c

 









 








 









 
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Sky Nelson, 2009

Unaffiliated

Running Title:

³An Interpretation of Macroscopic Quantum Superposition States´

or

³Retroactive Event Determination´

Keywords:

Macroscopic quantum superposition, consistent histories, relational quantum mechanics,

time, spacetime, retrocausation, framework, single-framework rule, synchronicity,

meaningful coincidence, positivism, observer effect, measurement problem, delayed

choice experiment, retroactive event determination, existential behavior, many worlds

 
c

  







 








 









 
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Sky Nelson, 2009

³The term µhappens¶ is restricted to the observation´i.

Werner Heisenberg





We suggest a pair of postulates which unify two current models of quantum

theory into a broader picture of reality, giving a physical interpretation of Macroscopic

Quantum Superposition (MQS) states. Relational Quantum Mechanics ([Rovelli]ii)

(RQM) and Consistent Histories ([Griffiths]iii) (CH) are discussed and related to the

postulates. By dropping the assumption that unobserved macroscopic events are ³in a

definite state´ determined independent of an observer, we arrive at a surprising but

consistent theory of quantum macroscopic reality (with fewer fundamental assumptions

about everyday reality) that does not contradict experiment or everyday experience. As a

result, a concept herein termed ³retroactive event determination´ is extended from a

quantum principle (in CH) to a macroscopic principle. Macroscopic events which have

not been observed by a particular observer are free to be retroactively determined.



 



The Relational model¶s premise is that the state of any observable cannot be said

to be absolute, but rather is determined only from the point of view of a given observer
(i.e. it is relationally defined). Hence, every measurement is seen as a relational exchange

of information between two entities that now form a relationship. These relationships are

essentially ³relational data´ about the world, but they cannot be seen as ³absolute facts´,

since they are only determined from a single observer¶s perspective.

Consistent Histories describes how, in a given experiment, a self-consistent chain

of events can be considered together as a family (rather than one by one). Many such

possible families (³frameworks´) can be defined, and which chain of events actually

happens in the experiment might not be determined until the end of the experiment. Once

the final result is known, one can then infer that all the previous events in that specific

family history must also have happened (what I refer to as ³Retroactive Event

Determination´).

Roughly, for the purposes of this paper, CH states that whether or not an

individual event can be considered to definitely have happened (to be ³data´) is

framework-dependant, i.e. dependent on other events before and after it (³framework´).

Similarly, RQM states that whether or not an individual event can be considered to

definitely have happened (to be ³data´) is observer-dependent. Rovelli, in ³Relational

Quantum Mechanics´, acknowledges and describes at length the overlap between the two

theories, and asks ³«how there can be facts, or data, if property ascriptions are only

framework dependent. I think that the answer is simply that there are no (observer

independent) data at all«´ Put another way, Rovelli perceives a hole in CH theory in that

the manner in which an event becomes certain from an absolute perspective is not well
defined. Rovelli plugs this hole with the proposal that no data is ever absolute, but is

always observer dependent.

This paper seeks to strengthen the connection between these two models by

starting with two postulates, each of which essentially relates to one of the two theories,

and then applying them to macroscopic quantum superposition states.


 
 



 

The approach I suggest to the interpretation of MQS states relies essentially on a

simple application of the positivistiv philosophy, which has been successfully applied in

much of modern physicsv. This principle states that the only meaningful concrete

statements we can make about the world are those that can be verified with observation

or experiment. In other words, any aspect of our physical theories that p
 is not

verifiable must be held as a postulate, even if it leads to a successful, verifiable theory.

In the case of MQS states, we must accept as merely a postulate the assumption

that events in the world that are happening now, but are outside of our realm of

observation, are determined and fixed in an absolute sense. Though this assumption

seems to explain very well the world we experience on a daily basis, it is not the only

possible explanation. In fact, it falls short if we are to consider synchronicity

(³meaningful coincidence´) a true phenomenon, in which separate events may be related

by meaning, and therefore happen together even in the absence of any physical causal

relationship.
 To understand my approach, let¶s first consider the approach that particle

physicists use to predict the existence of virtual particles. Any particle that exists for a

timescale shorter than that on which the fabric of the universe would allow it to be

measured (via the Heisenberg Uncertainty relations) cannot be said either to exist or to

not exist. We cannot (nor can nature) prove that these quantum fluctuations ÷
 p
, so

we have to assume they do. Yet we cannot say they ÷ exist, because we cannot measure

them experimentally. Do they exist, or don¶t they? The Anarchic principlevi says that all

particle interactions that 
happen, phappen. So if the existence of virtual particles is

not forbidden underneath the limits given by the Uncertainty Principle, then we can be

assured that they do in fact have scientific validity.

Such particles are therefore in a category of things that fall outside of observation,

yet have a very real and profound effect on actual physical processes. For instance, in the

vacuum of space, the existence of virtual particle pairs predict Hawking radiationvii.

Because of Hawking radiation, black holes will eventually dissipate themselves into

space. Virtual particles are also a key aspect of the Standard Model for forces, in which

virtual particle pairs are responsible for inhibiting the range of force carrying particlesviii.

The end result in the observable world is to define the range and properties of the forces

themselves. So we can see that certain

  theoretical constructs, arising out of

an inability to refute their existence, can have a profound impact on the observable

universe.

In a similar way, we can consider MQS states more as logical conundrums rather

than physical things, and yet arrive at a tangible physical result that has definite
consequences. Just as we cannot peer within the Heisenberg limits to see virtual particles,

we also cannot be ÷p
p  about any macroscopic event we haven't observed. The only

way to be definitely sure of the state of an event is to observe it in some fashion. So we

see that unobserved, necessarily hypothetical events can be included in reliable, 'true'

theories regarding observed events. This claim holds as long as the hypothetical events

cannot be shown
to exist. Until we observe a macroscopic object, we cannot actually

say what state it is in, nor whether it is even in a definite state. We should not simply

assume it is in some state if we ourselves are not observing it. From a strict interpretation

of Rovelli, it follows that even macroscopic objects have no observer-independent reality.

