CASE: Emperor vs.

Mahadevappa Hanumantappa

CITATION:(1927) 29 BOMLR 153

TOPIC: Vicarious liability under criminal law

SCOPE AND CHAPTER: Vicarious liability under statutory offences.

PROVISION OF LAW: Section 5 of the Indian Explosives Act 1884 deals with the power to
make rules as to licensing of the manufacture, possession, use, sale, transport, import
and export of explosives. Any breach of the conditions of the license by the licensee
leads to the commision of an offence under the rule 138 of the rules thus made.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused held a licence under Indian Explosive Act 1884, to manufacture gun powder.
According to the licence, the manufacturing could take place in a building exclusively
meant for that purpose and separated from any dwelling place, highway, street, public
thoroughfare or public place by a distance of 100 yards. The accused lived in a village
and constructed a building outside the village which complied with this condition and
employed women to manufacture gun powder there. One day, the servant took the
necessary material for the manufacture of the gun powder, went to the house of
accused in the village and performed part of the process of manufacture there. At that
time there was an explosion.The accused was charged with breach of conditions of his
licence.

ISSUES RAISED:

(1) whether there was a breach of condition No. 4 in the license in form A of the rules
under the Indian Explosives Act IV of 1884,

(2) whether it was a rash and negligent act so as to endanger human life under Section
286, Indian Penal Code.

(3) whether the accused caused the death of a person by doing a rash and negligent act
under Section 304A, Indian Penal Code.

THE TRIAL COURT DECISION:

The Honorary First Class Magistrate of Bagalkot who tried the case has given his
judgment in detail. It was held that the deceased pounded gun-powder in the house of
the accused unauthorizedly when he was absent and knew nothing about what was
going on in his house until the explosion occurred. It was also held that since there is no
evidence to show that the accused knowingly did any act which endangered human life
or which caused the death of a person, the accused is not guilty and was hence he was
acquitted of all the charges.

GROUNDS FOR APPEAL:

The appeal was regarding the breach of condition No. 4 in the license in form A of the
rules under the Indian Explosives Act IV of 1884 by the accused.The acquittal as regards
the charges under Sections 286 and 304 A, Indian Penal Code, is not questioned. With
regard to this appeal, further issues that arised were;

1. whether the servant was acting within the general scope of her employment.

2. whether the relavent penal clause is so drafted as to place upon the master criminal
responsibility for the acts of his servant.

CASES REFERED:

Police v. Cartman, [1896] 1 Q.B. 655

Coppen v. Moore (No. 2) [1898] 2 Q.B. 306, 313

Jefferson v. Derbyshire Farmers, Ld [1921] 2 K.B. 281

Queen-Empress v. Tyab Alli (1900) I.L.R. 24 Bom. 423, s.c. 2 Bom. L.R. 52
Emperor v. Jeevanji, (1907) I.L.R. 31 Bom. 611, s.c. 9 Bom. L.R. 967

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER:

The accused is held guilty of committing a breach of condition 4 of the conditions of the
license and of thus having committed an offence under Rule 138 of the rules made
under Section 5 of the Indian Explosives Act 1884. Futher ,considering the fact that the
accused is a petty grocer in a remote village and is presuumably unable to pay a heavy
fine, impose a fine of Rs. 150 was imposed.

RATIO DECIDENDI AND SPECIAL OBSERVATION:

The servent of the accused was employed to make gunpowder, and it was the accused's
business to see that she complied with all the conditions of his license.since she was
authorised to make gun powder, the entire course of her action during the manufacture
falls under the scope of authorisation. Therefore the contention that any negligence on
her part would be outside the scope of her employment was negated. Also,the fact that
the servant went to an unauthorized place to make the gun-powder, makes no
difference. It is not a sufficient answer to say that she was employed to work only in the
licensed house. Hence, the act was under the general scope of her employment, and the
breach of the condition of the license was committed while she was so engaged

Further, the scope of the statute is to regulate the manufacture of explosives, the object
or at least one of the objects to ensure the safety of the public. Therefore,under the
enactment, there is an absolute prohibition of the act done by the servant.hence, if it is
held that there must be personal knowledge to the master, the enactment of no effect .
hence the fact that the employer has no knowledge about the Act was immaterial and
he was liable for the commission of the said offence. Therefore, the order of acquittal
was set aside and the accused was found guilty of committing a breach of condition 4 of
the conditions of the license and of thus having committed an offence under Rule 138 of
the rules made under Section 5 of the Indian Explosives Act 1884.
CASE 2: HOWKER VS. ROBINSON

CITATION:[1973] Q.B. 178

SUBJECT:VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER CRIMINAL LAW

SCOPE OR CHAPTER: VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER STATUTORY OFFENCES

PROVISION OF LAW:

section 169 (1) of The Licensing Act, 196 which deals with the protection of persons
under eighteen and protection of persons under eighteen and other provisions as to
conduct of licensed premises and licensed canteens.

