Being-in-the-World-with-Others

Aron Gurwitsch
Human Encounters in the Social World, ed. Alexandre Metraux,
translated by Fred Kersten. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1979.

Human Encounters in the Social World is a translation of Aron

Gurwitsch's habilitation essay written in 1931. The text contains an
editorial preface by Alexandre Metraux which offers an excellent basis
for understanding the development of Gurwitsch's thoughts as well as
original insights into problems in contemporary philosophy and sociology.
The translation is by Fred Kersten.
Gurwitsch's work begins with a thorough treatment of the problem of
the knowledge about fellow human beings as it has been traditionally
formulated. With methodical thoroughness we are brought to a level of
understanding of this formulation which also enables us to clearly focus
upon its inadequacies. The reflections upon the "natural surrounding
world" (Part II) provide the foundation for the subsequent phenomeno-
logical elucidation of "consociate being together" (Part III) which
constitutes Gurwitsch's response to the two-fold task of:

1) working out the various dimensions exhibited in the

concern and knowledge of fellow human beings
2) clarifying that sense of being concerned and knowedge
which are correlated with the different dimensions.

In attempting to fulfill this task the rich specificity of the phenomena of

"human encounters in the social world" is described and analyzed in

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such a way as to make even more transparent the inadequacies of the

traditional formulation of the problem.

I. TRADITIONAL FORMULATION AND INADEQUACIES

The clarification of the problem concerning the knowedge about

human beings as fellow human beings suggests that epistemology and
psychology are not capable of bringing us to the very of the problem. A
"phenomenology of consciousness" would enable us to achieve the
necessary radicality and in so doing to establish the very sense of
epistemological and psychological approaches to the problem. In having
this sense before us we are thus led to an understanding of the motivation
leading to the traditional formulation. Gurwitsch concretely illustrates
the need for the phenomenological grounding through an analysis of the
theory of inference by analogy and the characterization of the problem as
the problem of access.
After examining the contrasting the views of Mill, Becher and Scheler
on the inference by analogy two results follow. On the one hand,
complexities arise in virtue of the theory which do not seem to be in
alignment with those characteristics which carry are descriptive of the
"conviction" we carry with us about our fellow human beings. On the
other hand, there is inconsistency within the theory itself. It suggests that
physical phenomena such as movements, actions and other changes of the
body are expressive movements. We do not fully grasp their sense and
yet they are expressive. The analogical inference is attached to the
expressive movements which are yet still to be considered physical
events.
Theodor Lipps' critique of the theory of inference by analogy leads to
the formulation of the traditional problem in terms of" access to someone
else's mental life." 1 Yet the same basic difficulties arise here which arose
in connection with the theory of inference by analogy. The interpretation
of" expressive movement" in terms of empathy, although making serious
advance toward validating those acts which function for presenting the
mental life of someone else, was nevertheless unsuccessful. If he were
successful he would have been led to the need to thematize and hence
discuss the traditional point of departure for the problem. This would
have made rejection of the traditional perspective transparently necessary.
Scheler and Cassirer take us beyond analogical inference and
empathy through their efforts toward explicitly determining what is
entailed in originary perception of expression. At least we are brought
closer to a clarification of the concrete knowledge of concrete mental life,
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i.e., to the very ground of expressive phenomena, hic et nunc. But there is
a " one-sidedness" ? 2 totheir analysis. In considering the problem of fellow
human beings, one is restricted exclusively to one sphere of phenomena,
viz., the expressive phenomena. For Gurwitsch, however, the problem is
not reducible to any one class of phenomena. It is multi-dimensional.
The task of the phenomenologist would then be to bring out the many
senses and dimensions of human encounters. It would then become clear
that the particular sense of any encounter is directly determined by the
dimension in which the encounter takes place. In carrying out this task
expressive phenomena are disclosed as derivative or founded pre-
supposing a more original sphere of phenomena. The retrieval of the
originary is the retrieval of the ordinary. This is the "natural living" in
which we have our conviction that we continuously inhabit a human
society. The unbroken continuity of natural life points to a knowledge
which precedes traditional epistemological and psychological approaches
which tend to gear their points to departure around either analogy and
access as empathy and expressive phenomena.