To state it another way, in discussing MQS states, the analog of the Anarchic

principle is that if macroscopic undetermined (superposition) states are not forbidden,

they must occur. (If it can happen, it will happen.) Yet we can never experimentally see

this undetermined state (just as we can never see virtual particles) because it is logically

impossible to see something and have it remain unobserved at the same time (just as it is

logically impossible to see something with precision greater than the Heisenberg limit).

Using the same logic for both of these phenomena, we see that it is valid to assume that

unobserved macroscopic states must be undetermined.

In summary, the postulates presented here will show that any entity (using first a

photon and then a human as an example) always displays physical properties upon

measurement, but its very existence is undetermined when not observed. In other words,

any entity that is unobserved cannot be said to exist in a definite state. When unobserved,

the ³existential behavior´ of an object (µwhen¶ and µwhere¶ it could be measured) obeys
wave mechanics. There are multiple simultaneous possible realities for all unobserved

objects (according to CH), and a single definite reality is singled out only upon

observation, after-the-fact. This principle will be applied to a macroscopic thought

experiment and shown to be consistent with common experience.

The manner in which we avoid inconsistencies between different observers is

taken from Relational Quantum Mechanics. Rovelli comments directly on this in RQM:

³A quantum mechanical description of a certain system (state and/or values of physical quantities) cannot be

taken as an µabsolute¶ (observer independent) description of reality«the quantum state of a system is always a

state of that system with respect to a certain other system.´ [Rovelli pg 6]

³«there is neither an absolute state of the system, nor absolute properties that the system has at a certain time.´

[Rovelli pg 7]


This means that we must assume that an event has a definite state only if we have

inferred its state through measurement, in which case it is only definite from our specific

perspective. We will consider the wave function to be a fundamentally real but non-

physical entity. By ³non-physical´, we mean that it is not subject to the laws of space and

time. It depends on rules of information and logical consistency, similar to µthought¶, and

has no physical permanency. The wave function is assigned the role of calculating the

many possible futures of every physical entity forward through time and throughout

space, but it is not limited to specific localized time and space constraints. As a result,

calculations performed from the wave function can, in many circumstances, be

determined after-the-fact.
s



We suggest two basic principles:

Postulate1:

!V Events are only µdetermined¶ or µundetermined¶ from a given observer¶s

perspective. The only events that are µdetermined¶ for an observer are those that

have been observed by the observer. Those that are not yet observed are

µundetermined¶.

µUndetermined¶ describes an event that still has multiple possible outcomes. It is

more than the idea that I simply don¶t know what has happened yet. It is the fact that

it hasn¶t actually µhappened¶ yet V
pp p
p
 
. This postulate implies that

the state of any observable is not absolute. The second postulate extends this.

Postulate2:

!V There is no definitive absolute perspective. The universe can only be

meaningfully described from one perspective (³framework´) at a time.

This postulate says that there is no global, bird¶s eye perspective on our world that

can see everything in a definite state. Definite states can only be viewed from a single

perspective at a time, in which case postulate 1 applies. Objectivity, as we know it, is

really ³agreed upon subjectivity´, the agreement on mutually observed events by two

localized observers. Instead of being able to ask the global question ³What has
 actually happened?´ we are left with only being able to ask ³What has happened with

respect to a given person's localized worldview?´

Consistent Histories [Griffiths] (CH) and Relational Quantum Mechanics

[Rovelli] (RQM) each provide crucial conceptual and mathematical foundations that

support these postulates. Consistent histories theory postulates that we can look at the

history of an unobserved particle as a set (a ³family´) of possible histories, each of which

must be internally consistent, according to certain mathematical requirements (which, to

some extent, correspond to physical boundary constraints). The particular set of

³questions´ we pose to a system determine the framework of possible histories that are

available, and only one framework can be used in a given analysis in order to maintain a

consistent (non-paradoxical) description of the system. This reflects the second postulate,

which states that we can only describe the world from a single perspective at a time (there

is no global, absolutely defined perspective).

In this author¶s interpretation of the Consistent Histories formalism, we find that

events are not required to be determined at the moment they happen. Rather, when we

pose a set of questions to the system (set the framework), the available histories are

selected retroactively. Events in that history which lead up to this moment are allowed to

fall into place retroactively, so long as the formalities of consistency are observed.

=   
   


÷

p

÷ p
÷

p   , at the

moment when a measurement later in the history logically requires it to be determined.

 RQM relates to both the first and the second postulate, showing us how to

understand the world as a place in which there are no absolute states of observables, but

only states based on specific relationships between localized observers.


 


 



  

Please see Addendum A.

     



Let's look into these two postulates, as applied to the delayed choice experiment.

Consider any two correlated events, such as the measurement of photon S by Q and by P

in the diagram below (Figure 1). Our common sense tells us that the measurement by Q

happens first, followed by P. If, therefore, our measurement at P were to affect Q,

(remember, Q happened first), we are stuck in a dilemma of acausality (Wheeler¶s

delayed choice paradox). Experiment has shown ([Jacques, et al.]ix) that this apparent

acausality does indeed occur.

The previous postulates help us understand this situation. Postulate 1 tells us that

events are not determined at the moment they ³happen´. Events are only determined

upon necessity, i.e., an event only becomes definite if another event is observed that

requires it to be so. In this example, we cannot say that the particle traveled along a

definite path within the apparatus, unless we measure a specific result at P whose logical
history requires the particle to have traveled along that path. Until such a measurement is

made, the entity in question will remain a superposition of possible realities.

This is at the core of (my interpretation of) Consistent Histories theory, which

says that a particular event is µpackaged¶ into a string or family of events, all of which are

orthogonal to each other. If the last event in a history (P¶s measurement) is observed to

be true, the previous events in the history (Q¶s measurement) all must have happened as

well. In this case, the other unselected histories cease to exist. Griffiths ³framework-

based´ approach can be used to imply that the events earlier in the history are being

retroactively determined when the event at the end of the sequence is determined

[Griffiths, Ch 12]. I propose that this is a very useful interpretation, because it can be

applied to macroscopic scenarios while helping us avoid any paradox of causality. This is

an important and profound consequence of CH that I refer to as Retroactive Event

Determination (RED).

