food-related stitnuli
·) ·i :)pon.ses are present. Thus an organism may be reported to be in state T
7¡ J.p~rticular time even though nothing observed at that tÍlne indicates the
1

.: ·li~: Hence, terms denoting states do not qualify for the behavioral data lan-
l .

. : ·. . . e ..
,'.c ommon approach to states is to admit them to the science but to define
~~· ·!f: • .

:-~f1 solely by tern1s in the behavioral data language. The organis1n is said
. ,. :,~.e in the state if and only if certain stilnuli produce certain responses. In
..:~·!f~n:1odel above this can be formulated: . ·
-~ e:~ >: T 1(A) iff ((S 1- - - - R i ) or (S- - - - R 2))
l 1:(:~1
: ,·1a is, A is in state T 1 if and only if either S1 produces R 1 , or S 2 produces
· ~.: the definition contains only stimulus and response terms from the be-
. ·.~ral data language .
. :hderstood this way, S ~ _ ! ¿ J J : ~ concepts commonly used in
:' scicnce and everyday spee_sh.~- To say that an object is soluble, for ex-
. ·<le,. is not to say that it is t;°the process of dissolving, but that when placed

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 58 TI-IEORETICAL CONCEPTS

in water it will dissolve. In general, to attribute a disposition to a object-¡;·

state that under certain conditions, éaIIec:l
11
·1.'e st' conditi·a n·s ," c~rta:in··9.:a
will
_,. .-.resu1t. Th~·s·state~
.- ...-._.i.- -(~~-g~~. h;~ger) can be conºstrued as dispositions in w@. 'I

the stimuli are the test conditions (e. g., food), and the responses are the o"
comes (e.g., eating) .
Note that for both dispositions and stato:!s, the conditional is assumed
hold only when certain other conditions obtain: the soluble substance is ..
1
expected to disso'lve if the water is frozen. These other conditions are cove{
by the ceteris paribt.u clause implicitly inclucled in the definition of a dispq .
tional term, although these ~gnditions canno1 be exhaustively list~d . Since h_' ·:
test co~di~i~~s (stimuli) and 01..Hs2..mes (responses) are pu bl~ ~nd observa~~
the attribu~i..9_~ _?_f ?- state meets behaviorist r:riteria of objec.~1.Y.gY ..ª~~~-~ ·
calness. t, ·
.. ~ - - - - - - i• j
·i
1

Operationally Defined Concep.'

·t
~ n:ieth~dological procedure ensuring that 111 intro_du~ed con~epts posses~I{
s1m1lar hnkage to observations is ·offered by operat1on1sm. Bndgman (192¡ ·
suggests that a concept be identified with the operations used to measure i_i .
To find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. Til
concept of length is therefore fixed when the operacions by which length is measurij
are fixed : that is, the concept of length in vol ves :1s much as and nothing more tha~
(p.'·$i
set of operations; the concept is sy nonym o1,1s with tJ1 ;! correspond1'ng set of operations.

In adapting operational principies to psychology Stevens (1939) asserts: :!

A term denotes something only when there are ,:oncrete criteria for its applicabilitf
and a ·proposition has empirical meaning only when the criteria of its truth or fals~
consist of concrete operations which can -be performed u pon demand . . . . When ~t
attempt to reduce complex operations to simpler 1nd simpler enes, we find in the eq~
that discriminati-on, or di.fferential response, is th,! fundamental operation.••, (p. 228) ·,1 !·
. ,.
Operationist principles are neatly congruent with behaviorist aspirations. ]f
it is stipulated that operations must be publidy observable (i. e. , introspection
is excluded), repeatable, and specified precisely enough for others to carry
them out, then there will be intersubjective· agreement and verifiability foi
the operations, their results , and ·consequently the application of the concept}
As a prescription, operationism stipulates that co·ncepts be introduced only
by operational definitions-i. e., in terms of operations u sed to measure thc
concept. As a t est, operationism states that c:oncepts that cannot be given an
operacional definition are scientifically unacceptable . ·
Far application in behaviorist psychology, operationism requires certairi
modifications. In Bridgman's original formulation, operatiorúsm concems thc
relationship between concept and measurement in physics. As compared witb
physics, psycJ:iology has developed very few concepts which can be measured

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 FIRST-ORDER CONCEPTS 59
.. . . precise way. Therefore, operational definitions in psychology often give
;~he _9p~_r-~.t i_~ __:13-~.~_!.C?....9~~:.S.~!1.~_.?-.P..PJY... ;!?:.:...~~cept. For example, the
·jt"'having a sensation of red" may ~e ope~atio~~lly defined_ by the op-
.~tis used to set up a perceptual expenment 1n wh1ch the subJect reports
~1111.!llli.:i1fi
,l '. . red." Here the operations define when the concept "having a sensation
,.:·_.':;' may be applied to the subject but do not include measuring_ opera-
. ·It ·By this broadening of operationism, behavio:ists extend the use_ of
, .· .·t i;ronist methodology to concepts as yet unqua~t1fied, thereby ex:i~unng
)f" ;"larger range of concepts meet behaviorist standards of acceptab1hty.
~o.ugh_in principie opera~io~ism seems straight.forward,_ in practi~e its
Jl~ation 1s not w1thout amb1gu1ty. One source of 1ndeterm1nateness 1s the
.,. iljn which the concept is "synonymous with" the operations. Taken lit-
{ \ :~.~¡;.this is unintelligible. 8 It would mean, far instan ce, that "distance" means
._;ti,ij,(:operation of_ choosing a s~andard unit, the operation of mar~ing off,:
·;;fl~t3/ith-these un1ts, the operatlon of placing the rod next to an obJect, etc.
;-~more acceptable_ interpretation of operationism. would ~e that the con-
.}e,g., d1stance) IS. defined as the r~~-~-!.ºf spea.!ie1_ ~p~ra~ons °.!
.· ¡~lf measurement with a ruler). In particular, to-Say that a certá1n ól5Ject,
·'.. • ·'::,_ossesses a property, T, at a particular value, N (e.g., "The distance to
\1i~f~ble is 90 cm") is to specify the results ("pointer readings,,) of those op-
\~. .t1ons.
r • ~ •·
Thus, .
>:l'í , /;· [T(A).= N] iff [(operations on A) .... N]
i'¡~jji\:
:Jti,n T is a property which is not measurable, then N represents a two-val-
.@ i.function i?dic~ting whether ?r not A possesses T.
Jtfp.,r~ulated 1n t~1s way, operationally d~~ned concepts are 2~~i.ti.o.ns. The
~,~at1on:_ar~ equ1v~lent .t~ t~e t~~t.. ~~r:1~:h_?,ons, and the r~su~ts of the opera-
:¡¡lfs ~re eq:uval~1:t to ---~~-e .. te_st_ o~t~_<::~~.es. 9 What operat1orusm adds to the
iUys~s of d~spos1t1ons _is the pnnc1ple that ali concepts are dispositional, e~n
:~ ~s hke we1ght and d1stance. -
J;i1z:t --·
·U,!fj;.
~,~-
,,~1i..
JJ~tes, dispositions, and operationally defined concepts appear, therefore. to
Partial Definitions

lj_íte a common logical. form:

¡t: .
·'•r·
T(A) iff [S(A)------+R]

~i,.$.·erious problem with an · three types of concepts is that the definition is in

]~j,fprm of a conditional: "S(A)----~R." By ·truth functional logic,
~f?n~itional _is true ~f the antecedent of the conditjonal is false~ Therefore,
:ji~) 1s true 1f S(A) 1s false. Far example, any rock not placed in water is
·1·~ t~
, jP:ble by this kind of definition of a disposition. 10 Therefore, Camap sug-
.:~
.... ~
an alternate formulation:
~:·

;t~t:·.
::i..,,_....
i.' .