II. TOWARD A NEW BEGINNING: THE CONCEPT OF THE

NATURAL SURROUNDING WORLD

Richard Avenarius was the first philosopher to make the attempt to

clarify the "natural concept of the world".3 It is to this world of pre-
philosophical man that we must return in order that we might better see
that all philosophical theory has it's beginning here. Husserl, Scheler and
Heidegger provide a path suggesting the effort to make this return.
Gurwitsch does not give extensive treatment to Avenarius because he
believes that the descriptive content of his definition of the natural
concept of the world is not essentially distinct from Husserl's more
explicit and precise determinations.
Husserl has shown that the "natural attitude" toward the world
implies a thematizing of the world. While in this attitude we are always
over against objects which are these as themes of a thematizingly
directed consciousness. Thus the natural world must be understood as a
"set of potential and actual themes". 4 Mental processes are intentional
which is to say that they have the form of "cogito" which is not only the
consciousness of object but an explicitly thematic consciousness, i.e., a
consciousness with an actual theme. Even this formulation it is not
surprising that we find the "historical roots" of the concept of the natural
world beginning with Descartes. It is a beginning which acquires a
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distinctive evolution and formation in Cartesians such as Antoine

Amauld. Gurwitsch offers an interesting sketch of this beginning which
is so decisive for the development of modem philosophy. Questions
immediately arise regarding this view of the natural concept of the world
which has its roots in Descartes. Specifically the initial thrust of the
questions would be directed toward on fellow human being is given as
an object which we observe over against us. But even more generally
one could question whether the world in which we live is really first the
world in which we have objects as targets of free cogitations. Does not
such a view presuppose an interpretation of being-in-the-world as always
already a world-cognizing?
Scheler goes beyond Husserl but does not achieve the necessary
radicality toward which the problem drives us. Scheler's theory of the
milieu provides the insight that we do not primordially ("originaliter")
stand over against objects which can be themes of free ego-acts. Rather
we always live primarily in a milieu and our comportment is always
within this milieu. But terms such as "milieu" and "comportment in a
milieu" merely signify directions for further analytical descriptions
guided by the motivation to determinately characterize the very being of
a milieu-thing. It is Heidegger who actually radicalizes the question
situation of our surrounding world is "over-there" as an object we find that
concerning the "natural surrounding world."5 Gurwitsch attempts
to show that when Heidegger made being-in-the-world the explicit
theme of the Dasein Analytic he succeeds in presenting a determina-
tion of the world of daily living which is essentially different from
that which is appropriated by the philosophical tradition. Heidegger's
analysis is pointed toward the Dasein "that I am in every case."
Hence contrary to the distancing attitude in which the situation
of our surrounding world is "over-there" as an object we find that
we live in it, i.e., "absorbed" into it as opposed to merely making objects
present by way of the free adventure of cogitative consciousness.
The stick I pick up to use is first an extension of my arm before it is
determined as a physical thing which is over against me as an object in
the world. Such milieu-things are those with which we have our dealings.
They are utensils denoted as "being at hand" by Heidegger. The being of
what is "at hand" and the "worldliness of the world" are further
determined as "bewandtnis" [" a purposive bearing destined for some-
thing"]. 6 Utensils at hand have a reference to that which it has its bearing.
Distinct from the references of utensils and their serviceability are the
references which co-include intra-mundane beings. However, what is
not clearly distinguished by Heidegger is whether the co-included is a
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constitutive moment of the utensil-totality or whether it is discoverable