As an example, in the situation we are discussing here, there are at least two

different possible histories (one for each leg of the apparatus) that remain undetermined

until the measurement by P. The event ³photon traveled path 1´ is determined to be true

(or false) retroactively upon the measurement by P. ( 

 




 
   

 
!

"
#

 
$We are allowed

to change the wave function retroactively, so long as we do not change anything that has

actually physically happened. If we are selecting a specific history from the wave

function (which is comprised of a family of histories), we can affect events in the past by
observing a particular history, without actually changing anything that has physically

happened. Again, this is because postulate 1 says that unobserved events have not

actually  
p happened yet. We would avoid any paradox of ³changing the past´ by

distinguishing between concrete (observed) physical events, versus

observed events

which have not already happened yet, whose wave function can still be adjusted (even

though the event¶s time coordinate is in the past). In other words, if events we are

affecting are still just information, and have not yet been actually determined, then we are

not changing anything physical in the past, and no physical law of causality is violated.

This line of thought brings up the argument that one could hypothetically observe

event Q secretly, so that when event P is measured, event Q has already been determined

in some ³absolute´ sense, even though P may not know it. This, however, is exactly the

point of Rovelli¶s Relational quantum interpretation.

In the Relational view, any measurement by Q, whether secretive or not, results in

a correlation of Q and the thing being measured (the photon, S). As a result, when P

measures the photon S, they are actually measuring a wave function that represents the

correlated states of S and Q. Any measurement by P will therefore always produce results

that are consistent with any previous measurement by Q. Rovelli says: ³P has information

about the initial state (of S), and therefore has the information that the measurement

(between Q and S) has been performed. The meaning of this is that she knows that the

states of the S-Q systems are correlated, or more precisely, she knows that if at a later
time t3 she asks a question to S concerning property A, and a question to Q concerning

his knowledge about A, « she will get consistent results.´ [Rovelli pg 15]

So the histories of Q and S are now intertwined. This does not mean that the event

³Q measures S´ is determined in an ³absolute´ sense as a result of Q¶s measurement

(although indeed it was determined from Q¶s perspective). From P's perspective, the

states of  S and Q are still undetermined at the time of P's measurement. From P's

perspective, Q¶s measurement didn't really ³happen´ when it happened. According to P,

the results of Q¶s measurement fall into place after the fact when P makes his

measurement of S, in order to be consistent with P's measurement of S. So the observer Q

also plays the role of unobserved entity from P¶s perspective, and exists in an

undetermined state.

Postulate 1 describes this behavior in its statement that events are only considered

determined or undetermined from a given observer¶s perspective. From P's perspective,

the events of S and Q were both undetermined until they were observed and retroactively

fell into place. Observer Q, however, would say the same thing about events S and P.

Rovelli proposes the same idea in his Relational model: ³a quantum mechanical

description of a certain system cannot be taken as an µabsolute¶ (observer independent)

description of reality, but rather as a formalization, or codification, of properties of a

system  p to a given Observer.´ [Rovelli page 6]


 
c  




 The formalisms to support each of these theories are well established and are

worked out thoroughly in their original sources. For our purposes, we will give an outline

of how the wave function behaves using these combined principles.

=  p
p 

As our example, consider a single event with two possible outcomes, which is

subsequently observed by 2 (or more) separate observers.

S0 = initial wave function being measured

Q0 = initial wave function of observer 1 (could be a detector device)

P0 = initial wave function of observer 2 (could be a detector device)

ȁ = the total wave function of the system from a given perspective

At each step, we look at the situation from various perspectives, and from any

given perspective the wave function states will be different. This is the essence of

Relational QM: the state of a system is not absolute, but rather is determined only relative

to a given observer.

Eqn 1: Initial state (t = 0)

ȁ = |S0>

Eqn 2: From observer Q point of view, after measurement (t = 1,2)

 ȁQ = c1|S1 > + c2|S2 >

After the ³event´, the wave function S0 splits into two superimposed states, as in

equation 2. Upon measuring S, observer 1 (Q) will obtain a definite measurable result

(either |S1 > with probability c12 or |S2 > with probability c22), but the wave function

doesn¶t objectively collapse. Instead, the wave function of Q becomes correlated with S.

The wave function remains a wave function, so that anytime it is measured by other

observers it gives an observable result specific to the measurer from the various possible

states available to it.

From observer Q¶s point of view, that¶s the end of the story. They have measured

S and gotten a definite result. We avoid the need for objective collapse through the

process of correlation of the state of the measurer with the measured.

For the second observer P, we say that the result of the measurement made by Q

as described above is to correlate the states of Q and S. 


%



 



s   
 $ The combined state from P¶s perspective

is given below.

Eqn 3: From observer P point of view before they make a measurement (t = 3,4)

ȁP = c3|S1, Q1> + c4|S2, Q2>

 In equation 3 above, Q2 indicates ³the state of Q in which he or she measured

|S2>´, and so forth. We must note that there are no cross terms such as |S2, Q1>, because

this would say that ³Q measured |S1> yet S was actually in state |S2>´. This circumstance

would describe an inconsistent reality, as defined by the Consistent Histories formalism,

and is forbidden.

Now in this way, whenever P makes a measurement, they will measure one of the

two terms above. Therefore, they will always find that if they measure S to be in state

|S2>, they will also find that Q is in state |Q2> (which means Q measured |S2 > as well).

Eqn 4: From observer P point of view after P¶s measurement

ȁP = |S2, Q2>

This is the final result for observer P, since they have measured a definite result.