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60 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

S(A)-----+[R iff T(A)] \1

,i

This says that if the test condition is in effect, then an object may be sai· ·.
have the disposition if and only if the required outcon1e occurs. In the .-.
an1ple, "soluble" would be defined as follows: lf an object is placed in W~'
then that object 1nay, be said to be soluble if and only if it dissolves. Untf
this forn1.ulatio11 the rock not in water ceases to be a problem, for it does n
satisfy the definition. Carnap calls his formula a "bilateral reduction ~..
tence," and he recoffi:mends its use for introducing dispositional terms. ll ,...,
Bilateral reduction sentences have logical properties with important im·~ .
cations far introducing tern1s into bchaviorist psychology. First, the state·:
disposition T is defined only if S(A) obtains, and the application of the e?.
cept is therefore indeterminate for all those instances in which S(A) <loes · ,
obtain. This area of indetern"linacy lea ves open the possibility that test co· :
ditions other than S(A) can be used when S(A) does not obtain. Thus as~ 1
ond characteristic of introduction by bilateral reduction sentences is that jfl,
"open" in the sense t·h at further bilateral reduction sentences-i. e. , test e~ ;
ditions and outcomes for the disposition-can be added as they are clise~.·
ered, thereby reducing the area of indeternlinacy. · -~,i :
As additional bilateral reduction sentences accrue, the result is wha t Carn) ;
calls a "reductive chain" in the fonn: · ..
.,
'
S 1 (A)========[R1 iff T (A)] ·tf
S2 (A) [R2 iff T (A)l jl'i
SJ(A)- - - ~ [ R3 iff T(A)] .. l
.
• 1.
., .
•
:(

•
• 1 :e,
Sn(A)---~[Rn iff T(A))
:f
I
where Si represents ~ test condition, and R¡ · represents the associated ouú
come. Indeed, most dispositions in everyday speech are manifest in n1ore tha~.
one way. For example, to say that Janes knows algebra is . to attribute to hiiíl
an ability to do many: things. Moreover, the attribution is open in that othci
manifestations may be added as, say, he learns to use a computer and can
therefore den1onstrate his knowledge of algebra in new ways . This open na·
ture of dispositional concepts permits them to play ~n integrative role in con·
ccpt formation. ·:
The open texture óf reductive chains and their indeternünacy mean thil
the reductive chain provides only a "parti-ª'r.'_gef~tion of a dispositi~!1al .term.1~
The reductive chain is therefore neith.er an explicitoperational oCfüíhion of
the term nor a "translation" of the term into the behavioral data language:
Acceptance of dispositional terms into the behaviorist science thus means· thc
1 . . _ _.._ _

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 FlRST-ORDER CONCEPTS 61
.,,.
·:·1pn of concepts tie~!~:he be~ioral 4.a.~.!!J.,mgu.age by a link weaker
~-
.:plicit ~!1J.!iQ.n.

..ip Partial Definitions and Operational Definitions

·.. ;~~o.nal definitions are also indeterminate since they assign no value when
.....eration is not .in_effect. However, in contrast to redUftÍve chains, ºP-.-:
)1al de~:1.~~~~-1~~--ªr: _
11:eant t~ be closed definitions . A co~~~~p·t~d~fi~ed
wyoné opera tio n , and di'lf~r~·¡;:·1:··operatío11·s"·d~fine different concepts. If
-~tlli. ~.!i~~i,~ula~ co~cept is defined by a certain measuring operation, and a second
tion 1s d1scovered that apparently 1neasures the concept as well, strict
itio11isn1. dem.ands that the second operation be considered as defining a
, .·¿
~ . concept rather than as an alterna.te measure of the first. Thus t strict

).tional definitions do not share the open texture of Carnap's reductive

.:':~ .~'~ and therefore cannot function in concept fo rmation a~reductive chains
., ,:,· .
:: · · · e.h aviorists treat this issue in severa! ways. The heroic response is to sac-
: .: ~:· ·!.the integrative role of concepts in favor of the protect1on offered by
): ' ~'lt-,.~perationisn1. This decision -m eans that for each operation, a separa te
tf.
;.--; ·.> empirical laws is required to relate a. concept to other variables. Strict
>t :· -~tionism demands that a law relating two nonoperationalized variables,
; :''.' ,.. ·. ·. hlch can be measured in m ways, and Y, which can by rneasured in n
, ,: 1 ' must be construed nbt as a single general law but as 111 X 11 see_rute
• ···~ ;

: }'ji .~,. Furthermo re, according to strict operationis1n, the m methods thought
; ··easure X, cannot be viewed as different ways of disclosi.ng the same
'. .l jnitude. Instead, each method defines a different variable. The resulting m
: l .".'.,a,bles are then considered to b~ related by empirical laws over an observed
.-~.: -~·.e ather than by the fact thatthey all reveal so1ne c 'o mmon aspect of na-
ijf. . 1" AlthoughsÜ·cn_·a con~e~vadv~ approac.h creat~s a .science less vulne~a-
,ijf¡:to the 1~eed ~~r maJo r_ rev1s10.n w1th new d1scovenes, 1t clearly pays a pnce
:Hftoss of sunplicity and 1ntegrat1on. 15 If the convergence of concepts and laws
i~ prerequisite and consequence of theory development then operationism
~j.y'.shield science only by. i~hibiting it~ gro~th. . . . .
j.S ¡Q_ther beh.a.vieris~, unw~lhng to sa~nfice e1ther 1nte~rat1on or caut1on: try

l
. \fose the two. This feat 1s accomphshed by suggest1ng a method for 1nte-
"''' .
· ~Jing operations into ª--~!!.'Ü~.le concept. According to this approach, con-
'1pts are initially to yedef!_ned by on~y one o~eration. _lf continued experi-
.,··ntal research reveals th~.t lV'lO operat1ons cons1stently y1eld the saine results,
~::r. the two opera~!:?.i~· may be considered as measuring and defining the
· 'e concep[t6-A.é:lditional operations can be added to the concept by the same
~ns,'"-afTürther research warrants. This approach is appealing because it ap-
iii¡ts to retain the virtues of operationism without sacrificing theoretical con-
~gence. However, this approach raises difficulties of its own.
'•('
1/ .
:;).·,
\~1. .
·~Jr'.
;.• ;e• :
! _ __,...
• t .-

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62 THEORETICAL CONCEPT·s

First, the suggested method for integrating operations undermines the v:·
rationale for Bridgman's operationism. Rela6vity theory had showri that phy."
was led to a crisis by the assumption that its basic concepts, such as time ~
space, can be measured in various ways all revealing the same underlyi-
physical property. This assumption had to be abandoned with the discov~
that the equivalence of diffe.rent measuremc:nt procedures breaks down ad
extremes of the range and that measurement is dependent on th~ conditi~
of the observation. Operationism is intended as a replacement. Thus, the~~
haviorist suggestion that two operations rn.ay be said to measure and deff
the same concept if they yield the same results is in effect to make the in{
tive leap that operationism was meant to forbid. 17 The observed congru(
of two measurement operations over a restricted range and under a lim? .
set of circumstances does not permit the id entification of the two, accord~ , ;
to the strict operati.onal approach. :~ J
A second problem with the behaviorist suggestion arises in determining wh . i
the two operations give the same results. {f initially each measurement ~. 1
eration defines a distinct concept, then a tl tird operation is needed to defjJ /
the concept of ''sameness of results." 18 Ho,vever, the nature of this third ·d •/

eration is never precisely specified. This prolilem is especially acute when th·.
is little overlap in area of application far the two operations. For examp
the method of triangulation is commonly u sed to measure extraterrestial d}
tances where there is no possibility for a comparison with distance as m~·
sured by a rod. Although the problem of defining the third operation nt
not preve to be insurmountable, it has ye•: to be resolved in ways that a
consistent both with operationism and wit.h the exigencies of concept fpr
mation in scientific theory. · ·
Underlying these questions about operationism and concept formation {
more fundamental problem in operationisn-L. Operationists have not sutce!t i
fully provided criteria for che individuation of operations. 19 That is, there:_. :'.
no formal way of determining whether 01 · not two activities represent tfj \
same operation. In Bridgman's classic exam ple, measuring distance by use:; ;
a rod is not the same operation as measurernent by use of light rays; therefciti- i
they define two concepts. But what about the operation of measuring witlf~ '.
ruler marked in meters compé\red with one marked in feet? Are Smith~· '.
movements in using a ruler the same operation as Janes'? Is measuring wi"_' :
a rod in the morning the same operation as measuring in the evening? Théf° .
are an infinite number of ways in which any two activities are similar arl
different. Without a criterion of individuation, there is no way to decide wh. · ;
to ignore the differences and classify the tw o activities as the same operati~ :
and when to ign:ore the similarities and con:iider the two as defining differc .· :
concepts.
In practice it is only a ~ l . that such distinctions are drawn. Only a~;·
it is known that temperatur~ affects length is measurement at extreme te ;
..~·
•,