only on the basis of subsequently progressive inquiry into the utensil-
totality's referential horizons. For Gurwitsch one must necessarily
distinguish between the very presence of what is at hand and it's
discoveredness on the ground of a fabric of references. Gurwitsch
attempts to illustrate the distinction by consideration of brain-injured
patients, children and animals. These examples serve to "concretize"7
those structures of the world of natural Dasein. In the service of
this effort reference is made to the works of Weigl, Gelb, Goldstein,
Cassirer, Bihler, Lowith, Kohler, Rubin, Wertheimer, Stein, Bergson,
Schmalenbach, and Brentano.
Carefully sifting, analyzing and integrating we are offered concrete
phenomenological descriptions in the form of "gearing into the situation"
and the "problem of utensil-identity."g It is the latter problem which
leads to a consideration the "Gestalt-thesis."
The concluding discussion of implicit knowledge seems to radicalize
even the Heideggerian view of "understanding". Gurwitsch's reflection
focuses around H. Schmalenbach's essay "Das Sein des Bewus-
stseins." We are brought from initial consideration of Brentano and
Hofman's inadequate views on implicit knowledge of the work of
Schmalenbach and Bergson. The former thinker offers us "genuine
insight" into the nature of implicit knowledge. The latter's distinction
between the "memory that reviews" and the "memory that repeats
seems to leads toward the geniune radicalization of the whole issue of
implicit knowledge.
So through these reflections we come to a way of characterizing the
very "sense of being" of the world of natural Dasein. Constitutive
moments of this being emerge which even Heidegger had overlooked in
his Dasein analysis. 11 The properties of the natural surrounding world
are held in relief so as to attempt to respond to the question regarding the
nature of being bound to the situation of this world. In exposing the
specific characteristics of our compartment we have established a
preparatory basis for understanding being together with others in
situation of the natural surrounding world. Only through the explicating
of the structures of this world do we gain access to that horizon in that
which we encounter our fellow human beings. It is this horizon which of
course determines the very sense of the encounter itself.

III. CONSOCIATE BEING TOGETHER

Gurwitsch's analyses of consociate being together leads to the

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articulation of three distinct dimensions of fellow human beings and their

being together. partnerships, memberships, and fusion. Throughout the
investigation constant reference is made to the sociological cateories of
society, community, and group. This is done not with the intention of
appropriating these categories but of clarifying their primary sense
through the disclosure of the "particularsense of being together offellow
human beings". We learn that the reference to this "co-included" world
of fellow human beings points us back to that ordinary belief which is
continuously at the basis of our living. All situations then co-include
reference to others and the implicit "knowledge" is a conviction at the
heart of our "living in".13
The analysis of partnership begins with the example of people working
together i.e., the relation of working together as fellow workers. Even
though relevant and essential the experiences of pressure, resistance,
and anticipatory "answering in advance" do not offer the essential
structure of the dimension of partnership. 14 The presence of the partner iss
essentially constitutive of the situation. The meaning of being-together is
reciprocally determined by how I behave toward the partner and how the
partner behaves toward me. The aims of the partners are obviously a
constitutive element of the situational encounter. Partnership implies a
common concern. By considering the attitudes of the partner we grasp
the sense in which each can be a partner. This is precisely why
partnership can be defined as "consociate encounter."" However
the description of consociate encounter can only lead to a fullness
of meaning when we have before us the response to the question
which asks as what 16 the partner is encountered. Such a response is in
terms of roles. Partners always encounter each other as workers, buyers
and sellers, employees and employers etc. The partnership-situation is
an encounter of fellow human in roles in which they are the ones who they
are as being what they are in a situation which is both particular and
common. Thus the knowledge of the situation is always a mutual
understanding of the partner in the particular role be assumes in the
concrete situation.
Since the concrete being of the partner only emerges within the role he
adopts in the situation then it is essentially and necessarily the case that
there is always the possibility for the partner to appear as something
which is still something outside of the situational encounter. This simply
means the possibility that the partner can appear in his freedom. Hence
the situation then acquires the characteristic of being episodically inter-
ruptive of the being of freedom and its unique horizon. One might even
further determine this episodic characterization of the situation in terms
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of a rootlessness. The situational encounter motivates being-together.