Of course, we can continue this process to any number of observers, and find that the

wave functions of different observers continue to become correlated in a web of

increasing size and complexity. For instance, from yet another observers perspective, K,

when P makes his measurement, all three previously defined wave functions will become

correlated in a consistent way. Before K makes his measurement of any one of the three

previous wave functions (S, Q, or P), from K¶s perspective they exist together in a

correlated superposition state.

Eqn 5: From observer K point of view (t = 5)

 ȁK = c5|S1, Q1, P1> + c6|S2, Q2, P2>

When K makes a measurement of any or each of these wave functions, they will

always find that the states of all three entities agree. Instead of the wave function

³objectively´ collapsing, we find that the system which the overall wave function

represents grows in size to accommodate the new interaction. In this way, the wave

functions remain in superposition states without objectively collapsing. 









 
    
%
  







 

   
 
   $

Observer P has measured a definite result from their own perspective, yet from observer

K¶s perspective those results are not determined.

The astute reader will notice a potential paradox in these ideas if we assume that

each observer must have a determined reality from their own point of view. Such an

argument would say that we must either have an objectively collapsed wave function (an

objective reality) or many (infinite) worlds to account for all the possible branches of the

wave function.

This would indeed be the case if we were allowed to look at the situation

simultaneously from K¶s perspective and P¶s perspective, since from P¶s perspective the

state of the system (eqn 4) is determined whereas from K¶s (eqn 5) it is not. However, the

second postulate says we must describe the scenario from a single perspective only
(although both these 

 p

can be said to simultaneously exist from different

perspectives). This means that by definition when an observer makes a measurement,

they are always measuring an object in an undetermined state, even though that object p

determined from its own perspective.

The concept of retroactive event determination fits in nicely here, since each

correlation of the wave function of two entities leads to a macroscopic superposition

state, which becomes determined or 'crystallized' from a given perspective
 




by future measurements made from that perspective. In a sense, it seems like

we are going back and affecting the past of others. Yet how can we say that we have

actually  
÷ their past, if, by definition, we didn¶t know what their past was to begin

with? (Remember the analogy to virtual particles and positivist principles.) What is

important is that the method of ³becoming determined´ is done through a process that

ensures consistency.

In comparison to Everett¶s many worlds theory, the view presented here is that

one cannot say there are actually many real worlds, as in ³many different versions of our

present reality´, because one can never observe these µother worlds¶. Rather, from a given

observer¶s perspective, there are many possible versions of 

 reality, only one of

which (say |S2, Q2>) becomes definite for that observer in the moment. There is no need

to ascribe reality to the other µunchosen¶ states, as these states can only be described from

another observer¶s perspective. Looking at the situation from two perspectives at once

violates our second postulate, the single-framework rule. In this view, no state is ever
objectively determined (only relative to a given observer), but wave functions are

correlated so as to remain consistent between various observers.

= 

p

p
p
p 

Eqn 5: Two possible consistent families of events

The same concept is illustrated in Consistent Histories with a diagram like

Equation 5. At t=1 an event occurs which is a ³choice´ point. The photon enters the

apparatus, which has two possible paths for the photon, and the two detectors Q and P are

in their ready/untriggered states. History 1 starts with the photon S being in state 1, and

history 2 with the photon in state 2. As can be seen, the photon existing in state 2 (for

example) is correlated over time (±) with the event ³observer Q also measuring it in

state 2´, and then observer P doing the same. The two parallel histories represent a

macroscopic superposition state of all three entities, S, Q and P.

This model is particularly helpful in understanding the nature of time in making

measurements. Both of these histories are a valid description of the system, from a

particular observer¶s perspective (e.g. P¶s perspective), up until the point at which that

observer makes a measurement which requires the system to have a definite state. When
P makes a measurement at time t=5, from his point of view his measurement must have a

definite result. If he measures S=2, then at that point history 2 becomes the only valid

description of the system. Only at this moment (t=5) can all of the previous events in the

history be said to have a determined state.

It should not be concluded that we are therefore  
p
 the past with our

measurement, because it is not clear   
 
until we made our measurement.

Instead, we can say that we have retroactively determined the past state of the system.

This process I call ³retroactive event determination´, or RED.

" 


& #

 


 

In everyday experience we make an implicit assumption about the nature of the

present moment, namely that an event is defined at the moment it happened. The

µpresent¶ is like a common reference point that we can all refer to and compare, and we

consider everything that happens to happen in the present. It is as if life is a piece of sheet

music, and the present moment is a cursor passing over each section of sheet music in

linear order.

By assuming, instead, that reality is only determined when something is

p


÷, events are no longer determined by the passage of an imaginary cursor. There

is, in fact, no common present moment anymore. Events are not determined at the time

coordinates that they happen at (i.e., they don't ³happen´ when they happen). Instead,
they are determined at the moment that their existence is made necessary through a

measurement of some sort.

For the purposes of this paper, we should clarify the meaning of the principle of

superposition as a redefining of what it means to µbe¶. Until observed, let us say that

objects have a degree of freedom in a 5th-dimension*x, which is to say that they exist in

multiple possible 4-dimensional states. These 4-dimensional states are simply differing

³versions´ of possible futures**. The fifth dimension represents all of the possible

outcomes of a given experiment or experience. The meaning of superposition is then

³multiple superimposed states of 4-dimensional existence within an undetermined overall

5-dimensional reality.´

Of course nothing can ever be measured in multiple states of being. It is precisely

the occurrence of interaction (i.e. exchange of information [Shannon]xi, what we call

µobservation¶) which defines the state of the observed for the observer, confining it to a

single 4-dimensional reality. Once observed, it is no longer undetermined, for that

observer.