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 .
INTERVENING VARIABLES 63
•· . i
~s considered to be a different operation from, measurement at middle-
·cm.peratures. It cannot be known in advance which similarities and
kces are to be selected or ignored in defining' operations. If the initial
'C:\n is incorrect in that certain ignored differences are found to be im-
~t ··~nd the class is too broad, then the resulting empirical laws and cor-
' ps will not have the same simplicity and ordérliness as a classification
f··distinguishes on the basis of those differences. Conversely, if the con-
·:·.: defined too narrov.rly-i. e., important simil~rities are ignored-then
.::ulting laws will di.splay redundancy. Expansion of the classification re-
. )a. the convergence of man y laws into fewer but more general ones. 20
··"\are·. no formal rules for constructing categories that maximize both
·dty and comprehensiveness. 21 Therefore, operationism is not an algo-
¡for concept formation. 22
:~ these considera·tions it follows that although an operational definition
: e .forn1ulated at any given stage, it is subject to revision in so far as its
'?-.for individuation of opera.tions are vulnerable to change. Viewed this
~pper ational definitions ~1ire the open-textured quality of reductive
~:. The only majar difference is that with the red~°"ctive chain, che con-
)rviewed ~(~pe3/.t :11 stages, and ne~ r~du_ction _sentenc~s are merely
: ~.to the ex1stln-g'scheme. From the operat1on1st po1nt of v1ew, the con-
,.· given a fixed closed definition, and every revision of individuation cri-
\ viewed as Íntro·d~·cing a new concept, albeít with the same name. 23
~ er concept development is visualized as the gradual evolution of a sin-
, cept or as series of discrete su bstitutions of improved concepts for less
.ones of the same name seems to be more a matter of taste ra_ther than
. .;~mental epistemological principle. Thus the differences between con-
~introduced by reductive chains anq those operationally defined all but
·. ,24

INTERVENING VARIABLES
,. .
1

,.-:·.~psitional concepts and operationally defined c:oncepts share important

:.~ features with the "i11_t~y~e," ~ t~..E,e of c2-1:.~~E-½~troduced
· olman which lays a central role 1n oehav1on,st matatheory. Tolman
. ' describes his use o1the1~t;~~enÍng varia6f~Ís way.:

;,.ory, as I shall conceive it, is a set of "interve~n-~·. :'~~!.~~~les." These to-be-in-

intervening variables are 'constr~_g,s,' which w.e . : . evolve as a useful way of
... ng down into more manageahle form the or~gi~al complete [empi~cal] fu~c-
. li • • And I have conceived a set of . : . funct1ons to connect thcsc mtcrvenmg
les severally to che independent variables, on the one hand, and a f~nction . . .
~bine thcm together and connect them to the final dependent van~ble, on the
~. (p. 9)
t· .

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 64 THEORETICAL'CONGEPTS

f\ An intervening variable thus represents a ~elationship between a set of inJ

~· · :~!ª~«:9.-~~?-.. ~..e..e.~~1j.:~~-t_~_ar~:.?~es_~~~- .~. s~t .?.E 15_~~~~!ate?. .?eren4_~?~t_JJii~~1es ~
~1
~. When behav1oral measures covary, th1s corr~la_tion cari be na1ned ande·
( ceptualized as a c~nui:io.n factor among all the measures. For exaiñple, a ri
., rate of lever press1ng for water, its toleration for quinine in its drinking wa(
l and the an1ount it dririks when provided with free access to water are,th':
· \ behavioral n1easures Which tend to covary. This covariation can be sai·
( represent an intervening variable, termed "thirst," reflected by each ofl
three behavioral meas'Ltres. .''
The intervening variable is also securely linked to the independent v~·
ables. lt is, as behaviqrists often describe it, "an!=hored on both sides. " 26 ··
be anc~ored on the other side, the state must be shown to correlate wi~
set of 1nterrelated independent variables . Thus, for example, the number'
hours the rat is deprived of water, the a1nount of salt in its diet, and the té
perature of its cage torrelate, in that each one affects behavior in similar w-l
T~efore, it can be said that these independent variables all affect a CO[!l~
~te called "tl~irst. '_' Anchored on both sides, the int~rvening v~riable rep~
se s the relat1onsh1p .between a set of dependent variables, which covaryij
a function of ea.ch of :i set of independent variables, and a set of independ~
variables each of which produces the san1e covariation in the set of depen~~
variables. . ·
ldeally the anchoring ~n the two sides sho uld be qu~ntitative and given'.
defining equatioñs. lri practice thi~ kind of definition is rardy achieved, H
a modelcñ-tlre ideal introduction of an intervening variable in the simpr
case helps to illustrat~ its conc~'-\al status. At the mínimum, the introd~
tion of an intervening variable,~¡tequires two indepe~ria~les, 11 ª.i
Ji, two dependent variables, D1 and D2, and four emp1ncally d~ed eq ·
tions. In an initial experin1ent,often termed the. "defining experin1e11t," ,t ·
relationship betwee~ D1 and I1 is deternüned while all other relevant variabl
are held constant:.'27 Fi;-0111 the defining experiment: ·~ ,
(1) D1 = F(I,)

The intervening variable T is introduced by stipulation either iu tern1s of ·:

or ¡ 1 • lt is of no iinportance which is ch osen since the choice of one logica.
entails the relationship of T ·to the other. Thus: · J
(2) T = G(D 1 ) by stipulation; therefore 1
(~) -T= G(F(I 1)): by thc stipulation in conjunction with equation (1). ~
_ .. _ i • .,

Equations (2) and (3) :.define T in tern1s of .depend_ent and indepe~dent va ·

ables and thus securely anchor the interven1ng van.able on both s1~es. Thr1:
more empírica! relation,sh.ips between dependent and 111de?endc:nt variable~ m11_
be determined. Since there are two dependent and two 1ndepende11t vanabl_~

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 INTERVENING VARtABL,ES 65

.e four different sequences in which this can be carried out. Because

·:.:_achieve the saine pu-r pose, only one will be illustrated.
~-.·e cond experiment, the relationship between D1 and h is deternüned:

D, =H(h)
.~flinductive logic of the intervening variable, 1t 1s assun1ed that values
'.'~hen produced by changes in lz refl.ect T in the saine way as those
'}el
by changes in..!,i. Therefore from equations (2) and (4):
. T=G(H(l:z))
·, ):d experiment, the relationship of D 2 to 11 is determined:
"t"f :.
D2 = K(I1)
·~ ·'.inductive logic of the intervening variable it is assumed that D2 also
.' ,T. From equation (3) it follows that:
. ·:.. ~
, _:.;_'.. I 1 = F*(G*(T))
~'... -.,/
\ .F* and G* are the inver'se functions of F and G, respectively; i.e., for
~µnction, P, there is an inverse function, P*, such tlut for all x,
•.;))= x. Therefore; from the assumptions of the intervening variable and
(6) and (7):
D 2 = K(F*(G*(T)))
= K(F*(G*(G(H(I2))))) from equation ·(S)
= K(F*(H(l 2))).
/'·.
.o.ation (9) is the key equation for the intervening variable. It is an em.-
_Jilaw relating an empirically defined dependent variable D2 to an e1n-
1
.. ~y defined ·indepen~ent variable 12. However, this law is derived by in-
}ye logic,__ p.:rior to empirical observation, from three empirically-derived
~Jo1ís'" án~ the as.s_µmptfons · of the intervening variable. The derivation of
;--loñ"{9j .t an thus be viewed as a prediction prior to the fo,urth experi-
.-,\a.c..as· ·~n explanation of equation (9) if it is indeed found to be the result
' :~~(fourth experiment. In either case, the derivation makes use of T. lf the
' ts of the fourth experiment conform to equation (9) then the assump-
.~·gain in degree of confirmation, and the intervening variable T preves
.'::a useful concept.
~
· ditional variables can be added to. the intervening variable by the same
· '·bds. A dependent variable is added by first empirically determining its
,onship to an indcpendent variable al'ready known to belong to T. Fron1
· esult, the assumed relationship of this dependent variable to T n1ay be
:-_-·c cd (cf. equations (6) and (8)). Fro1~ this, the relationship of thc depen-
/ariable to another independent variable in T 111ay be deduced (cf. equa-