BRIEF CASE FACTS

The defendant, the licensee of a public-house, delegated to a barman the responsibility of

ensuring that persons under 18 were not sold intoxicating liquor in the lounge of a publichouse.
While the defendant was serving customers in the public bar, the barman, unknown to the
defendant, sold beer to a person under the age of 18. Both the defendant and the barman
( vicariously) were charged with knowingly selling beer to the youth, contrary to section 169 (1)
of the Licensing Act 1964 .

THE ISSUES RAISED :

1. whether the barman and hence the defendant sold beer to a person under the age of 18,
with all due knowledge.

2. whether they are liable for commiting the offence under the relavant legal provision
eventhough there is know knowledge of selling beer to the youth.

3.whether the delegation of the manageriel functions and responsibilities to the servant is
effective enough to make the master vicariosly liable.

TRIAL COURT JUDGEMENT

The justices decided that the defendant did not escape criminal liability even though he had no
actual knowledge of the facts constituting the offence. They held that he had effectively
delegated his managerial functions and responsibilities in respect of the lounge bar to Weston
and is hence vicariously liable for the latter's act. They thought that the precautions taken to
ensure that persons under 18 were not supplied with intoxicating liquor were inadequate.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

The appeal is on the construction of section 169 (1) of the Act of 1964, the consolidating Act
which in this section re-enacts section 21 (1) to (7) of the Licensing Act 1961 . It reads:

"Subject to subsection (4) of this section, in licensed premises the holder of the licence or his
servant shall not knowingly sell intoxicating liquor to a person under 18 or knowingly allow a
person under 18 to consume intoxicating liquor in a bar nor shall the holder of the licence
knowingly allow any person to sell intoxicating liquor to a person under 18."

Hence it was urged that since there was no knowledge of the facts,as stated in the above
subsection the defendents should be exempted from liability.

CASES REFERED

Emary v. Nolloth [1903] 2 K.B. 264

Vane v. Yiannopoullos [1965] A.C. 486 , 497,

Linnett v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1946] K.B. 290 , where Lord Goddard C.J. said, at p.
296:

Reg. v. Winson [1969] 1 Q.B. 371

JUDGEMENTAND ORDER

The appeal was squashed and the conviction was upheld . Both the defendant and the barman
( vicariously) were found guilty with knowingly selling beer to the youth, contrary to section 169
(1) of the Licensing Act 1964 .

RATIO DESCIDENDI OF THE CASE:

The justices relied on the observation that the barman Weston "had complete control over the
sale of intoxicating liquor in that room and the responsibility of ensuring that persons under 18
years of age were not sold intoxicating liquor had been delegated to him by the defendant." .
Further, it was stated that "the licensee, in the cases in which he remains on the premises, will
nonetheless be held to have effectively delegated responsibility to his servant, which may not
often occur, but when they do there is no objection being seen to him being held liable. After
all, delegation is a matter for his decision and if he lacks confidence in the servant, he need not
delegate. I do not therefore feel misgiving at the result of this appeal."

CASE 3

Appellant is said to be an authorised signatory of M/s. Intel Travels Ltd (Company). The said
Company as also the respondent company had business transactions. Appellant on behalf of the
company issued a cheque dated 17.1.2001 for a sum of Rs.5,10,000/- in favour of respondent
which was dishonoured. Respondent filed a complaint petition against the appellant under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

The Parliament for meeting a contingency of this nature, namely, where a company is an
offender, has raised a legal fiction in terms whereof any person who at the time the offence was
committed, was incharge of and was responsible for the conduct of business of the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence.

10. For the said purpose, the company itself must be made an accused. It has been so held by
this Court in a number of decisions to which I would refer to a little later.

11. In this case, indisputably the company is the principal offender. A director of the company
inter alia can be proceeded against if he is found to be responsible therefor as envisaged under
Section 141 of the Act.