The core concept of ³existential behavior´ is important here. We should not

consider that the object itself is really wavelike«it is its p

 that is wavelike. It is

an object whose pattern of existence is wavelike, i.e. whose µwhere¶ and µwhen¶ are

governed by the probabilistic mathematics of wave functions. Hence, it is always

*
In the 5-dimensional ³Information realm´ [Nelson]
**
I.e. Einsteinian 4-dimensional space-time
measured or observed as a particulate thing. A common teaching tool is to describe a

photon as a µwavicle¶, and then to proceed to point out that it is impossible to describe

what a wavicle really looks like (i.e. it has some properties of a wave and some of a

particle). However, if we interpret superposition to refer to the ³existential behavior´ of

an entity, it is easy to visualize what a µwavicle¶  
like: it always µlooks¶ like a

particle, but the overall pattern of its existence (for example, when and where it is

observed in the 2-slit experiment) is ³wavelike´ or probabilistic.

ù 

( '




The following diagram (Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4) show a natural and

convenient way to illustrate the branching of possible states that occurs as a result of

postulates 1 and 2, from the perspective of the experimenter. This approach is described

to a limited extent in Consistent Histories [Griffiths, Ch 19]. In the experiment by

[Jacques, et al], there are many various events that could affect the wave function within

the apparatus. At each one of these events, defined not in specific time intervals but

rather according to the specific nature of the situation, the wave function will branch (in

the fifth dimension), leading to two or more possible outcomes. I have chosen several

convenient events within this experiment to represent in the diagram. Each line represents

a 4th-dimensional world line, and the junction represents a fifth dimensional branching.

At the bottom of the diagram, the wave function makes a split at the location of

the beam splitter 1. One subsequent history involves traveling path 1 and the other path 2.
Each of these possibilities degenerates into more branches, not shown. In this diagram,

the main relevant branching point is at the first beam splitter.

When the observer P takes a measurement at the end of the apparatus, in this case

they find that the photon was in the second state (Figure 3). Only upon this measurement

can one consider the events of this branch to be physically real from this individual

perspective. All the events within the branch (from the beginning of the experiment

onward) can be said to be retroactively real at this point. All other possible branches

disappear and are no longer possible, again from this individual perspective. Hence the

³contour´ of the 5-dimensional possibility space of the wave function is constantly

changing as past branches are trimmed, and new ones are added.

c

  





(c )

At the instant immediately preceding measurement, from the experimenter P¶s

reference frame, the state of the photon is fundamentally undetermined. It has evolved

from a definite state (at P¶s last measurement when the photon left the source) into a

multiplicity of states at later times. When the measurement is then made, events in the

photon's history are retroactively determined, in order to be consistent with any other

observed results.

CH describes this process in quantum systems ([Griffiths page 145]).

Furthermore, Griffiths indicates that from a mathematical and physical perspective,

macroscopic quantum states (MQS) are perfectly valid. ³If one supposes that the usual

Hilbert space structure of quantum mechanics is the appropriate sort of mathematics for

describing the world, then MQS states will be present in the theory, because the Hilbert

space is a linear vector space, so that if it contains (two possible states), it must also

contain their linear combinations.´ MQS states should actually be considered a prediction

of quantum theory, rather than an unfortunate byproduct. In CH, it is shown that

paradoxes arise through ³a process of implicitly«choosing families which contain no

MQS states, and then inferring from this that the future influences the past, or that there

are mysterious non-local influences«´ [Griffiths pg 283] In other words, the existence of

MQS states is what is necessary to avoid paradoxes in the real world.

Maybe the reason for the typical avoidance of MQS states is that ³most physicists

do not have any intuitive idea as to what they mean.´ [Griffiths pg 283] We shall attempt

in this section to provide some help in this regard. Is it possible that the process described

above applies to all phenomena, not just microscopic situations? Not only is there nothing

in the two postulates I have presented that is specific and exclusive to the microscopic

realm, but in addition, the postulates are self-consistent when applied to macroscopic

phenomena as well. This is an intriguing and potentially valid interpretation, because a

world that behaves according to these principles will look exactly like the world we

experience, given a careful analysis.

As a simple thought experiment, imagine going to the grocery store (Figure 5,

Figure 6, Figure 7). You arrive at 5:00 p.m., and accidentally run into a good friend
(person S). Is it possible that, from your perspective, person S¶s history was

undetermined until you actually observed her at 5:00 p.m.? In other words, from your

perspective, her whereabouts were unknown at 4:45 p.m., and so you cannot rightfully

say that you know her existence was in a determined state, i.e. that she was on her way to

the grocery store. Instead, this theory says that her state was undetermined, and multiple

outcomes were possible. The only way to
that she was actually on her way to the

grocery store would be through a measurement of some kind. So, of course, you could

  that this was the case by asking your other friend (person Q) to call person S at

4:45 p.m., and ask what S¶s plans were, without telling you the result. In this case, person

Q would be performing a measurement, and the wave functions of Q and S would

become correlated. However, you still would not know what S's plans were, because

from your perspective the states of both Q and S are still undetermined. Therefore they

are still free to be determined. So if you then saw person S at the store at 5:00 p.m., you

would still be surprised. Yet, if you checked in with person Q, you would find that,

without fail, Q's information about S would be consistent with your observation of S at

the store: namely, Q would report that S had been on her way to the store at 4:45pm.

From your perspective (P), this allows for the possibility that, had you gone to the

gym instead of the store, the potential for an event ³P accidentally runs into S at the gym´

exists as well, because S and Q are not determined from P¶s perspective. Depending on

the choices of P, the same outcome (³running into S´, whether at the gym or at the store)

is possible with different circumstances, through the action of retroactive event

determination. In this way, Newtonian causality always remains true when measurements
are made, but people are able to make free will choices in the moment that lead to

seemingly µfatalistic¶ experiences.

In other words, we are making an unallowable assumption if we assume that the

state of a 
 p  is determined if we have not ourselves observed it, for there

is no way to prove that it is determined except through observing it. In this case, it is

possible and reasonable to wonder if the event called ³person S heads to the grocery

store´ did not really ³happen´ when it happened (the event at 4:45 p.m. was not

determined until 5:00 p.m.).

 * 
  


Postulate 2 points out that any two observers measuring a common experiment

will always arrive at the same conclusions about the experiment. This is what we call a

³shared subjective event´. Every measurement and every observation is a shared

subjective event between the measurer and the measured.