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 ..
66 THEORETICAL C-ONCEPTS '
tion (9)). If the deduction is confirmed by experiment, then the candidat~
a~cepted into the intervening variable; if not, it is excluded. A similar to·o
nique can be used for testing independent ,,ariables for prospective mernb 1
shi~ in T . Thus the intervening variable is an open concept in that additioij
variables may be added with new discoveries. 28 .·
As equations (2) and (3) indicare, intervening variables are defined by.-b~·
\ dependent and Índependent variables. To s~1y that the value of an interven·~
\ variable T for an organism has the value N is therefore to say something ab·~ll
~ the behavior of that organism. However, it is not necessarily to say sorn·
~ thing about its current behavior. The value· of the· thirst-intervening-varia .,.
for a particular rat as measured by the independent variables may be vi·,
high, for example, but behaviors associated with the intervening variable ni'
be absent because other factors interfere. Without available water, the dcp~
dent varia ble amount-drunk cannot be me:1sured. Thus, the value of an .:.
tervening variable is reflected in behavior only under appropriate circt/ .
stances. Therefore, to say that T = N for .in organ.ism is to say that und . ]
circumstances C 1 dependent variable D 1 ,vill have value x, under circu··1. i
stances C2 dependent variable D 2 will have value y, and so forth throughcf
che class of dependent variables in T. .'
\it ~\ When viewed. in t~·iis way, t~~.J1~-~=~~-~?.i:~B.-~~~~?.-~:..!..~sem~~es.....di~.!:?..:~tio:'· ~
\ concepts and operat1onally detined conce_P.ts d1scussed aEove. 29 The arMi' 1
stances·u'iúler· wníc1i-á~-iñteiv~nX~'g";~i;b1·~-;~·~fk~Í:;<l i;bcliavior are equt . ~
alent to the test con di tions under which a clisposition is manifest and the d. · t
finin"g operations for an operationally defined concept. Note that it is tlii
circumstances, Cn, and rzot the in dependen t variables, that are equivalent.:, '
the test conditions. Similarly, the valu es of the dependent variables for . ·. ·
intervening variable are the eguivalent of the manifest outcomes for the d~
position .and the results of the measuring operacions for the operationally '.
fined concept. .{
On the other hand. intervening variables differ in significapt ways fro~
dispositional and operationally defined concepts. In contrast with strictly ai
erationally defined concepts, intery~~~~g_y~ r}.~_~)~~-?re___open. 30 An intervenin'..
variable is realized by a progressivefy in crea üng number·"of behavioral dcpcq
dcnt variables wh.ile a strictly operationally I lefined concept is defined by ·o~,
one operation. Nevertheless, opera~ional ddin.itions serve an important ro.l
·within the formulation of an intervening variable because each of the va·
ables included in the intervening variable can be operationally defined.
Intervening variablc.s also differ from di~;positional concepts . As equatfo
(3) indicates, intervening variables are defi ned fron1 the stimulus side (i.~1
independent variables). Although response 1neasures .occur only under appr ~
priate circumstances·, the independent variables can be measurcd and assign
á determina te value even when the circums·cances are not appropriate foro ·.
serving the behavioral measures. For example, a rat may be said to be thirst -i
J
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 THE INTERPRETATIO.N OF CONCEPTS 67

~lit is not currently under test conditions for the intervening variable
· because the intervening variable is also defined in terms of indepen-
:'ables, such as hours of water deprivation, room temperature, and
• ·i et, which can be measured. Therefore, a well ,formulated in~~ry1:~i:ig
fp, unlike ~ .. ?isp?s.~.t.i.?.:1ª1./~!!.<:.~..Pt, is determina te ·e.v en w~en ;est con-
.:.... o ºñot prevail, and it is not introduced by reductive cha1ns. 3

THE INTERPRETATION OF DEFINED CONCEPTS

They Are Mere Labels
haviorist interpretation of theoretical c'oncepts is that they are
or observed relationships between behavior and the environ-
i,1 ~. ost important, they do not stand for entities, events, or processes
:~,.~g in ·an unobserved realm in an organism's body or mind. They are
:.a lly _lo catable, in that relationships may hold ~ver limited intervals of
_.u t like all relational concepts, they possess no spatial location.
··, ugh abstract concepts are admitted into behaviorist science, they are
be reified, 32 or assi ned
....
a causal role.33 An intervening variable''inter-
·- ··- - - ......__........._.• ' - - - - 1 ..
·~o y m the sense t at the term representing the intervening variable
::· avioral law may be placed in a position intermedia te between the de-
~~, and the independent variables. Thus from equations (1) and (2) it
·:.:·stated that:
D1 = G*(T) = F(I 1 )
" ·.example, that drinking is a function of thirst, and thirst, in turn, is a
··n of deprivation of water. How~ver, interven,ing variables are not to
~:ceived as events or processes occurring after an environmental event
fore a behavioral event.

They Are Elimina __

.__....,,.______, ble

)ew of concepts leads quite naturally to a second, more radical, opinion

· behaviorists. If concepts are truly nothing more than !H:.IDtS-of ob-
:, relationships, then why not eliminate them , altogether and deal di-
)vith those observed relationships? A well defined concept is easily eli-
:'1e, and a vaguely formulated one does not belong in a scien~t·anyway .
. tspos1t1on is attributed on the basis of sorne observable property, then
. .~avior should be explained as a function of that ohservable property
l'. ,than the disposition. 34 If the disposítion is ascribed on the basis of the
·.e r to ·be expliíñecf"'{e. g., eating ís explained as due to hunger which is
:" . .from the eating behavior) then the concept is circular, and the expla-
tspurious.

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 68 TH.EORETICAL CONCEPTS

lntervenin.g v_ariables can be eliminated in a similar manner. If an interv·

ing variable is defined by equations of the forn1 of equations (2) and (3), t
wherever T appears, · it n1ay be replaced by either G(D 1) or G(F(I1)). 35 Th·.
forc, equation (9) derived with the help of T niay be derived as well with'
it: .}

(10) ,=
11 F* (D 1) from equation (1)
(11) D2 = K(F*(D 1)) from equations (6) and (10).

Fron1 equations (4) and (11), equation (9) can be derived:

D2 = K(F*(H(l 2)))
without using T.
,.
I

They Are Undesir~ffl

:J\
Not only are conccpts eliminable, but, opponents argue, their elin1inatic{''
also desirable. Many behaviorists fear that although a well formula té" in· 1 ;
nning_v.anible or dispositional concept may be logically impeccable, in ptif :
tice, the introduction of concepts inevit~bly leads to misuse. Such conceV:-: '.
they clain1, tend to be hypostatized and are éasily -iega"rded as sy1nbolii .
unobserved events . All too often, T comes to be viewed as an unobser~
inner state of the org'a nis111-either a physio~ogic.al one, or worse, from a:
haviorist perspective, a 1nental one. Men"t¡Íism thus follows in the waké ,
these concepts.~... e~p-~_c;:J~lly when---thef ·areÍdentified with states known J
through in.trospectÍOijl, 36
•
· . :' . ;
• 1

Besides· the oaú-ger~ of misinterpretation of well forn1ulated concepts, tH' 1 ;

is the further risk, according to these critics, that once concepts are ad ·. i
ble, poorly formulated ones will be developed. 37 This is likely to occur w:
an interveni?g vari_able .is n~t securely ~nchore~ on th~ stin~ulus (i. e.~ in' -~
pcndent variable) s1de. In tlus case, the 1ntervemng variable 1s the eqwval: '.;
of a dispositional coricept. The peril here is that behavior will be explainedtll 1 .t
brought on by the disposition, but the disposition itself is left unexplain :;
, with no atten1pt to link the disposition with its causes in the externa! en·. ~ ~
\ ro11n1ent. Thus behavior is explained by a concept inferred from behavio( · j
} self. Although such correbtions within behavior may be occasionally use · ~
they are 1nore likely 'to inhibit the search for the environmental causal an !
cedents of both the behavior and the correlations. Because these environmc
tal anteccdents are directly 111anipulable while dispositions are not, thcir
covery is far more Íl~portant for the practical control of behavior. 38 '! ;
The situation is worse when the concept is anchored on neither side. In t'I-~
case the concept is often invented ad hoc to explain a behavior. Not only' .
such explanations illegitimate, but they are also misleading. On the one b:{ f
experimental research is diverted fron1 the true causes of behavior and is..,.. ·;
:]
J
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 THE INT.ERPR.ET~TION OF CONCEPTS 69