One is only in the role obtaining here and now. It is precisely the
association of people determined exclusively in terms of their functions
for a common affair which can be designated as "Gesellschaft"
(Society)."
For Walther the step from society to community (Gemeinschaft) is
explained in terms of the additional characteristics of feelings and
sentiments. However feelings and sentiments do not legitimate the
community as community. Wherever we find feelings and sentiments
one must presuppose an already existent and constituted community.
Gurwitsch, agreeing with Schmalenbach, conceives of the community as
that "consociation" in which one grows "naturally", i.e., by nature.
Within the "natural" is to be included mores, customs, representational
modes, traditional goods, economic property, neighborhoods etc. so the
natural is that which we have inherited in common and into which we are
bom and out of which we grow. This is always taken for granted and
remains therefore unquestioned. It is precisely because of this phenome-
logical characteristic of the "at all times" that we can speak of it as
natural. Indeed the traditional qua traditional signifying continuity and
connectedness points back to the "always already". 18 Being-together as
being-together requires the more primordial grounding of traditionality.
One cannot stop at the material founding (i.e., partnership) nor at the
emotional (i.e., group). What is required is that the traditional be
disclosed as constitutive of the community in the double sense of
communical possession and life-context.
Traditionality implies historicalization (Vergeschichtlichung). As
essentially historical beings we are never solus ipse but always already
belong to fellow human beings. Communalization and historicalization
are always then to be grasped in their reciprocal unity. Here Gurwitsch
refers to the correspondence between Graf Yorck von Waterburg and
Dilthey and finds the former's analyses to involve a one-sidedness.
Yorck sees the Christian as the historical force with Dilthey objecting
that not only life of Christ but all of history signifies the "transfer of
force." Because the community is defined as "natural" with the sense of
historicalization we do not find personal will and decision. The people
within the community into which one has been bom have not been
selected because of personal qualities. One shares the same heritage
living the past with its same historical forces and motives. All of this
suggests that "givenness" arising from circumstances of life which
excludes freedom of choice. This means that the being together in terms
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of the membership in a community has its limitations. It does not signify

the being together of individuals insofar as they are individuals.
The limitation which pertains to the being of the community also
pertains to the Understanding which attempts to thermatize the community
in historical existence would indicate the effort to expose the "naturally
given" and what is "taken for granted". Accordingly since historical
understanding in this since, turns from the concrete, the individual and
what is uniquely constitutive of the individual as "individual ego"
remains inaccessible to it. In virtue of this distinction between the
spiritual subject" as the object of historical inquiry and the understanding
emergency in relation to the unity of the person Gurwitsch is led to the
including theme of consociate being together, fusion.
Fusion pertains to the group. The group is the fusion of persons who
are animated by the same " spirit." They experience themselves as being
animated. The unity of the group is explained in terms of charisma which
can be extraordinary and exceptional. There is surrender and devotion
generating devotion to the charisma. This is characterized in terms of
ecstasy: the appearance of the new with an overpowering exclusurity is a
stepping outside oneself in the response to the charismatic calling. It is
from the world in which one is rooted that one steps. Hence devotion and
surrender to charisma signifies a loss of the "world". z° As Max Weber
has shown the appearance of charisma is the "phenomenon of the
beginning." Literally a new existence emerges which bestows meaning
upon a "world". 21
The three "modal categories" of partnership, membership, and fusion
are fundamental regional-ontological categories22 of the object-region of
any "societies" whatever. The Eidos of societies requires the being-
structure of the categorial modalities described. Their unity and totality
indicate the constitutive structures of "living-in." The major result then
of Gurwitsch analyses has been to show that being-together signifies an
inseparable unity in which one is not standing over against others making
them objects of cognitive intentions. Rather being-together is being-with
and living-with as a consociating encounter. The model categories of
partnership, membership and fusion are precisely modes of encounter of
fellow human beings we live with in milieu-world as already suggested;
they are the form types which will show themselves if one carries out an
ideating observation in which the Eidos of "societas"is observed.
Gurwitsch concludes by suggesting that being together must then be
grounded in being-in-the-world, and being-in-the-world always signifies
being-in-the-world-with-others. So the analysis has led to what Heidegger
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has called an "existential". The sociological categories of dispositions,

"drives" and "tendencies" are not constitutive of being-together. They
always presuppose this "existential." Any investigation of being-in-the-
world-with-others will lead to the uncovering the modal categories of
partnership, membership and fusion which are constituted always as
derivatives of the being-in-the-world-with-others.23

Robert Madden
Duquesne University