As an example, the µdelayed choice¶ point in the experiment by [Jacques, et al],

exists in both the apparatus¶ subjective reality and that of the photon. A ³shared

subjective event´ (i.e. measurement) is as close as we can get to an ³objective reality´,

and it is the driving force of quantum mechanics, defining what is observable, and

thereby what really exists. Again, Rovelli: ³a quantum mechanical description of a

certain system (state and/or values of physical quantities) cannot be taken as an

öabsoluteö (observer independent) description of reality«the quantum state of a system

is always a state of that system with respect to a certain other system.´ [Rovelli pg 6]

It is
important that the histories (from the perspective of the photon or the

experimenters) agree on every aspect of reality. What p
important is that their histories

agree on the details of any shared subjective event (i.e. interaction between the two). If

the experimenter notices that the choice point of the apparatus was in state 1 (and not

state 0), the resulting state of the particle (when measured!) must also reflect that the

choice point was in a state 1 and not state 0. Therefore, the history of the photon is free to

remain undetermined from the experimenter¶s point of view up until the measurement. It

is only necessary that, from any two individual perspectives, all commonly observed

events are consistent.

Similarly, it is not necessary that all details of macroscopic reality are always in

agreement. What is necessary is that any comparison of specific events between

observers agree.

What is generated here is a complicated web of events that are only determined

according to the scope of each individual observer. Events must be determined in such a

way that whenever two observer¶s views are compared, they will agree, and yet also

remain undetermined for an observer if they have not witnessed a specific event. It is

challenging to imagine how some macroscopic events could be undetermined for one

observer, and different events would be undetermined for a second observer, and yet
imagine how these two could interact without generating a conflict of logic. I propose the

following diagrams to show how these two postulates accomplish this without generating

a paradox of µwhose view is more correct¶.

In the diagram (Figure 8, Figure 9) are displayed very simple µ5-d possibility

wave function trees¶ for a (microscopic or macroscopic) event, from the perspective of

two different observers (P and Q). The object being measured, S, starts by splitting into

two families of events (History 1 and History 2), corresponding to some real world

µchoice point¶. Figure 8 on the left is drawn from the point of view of P. At the time that

P makes his measurement of S (which is in History 1), Q has already made a

measurement. From P¶s perspective, Q is in a superposition of states, along with S. This

allows P to make a measurement of S and get non-deterministic results (i.e. not already

determined by Q¶s measurement), while still ensuring that Q will agree on the details of

the measurement.

The key to avoiding paradox is in the second postulate, which in essence says that

we can only diagram a given scenario from a single perspective at a time (applying the

single-framework rule from CH). In such a diagram, the observer from whose perspective

the diagram is drawn will always have a solid, unbranching line. Other objects within the

diagram will  
have branching lines that represent superposition states, and these

are then able to be µmeasured¶ together such that for each event in the diagram, there is

always an outcome of the measurement available that allows for consistency with all

other events. But a problem seems to arise. Suppose that Q observes S at t=3 and
determines that S has taken the right-hand path. For P, the states of both Q and S are still

indeterminate at t=3. So couldn't P observe S at t=5 and find that S had taken the left-

hand path? And in that case, wouldn't Q have to exist in two 'alternate universes'²one in

which he observed S taking the left-hand path and one in which he observed S taking the

right-hand path?

Rather than believe that these µunchosen universes¶ (or µmany worlds¶) actually

exist, I think the mystery of how events can be compared without conflict can be resolved

based on the idea that one cannot meaningfully speak of the definite existence of a

separate point of view when one has already defined a first point of view. (Again, this is

referred to in CH as ³the single-framework rule´ [Griffiths, pg 217]). In switching from

one point of view to another, information is always exchanged, and this information

manages to define events in the new point of view so that they match the old. This is the

essence of postulate 2. It is not possible to ever take the ³past participle´ or

counterfactual point of view (³What would have happened if«?´), for this requires

stepping outside the system in question and magically gaining information about it

without actually becoming correlated with it. The only thing that can be defined is a set

of circumstances as described from one perspective at a time.

One can see that (Figure 9) attempts to view a single situation from two

simultaneous perspectives, and as such it is not a valid drawing. Put another way, in

(Figure 9) we are attempting to look at the situation from more than one perspective at a
time. In doing so, we create a paradox in which P and Q would NOT agree on the state of

S when it is measured.

These diagrams are just a beginning and should be explored more deeply.

 

 



Please see Addendum B.





I have presented two postulates that attempt to provide a solid argument showing

that nature is undetermined except when observed. Postulate 1 says that any event

(macroscopic or otherwise) unobserved by a specific observer remains in a superposition

of possible histories for that observer. Its outcome is undetermined until its state is

observed, and then is only determined for that particular observer. The second postulate

says that there is no definitive global perspective that can see all events in a definite state.

We are always limited to speaking about definite events only as described from a

particular local perspective. From each local perspective, some events have been

observed (and are definite) and other events have not been observed (and are in a

superposition of self-consistent histories).

 This could be seen as only a slight modification of existing theories, namely

Relational quantum mechanics and Consistent Histories, yet it may be that these two

postulates help provide an overall framework in which both these two established

theories make sense together and can be applied to macroscopic phenomena. I suspect

there are many potential consequences of this approach, and I have touched on only a

minimum. Specifically, I have pointed out that events don't actually ³happen´ when they

happen, what I call Retroactive Event Determination. This means a distinction is made

between ³when an event becomes determined´ and ³the time coordinate at which that

event actually occurred´. A distinction is also made between events that have been

³witnessed´ and are therefore ³facts´ from a given observer¶s perspective, and events that

have not been ³witnessed´ from that perspective, which still have multiple outcomes

available (from that perspective).