óward the understanding of the inner processes and entities rather than
.g ing the independent extern~l variables which truly control behavior.
:r.er, because the concept is not securely anchored to n1easurable obser-
s!,:...it is often assigned din"lensions different fro m those used in the other
~i, thereby isolating psychology fro.i:n the rest of science.
· the in troduction o f dispositional concepts and intervening variables is
' by sorne behaviorists to lead to several eventualities which are at
:e with fundamental behaviorist doctrine. At the same time, however,
<port~t to note that these arguments are directed at the practica! con-
..~'es of 1ntroducing certain concepts into behaviorist psychology rather
-} the ~oncept~ themselves. Properly formulated dispositional concepts
·~.erve111ng variables are not logically suspect. T he argumen ts in favor of ·/
~Jiill;ination: involve the possible misinterpretation of the concepts or the
~ctlon o f 1mproperly fonnulated ones . Therefore, the case against dis-
~f1al concepts and intervening variables may be said to be a "strategic" ., \

- ·
}her than a ''philosophical" one. -

.......'
•J :.
The Case for Concepts
~y Mediate Caiisality. Proponents of concepts argue that the alleged
s are exagger,.il.~nd that concepts offer certain important benefits that
.'.not to be forfeited .39 One function served by intervening variables is
·ey bridge the temporal gap between dependent and independent vari-
'.Very often considerable time may pass between the occurrence of an
.rident variable .such as the reinforcement of a response and the behav-
\g., the later occ~rrence of that response) which is a function of that
· e. The introduction of an intervening variable, such as ha bit strength,
as a contemporaneous summary of the organism's previous liístory and
·: trves to r1:1ediate the time interva~. 40. Wh~n the behav~or finall~.es oc-
.may be said to be caused by the 1mmed1ately preced1ng state{ T,· rather
y an independent ~~,tiable_~_,;i_~_l:!~-E.!:.s t. ·
ough this-Í~cornmon justification for the introduction of an inter-
:i variable, there are two major problems with it. First, if a11 intervening
'le .is
truly just a mathematical term fully defined ?Y. the equations in
(
·. it appears, then it cannot serve as a causal event d1~tmct from the de- ,,
1·ffvariables. 41 Second, the justification assumes tñat all ·causality is of the )
WPified by one billiard ball striking a second one. Howeve~, as .Hu1ne /
· ~vely argued, causal necessity is not observably present even. m thi.s ca~e. l.
e requirernent that a case always be temporally and spat1ally cont1g-
42
:. .ith its effect, sometimes called the "bead theory of causality, " as-
.' causal necessity.
;· e behaviorists therefore adopt a functional view ~f c~us~lity. Func-
43

.\;relations are substituted for causal on~an·a-.l'"xTi" a ·ruñe.don of y" re-

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 70 THEORETJCAL CONCEPTS
,J

places "x is caused by y." This approach to causalíty thus avoicls any i ::
cation that unobserved causal necessity intervenes between cause and e ·
It also obviates the need far the contemporaneous occurrence of cause·,
effect. Therefore, behavior may be said to be a function of an event ir{"
rem~te past, and there is no need for an intervening variable to mediate·../
statement is not meant to deny that phy3iological events intervene bct 1
the two occurrences . Indeed, it is undeni:lble that such events do occur:•.
point is that these physiological events de, not have to be referred to in l):
to state a functional relationship between behavior and the environment,;
a molar behaviorism, therefore, does not have to sacrifice such relat:
ships . 44 !
2. They Simplify. A second justification for the use of intervening vari~ .
h at the):' ~~:2:.P-1.~fy__~h~[qrm::i.l ,e~?~~.~sic'.~ .. 9f_~:,h?:~~;i.l laws: Assum~d
is t_
an 1ntervenmg relates n dependent vanab1es to m 1ndependent vana.bles . W1tij
the intervening variable, if each dependen,: variable is related to each indep
dent variable, m X n equations are required . With the incroduction of.j
intervening variable T, m equations are required to express T as a functi9·~
ea.ch independent variable, and n equations for T as a function of each de·.
dent variable, for a total of m + n equati,)ns. Hence, for m or n~2 andÍ ·
other ~3. the use of T decreases the number of equations necessary. The;:·
ings are only in formal expression. Ther,~ is no reduction of the numbd'
empirical experiments necessary to establ ish the behavioral laws, for a ,A ,
able cannot be assumed to· belong to the intervening variable unless it is.1'i~'Mi o;ai-~t:-;;

perimentally preven to be. 45 ·

In reply to this claim, it can be argued that each dependent variable ca'
expressed in one equation as a joint function of all the independent varia\{
In this case, only n long equations are reguired to express the empirical e~
tent of the experimentally determined la,vs, and this is fewer than the,.níl\
equations necess ary to express each of th-! dependent variables as a funG6
of T (n equations) as well as T as a joint function of all the independent v:f
ables. .f
However, even here, proponents of th<! intervening variable argue thi
serves an important role. They claim that the long equation relating a dcp~ . ,
dent variable to ali the independent variables is so complex that it cannof
dealt with effectively. By subdividing the long equation into smaller gro
of ind~pendent variables and identifying e:\ch group with an intervening v. ,..,
able, the entire equation becomes more intelligible and therefore mana· j
a ble. 46 Rclationships that would otherwise be missed are clarified in an eq . ··,
tion judiciously simplified by a chain of intervening variables. To be s .r !a
nothing in the simplified equa?on using ~ ch~in of inte~vening variabl :' i
_ \ '. n_ot_captured by the long equat1ons. The s1mphfied equat1on has only a h !
\ nst1c advantage over the long equations, not a logical one.
·.
!:.

: ~
·. :I •

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 THE INTERPRETATION OF CONCEPTS 71
::. acilitate Inductive Systematization. By syttematizing various em-
·~etermined relationships, an intervening variable facilitates predic-
. i·sug~ests ne:' expe~iments. Th~s is a third_ rfason why s~~e beh~v-
·yor mterven1ng variables. An 1mportant 1nstance of th1s 1nduct1ve
·;zation is to be found schematized in equations (1) through (9). This
.s, in effect, an algorithm for suggesting an experiment and predict-
·. sults. Although, as shown above, chis same ¡derivation can logically
·d out without T, through equations (10) and (11), it is not as likely
··e t it will be carried out. Without T, equatiqn (11) has no rationale.
fno reason to expect D 2 and D 1 to covary as suggested by equation
~é introduction of T along with the associated intuitions that T is a
. 1·. of 11 and 12 and that T is refl.ected by both D 1 and D2 provide a ra-
· :nd n1otive for the derivation. As the number of variables increases
ie than one intervening variable is introduced between dependent and
°iient variables, the derivation becomes more complex and T becomes
''lmportant heuristic. Hence, T introduces a degree of inductive sys-
,;átion that would be lost in its absence. 47
-m·{ithe three argurnents in favor of the intervening variable, like the ar-
._ _.,. -... ,,.. '
rs against it, are strategic
~ .......... ---..rather
_.....- •.... ..!hal}~
__ phil_osop.h. ical. Neither side claims
lÍervening variables are logically indispensib1e. The point of contention
~. around che predicted Co~s~§·u~~-~~(C?.f -~heir use. Proponents assert
:ch concepts possess.. heuristic val u e to facilita te research while oppo-
Y,er that concepts encourage abuses which impede scientific progress.
~ e relevant to this disagreement might be found in a historical study
1

~~ctual consequences of the use of intervening variables or from a psy- ....._

.·""·Y, yet to be achieved, which accounts for scientific thought. '
' ..

:ri;~
1t Conventionalism
-~· 1

0
~tifications offered for the u se of intervening variables emphasize their
)md lead quite naturally to a conventionalist view of theoretical terms
}ory. 48 Intervening variables are valued-becau_se they provide a short-
. ·J!·ummary of observed relationships, mediate the derivation of predic-
Jind 1
make complex eqÜa_d.~ more manageable. To be sure, interven-
. fiables must be valid in that they must accurately summarize
t:ations, mediate coñfi~ed predictions, and correctly subdivide com-
~':lªtions. However, because they do not symholize events or entities,
matter of human choice as to how they are 1 formulated, and in this
ey are conventions. Note, for example, thc s~ipulative nature of equa-
), definíng T. 49 Consequently, there is no unicaue set of valid interven-
·:·r iables, just as there is no unique true summary of observations. For
. son, intervening variables are selected not merely for their validity but
.o r their conven1ence 1 degree of economy, and effectiveness. -