The wave function is a chain of possible states (a ³history´), and contains an extra

degree of freedom beyond our 4-dimensional physical reality, i.e., a 5th-dimension of

possibility. These possible states are in a coherent superposition with each other, forming

a collection of superimposed histories, each of which is self-consistent (according to the

principles of Consistent Histories). One cannot generally say whether a specific event in

a history has actually happened, but just that according to a given observer it has or hasn't

been determined (according to the principles of Relational quantum theory). When a

given event is observed by a given observer, the history(s) to which that event belongs

falls into place. This must happen in such a way that all of the events in the history can be

consistent with each other and with other event¶s observed by other observers. In this
way, through Retroactive Event Determination, the various histories observed by various

observers can fall into place in such a way that events are always consistent when

compared.

I have pointed out that nothing in the logic of these two postulates is specific to

microscopic objects or systems. I think that Rovelli might agree, from his statement:

³Physics is fully relational, not just as far as the notions of rest and motion are

considered, but with respect to all physical quantities´ [Rovelli pg 7], or from his

repeated use of macroscopic objects in describing information [Rovelli pg 3]. When

applied to the world of real macroscopic objects, these postulates yield a picture of our

world exactly as we experience it, with a logical and consistent flow of events. Further

research should be done into the implications of the macroscopic quantum states (MQS)

suggested by the postulates here, specifically with regards to ³synchronicity´, and the

role of information as ³meaning´ in affecting the outcome of retroactive event

determination.

A weakness of this paper is that it questions the nature of how events occur in

time and space, thereby challenging our general concepts of energy and information

transfer, without providing a comprehensive new model. For instance, if energy is

flowing through a system, but the manner in which the energy was flowing at time T is

not determined for a certain observer until after time T, what does it say about the

absolute existence of energy at time T? Also, how can a nonphysical entity, the wave

function, be considered real in and of itself, capable of changing retroactively before its
effects are felt in physical space-time? This formulation should be done, and I suspect it

can be. As a start, the reader is referred to [Nelson]xii.

Among the appealing aspects of this model is that it adds no new assumptions to

our understanding of the situation. Instead, it subtracts the assumption that something

exists whether or not it is being observed. This idea aligns with the spirit of scientific

tradition as perceived by David Hume [Isaacson, pg 81]xiii, by challenging us to believe

only what we can actually observe, and no more, and making no assumptions about the

continuity of reality between observations. This is used here to challenge an implicit

assumption of ³objectively determined reality´ that we all live with on a day-to-day basis.

According to this model, the wave particle duality is now translated into an

³undetermined versus determined´ duality. Events that are determined from one

reference frame may be undetermined (and still alterable) from another.

+
 



I am grateful for the feedback of the following people, either in discussions about

these ideas which contributed to the theory, or in editing of the manuscript: Joseph Dowd

(for his extensive editing and contributions), Thomas Bischof, Dana Nelson-Isaacs, Jude

Rowe, Brant Hindman, Rob Bryanton, all drop-ins to the Expecting Synchronicity

discussion group, and any others I¶ve neglected to mention.



 


 



  

There are a number of concerns with this view that might immediately present

themselves in the reader¶s mind, and I will address some of them in detail here.

The first concern is that at first view these postulates seem to be solipsistic. If the

world is fully relational in nature, and what is determined or not is totally defined per

observer, then it seems that reality is defined by the observer. How is it possible to have

any sort of common or objective reality in such a view? The answer is deep and lies at the

heart of the theory. We must consider the second postulate carefully: what is p
÷p
p 




  is indeed relative to the observer. This does not imply that there is no

objective reality. It implies rather that objective reality is something that is indefinite.

Objective reality must be defined as the linear superposition of all possible realities, of

which a single perspective is just one projection. It is perfectly possible for multiple

undetermined realities to match up without contradiction, as long as one follows the rules

stated in this paper.

The concern of solipsism actually results from a hidden assumption of a definite

objective reality. If one accepts that from one perspective (person P) the reality of another

person may be undefined (person S), we must also accept that from person S¶s

perspective, they will consider person P¶s reality undefined. Which is true? Which is the

objectively real state? In fact, these questions make no sense. Both states are correct

projections of the objective undefined reality into the perspective of that individual.

When the objective reality is seen as a superposition of all possible states, one is able to
stop assuming the concept of ³single objective reality´, though this is admittedly not easy

from within a limited individual perspective.

The world is only defined from individual points of view, yet no point of view is

favored. We have to be able to live with the concept of ³both-and´, where the defined

world depends on defining a point of view, but no single point of view is more important

or more real than any other.

The brief answer to the concern of solipsism is to consider very carefully the two

postulates, and especially the second. From a positivist point of view, all we know is

what we observe. We cannot talk about anything beyond this, which means two people

cannot compare the objective state of something unless they have both observed it.

Another concern is the question of collapse of the wave function. The theory

proposed here is based in part on Relational quantum mechanics, in which the idea of

collapse still has meaning but is defined relationally. Therefore, there is no such thing as

³objective collapse´, because a wave function that person P is observing is collapsed for

person P, but the same object may be in a superposition state for person S. A wave

function is a strange beast which takes a definite value when it is measured by one

observer and yet remains in superposition for other observers.

Similarly, one might ask the question ³What collapses the wave function? Does

this require conscious observers?´ In the theory proposed here, quantum reasoning is

applied to macroscopic objects, and there is no distinction made between people, rocks,

or insects. Any object will be treated identically as a quantum system and correlate its

wave function with anything it interacts with. So we understand the relational collapse of

the wave function to be a result of information transfer between two objects, in which the
objects now contain information about each other. Although this information is in some

sense relative to the particular observer, it is relevant because it must remain consistent

with other exchanges of information that occur with other objects in the environment. Yet

it does not require any conscious entity. The only advantage that conscious entities have

over inanimate objects is the ability to p
 

or perceive the interaction and

describe it with words and symbols, but this has nothing to do with the physics of the

interaction itself.

Retroactive event determination inherits features of many various quantum

mechanical interpretations, and also rejects others. It is similar to Copenhagen in that

collapse is defined (although relationally) and physical reality is not considered

fundamental or stand-alone (idealist). It departs from Copenhagen in that there is no

distinction or division between quantum and classical systems: the foundation and the

house that rests on it are built of the same principles.