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 72 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Fro1n this conventionalist point of view, it also follows tha.~ intervc:

variables have no unique represcntation, just as thcre is 110 unique shorth.
Matb.en1atical equat~ons are a con1mon n1ethod of representation but n~i:
only one. I11tervenin~ variables can also be symbolized by diagran1s, con
111echanical 111odels , · flow charts, or electrical fields. For exan1ple, Tol ;
intervening variable~ are often syn1bolizcd by spatial representations. so ¡.( .
ever, these fields ar~ not intended to represent the subject's phenomenoi··
cal field, nor are they maps of the subject's physical field . lnstead , thct
econon"lical, and, fo_r Tolman, convenient ways to represent the interaa}
of the variables affe~ting behavior and to derive spatial vectors represe .·
the subject's response.
Opposed to a co11ventionalist interpretation of intervening variable~\;
dispositional concepts is the realist v iew which argues, on philosop •.
grounds, that these concepts must be more than m.ere conventions. If be~
ior shows the interrelationships symbolized by the concept then there ._:
be so111ething about ,the organism by virtue of which those interrelations .
are true. This "so1nething" then is the true referent o f the dispositional;::.
1 cept or .the intervening variable. Furthennore, this "som,ething" can pJ",
51

i..:-causal role in behav,ior. lf a disposition or intervening ~ble is an e.i

í distinct frorn the observable variables, then it can truly "intervene" in 1
sense that it is a stat~ caused by the indeperident variables, and it, in turn,~ ·
cause behavior. 52 · .:,

.,.,~·
HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRU
A realist perspective lC:ads quit~- natur.all-y-t~ the introduction of concepts
plicitly intended to refer to unÓbserved eveFl(s within the organis1n. lt is hei
to distinguish forn1ally betwe~q._~]1ese éoncepts and those which ate vie·.
as a 111ere su11.1111ary of observed relationships, and MacCorquodale and M
(1948) provide the required differentiation. They term the latter kind of e
cept an ' 'intervening variable," and the forr:ner a "hypothetical construd
They define the interven:i ng variable as :I
simply a quantity obtained by a specified manipulation of the values of empirical ~
ables: it will involvc. n.o hypothesis as to thc existence of nonobserved entities 0 8
occurrence of unobserved processes; it will contain, in its complete statcment rJf
purposes of theory an~ prediction, no words which are not definable either explf_
or by rcduction sentenices in terms of the empirical varia.bles; and the validity of
1
pirical bws involving only observables will constitute both the necessary and s',
cient conditions for t}:ie validity of the laws involving these intcrvening variaB
(p. 103) )
i
i
In contrast, hypothe~ical constructs are defined as
conccpts "":'hich do 11oi n1ect the requiremc11ts for intervening variables in the s·
se~::~!!.íit .is to say, ~hesc constructs involvc tcrms which are not ~~-<?,l.l y redu ·

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 HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCTS 73

~ Fªl t~rn.s; they refer to processes ~r. ent~~f:~..... ~~-~-L-~..r.~__n_ot d~E,~~~ly _q,b.s~r.v.cd
· ,tey need not be in principle unobscrvable); the mathematical expressio 11 of •
': not be formed simply by a suit:i.ble gro u ping of tcrms in direct en1:e_irical ,
~: and the truth -~ftFie
empirical laws involved is a n!ccss~ry but 11ot-·a_.s~ffi- '
;·~.diti9.r, for the truth of th:_s_: .conceptions. (p. 104)
·\~mission of h.ypothetical constructs into the science of behavior is a
··r controvers.y within behaviorist thought. It is o bvious why this is
\ bthetical constructs pose a far greater challenge to behaviorist ideals
, . ricalness and objectivity than do interven.ing variables. Hypothetical
.}ts are associated with "existence propositions" which assign "surplus
if' over and abo ve observed correlations. Ad1nission of hypothetical
..~ts thus 1neans the inclusion of concepts referring to unobservables .
•i .
...
f. :"' .
,•(, .
~ -· 1. They Are U sed by O ther S cien ces
·ehts of hypothetical constructs argue that science, in fact, does not linut
~-dusively to interveni1~g._v~ri~bles . Physics has introduced a vast array
tetical terms such as''electron" and "neutron" which refer to unob-
i events and entities beyond ·the observati;-1~-~ from which their exis-
).: inferred. Modern physics could .not have progressed without the in- I·'
:· on of these hypothetical constructs. 54 Therefore, a n1ethodological
.:cii:i t'o disallow constructs oF'.this sort in psychology is not reflective of ',
.·i· e n1ethod and might put psychology ata severe disadvantage .
..·\ricists impressecf<.by the success o f physics construct a metatheoretical
\ ·of how such theoretical term.s derive empirical significance although
.·'fer to unobservables. 5 5 According to this n1odel, a theory is an axiom-
~ninterpreted calculus. Theoretical terms are introduced by postulates
,hhe theory ·that.. provide only an ünplicit definition of the theoretical
i~Y stating how they are rela.ted to the other tenns of the_~~~o~y. 56 The
r as a whole, is given empirical significance by a set of "correspon-
tules" which connect certain terms of the theory to e1npiric~l obser-
·"·'.'. These correspondence rules may take, among others, the fonn of
. ~onal definitions or reduction sentences. However, only son1e of the
,:qf the theory are included i~ ~the correspond~r..i..<?.~ rul'es. Other tenns,
.:én definition by the correspondence_.E':1~-s, are" theoretical and,_ha.ve only
lt definitions ..#They acquire en1pirical significance only by their role in
--
...·ire set of postul;t.es connected at various points to empirical observa-
.:y the correspondence rules.
~ponse to this argun1ent it can be clain1ed that there are cogent reasons
iychology should not follow the example of physics. First, psycholog-
'.'bry is 11.owhcre near axiomatization. Therefore any model for the in-
_=1.on of theoret1caitern1s which assumes an axiomatized theory is in-

-
~~le to psychology.-SCCond, as compared to psychology, physics is a

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..
74 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

far more mature and well developed science. Theorecical concepts are~
highly quantified, postulates are more explicit, and theoretical deductions:.'
, stricter, so testing of theories is more r~gc,rous. Therefore, the\~angers ai
< ciated with the introduction o~ theore~1ca l con~epts are much less sevcr:l
) physics than in psychology. Th1rd, unhke phys1cs, psychology must cont.
'~ with the fact that researchers bring to the-ir theorizing a wealth of prcscit
tific concepts about human action derivecl from everyday speech, intuit\
and their own phenomenology. Inevitably, these subjective and menta,::~
notions influence the formulation of th,. :oretical concepts in psychoI01•
Therefore, hypothetical constructs are more vulnerable to misuse in psy<
ogy than in physics. 57 !
These arguments as to why psychology should not imitate physi~s ar~;'.
without irony. A central thrust behind the behaviorist movement 1s the_'·
~ tempt to transform psychology into a science. Physics, in particula~, is Q. f
held as the model psychology should ernulate. However, as phys1cs P. ,i
gressed, i~s associated p~ilosophy of sc~ence evolved.; bue_ psychology, ¡f ~
blessed w1th correspondmg progress, d1d. not share 1n th1s developm~ñti f1
(_ Ironically, behaviorist philosophy of science is often defended by appe~j¡ J
¿ differences between psychology and physics. . m
~rr·
2.
¡
2. They Cannot Be A voided in Prad'
.1
·~
A second argument against the limitation of psychology to intervening V?. ~~
ables and operationally defined concepts 1s that in practice psychologist,' ·
not treat any concept as if it were one of those two kinds. Suppose, for;~
ample, that IQ is operationally defined a~. what is measured by a particu
test, and the intervening variable o.fhunger ·is measured by -;;t~ of lever pres'
for food. Suppose further that after the b ,!havioral measures"are-re·co'i:dc·
is discovered that the subjects in both experiments were il[.. Un'der-these:··
cumstances, it is commonly concluded th~t the behavio·r was not a true 01]
sure of the concept. However., if the conct:pt is in fact defined solely· in ter

tt
of the behavior, then whatever behavior i:; recorded is, by definition, a [ijj
sure of the concept. There should be no ra tionale for saying when the behf
ior is or is not a "true" measure of the concept. To deny that behavio},
a measure of the concept entails that the concept is son1ething o er than .'
is measured by the behavior. In practice,.. t.~ere~<?,r~, i~..app_~ars .~~.;~_)D,!~~,
~1,n~~:r,~;~;s~f,i~fs~IJ~i-~!l~gy _4.~-~.~:9_.~_<?.1:~~F~~. are·-~~.:-~.~~~-~f~.if..!h~t?re.::
...,..Tñis"árgu~;nt -<loes not seem conclusi·,e. Operacional definitions as ·,
as definitions of intervening variables inclnde implicit ceteris paribiis clause~
indicate that the outcome or response n1ea:mre defines the concept only u11
normal circumstances. Amount eaten is not assumed to measure hung _
the rat's mouth is sewn shut. It is assumecl that interfering factors may o~

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 HYPOTHETIC 'A L CONSTRUCTS 75
,.
. '.~revent an.outcome or behavioral measure from defining the concept.
when a behavioral outcome is not taken as a '. true measure of IQ or
'·'
' ~ · this is not because those intervening variabl~s exist as entities over
. },ve the measurements, but because the measurements were not per-
~ _:,under standard conditions. ,
~ihterfering factors which preclude conditions fr:om being standard can-
)xhaustively listed, not only because they can,not all be anticipated a
."ut also because they are infinite in number. Therefore, sorne intuitive
)inding of the concept is necessary to determine when a factor is an
':rng one. N evertheless, this in tui ti ve grasp of the concept does not en-
.~t an unobservable underlies the concept and is referred to in determin-
. en an outcome is or is not a true measure of the concet,t, Normally,
. . ition results from experience with the observed correlations and the
,/unproblematic application of the concept. In fact, all concepts, whether
)~~anal or not, involve an intuitive understanding which cannot be ex-
~.' ely captured by a listing of rules of usage. To know an object is red
:~gular also involves knowledge about normal conditions and interfer-
knowlege which cannot be fully explicat~d. 60

3. They Are Important for Reduction

~~~hird argument in favor of hypothetical constructs is that they brid~
tp ~~~~.~!1 .P.~ ~.h-.o~.ogy_ an,.d l:~.Y.§.!9hlgy. 61 Hypothetical constructs tend
i haracterized in physiological terms. They, therefore can serve a heu-
M"unction in suggesting to physiologists the kind of mechanisrns to look ,.,
!t son-ie point, the hypothetical constructs of psychology can be identi-~·
'ith the mechanisn-is discovered by physiology, and the theoretical re-./
.: of psychology to physiology will be accomplished. By combininlft
·:· ral as well as physiological features, the hypothetical construct facili-
pis reduction. If continuity with the other sciences is a goal of behav-
"~ sychology then theoretical reduction of psychology to physiology via
;.etical constructs is one way to accomplish this. lntervening variables
. ikely to be helpful in this regard . Beca use of their conventional nature.
' ning variables can be defined and redefined arbitrarily, while physio-
r, mechanisms seem to be matters of fact, not convention.
· } . argument in support of hypothetical constru'cts presupposes several
~:6nable assumptions. First, it .is not clear that hypothetical constructs are
.ifficacious for theoretical reductioñ than intervening~;·~i;bi~~·: With a
.·; etical construct, the possibility of attributing 1fivalid 'properties is ever
· J: In contrast, a well formulated intervening variable, in not exceeding
~tions, is more likely to correspond to a physiological...cQpstuct than a
.. etical construct with inco(rect features. 62 Futhermore, the argument
:s: that the subdivision of an entire organism into physiologica1 system.s

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 76 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

is a given rather than the consequence ofhuman conceptualization. Whe .,

skull is opened, the parts of the brain do not appear already labcled with .
ders neatly laid out. Neural "mechanisn1s" are created on the basis of a n-..
ber of consideration~, iñélúding functional tics as well as anaton1ical co
tions. Therefore, physiological mechan.isms are conve11tional ~1 the same
intervening variables ar_s:: both initially are human crea'tions, but both -~
prove their wórth. · i 1
Second, the argu~ent assumes that theoretical reduction is the best m~ \

for assuring continuity between psychology and the other sciences. Y et;
., of the contentions of n"lolar behavioris1n is that the legitimacy of a behav\
l:?j) psychology does not rest on the possibility of its reduction to physiolog/
the contrary, the aiins of molar behaviorism. are best achieved by li{
behavioral ·psychology, independent of physiology, which is effective fot
pre~ictiort a'ri.d con~rol of beha v~or .and i~ unencu1nbered. by pre1nature
ulat1011 about phys1ology. Cont1nu1ty with the rest of sc1ence can be acQ ·
1.
plished by a con1monality of methods and . q.noei{yiag_ assumptions. 63 . ;i
\ - · .. • • • ... . -·- # •.... . • • •

4. They Are N ecessary for Explaining Bebi1.

A four th objection to theories lin1ited to intervening variables and opera
ally defined concepts is that such theories are not truly explanatory. Bcc
theories oí this typ~ refrain from 111aking statements about events ínter~·
the behaving orga11i~1n, they are often derogatorily referred to as "black-b
theories. At best, i~ is often argued, black-box theories provide behav·:
laws relating input '. (stin1uli) to output (responses), but they do 11.ot ex··
these la wful relationships. Only by reference to events inside the black-: ~
i.e., h ypothetical constructs, can behavior be explained. 64 •
This objection. to 'black-box theories makes certain tacit assumptions a··
the nature of explanation that need to be exa1nined. If by 11 explanatio11''..
nomológical-deductive pattern is n1eant, then clearly black-box theoriet
explanatory. Particular instances of behavior are explained by deducing st
ments describing the1n fron1 general behavioral laws in conjunction ~
state1nents about initial conditions. Instead, the objection may be that th;·
havioral laws used in black-box deductive explanations are siinply descri~
of observed regulari~ies rather than explanatory. They are stated as givens ri
than as the results of the interna! events mediating them. ·!· •
It is true, as this argu1ne11t notes, that black-box theories 1nust have a~
fundamental beha.vioral ]aws fron1 which other la ws and state111ents a·
particular responses are deduced. These fundamental laws are indeed 11p
itive" in the sense · that they the1nselves are not deduced from other 1,i
However, the argun1ent is ntistaken in its implicit belief that thc situation .'
be otherwise. As Hu1ne clearly showed, causal laws are not logically n.
sary. Thercfore cven expl'anations referring to hypothetical

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 HYPOTHETICAL CONSTRUCTS 77

r¡;pc:al to fundan1e11tal laws, whether experimental or theoretical, which

. itive in the san1e sense that the funda111ental behavioral laws are.
'i,onent of hypothetical constructs might still argue that theories in-
!ing hypothetical constructs are superior because primitive behavioral
:___be deduced from such theories . Thus these theories explain what is
. jc°plained in black-box theories. In response to this argument it should
'd that it is always the case that the funda1nental laws ·of one science
"ibly the derived theorems of another n1ore funda1nental science. This
t well f?r theories incorporating physiological hypothetical constructs .
.;·;-eiess, Jttst because a science is possibly reducible to another science,
)' reason to deny tha.t the science is explanatory. lf this were the case,
·_.;s dence, other than the. most fundamental one, is explanatory, includ-
Aiological pycholo gy.
~éars that the claim that the black-box theories are not explanatory is
· . en deductive explanation is meant. However, "explanation" n1.ay be
:··.~ -.ther sen.ses. Often a deductive explanation does not provide the hearer
·::"·ü ituitive understanding, and consequently the explanation is not ep-
hlly satisfying. Thus, "explanation" may 1nean "to provi.de a satisfac-
-~~erstanding." Those who object to black-box theories are often say-
.~ffect, that although such _theories explain in one sense, they fail to
~.:understanding. In contrast, theories appe.aling to physiological mech-
' e said to meet the hearer's epistemic needs and provide an intuitive
f the explicandum. 65 Thus, objections ·to black-box theories often re-
~.Íeference for a certain kind of explanation. Therefore, the explanatory
f,.y of black-box theories depends on individual differences over what
~jes subjectively satisfying understanding.

5. They Are Heuristics

(ind extremely common objection to a black-box science is that it would
·.ssively " narro~t. thereby impeding scie1ttíÍlCJ.:!:_~.:~s. 66 Numerous
'es in the hístory of science can be a.dduceátoaemonstrate how unob-
~s were hypothesized to explain certain observations, and then later
_ypothetical constructs were found, through direct observation, to have
· f the hypothesized properffes asé:ribed to them. Genes, n1olecules,
-t, and distant stars are typical exa1nples . In this way the hypothetical
tt guides and integrates research. Although the properties assigned to
· truct are inferred from observation, they transcend the observations
~lde the construct's surplus meaning. This surplus rneaning enable~ the
~t~ integratc diverse observations whlch otherwise would not appear
,)ated. Moreover, from state1nents about the hypothesized properties,
·~atements are deduced which have observational in1plications. These,
·: s';lggest experiments which tend either to confirm or disconfirm the
i

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 7g· THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