One can also draw similarities to many-worlds interpretations, yet there is a

distinction in that the theory proposed here supposes only one present reality for the

individual, and there is no philosophical need to propose a plethora of other physical

worlds that will never be observed. Instead the entire question of the existence of other

worlds is bypassed essentially through the use of positivism. It is generally the subtle

assumption of ³objective definite reality´ that requires the concept of many other real

physical worlds, and that is specifically thrown out here.

Many-worlds theory would likely agree with the idea that our observed reality is a

projection from an indefinite ³higher´ objective reality, but a key difference is that in

RED the world observed by a single observer is considered definite and unique. There
can be no other versions (³worlds´) of this definite reality; there is only what is here,

now. Yet at any given time the majority of the universe is unobserved, and it is this

unobserved reality that is represented as many possible outcomes.

Finally, one is likely to bring up the common assumption that quantum principles

cannot be applied to macroscopic systems because decoherence cancels any interference

effects from the constituent atoms (which are the quantum systems). Here, however, we

have not tried to add up the contributions from many quantum systems. We have applied

the original principles of quantum reasoning directly to macroscopic objects as a whole,

not as a sum of their parts. We have shown that our discomfort with macroscopic

quantum states is a result of improper interpretation.

Indeed, one often makes the simplistic argument that we clearly never see

macroscopic objects in superposition states, so they must not exist. This is flawed

thinking, however, because in fact we never see 
 p
 in superposition states,

including p
 p quantum particles. In experiments, we infer from our

measurements that a superposition state must have existed before the measurement, but

once the measurement is made we always observe only one real value for our

measurement. The same applies to macroscopic states: if we correctly understand the

lessons of the microscopic quantum world, we should realize that in a 
 p

quantum world we should by definition not expect to ever
 or 

 a MQS state.

There should however be ways to test the validity of the model, which will be dealt with

in a later section.


&  

 




Any new theory must distinguish itself from current theory by explaining

previously unexplained phenomena. On one hand, the RED approach is based on two

well established approaches. Consistent Histories in particular in its formalism can

account for many known paradoxes of acausality and non-locality. As such CH, and by

inheritance RED, can account for such currently existing data as the delayed choice

experiment and others. This is of course essential and is a good thing.

However, RED goes further and makes claims about the retroactive determination

of certain types of experiments in the macroscopic domain. In theory, certain types of

experiments should be able to be performed retroactively and get a positive correlation

between events in the experimental µtimeframe¶ and choices made when the experiment

is actually performed, after the fact. Specifically, non-local experiments such as those

performed by Dean Radinxiv and others should be amenable to such retroactive event

determination. Because the causal relationship in these experiments does not rely on

physical cause and effect, any experiment that can get positive results in such a situation

should be theoretically possible to perform after the fact. The reader is referred to a

number of experiments that have been donexv,xvi or could feasibly be donexvii,xviii.

Experiments that rely on physical cause and effect would not show any RED effect,

because one can trace physical effects and their causes through linear, forward in time

processes. RED is not actually 

p
 any changes in the past; rather, it is retroactively

determining them. Therefore the non-local nature of experimental testing is essential.

The RED theoretical approach would likely be compatible with many of the

rigorous studies of the effects of consciousness on physical systems, such as those from
the Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research laboratory. I encourage collaboration and

exploration between these experiments and the theoretical model proposed here.

An interesting parallel of this model with virtual reality programming has been

brought to my attention, which may be helpful in understanding the implications of the 2

postulates. In ³massive multiplayer online games´ (³MMOGs´) there is a common

difficulty with synchronizing the actions of a large number of physically distributed

players in a real-time virtual world. One technique for dealing with this is called

³optimistic synchronization´xix,xx. Some of the parallels between RED and optimistic

synchronization include: The virtual world is only rendered in a definite state from the

perspective of each user (relational, postulate 1); there is no objective world, but rather

only the collection of worlds as rendered by all of the various users (postulate 2). Events

that are observed in common between two players must agree on the specific details

(consistency).

Optimistic synchronization is not proof that the world does work this way, nor

could it be a completely correct analog. Yet it may be a useful model which demonstrates

the way in which relationality and consistency work together in actual application, to

create a virtual world.

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i
Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper Torchbooks, New York, Harper & Row, 1958, pg 52,
as seen in ³The Dancing Wu Li Masters´, Gary Zukav, Bantam/William Morrow and Co, pg 305
ii
Rovelli, Carlo, 1996, ³Relational Quantum Mechanics´, arXiv:quant-ph/9609002v2
iii
Griffiths, R. B., Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2003
iv
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positivism
v
Isaacson, W., ³Einstein: His Life and Universe´, Simon and Schuster, 2007, New York, NY, pg 81-82
vi
Randall, L., ³Warped Passages: Unraveling the Mysteries of the Universe¶s Hidden Dimensions´,
HarperCollins, 2005, New York, NY, pg 228
vii
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/Relativity/BlackHoles/hawking.html
viii
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle
ix
V. Jacques1, E Wu1,2, F. Grosshans1, F. Treussart1, P. Grangier3, A. Aspect3, J.-F. Roch3, [2006]
³Experimental realization of Wheeler¶s delayed-choice GedankenExperiment´, arXiv:quant-ph/0610241v1
x
Bryanton, Rob, p
p
 =
p

p
, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JkxieS-6WuA,
http://www.tenthdimension.com/
xi
Shannon CE 1949, =   p=    

p p
University of Illinois Press, as seen in
Rovelli, Carlo, 1996, ³Relational Quantum Mechanics´, arXiv:quant-ph/9609002v2
xii
Nelson, Sky, 2010, ³Information Space and Asynchronicity in Special Relativity´,
http://www.expectingsynchronicity.com
xiii
Isaacson, W., ³Einstein: His Life and Universe´, Simon and Schuster, 2007, New York, NY
xiv
Radin, D., "1 

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xviii
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