statem~nts about the construct. 1:hus the at_te~pt to ch~racterize ~

theoret1cal construct and to test th1s charactenzat1on organ1zes and directl
search.ór--~-

The Case Against Hypothetical Constr~

·;:, '•

gu. ::ren~s in favor of the inclusicn of hypothetical constructs ai:

to o trate ·¿enes, just as are the argu ments in favor of intervening .
ables. The strategic arguments-that psychology should emulate physics,~
hypothetical constructs facilitate theoretical reduction, chat they provide -~·
satisfactory understanding, or that they a1·e heuristically fertile-reduce t(
common theme that the introduction of liypothetical constructs will en~"
the progress of psychology, not that che y are logically necessary. Simii1•
the case againsc hypothecical constructs 1s base9...~.~Eg_~~Y. ..?.~ .Jtrategic ca~!
erations. In addition to all the o bjection, to 'intervening variables revic=
above, it is feared that the use of hypothetical constructs will encouragci<t
warranted speculation, resulting in prem:1ture "physiologizing" and thet·
ation of theoretical "fictions." :~
Hypothetical constructs seem less open to experimental tests because pi
~-¡ erties can be attributed to them ad hoc to accommodate any experiment~Í
(_ sult, and they therefore appear to provicle only spurious explanations. (·
thermore, if they are not logically required, then their introduction viq
• the principle of parsimony by unnecesarily complicating a theory. Theoq
devoted to determining the properties o f the hypothetical construct rul.i
diverts attention toward inner mechanism.s not readily manipulated and -a'.
from the environmental factors responsible for both behavior and its p;
iological med.iators. Again, the argument is strategic, not philosophicaUt
Sorne behaviorists argue, furthermore, that hypothetical éonstructs ar.,11

( ways dispensable. Constructs are ·said to intervene between independen(, ·

dependent variables. If thishrel ationshdi~ is lawful, thenS the insertion of~
¿ construct does not add to t e 1aw an 1s unnecessary. imi1arly, if the :
struct is lawfully related to the independent variable, and the dependent y
able is lawfully related to the construct, then again, the dependent variahi
)
lawfully related to the independent variable, and the construct is useless:
on the other hand, there is no lawfulnes·, , the construct cannot create it-
either case, the construct is dispensable, generating th·e behaviorist "para'.
of theorizing. " 6~ ·;

Hypothetical Cc,nstructs in Behaviorist Theci

In the absence of decisive arguments for or against the use of hypotho'
constructs, the decision to introduce the1n into behaviorist science is le~
the strategic intuition of the individual theoríst. In point of fa(:t and contt
t~ the popular image, the majority of behaviorist theories include h~_p~
·~;
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 HYPOTHETIC,<'.\.L CONSTRUCTS 79
1

J:rUCts among their theoretical teim~. Althou~h there are a'-9ast num-
.. ch constructs to be found throughout behaviprist theories, they can,
: ost part, be classified into four bread categdries.
·.ategory can be characterized as consisting of c~.Y~.IJ._~.~ ~.!'1~~- These
~·e ptualized as similar in all essentials to observable responses except
· ·; ,~·are small in sea le or else located inside the b?dy . This class includes
··,ocal speech and visceral responses Watson arid others use to explain
1 70
" {and emotion. Hull 's anticipatory· goalreact~on, Spence's emotional
;:s and Mowrer's "hope" and "fear,, form ano.t her subclass. 71 Interna!
,
~al responses, mcluding the "coding response, 11 are also of this type. 72
-
··. ne very large subclass of the covert response cateogry is the "me-
·::esponse. " This covert response has been assigned manifold functions
1
· ehaviorist theories, ranging from the mediation of generalization in

·nce of physical similarity to the acquisition of meaning in verbal be-

3
.\

;:t stimuli form a second bread category of hypothetical constructs.

,,i~ h)LF"e-thesized to arise from at least three possible sources. First, cer-
fuuli are <;:aused by various physio1ogical processes ~ithin ~.~-~---~ pdy.
i'?-~tion of food, for example, leads'to.-physiofogical changes-which con-
~otential stimuli for behavior. Or these stimuli may be caused by overt
:-J in the form of proprioceptive stimulation arising from muscles and
~Lsuch as the movement-pro duced stimuli of Guthrie's theory.74 Third,
~.. ~:timuli may be the result o f coverc responses, as in the stimulus con-
~ )!S of Hull's pure stimulus acts or anticipatory goal reaction, which
~í:urn
,. elicit overt behavior. 75
'rd set of hypothetical constructs consists of long-:-Jerm physiological
..sm thought to underlie behavioral states or dispositions. State vari-
..1p·se a.. ·p robfeñi for those beha viorists- who preTer to conceive of re-
' l\~.and stimuli as brief and momentary events because states are long
: nd continuous. However, tonus and postura! reflexes provide a model
,),e this difficulty. Therefore, a number of dispositional concepts, in-
. ···.;atention, determining tendencies, anticipat'o ry set, attitude, and
1$S; are interpreted as states of muscle tonus, p~stural refl.exes, or their
~ual offspring, the "motor set." 76 .
fourth category of hypothetical construct differ~ significantly from the
··, ,:In this category belong overt stimuli and re~p.o.n.s~s.J.Vhich are not hid-
..}de the organism and are -the~e(oi-e 'i -iot-~;~bservable in th~··;-;:~~ sense
~:!. eveñ~s are. Nevertheless, thes~· éve~ts ,are. hypothetical i~, _t,h-;.-t·,!P.C}'
fulafe~ ~lthough:.._no~ actually observed, identified, or recorded .... Con-
·:r cxample, a con~peting-res'p ons"e tñe·o ;y·'ot'extinc:"tíoñ~'-"A."~órding to
º6ry, an unreinforced response stops occuring b~cause incompatible re-
.are conditioned and interfere with it. These cómpeting responses are
·~sized in order to explain an observed deérease in a particular re-
:: but the competing responses are not actually identified. n

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80 THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

1 '

Characteristics of Hypothetical Constructs in Behavior-ist 1:'h ·

Although n.o restrÍctions :ue logic~lly imposed on the postulated prop·
of the hyp,othetica~ construct, they neverthdess generally conform to:.
condit.ions. First, t~e properties assigned to the hypo thetical construct e{
differ substantially from those of observed stimuli anctr,.es-poñses. Th~
conceived as materfal rather than mental and as obeying the same laws as.i:
stimuli and respoñses-:-with the possible exception that constants in thc :.
tions nuy differ somewhat because of the reduced size of covert forms.i
ond, hypothC:~ic~l é:onstructs are commonly located peripherally, in thc:'-
cles and gfands, rather than .in the central nervous system·:~il:íird, hypotli;.
constructs are typically thought to opera.te under the function.al control 0
vironmental varia~les, that is, their activities are no t "aut~ñó-ñi.ous-:-,-,-so ~
although this cÓ¡~dition is rarely achievcd, it is preferable that thc hypo··
cal construct be linked by a functional relationship to an observ.able env}
111ental variable, or. an observable behavioral variable, or, ideally, to both;~
linkage is different. fron1 the intervening variab le. W ith the hypo thetica ·
struct, the linkag<: relates three distinct entities, and the hypothetica{
struct has a n1.eani11g and existence beyond that provided by the .func··
relationship. · .·;,
These four conditions con1bine neatly in a co1n1non exan1.ple of a .~
thetical con struct. lt is hypothesized to begin as an overt muscular res¡/
a cquired through the n o rn1al laws of learning as a function of externaf
ables. It gradually. regresses in magnitude until it is unobservable. In ~--
duced state it yet remains a response, still n1uscular, and still under thei.
tional control of ei1vironment variables . 81 · ·
These four con~itions help to guard against behaviorist fears of u
ranted speculation and the introduction of "fictions." The first conditi.
sures that no properties will be attributed to the construct that are not/
erties of observables. The second and third conditions allay behaviorist q:
about the taint of mentalisn1. Behaviorists often argue that because so 1(
known about the :central nervous system, it serves as the last refuge ci
1
soul in psychology. Processes hypothetically located there often have .
ties of free will, agency, and the mental. 82 Therefore, by locating covert e'.
in the periph.ery a~1d keeping them under the functional control of the,.'
ronment, behaviorists prevent the contamination of their constructs by<.
. talism. The fourth condition, in tonjunction with the first, hel,ps to ~.
. that the theory ini which the hypothetical constructs are embedded is ~
) ously testa.ble. Unconfirmed postulates can be discarded along with thei
pothctical constru'cts. Thus although behaviorist hypothetical construc;
inferred rather tha'n obser:ved, they are closely rclated to observables b{
.lines of inference, · thus retaining their empiricalness. and objectivity.

,·.

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